[G.R. NO. 151876 : June 21, 2005] SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE O !"E P"#L#PP#NES, Petitioners, v. ERNAN$O L.

$#%AG#&A, Respondent.

Administrative Circular 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, merely establishes a rule of preference in imposing penalties for violations of Batas ambansa Blg. 22 !B 22", the #Bouncing Chec$s %a&.# 'hen the circumstances of both the offense and the offender indicate good faith or a clear mista$e of fact &ithout taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone - - instead of imprisonment - is the preferred penalty. As the Circular re(uires a revie& of the factual circumstances of a given case, it applies only to pending or future litigations. )t is not a penal la&* hence, it does not have retroactive effect. +either may it be used to modify final ,udgments of conviction. -he Case Before us is a etition for .evie&1 under .ule /0 of the .ules of Court, assailing the 1ctober 10, 2001 2 and the 1ctober 11, 20013 1rders of the .egional -rial Court !.-C" !Branch 0", Baguio City./ -he 1ctober 10, 2001 1rder released .espondent 2ernando %. 3imagiba from confinement and re(uired him to pay a fine of 100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. -he 1ctober 11, 2001 1rder disposed as follo&s4 #'56.621.6, 7in8 applying the doctrine as held in the above-entitled cases in this case, the instant petition for 5abeas Corpus should be, as it is hereby, 9.A+-63. -he Baguio City :ail 'arden is hereby ordered to );;63)A-6%< .6%6A=6 the petitioner from confinement unless he is being held for some other la&ful cause other than by virtue of the =entence ;ittimus dated =eptember 2>, 2001 issued by C6=A. =. ?)3@<A, Cler$ of Court, ;-C /, Baguio City. 2urther, the petitioner is re(uired to pay a fine in the amount of 100,000.00 in lieu of his imprisonment, in addition to the civil aspect of the :oint :udgment rendered by ;-C / dated :uly 1A, 1BBB.# 0 -he 2acts -he pertinent facts are not disputed. .espondent 2ernando %. 3imagiba issued to etitioner =usan 9o thirteen !13" chec$s &hich, &hen presented to the dra&ee ban$ for encashment or payment on the due dates, &ere dishonored for the reason #account closed.# A 3imagiba &as subse(uently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of B 22 C under separate Complaints filed &ith the ;unicipal -rial Court in Cities !;-CC" in Baguio City.> After a ,oint trial, the ;-CC !Branch /" rendered a 3ecision on :uly 1A, 1BBB, convicting the accused in the 13 cases. -he dispositive portion reads as follo&s4 #'56.621.6, in vie& of the foregoing dis(uisition, this Court finds the evidence of the prosecution to have established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged and imposes upon the accused the penalty of 3 months imprisonment for each count !13 counts" and to indemnify the offended party the amount of 1ne ;illion -&o 5undred +inety 2ive -housand esos ! 1,2B0,000.00" &ith legal interest per annum commencing from 1BBA after the chec$s &ere dishonored by reason DACC1@+- C%1=63D on 3ecember 13, 1BB0, to pay attorneyDs fees of 10,000.00 and to pay the costs.#B -he appeal of 3imagiba &as raffled to Branch / of the .-C in Baguio City. 10 1n ;ay 23, 2000, the .-C denied the appeal and sustained his conviction.11 -here being no further appeal to the Court of Appeals !CA", the .-C issued on 2ebruary 1, 2001, a Certificate of 2inality of the 3ecision.12 -hus, on 2ebruary 1/, 2001, the ;-CC issued an 1rder directing the arrest of 3imagiba for the service of his sentence as a result of his conviction. -he trial court also issued a 'rit of 6Eecution to enforce his civil liability. 13 1n 2ebruary 2C, 2001, 3imagiba filed a ;otion for .econsideration of the ;-CC 1rder. 5e prayed for the recall of the 1rder of Arrest and the modification of the final 3ecision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him.1/ -he arguments raised in that ;otion &ere reiterated in a ;otion for the artial Fuashal of the 'rit of 6Eecution filed on 2ebruary 2>, 2001.10 )n an 1rder dated August 22, 2001, the ;-CC denied the ;otion for .econsideration and directed the issuance of a 'arrant of Arrest against 3imagiba.1A 1n =eptember 2>, 2001, he &as arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence. 1n 1ctober B, 2001, he filed &ith the .-C of Baguio City a etition 1C for a &rit of habeas corpus. -he case &as raffled to Branch 0, &hich scheduled the hearing for 1ctober 10, 2001. Copies of the 1rder &ere served on respondentDs counsels and the city &arden. 1>

