Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Prolif Core
Prolif Core...................................................................................................................................................................1
Prolif Core......................................................................................................................................1
***PROLIF BAD***.................................................................................................................................................4
***PROLIF BAD***.....................................................................................................................4
Prolif Not Inevitable....................................................................................................................................................4
Prolif Not Inevitable......................................................................................................................4
Prolif Bad – Prolif is Fast (1/2)...................................................................................................................................5
Prolif Bad – Prolif is Fast (1/2).....................................................................................................5
Prolif Bad – Prolif is Fast (2/2)...................................................................................................................................6
Prolif Bad – Prolif is Fast (2/2).....................................................................................................6
Prolif Bad – **Utgoff** (1/2).....................................................................................................................................7
Prolif Bad – **Utgoff** (1/2)........................................................................................................7
Prolif Bad – **Utgoff** (2/2).....................................................................................................................................8
Prolif Bad – **Utgoff** (2/2)........................................................................................................8
Prolif Bad – Accidents................................................................................................................................................9
Prolif Bad – Accidents...................................................................................................................9
Prolif Bad – Causes Nuke War (1/2)........................................................................................................................10
Prolif Bad – Causes Nuke War (1/2)..........................................................................................10
Prolif Bad – Causes Nuke War (2/2)........................................................................................................................11
Prolif Bad – Causes Nuke War (2/2)..........................................................................................11
Prolif Bad – Causes Conventional War....................................................................................................................12
Prolif Bad – Causes Conventional War.....................................................................................12
Prolif Bad – Causes Miscalc.....................................................................................................................................13
Prolif Bad – Causes Miscalc........................................................................................................13
Prolif Bad – Deterrence Fails (Generic)...................................................................................................................14
Prolif Bad – Deterrence Fails (Generic).....................................................................................14
Prolif Bad – Kills Heg...............................................................................................................................................15
Prolif Bad – Kills Heg..................................................................................................................15
Prolif Bad – No Civilian Control..............................................................................................................................16
Prolif Bad – No Civilian Control................................................................................................16
Prolif Bad – No 2nd Strike Capability......................................................................................................................17
Prolif Bad – No 2nd Strike Capability.......................................................................................17
Prolif Bad – Nuclear Escalation................................................................................................................................18
Prolif Bad – Nuclear Escalation..................................................................................................18
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Prolif Bad – Nuclear Winter.....................................................................................................................................19
Prolif Bad – Nuclear Winter.......................................................................................................19
Prolif Bad – Preemptive Strikes................................................................................................................................20
Prolif Bad – Preemptive Strikes.................................................................................................20
Prolif Bad – Rogue States.........................................................................................................................................21
Prolif Bad – Rogue States............................................................................................................21
Prolif Bad – Terrorist Acquisition............................................................................................................................22
Prolif Bad – Terrorist Acquisition..............................................................................................22
Prolif Bad – A2: Deterrence Empirically Successful................................................................................................23
Prolif Bad – A2: Deterrence Empirically Successful................................................................23
Prolif Bad – A2: Rationality Checks.........................................................................................................................24
Prolif Bad – A2: Rationality Checks..........................................................................................24
***PROLIF GOOD***............................................................................................................................................25
***PROLIF GOOD***...............................................................................................................25
Prolif Inevitable.........................................................................................................................................................25
Prolif Inevitable............................................................................................................................25
Prolif Good – Prolif is Slow (1/2).............................................................................................................................26
Prolif Good – Prolif is Slow (1/2)................................................................................................26
Prolif Good – Prolif is Slow (2/2).............................................................................................................................27
Prolif Good – Prolif is Slow (2/2)................................................................................................27
Prolif Good – Prevents Wars (1/2)............................................................................................................................28
Prolif Good – Prevents Wars (1/2).............................................................................................28
Prolif Good – Prevents Wars (2/2)............................................................................................................................29
Prolif Good – Prevents Wars (2/2).............................................................................................29
Prolif Good – Prevents Miscalc................................................................................................................................30
Prolif Good – Prevents Miscalc..................................................................................................30
Prolif Good – Solves Entanglement/Escalation........................................................................................................31
Prolif Good – Solves Entanglement/Escalation.........................................................................31
Prolif Good – Conventional > Nuclear War (1/3).....................................................................................................32
Prolif Good – Conventional > Nuclear War (1/3).....................................................................32
Prolif Good – Conventional > Nuclear War (2/3).....................................................................................................33
Prolif Good – Conventional > Nuclear War (2/3).....................................................................33
Prolif Good – Conventional > Nuclear War (3/3).....................................................................................................34
Prolif Good – Conventional > Nuclear War (3/3).....................................................................34
Prolif Good – Solves Poverty ...................................................................................................................................35
Prolif Good – Solves Poverty .....................................................................................................35
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Prolif Good – Poverty > Nuke War..........................................................................................................................36
Prolif Good – Poverty > Nuke War............................................................................................36
Prolif Good – A2: Accidents.....................................................................................................................................37
Prolif Good – A2: Accidents........................................................................................................37
Prolif Good – A2: Anonymous Attack.....................................................................................................................38
Prolif Good – A2: Anonymous Attack.......................................................................................38
Prolif Good – A2: Asymmetry..................................................................................................................................39
Prolif Good – A2: Asymmetry....................................................................................................39
Prolif Good – A2: Civil Wars...................................................................................................................................40
Prolif Good – A2: Civil Wars......................................................................................................40
Prolif Good – A2: Hair Trigger Alert.......................................................................................................................41
Prolif Good – A2: Hair Trigger Alert........................................................................................41
Prolif Good – A2: Military Control is Unstable.......................................................................................................42
Prolif Good – A2: Military Control is Unstable........................................................................42
Prolif Good – A2: No 2nd Strike Capabilities..........................................................................................................43
Prolif Good – A2: No 2nd Strike Capabilities...........................................................................43
Prolif Good – A2: Nuke Blackmail Undermines Heg..............................................................................................44
Prolif Good – A2: Nuke Blackmail Undermines Heg...............................................................44
Prolif Good – A2: Preemptive Strikes......................................................................................................................45
Prolif Good – A2: Preemptive Strikes........................................................................................45
Prolif Good – A2: Proximity.....................................................................................................................................46
Prolif Good – A2: Proximity.......................................................................................................46
Prolif Good – A2: Rogue/Failed States.....................................................................................................................47
Prolif Good – A2: Rogue/Failed States......................................................................................47
Prolif Good – A2: Terrorists (1/3)............................................................................................................................48
Prolif Good – A2: Terrorists (1/3)..............................................................................................48
Prolif Good – A2: Terrorism (2/3)............................................................................................................................49
Prolif Good – A2: Terrorism (2/3)..............................................................................................49
Prolif Good – A2: Terrorism (3/3)............................................................................................................................50
Prolif Good – A2: Terrorism (3/3)..............................................................................................50
Prolif Good – A2: Unstable Rivalries.......................................................................................................................51
Prolif Good – A2: Unstable Rivalries.........................................................................................51
***PROLIF BAD***
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***PROLIF BAD***
Prolif isn’t inevitable – countries don’t need them, and persuasion to not prolif has been
successful in the past
Roberts 9 [Brad, Ph.D., Institute for Defense Analyses, “Challenges to Military Operations in
Support of U.S. Interests, Online, Acc. Jul 31, 2009]cn
Proliferation is not inevitable. Many states have had nuclear weapons ambitions but few have gone the
distance. Historical peak of nuclear weapon seekers: 20. Ratio of nonproliferation wins to losses in 1960s was 18 to 5. Ratio
over last 20 years is 4 to 2: South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine versus Pakistan and North Korea. Many states have accepted
latency as an adequate substitute for actual weapons. Proliferation pressures erupt in waves. Drivers: both
primary and secondary. Usually the primary drivers are localized within regions but sometimes secondary drivers are external. Nonproliferation
successes include both rollback and the inhibition of “roll forward” by those with latent capabilities.
