Analysis

March 4, 2014

Summary: Turkeys current peace process is not the first attempt at solving the Kurdish issue peacefully. There have been multiple prior attempts to reach the same goal. However, four factors set the current process apart from previous trials and render the ground ripe for a solution: 1) transformation in the states understanding of the Kurdish issue, 2) termination of military-dominated tutelary and the concomitant rise of civilian politics, 3) the publics increasing resistance to provocations, and 4) the perceived legitimacy of the solutions parameters on both sides. Furthermore, changing regional dynamics resulting from the Syrian Crisis have been another compelling determinant that pushed Turkey to tackle the issue more earnestly. Yet these factors are not sufficient to move the process forward. It is only political and legal steps that can reinvigorate the process and push it to a next level.

Revisiting the Kurdish Peace Process: Facilitating Factors, the Regional Dimension, and Challenges Ahead
by Galip Dalay
Introduction Despite a roiling summer of discontent, a sensational graft operation, and ensuing power struggle, Turkeys most important agenda item of the year continues to be the resolution process to bring the Kurdish issue to a peaceful conclusion through dialogue. The recent process is not the first attempt at solving the Kurdish issue peacefully. There have been other attempts during the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule and prior to it. Yet, no other attempt has provoked the level of optimism more than that generated by the current peace process. For the first time, peace with the Kurds seems to be within the reach of a political solution, despite all of the shortcomings and setbacks throughout the process. Four factors set the current process apart from previous trials and render the ground ripe for a solution: 1) transformation in the states understanding of the Kurdish issue, 2) termination of military-dominated tutelary regime and the concomitant rise of civilian politics, 3) the publics increasing resistance to provocations, and 4) the perceived legitimacy of the solutions parameters on both sides. Furthermore, the changing regional dynamics resulting from the Syrian Crisis have been another compelling determinant pushing Turkey to tackle the issue more earnestly. Facilitating Factors State mentality in Turkey, for a long time, had been epitomized in the policies, approaches, and decisions of the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was dominated by the military and served as the most important platform for deciding on issues of high politics. Prior to 2000, it also provided the military with the most conducive mechanism to impose its will on the civilian governments, as the NSC secretary-general had to be a military officer and the agenda of the NSC meetings were largely been set by military. Of all topics, the NSC regarded the protection of the republics secular nature, its territorial integrity, and national unity as primary prerogatives. While any manifestation of Islamic identity and demands were deemed as posing a grave menace to the secular nature of the republic, the Kurds demands for greater cultural and political rights were considered threatening to the territorial integrity of the

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country. Hence these demands were cast in security terms and were responded to largely with security measures. Yet, in 2004, Turkey overhauled the structure of the NSC as part of its drive to conform to the EUs political and legal demands, with the hopes of obtaining a date to commence membership negotiations. In the new form, the NSC had become dominated by civilians and its overall role was relegated to that of an advisory body. This change to the composition and agenda of the NSC paved the way for desecuritiziation of the issues that had been securitized by the NSC previously. In this respect, the Kurdish issue has gradually been recast in political and civilian terms rather than security ones. Second, dismantling the military-led guardianship system, as a result of an active struggle against this system by the civilian politics that took place between 2007-10/11, has released the government from previous constraints. This, in return, led the government to take bolder steps in settling the Kurdish issue. But the recent peace process is not the first initiative in attempting to solve the issue during AKP rule. Rather, it is the third trial. The first initiative came with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoans 2005 speech in Diyarbakir, the largest Kurdish majority city in Turkey, when he recognized the existence of a distinct Kurdish issue. He then referred to further democratization and economic improvement of the Kurdish plurality region as the way forward for tackling the issue. Despite the modest nature of the overture, his remarks elicited stern criticism from the establishment, the alliance of military and high bureaucracy supported largely by the main opposition Republican Peoples Party, which led him to backtrack on this opening. The second initiative came in 2009, around the time the balance of power was already tilting in favor of the government in the fight against the old establishment. This initiative was premised on secret negotiations between Kurdistan Worker Partys (PKK) representatives and officials from National Intelligence Service in Oslo. Yet this opening floundered due to the mass arrests of Kurdish politicians and activists within the framework of the Union of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK) investigations and PKKs resort to violence. The most audacious step to date came with the recent peace process, which was centered on open dialogue with Abdullah calan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK. This