.uling of the .egional -rial Court .ight after hearing the case on 1ctober 10, 2001, the .-C issued an 1rder directing the immediate release of 3imagiba from confinement and re(uiring him to pay a fine of 100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. 5o&ever, the civil aspect of the :uly 1A, 1BBB ;-CC 3ecision &as not touched upon.1B A subse(uent 1rder, eEplaining in greater detail the basis of the grant of the &rit of habeas corpus, &as issued on 1ctober 11, 2001.20 )n ,ustifying its modification of the ;-CC 3ecision, the .-C invo$ed Vaca v. Court of Appeals21 and =upreme Court Administrative Circular !=C-AC" +o. 12-2000,22 &hich allegedly re(uired the imposition of a fine only instead of imprisonment also for B 22 violations, if the accused &as not a recidivist or a habitual delin(uent. -he .-C held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of 3imagiba. 23 )t further noted that !1" he &as a first-time offender and an employer of at least 200 &or$ers &ho &ould be displaced as a result of his imprisonment* and !2" the civil liability had already been satisfied through the levy of his properties. 2/ 1n 1ctober 22, 2001, etitioner 9o filed a ;otion for .econsideration of the .-C 1rders dated 1ctober 10 and 11, 2001. 20 -hat ;otion &as denied on :anuary 1>, 2002.2A 5ence, this etition filed directly &ith this Court on pure (uestions of la&. 2C -he )ssues etitioner raises the follo&ing issues for this CourtDs consideration4 #1. 7-he .-C8 :udge &as utterly devoid of ,urisdiction in amending a final and conclusive decision of the ;unicipal -rial Court, Branch /, dated :uly 1A, 1BBB, in nullifying the =entence ;ittimus, dated =eptember 2>, 2001, issued by E E E 7the8 ;unicipal -rial Court, Branch /, Baguio City, and in ordering the release of 73imagiba8 from confinement in ,ail for the service of his sentence under the said final and conclusive ,udgment* #2. Assuming only for the sa$e of argument that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, the etition for 5abeas Corpus is utterly devoid of merit as 73imagiba &as8 not entitled to the beneficent policy enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and .osa %im cases and reiterated in the =upreme Court Circular +o. 12-2000* E E E #3. 9ranting for the sa$e of argument that 73imagiba &as8 entitled to the beneficent policy enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and .osa %im cases and reiterated in the =upreme Court Circular +o. 12-2000, the minimum fine that should be imposed on 73imagiba8 is one million and t&o hundred ninety five thousand pesos ! 1,2B0,000.00" up to double the said amount or ! 2,0B0,000", not ,ust the measly amount of 100,000* and
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#/. 7-he .-C8 ,udge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac$ or eEcess of ,urisdiction in hearing and deciding 73imagibaDs8 etition for 5abeas Corpus &ithout notice and &ithout affording procedural due process to the eople of the hilippines through the 1ffice of 7the8 City rosecutor of Baguio City or the 1ffice of the =olicitor 9eneral.# 2> )n the main, the case revolves around the (uestion of &hether the etition for habeas corpus &as validly granted. 5ence, the Court &ill discuss the four issues as they intert&ine &ith this main (uestion. 2B -he CourtDs .uling -he etition is meritorious. ;ain )ssue4 Propriety of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

-he &rit of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in &hich individuals are deprived of liberty. 30 )t &as devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unla&ful restraint* or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those &ho may have been illegally confined or imprisoned &ithout sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unla&ful custody. 31 )t is therefore a &rit of in(uiry intended to test the circumstances under &hich a person is detained. 32 -he &rit may not be availed of &hen the person in custody is under a ,udicial process or by virtue of a valid ,udgment. 