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Roberts 99 [Brad, member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses,
"Viewpoint: Proliferation And Nonproliferation In The 1990s," The Nonproliferation Review,
Fall, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/voI06/64/robert64.pdf, accessed 9/2/02]cn
But the standard answers don't really take us very far into this problem any more. To grasp the full stake requires a broader notion of stability-and an
appreciation ofthe particular historical moment in which we find ourselves. It is an accident of history that the diffusion of dual-use capabilities is
coterminous with the end of the Cold War. That diffusion means that we are moving irreversibly into an international system
in which the wildfire-like spread of weapons is a real possibility. The end of the Cold War has brought with it great
volatility in the relations of major and minor powers in the international system. What then is at stake? In response to some catalytic event,
entire regions could rapidly cross the threshold from latent to extant weapons capability, and from
covert to overt postures, a process that would be highly competitive and.iliky, and which likely would spill
over wherever the divides among regions are not tidy. This would sorely test Ken Waltz's familiar old heresy that "more may be
better"-indeed, even Waltz assumed proliferation would be stabilizing only if it is gradual, and warned against the rapid spread of
weapons to multiple states. At the very least, this would fuel NBC terrorism, as a general proliferation ofNBC weapomy would
likely erode the constraints that heretofore have inhibited states from sponsoring terrorist use of these capabilities. Given its global stature and media
culture, America would be a likely target of some of these terrorist actions. What kind of catalytic event might cause such
wildfire- like proliferation? The possibilities are not numerous and thus we should not be too pessimistic, although history usually surprises. One catalyst
could be a major civil war in a large country in which NBC weapons are used. Another catalyst might be a crisis in which NBC weapons are used to call
into question the credibility ofUS security guarantees. Such a crisis would have farreaching consequences, both within and beyond any particular region. If
the threat ofthe use of such weapons is sufficient to dissuade the United States from reversing an act of aggression, or if their use is successful in defeating a
US military operation, there would be hell to pay. How, for example, would Japan respond to a US decision not to seek to reverse NBC-backed aggression
on the Korean peninsula? How might NATO partners respond to a collapse of US credibility in East Asia? This stake
isn't just America's
stake. Any country whose security depends to some extent on a regional or global order guaranteed by
Washington has a stake in preventing such wildfire-like proliferation. This is truest of America's closest security
partners, but it is true of the many small and medium-sized states that depend, to some degree, on collective mechanisms for their security. It seems
reasonable to expect that many of these states would respond to a loss of US credibility and to the fear of
greater regional instability by moving up the latency curve. If they were also to cross the threshold to
weapons production, the international system would have a hard time coping. It seems likely that such
proliferation would cause the collapse of nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms. This, in turn, would
precipitate a broader crisis of confidence in the other institutions of multilateral political and economic activity that
depend on some modicum of global stability and cooperation to function. The consequences could be very far-reaching. These
international mechanisms and institutions have been a primary means of giving order to an anarchic international system.
Wilcock 97 [Luke, "Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the Efficacy of Deterrence," Interstate
Online, Issue 50, Spring, http://users.aber.ac.uk/scty34/50/prolif.htm, accessed 8/3/02]cn
Coupled to the above is the prospect of a reduction in the freedom of action of the major powers, mainly the United States and Russia, and tied up with this
is the question of how the deterrence relationship will develop between small and major nuclear powers. (fint11) The worry
of proliferation
pessimists is that additional nuclear states will increase the risks major powers will have to face in
their efforts to intervene in and defuse conflict situations. The heightened probability that nuclear weapons will be
present and of the potential for escalation to the nuclear level which will therefore exist, will, it is thought,
significantly increase the costs of such intervention and hence be a deterrent to this. Furthermore, fearing a proliferated world, it is argued that non-nuclear
states concerned for their security, especially as
the deterrent umbrella provided by the United States and Russia
recedes, will become locked into a global nuclear arms race where the urgency to acquire nuclear
weapons takes precedent over safety.
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Prolif snowballs
Payne 96 [Keith, adjunct professor at Georgetown and president of the National Institute for
Public Policy, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, p. 21-22]cn
Two points are suggested by this discussion. First, of course, is that proliferation is beginning to pose a real threat to u.S. allies and overseas interests.
Second, proliferation
can be self-propelled, as proliferation by one regional power serves as the catalyst
for further proliferation in that region-the pressure on Japan from North Korean proliferation
demonstrating the point. Consequently, the view noted above by Kabun Muto concerning Japanese armament, despite the furor it stirred,
should not come as a surprise. Japan is a country with a high population density, and a small number of North Korean missiles and WMD could place much
of the Japanese population and industry at risk.
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Utgoff 2 [Victor, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the
Institute for Defense Analysis, "Proliferation, Missile Defense, and American Ambitions,"
Survival, Summer, p. 87-90]cn
Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by
the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great
pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons. Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to
some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by
North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of
establishing a reliable supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nucleararmed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United
States, were [was] no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a
few additional states would begin
to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives
would spur increasing numbers of the world’s capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever
less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many,
perhaps most, of the world’s states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to
improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the
restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably
be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other
areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint. Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear
proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we
are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it
needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And,
for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting
to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous.
Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those
who
succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes
capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent’s nuclear
programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of
building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass
destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today
will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause
serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons
failing into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out
hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent
opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times
between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure,
some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the
probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero.’ These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to
nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They
believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature,
however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states ‘known to
possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles
along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always
avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-
examples Egypt
attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina
invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain’s efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who
claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that
any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history
provides unhappy examples of states whose
leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a
‘victory or destruction’’ policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat. And Japan’s war minister, during
debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested ‘Would it not be wondrous for
the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?”
McGwire 94 [Michael, Faculty of Social and Political Science at Cambridge, "Is There a Future
for Nuclear Weapons?" International Affairs, 70, 2, p. 224-225]cn
Advocates of an LSN world claim that nuclear war would be prevented by the deterrent effect of mutually assured destruction. This assumes that war is
always the outcome of rational decision-making and ignores the possibility of accidental or inadvertent war. Recent
analysis of the
command, control and communications (C3) systems ofUS and Soviet strategic forces during the Cold War argues that a
significant probability of procedural and systems malfunctions (and hence mistaken activation of strike plans) was
inherent in both systems. Inadvertent war can come about through misunderstanding and/or the momentum of events. The Cuban
missile crisis is a classic example of this process, but access to the archives is revealing other incipient cases, the misreading of a
NATO exercise in November 1983 being a good example. So far our luck has held, but it will be severely tested as_we
move from a bipolar to a multipolar game, where the new players' nuclear C3 will be more prone to
system errors, and each player's understanding of the others' thought processes will be even more
rudimentary. And can we assume that the other players will all be as cautious as the Soviet Union, which
saw the primary threat as inadvertent war, a danger that could be avoided but not prevented? Or are they more likely to emulate the
United States, which believed that war could be prevented by the threat of escalation, and was prepared to up
the ante in a crisis? The existence of two or more such players would sharply increase the future probability of
inadvertent and accidental war.
Freedman 95 [Lawrence, Professor of War Studies at King's College, "Great Powers, Vital
Interests and Nuclear Weapons," Survival, v36 n4, Winter, p. 37]cn
As nuclear arsenals spread, despite the non-proliferation regime, more parts of the world move beyond the effective
influence of the former great powers, while, at the same time, the possibility of some dreadful nuclear mishap or
deliberate employment increases. Given the uncertain distribution of the effects of any nuclear
detonations, this prospect should encourage a broad view of vital interests. It argues not only for efforts to support the nonproliferation regime, but
also, and as important, that the great powers should get involved before areas of conflict begin to acquire a nuclear dimension.
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Nuclear prolif is too dangerous – it leads to multiple scenarios for nuclear war
Prolif causes war – it destroys good relations, prompts first strikes, and military doctrine
ensures use
Quester 2k [George, Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, "The
Unavoidable Importance ofNuclear Weapons," Alternative Nuclear Futures, ed. Baylis and
O'Neil, p. 33]cn
The outside world, and the countries directly within a region, will have to be very nervous about the transition periods where countries
are coming into the possession of such weapons, and can deploy only rudimentary delivery systems, thus tempting an
adversary to strike first in a preventive war. If the impact of nuclear proliferation on the likelihood of war might thus be mixed, the
impact on the destructiveness of war will most probably be horrendous, as millions are killed in short bursts
of warfare, rather than thousands. The spread of nuclear weapons to any large number of separate countries increases the
chances of their coming into use, simply because they are embedded in the military forces that are
committed to conflict. and come to be treated as 'just another weapon but with potential1y horrible results where the
targets are the cities of south Asia or the Middle East. And yet another possibility, of course, is that a relatively irrational or actually crazy
ruler would come into command of one of these arsenals, someone indifferent to the nuclear or other
retaliation that his country would suffer, someone thus capriciously launching a local nuclear holocaust. Turning to the
burdens in peacetime of being prepared for war, the spread of nuclear weapons can also poison the political relations in
pairs of countries. Consider the normal relations of Brazil and Argentina today, as compared with what
those relations might have become if each had acquired a nuclear arsenal, amid all the calculations and
discussions of what each could do to the other's cities.
