Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC

of

the

Philippines COURT

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985 LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847. b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278. c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65. d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 15401547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 16971701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 17461751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 18251826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 18431844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244. e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528,

ESCOLIN, J.: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought: a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312,

531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857. f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 2527, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123. g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360378, 380-433, 436-439. The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged nonpublication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote: SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course. The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431]. Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said: We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not

applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error' No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character. The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case. Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ... The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases

where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows: Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ... The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time

when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5 The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6 It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit: The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon

accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court. Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an allinclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified." From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. InPesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. SO ORDERED. Relova, J., concurs. Aquino, J., took no part. Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification): There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect. I shall explain why. 1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to

certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity. 2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2 3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior

thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes. 4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule. 5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion. Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties. Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso

perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring: I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification): The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the

publication of laws in the Official Gazetterequired by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette. Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role. In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to

disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring: I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring: I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification): There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect. I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity. 2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2 3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and

unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes. 4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement. I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion. Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties. Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring: I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazetterequired by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette. Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a

provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role. In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring: I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring: I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof. Footnotes 1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag be recognized, access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shag be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. 2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs. City Mayor, 16

SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392. 3 16 Phil. 366, 378. 4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179. 5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146. 6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150. 7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion. 8 308 U.S. 371, 374. 9 93 Phil.. 68,.

Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A 2 Ibid, closing paragraph. 3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960). 4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924). 5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433. 6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172. Teehankee, J.: 1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras. 2 Notes in brackets supplied.

10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request regarding the respective dates of publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed therein. No report has been submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or nonpublication of other presidential issuances. 11 129 SCRA 174. Fernando, CJ.: 1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills connection Article 7, Sec. 21 of the

3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15. Plana, J.: * See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall provide publication of all statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force until published." See also S ate ex rel. White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.

Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-22228

of

the

Philippines COURT

It appears that on September 25, 1963, the Registration of Labor Organizations hereinafter referred to as the Registrar issued a notice of hearing, on October 17, 1963, of the matter of cancellation of the registration of the SSSEA, because of: 1. Failure to furnish the Bureau of Labor Relations with copies of the reports on the finances of that union duly verified by affidavits which its treasurer or treasurers rendered to said union and its members covering the periods from September 24, 1960 to September 23, 1961 and September 24, 1961 to September 23, 1962, inclusive, within sixty days of the 2 respective latter dates, which are the end of its fiscal year; and 2. Failure to submit to this office the names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of the officers of that union within sixty days of their election in October (1st Sunday), 1961 and 1963, in conformity with Article IV (1) of its constitution and by-laws. in violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875. Counsel for the SSSEA moved to postpone the hearing to October 21, 1963, and to submit then a memorandum, as well as the documents specified in the notice. The motion was granted, but, nobody appeared for the SSSEA on the date last mentioned. The next day, October 22, 1963, Manuel Villagracia, Assistant Secretary of the SSSEA filed with the Office of the Registrar, a letter dated October 21, 1963, enclosing the following: 1. Joint non-subversive affidavit of the officers of the SSS Employees' Association-PAFLU; 2. List of newly-elected officers of the Association in its general elections held on April 29, 1963; and 3. Copy of the amended constitution and by-laws of the Association. Holding

February 27, 1969

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU) SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATIONPAFLU, AL FAJARDO AND ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-PAFLU, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS and THE REGISTRAR OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, respondents. Cipriano Cid and Associates and Israel Bocobo for petitioners. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for respondents. CONCEPCION, C.J.: Petitioners pray for writs of certiorari and prohibition to restrain respondents, the Secretary of Labor, the Director of Labor Relations and the Registrar of Labor Organizations, from enforcing an order of cancellation of the registration certificate of the Social Security System Employees Association hereinafter referred to as the SSSEA which is affiliated to the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions hereinafter referred to as PAFLU as well as to annul all proceedings in connection with said cancellation and to prohibit respondents from enforcing Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875. Petitioners, likewise, pray for a writ of preliminary injunction pending the final determination of this case. In their answer, respondents traversed some allegations of fact and the legal conclusions made in the petition. No writ of preliminary injunction pendente lite has been issued.

1. That the joint non-subversive affidavit and the list of officers mentioned in the letter of Mr. Manuel Villagracia were not the documents referred to in the notice of hearing and made the subject matter of the present proceeding; and 2. That there is no iota of evidence on records to show and/or warrant the dismissal of the present proceeding. on October 23, 1963, the Registrar rendered a decision cancelling the SSSEA's Registration Certificate No. 1-IP169, issued on September 30, 1960. Soon later, or on October 28, 1963, Alfredo Fajardo, president of the SSSEA moved for a reconsideration of said decision and prayed for time, up to November 15, within which to submit the requisite papers and data. An opposition thereto having been filed by one Paulino Escueta, a member of the SSSEA, upon the ground that the latter had never submitted any financial statement to its members, said motion was heard on November 27, 1963. Subsequently, or on December 4, 1963, the Registrar issued an order declaring that the SSSEA had "failed to submit the following requirements to wit: 1. Non-subversive affidavits of Messrs. Teodoro Sison, Alfonso Atienza, Rodolfo Zalameda, Raymundo Sabino and Napoleon Pefianco who were elected along with others on January 30, 1962. 2. Names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of all the officers who were supposedly elected on October (1st Sunday), of its constitution and by-laws. and granting the SSSEA 15 days from notice to comply with said requirements, as well as meanwhile holding in abeyance the resolution of its motion for reconsideration. Pending such resolution, or on December 16, the PAFLU, the SSSEA, Alfredo Fajardo "and all the officers and members" of the SSSEA commenced the present action, for the purpose stated at the beginning of this decision, upon the ground that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 violates their freedom of assembly and association, and is

inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; that it unduly delegates judicial power to an administrative agency; that said Section 23 should be deemed repealed by ILO-Convention No. 87; that respondents have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating, on November 19, 1963, its decision dated October 22, 1963, beyond the 30-day period provided in Section 23(c) of Republic Act No. 875; that "there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law"; that the decision complained of had not been approved by the Secretary of Labor; and that the cancellation of the SSSEA's certificate of registration would cause irreparable injury. The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis. The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said section 1 is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with orwithout said registration. 2 The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations, associations or unions and the possession of the "rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations". The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and privileges, much less said personality, which are mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of which registration is required to protect both labor and the public against abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly accredited agents of the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and union of workers are engaged affect public interest, which should be protected. 3 Furthermore, the obligation to submit financial statements, as a condition for the non-cancellation of a certificate of registration, is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of the members of the organization, considering that the same generally solicits funds or membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts of money due to them or to the organization. 4 For the same reasons, said Section 23 does not impinge upon the right of organization guaranteed in the Declaration of Human Rights, or run counter to Articles 2, 4, 7 and Section 2 of Article 8 of the ILO-