33 5o&ever, as a postconviction remedy, it may be allo&ed &hen, as a conse(uence of a ,udicial proceeding, any of the follo&ing eEceptional circumstances is attendant4 !1" there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person* !2" the court had no ,urisdiction to impose the sentence* or !3" the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such eEcess.3/ )n the present case, the etition for a &rit of habeas corpus &as anchored on the ruling in Vaca and on =C-AC +o. 12-2000, &hich allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for convictions under B 22. .espondent sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being eEcessive. 2rom his allegations, the etition appeared sufficient in form to support the issuance of the &rit. 5o&ever, it appears that respondent has previously sought the modification of his sentence in a ;otion for .econsideration 30 of the ;-CCDs 6Eecution 1rder and in a ;otion for the artial Fuashal of the 'rit of 6Eecution. 3A Both &ere denied by the ;-CC on the ground that it had no po&er or authority to amend a ,udgment issued by the .-C. )n his etition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same arguments that he had invo$ed in the said ;otions. 'e believe that his resort to this eEtraordinary remedy &as a procedural infirmity. -he remedy should have been an appeal of the ;-CC 1rder denying his ;otions, in &hich he should have prayed that the eEecution of the ,udgment be stayed. But he effectively misused the action he had chosen, obviously &ith the intent of finding a favorable court. 5is etition for a &rit of habeas corpus &as clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and eEecutory. =uch an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping. .espondent should have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a different action in another forum. -he Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to support the issuance of the &rit of habeas corpus. Preference in the Application of Penalties for Violation of P !!

-he follo&ing alternative penalties are imposable under B 224 !1" imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year* !2" a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the chec$, a fine that shall in no case eEceed 200,000* or !3" both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. 3C =C-AC +o. 12-2000, as clarified by =C-AC +o. 13-2001,3> established a rule of preference in imposing the above penalties.3B 'hen the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mista$e of fact &ithout taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty. /0 -he determination of the circumstances that &arrant the imposition of a fine rests upon the trial ,udge only./1 =hould the ,udge deem that imprisonment is appropriate, such penalty may be imposed. /2 =C-AC +o. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment. -he competence to amend the la& belongs to the legislature, not to this Court./3 "napplicability of #C$AC %o. &!$!''' etitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent policy enunciated in =C-AC +o. 12-2000, because he is not a #first time offender.#// -his circumstance is, ho&ever, not the sole factor in determining &hether he deserves the preferred penalty of fine alone. -he penalty to be imposed depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case. /0 )t is the trial courtDs discretion to impose any penalty &ithin the confines of the la&. =C-AC +o. 13-2001 eEplains thus4 #E E E. Administrative Circular +o. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B 22 such that &here the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mista$e of fact &ithout taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. +eedless to say, the determination of &hether the circumstances &arrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the :udge. E E E. )t is, therefore, understood that4