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Betts 2k [Richard, Professor and the Director ofthe Institute of War and Peace Studies at
Columbia, "Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian
Realism," The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order, ed. Utgoff,
p. 65-66]cn
High-quality theory is not necessarily a direct guide to good policy. In the scientifically rickety world of social science,
any theory that predicts, say, 90 percent of outcomes on some important matter is an amazingly good
theory. The Waltz argument may be in that category. In the overwhelming majority of cases, new nuclear states may be more cautious and remain
deterred by each other. In the world of policy on the other hand, people do not marvel at all the cases where nuclear weapons will make the world safer, but
worry about the exceptions where things will go wrong. Those
wrapped up in policy also take more seriously the
prospects for nonrational or accidental action associated with complex organizations, problems that Sagan poses
as the main grounds for greater pessimism than Waltz derives from looking at the broader logic of the international balance of power. Nuclear weapons
stabilize In most cases, the logicof deterrence theory that became the bedrock of U.S. strategic thought in the
course of the nuclear era suggests that the acquisition of nuclear weapons should have a stabilizing
effect-that is, they should make it hard to change the status quo by force. Those who have a powerful deterrent will be less coercible or conquerable. It
is less clear whether they will coerce non-nuclear neighbors. "Rogue" states that start brandishing
nuclear threats risk bringing down an international consensus-and more significantly U.S. power and
countercoercion-on themselves. On the other hand, they may sometimes find that nuclear capability makes the outside powers more
amenable to negotiation than they might otherwise be (as in the case ofNorth Korea's diplomatic coup with the United States). If nuclear spread
enhances stability, this is not entirely good news for the United States, since it has been accustomed to
attacking small countries with impunity when it felt justified and provoked. The United States is not
accustomed to being deterred by anyone but the Russians or Chinese. This is not the main reason, however, that the Waltz argument fails to
command enthusiasm. The main reason is the worry that real statesmen may not always have the courage of Waltz' convictions, that one exception
to the rule may be too many, and that the ramifications of the first breakage of the half-century taboo
on nuclear use are too unpredictable to tempt us to run the experiment. If the probability that nothing
will go seriously wrong in any one case of proliferation lli a reassuring 90 percent, the odds that
nothing will go seriously wrong in any of them decline steadily as the number of cases grows. In short,
when it comes to nuclear weapons, "very" stable in "almost all" cases is great for purposes of
theoretical clarification, but not good enough for purposes of policy prescription.
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Abraham 99 [Itty, "Nuclear Power and Human Security," Bulletin of Concerned Asian
Scholars, v31 n2]cn
But "successful" nuclear deterrence does not make conventional warfare less likely. If anything, the
historical record shows that the nuclear powers, successfully deterred from dropping missiles on each
other, fought each other through a variety of surrogates in Africa, Latin America and Asia, for nearly haIfa centurv. The
price for the cold war was paid with the lives of black, brown, and yellow people-not a sign of success if
you lived anywhere other than in the United States or the Soviet Union. For India and Pakistan, there
is nowhere else to go, or, having nuclear weapons on both sides says nothing about the likelihood of
peace breaking out. Rather, the presence of nuclear weapons may make policy-makers more sanguine about resorting to conventional and
unconventional forms of warfare. The moral sanction of not using nuclear weapons because of their destructive
power is easily trumped by the peculiar form of "rationality" that becomes the norm for strategic
discourse once nuclear are in place. As nuclear war fighting plans are drawn up, policy-makers are "rationally" led to make calculations on the basis of
the threat potential of relative destruction. Does a destroyed Karachi equate to a destroyed Bombay, or should New Delhi be added in order to make the
relative loss to each country the same, they ask each other. Are
nine million Indian dead the same as one million Pakistani
dead, given the population differentials of each country? That even asking questions like this betrays a
fundamentally immoral condition is soon forgotten once the rational game played by theorists and
strategic thinkers takes over.
Lavoy 95 [Peter, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Security Studies, Summer, 1995, p. 737]cn
Some observers fear that nuclear
weapons make the use of conventional military force more probable. Early in his
career, Waltzhimself suggested that a "mutual fear of big weapons may produce, instead of peace,.!! spate
of smaller wars." There are at least two possible paths to conventional war in the nuclear world. First, states armed with nuclear
weapons might bully or attack their non-nuclear neighbors and then use their nuclear arsenals to
intimidate foreign powers from intervening. Second, in a situation in which two states possess nuclear
weapons, if one country is confident in its ability to manipulate the risk of nuclear war and control the
pace of military escalation, it might attempt to use military force against the other state in an effort to
alter the territorial or political status quo.
Nuclear weapons inspire conventional escalation which may spill over to nuclear use
Miller 93 [Steven, Director of Studies at the Center for Science and International Affairs at
Harvard, "The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs, June/July]cn
IT IS RARELY ARGUED that nuclear weapons will magically solve the problem of conflict in its
entirety. While all-out or high-stakes wars may become too dangerous to fight, there is still room for less challenges at lower
levels of conflict. If the nuclear balance is believed to be highly stable, then decision-makers may
calculate that they can fight even substantial conventional wars with little risk of escalation, since all parties
possess enormous incentives not to use nuclear weapons. In addition, nuclear deterrent threats will not be equally effective in
all circumstances; deterrence will not work well when dealing with ambiguous borders or disputed
territories -- a point that may be highly relevant to Russian-Ukrainian relations. But conventional conflicts in a nuclear
environment raises the risk not only of intentional nuclear escalation, which leaders will have incentives to avoid, but
also of inadvertent nuclear escalation, which leaders may not be able to avoid even if they want. A conventional war could jeopardize
nuclear deterrent capabilities directly or degrade other important capabilities, such as warning systems, thus
increasing the possibility of successful nuclear preemption. The most extensive analysis of this question concludes that the
problem of inadvertent escalation will "loom especially large for small and medium-sized nuclear
powers, since they will have the most difficult time building nuclear forces that can survive."
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Betts 2k [Richard, Professor and the Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at
Columbia, "Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian
Realism," The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order, ed. Utgoff,
p. 66-67]cn
The notion that widespread nuclear capability would inhibit aggression by creating a world of porcupines or a "unit veto
system" of omnilateral deterrence isan old one. The suppression of military interventionism, however, could
simply channel impulses to meddle into covert political action or other less direct methods. These in turn
could increase diplomatic tension and the chances of miscalculation, especially since many of the political
systems of the potential proliferators are likely to be weak, permeable, and praetorian, unlike the stable institutionalized
governments of the developed world. Internal political weakness and externally deployable military strength (via
WMD) are a volatile combination. It was reckless enough for the Argentine junta in 1982 to divert public attention from internal economic
problems by grabbing the Falkland (or Malvinas) Islands-one of only two cases of a non-nuclear state initiating combat against a nuclear power (the other
being Egypt and Syria against Israel in 1973).
Wilcock 97 [Luke, "Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the Efficacy of Deterrence," Interstate
Online, Issue 50, Spring, http://users.aber.ac.uk/scty34/50/prolif.htm, accessed 8/3/02]cn
Evidently the regional consequences of nuclear proliferation raise some important questions, but what are
the wider implications of nuclear weapons proliferation? How will emergent nuclear states affect stability on an international
scale? For Stanley Hoffmann, "a world of many nuclear states would raise extremely difficult issues of
management." The crucial factor is perceived to be the resultant increase in difficulty in decision making, that more nuclear powers
will complicate calculations and that mis-perceptions will become more dangerous and more likely as a
consequence. It is argued that the relatively clear-cut bipolarity which characterised the Cold War would diminish and that "uncertainties will tempt
instead of deter. " Having got used to a stable nuclear world, states may start to take the deterrent effect of
nuclear weapons for granted and in so doing become more and more daring in their foreign policy
aims. (ftntlO) Nuclear weapons possession might create ambitions, ambitions which are likely to be
conflictual.