Convention No. 87, which provide that "workers and employers, ... shall have the right to establish and ... join organizations of their own choosing, without previous authorization"; that "workers and employers organizations shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority"; that "the acquisition of legal personality by workers' and employers' organizations, ... shall not be made subject to conditions of such a character as to restrict the application of the provisions" above mentioned; and that "the guarantees provided for in" said Convention shall not be impaired by the law of the land. In B.S.P. v. Araos, 5 we held that there is no incompatibility between Republic Act No. 875 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Upon the other hand, the cancellation of the SSSEA's registration certificate would not entail a dissolution of said association or its suspension. The existence of the SSSEA would not be affected by said cancellation, although its juridical personality and its statutory rights and privileges as distinguished from those conferred by the Constitution would be suspended thereby. To be registered, pursuant to Section 23(b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor organization, association or union of workers must file with the Department of Labor the following documents: (1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization together with a list of all officers of the association, their addresses and the address of the principal office of the organization; (2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization, association or union to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method; and (3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or more years, a copy of its last annual financial report. Moreover, paragraph (d) of said-Section ordains that:

The registration and permit of a legitimate labor organization shall be cancelled by the Department of Labor, if the Department has reason to believe that the labor organization no longer meets one or more of the requirements of paragraph (b) above; or fails to file with the Department Labor either its financial reportwithin the sixty days of the end of its fiscal year or the names of its new officers along with their non-subversive affidavits as outlined in paragraph (b) above within sixty days of their election; however, the Department of Labor shall not order the cancellation of the registration and permit without due notice and hearing, as provided under paragraph (c) above and the affected labor organization shall have the same right of appeal to the courts as previously provided.6 The determination of the question whether the requirements of paragraph (b) have been met, or whether or not the requisite financial report or non-subversive affidavits have been filed within the period above stated, is not judicial power. Indeed, all officers of the government, including those in the executive department, are supposed, to act on the basis of facts, as they see the same. This is specially true as regards administrative agencies given by law the power to investigate and render decisions concerning details related to the execution of laws the enforcement of which is entrusted thereto. Hence, speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) had occassion to say: The objections of the appellees to the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not only as an undue delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works but also for being unreasonable and arbitrary, are not tenable. It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was anyway entitled to make because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession (Palanca vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil., 449).

It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves thedetermination of some question of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, andauthorities are clear that they are validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.7 It should be noted also, that, admittedly, the SSSEA had not filed the non-subversive affidavits of some of its officers "Messrs. Sison, Tolentino, Atienza, Zalameda, Sabino and Pefianca" although said organization avers that these persons "were either resigned or out on leave as directors or officers of the union", without specifying who had resigned and who were on leave. This averment is, moreover, controverted by respondents herein. Again, the 30-day period invoked by the petitioners is inapplicable to the decision complained of. Said period is prescribed in paragraph (c) 8 of Section 23, which refers to the proceedings for the "registration" of labor organizations, associations or unions not to the "cancellation" of said registration, which is governed by the abovequoted paragraph (d) of the same section. Independently of the foregoing, we have repeatedly held that legal provisions prescribing the period within which a decision should be rendered are directory, not mandatory in nature in the sense that, a judgment promulgated after the expiration of said period is not null and void, although the officer who failed to comply with law may be dealt with administratively, in consequence of his delay 9 unless the intention to the contrary is manifest. Such, however, is not the import of said paragraph (c). In the language of Black: When a statute specifies the time at or within which an act is to be done by a public officer or body, it is generally held to be directory only as to the time, and not mandatory, unless time

is of the essence of the thing to be done, or the language of the statute contains negative words, or shows that the designation of the time was intended as a limitation of power, authority or right. 10 Then, again, there is no law requiring the approval, by the Secretary of Labor, of the decision of the Registrar decreeing the cancellation of a registration certificate. In fact, the language of paragraph (d) of Section 23, suggests that, once the conditions therein specified are present, the office concerned "shall" have no choice but to issue the order of cancellation. Moreover, in the case at bar, there is nothing, as yet, for the Secretary of Labor to approve or disapprove, since petitioners, motion for reconsideration of the Registrar's decision of October 23, 1963, is still pending resolution. In fact, this circumstance shows, not only that the present action is premature, 11but, also, that petitioners have failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them. 12 Indeed, they could ask the Secretary of Labor to disapprove the Registrar's decision or object to its execution or enforcement, in the absence of approval of the former, if the same were necessary, on which we need not and do not express any opinion. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition herein should be, as it is hereby dismissed, and the writs prayed for denied, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered. lawphi1.nt Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,. Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur. Footnotes
1"Any

labor organization, association or union of workers duly organized for the material, intellectual and moral well being of its members shall acquire legal personality and be entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations within thirty days of filing with the office of the Secretary of Labor notice of its due organization and existence and the following documents, together with the amount of five

pesos as registration fee, except as provided in paragraph "d" of this section:"

2Ex

10Black

on the Construction and Interpretation of Laws, p. 545. Emphasis ours.

11Herrera

parte R.J. Thomas, 174 S.W. 2d, 958-960. A.L.R. 700-701. A.L.R. 894-895. January 29, 1958. ours.

3167 4160

v. Barretto, 25 Phil. 245; Uy Chu vs. Imperial, 44 Phil. 27; Manila Post Publishing Co. v. Sanchez, 81 Phil. 614; Alvarez v. lbaez, 83 Phil. 104; Ricafort v. Hon. Wenceslao Fernan, 101 Phil. 575; Cueto v. Ortiz, L-11555, May 31, 1960; Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa ng San Miguel Brewery at mga Kasangay v. Enriquez, L-12999, July 26, 1960.
12Montes

5L-10091,

6Emphasis 7Lovina 8"If

v. Moreno, L-17821, Nov. 29, 1963. Emphasis ours.

v. Civil Service Board of Appeals, 101 Phil 490; Ang Tuan Kai v. Import Control Comm. 91 Phil. 143; Coloso v. Board, 92 Phil. 938; Miguel v. Reyes, 93 Phil. 542, Calo v. Fuertes. L-16537, June 29, 1962.

in the opinion of the Department of Labor the applicant organization does not appear to meet the requirements of this Act for registration, the Department shall, after ten (10) days of notice to the applicantorganization, association or union, and within thirty (30) days of receipt of the above-mentioned documents, hold a public hearing in the province in which the principal office of the applicant is located at which theapplicant organization shall have the right to be represented by attorney and to cross-examine witnesses; and such hearing shall be concluded and a decision announced by the Department within thirty days after the announcement of said hearing; and if after due hearing the Department rules against registration of the applicant, it shall be required that the Department of Labor state specifically what data the applicant has failed to submit as a prerequisite of registration. If the applicant is still denied, it thereafter shall have the right within sixty days of formal denial of registration to appeal to the Court of Appeal which shall render a decision within thirty days, or to the Supreme Court."
9Tauseco

Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-15127

of

the

Philippines COURT

May 30, 1961

EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee. G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee. CONCEPCION, J.: Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, absolving defendant Arellano University from for plaintiff-appellant.

v. Arteche, 57 Phil. 227; Querubin v. Court of Appeals, 82 Phil. 226; Gutierrez v. Aquino, L-14252, Feb. 28, 1959; Estrella v. Edanio L-18883, May 18, 1962.

plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof thereon. In the language of the decision appealed from: The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the agreement of facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and documentary evidence introduced by the parties, it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up preparatory law course in the defendant University. After finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law studies in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in defendant university was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed

transcripts. The defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case. Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to sign the following contract covenant and agreement: "In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash. (Sgd.) Emeterio Cui". It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private schools, colleges and universities," reading: 1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some schools offer full or partial scholarships to deserving students for excellence in scholarship or for leadership in extra-curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but gifted students should be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that such scholarships are good only if the students concerned continue in the same school nullifies the principle of merit in the award of these scholarships. 2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer

to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school. 3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have enjoyed scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to other schools since their credentials would not be released unless they would pay the fees corresponding to the period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the right of the student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves the right to authorize such transfer. that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked the Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript of his record in defendant University, without being required to refund the sum of P1,033.87; that the Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position taken by the plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and that, this notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said refund were made, and even recommended to said Bureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant to release said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented to the court for judicial action." As above stated, plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest, said sum of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in 1953. Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said amount, aside from P2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of litigation. In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of Private Schools, namely, that the provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid and binding and that the memorandum above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a counterclaim for P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees. The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not. The

lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the ground that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply because he wanted to follow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its brief that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void because said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had been neither approved by the corresponding department head nor published in the official gazette. We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the question whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant University to the Abad Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching effects, transcend personal equations and demand a determination of the case from a high impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for, regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. As the Director of Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the defendant, There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the contract entered into between Cui and Arellano University on September 10, 1951 was void as against public policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state, courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government officers.' It might take more than a government bureau or office to lay down or establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but courts consider the practices of government officials as one of the four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It has been consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of

contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of morality which have received some kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the United States after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not

to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.) WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades, Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur. Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.

Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC DECISION January 17, 1916

of

the

Philippines COURT

G.R. No. THE UNITED STATES, vs. MATEO P. PALACIO, defendant-appellant. Antonio Belmonte Attorney-General Avancea for appellee. ARAULLO, J.: for

L-11002 plaintiff-appellee,

appellant.

These proceedings for violation of section 87 of Act No. 82, the Municipal Code, were brought against the defendant, Mateo P. Palacio, in the Court of First Instance of Leyte by the following complaint filed therein by the fiscal on December 18, 1914. The undersigned charges Mateo P. Palacio with having violated section 87 of Act No. 82, in the following manner, to wit: Said accused, on or about the 26th day of September, 1914, in the municipality of Tacloban, Province of Leyte, P.I., he being then and there a deputy to the provincial assessor of Leyte, charged with the duty of assessing real property, did wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally upon revising the assessment and in reassessing the property of Francisco Madlonito, situated in the barrio of Di-it, municipality of Tacloban, omit from the tax list certain real properties and improvements belonging to said Francisco Madlonito, knowing that the properties omitted were lawfully taxable; in violation of law. A demurrer having been filed by defendants counsel on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint did not constituted the crime provided for and punished by said section 87 of Act No. 82, the same was overruled, and, defendant having pleaded not guilty, the case came to trial. Evidence was introduced by both the prosecution and the defense, and, on January 15, 1915, said Court of First Instance rendered judgment in which, insisting upon the overruling of the demurrer interposed to the complaint, and finding of the demurrer interposed to the complaint, and finding the defendant guilty of the crime therein charged, he sentenced him to the penalty of forty days imprisonment in the provincial jail, to pay a fine of P100, or, in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment and to pay the costs. Defendant has appealed from this judgment and has assigned thereto various errors which, as stated by the Attorney-General in his brief, may be reduced to the following:

1. That the lower court erred in holding that the evidence adduced at trial proves defendants guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. 2. That the facts alleged in the complaint and proven at trial do not constitute the infraction provided for and punished by section 87 of Act No. 82, known as the Municipal Code. The evidence shows beyond all doubt that while defendant was serving as a deputy to the provincial assessor of Leyte, duly appointed and such, and having proceeded under orders of said assessor, given in the month of September, 1914, to verify the measurement, evaluation, and assessment of the properties of one Francisco Madlonito, situated in the barrio of Di-it, municipality of Tacloban of said province, he presented in performance of his duty a report in which he recorded as real property belonging to said Francisco Madlonito a rectangular parcel of unirrigated land which was adjoined on the north by the land of Anacleto Condes; on the east, by that of Ventura Vias; on the south, by that of Jose Guardino; and on the west, by woods; it measured 3 hectares 51 ares and 23 centiares in area, the only improvements consisting of 500 hemp plants; that several days afterwards, in the following month of October, the provincial assessor, having been advised that defendants report was false, proceeded in company with another deputy to remeasure and to make a new valuation and assessment of the same land, under guidance of and in accordance with date furnished by the same Francisco Madlonito who had previously conducted and furnished information to defendant; as a result of this proceeding on the part of said provincial assessor, it was ascertained that said land was unirrigated hemp or corn land; that it was polygonal in form and was adjoined on the north by the property of Anacleto Condes and Basilio Espejo; on the east, by that of Nicanor Dolina, Basilio Espejo and Ventura Vias; on the south, by the land of Tomas

Tabosa and a wood; and by a wood on the west; it was found to measure 15 hectares 17 ares and 65 centiares in extent, the improvements thereon consisting of a plantation of hemp, a dwelling house of mixed material, 80 clumps of banana trees, 9 cacao trees, 24 coconut trees 5 years of age, and one coconut tree in bearing. It was therefore apparent that in the tax list of real property which, as deputy to the provincial assessor, defendant was charged to prepare that is, the report presented by him he had omitted real property belonging to Francisco Madlonito, which property consisted of 12 hectares 66 ares and 42 centares of land and all the improvements mentioned, with the exception of the 500 hemp plants specified in this report. Defendant endeavored in a way to explain this omission by attributing it to the fact that in making his report he relied upon the information furnished by Francisco Madlonito himself, and, with respect to the area, on that given him at the time by the two laborers who measured the land and who assured him that said measurement was correct, because it was the same as that which has been pointed out to them by the owner of the land. Defendant further explained that he also accepted the informations furnished by said laborers with respect to the improvements specified in said report as consisting of a plantation of hemp; that these men had told him that there were no other improvements except the hemp plantation and some banana trees of which he did not know how many there were; with respect to the house, Francisco Madlonito told him that it belonged to Emiliano, Franciscos brother; that this latter was absent at the time and therefore defendant did not measure the property, deciding to postpone doing so until the 15th of January of the following year, when he intended to return. These explanations of the defendant are not satisfactory, nor can they serve to exonerate him as he claims because, in the first place, he should