EEE #2. -he :udges concerned, may in the eEercise of sound discretion, and ta$ing into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine &hether the imposition of a fine alone &ould best serve the interests of ,ustice, or &hether forbearing to impose imprisonment &ould depreciate the seriousness of the offense, &or$ violence on the social order, or other&ise be contrary to the imperatives of ,ustice*# -he Court notes that the etition for a &rit of habeas corpus relied mainly on the alleged retroactivity of =C-AC +o. 12-2000, &hich supposedly favored B 22 offenders./A 1n this point, 3imagiba contended that his imprisonment &as violative of his right to e(ual protection of the la&s, since only a fine &ould be imposed on others similarly situated. /C -he rule on retroactivity states that criminal la&s may be applied retroactively if favorable to the accused. -his principle, embodied in the .evised enal Code,/> has been eEpanded in certain instances to cover special la&s. /B -he issue of retroactivity of =C-AC +o. 12-2000 &as settled in (e )oya v. )ail Warden of atan*as City,00 &hich &e (uote4

# etitionerDs reliance of our ruling in +rdo,-e. v. Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the ne& la&, citing People v. #imon, is misplaced. -hus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the .evised enal Code, =C Admin. Circular +o. 12-2000 as modified by =C Admin. Circular +o. 13-2001 should benefit her has no basis. #2irst. =C Admin. Circular +o. 12-2000 is not a penal la&* hence, Article 22 of the .evised enal Code is not applicable. -he circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final ,udgment. #=econd. As eEplained by the Court in =C Admin. Circular +o. 13-2001, =C Admin. Circular +o. 12-2000 merely lays do&n a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B. . Blg. 22. )t does not amend B. . Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the la&. =C Admin. Circular +o. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to ta$e into account not only the purpose of the la& but also the circumstances of the accused - - &hether he acted in good faith or on a clear mista$e of fact &ithout taint of negligence - - and such other circumstance &hich the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed.# 01 Because the Circular merely lays do&n a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline for the trial courts. -hus, it is addressed to the ,udges, &ho are directed to consider the factual circumstances of each case prior to imposing the appropriate penalty. )n other &ords, the Administrative Circular does not confer any ne& right in favor of the accused, much less those convicted by final ,udgment. -he competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering the decision against the accused. 02 -hat decision is sub,ect only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or la&, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac$ or eEcess of ,urisdiction. Another trial court may not encroach upon this authority. )ndeed, =C-AC +o. 12-2000 necessarily re(uires a revie& of all factual circumstances of each case. =uch a revie& can no longer be done if the ,udgment has become final and eEecutory. )n the present case, the ;-CC of Baguio City had full $no&ledge of all relevant circumstances from &hich respondentDs conviction and sentence &ere based. -he penalty imposed &as &ell &ithin the confines of the la&. @pon appeal, the conviction &as sustained by .-CBranch / of Baguio City. 6ventually, the 3ecision attained finality. 5ence, .-C-Branch 0 did not have the ,urisdiction to modify the la&ful ,udgment in the guise of granting a &rit of habeas corpus. -he doctrine of e(ual protection of la&s 03 does not apply for the same reasons as those on retroactivity. 2oremost of these reasons is that the Circular is not a la& that deletes the penalty of imprisonment. As eEplained earlier, it is merely a rule of preference as to &hich penalty should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a case. At any rate, this matter deserves scant consideration, because respondent failed to raise any substantial argument to support his contention. 0/ /odification of 0inal )ud*ment %ot Warranted -he Court is not unmindful of #o v. Court of Appeals,00 in &hich the final ,udgment of conviction for violation of B 22 &as modified by the deletion of the sentence of imprisonment and the imposition of a fine. -hat case proceeded from an #@rgent ;anifestation of an 6Etraordinary =upervening 6vent,#0A not from an unmeritorious petition for a &rit of habeas corpus, as in the present case. -he Court eEercised in that case its authority to suspend or to modify the eEecution of a final ,udgment &hen &arranted or made imperative by the higher interest of ,ustice or by supervening events.0C -he supervening event in that case &as the petitionerDs urgent need for coronary

rehabilitation for at least one year under the direct supervision of a coronary care therapist* imprisonment &ould have been e(uivalent to a death sentence.0> -he peculiar circumstances of #o do not obtain in the present case. .espondentDs supposed #unhealthy physical condition due to a triple bypass operation, and aggravated by hypertension,# cited by the .