The Kurdish issue has gradually been recast in political and civilian terms rather than security ones.
occurred only after the government won a decisive victory over the old guards, the previously dominant militarybureaucratic alliance, in a power struggle. The more the civilian government has gained ground vis a vis the military, and thus felt secure in the system, the more it has been willing and capable of taking bolder and more sophisticated steps in approaching the issue. Third, throughout the history of the PKK insurgency against Turkey, some form of ceasefire has been proclaimed almost nine times in order to clear the way for a political solution to set in. Yet each of these ceasefires was broken as a result of provocations on either side. This has gradually led the general public to develop a strengthened immune system against similar provocations. The fact that the recent peace process withstood a wide variety of provocations since its start attests to this increased level of public resistance to provocations. This in return made the task of negotiating parties easier. Fourth, the growing convergence between the Kurds and Turkey on the broader boundaries within which a prospective solution would take place is another facilitating factor. In this respect, calans letter, which was read aloud to a crowd of 1 million gathered in Diyarbakir on March 21, was critical. In his letter, calan declared two things: first, the PKK seeks a solution to the Kurdish issue within Turkeys borders and through further democratization, thus effectively renouncing any irredentist claims and violence. Second, the era of armed struggle has come to an end. In the new era, the struggle for Kurdish rights will be advanced through political means. Both of these points increased the legitimacy of the Kurdish demands in the eyes of the broader Turkish public. Regional Dimension In addition to these factors, both the drastic change in the geopolitics of the region ushered in by the ongoing crisis in Syria and the growing economic, energy, and political

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relations between Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have also played a significant role in convincing Turkey to more vigorously seek a solution to the Kurdish issue. The emergence of a fledgling Kurdish enclave in Syria spearheaded by the Democratic Union Party, an offspring of the PKK, demonstrated that the PKK is gaining ground in regional politics. Any delay in solving the Kurdish issue domestically will yield heavier costs for Turkey regionally as well. In addition, Iraq is Turkeys second major trading partner (after Germany) and over 70 percent of the trade between the two countries is being conducted with the KRG. These growing ties between the sides will always remain tenuous unless Turkey settles its own Kurdish issue. After all, the neighbor with which Turkey shares its longest border is no longer Syria nor Iraq. Rather, it is Kurdish entities. Mutually beneficial relations between Turkey and these entities is contingent upon a successful settlement of the Kurdish issue in Turkey, and the Syrian imbroglio has only clearly illustrated the urgency of such a settlement. Conclusion These facilitating factors have been crucial both for initiating the process and keeping it on track thus far. Yet they are not sufficient to move the process forward. It is only the political and legal steps that can reinvigorate the process and push it to a next level. In this regard, the eradication of the Specially Authorized Court system, which is not only responsible for contentious verdicts on the widespread arrests of members of the old establishment, but also hundreds of Kurdish politicians and activists within the framework of KCK operations/trials, is a move in the right direction. This move, however, needs to be accompanied by the annulment of Turkeys infamous anti-terror law, as it is the content of this law that facilitates the arrest of Kurdish politicians and of others on tenuous charges. Moreover, a final solution to the Kurdish issue obviously requires Turkey to devise a new constitution. Some of the fundamental demands voiced by the Kurdish side which include but are not limited to the use of Kurdish language in all levels and types of educational institutions, modification of citizenship clause, and devolution of power to local authorities can only materialize with constitutional amendments. However, Turkeys new constitution writing process, which began in 2011, has so far failed. Yet, the government still possesses instruments that will revitalize the process. In this regard, the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Partys recently declared proposal contains some important points. These points include some form of institutionalization of the peace process, abrogating Turkeys discriminatory legislations, annulment of Turkeys anti-terror law, and regranting citizenship to the Kurdish politicians currently residing in Europe, who in previous decades had been stripped of their citizenship. At this juncture, Turkey should have more open and sophisticated discussions on what the eventual solution to Kurdish issue requires. To reciprocate, the PKK should continue its withdrawal from Turkey to facilitate such steps.
About the Author
Galip Dalayworks as a researcherin the political research department at the SETA Foundation in Turkey. He is also the book review editor of Insight Turkey. His opinion articles have appeared in AJE Opinion, AJE Magazine, Huffington Post, World Politics Review, Fair Observers, and in major Turkish dailies.

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