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ONT
(APE agen
suggested by SACSWA, ond the addition of "such instructions as may be
necessary to cover a serious threat to the air route or to the security
of the base,
This formal statement vas seconded by a personal request fron Sir
Charles Portal to General Arnold that he lend his influence to secur-
ing the measures suggested therein, and Sir Charles was assured by the
7
who ngs
Several days later General Arnold received a neasage from General Kuter,_/
latter of the AAF's desire "to arrange for sncoth coordination.
then on a misaion to the CBI and who had just conferred with Lord Louis
and General Strateneyer at Yew Delhi. General Kuter inforsed General
Arnold of the sertousness of the oversight of the JOS in not having
provided SAGSEA innediately with a copy of their original directive
(of 5 January) to Stilwell. An apology was dus, and in the future
of all directives
Nounthatten would be content with information cop!
and orders to the XX Bonbor Command.”° Pending formal action ty the
Joint Ohtefs, General arnold cabled General Stilwell, expressing reeret
concerning the oversight toverd Mountbatten and pronieing that in the
future Anforaation coples vould de furnished hin, As to the matter of
conmand relations, the JOS wee currently reviaing their direetive, and
Stilwell wa tnforned for pianning purposes only, of its tentative
contents.
Concurrentiy with this difficulty over detatle in the theater, the
problen of over-all comand of all YER forces had been under discussion
in Washington, and it seons Likely that the situation in the OBI, the
only theater of imnediate practicel concern, mst have influenced
Ae i
ay x
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CIT tova6,
4ocisions on the broader question. At any rate, when the conprohonsive
plan on Optinun Use . . . of VLE Bombers was submitted to the Joint
Chiefs on 2 Yarch, it contained a recommendation that control of YLR
units "be retained directly under the Joint Chiefs of start." ahis
Giffered sharply fron the directive of 6 January which had provided that
‘the XX Bomber Gomiand operate under the general directives of the JUS,
‘but under the direct consand and control of Stilwell.
The preliminary description of the now directive walch General
Arnold sent General Stilwell had deen prepared by the AAF in consonance
vith this now principle end vas prosented in a mono to the Joint Chiefs
on 6 March. The AAP agreed with the British Chiefs of Staff that VLK
operations 4n SHAG should be coordinated with the Suprene Allied
Commander. Hence it was proposed that a new directive (draft inclosed)
‘de sent Stilwel}, and the British Chiefs be asked to direct Lord Hount-
datten to cocperate with the terms of that directive. An apology to
‘the latter was also included. Briefly, Stivell ves informed thot as
0G, USAF OBI, he would command U. S. Strategic Air Forces (VIR) in his
theater, conducting mseions ander the operational control of the JCS,
Stiivell would coordinate operations in Chine with the CG, Fourteenth
AMr Force and (tinese Air Force (Ghennault). In operations from, or in
the arsa of responsibility of, SEAC, Stilwell would coordinate with
SAGSEA, then unresolvable conflicts arose, the two commandere would
refer then to thelr remective chiefs of staff, Defense of alr beses
and routes would devolve upon Stilwell and Momtbatten in thelr respec-
tive theaters, and Stilvell would render maxtmum 19,
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the WER project, he JOS night nove walte fv0m the theater at any
tine,
The Joint Chiefs approved this memo and the appended directives
on 7 Harch ond presented it to the COS for consideration.°? General
Stilwell was given a copy of his directive with the information that
it had been accepted by the JOS and was being considerad ty the CCS.
This time he was requested to “have Strateneyer keep Mountbatten in-
formed. "°% On 13 March minor verbal changes were made in the directives;
on the 25th the revision was adopted by the Coubined dhiefs.°* and
Stilwell and Mountbatten were so informed, °&
Lord Hountbatten accepted the new arrangenmt apparently with
Little enthusiasm. He and Sir Richard Peirce considered the "eonmand
and control set-wp for VIR tombers unusual" (watch no one could deny);
they asked for information copies on all txportant decisions (which had
‘been pronied), and they requested, through Generel Sultan, that Gonorel
Arnolé "not send instructions to Wolfe atrect."°© mnis latter request
could not be granted in the light of current plans.
Tt will bo recalled that on 23 March the Joint Chiefs had decided
to establich the Swenticth Air Force and thet immediately therecfter they
had approved a command systen for thet organization and its constituent
unite, the uain features of that systen have alveady been described: ”
in effect, the decision of the JOS to retain direct control of all VLE
units oad to operate then through General Arnold had lessened the
responsibilities of the theater commanders, On S April the Ghief of
Staff announced to General Stilwell the decision
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Twentieth ani that he nlght expect further revistons in his directive.®
ier
8
After the new air force had been formed and the detetled statexent of its
policies had been formally approved, the JOS Gispatched to Stilwell by
courier a copy of that statonent (JCS 742/6, 6 April 1944) and a cable
describing briefly his role under the nev arrangenent.°? Since the XX
Bomber Connend vee assigned to the Twentieth Air Force, all major dectetons
regarding deployment, missions, and target objectives in the OBI, a
elseuhere, would be made ty the 70S and executed by the CG, AMF. General
Stilvell was directed to effect the ne
sary local coordination betveen
‘VLR missions and other operations in the OBI, consulting with Mountbatten
insofar as the miesions affected his theater and informing the General-
issino, to the extent that security permitted, concerning directives on
missions from China bases, Provision and defense of bases in SEAG
would be @ responsibility of Mounthatten's, 4n China, of Stilvell's,
General Stilwell had aleo the duty of providing logistic support of all.
components of the XX Bouber Command opereting from hia area. If con-
fliets between Stilwell and Vountbatten should arise, they should be
referred to the appropriate chiefs of staff, In case of a tactical or
strategic energency, Stilwell aight divert the 3-29's fron thelr stra-
tegic progran, instantly informing the JOS of that act. As an after-
thought, the name of the Comander in Ghtef, India,was added to that of
ectiona. >
SACSEA in the appropriate
This directive then included sone provisions which had been
suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff on 28 Tebruary, It did not,
however, acquiesce in Nountbatten's protest over channels of cosmunication
4 PFC ay,
be oes EE
REET,
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Detwean the JOS and wolfe; direct coummication between the 0G, AAR,
128
and the VLR bomber comuander was specifically authorized, & meao-
randun describing this arrangenent was prosonted to the Hritioh Chiefs
of Staff, and they were requested to instruct Nountoatten and Commander
in Chief, India, to fulfill those obligations which had been stipulated
tor then, St
This meno provoked the unsuscessful atterpt on the part
of the British to rosove over-all control of YE units from the JOS
to the 60S which has already beon descrited.°? Actually, however,
the commend polioy for the XX Boxber Command which was descrived to
General Stilwell by the cables of 20 April and by courier Alspatch was
‘that under witch VLR missions were initiated,
One further incident reuains to be told, ‘There had been some
Justification fron a purely military point of view of Jord Mounttatten's
desire to arrive at a clear understanding n respect to responsibilities
for logistics, coordination, end base defence within his theater: port
and transportation priorities for the 3-29 project inovitably would
conflict with those for other planned operations, and, as events had
recently stom, the Galeutta area vas not inmune to Japenese air attack,
But 1¢ 4s provable that considerations of prestige vere not wholly
absont. ‘he Sritish had lost "face! in the orlental world, and if thoy
were to regain their forner
jcendancy in South Hast Asia, their oun
efforts should not be overshadowed by those of the Auericans, and
hence comand prerogatives were perhaps nore jealously defended than
in Europe, The abtitule held in China toward the VIR tober force was
also colored by sinflor non-military considerations
“RabihiigipnaananeeON, use OSS
re aoe6)
acne (ARR
os a
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129
‘ LSE OL
190-46)
If the interpretation advanced in an earlier chapter be correct,
‘the choice of China as a theater of operations for the 3-29 was in
portently influenced by the desire to strengthen the war effort of
‘the Chungking governuent. The Generalissimo had accepted the proffer
of tais aid and hsd cooperated, not without profit, in the construction
of tho bast
Tb has already deen indicated that Chiang Kat-chek had
attempted at highect level to sesure control of the 3-20's, as well as
of the Fourteenth Air Force, for General Chennavlt; in which ease the
Goneralissino's close relations with that leader might have given the
former some influence in their direction. hat effort fortunately had
not been successful. The pressure from the Japanese in Hast China led
General Chennault to suggest to General Stilwell in April the temporary
Gtversion of MATTERHORN air transport capacity in favor of the Four-
teenth Air Force's defensive needs and, in an emergency, the diversion
of "all Matterhorn resources to tactical rather than strategie pur-
poses, using YER's to pulverize min Japanese bases, and employing the
transport capacity released by short-range use of B-25's to supply the
Fourteenth Air Force and the Chinese ground ary. 93
The Japanese threat
was not an 4dle one, but the suggested Atversion, within Stilvell's
power, would have thwarted the very purpose for which the 3-20's had
been allocated to the CBI,
A few days later General Stilwell advised Gonorel Narchall that
the Generalissimo was insisting that he command the TLR project in
China, with hie relation over the XX Bomber Comuand identical to that
which he enjoyed (as Suprene Commander in China) ov Fourteenth
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For ernest
Air Force, It vas Stiiveli's impression that this donand vae primarily
notivated by Caleng Kai-shek's concern over "face" and might be met
by an explanation of the command set-up newly provided for the Twentieth
Air Foree, General Marshall pessed on this information to the President,
with a Graft mocsage for Mepateh to the Genoralienine,* On the 12th
the President cabled Chiang Kai-shek, acknowledging receipt, via Stilwell,
of the Generali ssizo's views on comma of VIR bonbere. ut all VER
units dn all arens wore to be under General mold for the JOS. The
Suprene Commander in each theater would hava the rempons!Dility of
coordinating VLR with other operations; in China, this would be the
Generalissimo, and he would be informed concerning directives pertinent
‘to VER bonbers based in areas under his jurisdiction.9©
‘A few days later General Narehall cabled for a review of the
accomplishments of the Fourteenth Air Force in terns of the "terrible
price! we wore paying.°© Apparently the Chief of Staff vas seriously
considering the possibility of moving that force from China. ‘The Chief
of Air Staff reported that the Fourteenth had done as well as could
be expected with current strength snd supplies and advocated no let-up
in eir overations in China until the "success or failure of HATTEREORN
is established" and until further progress was made in the Pacific.27
Perheps it was only coincidental that General Marshall's inquiry into
the combat record of the Fourteenth followed so rapidly the effort of
Chennault and the Generalissino to gain a freer hand with air units
in China, but a natural inference is that he was not pleased with the
nothods whitch had been followed, Sut the command of the XX Bomeer
HOTT eT Usi
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Commend was maintained in anerican hands and no drastic steps were
taken, Tho arrongenent desoribed in the Procident's cable put Chiang
Kai-shelc on the same level as Lord Mountbatten and there was no longer
‘any question of a slight to the Chinese, When Stilweli's revised
Girective was issued on 19 April it instructed hin to keep the
Gensrelissino informed on YER operations, but 1t left to Stilwell the
Feeponsibility for coordination,
It was late in April, then, before final agreements hed been
reached as to how the Twentietn Air Force should ve commanded and how
Lt should exereise control over its constituent forces. The nature of
those command principles was not announced to the public until 15 June,
when the first 3-29 attack on Japan proper Lifted security regulations. ™
The finel arrangements had been long in the making, but throughout all
‘the changes in status of the severel theater comanders, the actusl
work of preparing the airfields, the facilities, and the supply system
had bet Tt 4s refreshing to ve able now to tum from
tn progr
the conference table and the headquarters dosks to the porte of India
and the alr strips of China in an effort to describe those preparations.
EMTS ONT
Ww-h6)
FoR
8
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Choptor YI
‘THE BASES
The value of a base of operations will, therefore,
seldom deternine the choice of an undertaking in the
fixet instance. Mere difficulties wich may arin
in this respect must be set aside and compared wii
‘the other effective means. Obstacles of thie kind
often vanish before the force of decisive victories.
Karl von Clausewitz. On Kar.
Introduetion
‘The statement that the air war of today 1s one of bases and
loglstics as well as of aircraft and crews has become trite through
constant repetition, dut like many another trufem 1t should be often
reiterated, hovever obvious it may seem. ‘That statenent tekes on a
special slenificance vhen applied to the strategic bexberdzent of Japan
vy VER atroraft.
In principle the plan for those operations was fundamentally akin
to the plan for the Conbined Bomber Cffensive im Zurope, The material
foundations of the alr war in Burope and in the Asiatic-Pacific areas
however @ifferea sharply. In northwestern Zurope, until Day, AAF
bases were all in the United Kington. Gouerelly they had been built
by the Britisn-of materiale, by methods, and to standards comparable
to our ow, Operational fields and supply and maintenance depots were,
20 wartine aruy installations go, permunent; they operated in a
civilized, industrial community. Supply routes, both by sea and rail,
were as higtly developed as any in the world, True, the sea-line was
‘long and vulnerable to submarine attack, the railways choked with munitions,
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e port Zeciiities danaged by alr attack and labor and materials scanty-—
‘ut the commmientions notwork was a going concern subject only to
interruptions, and the bases by field standards were lumurious,
In the invawion of North Africa, Stelly, and Italy tactical air
units vere forced to use temporary strips and inprovised methods of supply
and maintenance, but from earliest days heavy bomber units vere able to
employ captured atrficlds and facilities, After settling in Italy the
strategic forces operated from permanent bases under conditions waich
were adequate if not ideal. Throughout the BIO, then, it wae more
often a question of extending ant repairing exteting feclIities than
of creating.
In the var against Japan, operations had been limited by lack of
proper bass ané by difficulties inherent in the supply situation fully
fas much as by the small size of the forces avallatle, From the outset
4n the Pacific war only infinite toil and sikilifWl imrovization had
nade poseible the sloviy mounting voight of aerial warfare, Air strips
had been backed out of Jung!
scraped off the coral tops of atolis,
or seized in bad condition from the eneuy. Often they were subject to
aerial attock and ground infiltration, occasionally to naval toxbard-
nent. Low shipping priorities, the excessively long supply line, and
the absonce of any local factiitios kept our bases unbelievably printtive
by U. 8. or Hiropean standards, Their remoteness from Japan and the
accelerating forvard movenent of our battle line discouraged any effort
at permanence.