-C in its 1ctober 10, 2001 1rder, 0B is totally bereft of substantial proof. -he Court notes that respondent did not ma$e any such allegation in his etition for habeas corpus. +either did he mention his physical state in his ;emorandum and Comment submitted to this Court. .espondent see$s the retroactive application of =C-AC +o. 12-2000 in his favor on the basis alone of the alleged settlement of his civil liability.A0 Citing 1riffith v. Court of Appeals,A1 he theoriGes that ans&ering for a criminal offense is no longer ,ustified after the settlement of the debt. .espondent, ho&ever, misreads 1riffith. -he Court held in that case that convicting the accused &ho, t&o years prior to the filing of the B 22 cases, had already paid his debt !from &hich the chec$s originated" &as contrary to the basic principles of fairness and ,ustice.A2 1bviously, that situation is not attendant here. -he civil liability in the present case &as satisfied through the levy and sale of the properties of respondent only after the criminal case had been terminated &ith his conviction. A3 Apparently, he had sufficient properties that could have been used to settle his liabilities prior to his conviction. )ndeed, such an early settlement &ould have been an indication that he &as in good faith, a circumstance that could have been favorably considered in determining his appropriate penalty. At any rate, civil liability differs from criminal liability. A/ 'hat is punished in the latter is not the failure to pay the obligation, but the issuance of chec$s that subse(uently bounced or &ere dishonored for insufficiency or lac$ of funds. A0 -he Court reiterates the reasons &hy the issuance of &orthless chec$s is criminaliGed4 #-he practice is prohibited by la& because of its deleterious effects on public interest. -he effects of the increase of &orthless chec$s transcend the private interest of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. -he mischief it creates is not only a &rong to the payee or holder, but also an in,ury to the public. -he harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can very &ell pollute the channels of trade and commerce, in,ure the ban$ing system and eventually hurt the &elfare of society and the public interest. -he la& punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order.#AA '"ERE ORE, the etition is GRAN!E$ and the assailed 1rders %233"0"E(. .espondentDs etition for habeas corpus is hereby (E%"E(. %et this case be RE/A%(E( to ;-CC of Baguio City for the re-arrest of respondent and the completion of his sentence. [A.%. NO. R!J(02(16)8. June 2*, 2005] $AN!E +#,EN!E, Petitioner, v. . JU$GE JOSE S. %AJA$U,ON, Respondent. RESOLU!#ON AUS!R#A(%AR!#NE-, J.: )n a letter-complaint dated :uly 21, 2000, addressed to then Court Administrator Alfredo %. Benipayo, 3ante ?icente charged respondent :udge :ose =. ;a,aducon of the .egional -rial Court !.-C" of 9eneral =antos City, Branch 23, &ith gross ignorance of the la&, grave abuse of authority and manifest partiality, praying that he be administratively disciplined and terminated from the service. -he instant administrative complaint stemmed from a series of criminal cases involving a certain 6velyn -e of 9eneral =antos City. -he factual and procedural antecedents leading to the instant administrative case is summariGed in this CourtDs .esolution of 2ebruary 1B, 2001, in 9... +1=. 1/0C10-1> entitled, People of the Philippines v. Evelyn 4e, pertinent portions of &hich read as follo&s4
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)n a ,oint decision dated ;ay 31, 1BB0, the .egional -rial Court, Branch 23, 9eneral =antos City, found 6velyn -e guilty on four counts of violation of B. . Blg. 22, other&ise $no&n as the Bouncing Chec$s %a&, and sentenced her to t&o !2" months of imprisonment on each count. -he decision became final and eEecutory after this Court had denied -eDs etition for .evie& from the affirmance of the trial courtDs decision by the Court of Appeals.