not have relied on what the interest party himself, Francisco Madlonito, told him, nor upon the information which, at the time he inspected and measured the lands, was furnished him by the two laborers of whose services he availed himself for the actual performance of that labor. He himself ought to have verified the correctness of the information and have informed himself of the true area of the land and of all the improvements thereon, they being in sight, in order to include them in the report which it was his duty to render to the provincial assessor in fulfillment of the mission confined to him. In the second place, Francisco Madlonito himself testified at the trial that he had furnished defendant with the same date and information which he subsequently gave to the provincial assessor and to the latters other deputy when they both went to verify and investigate the defendants work, form which verification and investigation it was disclosed that the land was larger by 12 hectares 66 ares and 42 centiares and that it contained many other improvements such as clumps of coconut, cacao and banana trees, besides the 500 hemp plants mentioned in defendants report. We therefore fail to understand and it has not been explained how said improvements could have been omitted from the report, nor how defendant could have failed to mentioned therein such a large tract of land as that of the 12 hectares above referred to. This, together with the circumstances of defendants having passed the previous night in Francisco Madlonitos own house, and having had, therefore, sufficient opportunity and time to inform himself of exactly what the latters property, which was to be measure and recorded in said report, consisted of, constitute proof that defendant (exception made in so far as the house is concerned, for it might be true that it did belong to Francisco Madlonitos brother), willfully omitted from his report and extensive portion of Francisco Madlonitos real property that he knew was lawfully taxable and which it was his duty to record in said

document. The lower court did not, therefore, incur the first error assigned by defendants counsel in his brief. Defendants counsel alleges, however, that the act committed by his client and which, as aforesaid, was proven at trial, does not constitute an infraction provided for and punished by section 87 of Act No. 82, known as the Municipal Code. That section provides as follows: Any officer charged with the duty of assessing real property, who shall willfully omit from the tax lists real property which he knows to be lawfully taxable, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos, or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court. Section 49 of the same Act, No. 82, provides that the real estate of the municipality shall be valued and assessed for taxation by a board, to consist of the president, the municipal treasurer, and a specially authorized deputy of the provincial treasurer, which board shall be known as the municipal board of assessors. Said section 49 was amended by section 1 of Act No. 1930, so that the aforementioned municipal board of assessors should consist of the municipal president the municipal treasurer and, instead of the deputy to the provincial treasurer, of a third member to be appointed by the provincial board. Subsequently, on February 11, 1913, Act No. 2238 was passed, section 1 of which created the position of provincial assessor for each province containing municipalities organized under the provisions of the Municipal Code. Section 2 of this Act provides that provincial assessors shall be allowed such number of deputies and clerks as shall be fixed by

the provincial board with the approval of the Executive Secretary, and section 4, in reciting the duties of the provincial assessor, and, consequently, those of his deputies, provides that, when directed by provincial board, he shall revise and correct the assessments and valuations of real property for the purpose of taxation, and , in the manner set forth in the Act, revise and correct, when so directed, any and all assessments and valuations for taxation, make a correct and just assessments and state the true value of the real property. Other sections of this Act confer upon the provincial assessor various powers in connection with the preparation of the lists of property subject to assessment, and, finally, establishes the procedure that must be followed where any municipality or any property owner does not agree with the assessment and valuation so made. As may be seen, the purpose of Act No. 2238, in creating the office of provincial assessor and allowing him such number of deputies and clerks as shall be fixed by the provincial board with the approval of the Executive Secretary, was the same as that of Act No. 82, in creating, in section 49 thereof, the municipal board of assessors; and Act No. 1930, in amending said section in the manner aforementioned, to wit, by providing that all the real property, taxable or subject to the land tax, existing in the municipalities of these Islands, should be assessed, and, for this purpose and in order that the provincial board should exercise the necessary and proper supervision over acts of the municipalities relative to said tax, provided that someone representing the provincial board or better said, a provincial official, should be a member of the municipal board of assessors a purpose and object which are more accentuated in Act No. 2238 by expressly creating the office of provincial assessor for the revision and correction of assessments and valuations of real property declared in the municipalities and to enable this official to take a direct and active part in preparing the lists of

property subject to said tax. Said Act 2238 is therefore intimately related to the two Acts Nos. 82 and 1930 aforecited, and is virtually a complement of the same in so far as regards the declaration and assessment of taxable property. Said Act No. 2238 provides in section 18 that all Acts or parts of Acts in conflict therewith are repealed. In the two aforementioned Acts, Nos. 82 and 1930, in so far as relates to the assessment and valuation of taxable real property in municipalities, there is, strictly speaking, nothing which may be said to be in conflict with said Act no. 2238, not only for the reason above stated, but also because this Act has done nothing but change the method and procedure provided in Act No. 82, the Municipal Code, for determining the taxable real property in the municipalities and the value thereof, by means of the intervention which in said procedure is given to the provincial assessors. But that municipalities are not excluded from taking part in the proceedings is shown by the fact that section 9 of this Act No. 2238 provides that, prior to directing the provincial assessor in accordance with the provisions thereof, to proceed to revise and correct the assessments and valuations of real property, the provincial board shall require each municipal council of the municipalities organized under the provisions of the Municipal Code (Act No. 82) to prepare, in such form and detail as the Executive Secretary may prescribe, a general schedule of the values of the different classes of land for the municipality which shall be forwarded to the provincial board for approval, and such schedule, when approved by the provincial board, shall serve the assessor as basis for the valuation and assessment. It also provides in section 13 that it shall be the duty of the municipal president, secretary and treasurer and all municipal employees, to render every assistance in their power to the provincial assessor.

Furthermore, one of the rules of interpretation, as very properly said by defendants counsel in his brief, is that when there are two laws on the same subject enacted on different dates, and it appears evidently by the form and essence of the later law that it was the intention of the legislator to cover therein the whole of the subject, and that it is a complete and perfect system, or is in itself a provision, the latest law should be considered as a legal declaration that all that is comprised therein shall continue in force and that all that is not shall rejected and repealed. A simple perusal of Act No. 2238 is sufficient to show that it was not the intention of the legislature to cover all matters relative to the assessment and valuation of the taxable real property of the municipalities, and subject, because, as aforesaid, the Act in question is closely related to Act No. 82, of which it is virtually a complement in so far as regards the organization of the service of making the lists for the complete and adequate collection to the tax on the real property in municipalities organized under said Act No. 82. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that section 87 of this latter Act should be considered as repealed, in so far as it prescribes the penalty incurred by any official who, being charged with the duty of assessing real property, wilfully omits form the tax lists any real property which he knows to be lawfully taxable. Repeals by implications are not favored, and will not be decreed, unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed. Hence, every effort must be used to

make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier. (23 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 489, and cases there cited [vol. 26, pp. 721, 726].) As said Act No. 2238 provides no penalty for the provincial assessor or his deputy who, in revising the assessment and preparing the tax list of real property, wilfully makes any omission such as that aforestated; and as the provincial assessor, or his deputy, is a public official or an official of the class referred to in section 87, it being immaterial whether he be a provincial or a municipal official (for it is sufficient that it be the duty of such official to assess real property) it is evident that the said penal provisions in force and is applicable to the provincial assessors and their deputies referred to in Act No. 2238, and that the lower court did not err in sentencing defendant, under the provisions of said section 87, to the penalty specified in the judgment appealed from. The fact that the cadastral survey of the municipality of Tacloban was to terminated at the time of the discovery of the omission made by the defendant in the report presented by him to the provincial assessor, and that such omission might have been repaired by correcting the list or report by means of revision and new assessment made by the provincial assessor himself on his proceeding with the investigation of the misdemeanor committed by defendant, does not exempt the latter from liability, because what the law punished in said section 87 is the fact of the willful omission, by the official charged with the duty of assessing the real property in the tax list, of any property which he knows to be lawfully taxable; and it is immaterial whether said omission can or cannot subsequently be remedied, because it constitutes in itself a false representation in that document and a fraud committed by the public official to prejudice of the Government or with intent to cause such prejudice.