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Wirtz 98 [James, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Post-
graduate School, "Beyond Bipolarity: Prospects for Nuclear Stability After the Cold War," The
Absolute Weapon Revisited, ed. Paul, Harknett, and Wirtz, p. 153]cn
The logic ofMAD might not govern strategic relationships in the future. Counterforce strategies,
nonsurvivable delivery systems, waning robustness of arsenals, and the potential for "windows of
vulnerability" would reduce the prospects for arms-race and crisis stability, at least until second-strike capabilities
emerge between any potential combination of nuclear-armed antagonists. Additionally, bipolarity, or the more idiosyncratic sources
of Cold War stability, will not exist to reduce the instability created by the absence ofMAD. An extremely
dynamic nuclear balance, possibly produced by the politics of nuclear alliances, will stand in stark
contrast to the slow and relatively predictable pace of change in the superpowers' Cold War arsenals.
And even an overwhelming nuclear advantage appears incapable of deterring millenarian states; perceptions of the intensity of leaders' motivations for
engaging in war, and the actual strength of those motivations, would have a greater impact on stability in deterrence situations not characterized by MAD.
When combined, these developments indicate that future nuclear relations could be governed by the
logic of conventional deterrence.
Betts 2k [Richard, Professor and the Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at
Columbia, "Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian
Realism," The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order, ed. Utgoff,
p. 73]cn
There are two main rebuttals, and they are convincing. First, the
fact of a half-century of nuclear peace between the
superpowers leads the optimists to assume that what was, had to be, and to overestimate how intrinsically safe the
confrontation was. Although U.S. and Soviet leaders meant to be cautious, there were numerous
accidents that raised the risk of inadvertent escalation. Moreover, the tendency of military elites to consider
preventive war as a solution more readily than civilian politicians do manifested itself even in the United
States; in newly nuclear countries with military governments, these tendencies would not be as reliably
constrained as they have been.
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Welch 2k [General Larry, USAF (retired), Foreword, The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation,
U.S. Interests, and World Order, ed. Utgoff, p. vii-viii]cn
Some hope that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will ultimately lead potential aggressors to conclude that war has become too dangerous.
But centuriesof history, including the past five decades, lead most observers of the international scene
to be deeply skeptical that a more proliferated world would be more peaceful. It seems more likely that highly
destructive wars would increase as the number of actors armed with these weapons rises. Thus, efforts to limit
or roll back proliferation remain a national priority There is reason for some optimism about the outcome of such efforts. Looking back, international
nonproliferation efforts, coupled with the selfrestraint exercised by many nations, have been surprisingly effective. Predictions made decades ago of the
number of states that would have weapons of mass destruction by 2000 have proven pessimistic. While the large majority of the world's states are now
capable of building weapons of mass destruction, only a minority appear to have done so, or to be purposely moving toward such weapons. Many factors
are involved in explaining this divergence between capabilities to build such weapons and the choice to do so. Among the most important is the belief that
the major states will continue to play their post-World War II role of keeping sovereign states from conquering or destroying one another. But
proliferation raises the risk involved in intervention, and the end of the global contest for power with the
former Soviet Union causes some to believe that the outcomes of regional wars are less important to
the United States. This combination could undermine confidence in the capability and the will of the United
States to continue to play the key stabilizing role the world has come to expect of it.
Freedman 95 [Lawrence, Professor of War Studies at King's College, "Great Powers, Vital
Interests and Nuclear Weapons," Survival, v36 n4, Winter, p. 37]cn
The situation, however, is more complicated and more paradoxical than this suggests. Rather
than reinforce power politics as usual,
nuclear weapons in fact confirm a tendency towards the fragmentation of the international system in
which the erstwhile great powers playa reduced role. While their credibility in extremis may be as dubious as
ever, nuclear guarantees show a remarkable resilience within an established alliance framework.
Outside such a framework, however, they have at most a fleeting half-life, especially at a time when the nuclear powers are
taking care to limit their general liabilities when addressing the security concerns of others. Nuclear powers are reluctant to transfer nuclear capabilities to
vulnerable states to enable them to help themselves, although they have no difficulties in justifying conventional arms transfers on this basis.
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Kateb 92 [George, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, The Inner Ocean, p. 111-12]cn
Schell's work attempts to force on us an acknowledgment that sounds far-fetched and even ludicrous, an acknowledgment that the
possibility of
extinction is carried by any use of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited or how seemingly rational or seemingly
morally justified. He himself acknowledges that there is a difference between possibility and certainty. But in a matter that is more than a matter, more than
one practical matter in a vast series of practical matters, in the "matter" of extinction, we are obliged to treat a possibility-a
genuine possibility- as a certainty. Humanity is not to take any step that contains even the slightest risk of extinction. The doctrine of no-use is based
on the possibility of extinction. Schell's perspective transforms the subject. He takes us away from the arid stretches of strategy and asks us to feel
continuously, if we can, and feel keenly if only for an instant now and then, how utterly distinct the nuclear world is. Nuclear discourse must vividly register
that distinctive- ness. It is of no moral account that extinction may be only a slight possibility. No one can say how great the possibility is, but no one has yet
credibly denied that by some sequence or other a particular use of nuclear weapons may lead to human and natural extinction. If it is not impossible it must
be treated as certain: theloss signified by extinction nullifies all calculations of probability as it nullifies all
calculations of costs and benefits. Abstractly put, the connections between any use of nuclear weapons and human and natural extinction
are several. Most obviously, a sizable exchange of strategic nuclear weapons can, by a chain of events in nature,
lead to the earth's uninhabitability, to "nuclear winter," or to Schell's "republic of insects and grass." But the consideration of
extinction cannot rest with the possibility of a sizable exchange of strategic weapons. It cannot rest with the imperative that a sizable exchange must not take
place. A so-called tactical or "theater" use, or a so-called limited
use, is also prohibited absolutely, because of the
possibility of immediate escalation into a sizable exchange or because, even if there were not an
immediate escalation, the possibility of extinction would reside in the precedent for future use set by
any use whatever in a world in which more than one power possesses nuclear weapons. Add other
consequences: the contagious effect on nonnuclear powers who may feel compelled by a mixture of fear
and vanity to try to acquire their own nuclear weapons, thus increasing the possibility of use by
increasing the number of nuclear powers; and the unleashed emotions of indignation, retribution, and
revenge which, if not acted on immediately in the form of escalation, can be counted on to seek expression later. Other than full
strategic uses are not confined, no matter how small the explosive power: each would be a cancerous
transformation of the world. All nuclear roads lead to the possibility of extinction. It is true by definition, but let
us make it explicit: the doctrine of no-use excludes any first or retaliatory or later use, whether sizable or not. No-use is the imperative derived from the
possibility of extinction. By containing the possibility of extinction, any use is tantamount to a declaration of war against humanity. It is not merely a war
crime or a single crime against humanity. Such a war is waged by the user of nuclear weapons against every human individual as individual (present and
future), not as citizen of this or that country. It is not only a war against the country that is the target. To respond with nuclear weapons, where possible, only
increases the chances of extinction and can never, therefore, be allowed. The use of nuclear weapons establishes the right of any
person or group, acting officially or not, violently or not, to try to punish those responsible for the use. The aim of the punishment
is to deter later uses and thus to try to reduce the possibility of extinction, if, by chance, the particular use in question did not directly lead to extinction. The
form of the punishment cannot be specified. Of course the chaos ensuing from a sizable exchange could make punishment irrelevant. The important point,
however, is to see that those who use nuclear weapons are qualitatively worse than criminals, and at the least forfeit their offices.
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Rao 90 [Narashima, Minister of External Affairs, Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free and Non-
violent World, p. 4]cn
The nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear weapon powers concentrate an awesome power of
destruction. It has recently been established scientifically that the use of even a small proportion of these weapons
will suffice to bring about a nuclear winter in which there will be no trace of life on earth. Thus the world
has been brought to the very edge of a precipice and the survival of the human race is in real peril,
only one pressing of the wrong button or one computer malfunction away. Political leaders, scholars, scientists and
strategic experts and activists of the peace movements bring home the fact that such a situation cannot be allowed to continue. The urgent and over-riding
need to take decisive steps for bringing about nuclear disarmament now was acknowledged almost universally. That even the leading nuclear weapon
powers have begun to realize this truth is symbolized in the signing and ratification of the INF Treaty and the impressive progress made in its
implementation.