1n ;arch 11, 2000, -e sought clarification from the trial court &hether she should serve her sentences successively or simultaneously. )n an order, dated ;ay 20, 2000, the trial court clarified that she should serve her sentences successively, but Dfor humanitarian reason and in accordance &ith Art. C0 of the .evised enal Code, it held that Dinstead of serving imprisonment of 6)95- months, the prisoner 6?6%<+ -6 should serve only siE months. 1n :une 2, 2000, -e filed a motion for reconsideration, &hich she prayed be also considered as a petition for issuance of the &rit of habeas corpus. Citing Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 2B> =C.A A0A !1BB>", in &hich the sentence of imprisonment of a party found guilty of violation of B. . Blg. 22 &as reduced to a fine e(ual to double the amount of the chec$ involved, -e prayed that her sentence be similarly modified and that she be immediately released from detention. )n a supplemental motion, -e argued that she had been denied e(ual protection of the la& because the trial ,udge in another case involving multiple counts of robbery directed the accused to simultaneously serve his sentences. 1n :une 20, 2000, the trial court denied -eDs petition for issuance of the &rit of habeas corpus on the ground that -e &as detained by virtue of a final ,udgment. 1n :une 22, 2000, -e filed an omnibus motion praying for her release on the ground that she had been in ,ail since ;arch 10, 2000 and had fully served the three months minimum of her total sentence under the )ndeterminate =entence %a&. )n the alternative, -e prayed for release on recogniGance. 1n :une 23, 2000, -e moved for reconsideration of the trial courtDs order of :une 20, 2000, alleging that the finality of the ,oint decision against her did not bar her application for the &rit of habeas corpus. =he prayed that pending determination as to &hether the ?aca ruling applied to her, she also be allo&ed to post bail pursuant to .ule 102, D1/. 1n :uly 0, 2000, the trial court allo&ed -e to post bail in the amount of one million pesos, holding that it &ould order her release upon the approval of her bail bond and thereafter certify the proceedings to the Court as the latter has concurrent ,urisdiction over proceedings for habeas corpus. 1n :uly C, 2000, the trial court approved -eDs bail bonds in the reduced amount of 000,000.00 and ordered her release. -he trial court also directed its cler$ of court to certify the proceedings to the Court. 1n :uly 11, 2000, Assistant City rosecutor ;arie 6llengred %. Baliguiat moved for reconsideration of the trial courtDs resolution of :uly 0, 2000. 1n :uly 1>, 2000, -e filed a notice of appeal from the order, dated :une 20, 2000, and the resolution, dated :uly 0, 2000, of the trial court. 1n :uly 31, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration of the Assistant City rosecutor. )t also denied due course to -eDs notice of appeal on the ground that there &as no necessity for the appeal to the Court of Appeals because it had already ordered that the &hole records be for&arded to this Court pursuant to .ule 102, D1/. 1
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)n the present case, complainant, &ho claims to be the station manager of .adyo Bombo, 9eneral =antos City, alleges that &hile -e &as in prison, respondent ,udge allo&ed her to be released and confined at a local hospital in the guise that she &as suffering from certain illnesses. Complainant further alleges that respondent ,udge approved -eDs application for bail as part of habeas corpus proceedings even though no petition for habeas corpus in favor of -e &as filed and doc$eted. As a result of respondent ,udgeDs order allo&ing the provisional liberty of -e, the local media in 9eneral =antos City made an uproar and criticiGed respondent ,udge for his action on the said case. )n retaliation, respondent ,udge cited for indirect contempt a group of mediamen &ho published a critical article against him. Complainant contends that respondent ,udge &ill not hesitate to use his clout and po&er to stifle criticism and dissent. )n addition, complainant alleges that in a separate case, respondent ,udge allo&ed the release of the accused &ithout the posting of the necessary bail. 1n the basis of the above allegations, complainant prays that respondent ,udge be investigated and if &arranted, be terminated and removed from service. 2 )n his Comment, dated 1ctober 1C, 2000, respondent ,udge submitted the follo&ing contentions &hich &e (uote verbatim4
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1. -he certified records of the above-mentioned cases against 6velyn -e &ere for&arded to the =upreme Court on August 0, 2000, upon the order of undersigned by the Branch Cler$ of Court for revie& of our (uestioned 1rder !attached as A++6X D1 of letter Complaint"*
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2. 1n :une 2, 2000, 6velyn -eDs counsel filed not only a motion for reconsideration denying our previous order denying her motion for release from detention but also a petition for Habeas Corpus in the same cases*