By reason of the foregoing, and the judgment appealed from being in accordance with the merits of the case and the law, we hereby affirm the same, with the costs against appellant. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres Carson and Trent, JJ., dissent. and Johnson, JJ., concur.

Republic SUPREME Manila THIRD DIVISION

of

the

Philippines COURT

G.R. No. 75860 September 17, 1987 ANG PING and CARMEN PIMENTEL, petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, Branch 40; and JULIO and ZENAIDA KO, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: The issue in this petition is whether or not the execution of a final judgment in an ejectment case which has gone all the way to the Supreme Court may be stayed by a trial court on the ground of a supervening event, namely a decision by a regional trial court ordering the nullification of sale and title and granting legal redemption in favor of the private respondents. On November 13, 1985, in G. R. No. 70581, (Ang Ping, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.), we issued a resolution which reads in part:

On October 25, 1983, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila rendered judgment in an ejectment case filed by the petitioners Ang Ping and Carmen Pimentel against private respondents Julio Ko and Zenaida Ko. The trial court ordered the respondents to vacate the disputed premises, pay P5,000.00 a month in rentals from March 1, 1981 until they vacate minus whatever payments may have been made in the meantime, and pay P3,000.00 attorney's fees and costs. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the decision was affirmed in toto on March 26, 1984. On July 5, 1984, RTC Judge Conrado T. Limcaoco partially granted a motion for reconsideration by reducing to P500.00 monthly rentals, the rate of monthly rentals agreed upon from June, 1979 or earlier when the respondents and their parents were leasing the premises from Uy Chaco Sons and Co., Inc. The Regional Trial Court of Manila sustained the MTC findings that B.P. No. 25 is not applicable because (1) the monthly rental is more than then P300.00 rental covered by the law and (2) the respondents use the (sic) commercial reasons and not for a residence. The Urban Land Reform Law, P.D. 1517 was likewise not deemed applicable, a finding impliedly accepted by the respondents when they abandoned this ground. In their petition for review filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court, the respondent questioned the validity of the October 25, 1983 decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court on the ground that it was released only on January 24, 1984 when Judge J. Cesar Sangco had already retired. (p. 9, Rollo) We resolved affirmatively the issue of whether or not the October 25, 1983 decision of Judge J. Cesar Sangco in the ejectment case was valid. Instead of remanding the case for a re-promulgation of the same judgment, this Court affirmed the decisions of the courts below as modified, i.e. reducing the P5,000.00 per month rentals to their prelitigation level of P500.00 per month.

After a motion for reconsideration was denied and entry of judgment was made, the petitioners returned to the metropolitan trial court where they filed a motion for execution of the judgment. The private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that a complaint for annulment of sale which they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila had, in the meantime, been decided in their favor. The Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 13911 declared null and void the sale by the earlier owner, T & C Corporation, to the petitioners on grounds of equity under Article 19 of the Civil Code and ordered the petitioners to sell 190 square meters of the land they had purchased to the respondents upon Julio Ko's paying them P190,000.00. The petitioners filed a motion to set aside and/or reconsider the decision. According to a manifestation filed September 1, 1987, the motion for reconsideration was denied, whereupon the matter was raised to the Court of Appeals where the case is now pending. Going back to the ejectment case, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila denied the respondents' opposition and granted the motion for execution. On April 28, 1986, respondents Julio and Zenaida Ko filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to stop the implementation of the writ of execution in the ejectment case. It is the preliminary injunction issued by Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 86-35622 which is now before us. The bases for the decision in the ejectment case are summarized by the Regional Trial Court of Manila as follows: Defendants contend that they cannot be ejected because: (1) they are subsisting lessees at the time of the purchase of the property in question by the plaintiffs from T & L Development Corporation, under Sec. 5 of B.P. No. 15; (2) plaintiffs' need of the leased premises is

not for use as a residential unit as required by said law, but as an office and bodega; and (3) since they were not given an opportunity to exercise their right of first refusal before the leased premises were sold to the plaintiffs, the sale thereof to the latter is null and void and in fact filed a complaint for annulment thereof on that ground. As to the first two grounds the basic issue is whether or not B.P. No. 25 is applicable to this case. The coverage of said law is defined in Sec. 7 thereof according to which said law applies only to "All residential units the total monthly rental of which does not exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00) as of the effectivity of this Act ..." The undisputed fact is that at the time of the purchase of the premises in question defendants were paying a monthly rental of P500.00. Moreover, it is even doubtful whether the leased premises may be considered as a residential unit under Sec. 2(b) of B.P. No. 25, considering that defendants are undeniably using the same for commercial purposes because it is there where they do business under the name of Johnson Blacksmith & Machine Shop. As to the third ground, while it is not necessary to resolve it, it is just as obvious that P.D. 1517 is likewise not applicable, as correctly pointed out by counsel for the plaintiff and as indicated by the plaintiff and as indicated by defendants' abandonment of this ground. Since neither B.P. No. 25 nor P.D. 1517 are applicable, the settled rule that a month to month contract of lease is a contract for a fixed period, expires at the end of every month and may be terminated on any month, applies. Plaintiff did so when it served notice of termination thereof dated February 20, 1981, effective 30 days thereafter.

Premises considered the court finds and so declares that plaintiffs have satisfactorily established their causes of action. (Annex J, Rollo, p. 75-76) (Rollo, pp. 5-6). On the other hand, the decision in Civil Case No. 139111, nullifying the sale in favor of petitioners Ang Ping and Carmen Pimentel is based on a finding that justice and equity would be served by allowing Julio and Zenaida Ko to buy the properties already sold to the petitioners. Among the findings in Civil Case No. 139111 are: (1) Julio Ko has been operating his Johnson Blacksmith and Machine Shop in the disputed premises since 1965. (2) The respondents have religiously paid the monthly rentals of P500.00 for the premises. (3) The respondents were never informed that T & L Development Corporation intended to sell the premises. They claimed a right to priority in the purchase of the lot and the corresponding part of the building and on April 24, 1981 deposited with Equitable Banking Corporation the amount of P192,161.78 in trust for Ang Ping for the redemption or repurchase of the lot and apartment door sold to Ang Ping and Carmen Pimentel. The court stated that there is nothing legally wrong in an owner of a leased property selling it without notifying the tenant. However, it found a failure of the owner and the buyers to observe honesty and good faith because other tenants were informed of the proposed sale but not Julio and Zenaida Ko. The petitioners raise two grounds for the allowance of their petition, namely: A The respondent court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the