Beckman 2k [Peter, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, et al, The Nuclear Predicament:
Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century, 3rd edition, p. 6]cn
There are, of course, other reasons to be concerned. If
nuclear proliferation continues, there are some potential nuclear
states that may not be politically strong and stable enough to ensure control of the weapons and
control of the decision to use them. If neighboring, hostile, perhaps politically unstable states, such as India
and Pakistan, have them, the temptation to strike against traditional rivals may be too hard to resist. When
the weak fear the strong, the weaker party often does what it can to maintain its security. Pakistan has
fought three wars with its larger and more powerful neighbor, India. If it feels threatened, it might be
tempted in the future to act preemptively. Many fear that states that are radical at home, say a Libya, will
recklessly use their nuclear weapons in pursuit of revolutionary ends abroad. In some of the new nuclear states,
civil control of the military may be weak. Nuclear weapons may fall into the hands of military officers
more inclined to use them.
Despite uncertainty, military leaders will plan and seriously consider preemptive strikes
Fetter 96 [Steve, associate professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of
Maryland, "Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," International Security, v21
nl, Summer, p. 179 ]cn
Although no prudent leader should have confidence in the ability of preemptive or counterforce strikes to limit
damage to an "acceptable" level, that does not mean that such attacks will not be planned and seriously
considered during a crisis. The fact that U.S. and Soviet planners could not have confidence in the ability of counterforce
strikes to limit damage did not prevent military officials from planning counterforce attacks. As late as 1961, the U.S.
military believed that massive preemptive strikes "should permit the United States to prevail in the event of a general nuclear war," even though they
believed that "some portion of the Soviet long-range nuclear force would strike the United States." Some military
leaders went so far as to
recommend a preemptive attack, despite the fact that the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities at the time far exceeded those of India or
Pakistan today. Without reliable information on the nuclear doctrines of proliferators, it would be unwise to
assume that military officials in these countries will not also plan such attacks and recommend their
implementation during a crisis.
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Beckman 2k [Peter, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, et ai, The Nuclear Predicament:
Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century, 3rd edition, p. 229-230]cn
What precautions should we take against the risk of nuclear terrorism? Here there
is a close relationship between the two targets of
antiproliferation policy: states, as discussed earlier in the chapter, and terrorist groups. First, stopping states from
acquiring nuclear weapons will help stop terrorist groups from acquiring them. As Thomas Schelling notes:
"The best way to keep [nuclear] weapons and weapons-material out of the hands of nongovernmental entities is
to keep them out of the hands of national governments." Second, precautions to keep nuclear weapons from proliferating to
terrorist groups are of the same general sort as precautions against the more familiar kind of nuclear proliferation involving states. Our antiproliferation
efforts directed against nonstate groups, like those directed against states, can be based on coercion, denial, and/or cooperation. In terms of coercion,
authorities can engage in on-going intelligence activities to attempt to learn of any efforts on the part of
terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons, coupled with the availability of military-type rapid response teams, such as the Nuclear
Emergency Search Teams maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy, to thwart any such effort. In terms of denial, authorities can make efforts to keep
nuclear weapons and the materials needed to construct them out of the hands of terrorist groups. Cooperative antiproliferation takes a different form in the
case of nonstate groups. In the case of cooperative efforts to stop proliferation by states, one seeks to negotiate with those states to convince them in one
way or another that acquiring nuclear weapons is not in their interest. To seek to stop terrorist groups from using nuclear weapons, the cooperation
that is appropriate does not involve wotking with the terrorist groups themselves, but rather working with the people whose
grievances the terrorist group claim to represent, and with their governments, to reduce the injustices
that give rise to those grievances.
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Fetter 96 [Steve, associate professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of
Maryland, "Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," International Security, v21
nl, Summer, p. 179 ]cn
Hagerty cites the "unblemished record of political leaders resisting the temptation to decapitate their enemies' existing nuclear forces" as strong evidence
against the "logic of non-proliferation" (p. 85). But the fact that deterrence held in one crisis, or even ten crises, does not
prove that the risks of nuclear deterrence are acceptable, any more than twenty-four successful launches proved that the Space
Shuttle met an acceptable standard of reliability, or twenty years' experience operating civil nuclear reactors proved that
the risk of a meltdown was acceptably low. The successful resolution of a single nuclear crisis does not provide meaningful evidence
about the probability of nuclear war over the long term. Deterrence is a threat that leaves something to chance, and the risk that a crisis
might escalate out of control is a powerful factor that moderates the behavior of prudent leaders. The key question is not whether deterrence can
fail, but how likely such failures are. If a one percent chance of a nuclear conflagration is too great a risk to
run, then the fact that deterrence was successful in one or two crises is a completely inadequate basis for rejecting the "logic of nonproliferation." An
examination of past nuclear crises should not make one optimistic that the risks of nuclear deterrence are
acceptably low. While it is true that even the most extreme crisis-the Cuban missile crisis-was resolved without resort to nuclear weapons, recent
research has revealed disturbing evidence indicating that risks of escalation and accidental or
unauthorized use were far greater than is usually appreciated.2 Consider: Top U.S. military leaders, in the mistaken belief
that no nuclear warheads had been delivered to Cuba, recommended air strikes to destroy the missile sites, followed by an invasion of Cuba. Authorization
had been given to Soviet commanders in Cuba to use tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a U.S. invasion. These warheads, which lacked control devices
to prevent unauthorized use, were dispersed during the crisis to reduce their vulnerability to a U.S. attack. The longer-range missiles and their warheads also
lacked use controls~ opening up the possibility that Soviet commanders in Cuba could have launched a nuclear attack against the United States. Castro and
Soviet military leaders argued for a tough response to U.S. demands that the missiles be removed. Khrushchev initially ordered work accelerated on the
missile sites, and ordered Cuba-bound ships to ignore the U.S. quarantine. At the height of the crisis, Soviet commanders in Cuba, acting on their own
authority, ordered air defense units to shoot down a U-2 reconnaissance airplane. Later that same day, a U-2 on a routine mission accidentally strayed over
Soviet airspace. Either act could have been interpreted as a calculated provocation by the other side. During the crisis, officers at Malmstrom Air Force Base
jerry-rigged the launch system to give themselves the ability to launch their Minuteman missiles without higher authorization. During the crisis, the
Strategic Air Command deployed nuclear warheads in nine often test silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base and then launched the tenth missile in a previously
scheduled test, oblivious to the possibility that the Soviets might have been aware of the warhead deployments and could have confused the test for a
nuclear attack. During the crisis, U.S. radar operators mistakenly reported that a missile had been launched from Cuba and was about to hit Tampa. Only
after the expected detonation failed to occur was it discovered that an operator had inserted a training tape into the system. Optimists apparently
believe that the fact that war was avoided despite these mishaps shows just how robust nuclear deterrence is.
This is somewhat like NASA managers who used the fact that booster seals had eroded and partially failed
in earlier successful launches to justify the fateful decision to launch the Challenger: There are several references
to flights that had gone before. The acceptance and success of these flights is taken as evidence of safety. But erosion and blow-by... are
warnings that something is wrong . The fact that this danger did not lead to catastrophe before is no guarantee that it will not the next
time . When playing Russian roulette the fact that the first shot got off safely is little comfort for the next.
To pessimists, the mishaps and miscommunications during the missile crisis demonstrate that deterrence can
fail despite our best efforts to prevent nuclear war, and that the probability of such a failure is unacceptably
high. Under somewhat different circumstances, with different political and military leaders, an attack on Cuba might
have been ordered, a serious accident might have occurred, or an innocent event might have been misinterpreted as an act of
war, any of which might have triggered the use of nuclear weapons. The fact that nuclear war was avoided in the Cuban missile crisis and the 1990 Indo-
Pakistani crisis should be little comfort for the next crisis.
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Quester & Utgoff 94 [George, Government at Maryland and Victor, Institute for Defense
Analysis, "No-First-Use and Nonproliferation: Redefining Extended Deterrence," Washington
Quarterly, Spring]cn
If Americans ask themselves the elementary question of why they should be opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, an obvious first answer might
now be that such a spread of weapons of mass destruction could lead to U.S. cities being destroyed and/or U.S. military units or other U.S. assets abroad
suffering nuclear attacks. Further, Americans also care about nuclear proliferation because foreign cities may get destroyed in future outbreaks of war.