‘The availability of VIR bombers for the war against Japan reduced
sonora the hanticep - d by the distance of ia bases from Japan,
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vut under average conditions obtaining in the Pacific the 3-29 coulé
hardly have operated. A pierced-stesl matting flung on a beach, &
handful of tools and Yankee know-how, and gasoline drums floated in-
shore might keep a fighter squadron in the air; they could not sustain
@ persistent bonberdnent program by the heavlest, largest, greediest,
and most complicated tober in existence. Tho Air Planners in Washington
were fully avare of these factors, They rejected the Darwin area in
Australia because of its distance frou Japan and its impractical 100;
amall island bases were out of the question, The Marianas were
promising both in respect to position and logistical possibilities,
but they would not be cvellasle until outunn 1944,
The decision to operate fron the OT was made because the con~
tigulty of China bases to the Japenese Inner Zone offered opportunity
for early initiation of strategic bonbardnent and because of certein
considerations which were not wholly nilitery. It was made with full.
knowledge of the logistical difficulties and in the face of mumerous
protests ubich those difficulties evoked. 4s compared to most Pacific
areas the OBI did offer certain advantages. Base areas did not hive
to be seized in expensive operations and if properly chosen could enjoy
a fair degree of security. lative manpower was abundant and native
natertols were not limited to paln logs, corel, and beach sand——end
‘doth were important considerations in a theater so distant from U. 8.
ports, But the 12,000- to 15,000-n11e han} by water, the overtaxed,
port and transportation systens in Indis, the absence of any rallvay
notwork in China, and above all, the fantestioally difficult 100 fron
Q
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whe)
India into Ckina--these factors constituted powerful arguments against
135
the proposed MATTERHORN schene, At dest the construction of airfields
and depots and the establishnent of an air transport route capable of
building and maintaining an adequate stock pile would have constituted,
a formidable task, In the face of the target dates ot and the
Testrictions imposed on the 3-28 by conflicting priorities, the task
night well have sooned impossible.
The bases were butlt, not wholly on schedule, bub in such fashion
that operations could be launched in June 1944, ‘he problem of trans-
Porting a sufficient exount of supplies to the China bases however was
never sutisfnctorily solved, Distance, veather, terrain, and the
Anherent inefficteney of an alr transport systen with fuel available
ab only one end of its route,might have been conquered, But the
Pressure of rival operations in the CBI proved too mush of a handicap,
and the quiczening teupo of war in the Pacific was to lead eventually
to the abandonment of HATTERMOR bases for others less frightfdly
expensive In effort.
The next chapter vill deal with the establishxent of the euply
Lines and tn a subsequent volute 1t will be shown how straitly the
operations of the XX Bouter Comand were limited by the inadequacies
of thet syaten, Hore must be told the story of the bases. In des-
oribing the early planning and the prelininary negotiations, the
problems of India and China may be considered together. The actual
construction however was done indevendently by separate agencies,
Sahetobtber
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seroee fp oer
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reattis Ares,
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CR PRFIGAL | « 186
AFR ot
e using different methods and materials, and there is then a separate
story for the Galeutta and the Ghengtu area, A brief statenent on
e the staging fields in Ceylon ts throw in as a sort of epilogue. ‘The
over-all task called into play Chinese coolies working in mothods hallowed
dy ancient traditions, an Anglo-Indian forse combining native manpower
and techniques with soma modern machinery, and U, S, Army ongineoring
units using partly improvised methods, partly heavy mchinery. the
contrast, revealing as it 418 something of vasic national characteris—
e@ tea, is inetractive. It was not a task of the Trentieth Air Force,
this building of airfiolds, but it was absolutely essential to the
niesion of bombing Japan, and there was in it something of the epic
quality of the 1,600-mile strikes against Xyushu. One chapter of the
story of the Twentieth was written, then, in the ewoat of coolies froa
Ssechwan and Bengal and Ceylon, and of aviation engineere fron Iowa
and Alabaaa end Oregon as truly as wore subsequent chapters written
e in the Dlood of 3429 combat crews.
Exelimtnary Elens and Heeotintions
In a previous chapter’ a brief description was given of the
strategic inplloutions of several plans for the ouploynent of 3-29's
fron the CRT, The chert on the ovvoaite page summarizes the main
Features of each in respect to its provisions for alr tases, ‘he plane
e had those features in common: that they called for two sets of bas
one in Sengal, one in China (Changsha, Xwollia, oF Chengtu areas);
e that the two areas should de Linked by air traneport alon
es
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tho dates should be built, ao far Se'wae poostble, by manpower and
from uaterlals locally available. A glance at the chart will indloate
9 progressive diminution in the nusber of fields donanded and a tendency
on the part of plans made in ¥ashington to prefer an earller target
date than those advanced by the theater, Both these factors wore con-
Aitioned by over-all strategte planning which in effect had two
odjectives—carly use of B-29's from China, regardless of costs, to
‘Dolster Chinese resistance; and a long-tera program of boxbarduent from
bases more suitably located, which eventually diverted most of the
VER units from the OBI to the Marianas,
Barlier passages have shown how consideration of the OBI as the
theater for initial VER operations was begun at QUADRANT tn august
1943 and how a definitive deciston vas roached only at SEXTAIT in
emihat tn the peomubile po Sire declel on col he a This Page Declassified IAW EO12958
138
POR OFFICIAL usr oxy
(AFR Lye dr
Appropriate officers from the staffs of the UBI headquerters and of the
AAF and the SOS in China and India nade a hurried survey of the alr-
Tela pomstbilitt
im the theater, fommlated a critique of SSrIIKG
SUN and subnitted an alternative plan, TWILIGHT. These genoral aseump-
tions governed their thinking: that fields could be bullt in Ghina
without recourse to U, $, ald other then financial and technical ad~
vice; that some advantages would be gained in Indie by using atrdrone:
then in exlatense or under construstion; that the India bases could
‘be bullt on schedule only by importing certain materials (coment, roin-
forcenent steel, ditunen, pipe, ete.) and dy the use of U. S. con-
struction unite with organizational equipment, aided ty local labor.
Specifically 1t was estimated that one engineer aviation battalion
could complete one airfield in 4 months, >
When the TWILIGED pian vas rejected in Veshington in favor of the
ess astitious and more expeditious MADTERIONI schene, the theater
ascumptions in respect to airfields wore accepted as a working basis
for that latter plan. That is, it was accepted that, given U. S.
advisory personnel, the Ghengtu flelds could be completed according
to this schedule: two within 2 months after work began, two others in
A nonthe, five within 6 xonths.* For India, however, construction
unite in the number suggested ty the theater must be provided. To
oot the "by March" dateline of KARTZRHORN, then, 1¢ was necessary
immediately to
cure the conaent and cooperation of the British in
India and of the Chin
governnent, and to ship to India those forces
and materials required, There was 20 delay or difficulty in enlisting
ih 490-16)
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“easily
GheRE 139
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e the elf of the two allied governndates ant since the negotiations were
soon consummated they may be described briefly here, ‘he alloestion
e and deployment of the construction units however entatlet. many prac~
tical difficulties, and since that problem pertained only to the India~
Barna Sector 1t wil} be discussed in a Istor section,”
When MADTERIOR, yas presented to the Joiat Planners on 9 Koveuber,
they were not propared to accept it without further study; bub they
414 instruct thelr atr member, General Hansell, to request the JOS
e to secure approval of the construction of the desired tasce in the
event that the plan vas finally accapted.° Tats requant too the form
of a JPS nono, suggesting that the JOS recomsené to the Conbined Chiefs
that the latter authorize that four airfields be made available in
the Celeubta area and that the prover U, §. authorities inftiate
neagures requ site to ineure the construction of five atrdrones in
tho Gengtu area, farget date vas "by May.*” such action had already
‘deen taken, ‘The President, who had approved in princivie the
HAPGERHORN project, had on 10 Noveuber dispatched cables to the Prine
Minteter and the Generalisstao, annomeing the possibility of TE
operations from the OBI and requesting cooperation tn obtaining and
constructing the airfields under the genorel conditions described in
wapzucons.® the chinese authorities had not previously been informed
of any of the VLE plane, but the British in Indla had been con-
e salted by the thester officers who drew wp the MVILIOK plan, vatte
08% India was “not unsympathetic," the British were not overly e
e thusastic tovard a plan witch threatened to compote with construction
Lo lla
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(APR 190-16)
e and logistics for their own operations, and they were inclined to be
xost conservative in thelr estination of completion dates.” this
e negative attitude wan not shared by the Prive Mintster, who concurred
in the President's request and instructed the Commander in Chief,
India, "to render every poset ble astistance in the construction of
the four alr bases in India.""+ the Generaliesino ves equally
coupliant, pronfoing thet China would furnish the material and labor
and requesting that U. S. technical advisers and engineers be
e@ out at once. ™?
ent.
In view of these tentative agreements made at the governmental
level, action by the Combined Cate:
of Staff, ponding final acceptance
of MADTERIOR!, wae only a matter of form. So when the Joint Ohiefs
presented to the COS the nesorandun recomiending approval of the
alrfloide,”* the British nmaxbers could only refer to the Prine
Winteter's action, add their om approval, and point out that U. 8.
e construction units shoulé be in place by 16 January 4f the fields vere
‘to be completed by 1 April, vhen all facllitios would have to be
‘throw into construction of air strips for the Ledo Hoad."* the
final decision waa roached only with the agreenent at SEXTANT to
nomt VATTERHORY, with dts Galoutta and Chengta bases, twithout
naterially affecting other agproved operations. "15 this latter
ruling was #0 interpreted that 4¢ persitted the tenporary diversion
of certain "resources" from the Ledo Road in order that target dates
for the VIR bases in India aight be act.” pub the "resources"
Ancluded only some construction equipment (notably dump trucks) and
" mW USE ONLY
(AFR 190-16)
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saU7 ota
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png obprg,
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ET.
(AER 1-36)
not the all-important engineer units, the agromont aswuzed the
4.
arrival in the CBI of such units by 15 January, and the accomplishnent
of certain preliminary phases of the work by local British agencies.
The following pages will indicate how difficult was the task of pro~
viding at an early date the U, 8, forces which were required ané how
4m consequence target dates were never fully met,
The Indian Bases
Selection of sites. ‘ho actual selection of the sites for the alr-
Arones in India was nade by theater authorities, The specific loeali-
‘tes were subject to many changes, but there was never any thought but
what the general area would be in that part of Beagal lying near
Galoutta. ‘The choice of this area was dictated by its location vis-a—
vis Ghina, by the fact that Geloutta was the only adequate port in north~
cast India, and by rail and road communications that were, as Indian
rout
went, good, Those sane factors had governed the choice of the
sane area for the siting of heavy bomber tases for the Eastern Air
Command. In the region surrounding Mdnapore, some 70 niles west of
Galcutta and in rolling plains at the edge of the Ganges alluvial
completed or und
construction,
The fields were Duilt to accommodate
‘to scuadrons of B-24's cach, usually with 6,000-foot paved runways
end 14 was thought that by extending and strengthening runways and in-
creasing the facilities these could be made suitable for B-29's,
Genoral Stratoneyer appointed in the theater a "Dwilieht Committee"
Fo
APE fay p3y ONLY.
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e under Gen. Robert Oliver, 0G, ASC. This comittes made a survey of
existing {olds with representatives of the RAF, and by 17 November
e had tentatively dootded on the folloring Losstions: Siehnapur,
Fuardoba, Mhereggur, Helelkunde, and Chekulies Early in Deoesbor
am odvance party from the XX Bonber Command arrived in Indie, and
the engineer officor, Mejor Freret, made an inspection of the sites
chosen. For sone reason Dishnapur was abandoned in favor of Dadhiundi,
and prelininery work wes tnaugurated. "When General Wolfe arrived tn
e India (15 January) he in turn inspected the airfields and, efter con-
sidering for a while Panagerh, finally selooted Hharagpur as his head~
quarters bese. Kharagpur was the most importont veil junction in the
rogion, locsted on the meinline Hengel-Nagpur railway 65 miles wost of
Calcutta, end with a branch line which served most of the other proposed
airfielis, Hot the least important factor in his decision was the
existence at EIJ1L, an adjacent village, of a large new building, the
CoLlectorate (designed as a political prison), which housed the XX
© sexier conuat toatqurtors,
General Stratemeyer had planed to construct nine airfields~-one
transport feld and eight one-group 5-29 flelde-sor the Daaber felde
to be ready in April, four others in Septerber, Pending final
election of the letter four it was plamed to use Kharagpur as a head=
quarters and trensport field, and to build the first four 5-29 folds
e to tmo-group standerds (66 hardstands each). Construction was to be in
‘ro ghoses so that each airdrne could accamuodate 28 airoraft by April,
ser TOR eo
(AFR 10-16)
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FOR OFF TSU sa
(Abie
e 56 by September.“ then 1t became apparent thet schedul
on the five
Hlelda could not be mot, At was decided that offerte should be con-
centrated on aking Kharagpur (as a 3-20 base) and Ohakwlia partly
e operational by 15 March and housing two groups temporarily at other
ste1ds,™ charra and Gaya.” on the 3-29" wore someviat delayed in
arriving in India, it was possible to drop Gaya from the Met and the
four groups were based at Ubaragpur (468th), Chakulia (40th), Plardoba
(4628), and Charra (44ith), The last © field kad only a 6,000-foot
vunvay which was extended by two 900-foot steel mats. On 1 July, the
e Aatth Grow uoved fron Gharra to Dudhkun@l, and in Mey the transport
Field at Kalaiicunda was opened. the problen of selecting the other
four felds vas in time simplified by deciatons made outside the OBI,
The suggested expediont of operating two groups fron each field
had not been satisfactory to General Wolfe, nor was he content with
the afditional fields which had been considered. Fe wished to obtain
other eltes east ond north of Kharagpur in less congested areas,””
e By 26 February, those four fields had been selected and SOS had given
the necessary orders for construction.” These included, in addition to
Charra and Gaya, Jargraa and Gldbni, localities at which no construction
had deen done.” vhen 1t becane evident In Washington that the full
Aeploynent of to 3-29 wings in the OBI vould not be consummated,
General Amold warned Strateneyer of the probalile change in plans.
e@ Then on 11 April Strateneyer was informed of the JOS decision to divert
the 722 tiing to the Mactenas and instructed, in view of the lesser need,
e to pick five fields for comletion.®! In reponse to this directive
Shedadtnrs ECR OFFIC
MAFR dye-16)
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ro hORET a
Coton,
e ‘the GBI chose Kharagpur, Dudhkundi, Ghakulia, Mardoba,and Charra
a8 operational flelde, vith Kalaiiunda as the transport fiela.°?
e Later, as e previous passage has shown, Charra was dropped frou the
ist and never brougit up to 3-29 standards.
Construction personnal, Accepting the dlotun of the CBI that airfields
in Indie could be built only with the ald of U. 8. engineer forces and
equipment and some materials, the AAF vas fased with the task of getting
those men end supplies into the theater in time to meet target dates.
e Mime was short and the route to Indie was long-6 weeks or more by
ship, Complications vere many--the deley in arriving at a fim deot-
ston to mount MATTERORI, the scarcity of engineer aviation wits, and
‘the fact that the responsible leaders were scattered in India, Burma,
Cairo, and Yashington, From the begiming the terget dates vere 1m
practicable to achleve, end the restrictions placed on the project
were euch that 1% was only by compromise and invrovization that the
e unfinished fields were able to receive the B-29's in April.