temporary restraining order of April 28, 1986 and the Order of May 16, 1986, denying petitioners' Motion to Dismiss and directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to stop the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the MTC of Manila (Rollo, p. 13) B The respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, thereby depriving the petitioners of the fruits of their legal victory through the implementation of the final and executory decision. (pp. 13 and 18, Rono) The petitioners contend that the decision of Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in the nullification of sale and title and reconveyance case does not as yet confer on the respondents any enforceable right whereas this Court has already entered judgment in the ejectment case. The petitioners also point out that we were fully aware of the pending nullification and reconveyance case because the same was brought to our attention in G.R. No. 70581. Yet, we denied a motion for reconsideration of our decision in the petition for review of the ejectment case. We agree with the petitioners. The principle enunciated in Ramirez v. Bleza (106 SCRA 187) applies. We ruled in Ramirez: Moreover, the pendency of Civil Case No. R436, an "accion publiciana", where ownership is concededly the principal issue, (Rollo, p. 59.) before the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, does not preclude nor bar the execution of the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. R184, where the action was for forcible entry and

the only issue involved was the material possession or possession de facto of the land under litigation. Such action which involves the title over the premises is entirely independent from forcible entry. (at p. 194) Justice Ramon C. Aquino was more emphatic in his concurrence: I concur. Respondent judge of first instance acted with grave abuse of discretion in preventing the execution of the final and executory judgment of the municipal court in the ejectment case on the flimsy pretext that another possessory action was pending in his court involving the same land. The judgment of the municipal court is res judicata as to the issue of possession de facto but it not conclusive as to the title or ownership (Sec. 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court; Pealosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303). Possession and ownership of a parcel of land may be held by different persons. The winning party is entitled to the execution of the municipal court's final judgment as to possession. The enforcement of that judgment would not cause "chaos and confusion". (id. at p. 195). In De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 520), we had a similar ruling: We find no merit in petitioners' aforesaid submission. An unlawful detainer action has an entirely different subject from that of an action for reconveyance of title. What is involved in unlawful detainer case is merely the issue of material possession or possession de facto; whereas in an action for reconveyance, ownership is the issue. So much so that the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property does not divest the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor

will it preclude or bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the only issue involved is material possession or possession de facto. (Ramirez v. Bleza, L45640, July 30, 1981, 106 SCRA 187). This is so because: The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no case bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. (Section 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court). The rationale is that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. (Republic v. Guarin, supra). It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a "time procedure" designed to remedy the situation. (Mabalot v. Madela, Jr., 121 SCRA 347). Procedural technicality is therefore obviated and reliance thereon to stay eviction from the property should not be tolerated and cannot override substantial justice. (Dakudao v. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877). So much so that judgment must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff in order to prevent further damages arising from loss of possession. (Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167). (At pp. 527-528).

As early as 1922, this Court declared in Shioji v. Harvey (43 Phil. 333) that "the only function of a lower court, when the judgment of a higher court is returned to it, is the ministerial one of issuing the order of execution. A lower court is without supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher court." This is especially true where it is a Supreme Court decision or resolution which states with finality how the particular case before it has been resolved. We ruled in Tugade v. Court of Appeals (85 SCRA 226): Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera (L-31589, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98). "The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit." (ibid., 107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited.) The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: "Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable

controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings." (Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila [Branch VI], L26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961.) (at pp. 230231). We refrain from expressing any opinion on the merits of the decision in the nullification of sale and reconveyance of property case. The merits will have to be threshed out by the proper court on a full consideration of the evidence and the law upon which it is based. Our decision here is limited to the execution of the decision in the ejectment case. From the foregoing, it is plain that the law is on the side of the petitioners. The injunction was improperly issued. Do the equities of the case warrant a disregard of established precedents? It is true that the private respondents would suffer painful consequences if they are ejected now only to be reinstated if they eventually win the nullification of sale case. However, the petitioners are also suffering an injustice. The ejectment case in their favor was decided as early as 1983. The regional trial court affirmed the decision. The Intermediate Appellate Court ruled that the promulgation of the trial court's decision was defective and ordered it repromulgated but this Court set aside the appellate decision and reinstated the metropolitan trial court and regional trial court decisions. There being no final decision in the annulment of sale case, the petitioners have equal chances with the private respondents of also winning that case. The private respondents cannot claim to have overriding considerations of equity on their side, sufficient to stop the execution of a final judgment in the ejectment proceedings. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The orders dated April 28, 1986 and May 16, 1986 of the respondent court are SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court is ORDERED to immediately execute the decision in the ejectment case. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of this decision will be granted.

SO ORDERED. Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic SUPREME Manila SECOND DIVISION

of

the

Philippines COURT

G.R. No. 74122 March 15, 1988 GUILLERMO NACTOR, SPS. ANSELMO & ELENA NACTOR, PRECILIANO NACTOR, JOSE NACTOR & GLORIA NACTOR assisted by her husband MANUEL CLAYTOS, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, * HON. NICOLAS A. GEROCHI, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 139 & SPS. CLARO & MAGDALENA MELCHOR respondents. PARAS, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside or reverse the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court ***(now Court of Appeals) dated January 30,1986 in ACG.R. SPNo.07595 entitled Guillermo Nactor, et al. vs. Nicolas A. Gerochi, Jr. affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Br. 139 in Civil Case No. 9307 on June 4,1985, which in turn affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Civil Case No. 25607 dated September 5,1984. Respondent Court of appeals dismissed the petition seeking to set aside the Omnibus Order of the Regional Trial Court not only because the decision of the said court had already become final but also because on the merits of said decision, the affirmance thereof was in complete accord both with the facts and the law on the matter.

The antecedent facts of this case as found by the Metropolitan Trial Court are as follows: Sometime in 1962, the herein plaintiffs-respondents (Spouses Melchor) allowed Guillermo Nactor (one of the defendants-petitioners) to build a shanty on their property as at that time they were intending to go abroad. Guillermo Nactor occupied the premises without any contract and without any rental, but with the understanding that he would watch over the property of the plaintiffs so as to prevent squatters from entering the said property. Instead of complying with the said agreement, Guillermo Nactor allowed his relatives to build houses inside the said property without the knowledge and consent of the Melchor spouses, so that when the latter returned to the Philippines, they discovered that many people were squatting inside their property. Hence, they lost no time in demanding that Guillermo Nactor and his group vacate the property in question. When petitioners refused to vacate the premises, the Melchor spouses filed a complaint with the Barangay, which was later elevated to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati, Metro Manila. The trial court decided the case in favor of the Melchor spouses on September 5, 1984, the dispositive portion of the decision reading as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and any and all persons claiming right/title under them to vacate the lot at 7713 St. Paul Street, Barangay San Antonio Village, Makati, Metro Manila and surrender peaceful occupation and possession thereof to plaintiffs and to pay jointly and severally to the latter a monthly rental of P100.00 from the date of the filing of the complaint on 30 August 1983 until they finally vacate the premises and to demolish and/or transfer all the improvements they have introduced thereon. Defendants are likewise ordered to pay the Plaintiffs P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses plus costs of suit. (Rollo, p. 17) On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Makati affirmed in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial

Court on June 4,1985, with the following observations and conclusions: After a careful perusal of the evidence on record and the supporting arguments proffered by plaintiffs-appellees in their memorandum, this court finds no cogent reason to disturb the decision of the Court a quo, to which reference is hereby made. Furthermore, as admitted by the defendants, particularly, defendant-appellant Guillermo Nactor, that his occupancy of the said land was by mere tolerance and generosity of plaintiffs-appellees, allowing him to have a temporary place to build his abode, while the couple-plaintiffs-appellees--were still abroad. Evidently, while the actual physical possession might have been temporarily transferred to defendantappellant Guillermo Nactor as a caretaker thereof for almost 20 years, the legal and juridical possession thereof remains in the hands of plaintiffs-appellees, more especially so that the land in question of within the protective mantle of indefeasibility of the torrens system. Acts merely tolerated, and those executed clandestinely and without the knowledge of the possessor of a thing or by violence, do not affect possession (Art. 537, New Civil Code; Mercedes vs. Go Bio, et al., 78 Phil. 279). Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by mere tolerance of the owner shall not be available for the purpose of possession.' (Art. 1119, New Civil Code) (Emphasis supplied) To deny plaintiffs-appellees of their right to physically repossess the said land as uncontested and

uncontroverted lawful owners thereof, would be tantamount to extending premium, if not license, to a pretender of lawful possession' arising only from the charity and benevolence of its owners. This Court, both in law and equity, under these antecedents, and after having extended benevolence to defendants-appellants for so long, should now allow plaintiffs the full enjoyment and use of their property. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with costs against defendants-appellants. (pp. 17-18, Rollo). The defendants-petitioners moved for reconsideration on June 24,1985, which motion was denied by respondent Judge, in an Omnibus Order dated October 22,1985, for having been filed after the decision had become final and executory. Simultaneously, on motion of plaintiffsappellees, a writ of execution was issued. The motion for reconsideration having been denied, defendantspetitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari on October 31, 1985 with the Court of Appeals. On January 30, 1986, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, the pertinent portion of the affirmance reading: The petition is thus without merit. Not only had the respondent Judge's decision become final, and beyond the respondent Judge's competence to vary, set aside or modify, but that on the merits of the said decision, the affirmance thereof by the respondent Judge is in complete accord both with the facts and the law applicable on the matter. No reversible error has, therefore, been committed. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED, with costs."

The defendant-petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated February 22,1986 which motion was denied on March 21, 1986 for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. In the resolution dated June 11, 1986, the Second Division of this Court, before acting on the petition, required the petitioners to comply with the rules by submitting to the court proof of service of the petition on the Intermediate Appellate Court and the adverse party and to sign the petition, the verification and the jurat (Rollo, p. 22). However, before petitioners could comply with said requirement which were filed on August 26, 1986, (Rollo, pp. 40-47; 56) respondents filed their comment dated June 30,1986 (Rollo, p. 23). In the Resolution of October 15,1986, the court required the petitioners to file a reply to the comment of counsel for respondent (Rollo, p. 58). On October 28, 1986, respondents filed an urgent Motion for Exigent Resolution and Refutal to the Petition for Review on certiorari (Rollo, p. 59). The resolution of November 10, 1986, gave due course to the petition and required both parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 67). On that same date, however, the petitioners thru counsel filed their manifestations/explanation (Rollo, p. 68) stating that they are therewith submitting the attached Supplemental Reply to the comment of counsel for the respondents (Rollo, p. 78, Annex "D"). Respondents filed their memorandum on December 15, 1986 (Rollo, p. 91), and a motion for early conclusive resolution and/or final resolution on February 19, 1987 (Rollo, p. 98), followed by another motion reiterating early conclusive resolution and/or final decision by the same respondents on March 23, 1987 (Rollo, p. 100). On April 8,1987, petitioners filed their comment on the motion for early resolution while respondents filed their urgent ex-parte motion to withdraw deposit and [rayed that the amount be released through their authorized representative and attorney-in-fact (Rollo, p. 107). A special power of attorney was attached thereto (Rollo, p. 110). In the resolution of June 3,1987, the court required the private respondents to file a reply to the comments on the motion for early resolution filed by counsel for

petitioners and petitioners to comment on the urgent ex-parte motion of private respondents to withdraw deposit. The latter was filed on July 3,1987 (Rollo, p. 114). Petitioners raised the following assignments of error: I THE DECISION ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED ON THE 24 OF JUNE 1985 IS ALREADY LATE BY ONE DAY, THE PRECEDING DAY, JUNE 23 BEING A SUNDAY. II THE DECISION ERRED IN BINDING THEREIN THE DEFENDANTS IN THE FORCIBLE ENTRY CASE WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED. III THE DECISION ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION. Otherwise stated, the issues raised in this case are two fold: (1) as regards the timeliness of the motion for reconsideration filed and (2) the lack of cause of action on the part of the complainants and lack of jurisdiction to try the case on the part of the court a quo. Petitioners contend that the motion for reconsideration was filed on time with the Regional Trial Court on June 24, 1985 because the fifteenth day, June 23, 1985 is a Sunday. There is merit in this contention. Pertinent thereto, Section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, B.P. 129 provides:

The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award judgment or decision appealed from: ... On the other hand, the rule on the computation of periods for filing of pleadings is now embodied in Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides: Art. 13. ... In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. and also in the Revised Administrative Code which likewise provides: Section 13. Computation of time in computing any fixed period-of time, with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done at a certain time or within a certain limit of time, the day or date, or day from which the time is reckoned, is to be excluded and the date of performance, included, unless otherwise provided. However, in case the last day is a Sunday or a legal holiday, it is understood that where the time refers to a period prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by an order of the court, or by any other applicable statute, the last day should really be the next day, provided said day is neither a Sunday nor a legal holiday. The law cannot require compliance on a day when entities supposed to receive pleadings or documents are closed in view of the holiday. Thus, as authoritatively formulated by this Court, the computation of the appeal periods is to the effect that the first day shall be excluded but the last day of the period so computed is to be included unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday nor a holiday (Kabigting v.

Acting Director of Prisons, 6 SCRA 281 [1962]; De las Alas v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 200 [1978]. Accordingly, in said cases, the period to perfect an appeal is extended ipso jure to the first working day immediately following. It will be noted, however, that petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the Regional Trial Court in its Omnibus Order, not only because said motion was purportedly filed late but also for lack of merit. Thus, in said Order, the Court ruled as follows: In passing though, even a careful consideration of the grounds relied upon by defendants-appellants in their Motion for Reconsideration as well as the opposition thereto by plaintiffs-appellees, thru counsel, this Court finds no cogent reason to alter its aforesaid decision sought to be reconsidered, as the main grounds relied upon by defendants-appellants had been amply discussed in the decision of this Court in affirmance of the one rendered by the court a quo." (Original Records, p. 20). On review, the Court of Appeals was even more specific in denying the petition which seeks, to set aside aforesaid Order, not only because the decision of the Regional Trial Court has ostensibly become final but for lack of merit. All these notwithstanding, petitioners would have this Court review the findings and conclusions of the court a quo which have been affirmed in toto not only by the Regional Trial Court but also by the Court of Appeals, on the basis of technicalities obviously resorted to only for purposes of delay. Petitioners allege that it is only Guillermo Nactor whose entrance into the premises was with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs who can be bound by the judgment in the unlawful detainer case but not the rest of the defendants whose occupancy was termed by the plaintiffs as unlawful and/or illegal, without any written consent and/or authority from them. They claim that such defendants should therefore be