Following such proliferation, nuclear attacks on U.S. targets could take place more "rational1y" in the wake of
normal military and political conflicts. Crises sometimes lead to "a war nobody wanted," or to
escalations that neither side can control. The risks that such deterrence failures would involve nuclear use
are increased as more countries get nuclear weapons. Such nuclear attacks on U.S. targets could also take place
less "rational1y" -- if someone like Idi Amin or Mu'ammar Qadhafi were to take charge of a country that
possesses nuclear weapons. The kinds of political forces that bombed the World Trade Center in New York, or
attacked the entrance to Central Intel1igence Agency (CIA) headquarters in Virginia, might then use nuclear weapons. Second, nuclear
weapons have always been important, not just for the devastation they inflict, but also for the political intimidation imposed by the possibility of nuclear
devastation. The spread of nuclear weapons to any sizable number of countries will tend to give each a way
of intimidating the rest of the world, and thus of vetoing the outside world's objections to any of its more
obnoxious activities: "ethnic cleansing," brutal dictatorships, warlord-caused famines, or conquests of
neighboring states not so strongly armed. Americans, and most other people, will want to avoid a situation in which any state can defy the will of
the rest of the world, just by being able to threaten the destruction of any of the world's cities. Whatever hopes are now entertained for a disciplined world
order and areliable system of collective security thus depend on the halting of nuclear proliferation. Final1y, the
United States will not find it easy to sit on the sidelines in a regional war involving nuclear-armed states. In
desperate circumstances such states will try to threaten the interests of bystanders, in order to force an international intervention. And other states within and
outside such a region wil1 apply great pressures for U.S. and/or UN involvement.
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***PROLIF GOOD***
Prolif Inevitable
Prolif is inevitable – nuke power and states feel threatened
Stuart 7 [John, writer for Future, Mar 11, “Talk: Nuclear Proliferation,”
http://future.wikia.com/wiki/Talk:Nuclear_Proliferation]cn
Proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear material available to terrorist organisations. Proliferation is
inevitable. A number of states
are already starting to develop a "civil" nuclear programme. A number of these states do not have the most stable of
political regimes or have a significant level of extremist activity within their borders. Under the guise of obtaining civilian nuclear
power, it will be no surprise to many that some other states have the hidden agenda of producing
nuclear fission weapons. As a result of their own foreign policies, such countries may perceive they
need protection from the war orientated rumblings of other states. Alternatively, such countries may also believe in the
concept of “pre-emptive action” to further their own view of the world.
Chain reaction prolif is a myth – arms races are unlikely and extremely slow
Tertrais 1 [Bruno, senior research fellow for strategic studies at the Fondation pour la
Recherche Strategique, Washington Quarterly, Autumn]cn
Beijing has a long historical record of developing strategic programs very slowly; the Chinese leadership may
be wary of entering into a competition that it may perceive -whatever the reality-as having been lethal
to the Soviet Union. Thus, for many reasons, China is likely to "jog" with rather than race with the United
States. Finally, the Bush administration's missile defense program is intended to intercept handfuls of incoming missiles, not hundreds. The extinction ofthe
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty would no more trigger a new arms race than it limited the Cold War's arms race (if the ABM Treaty had closed the
possibility of an offensive/defensive race, it channeled the superpowers' competition toward the offensive side). These analyses produce a few conclusions.•
Asian countries have not engaged in arms racing of the sort that existed during the Cold War, although the
countries strategically compete among themselves. Claims of the existence ofa "nuclear reaction chain" do reflect a reality. The links between the Chinese,
Indian, and Pakistani nuclear programs, for instance, are historically well proven. Asian arms races, however, to the extent that they
exist, are mostly slow processes fueled by political rivalries and of a qualitative rather than quantitative
nature, especially as far as ballistic missiles are concerned. They qualify as Type-II arms racing rather than Type-I. As a former Pentagon official
argued, "It is a bunch of loosely coupled arms races, and our past has been dominated by one very large arms race.... People need to stop living in the past."
15 • The conditions do not exist for a new arms race involving the United States, Russia, and China. Neither
Russia nor China has the
means or the will to race in the way that the Soviet Union and the United States did during the Cold War. Moscow and Beijing will
only seek to maintain their current ability to strike the United States, not compete for the best missile or the highest number of
warheads.• Some links do exist between Asian arms racing and global arms racing involving the five recognized nuclear powers. Notably, because "China's
nuclear identity is both global and Asian," it stands at the juncture ofAsian and global strategic dynamics. There
is a logical abyss, however,
between this idea and the belief that
a mechanical process exists whereby an increase in the Pakistani nuclear
weapons arsenal would automatically trigger a rise in the Indian one, instigating a Chinese decision to
augment its own forces, and eventually leading Moscow to build up its own forces-or vice versa.
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Mueller 98 [John, Professor of Political Science at the UNC-Chapel Hill, "The Escalating
Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons," The Absolute Weapon Revisited, ed. Paul, Harknett, and
Wirtz, p. 83]cn
Therefore, although there may be some imaginable circumstances under which nuclear weapons could have value, these scenarios tend to be rather strained.
Moreover, with the possible exception of the curious events surrounding the Yom Kippur War of 1973, there
has been no clear militarized
crisis among major countries since 1962. And conventional international wars between India and Pakistan and
between Israel and the Arab states, once so common, have been absent from the world scene for decades.
Indeed, international wars are quite rare: most armed conflicts- including ones currently taking place-are civil wars.
Dropping a nuclear bomb on one's neighbor doesn't make a great deal of sense. Civil wars do not usually present
military targets that might make nuclear weapons very helpful, although a nuclear attack on an enemy city could appeal to an appropriately fanatical leader
as the ultimate in ethnic cleansing.
Tertrais 1 [Bruno, senior research fellow for strategic studies at the Fondation pour la
Recherche Strategique, Washington Quarterly, Autumn]cn
Do arms races cause wars? This classic international relations question is almost a century old. After World War I, scholars and politicians
were tempted to label the extraordinary military buildup that developed between 1870 and 1914 as a major cause, if not the major cause, of the conflict.
Subsequent historical studies, however, have shed considerable doubt on this theory. Moreover, arms racing
may in fact have positive aspects. NATO's 1979 decision to deploy Pershing-2 and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in response to
the Soviet Union's deployment of SS-20s and Backfire bombers, which undoubtedly was part of an action-reaction process, made the "zero option" and the
INF Treaty possible. When
competition spirals out of control, states may feel that engaging in a dialogue to
control it is in their common interest-thereby creating an atmosphere conducive to a better
understanding of the other party.
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Miller 93 [Steven, Director of Studies at the Center for Science and International Affairs at
Harvard, "The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs, June/July]cn
THE CASE FOR NUCLEAR proliferation rests on the pacific effects of nuclear weapons. As Kenneth Waltz
asserts in the most famous advocacy of proliferation, nuclear spread "will promote peace and reinforce international
stability." Because nuclear weapons greatly increase the costs and risks of war, they induce caution in
the behavior of states and substantially reduce the likelihood of miscalculation. Wars between nuclear-arms states
become simply too dangerous to fight. The force of this argument is greatly strengthened by the experience of the Cold War, in which the
two bitterly opposed protagonists avoided war for nearly half a century despite numerous crises and provocations. If nuclear weapons reliably cause peace,
then nuclearproliferation to Ukraine -- or any other state, for that matter --is not merely acceptable, but desirable,
stabilizing a situation that might otherwise be prone to conflict.