Originally it had deen supposed that atrfield construction in the
GBI should be a responsibility of the CG, AAT IBS. General Oliver
head of the TWILIGHT Conte
and project officer had begun the
selection of the fields, and General Strateneyer requested by naze
sone 15 engineer officers to aid the thester counittes in constructing
the ftelds.© Gonorel Stilwell however vested Maj. Gon, We Ee Re
e Covell, CG, SOS in CBI, with romponelbility for the construction,
Brig. Gen, S. 0, Godfrey, the Air Ingineer, was sent to the theater
v La Gt
(AER 10-16)
ve SOEs
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145
to take charge, under General Covell, of the actual balléing both in
China and Indta,“* ae a roqult of this change in the responcible
agency, Generel Strateneyer cancelled ais requisition,» and instead
key personnel of engineer aviation units assigned to the project were
sent ahead by alr to assist in prolintnary planning. ©
It has been chown” that the XX Bonber Connand was represented in
planning by Yajor Freret, tho engineer officer of its advance echelon,
and by Goneral Kolfe himself. ‘The actual construction work was directed
dy ColeL.B, Seanan,”? who roported to Colonel Farrell, Chlef ingineer
of SOS in CBI,
MADONELOR enlled Zor the completion 4n India of four one-grou
YAR fields "hy March," elght by Septenber, The OBI's estimate of the
construction Zorces required vas slightly modified by General Godfrey,
vho had rletted the theater while TNILIOET wae still being constderod.
Ke recommended one engineor aviation regiment (les three battalions)
for eduintetration, four regular and one airoome angineer arlation
battalions, Zour dunp truck companies and two petroleum distribution
Companies.°? this calculation vas incorporated into the KATERHORY
vlan.“ tt was uterstood that the construction wits would have to
Ye diverted from other assigamonte and that extraordinary measures must
ve teken to provide the troop 1ift and chipping required. According
to the accepted rate of vroduction, the unite must be on the Job by
the boginaing of Deconber, This obviously was imoselble, but the
AAF did make strenuous efforts to got the units moving at once.
Soaaheenner Ces
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(AMET
e General Arnolé on 8 Wovenber initiated action within the Air
Staff preparatory to the assigunent of tho required uatts.“2 vhen on
the following day MATTERHOR: was presented to the Joint Planners,
objection was raised to the proposed temmorary diversion of the avia-
tion engineers previously allocated to other theaters.” As one of
the interim measures to be taken while the plan wae under consideration,
General Arnold recommended to the Ohief of Staff the assigunent for
shipnort on 18 Decenber of the following desigated units:
Uhite Dixerted
e 980th Ing. Av. Bet. (less 3 battalions) ‘SOWESPAC
879th Eng. Av. Bn. (Airborne) UK
1906th hg. Av, Bn. ‘SOWESPAC
Le76th mgs ave Bee SOWESEAG
‘Lev7th Ing. Av. Bn. (AAPEAC
4 Gum truck Companies )unit and source
2 pet, dist. companies )not specified
This request, which was one battalion short of the original estimate,
was opproved by Lt. Gen. J. 7. Hcliamney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 15
Movenber, and four days later by the JOS, then at gea en route to
e sumaut,“4 gy atrection of the Chief of Steff, General Nelarmey
alerted those units designated by naxe; the pipe line conpanies were
to be token from five such units already assigned to the GBI,*° ana
the diverted engineer units were to be replaced ty newly activated
organi zations.
The Joint Chiefs however had imposed certain restrictions on tho
e GAspatch of these troops: diversion of comattted units and replacenent
by neviy activated untts was not to upset existing sbipping schedules
e and troop 1ift for the force was to be held within the capedilities of
‘nhs ae
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CTT wee 147
AEE: 20-0)
the OBE, plus any af@tional shipping vaich alent be granted at
suxtavr,4S Yithin those restrictions sbtpping on 15 Decoxber could
be found only for the skeleton regiment, two regular and one alrvorne
battetions the balance of the force would have to wait for a later
convoy.“
General Stilwell had been Inforned on 9 November of the construc
tion units designated by tha MATVERHORK plan.“® Because of other
scheduled operations the CBI haé need for several additional engineer
attalions; theater requisitions in this respect and the attendant
demands for troop 11f% were in open competition with the MATTARAGRS
priorities.*? on request from Washington, however, General
Stilwell granted priorities for those units watch could be shipped
on 15 Decenver mer the JCS restrictions." mis would.exhaust troop
spaces on the 16 Decanter convoy--a fact to which the theater ob
Jected-—and the voyage would be slow becat
of the necessity of
‘transshipment in North Africa, The Combined Chiefs of Staff at
SMWASY wore anxious that the fields de completed by 1 April in order
that the tine schedule of other S340 operations should not be in~
terrupted, This vould require the arrival of the engineers by 15
Jenuary.>? githough action was teing taken to expedite the trans-
shipuent of the troops in North Africa,” the arrival of even the in-
complete foree sailing on 16 Decerber could not be expected ty mid-
January.
Faced with on early target date and a delayed and reduced schedule
for construction forces, the theater was herd put, Preliminary work
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TIAL Coos 0.4 ue
(ARK 1a0-t6)
e could ve done by Indian labor working under British supervision,
and a progran of such construction was inaugurated with the emectation
e of completion of that thase by 15 Januery, To ald in this task, sone
800 trucks were Dorrowed from the Ohine Defense Service and 200 fron
the Ledo Road and driven by AMF casuals.” There was however a dei
perate need for U. S. aviation engineers. General Stratemeyer had
proposed that two battalions be borrowed froa the Ledo Road project,
pending the arrival of the untts assigned to NarTERHORT.§° inen thie
+ @ proposal had first beon made, the BTA of the engineers was optinistically
calculated for mid-January; by Christmas he hed Learned that a more
realistic estinate would place the date at Fotrunry or later.” thts
revised schedule of arrivals madeqen nore attractive the prospect of
borrowing construction forces already in the theater,
hen General Strateueyer requested from General Stilwell tho loan
of an engineer aviation tattalion which had recently arrived in the CBI
e for ausiguent to tho Ledo Road, his request was dented. General
Stilwell considered that his directive gave top priority to the edo
project, and that directive wae fortified by strong personal interest
in the eatablishnent of a land 100 to China, At a Christnes Day con-
ference detween Maj. Gen. L. R. Lutes, General Godfrey, and other
interested officers it was decided that more borrowed trucks should be
put on the airfield job and that the question of diversion of units
e frou the Ledo Road should be referred to Washington.™? Specifically,
e General utes wished thet Stilvell and Mounttatten should be authorized
to make the desired dtverston,®? an act which vould saitated
i US UNLY
- (AFR 190-18)
2
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(AFI 100-15) 9
a change in their Strectives. Stilwell, on ingulzy fron the Chief of
Staff, expressed the optaton that the "overland route to Ghina te
e inporattve," and recommended that no units be diverted from that
project.° iten General Marshall inqutred an to the ostinatet dates
of completion of the alrirones with the forces currently asstgned, he
learned that the theater SOS vere now thinking in terms of a drastically
retarded scheduler one flold barely operational by Sl March; a second
dy 30 Aprils four ready for Linited operations by 30 Junes five eomlete
@ = —ay-50 sestosvar. tater these conditions, the theater proposed to divert
two Dattalions fron anghIbLous operations vrevlously scheduled. for
sm0.57 hts wax agrocable to Stilwell inassuch as the operations were
act to tele place witil after the onsoon (1.8., Sentenber 1944), and
apparently to lord Nounthatten in Mest of his ouxrent concent of
fubure operations. Indeed, slace he now considered that "the project
of the Ledo Road ie out of etep with alobal strategy! and advosated
e the abandonment of amphibious operations in durm and the curtailment
of the caxpalgn in north Burma, and since he hoped to use the B-29's
in hie move tovard the southoast,©" Lord Loule mist have been willing
to provide for MATTEREONI aviation engineors assigned to either of the
projects in question. Under those conditions General Marshall
steno’
to MATISRIORN the 1886th Mngineer Aviation Battalion, then under
e ordera for movenent te the OBI in February.
Nothing was done about the Sedo Hod units, and the 186th could
@ not de exnected in the theater util the veglming of April.
RE Pe
U. & Gaiefs of Staff were forced to pronont to
walt
oe LOR
ial
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(AR 4) 10
the British maubers of the CCS the retarded schedule for airdroue
completion, &*
General Amold and the Air Staff naturally had favored
extending to HAPEERIORI a higher priority dn allocations and shipping,
and specifically the diversion of the Ledo Road units by a chango in
Sthlwell's airective;®> the only alternative seemed to be a revision
of the target date for 3-29 operations to 50 June, the Chief of
Stagf stil dtd not fevor any Interruption of the Ledo Road construc
tton,°” but a sulden revereal came from the thoater itself.
on 16 January Gensral Govell went to Stilwell's advance head
quarters in Suraa to ake anothor attempt to reoure the desired
engineer tattalions. ” wy Sti1weli was Willing to reconsider is not
spvaront, but the mission was successfol. Om 2) January Strateneyer
vas adle to announce to General Amold that he had chtained a reinforced
69
‘battalion (1,100 men) which would be in place by the first of February.
‘This would materially improve target dates
two fields should be barely
operational by 15 March; by using two touporary fields as auxiliaries,
the four grows of B~29's could be acconnodated’? by mid-March, the
plonned tine of arrival, but full-scale operations would be delayed,
In an offort further to expedite the schedule on the fizat 4
fields and to insure the prompt construction of those required in
Septouber for the second 3-29 wing, the air Staff again requested the
assignment of tvo additional engineer aviation battelions to HAPTERHORN,
This request was not favorably entertained vy the Chief of staft.”*
When the theater seconded this appeal by asking that an additional
uattalion be ass}med to the project,’” that request also was refused,
FOR OFFICIA!. USE ONLY
§AFR 130-16)
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1s.
GA Lets)
e but Generel Marshall aid grant pormiecion to uog for MATIEROR, mits
scheduled for Narch shipment to the GaI.”> tuts was acceptable to
e the theater,”* and it appeared for a short tine as if there would be
an adequate force on hand ty late spring. ‘he change in deployment
plans vhich wae to send the 754 Ving to the Marianas, hoverer, held up
‘tho shipment of the additional units.75 and on 11 april General .
Strateneyer was informed of the definite deciston to
6
md those unite
with the contat wing.”© whis relieved the GiT of the duty of Dulldtag
e the four other fields, but it also nent that the first five fields
must be completed vith engineers nov in the theater-of which one
~ Battalion was to be reasstmed in July to an alr connando operation.
So much for the negotiations, the description of which has lost
touch with the unite which actually aia the work, Those troops
ch
were shipped in mid-Deceuber arrived in North Africa on 3 January,
were trawshipped, snd landed in western India before 22 February,
e ‘They were ansimed in this fashion: 930th Reginent (less 3 battalions),
Kalaikunda; 1875th Battalion, Dudhicmndi; 187th Battalion, Chainulia;
879th Battalion (Airborne), Yiardoba. The 3824 Engineer Construction
Battalion (Seoarate) noved from the Ledo Road by afr, was already on
‘the job at Kharagour; and the 6534 Shgineer Avlation Dattalion was at
Ghandie,” the latter watt had arrived ta Intta on 2 February and,
though not assigacd to MATTEREOR:, had asparently been wut on the job
e by General Stivell, he 2896th Battalion sailed ron the Vost Coast
of the United States Inte in February, arrived in India on 31 March,
and was assigned to Plardobe,
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e Fron the evidence available 1t 1s not arparent whether the 879th
was actually put on the job or not; its 1ight-vaight equipment was not
e well adapted to heavy conerate construction,” and it seams logical
to suppose thet it may have/exchensed for the 6538." Several, changes
were node during the course of construction, and in July the 3824
and the 1868th were reassigned to 3urna.® Actuslly, then, the worl
was done largely by 5 battallons as the ortginel plans had called for;
tho schedule hovever wae nover approximated.
e@ Oreanisation of construction forces, In all, the forces employed in
wulldlar the five alrdromes {ncluled sone 6,000 U. S. troops and 27,000
Tnian eivilians.°2 he wosie of those two forces overlapped sonovnat,
: out in general the nature of their taslcs was Gictated by their respec-
tive skills. Until the arrival of the aviation engineers late in
Fobruary most of the work was done by the Auglo-Indian force, The
construction agency vas the Central Public Works Department (CPHD),
e which furnished the administrative and supervisory personnel. Actual
work was done by contract native labor. PWD wae informed of U. 8.
requirements, and accomplished those through thetr own methods, ‘The
process of requisitioning was somewhat complicated, involving ayproval,
of the governnent of India and reverse Lend-Lease accounting. This
fact and the traditional slowness of Indian nethods required much
Nexpediting’ on the part of the americans, While the Indians were
Going mst of the work the project officer, Colonel Sesxan, was escen-
e Mallya Lalson officer between the Anglo-Incian organization and the
GG, Construction Service, S05,
inn 190-16)
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FOR ON ICAL U %3
(APE de s-16)
ith the arrival of the U. S. troops, the theater ingineer Devart~
ment set up an organizction consisting of Division 1 (headquarters ot
Celeutte), with ungineer District lv (headcuarters at iaLaikunda) in
charge of airdrove coustruction and District 12 in charge of
pe
Line layings (ue battulion was assigned to each field, In general
the British were responsible for those tasks which could be done by
hand labor (road building, Lousing, eto.), the .mericans for those
tasks requiring skilled lubor and heavy machinery (earth noving, paving,
utilities, strectural steel, ete.).
he pAperLine systen. The progress chart on p. 157 indicutes that the
pie Line syste: vas vushed throug in advance of the airfields which
it serves, ‘his was the natural. onder of construotion, and it was
nade possible by the eurly errival of adequate construction forces,
Barly plans had oled for the assignment of byo petroleum distribution
conpatiies to be uiverted trou five such units en route to Indie for
other projects.°* ‘this force was deemed inadequate by the theater
SCS, ant by 9 Jamury three such companies hud been assigned ana wore
unlosaing equipaent in the Lalaikunda neighborhood.®? In all, four
companies worked on the project—the 707th, 700tu, 708th, and 709th.
These units arrived ahead of thelr equipment ana were handicapped by
being forced to work with borrowed substitutes,
To furnish fuel for the 2-29's, transyorte, and noter vehicles,
plans called Sor a pipe Line fron Pudge-Dudge, on the Zar side of the
Hoogly River near Culeutta, to the several felds. + sixeinch pipe
was to be laid to the vicinity of Dudhkundi (about 70 miles from the
= + BOR OFFAL to UideY
“ion MAFR 100-16)
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terminus) and thence four-inch pipes were to extend to each of the
cs
five fields. Within each field vipes were to carry the gas to the
various using agencies. Light-velpht "Invasion" type pipe was used,
with victaulic couvlings. ‘here were three main pumping statlons.
Bolted steel tanicage was provided at each field-a total of 191,000
varrels for aviation and aotor fuel in the five.
Seonuse the Jine ran through @ thickly-populated district, the
pipe was buried to avola injury from acetdent or native eurlosity.