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3. )n the eEercise of sound discretion and after hearing the comment of the public prosecutor, &e issued the (uestioned 1rder, &hich is self-eEplanatory*
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/. 'e believed then that &e had the discretion to allo& her to be released on bail, based on =ec. 1/, .ule 102 of the .evised .ules of Court*
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0. 'e &ere thin$ing then that in such a dilemma, &hether or not to release her on bail, it &as a better ,udgment to release her from bail on a &rit of habeas corpus, because, 6velyn -e might be right in her contention that she is considered to have served her sentences simultaneously. )f &e denied her petition for Habeas Corpus, and on appeal, she could get a favorable decision from the =upreme Court, surely, she could return and charge us &ith a graver offense of ignorance of the la& and abuse of discretion. =he could even file other cases against us under the .evised enal Code, such as rendering an un,ust order, or under the Civil Code for moral damages in millions of pesos*
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A. -o obviate such a possible move on -eDs part, &e opted to allo& her release on bail through the &rit of habeas corpus proceedings. Any&ay, the =upreme Court has the last say on that matter*
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C. -herefore, &e are of the vie& that the letter complaint of ;r. 3ante ?icente is legally premature as it concerned cases &hich are still sub,udice*
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>. Besides, &e are of the opinion that ;r. ?icente has no personality as a third party to charge us &ith anything as he has not sho&n any damage that he could have suffered because of our 1rder*
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B. 'e are convinced that ;r. ?icente is trying to pre-empt our move to charge his radio station for libel or cite the announcer for indirect contempt of Court &hen his radio station and announcer had been reviling and attac$ing us for many days on the air for having allo&ed 6velyn -e to be treated and confined in a hospital upon recommendation of a government doctor and for having allo&ed her release from imprisonment on bail* a certified XeroE copy of the letter of the .egional 3irector of the 3epartment of -ransportation and Communication !+ational -elecommunications Commission" dated August B, 2000, in reply to our re(uest for copies of the broast tapes, is attached here&ith as A++6X D1*
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10. As to the charge that &e are stifling criticism by the print and broast media, &e are of the vie& that if media has the privilege to criticiGe the Courts and the :udges, &e have also the right to charge them for indirect contempt of Court and libel, because there are la&s regarding this matter. -he article of a certain :oseph :ubelag is no& a sub,ect of an indirect contempt charge before us, &hich &e are about to resolve*
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11. .egarding our 1rder in Criminal Case +o. 1/0C2 in the case of D eople v. :hoyche 9ersonin- almaD, .-C Br. 3A, it &as done &ith sound discretion on our part because it &as already A430 in the evening and the offices &ere closed and being a 2riday, the accused &ould be detained for t&o days and three nights, unless &e accepted and approved the bail bond. Besides, the la& re(uires ,udges to approve bail even during the holidays. )mmediately, on ;onday, the money in the amount of A,000.00 &as deposited &ith the Cler$ of Court as sho&n in the official receipt !A++6X DA of letter complaint"*
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12. .egarding our competence, honesty and integrity, modesty aside, as a ,udge for the last thirteen years in 9eneral =antos City, the records of the ;unicipal -rial Court and .-C, Branches 23 and 22 !being a pairing ,udge of the latter court since 1ctober last year" sho& that most of our decisions appealed to the Court of Appeals and the =upreme Court have been sustained or affirmed*
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13. As to our reputation in the community, let other members of the media and a member of the hilippine Bar spea$ about it. 'e are enclosing here&ith a XeroE copy of a ne&s clipping of hilippine 3aily )n(uirer, :uly >, 2000 issue !attached here&ith as A++6X D2D", about ho& &e tried and decided the celebrated case of eople v. Castracion, et. al. &hen the =upreme Court assigned us to hear the evidence of the defense and decide the case. 'e did our &or$ in that case as best &e could as &e have done in all cases being tried and decided by us, mindful of our duty to do our &or$ &ith faithful diligence, honesty, and integrity. 'e do not eEpect praises from others as &e do not also &ish to be criticiGed or attac$ed by .adio Bombo station in 9eneral =antos City especially by its manager, ;r. 3ante ?icente, &ithout basis or competent proof and evidence. Atty. .ogelio 9arcia, &ho vouched for our honesty, competence and integrity is a former assemblyman of =outh Cotabato and 9eneral =antos City, and an eE-Assistant ;inister of %abor. 5e has $no&n us in the community for almost t&enty five years*