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Layne 96 [Christopher, fellow of the Center For Science and International Affairs at Harvard,
"Minimal Realism in East Asia," The National Interest, Spring, p. 72-73]cn
This is doubly true when
the potential aggressor is a nuclear power because, as Charles de Gaulle reasoned well, rational states
will not risk suicide to save their allies. For both protector and protected, extended nuclear deterrence raises constant and ultimately
insoluble dilemmas of credibility and reassurance. The conditions that contributed to successful extended nuclear deterrence in Cold War Europe do not
exist in post-Cold War East Asia. Unlike the situation that prevailed in Europe between 1948 and 1990-which was fundamentally stable and static-East Asia
is a volatile region in which all the major players- Japan, China, Korea, Russia, Vietnam-are candidates to become involved in large-scale war. There is no
clear and inviolable status quo. The lines of demarcation between spheres of influence are already blurred and may well become more so as Chinese and
Japanese influence expand simultaneously, increasing the number and unpredictability of regional rivalries. The status of Taiwan, tension along the 38th
Parallel in Korea, conflicting claims to ownership of the Spratly Islands, and the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands are only a few of
the flash-points that could ignite a great power war in East Asia. Washington will clearly exercise far less control over the policies of East Asian powers
than it exercised over Americas European allies during the Cold War. Hence, the
risk of being chain-ganged into a nuclear
conflict are much higher for the United States in post-Cold War East Asia if it maintains or extends nuclear
guarantees to any of the region's major states. Even more important, post-Cold War East Asia simply does not have the same degree of
strategic importance to the United States as did Europe during the Cold War. Would the United States risk a nuclear confrontation to defend Taiwan, the
SpratIys, or Senkaku? Knowing that they would not constitute the same kind of threat to U.S. interests that the Soviet Union did, future revisionist East
Asian powers would probably be more willing to discount America's credibility and test its resolve. The presence of American forces in
the region may indeed have the perverse effect of failing to preserve peace while simultaneously
ensuring the United States would be drawn automatical1y into a future East Asian war. They could constitute the
wrong sort of tripwire, tripping us rather than deterring them. Notwithstanding current conventional wisdom, the United States should
encourage East Asian states-including Japan-to resolve their own security dilemmas, even if it means
acquiring great power, including nuclear, military capabilities. Reconfiguring American security policies anywhere in the world in ways that,
in effect, encourage nuclear proliferation is widely seen as irresponsible and risky. This is not necessarily the case. Nuclear proliferation and extended
deterrence are generally believed to be flip sides of the same coin, in the sense that providing the latter is seen to discourage the former. Nearly all
maximalists are simultaneously proliferation pessimists (believing that any proliferation will have negative security implications) and extended nuclear
deterrence optimists (believing that extended nuclear deterrence "works"). But this formulation comes apart from both ends in
East Asia:
Potential nuclear powers in the region are unlikely to act irresponsibly and, as suggested above, the U.S. nuclear umbrella is
of uncertain credibility in post-Cold War circumstances in which the Soviet Union no longer exists and strains in the U.S.-Japanese relationship are
manifest. Even selective proliferation by stable, non-rogue states admittedly raises important political, strategic, organizational, and doctrinal issues. But so
does relying on America's nuclear extended deterrence strategy in changed circumstances. The
need at hand is to weigh the dangers
imbedded in an extended deterrence strategy against those posed by the possibility of nuclear proliferation, and here the
Japanese case provides the most important and sobering illustration.
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Shwartz & Derber 91 [William and Charles, Harvard Nuclear Study Group, The Nuclear
Seduction, Introduction, http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?
docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=d0e180&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e180&brand=ucpress]cn
For many years, a striking consensus has reigned: the nuclear arms race between the superpowers is the main source of danger. The arms race is "the central
concern of the closing years of the century," the cause célèbre of our time. A U.S. senator says that "the very survival of our planet, the survival of the
human race, is at stake," a common view.[1] The right, the center, and the left disagree, of course, about how the United States should run the arms race.
The right urges us to build weapons like the MX missile, the Stealth bomber, and "Star Wars"; the center, to sign arms control treaties like INF and START
with the Soviet Union; and the left, to stop and then reverse the arms race through a test ban, a "freeze," and huge reductions in nuclear arsenals. But all
focus on the hardware, the weapons themselves. Most of the nuclear debate concerns which weapons should be deployed and which destroyed. But short of
near-total nuclear disarmament, we believe that no
change in the arms race can in fact make a profound difference. MX,
Star Wars, INF, a freeze, or even a 90 percent reduction in nuclear arsenals cannot reliably change the
horror of a nuclear war. They cannot much affect the risk that the nuclear states will plunge us into that
horror. They cannot make the world much safer or more dangerous than it already is. The nuclear danger is
real—even more ominous, as we will show, than most people appreciate. But the fixation on weapons has obscured the real
menace: the political conflict and violence raging around the world that could one day burn out of control and set off a
nuclear cataclysm. As the world debates largely irrelevant missiles and arms control treaties, the superpowers
are fanning the flames of conflict and war from Afghanistan to Nicaragua, Lebanon to Cambodia. Forty years of history reveal
that such conflicts can suddenly veer out of control and even erupt into open superpower confrontation. Yet
in a time of unprecedented public concern about nuclear war, few—even in the peace movement—protest the nuclear hazards of their governments' foreign
intrigues and interventions. Those of us concerned with the nuclear threat have long been like the apocryphal drunk who searches for his lost keys hour after
hour under a lamppost—because it's light there. The giant weapons systems are seductive, the obvious place to look for answers to the nuclear peril. The
light there is good. But there is little to be found. If
we want the keys to a safer world, we must turn the light to the real
conflicts and battlefields where the superpowers and their clients confront each other every day, often hidden
from public view, and where they periodically collide in terrifying crises that threaten to provoke
worldwide catastrophe. The Absolute Weapon Public issues generally develop a "culture," a consensus about the key questions, the level of
analysis, and the language of debate. Since these assumptions are shared, they rarely come up for discussion. The common perspective that
guides discourse on nuclear war and peace is what we call the "weapons paradigm." It magnifies the importance of the
weapons themselves far beyond their real significance. It views weapons as the basic source of security or insecurity, power or
weakness, peace or war. It pegs the arms race as the problem and some change in that race as the solution.
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Nyquist 99 [J.R., WoridNetDaily contributing editor and author of 'Origins of the Fourth World
War,' May 20, http://www.antipas.org/news/world/nuclear_war.htrnl]cn
I patiently reply to these correspondents that nuclear
war would not be the end of the world. I then point to studies showing
that "nuclear winter" has no scientific basis, that fallout from a nuclear war would not kill all life on
earth. Surprisingly, few of my correspondents are convinced. They prefer apocalyptic myths created by pop scientists,
movie producers and joumalists. If Dr. Carl Sagan once said "nuclear winter" would follow a nuclear war, then it must be true. If radiation wipes out
mankind in a movie, then that's what we can expect in real life. But Carl Sagan was wrong about nuclear winter. And the movie "On the Beach" misled
American filmgoers about the effects of fallout. It is time, once and for all, to lay these myths to rest. Nuclear war would not bring about the end of the
world, though it would be horribly destructive. The
truth is, many prominent physicists have condemned the nuclear
winter hypothesis. Nobel laureate Freeman Dyson once said of nuclear winter research, "It's an absolutely atrocious piece of science, but I quite
despair of setting the public record straight." Professor Michael McElroy, a Harvard physics professor, also criticized the nuclear winter hypothesis.
McElroy said that nuclear winter researchers "stacked the deck" in their study, which was titled "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear
Explosions" (Science, December 1983). Nuclear winter is the theory that the mass use of nuclear weapons would create enough smoke and dust to blot out
the sun, causing a catastrophic drop in global temperatures. According to Carl Sagan, in this situation the earth would freeze. No crops could be grown.
Humanity would die of cold and starvation. In truth, natural
disasters have frequently produced smoke and dust far
greater than those expected from a nuclear war. In 1883 Krakatoa exploded with a blast equivalent to
I0,000 one-megaton bombs, a detonation greater than the combined nuclear arsenals of planet earth. The
Krakatoa explosion had negligible weather effects. Even more disastrous, going back many thousands of years, a meteor
struck Quebec with the force of 17.5 million one megaton bombs, creating a crater 63 kilometers in diameter. But the
world did not freeze. Life on earth was not extinguished. Consider the views of Professor George Rathjens of MIT, a known antinuclear activist,
who said, "Nuclear winter is the worst example of misrepresentation of science to the public in my memory." Also consider Professor Russell Seitz, at
Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, who says that the nuclear winter hypothesis has been discredited. Two researchers, Starley Thompson
and Stephen Schneider, debunked the nuclear winter hypothesis in the summer 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs. Thompson and Schneider stated: "the
global apocalyptic conclusions of the initial nuclear winter hypothesis can now be relegated to a
vanishingly low level of probability." OK, so nuclear winter isn't going to happen. What about nuclear fallout?