Titching was done by native contract lator, Your major submarine
river crossings were ude, In opite of these procautions the light-
weteht pipe developed sone leaks; it becene necessary to maintein a
cereful check by walkers and ty telephone reverts from the pumps, and
to replace some
tions with welded steel pipe, Trouble was also
cccontoned by the accumlation of rust ané scale In she on-field
@ietetoution pipes, and on request from the XX Zoubor Coutand that
systen was standonet in favor of truck deliveries. Sone difficulty
in the erection of steol tanite was occasioned by the loss or delay in
transit of sone of the plates.
Pipe-Mne construction was begun on 16 January, vith a 15 Yarch
target date, Because Garagpur and Chalmlia vere scheduled for
earliest completion, work vas pushed most rapidly on those fields. 3y
26 Februnty the Mine to those stations had been finished and checked. °°
‘then the target date arrived, the fuel was Delng purped to three fields
then scheduled to receive the BA20's (fuel was hauled to Oharra ty
truck), though the system was finished sone time later.
cr a OFFICIAL 1
tober APR ;
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Grading and paving. ‘The airdronos selected for comletion had been
designed to RAF henvy-bonber specificstione, with 6,000-Z00% concrete
or nacadan runways and parking and service facilites, highly élapersed,
for two squadrons of Z-24's, Tt vas decided to extend the runways to
7,800 fect (instead of the 8,600 feet originally dexanded).°° since
teste showed the 3-24 paving inadequate,°” the exteting strips were to
he reinforced with 7 Inches of concrete, with 10-tnch conerete navenent
on the extensions. Inter exertence was to vrove these specifications
acceptable, dut over-conservative in respect to thicimess and sonevhat
Gengorous in respect to length.°? tn spite of the danger of air
attack—Caleutta was borbed by the Japs in Tecenter 1943--the British
systen of @ispersnl ves abandoned in favor of a nore convenient concen-
tration of facilities
The lay-out on the several fields differed,
with hardstands of both the chevron and figure-eleht types being used;
eventually rectangular parking areas with over-all. paving wore added.
Im spite of the theater's request for carly shizment of oqutpnont
and supplics,? the tght ebfpping altuation and the uncertain status
of movenont plans for the engineer units added to the perennial
aiffleulty of synchronizing the shipment of troops ond materiel, and
the construction forces arrived in advance of their unit equipnent.
They were forced then to borrow from the British? with consequent
Joss of efficiency in using unfamiliar machinery end in changing over
on the arrival of the U, S. tens, In sone cases—-ns in crushing and
screening units at Indrubt1——the U, S. machines were oimply added to
1
‘those Britich ones already in use.
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e The whole Job entailed the moving of sone 1,700,0Wcubte yards
of earth, Vore than half of this wae in conection with grading ranwey
shoulders and filling for runway extensions. Heavy equipment, either
e vorrowed or organizational, was available for this, Heavy reins during
the monsoon period hampered this Job, but the terrain offered no
particular handicaps and in general the earth-noving proved a less
complicated tasic than concrete production.
Although the airfields vere supposed to be bullt of materiale
locally available, it was early aprarent that cenent in sufficient
quantities could not be had in the GBI.9? vu, §. cement was imported
‘to eupplenent the inadequate supply. Indian cement proved inferior,
and decause it was impossible to maintain a rational schedule of ship-
nent it was diffioult to maintain a stock pile.
Otker uaterials were locally available. Sand for fine ageregate
vos found in streans eastly accessible to each field, though because
of floods during the monsoon 1 was necessary to stock-pile it in ad~
@ vase
of this iter for all fields was assigned to the 8534 ingineer aviation
Coarse aggregate was sonething more of a problen.* Production
Battolion. Both gravel and erushed trap roel: wore used~—the gravel
fron pits at Chalulia and Thalbungark, the rock fron basalt boulders
at Indrabil, In the early days the gravel wes used without washing
and the clay showed up tn the concrete, but otherwise the materials
e proved satisfactory, Between February and Septeuber some 450,000 exbic
yards of coarse aggregate wore produced ond @istributed. Distribution
@ —_ ct stout 205 care par day on a congented sully aye
required no
ttle ingenuity. +
FOR UFF (AN 1.
CUI 19
N
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208 Ur) as7
(arte
Frodustion of concrete was by the ongineer tattolions stationed
at the several fields, and it fered with local conditions and the
equipment and facilities available at each, At Zharagpur, where the
S028 arrived without heavy equipment, stationary mixers were used and
much native labor with wheeltarrows. At Chakulia and Plardoba batching
wos done in dum truske loaded by bucket Loaders and gravity feed.
At Dudbinndi an ingenious voluetrle batching plent was constructed
Whteh produced 85,000 yards in 78 days, reaching a peak of 2,018 yards
ina single day, shen paving began at Kalelinmét in mid-July, £011
nodern equlpnent was availetle, and though the output never reached
that accomplished at Duthkundi, the work required fever man hours and
the concrete was supertor.%©
On all bat the lest Meld, concrete was spread by hand by native
lobor Wooden forms, locally produced, were used. Concrete was laid
with expansion Joints, not habitually used in India but shown necessary
oy buckling at Kharagpur. Curing wae rendered difficult by poor
vater-distribution syatens and the hign rate of evaporation.
Personnel and technical Louring. Housing vas planned to take ful
advantage of existing factities and local naterials and labor tech-
niques, The chotee of Kharagpur (or rather, of ite suburb Hijil) as
the alte of the XX Souber Conzand Headquarters wae largely determined,
as 8 previous statenent has shown, by the axtatence there of the as
yet umsed Collectorate building. och work had to be done to modify
this building for its new purpose” and to provide new housing there
end at the other fields, Tented housing was much in vogue 1a the early
: ii
KOK Ot
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7
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PROGRESS CAHIR Tr
e VLR FIELDS.
SO BROM Fila REPORT
43-29 BASES /N /NOIA
NO Ve (O44
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158
@ «SH ents wore aareety of mative vaastat construction (Bard earth
or concrete floors, bamboo and plaster walls, thatch roofs), Adiwini-
strative and technical buildings included a wide assortment of types—
Basha for the anal) bulléings, and for the larger, U, §. plywood
prefabricated, Masons borrowed fron the British, and some Italian
prefabs imorted by AS0 fron Britrea, slightly shopworn and bullet
marked. Mae Comber shops with overhead travelling cranes were erected,
by U. S, engineers, Dut vita no little éiffieulty owing to danage and
loss of structural steel parts. Butler hangars with steel franes snd
e canvas covers proved serviceable for a variety of uses.”
Much of the housing was built by native Isbor, as well as the in-
ternal road aystens within the fields, Most of the ulilities-avater and
electric aystens-—vore constructed by U. S, engineers,
‘The chart on p.l87 will give some ides of the progress of airfield
construction, but 1t is apt to be misleading, the fields were not
completed util Septerber, and although fortnightly reports to vashington
were apt to report “work progressing on schedule," that schedule was
fer in arresrs of oarly plans, Sut what te of moet importance 1s that
the fields were able to recetve the 2-29's when they arrived. This en-
tailed the use (until July) of the B-24 field at Charra and a great
mumber of temporary and irritating oxpadiente. Sut the fields could
be used, even if they were "barely operational."
e he cost of the flelés, because of the several agencies concerned,
te difficult to deteraine precisely: perhaps $20,000,000 would be a
e fair ostinate, vith $2,000,000 of that going for the pipe-line systen.°°
ae anny. OF FACIAL. USE OSLY
ee (ABE 190-16)
le
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—_——e
blob 1s9
uk OFCCE to ONLY
e (A kv)
The China Bases
A casual reference to the fortnightly progress reports on the
\ADTIRHORY airfields in the winter of 1943-44 will show that rempon-
sible officers in the CBI were alveys nore optinictie about necting
schedules at Chengtu than at Calectta, ‘That attitude had beon mani-
fosted early in the game and events were to prove it wholly justified.
In Bengal, for reasons vinich have been shown, construction lagged behind
original schedules; in China those wore at least aporoximated, The
@ —itnaion sietts had the advantage of the earlier start, and eventually
of U.S. Aray engineers ond heavy machinery, but their progress had
deen deterained inexorably by shipping schedules. It 1s ironteal. that
in China, where air operstions had always been limited by a logistical
situation so restricted that incoming supplies had to be measured almost
‘by the pound, tne shipping problem had no direct bearing om the con-
struction of VLR fields, There was no immatient sweating-out of over-
@ axe exctnoer sate and oxnigeent. The Stelde were bullt of Literally
local--that 1s, neighborhood--materials and dy the "hand, muscle and
goodwill on the part of 300,000 to 500,000 farmers." The story of that
building is, as a correspondent wrote, Ya saga of the nameless little
people of China. 199
Suoh Giffioulties as the Anericana experienced
were financial, and Anericarahad long since exhibited a willingness to
e exchange billions for a fey months saved here or there.
Selection of the bases, the THIEIGHT plan, eutnitted by the OBI on
and
e 11 Septesbor 1943, had called for the construction of VLE ba
protective fighter strips in the Kwellin area and transport fields at
ai MAFR 190-19)
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160
FOR OTS '
e G eo :
Kunting, Materials and labor were to be found locally, ‘the C3I
acceptel the Air Plenners' sugcestion, eventually to be incorporated
e into UATTEKEORT, thet the Ghengtu ares be substituted for Kweilin,
though that latter area was not forgotten.
This chanze had been effected because of the inordinate ground
force (50 U. S.-trained-and-equipped Chiness divisions) which General
Stilwell reculrea for defense of vetlin, 1?
Chengtu bases would be
further fron the intended targets, and missions from then would be
e vulnerable to Interception longer than if Kwollla were used, but it
wae contonly accepted that the more vesterly bas!
would probably te
immune from grou attack.
Chengtu was the capitol of the province of Szechvan, It was
located about 200 miles northwest of Chung:ing and sone 400 mil:
north of the Hump tersinal at Kunming, An ancient city, 2 seat of
connotes and of culture, its inortance hed boon ehanced by Japanese
e seizure of nore populous cities to the east and by floods of exteres
frow that region. Chengba lay in the valley of the Min River, About
2,200 years ago a seni-nythologtenl engineer, one Li Ping, had harnessed
the river as it burst fron the mountains northwest of the city and
had diverted it into several large canals and a uyriad of sualler ones,
Fis ingenious irrigation system, still operated with due respects to
‘donoficont deities, made of the valley a sort of artificial delta of
e oxtraordinary fertility. This Celta or plain, no more than 70 miles
e ong and some 1,700 square niles in oxtent, supported a population of
about 2,200 persons to the square mile, one of the world's most densely This Page Declassified IAW EO12958
Qonvanany
WAM MLONSHS SHL NI SISVE UY
sevyshumynband]
PC VAL USE ONLY
(ABB 190-16)
FOR OFF
NaISHNYH
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161
HOR OFKICIML UL
ao (ABH 180.18)
S Inhobl ted area The plain was adatrably sulted for VIR flalde;
some 1,600 feet above cea level, its clinate was much better than
e that of Galeutta, its weather not bed for flight. ‘There were no
sudden olevations closer than the rugged mountains which rose sone fifty
miles to the wost and north; mntertale of the sort intended wore
abundsnt, 3ut the very fertility of the valley and its teening popu
lation meant that airfields could ve sited only at the expense of sone
economic and social dislocation, and there were gerious political in-
e plications which proved worse tn snttetpatton than tn actuality.
Chiang Xai-shex's accoptance of the President's propossl to dase
VLR bombers in the Ghengtu area ande it possible in mid-Noveaber for
the OBL to initiate « study of possible airdrone sites, with a view of
completing four fields ty 1 4oril end a fifth by 1 May 02 s¢ 0, 5,
advicory personnel were available on tine. Zigineers of Goncral
Oliver's TNILIGH? Comittes made a survey of the reglon, and by 28
105 mere wero al-
e Novenber they had tentatively selected the sites.
ready in the region several Chinese bouber and fighter fields, sone
of watch might te extended for VIR requirenente; other fields had to
be bullt frou scratch. Flans for the fields were prepared for sub-
nisston to the Generalisetmo,19 who on 16 Decexber approved the lay-
outs for five YR fields noar Chengta, and,in princtple, of other
fields in the Kwellin area and at Zmaing. 2°? she mpecific elt
e wert Hsinching, Kitnglat, Yenideng, Chinghsing, and Sintua in the
Ghengta area; Wiuchen ae a ferrying base near Kunming; end Kvetlin
and Suichvan as the proposed bases in the east."°° mis selection
passed over two existing fields at Chengtu and within a fortnight the
FOR OFFicraL p.
(ER 150)
DONLE,
, E
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PL USE ONLY
SECRET (Ask 190-16)
e ldet was changed sonevhat; in order of ease of construction, th
fields were named: Heinching, Kiuglai, Kwanghan (a virgin site),
e Pergsian, and Chungehingchow. Selection was made vith an eye on con-
tiguity of materials and availability of conscript labor and on the
attendant interference with the irrigation systen.l°? this selection
was approved by the advance echelon of the XX Bomber Comnend staff in
a vielt to Kunming about 11 January and by General Wolfe himself,
who ingpected the provosed sites a fortnight ater? Soon aftervarde
e it was decided to defer construction of Chungchingchow to allow fighter
field construction to be synchronized with that of the VLE bases;
that is, four fighter fields overational by SL March, with paving
completed by 15 May; and two VLR fields completed by 31 March, two
more by 30 anrii.109 By the time work on the fighter flelds was
finished, however, the Joint Chiefe had decided to divert the 734 Wing
to the Merianae and the fifth VLR field was never built.
e The fighter fielde were selected by General Chennault, who was
ressonstble for alr defense of the YL tases. Tour vere in the
immediate nelgktorhood of the Chengtu fields: Pungwhangshen, Shwangliu,
Pungshacheng, and Kwanghan, which was a combined VLE and fighter base.