charged with forcible entry, but without compliance with the Rules on Forcible Entry cases among which are, a written demand to vacate which must be definite, petitioners claim that the complaint is devoid of a sufficient cause of action and invests upon the court no jurisdiction to try and decide the case (Rollo, pp. 10-11). Such allegation is untenable. Aside from the findings of the trial court itself, that there is no contract at all between the plaintiffs and defendants and that the occupation of the property by the latter was only by tolerance of the former, such fact was confirmed by the testimony of the principal defendant Guillermo Nactor, whose testimony was quoted in the decision of the court a quo as follows: Q. You mean to tell the Honorable Court all the defendants in this case were allowed to silly in this place? A. Yes, Sir, spouses Melchor told us that we can stay there so that nobody will stay in the place. (TSN dated May 9, 1984): It will likewise be noted that defendants, all surnamed Nactor are the relatives of Guillermo Nactor who was the caretaker thereof. It is obvious that they gained access to the property through him and occupied the same under his responsibility. Consequently, if Guillermo Nactor has admittedly lost the right to stay on or occupy the property in question, with all the more reason have the rest of the defendants who are only occupying the property under him, no right to stay on the premises. Thus, the trial court in unmistakable language, in ordering that the property be vacated and possession thereof surrendered peacefully to the plaintiffs, included all the defendants and any and all persons claiming right/title under Guillermo Nactor.

While it is true that the instant case was tried by the court a quo on the basis of the unlawful detainer charge instead of forcible entry for the rest of the defendants excluding Guillermo, it is an elementary rule of procedure that what is controlling is not the caption of the case which does not materially alter the situation but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant (Ras v. Sua, 25 SCRA 155-159 [1968]). Besides since the rest of the petitioners were on the property under the apparent protection of Guillermo, an unlawful detainer case (and not necessarily one of forcible entry) may properly be used against them. Still further, petitioners claim that they fall within the protective mantle of P.D. No. 1517 "Urban Land Reform" as per Proclamation Nos. 1767 and 1967, as amended by Proclamation No. 2284, However, the records show that the property in question is outside the DECLARED URBAN LAND REFORM ZONE" (ULRZ), and situated on the northeast side along Saint Paul Road, has never been within the areas covered by "BOUNDARY DESCRIPTION PURSUANT TO PROCLAMATION NO. 1967," as certified by the Human Settlements Regulation Commission. (Annexes "A" and "A-l," Rollo, pp. 28 & 29). In resume, petitioners did not dispute the fact that private respondents are the lawful owners of the property in question, that Guillermo Nactor and the rest of the defendants are occupying the property only by tolerance of the owners and that under whatever remedy private respondents may avail themselves of, to enforce their rights, petitioners have to vacate the property because they have no right to stay therein. The main thrust therefore, of their objection is not on the merits of their claim but on the technicality that the nature of the action taken by the private respondents is erroneous. That the position of petitioners is totally devoid of merit, is shown by the fact that the end result would be the same. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

This Decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur. Footnotes ** Said Appellate Court is hereby ordered impleaded. *** Penned by CA Justice Nathanael P. De Pano Jr., concurred in by Justices Jose A.R. Melo and Rizalina S. Bonifacio-Vera

Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-17938

of

the

Philippines COURT

April 30, 1963

ESPERIDION TOLENTINO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ADELA ONGSIAKO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. Esperidion Tolentino for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant. Edmundo M. Reyes and Senen Ceniza for defendants-appellees. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Appeal from the order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its Civil Case No. 3197.

The plaintiff-appellant, Esperidion Tolentino, prays in the complaint that he filed with the lower court on 20 May 1959, for the enforcement of the dissenting opinion rendered in the case entitled "Severo Domingo, et al. vs. Santos Ongsiako, et al., G.R. No. 32776." The decision in said case (in favor of appellees' predecessors, and adverse to those of appellant) was promulgated by this Court on 4 December 1930, and, together with the dissenting opinion, appears in Volume 55 of the Philippine Reports, starting on page 361. Unfortunately, the records of said case were lost, or destroyed, during the war. The plaintiff-appellant claims to be the successor-interest of the late Severo Domingo, who died without having received a copy of the decision, and alleges that plaintiff-appellant learned of the decision, only about a week before he filed the aforementioned complaint; that the decision of the majority of the Court was erroneous and unjust; that the dissenting opinion is the correct view of the case, and should be enforced. The court below, on motion of one of the several defendants, dismissed the case, for lack of cause of action. Not satisfied, the plaintiff-appellant interposed the present appeal, and urges that the failure of service of a copy of the decision upon the late Severo Domingo was a denial of due process, which invalidates the decision, and asks that, on equitable grounds, the present case be heard as a proceeding coram nobis. Assuming the truth of the allegation that Severo Domingo, appellant's predecessor-in-interest, was never furnished a copy of the decision in G.R. No. L-32776, it appears in the printed report of the case (55 Phil. 361) that he was represented by Atty. Ramon Diokno. Being represented by counsel, service of the decision is made upon the latter by the clerk of the Supreme Court (Sec. 250, Act 190), and not upon the client (Palad vs. Cui, 28 Phil. 44); and the unrebutted presumption is that the said official of this Court had regularly performed his duty (No. 14, Sec. 334, Act 190; Sec. 69 [m], Rule 123, Rules of Court). Appellant's alleged predecessor-in-interest was not, therefore, denied due process of law.

Appellant's position that the decision was erroneous and unjust is entirely untenable, because the issue sought to be reopened is res judicata, aside from its having stood unchallenged for 30 years. The ridiculous prayer to enforce a dissenting opinion requires no discussion, it being sufficient to state that there is nothing to enforce in a dissenting opinion, since it affirms or overrules no claim, right, or obligation, and neither disposes of, nor awards, anything; it merely expresses the views of the dissenter. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t Lastly, the appellant's claim that "the lower court erred in not allowing plaintiff-appellant's cause as a proceedingcoram nobis", is devoid of merit. The ancient common law writ of error coram nobis, now substantially obsolete even in common law jurisdictions (49 CJS 561), does not lie after affirmance of a judgment on writ of error on appeal (49 CJS 562); nor can it be grounded on facts already in issue and adjudicated on the trial (49 CJS 567). Moreover, the jurisdiction of a writ of error coram nobis lies exclusively in the court which rendered the judgment sought to be corrected (49 CJS 568), so that it should have been sought by appellants, if at all, in the Supreme Court, and not in the Court of First Instance. In the Philippines, no court appears to have ever recognized such writ, the rule in this jurisdiction being that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law.1 Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium. The order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed. Costs against the appellant. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur. Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes
1Pealosa

vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303; Dy Cay vs. Crossfield, 28 Phil. 251; Layda vs. Legaspi, 39 Phil. 83; Aquino vs. Dir. of Lands, 39 Phil. 850; National Bank vs. Barreto, 52 Phil. 818; People vs. Macadaeg, L-4316, 28 May 1952.