Wouldn't the radiation from a nuclear war contaminate the whole earth, killing everyone? The short answer is:
absolutely not. Nuclear fallout is a problem, but we should not exaggerate its effects. As it happens, there are two types of fallout produced by
nuclear detonations. These are: 1) delayed fallout; and 2) short-term fallout. According to researcher Peter V. Pry, "Delayed fallout will not, contrary to
popular belief, gradually kill billions of people everywhere in the world." Of course, delayed fallout would increase the number of people dying of
lymphatic cancer, leukemia, and cancer of the thyroid. "However," says Pry, "these deaths
would probably be far fewer than deaths
now resulting from ... smoking, or from automobile accidents." The real hazard in a nuclear war is the short-term fallout. This is a type of
fallout created when a nuclear weapon is detonated at ground level. This type of fallout could kill millions of people, depending on the targeting strategy of
the attacking country. But short-term
fallout rapidly subsides to safe levels in 13 to 18 days. It is not permanent. People
who live outside of the affected areas will be fine. Those in affected areas can survive if they have
access to underground shelters.
Gray 2k [Colin, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Hull, "To Confuse
Ourselves: Nuclear Fallacies," Alternative Nuclear Futures, ed. Baylis and O'Neil, p. 17]cn
A small nuclear war is an oxymoron. While most probably it is true that a
nuclear war between regional powers would have the effect of
encouraging extra-regional actors to keep their heads down, it is not likely that a 'small' nuclear war between regional rivals
would have negligible, or world-system supporting, consequences. Scholar-theorists like Kenneth N. Waltz probably are correct when
they point to the readily confinable domain of a regional nuclear conflict. In Waltz's brutally realistic words: [i]f such
[relatively weak] states use nuclear weapons, the world will not end. The use of nuclear weapons by lesser
powers would hardly trigger them elsewhere. No one wants to be a player (target) in other people's
nuclear wars.
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Military spending creates cycles of poverty, crushes economic growth, and makes conflict
more likely
Desai 2k [Nitin, undersecretary-general for economic and social affairs at the UN, and Jayantha
Dhanapala, undersecretary-general for disarmament affairs at the UN, International Herald
Tribune, December 22]cn
At the United Nations' Millennium Summit in September, world leaders pledged to "free our peoples from the scourge of war, whether within or between
States," and to halve global poverty by the year 2015. That these should be global imperatives is apparent from two broad statistics. Wars claimed more than
5 million lives in the 1990s, and nearly 3 billion people, almost half the world's population, live on a daily income of less than $2 a day. Poverty and
conflict are not unrelated; they often reinforce each other. Poverty is a potent catalyst for conflict and
violence within and among states, particularly at a time when poor countries and peoples are increasingly aware of the relative affluence of others.
Conflicts plunge many individuals into poverty and deal a severe blow to a country's longerterm development efforts.
Even where there is no active conflict, military spending absorbs resources that could be used to attack
poverty. During the Cold War, world defense spending peaked at around $1.2 trillion in 1987. The first half of the 1990s saw some sharp
reductions in military expenditures in economically advanced countries. Partially as a result, Western
countries reaped a substantial peace dividend in the form of an extended period of economic
prosperity. However, by 1997 global military expenditures were rising again. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
world military expenditures rose by more than 2 percent in 1999, and a further increase is expected for this year. World military spending is now around
$800 billion, a level equal to more than 2.5 percent ofthe world's output of goods and services. The share of the developed world in global defense spending
continues to exceed 70 percent, with five economically advanced countries accounting for the great bulk of this spending. The share of the developing
world, however, has grown during the past decade. During the 1990s, spending on arms and the maintenance of military forces increased by one-fifth in
East Asia, by one- quarter in South Asia and by more than one-third in South America. High military spending has been both a cause
and a result of the large number of conflicts in the developing world. On average, defense spending absorbs more than 10
percent of government budgets around the world. In some developing countries the burden is considerably higher than this average. These increasing
military expenditures in developing countries are reflected in international arms sales. Global arms transfer agreements with developing nations increased
from $16.8 billion in 1998 to $20.6 billion in 1999. The U.S. Congressional Research Service estimates that worldwide arms deliveries from 1992 to 1999
totaled more than $296 billion, of which nearly 70 percent went to developing countries. The economically advanced countries accounted for more than 90
percent of these sales. High
levels of military spending in some countries impair development by crowding out
private and public investment. Moreover, since developing countries import most of their military equipment, spending on foreign
armaments reduces the scope for imports of capital goods that would allow the economy to expand and
diversify. Most importantly, high levels of military spending aggravate tensions and engender suspicion,
encouraging higher spending in other countries and creating conditions ripe for conflict.
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Gilligan 96 [James, Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical and Director of the Center for
the Study of Violence “Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and Its Causes,” p191-196]cn
The 14 to 18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths
per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major
military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those by genocide-or about eight
million per year, 1939-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000) deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even
a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R . (232 million), it was clear that even war
cannot begin to compare with
structural violence, which continues year after year. In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many
people die because of relative poverty as would be killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This
is, in effect. the equivalent of an ongoing, unending~ in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide,
perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. Structural violence is also
the main cause of behavioral violence on a socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from homicide and suicide to war and
genocide). The question as to which of the two forms of violence-structural or behavioral-is more
important, dangerous, or lethal is moot, for they are inextricably related to each other, as cause to
effect.
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2nd strike is irrelevant – the perception that a few nukes would survive is enough to deter
Welch 2k [General Larry, USAF, Foreword, The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S.
Interests, and World Order, ed. Utgoff, p. vii]cn
But proliferation raises the risk involved in intervention, and the end of the global contest for power with the former Soviet Union
causes some to believe that the outcomes of regional wars are less important to the United States. This combination could
undermine
confidence in the capability and the will of the United States to continue to play the key stabilizing role the
world has come to expect of it. I believe the United States will continue in its stabilizing role for at least three
reasons. First, U.S. political leaders, whatever their political philosophy, have always found it difficult to
keep the nation on the sidelines in the face of massive violence or destabilizing developments. Second, the United States
will seldom, if ever, find it in its national interest to be deterred from standing up to aggression. Third,
I believe that the United States remains willing to accept risks-even large risks- for an important cause.
Empirically, prolif doesn’t allow nuclear blackmail – states aren’t threatened, and
bandwagoning solves
Preemptive strikes won’t happen – low probability of success and deterrence checks
Even radical states will abide by nuclear restraint – prolif makes them more cautious and
cooperative
Lavoy 95 [Peter, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Security Studies, Summer]cn
Waltz does not dispute the ability of terrorists to gain control of a. few nuclear explosives. He does doubt, however, that terrorists ever would use them. This
sanguine view derives from three assumptions Waltz makes about the nature and aims of terrorist organizations. First, because
'secrecy is
safety" for terrorists, Waltz believes that they would not wish suddenly to enlarge their ranks through the
multiplication of "suppliers, transporters, technicians, and guardians" required to obtain and
maintain nuclear weapons. Second, terrorists are not well suited to carrying out the time-consuming
negotiations needed to obtain the compliance of a state placed under a terrorist nuclear threat. Third, terrorists favor tactics of
disruption and harassment to threats of wholesale death and destruction; nuclear weapons do not help terrorists reach their long-term goals. If terrorists did
seek to take many lives, Waltz reasons that poison would be a better weapon.
Terrorists won’t use nukes – they think it’s immoral, undermines their goals, and are too
powerful
Beckman 2k [Peter, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, et aI, The Nuclear Predicament:
Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century, 3rd edition, p. 227-228]cn
Would it be rational for terrorists to use nuclear weapons? An act is rational only relative to the goals and assumptions of the actor. So, to ask whether
nuclear terrorism is rational for a terrorist group is to ask whether it is rational relative to its goals and assumptions. Normally, a terrorist group has goals
and assumptions different from those of the ordinary person. Still, there is some reason to think that nuclear use would not be rational for
the terrorist, even from the terrorist's point of view. For one thing, the main concern of terrorists seems to be to
make their grievances known, not just to kill people. Brian Jenkins notes: "Simply killing a lot of people has seldom been a
terrorist objective.... Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead." He bolsters this point by observing
that many terrorists are morally opposed to indiscriminate violence, given that "they regard a government
as their opponent. not the people," and they do not want to alienate the people. There are other reasons to think that
nuclear terrorism would be irrational from the terrorist's perspective. The cohesion of a terrorist group is of great importance to
the group, and the use of nuclear weapons risks the loss of that cohesion. Given the revulsion some in
the group might feel toward such an act, the decision to use nuclear weapons might shatter the group. Moreover, terrorists might well
discover the same truth that states have discovered, namely, that nuclear weapons are too powerful. For the question arises: What demands could
nuclear terrorists make that would correspond in magnitude to what they threaten, demands that they
could be assured that the state would carry out, given the temporary nature of the nuclear threat they
would pose?
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