Thon in an effort to establish a wider defensive perimeter, Chennault
sought and obtained permlesion to bulld three additional fighter
fielés, locates sonewhat farther fron Chenstu. "these fields vere
Mienyeng, Klenyang, and Suisning,
e ‘The CBL's reference on 19 Decenber to nirfielés at Xwetlin end
Kunming and the statenent on 9 January that the Generslissino was
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163
e m
conctdertzy planned luysute da those regtons wae eouevhet confusing
*o Sushington, I: SAT Hecdquorters tt senue? that the thenter vas
e postion vith
<3 plan, ond General
he now defunct SHILIGRT-DR
camel nae not dn fever of fimmnetng thore fhelds fron WARTERIIR™
us
nés che Gol war tt elacr that the folds ..
a part of the
MADTERIOET plana-thoss at “iveflin ts glwe gracter opernttona?. Mext-
DIMty, and that st Gumalug to be used as ca energensy fteld on 2.29
stnttle fi ghts-—ond yrs
ng
artongescnt.” "The reguerea couo from Genet
me
swrarently represented hi opinion. but
seed for peraleston to sate the necessary
ral Strateseyer, and
eral Chenneult had a
special interest in the Zvellin aren, He had consented to tne change
from SWILIGHT to MAPTERHORN, tut he now wrote to General amold, point-
Ang out that except for ground security Kwellin possessed every advantage
over Cnengtu and urging that the additional bases be built in Evangel
us
Province.” General Aracld considered tne* the improvement of f1elas
@ ax vscitin snd Sietng we nebber for Copered SHELL to doeti© and
thet the tr Department would not act without Me recom
at the Insthgctden of Stratencyer ond Chenncwb, Stilve2l sutttted
to the 6
elo the requert for extenston of reamys of thrss
flee fir end one ab kucntng.117 ore Gencraltact
convent
ha. DVS wy, verdteg solution of Strenclal preblere which wlll be ces
on of lad a dozen 7
By dh; construction bad ec”,
o® planned fer the folowing Meléer Chengeune and
o—_ FOR OFFICIAL a OnLy
‘ (AFR 190-18)
J
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oja
e Labiang near Lunnings wweilineLé vrdla chen ata Litiesow in istangsh
vrovinces Sinehen: anu Suictman an biangol. 98 eins for dnenvsung
Jia Chou ana Liucnow were
e en Suloimaa wre not exeouveds hwedlineLt
aeccroyod to prevont tein use Uy Uke eneny when tie vspanese overran
the revion iv He autum o 19h. fy Lovedter, only Lulang (usable)
ug
wns Sinoteng (uncer construction) renainea a che six. 1? te operae
tions of tle
C Leber Comnurd were conducted, es had origiacly been
planed, fro the Jhenctu oases.
Grounization Lor constructios
It hud been the vresiuent!s original
Orieng rsiesheis that the
MAAR’ Lields szoula be
suggestion to
built of loed nsterials vy Chinese Labor, with the aia of U.S. teche
aleiins iu envmeore ena lendvleuse Junds. Ib was on Unis vasis that
te Generalissino scceptea tre nlan, imeditely in its tentatave fom,
ana Leter at 3X0, 7 in a de.inisive fashion. there was never ang
cuestion ou relinquishing the vener.d tenes of the ugreeient, but as.
in 80 saiy obser features of the piu, there was uo-e alzsieulty of
interwretulion ot uetails, ‘This wus eapeciily true of fimsneiel aid,
Tee utter of the advisory personel entullea Little wore than routine
Gisfioulties, wid essentially tie orgailzation o: construction forces
cee rather than Anerican provlene
meee FOR OFFICIAL C3. Care
(AFR 180-16)
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a 164
@ The responsibility for smeerdelon of airdroue construction in
Gaina vas vested in the 0G, Fourteenth Alx Force, tut bie engineers
e were not sufficiently munerous to senuxe the MAPTISKORY project in
ad@ition to thelr normal duties. Hence it was recognized that the
advisory personnel protised by the President must be found fron the
States and that thelr early arrival was an absolute prerequisite for
120
the timely corpletion of the VLR ti The War Devartnent re-
quested a lict of the theater's requirenentes' wut vherent a few
timate of the
e@ specialists were desired innediately,1°? no accurate
personnel needed could be nade wntil after a curvey of prospective flolde
had doen mae and the theater ongincers were better acquainted with
the spectfiestions doumded for 2-2) fields.’ nen on 26 Noverber
General Oliver's TNELIGEE Comittee engineers had completed a survey
of the fields, the OBI requested the dispatch by air priority #2 of
a small advance echelon of specisliste--15 officers and 31 mon,12
e uhese specialists were quickly assenbled and were sent to the theater
early in Decenber when General Godfrey went out as project officer for
the AATTHRION! tterds.125 Wnen General Godfrey arrived in New Delhi
on 1] Decenber the total requirements had still not been finally
agreed upon." ue went on to Ohina, where sone engine
8 were
transferred from the SOS OBI to General Oliver's aSC for the Ghengtu.
project; the final requisition for specialist percomnel wes dirpatched
e to Washington and the construction organization was set up.22? these
specialiets were later sent by air priority.1
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“yur - 1165
WAL 5 ole)
e The Chengtu alrdrones lay in Fuglneer District No. 2, China Air
Service Area Comrand, Over-all supervision of airfield construction
e fell to the Fourteenth Air Force's Geineer, Col. , 4. Byroads, who
as a nenber of the TWILIGHT Count tt
had helped select the flelas,
General Godfrey continued to coordinate construction activities both
in the Caleutta end Ghengtu areas.’ with him he had brought from
the States It, Gol, W. I. Kennerson, who took charge of the U, S. arny
engineers on the Chengtu bases. Jdaieon with the Chinese engineers vas
e@ effected through a Chinese civiltan.7°
The snall force of V. &, Arny engineers, it must be recognized,
were for planning and supervisory purposes only; the actual direction
of the horde of coclies vas done by Chinese engineers. Airfield con
struction in China was a responsibility of the Mnister of Comumications,
Anorican-sducated Dr. Beng Yang-Fu. We atded in the selection of
fields and in establishing general policies, though direction of the
@ work was passed on to his Doputy Commiesioner of the Tngineering
Cosmlesion and to the Ghief igineer. Soue problens comected with
the alrftelde cane within the purvley of the liinieters of Finance and
of Defense. After construction was under way, @ Chengtu Office of the
cbinese Znginesring Office was set up, vith its director ascinting in
adninistrative and Zinanclal rather then technical affairs.11
selected
2 Late in Decenber Dr. Taeng Yang-Tu and his subordinat
the executive engineers who were to direct the actual construction.
e Few of then had ever built an airfield, nost of then coming directly
from railroad jobs. But early in January they came up from Kunuing,
fT pO.
; een Rar YOR OE ie)
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ont Lo 1686
(Ae , 3:
e each bringing his om eculpment and staff, sone 300 in alt.” one
engineer was yut in charge of each 2-29 base, and one over all of the
e " fighter fields thon planned. Daring the fortnight after thelr arrival
the Chinese engineors woro briefed by Colonel Keunerson and his staff
on the specifications for 3-29 fields. ith thts orfentation, the
Chinese were atle to take over their job, making their own dotatied
arevings fron layout ené crose-saction sketehes.1°5
The labor problem vas handled forthrightly and with little concern
e for those nost intimately concerned. China's greatest source of
strength lay in her inexhsustible reservoir of nanpover--unsictLled
dy western standards end wholly lacking in nodern machinery, but
pationt and sturdy and bound by a soctal orgamlzation that could be
traneferrcd directly to the new task, The Chungking governnent proposed
to tap this great resource by the simple ané custon-hallowed process
of conscrivting farmers fron the lin valley for the heavy construction
e work; housing was to be eracted by sicllled contract lator, The woetorn
world had narvelled at the earlier bullding of the Furma Road by
masses of Chinese coclies; this new project wae to challenge credulity
‘dy the magnitude of the force involved, Those who described the
project sought analogies in the building of the Great iiall of China
or Herodotus’ accomt of the building of the great pyranid of Cheops.
But whereas the Chengtu project was accomplished by methods and toole
e not dissimilar to those used on the ancient vorke, the time clexent
was entirely different-.the tine schedule on the China bases was charac-
teristically Anerioan.
FOR OFF [AL ©
titrate. MALK LU)
ines
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16?
e@ In early January the Chinese directors and Colonel Kennerson
nade an estimate of the labor force required,
siting the figure at
e 240,000 and assigning to the executive engineer of each field the
nunber required. '* Actual consoription was a responsibility of the
Governor of Szechwan, who promised to draft the men for 11 Jenuary.255
Within 2 weeks sonething Like 200,000 had appeared and by 24 January
work haa begun on most of the fietds.296 tn nig-February, when tt
appeared that schedules could not be not, the Covernor agreed to
@ Graft 60,000 adéitionsl laborers, and in arch, 30,000 nore for the
fighter flelds in the outer clrcle-sone 830,000 consortpts in all.
At the peak, 96,000 were worlding on Pengshan alone. In adéition,
there were sone 75,000 contract workers exployed, Reporte from
various Averican observers differ in regard to the totel musber of
mon involved in the project, and 1t 1s dublous that Chinese statistics
Were xotLewlously acourato; but with the inevitable turnover, there
e nay well have been nearly half a million Chinese employed on the job.157
Tho laborers were drawa frou villages within a radius of 160
niles fron Ghengtu, The original draft vas on the basis of 60
workers from each 100 households, and on the job the coolies were
organized into units of 200, still preserving something of the village
structure with local officials keeping the pay rolls.
e Einauclal problews. An enterprise conducted on such a scale could
hardly fail to effect e sharp economic and social renction. ‘The
e Chengtu area had been chosen ag a site for VLR bases because of ite
ronotenoss fron the war. ‘That rexotenoss was psychological end
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politic us well us geographic, Szechwan hes been coupered with our
pro-Pourl ilutbor IHudle “ests seotingly imme to Japanese attack,
the province was Hsolcticnist," apatvetic tovara the war, and, poten
tially ut least, fantinforeign." Tés wurlords still enJoyed a real
pover urd looked on the ZATISEHCX! project as s scheme whereby the
Ghungking governnent could excroach upon their quasi-autonony. Men
of property seared, needlessly, that their lands would be seized
without recoupense, ana with more justification thet the building of
the fields and the Zeeding of the Us S- forsee (always exaggerated
in ele) vould add to current inflation. The whole poptlace feared
that the estcblishnent of the fields would bring Japanese bonbers to
Chengtu, and ttey wore ap,rehensive of aisorderly conduct by -verioan
soldiers? qThe little man mew that he was being torn. trom his
howe during the iiew Year holiday season and that he might be kept at
work past the season for rice planting-in fact, his amdety to return
in tine for thut sousonal chore has been evopted as the incentive
which arove hin to meet the target dutes.9? only the ohungking
govornmn, the politicluns, ani the contractors stood to gain by
the project.
the role or the Guungking goverment doss né appear, fren the
incomplete evidence uvallable, a noble one, then on 10 loveaber the
President had first proposea to the Generclissino the building of the
Hlelds, he had indicated thet the United States woula make funds
available through lend-lease. l'o specific statenent was nade 2s to
‘the amount or the terns of this financial eid. ‘hen '{.PTER
nen HOB CHF TT .
(Ais aoe)
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(AEH Lovey
169
6 fornally accepted at SSK2WUT, negotiations in China had made little
, and it wag evident te the theater comanders that 20:
progres
Reasure would have to be exerted from Washington.+“0 Chiang Kai-shec
e originally set the cost of the flelds at "over »2,000,000,000" chinese
Yattonel currency" and asked the Prasident for a guarantee of that
enount, ‘hls meant that the United States would bear all the cost
of construction, witch the administration was willing to do, but it
wos naturally interested in the rate of exchange. Currently the
e Placknarkot open rate in China was in the neletborood of 100 or
dollars to one dollar, U, S, currency. ‘The Ghinese governnent, in
the interest of controlling inflation, had arvitrarily eet tno rate
at 20 to 1, Ab the open mate, the cost of the fields would nave been
high but "not unreasonable"; at the official rate the cost would have
‘deen exhorbitant-—sonething approscning $125,000.00 v. s.14#
The negotiations dragged on for several mouths, and inasmucn os
agencies other than the Var Departuent (State and Treasury Departaents
] ssc tana-isane) voro concerned, tho Socuionte snaiable to thie author
allow only a fragmentary account. The Treasury Department, >eing
interested in the broader problen of U. $.-Chinese financial relations
a8 Well as in the Ohengtu flelds, wanted to kold out for the 100 to 1
rate, though willing to act as military necessity demanded, The Yar
Depurtaent was anxious to secure the fields at a reasonable rate, but,
e in the face of Chinese Inclatence on the official exchange, vas
willing to act on a compromise suggested by Gonorale Somervell and
e Clay-—wneredy the 20 to 1 rate would be maintained, but the Chinese
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SEGRE OR OMI os
(AFL 12e16)
17%
e would deposit $60 Gi for each $20 Ox advanced by the Unised States,“
Ghieng Kad~she: realized that the urgency of the target ate
node it Giffioult for the Yar Departuent, through Stilwell, te bargain
effectively, ond while holding fost to hie denna for the official
rate he began to point out that failure to agree on terma—neening
his teras—woulé cause a delay in construction.“ one does not spesit
of Dlacisati on the part of an ally, but at dest this vas very shrewd
trading. To onsure that the project could go on, General Stilwell
e had to uarantes payment of the su demanded at e rate which skould
be decided by current negptiations, 14>
‘he Generalissimo 414 promise
to do his utmost to emedite construction of the airfields, but for
the time Deing a1 funde in China were frozen and it was difficult to
jecurs money for the Chengtu project. 16
Negotiations were further couplicated by several factors. Firet,
there was the question of the shortage, real or pretended, of Gi notes
in China, Anerican officals velieved there were §$10,000,000,000 GH
notes in reserve dn Ohina, but Dr, Kung, Chinose Minteter of Finance,
insisted that there was a shortage and to get notes for ourrent noods
Lt vas necessary for the ATC to fly then out of India.“4? ayo hundred
million dollars in snall bills belts up--as one observer put 4t, haul
ing Ohinese currency wis "definitely a factor im the tomage operation
over the Hump."48 second, there was the matter of the additional
e@ fighter fields and the extession of fields at Kvellin and Kunning.
Those had not been counted in the original estimates. The Chinese had
e ‘been building those at Kweilin for 3-24 bases but now wished to have
1 bel Cake
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ret
ee
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then paia for along with the Chengtu bsces. Tho Var Departnent was
willing to sinsnes the sdaitionel. fighter fields as a part of
VATTERHORI—-and did-—but not the other bases.147 Finely, there was
the matter of Ghieng Kai~ehak's request for « Loan of ©1,000,000,000
GH over and atove the payments for MAMTERECRK. Theater officers thought
‘that there was ro valid need for the loan, the demand for which hed
boon notivated by desire for prestige and the “eneralissino's postwar
plans. gut the refusal to grant this loan ade Chiang Kai-shek
nore obdurate in his refusal to ageept a reasonable solution to the
question of the exchange rate.)
Hence it vas that negotiations continued through January and
Nebruary end into Mareh, with numerous proposals and couter-proposals
and all the involved procedure custonary in oriental diplomacy. Fors
tunately enough currency wis advanced from tixe to tine without «
definite agreewent us to the rates; tle axounts were often inadequate
but this did allow construction to go on, ‘shat the find, settlenent
was this author has not been able to learn. In curly Laren the
estimated cost of the buses——four VLR and six fighter fielda--hed
risen to {jk,4$0,000,000 C# and the rate had not yet been doternined.15?
cue later source speaks of an official (Us $. governnent) rate" of 40
to 153 and thot may have been the vate ab which the settlenent was
rade, One estinate nay be hazerded with Little fear of contradiction—
that the fields cost too mich and that their cost, added to that of the
necessarily extravagant logistical systen, made L./PTERIOR operations,
per ton of bonbs celivered, among the nost costly of the ware
: ee
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age tects)
we
Such profits as accrued to Ghina were not very equitatly spread,
and the building orogran Mia result in some local hartships. Land-
omere, in spite of feare based on earlier experiences vith the
Chinese government, 414 receive compensation for their fields,
though uot at the rate nalé for by the United States and not very
promptly: because of the @lspute over finances and the graft and
Inofficlency of offictale the settlanente were not comlete on 8
February, long after work had veg," * Inflation was aggravated,
as had been antletpated, and landowmors vio had to sell on a rising
narket lost. fo provent the inflation fron intorforing too greatly
with the flow of batlding materials to the contract butlders (sone
$400,000,000 were involved), cefling prices on those articles were
fixed by the Governor and his negotiation boara,15> bat the measure
was only partly successful.
‘fhe Little men vho bullt the flolde suffered aost, hey were
paid on a sort of plecevori dasic, with a pousibllity of earning $50
CH per day, Few reached that fgure--perhags §25 Oil was an average
wage. With the rise in food costs, that war hardly enough to Zeod the
Anborers and nany of then had to be yartielly supported by thelr
fantttes, >
Im spite of these diffieulties, the disoriers which some had
antlolpated ald not coeur, ‘here vas mich grusbling and a few snail
riots, oceasioned in one instance by U. S. engineers proceeding too
preotpitately before lands had actually been purchased, Sut the
fields were built and there was no general resistance on the part of
8 ONLY
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13
eres ness Am fast, Hay cme ‘eventually to take some pro-
prictary pride in the 2-29 project.
Construction, The necessity of building the Chongtu ficlds from ~aterials
@ in the immediate vicinity eliminated of course the possibility of
either concrete or asphalt runvays. ‘The Chinese under imericen super-
vision had built Melds adequate for Chennsult's B-25's und Be2ht3y
but the B-29 requirea u sturdier construction. hen the CBT learned
of the probable adoption of AL.TTERHCRN, Ghenneult requested specific
informstion as to Use syecivication o: flexible pavenents vor VLR
runways.)°7 pull information for gravel und rock runways wes given,
with a minimum length of 7,000 feet at seu level. ”* Actually the
four VLE fields were built with single runways roughily 8,500 feet
(2,600 meters) long, 200 feet (61 meters) broad, and 20 inches (50
continotors) thick, Fifty-two hardstands were proviced on each.
Fighter fields were single strips 4,600 feet by 150 feet (1,400 meters
by 45 neters), with thickness varying fron 20 to 30 centimeters; and
e four to eight hardstande.5? the base course was laid with rounded
waterborne rock, sand and gravel, wet and rolled, The wearing course
was a sort of native concrete called "slurry," a mixture of crushed
rock, sand, clay, and wsters rolled and finished, this gave a texture
and tensile strength not unlike the adobe construction of the Southwest.
The fields were «luost Literally “handuade." Materials were carried
@ from nearby streans in buckets or baskets slung from yokes, in the
woousn-wheeled, squeaky wheelburrows of the district, or less often in
_ iantinimetiimiemeets
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e mule carts, Zxcavation was by rude hoes, Rocks were laid individually
174
by handy the crushed rook was beat out patiently with Little hamere,
he rollers were drawn by man (and woman) power, the slurry mixed In
e@ pits by barefoot men and boys, 160
The first task--draining the rice paddies prevaratory to excavation-—
vegan on some flelds on 24 January. At that tine 1t was thought that
two TER flelde would be operationslly complete by Sl March, tho othor
two ty 50 dortz.”** ay wta-tareh, finsnotal and other difficulties
@ —_—_ BE Fetarted the ompected completion anton to 15 Jot] for Falnohtag,
and 5 Yay for the other three fields, thowh the forner field was al-
ready oven for the delivery of supplios, and all fields should be in
~ early apriz.*©? pour tighter strips were supposed to be ready for
Linited operations before 1 Anril, the others later in the month. +69
Schedules for the fghter fields were naintained, bub the VLR fields were
again sozevhat delayed by vausual ralue, some labor tumover with the
approach of the plonting season, and the pereantal troubl
e 164
funds.
with
On 24 Apri, General Saunders of the S8th Ving brought the firet
3.29 to Xvenghan, ‘This was three months to the day after the paddy
walls bad eon broken. By 1 Nay the four VER fields wore open to 3-29
tratttc, °° ay 19 May the rumvoys on ol) fields, ER and fighter,
wore comleto and sone of the fields were comletely operationar26°
@ General Kuter, vho visited the fields whlle they were being built,
reported to General Amold: "Construction at Chengtu without doubt
Fepreseats one of the truly great efforts of the war."™©? the nistortan
ee,
Settee (AFI: 190-16)
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Menneriye,
ze 2
Sigriyale
Me
e
3° x
very
“ io
e ©
e
Jee]
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cat 1s
“(aie 130-18),
e of the XX Bomber Connand, whose account has been liberally used in
this chapter, wrote:268
It 4s to be doubted that © project of the nagnttude of the Chengty
e airfields could have been accomplished in any other country but
Chins under the conditions thet prevailed. ‘The Chinese coolies-—
the John Q Public of the Chengtu Plain-—denonstrated effectively
the best features of their nation,
She Gavlon Helds
It will be reealled that eppononts of the MATTERHORN plan within
the JPS had stressed, in the winter of 1943.4, the importance as
e strategie targets of of1 refineries and deoots in the VAT, ond had ad-
vooated the use of Vi bases in North Australia from which to strike.
‘The proponents of HADTERIORI hed, as a comronise, suggested the
possibility of bombing Palembang, the wost important ofl objective
in Sumatra, by India-based 3-29's staging through fields in Geyton.
Thie alternative was accepted in principle and on 2 March incorporated
into the plan for Optimun Vi
ote. This plan was uot accepted until
@ 2 sorta, vat on 5 Harsh Oonerad StLLveLd wan taforued that his
Atvective, when soproved, would probably call for one or more miestono
against Faleabang fron Ceylon atrérones.””? operational plans called
for the first such msston to be performed by 15-20 Juty.72
Vhen the possible use cf Ceylon airfields was broached at SEXIANT,
Britien sources had indicated that there existed on the island three
e bowber fields: one for B-24's at Stgiriya and a 4,00-foot field at
‘Trincouales, both belug extended; and a 6,000-foot field at Ratualans,
e@ incapable of further lengthening, Under construction were two other
B ou.
EARL 190-16)
Lo I
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——
POF cay Cesta
(AER sauté)
e fields (umidentified in the report); planned for VEB requizenents
176
with 9,000-foct ramvays, they could be ready by 15 June.?”? ceyion
e presented, one saall scale, protiens of airfield siting and construc
tion no less complex than those of India and China, Ceylon was a large
island with poor internal communications, Frou its nearest point to
Palembang vas a &stance of nome 1,750 miles, a Jong haul even for the
3.29. RAF bases, having been chosen without regard for Falesbang, were
even nore @istant from that target. Primitive transportation wold
@ «2 eLourt any tulleing da the ares most favorably ortented in
respect to Palembang. Construction would be a responsibility of SACSEA
and would have to be done without J. S. ald, vith the Limited equipment
and leisurely methods prevalent in Geylon, and in the face of foraidable
difitealties imsosed by terrain and inadequate eonmnications,
Although Lord Mountbatten ad mown since SEKIANT of the tentative
Plans for operations fron Ceylon, he had made no serious effort to
@ TE He emateed tetas wekLe deployment plane vere tn a atate of
flux, On 5 March General Suter, then in India on a mission witch
concerned, arong other matterc, the 1ANMERION project, conferred wth
Tord Louls, When the latter expressed willingness to initiate a build
ing progran when officially requested, General Kuter recommended to
Vashington that SAGS24 oe informed of the current status of plans for
Coyton.*”> setawolt's atvective, witch cate directly thereafter, wes
e yecktte tn Its reference to the need for the Ceylon Meldss and though
Lord Louis was sonewhat vicued at the way in which that directive was
(ARR
5 %
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R AvedN)
e promlgted,’”* be tumed immediately to the required task,
176
Bn route to Australia, General Kuter stopped off at Colombo,
@ where he met with the Connander in Chief, Ceylon, and with Sir Richard
Pelres end other RaF officers, He learned that the British were
currently working on two YLE fields: (1) Kankesanturai on the north
end of the islené near the mort of Jaffna (completion, October 1944);
and (2) Xatunayake (Wegonbo), near Colombo (completion, April 1946),
Whon he pointed out that the localities lay at the extrene B-29 range
e from WEL targets, the British offered as alternatives alrdrones at
China Bey and
were sonevhet lese dictont, but ot122
would pernit ulssione only with a reduced Dont load, General Xuter
proposed the ure of eter in the southeast part of the delend, fifty
wiles fron the raiirosd teruinus at Vatara, He net the "usual ob-
feotions," not wholly unjustified, concerning the shortage of labor,
cquipnent, and natertals and the carly target date (July 1944). RAF
e offictals realized that Ceylon might be used as a staging base arainst
Singapore, which was an attractive prospect, but Futer thought that
thet apathy night ve cured by further enlightennent concerning
MADTEROR' plane, by 9 gentle hint that B-29's might be used from
Australia rather than Ceylon, and by the loan of enginear equtpnont.?”©
the inaccessibility of the ares desimated by General Kuter and
the time factor, however, made the southern flelds inzpractical, and
© te sseatton veo rotctod ta sator of the sour stoves axtonnd
e above, with China Bay and llinneriya scheduled for earliest completion--
probably by duly with the overaris poatten bad
elven thea,2??
POR OSFITS Coe ML
(AFR 190-16)
_.. mm
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Tesiqns called for acconnodations for 26 3.29's on each flold
in order that 60-plane misstons could ve staged through Ceyloh. By
nid-tpril it woe apparent that the July torget date could not be net
end General Strateneyer recuested pernssion to abandon work on ail
fLelds save China Pay, and there increase facilities to a carnoity of
56 3-29.27 me Joint Chiefs requested the Britich to increase
thetr efforts 1n Geylon;1”? vat Tord Nounthatten, on the advice of
Strateneyer ond Yolfe, had alrenty terporarily susponded vork at
Eimnertya, an with the concurrence of the British Ghiofe of Staff the
JOS consented to the tencorary concentration on China Pay alone, 180
Presumably Imneriyn was to ba completed later, but the status of
Kankesenturad ond ‘atunqaie was uncertain. ®! py mié—culy a 7,200-
Soot rumway, the hardstands, and the fuel distribution systen at China
2ay were 100 per cent complete, and by the tine of the firet mission
out cf Gaylon on 10 august the fold was holly operational. /°?
FOR OFFICEAL USE ONLY
SET en, (AFR 19-16)
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68 ae sea
e Ghepter Wt
Reweniber, tco, that every single godéam thing that we send
into Oaize has to te flown in.
Letter fron a menzer of XX Bonber Command's
Advance Sehelon
vhon la Janvary 1946 the Jotut Intelligence Comittee made a
cougeratlve study of the sultabllisy of sone half-dozen areas us
e@ potoatial tases for the ewloymcnt of the 422 agetnct Japan, they
raved Ghengta ne the loo:
offoriag the greatest logl stlead atsst-
zalttes.) Fee geraons ta the LATTHPMORN plancing staff would have
challenged that Juicnont.® sav Headquarters bad lenmed fron bitter
experience the eos) of any operations in China, General arnoli had
recently stated for publte tnfomation that "Zo supply owr groving alr
atrenzth in that country has been werhaps the greatest single challenge
e to the efficteney of the tr Forces," and the 3-29 pzvJect proa! sed
te susterate a vary complex sftustion, Tt cannot be euphasized too
stroucly that th MATTERHORN plan had bees formulated deliberately
in the fase of recognized Ufftculties and had teca adopted at hishest
levels for reasons vhich sesued xt the tive to transcend ordinary
stamlards of econouy of offort.
e Plamers a Washington and Catre of eoxre could not anticipate
11 the troutLys vitch would remult from the prectpLtate conltzent to
x.”
of an untried plane tu a theater where primitive facllictes,
OPP 2 UNE
2 (AFR 190-16)
a AMI
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ra
(ATR 1609
e GLOBAL SUPPLY ROUTES
Len
e ‘unrace sus
ORIGINAL 0-29 HevEENT
Arc ‘ripeanie® Raure
. ae 4 2
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<<
(AB
aye, 180
e tangled comand systeus, and o fluld tactical sttuatlon coneptred te
Amvalldate comonly accupted planning factors, Generally the ‘lashtagton
e astisater of target dates and avaliable rescurs.0 woro on the ostinistte
shie, @ teateasy not infrequontly ascribed by thester officers to
Aptoat b-
sorters.2ub thera was no fa{luze on the part of the
‘ashingtan planners to consiter tn thets ealsulntlony the fundamental
probloae {avolvef 4m nourishing a boabartuent progran from China bases.
Baslowlly nost of thoee probless stenael froa distance and ite
r ) consultant fastor tiae, and from the competitive deuands of the numer—
ous operations ina glotal war.* The bases ta china were to be the
host distant fron the Untted Stater of all these in ow far-fimg
attls line, The 2-29's could be Zlown out by their combat ere:
wore aatter of 11,509 miles by the routs chosen. All othor
ond satertel wast be noved by water or by aly tramsyort, Hg
priority passsagers and frelyht could go cut dy ATG via Vatal, Khertowa,
e and Garachi-wa trig which adght be nade in 6 days with lus but which
for sone XK Bouber Comwné personnel consused » aonth or nore. Sven-
tunlly the Xt Boaber Command ewployed a speotal "Slend" service--
surface sity from Yewaric to Cesablanen and A20 shuttle Casublanca to
Caleutta, Zhis gave a regular but Maite? service for taportant
supplics and for passengers of lower priorities; passage required
But the great bulk of troops and supplicc had to
‘be moved ty water, In the early troop moveacats sous units went via
ee *
vessels, Other unlts and soct suzplice went wectwurd, however, either
Neditorranean and the Suez, irnsshipping in North Afrles fn British
MR OFFICIAL. USE ONLY
i imal
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SEGREY
262,
(ar anaes
@ soa Pactfts P0%'s oF foun the AnLsitte end out thsvayh fhe Fara
Geni, Tron elther coust ships rounded the southern chores of
e Australia; 61
‘ub troops regalarly Landed at Zoubay and went back east to the
y vessels then went up the Bay of Bengel to Calestte
“huragpur area in on unplersont woos of travel by Indian raflronde,
One fortunate troap shipaent made the voyage frou Los angeles to
Boubny tn 54 days; ost unite wore & to 10 wecks in passage fron the
United Ststes to tl
Bengal stations. 4 Liberty cargo ship could be
e@ counted on to wake the trip ou’ in 60 days and accomplish two tura-
arzunig ina year, Under the best 2f clrewistances coommications by
sea would have deen slow. With the CBE rating Lower sbiopine priorities
thon either the Daropean er Packfis theaters, tonnage and trosp 1Lft
were strattly lialted and within the theater the YLR project had to
coupete with numerous other corm twonts.
Difficulties dtd not end with the arrivol of supplies within the
e theater, Ports were Mxited in amber, overtaxed, and by U. 8.
stondurés inefficiently ogerated; as an early exissary for haTTERuORY
put 4t, Celeutta was "a good port with bad habits," iiithin India rail
transportation wes slow and uncertein, highways hopelessly inadequate
for a najor war, Ground eoummicattons between the several Chins
vases wore practi tly non-ertetont,
e But the eruclal stage in the transport networks Lay between Galoutta
and Chengtu, After the Japonose had ext the Bursa Road in late spring
e of 1942 all supplier had Deen carried into china ty air. In the winter
“(AER 190-16)
- SE
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a 12
“ARE 48)
e of 1945-43 Geisral Stilwell was tring to drive through a new land
Led—the road from Ledo which was Later to tear his naue, and an
@ accompanying vips-line--but those projects did not promise any early
ald ty LATTEROR’: rather, stace they wore tn open comotition for
shipaing and verconnol, they constituted only an additlonal Amsedinent.
The life Mne to Chins then wan the celeorated over-the-Hunp alr route
from Assan bases to Konuing, nourished frou Jengnl ty a complicated
saxtare
e eredaally WAlt vp its operations with)
all, river, and air routes. 4010's India-China i
ing, had
wg the end of 1943 1t was haul-
ing nore ta 12,090 tons per xonth, That asount however was pitifully
tnudequate for existing requireaents--the Fourteenth ar Force alone
needed 10,009 tons-—and every ton claimed in allocation had to be
Justified by dire neoesstty. During 1944 the capacity of that route
Anoressed and eventually HATTERIOR! profited by the expansion, Sut
in thy declining the VLR project was not supposed to infringe upon ANC
e allocation of tonnage to other agenoes, and such ald ac the XX Bomber
Comand Ata recotve in the carly xonthe of 1944 was melther substantial
nor depentable,
Tn spite of all there handle-ys the XX Bouber Coanand was able to
scowulte in China enough supplies to support a Mnited boaber offen
The tine
5!
elnle originslly concetved was never even clossly
e apgroxtuxted, Delavs in the coubut readiness of the 2-29's contributed
‘to this fallure, as did delays in the oversoas sovement of men and
e supplies and in the bulld-up of » cloak pile ia China. Ine long and
Antyuslve Voubardaent ‘panna ache not
FOK Otis oe CNuY
s sia 1-16)
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=a
FOR OF
Ly
183
Myo Be
(pr i938?
significant: the Zighth Atr Force had also got off toa
e have ber)
slow start. Dut the logtrtioal fustore which contriouted to the tardy
e initiation of combut operations ware inherent in the geographical,
Inductrial, and tucties) attvation in the O3f theater, and those
factors wore to cuntinue to conALtion all oprations of the XX Bomber
Comumd until ts nove to Paclfle buses,
Tn this chapter an effort 4e uade to describe only briefly the
overaoas novouont of the planes, egulguant, and personne! of the
e Command, bub a fuller trentacnt Lo given to the efforts of the command.
to extsblish an adequate ind depentatle supply Line betveen Caleutta
and Chongta. tn gonerel the teciuning of coutat activities in atd-une
has been taken as a rough chronolocleal terainax for thie stuly. 3e-
cause at thet tiue, hewever, the probleas of over-the-tiuyp traneporta-
tion wore reuebing a climax, the story ts in this chapter carried
sonewhat further.-to Septesber 1944 vhen a solution of sorts ws
e evolved.
Logistical Elans
Seasenition by the afr staffs in Washington sn? the UBT of thoso
logistical difficulties which have been enumerated, cbarply affected
sath of the rucceseive plane for VER optrstione viich exansted fron
their respective offices in 1943, Specifically each plun offerad sose
e expetteat uneredy operations froa Grins Yesee aight be nowelshe? by
oir transport frow Celoutta in such wise thet there woul? be no In-
e fringenent on air Mit allocated to current operations. Those plane
(AER 100-18) ©
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- 164
(at be
e
have boon desoritea oarlier in respect to their strategic Amplications;
here 1t uay be useful to review those sections wileh dealt exclusively
e vith toglettes,
The scbitious SITING SU plan had called for the delivery to
Galoutta by chip of 690,000 tons per month, of hich appropriate itens
were 42 be ferried to forward bases in the Changsha area by C-87's
allotted to the project at the rate of 200 per grow of 2-g2's--in all
soue 4,000 0-87's for the 2 costat grows contesplated.” the comtor-
proposal which caue frou the tkeoter tn the guise of the DTLIGHT plan
nected dow sosevhat these extravagant entimates.° For 10 groupe
nawmtng ssa0 609 coubat sorties ger xonvh fron the HvelLin ares It
‘aos esthnated that 62,000 tona of dry oango, plus ruffieleut POD,
showlé be scipped ench nonth to Calewsta, Boss should be hanlet to
Ywsthin by 48 B-2l'e oonverted for the purpose, a4 other supplies by
67 GoSt's ox C-87'2, those alzoraft would fly direst to Xvellin,
tut on the retura would stage vin Kunming, where it was expocted that
fue! would be available by pipe line (after July 1944). 3-29's wore
to fly fron Coleatte. to Vwollin with an extrs load of gas vat no boubs,
noch up ub Tactlin, ant after the nl
on refuel there for the retura
Might to the rear arom.
wo features of TWILIGHT wore of gre. stentttcance for later
@ plane ant ozeratloni
‘the tea of ustng the Chins area for staging
wields rather thaa pormanont taser, ani the eaggestion that the 3-29's
e contrioute to the support of their own operatione by hauling part of This Page Declassified IAW EO12958
Pe apes
seenet 188
@ ‘the required fuel. The source of the latter sugedstion ts not apparent.
It had been one of the conditions under which General Chonnault's firot
e hecry Doxbardnent group hnd boon assigned that the uft should be self-
supporting as far a6 tronovort we conesrnod; and that group, the
B06th, had been esinently cuscessful in its oserations since licrch
1943. About the time the TWILTCHT plan was fermilated Col. L. Ty
Rarmen, Deputy of the oS8th Wing, was at Chennault's headquarters. re
and Chennault and Col. ZH, Beebe of the SO%th Group drow up a brief
e loglatical plan for possible operations of the 58th iing, slong lines
sisller in concept to TWILIGHT but one much smaller scale. It seems
plausible to assuse that the self-sapport ides steumed frou a combina-
tion of Colenel Feebe's expertences and Colonel Harman's estimate of
B-ae capabilities.” At any rate the skeleton plan sketched in
Chennault's headquarters wes incorporated into the plm which Wolfe
presented to General Arnold on 12 cstover.”
e General idolfe's plan, it vill be recalled, was deslgned for nore
Annediate execution than elthor of ite predecessore, and it thorefore
Anvolved tne use of a sunller force and of a lesser amount of supplies.
The plan was based on the employment of tyo TED wings with a totel
assigauent of 300 3-29'r, and 1t made no special proviston for the
period (April to September 1944) when only one wing would be ix place.
Assuming thut "abnorunl logtetion required In thie area necessttetes
e ccploysent of the 3.98 bonber ar a eontet Srareront,” Yolte proyosed
e to use 100 cArereft on coutut missions and 190 (contained in combat
ying Caloutte to ain His caleuleticns
condition) as transports This Page Declassified IAW EO12958
hese becod on there figurert trenayurt sorter per month, 2,160;
Fay load, 5 tons; totel wonthly tonnage, 10,600, Using a planning
factor of 30 Lone per ecxbst wigeton, he could thue count on three
100-rortie stri!
onth fron. the forvard sven (9,000 tons), and
eB
rUt1] enfoy © confortatte nargtn of esfety. To support the fetter
evoupe which would be ettacked ty the Fourteenth afr Force for his
atréroce defense ond to asetet In bullding the inltdod stock pile
1 Sole projoued te eaploy 20 6-37". These vere to
cone out wlth the O9th sing end were to be attacked to the S9¢th Bou-
ardent Grow
rt ware te cpurste excluctvcly for the TEE project.
The VATTIESOR’ plan wae enscrttally Mike volfe's in the syeton
ef abr transyort recorm.ndné, thing simoe Lt provided for the Inltdel
yuent only of the 6th jing with tts 100 2-29's it wne based on
om ertinute of only one 10d-sortic mleolon por genth frox aprll to
Septoater. The contral core of tke plan war rti]l thet by virtue of
the
sort cetivitte: of tho 2a!
8 (ond the 2 6-878), 6 no
Grin will be tapose? upon the feelLither or servicer allocated to
othe: operattens im the theaver."® It Ls dvblous thot MATTERHOR?
Would have been sdopted at SEKIN? without tMs provision, and the
svecitically qulffled thelr sysrcval by the restriction that
IATNDEOR: chould be sounted “without mterlelly affecting other
nto
e qucrittons.
Unicrtunctel; that elauze was subject to a verlety of interpreta-
tone, Obvicasly It could not kee that SMTTEPHONT vas to receive no
(AFR 190-16)
a ~~ MI
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Siorer 187
ya Igae)
Jegistical support vastever—in fact the Joint Chiefe had alresdy
faced the necenclty of seewing troop ft anf cere: space for the
ort from Ineti
rroject, In respect to alr trax to China, thenter
comanders were inclined toverd o 1tterel resting of the SEXTA.T qualt-
flontions but dn the face of logistics) realities Lt was soos nocessary
to vsekty the restrictions by a musber of expediente, none of then
wbolly satiefacto: Lt @ wore
y to any of the interested purtle:
cleurely tae schedule fer initiation of contet nieplons the ofr
troncrert schene Zorulated by Genera] Wolfe afght have worked. the
etrong dasive In Jastington to une gocd the T-day prosised by Genera
Amold to the Fresizent, houever, plas deley~ br ngenelus other than
tke
wbex Gomand in ueeting comituente, mde it necosarry to
provite logtetical suport ip aléition to that originally eonterplated.
4nd, even 80, operations were inevitably postponed.
The Orerssis Vovowent: Shisring
wos rot, by ctondcrde of the TIO, 5 tremendous wider
EC:
tatdng but the problen ef findirg bottoms to rove troops end supplies
iat
6 to neat the seceated tergel ator vic a Uifsleult one: oc a
aa For~
pale aencage crc: SIMA out At, "shipping de bottleneck,
tunately eutmarine losses iz the luct quarter of 1943 were not so heavy
ag hed teon enttedyated, ond ir eotte of heavy uovenante to the 2I0
the chizpln, situstior ws eleetdc esowh te allow, with the exerelee
of soue Ingenuity ani vith cere inevLtable celeye, the acalmment of
tomiage and troop spacer to the VE project. As between troop transrorts
- ” A. cate Wok)
(AFR 190-16)
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at kote
and cargo vensele it was the farmer whieh caused the rost concorn,
ho first troope for vhich transportation ha? to de provided
wore the construction unite for te Indi: afr besec; the etory of how
thoy were shipped. in large part out of troop Lift reculerly asslmed
L
to the OPT, har elmeady been told. General Stilwell wae whilirg to
this cocorctor to SANTOR, pechare tn part becsure the engineer
unite could be used for otter therter rejects onse the VIR tases
vere coupletes but 1t hud been bis understcnding that extra ehipring
would be urovided for Xt Zouber Command needs, wolch he could hardly
ne expected to carry frou a shipping budrct nlready bedty strained,
In the discussion of IATTERFORY at the SETANT conference the
yrobles of siipring was one of the crucie] iseues. The logistics
tables provided in the plan submitted called for shipping to acccnuodate
0 20,000 troce sacer rd acxe 200,000 tone of ery cargo between
1 danvary ané 20 June, and nore than 20,000 tens POL per month after
Lapril. This proviston wee for the XX Beuber Connand with its first,
ving oly; as the second wing noved out into coubit, tonnage require-
xente would incresse.4 9
ye figures of course were not firm, but
they hat served ac a guile woerety logistical planers hat begun to
set up the necesrory shipsin..1© the proviso that NATIEHION should
not affect naterially other approved operations complicated this task.
Current estimater indtented that shipping for all accepted projects in
the OT wus avetLable, and the postponencnt of operation TARZAL, then
thought protatle, wou
release sone alloented shipping during the
firet quurter of 1944, Trcop lift wae more difficult to obtain than
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he sg
e cargo vorscle, but t wos thoukt that, by moving uulte fron Newport
evs te Torts Afetoe tn T 5. sitpe and tranothignting then thera/Hnt thet
@ ahips for the rum to Boxbuy, adequate proviston ight de ucco.1®
ca the Basle of agresents unde in the final eesctons at SHAT
eGalttonal troop Lift of 3,000 apices war allotted to the OBI for
Jeamucry, and with General StLivell's concent vas acelimed to XX Bouber
Cound use, ‘Thle capsckty cured for two service growps, an alr depot
grovp and varfous ansller uatts.? thie troop novenent wes nade
e@ sosritle by trensfer of a ohtp fron the Talted Steles~Talted Kington
rit, a troncfer made vithout serlouely dicturbing the bail
up af the
invuston force. 1%: planning alced at tating atvantege of all
vaconetec ta shipe,!? sttccation was made ty Chrletane for shipping
Jor alY UATI-EFOR! pereomel and mtertel need. through July 194¢,20
This wllocc thon d40 not Insure the ~rorgt arrivel of troops and
oupglies. Of 20,870 tons of Initial orgarizational equlpment, 11,280
e tons were scheduled for chipuent by 1 Jamexy."2 Of aso tte:e,
euoumting in bulk te some 4,300 tenc, 98 yor cost were on tke seas or
avaiting Gegatch at Tewari by 15 danuary.°? ASF iteus ai¢ not receive
ruck prompt trestzent, apparently ecause ASF had not been instructed
dy OPD to puck UAQTERLORI ahipnente, ‘Thet conditdon wns renedted by
clving to the project firet urlorlty for the month of February.
e By 1@ Fetreory 62,000 tons of ASF equiprent and supplies hié been
shipped cn the bectlog awedting in port wat only 4,000 ton: the
a late date at which shipping was arde araflctle and the fatlure to push
(APT 190-16)
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yuk WF
He 190
the project nado 11 aifflewtt to spncnronize the arrival of organtze-
tonal egulguont and the troce untts, Socething of the herdshtps
@ zecuclened by this bad tinting hue doen aentiened earlier in comection
vith the enginecr battellors, and reports froa other typer of organtza-
tHene trdtecte thet fev of then fount on thetr arrivel the equlpuent
necdot.
Refore the ond of Fetrnary the majority of unite acheduled for
noveiont by aurfaca craft vere at sen, with arrivels eetinated for
e Late Moreh or early april.®5 oze large contingent, incJuding seven
‘ond unixtenance squadrons with a combinné 2/0 strength of 119/2055,
eabarked in Liberty ships
Yewyort Nows an* safjed on 12 Februury in
@ large convoy bound for Oras, ‘here they were transferred to the
Ghamallicn, = foruer French Liner opernted by tho Britieh, and on
L april they reached Zontay, having been 60 days in pacsage frou the
Untted Stat:
Other wilt: left in a convoy for Casablanca on 22
en€ tranashipped at Oren to the IpLlendaa, a Dutch liner in
British services they dé not urrive at Sonbsy until 26 April. hore
fortunate were those unite including eter’ bord mintenance squadrons,
which eatled from Lop Angeles on 27 Yetrunry in J. $. 5. dk, Toma.
th only a sincle stop at Heltourne, where they picked up Zoyal
Mary conveyt, they recehed Bestar on Sl larch, Tot only was thetr
e voyoce utch faster, but they avolded sone of the disconforts suffero®
other unite which ted core through the Hea! terranean. =
e Other orgartantions continued to arrive at Bombay during 4ortl,
and vere sexton by ratl te the Zengn] stations--a trip of 5 to 7 days.
OR Of,
be EE
SECRET e sDoagy ON
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ums rag
91
en hess
e At the ent of larch fever than 4,000 men of tke counand vere tn place.
Dy nid-apetl cow, 2,€08 had arrived, with not of the othorr acheduled
e for arrival by the end of the nonth. A station list of 10 tiny shows,
21,820 in place, Thte covered all wilts acclmed and attached to the
esszsnt, including seme C31 ada few Britieh troops who had already
‘deen in the theater, and 1t incleded also X% Somber Comand personne!
ich had arrived ty alr. But in all sonething ice 20,000 wen liad
sarived In Inte during prt, hae been prec!
e and the sajority of ther had coue by sea. 2”
isa
sed and put te v
Aix Semnspork fio the Theater
Because of the pressure of tine, alr transrort var of nore than
eval inportance dn noving yersonne! anf high pricrity freight of the
XX Eombor Courand to the theater. Other thon sual n@vance parties,
Vitch safe their way out ty ATG, the first important movenent van nade
6 4m the 20 C-87'r wich Hed Deen acclened to the command. There planes,
Jed by Gereral Volfe hirself, carrie? certain key personel and some
eqipuent. They left vorrison Field on 5 January and arrived at Yew
Tethi oa the 15th.%° cripinatty 1t had been planned thet the 2-av's
‘thengelvce would carry all combut crave, regular and extra, and other
passengers, brt that plan was screppe?, Because of the ustrte’ nature
of t:
T+O8E0 engine 1t vee teousht necessary
provide along the
e route “nd in the therter c larger poreentare of spares than vas
custouery for other bouburduent units. The large elze of the engines
wh EN a ag
gCRET FOR OFFIC rau USE ONLY.
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u , 192
leck@ed to carzy one spare in cach 3-29 by elirinating passenger
ven thie expedient would not satisfy engine reguireuents, axé 1b
mmuver of men which she command could Itself
reduced consi¢er: bly
wove by air, The seant, 1f schedules were to de maintained, that a
considexeble arount of ald must po hed fron
2, and in view of the
control of ATC allocations to Inia by the OE and the restrictions
place? on LAMPESEOR: by the OOS, the altvation offered real difficulties,
Im early Febroary AAT Headquarterm estizeted that the XX Bomber
Command wowlé require from ATG the follewing allocations: February, 90
tons; March, 190; April, 240; May, 230. On request Generel Sttiveli
expressed willingiess to undorwits thece aurmts fron his allotuent.2?
Pessengers would nuxber 1,252.82 og 20 February beyan the wovesext
vie South snoriea and Jeatral Afric: of persomel from the several
headqusctare—cousni, wiag, groups, and squdrone. Because of low
priorities held by sue of these ghipnente, some meavers vere as long
af 38 days ca zoate, 52
Meamfiile it became obvious that estim.tes which had bewn agreed
-~5350 engines,
ath 2
on Were not adequate, ‘The chlef alffieulty vas
and wher efforva to reiuee transrort royulrmuents by dnorensing englae
33
overhaul potentials in the thester falled,” 1t besane necessary to
other arrangouents, The new plan was to catablish a water-air
Touta, with passengers ané freight proceeding fron the United States
‘to Casablanca by surface cra‘t, and thence to Caleutta by AIG. By
‘this means 4t was hoped to deliver 500 to 660 tone during the crucial,
4OR OFFIC!)
SECRET (ABR 100-16)
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ONLY This Page Declassified IAW EO12958
“CRT
193
bs deste oa6)
aonths af Apri] ent bay." ints wav acccptuble to General Stilwell,
through stor hendqurters priorities were to te cleared." to
eccemplish the took, 27 D-UMs were to te azstincd (actually only 25
were), which skould
ke 175 trips, hauling a totel of 786 pasuingers
and 250 exginer,2€
The zoveacnt, Imown to AT0's Torth africox Wing as Hselon 10,
uroved te te the largest cngle project which kad been exeouted ty that
crgantantlon, ke shuctle cervice began vith a flight fron Casablanca
on 6 Aprit, o few dese eorlts ected, und v:
completed
onl dure,
cifted muber of encinen were hauled,
‘ub puscengere corrled euMeret 1,525. che (-f4!s carved serally
28c0 enciner, 12 pursergrrr with excear tagsnge, and 1,500 to
1,200 powdr of adaitional fratgtt. Clue In possace vurled, but we
oul]; arounl 2 to 4 weolrc. Thus couhat ereve starting frou the
“nited States on 19 .rch togan te urrive ct Cha:
on 11 aprty 97
Fron ite Incegtioa thie acthod me reecuctzed ac a temeriay
stongrp to be utilised osly during Aprfl ent ley. Tn aldlarck General
Smeold sxmounced to Generel “olfe that thres Pusher Suyport Squadrons,
with Inttial eqaigsent of 18 C-4€'s each, uore being orgarized to
owt le atéttioncl alr trineport for Mago
. Tt was sugcerted,
that the frat ait, sche2uted for jelivers tx turch, be uttlizet to
coypent Eeay tomncge and thet tke other scustrons, to cove out in april
and tay rocvestively, should do turned over to ATO to te operated on
tho Cnenblence-Sclestia *uttle watil October, by whlch tne aT? wae
33
expected to te sble to muprort the XX from tte ow resources.
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194
Gerercd Wolfe submitted an operational plan which wes acceptatle in
ington. 9 tub there we sone diftleulty ir getting the operctiene
under wey, lL the units were lute in apresring. The firet syucdron,
on te arrive1 In april, nos put on the Emp run as bud bees Intended,
“her the other unite aprenred later, thetr cortrs2 praconted a problen.
What tire the derignotion of these latter units had beer changed
to the Ist ond 28 aly Tracuort Synczone (weMTe), Tf var evidently
intended that the ‘nobility’ should be achieved tr not tying ther
down to normal service orgonizettons and cqctguent, but the faflure
to supply uch anintereree worked grent hamtsMps on the agerer which
had to opercte #1
. Shely control then and thet aiurter beatae 8
rattor of Qrpute tetween AC and the Xt Pomber Comund.“ Yeverthe-
lece MIG'e Yorth African tng beGe apercting the ecmealled "lene!
service on 6 Sure, hie required sone readjuttaent of thelr regular
we be
se of the Idstted range of the C-uFte.4l
The Mend service guaranteed to the Xt Bouber Commnd 393 tone per
senth (Including aprroat. ate
Avec), Ovursll priority wae
ectehliched by the Terth Afrtecn vilng, intersel prtoritier by the aa *
Tm lute neut th eMocstte: Increased for the &
ding,
% In alMitien to the Men? service, § tone a north all-air
service frou the United Stutoz to India wos acelyned to the comand,
ing priorities on certiffection from the the. tert
with a10 esteMte®
Sreracns waceuend of ibe Tacks
‘hen specific planning for th: employment of
B-09 first Degen
tn the spring of 1947 Lt ws thawht that 190 of the planes would be
tO O,
APL syola6y
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seener 195
(an oder
sly gamury 194.4° relays in production occurred
@ ves Sor caste t be
however witch husdteayred trataing activittec of the Doth ving’? and
e necestItated sco reviston in the plans for deployment. It won these
Colays witch hed cuured the Fresi?en
gree!
annoyance end had led to
cfforts on the gurt of the UP te cecure Myhor profuetton prtort thes
for the B29 groject.2” By the tine the NATTERNONT plen was presented,
to the Joint Chots it var ovkdent that ever 4f ar over-rtéing priority
were cstabtichnd for the 2-99, It would be here teforo the S8th ‘ing
e would receive ite Gu) corglenent of atrertt,? sy rtagaruary a
yart of the Ing tn production
‘boon olirizated, but sottfie.tien
for costat (Irelwiing the inatal
lon of a four-gun turret) war behind
49
schedule.” at that toe It was ertizated that only 159 of the 150
pla note realr for cortat by 1 ereh.© atr@rone construe-
coule
tlon tn the Calcutta ares had been correspondingly slow. and for a
walle dt alght hove seered that the readiness date of the feldy
e rather than of ths 3-29's would be the chef fuctor in detervining
the tae of dopartere, But by late Jamury theater officials vere
core opti
ctie concerning tke progress of construction. /ith Kharsepur
snd Chains e+
sated as Ttarely operational" by 16 arch, ané other
fields which could be used tenporarily if neceesa=y, the theater ws
conficent of being able to birdie tke 3-29's as soon as they could be
rent oub."! Ina gencrel werr, ther, the beginning of liarch was
e accepted 93 a sonsttle tercet Gute for the neretent.
: The over-all plan for the overseas {14h of the 2-20's included
a deci to semi severe] of the planec to Shglend before the four
US
__ inmates
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196
» O
(Goh te
svoups left for India, bls Qiverston bag the due? purpose of glving
the 2.28 u okutedown test tn a long overwater flight with @ spare
engine abocri, und of acrving at a part of an elaborate sckene of
deception, CooréLustion with the Tighth alr Torce tegen In early
Tece.ter, ©? ané detatle of the schaxe were worked out Jointly by aa?
Keagqwrtors end General wolfe an? his eteff ot Salina."* the flight
nas reduced t¢ a sincle plane and there were uany modtffeations in
detall, but the baste elenents of the cche-e remained. unckanged,
Mhe utility of such & cover olan is obyicus. The existence of
the 3.29 kad long since ceused to d2 a secret, and on 4 Jemuary’ General
Ameld stoted for public tnforcction thet tthe 2029, for example,
wAI1 see action tr 1944." veowtedge of the abnormally Tong runways
veing betlt ot Caleutta ond Chengtu could not be kept from Uopenese
Antelldcerce and it required no master aind to deduce thit they vere
not being prepare? for Bigtts or Oalf'e, hon the 2-09" should arrive
im Indic thetr phystesl presence could not be long hid, and their
arnt
+ it wap feared, right Indleste all tee elenrly the purpose of
the Chengta flelds. Any means which night dicguice the wiecton of the
Po28's would ald materfally in achicvinc tactieal curprise.
Resentially the cover plex exlled for the Glgpiteh of several
aoa's (ar one) to England, routed through Torthnest africa, In
nd the planer wera te be shifted about frou fleld to Held until
‘thelr preserce should becore Zoirly widely ‘now sn? the inpreacion
chowld be geined ty the Axle powers that TIP tonters were to age thelr
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‘ (AFR 150-18) This Page Declassified IAW EO12958
vet
th thts controlled Leak
wolght to the Combired Zonber Offensive,
in securtty there wos te be coordlzcted a coneurrent gregran of
publicity to crecte the following belicfar that the 3-29, though
@ecl ne for VEE operations, had not lived vp to exzectatone; that
ib wae Yelrg uodLfed to serve as an amed “auper-transport"; thet
in vlew of the preceing need for alr 11ft over the Eup, several of
these atreraft were betng sent to Indiz on an enperinentel beets; and
hat it wae for then the nov fields hed teen prepared.
The "news" releases wore ude in the thecter according to plan in
nidaPebrenry. £6
Mesrwnile the flight plan of the so-celled "Pothflnder"
plane to Ingland vac changed tn reqpect to route, schedule, and other
detalles. The date of departure kaa to be poctponed from 10 Febreary
to ecsly arch to cllow flight testing of the ner R-5SEO engines
redified in Janvory,”” che otaxe, under comand of cl. Trank dook,
Fle out vic “atel and thurrelech to St, dewgan.®® Instead of return
dng to Salina vith tho f11ght dots, the eollcebion of whion had beos
one of its mlartons, the plane and erew reenined 4m Tnglend until the
end of varch."? revorts avtratted by radio fron Segland however tn
clected no gre-t yariction ip flight characteristics from those watch
had been observed ir previcus tests. surty in april the Pathfinder
wert on to Thuragpar, arriving there on the 6th, the eecond 3-22 to
appear at an Intic tace.&
Meanvhtle the main body of plunes had beau: to nove out. On
J harch, the date provicurly set for the departure of the initial wite
f
Geners Argold announceé t2 the theoter a nev flight echedute.©? me
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FOR UF) ML TSE ob 196
(Arie 19016)
firct eckelon (10 3-28's of the 40th Grovp) would Lenye on 10 arch,
arf therecfter tusreuente of 9 or 10 planes were to be Gispatched
fadly util 26 oreh, Allowing § daye for the trip, thte achefule
previded Zur the arrival of the full flight echelon at Caleutta
Detween 15 and Sl arch, The deulnated route was ae follows:
Saline to gander ei 2,500 miles
Gonder Late to Larrakeck 2,700
vayrekech to Cairo 2,350
Gatzy to Saracht 2,400
Harachd t2 Osleutte Lo
31,580
net
Tt wus expected that the varlous alte vould sake no Landings tn India
rave .t thelr respective bene etatione, witch were deotmated in
sdvaree by Generel Stratenryers bat Torech! decane a regular station
rather thin cm esergency fel, and landing: vere sonetiner ante at
other beaae.
On 20 torch “ashincton snromoed onothar delay which would bold
ug the tnittel contince=t w:til Df arch, and the dopartore of the
other Increxents by 16 dare eech.°* thie schedule should have seen
the ylanes crrive tn Ind{a between 1 and 16 Jprity tt was adhored to
culy in its «: Barcan.
gtasez. The first B-a?, piloted by Col. L. Te
carived ot Oha'rulia on 2 Sprfl, sewers] dass later then antiotzeted, ©
Dy 18 Agxt1, when the whole ncvenent should have Yecn completed, only.
52 planes were at their stations, Save for one forced landing at
Freaque Isle the planes kud unde the ccear puesage witout untoward
oh am, ONLY
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FOR OFFICIAL U
(APE 420-2de
Anclicnt, but a musbor of acciderte cceurred eact of the atlantic, A
total wreck at Usrrakech on 1¢ April and a partial one ot Catro on
the L5tk wore followed replaly by Zive azchdente, including two planes
completely destroyed xt Leracht, Tren ML te 29 Apri? all plance
®
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