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1/. Complainant 3ante ?icente is ,ust a ne&comer to 9eneral =antos and he and his radio station have a bad and notorious reputation of attac$ing the character and good name of some people here as sho&n by cases for libel filed in our courts. 3
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)n its .eport dated ;arch 11, 2002, the 1ffice of the Court Administrator !1CA" confirmed that Criminal Cases +os. B/0A-B/A0 &ere indeed certified by respondent to this Court./ 5o&ever, this Court in its .esolution of 2ebruary 1B, 2001 in 9... +1=. 1/0C10-1>, resolved to return the records of the consolidated cases to the .-C of 9eneral =antos City, Branch 23, and to order the said court to give due course to 6velyn -eDs notice of appeal from the 1rder denying her petition forhabeas corpus and from the 1rder re(uiring her to post bail in the amount of one million pesos for her release from detention. -his Court made the follo&ing pronouncements4 .ule 102, D1/ provides4
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'hen person la&fully imprisoned recommitted, and &hen let to bail. )f it appears that the prisoner &as la&fully committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the &arrant of commitment &ith an offense punishable by death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. )f he is la&fully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or ,udge. )f he be admitted to bail, he shall forth&ith file a bond in such sum as the court or ,udge deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the prisoner and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for his appearance before the court &here the offense is properly cogniGable to abide its order or ,udgment* and the court or ,udge shall certify the proceedings, together &ith the bond, forth&ith to the proper court. )f such bond is not so filed, the prisoner shall be recommitted to confinement. -he foregoing provision, ho&ever, applies to cases &here the applicant for the &rit of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against him, not &here, as here, he is serving sentence by reason of a final ,udgment. )ndeed, .ule 102, D/ disallo&s issuance of the &rit &here the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is Dsuffering imprisonment under la&ful ,udgment. -he certification of a case under .ule 102, D1/, moreover, refers to cases &here the habeas corpus court finds that the applicant is charged &ith the noncapital offense in another court. -hus, the certification of this case to this Court is clearly erroneous. 0
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1n the basis of the above-(uoted .esolution and the provisions of =ection 2/, .ule 11/ of the .ules of Court, the 1CA, in its .eport in the present case, found respondent ,udge guilty of gross ignorance of the la& and recommended that he be fined in the amount of 20,000.00.A
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-he Court agrees &ith the findings of the 1CA eEcept for the recommended penalty. =ection 2/, .ule 11/ of the .ules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the grant of bail after conviction by final ,udgment and after the convict has started to serve sentence. )t provides4
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=6C. 2/. %o bail after final 5ud*ment6 exception. - An a..u/ed /ha00 n1t 2e a0013ed 2a40 a5te6 the 7ud89ent ha/ 2e.19e 54na0, un0e// he ha/ a::04ed 516 :612at41n 2e516e .199en.4n8 t1 /e6;e /enten.e, the :ena0t< and the 155en/e 2e4n8 34th4n the :u6;4e3 15 the P612at41n La3. )n case the accused has applied for probation, he may be allo&ed temporary liberty under his bail, but if no bail &as filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allo& his release on recogniGance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. #n n1 .a/e /ha00 2a40 2e a0013ed a5te6 the a..u/ed ha/ .199en.ed t1 /e6;e /enten.e. 7Emphasis supplied8 -he only eEception to the above-cited provision of the .ules of Court is &hen the convict has applied for probation before he commences to serve sentence, provided the penalty and the offense are &ithin the purvie& of the robation %a&. )n the case of 6velyn -e, the ,udgment finding her guilty of violation of .P. l*. !! on four counts and imposing upon her the penalty of

imprisonment for t&o months on each count has already become final and eEecutory. =he did not apply for probation. At the time respondent ,udge granted her bail she &as already serving her sentence. 2rom the foregoing, it is evident that -e is not entitled to bail. .espondent ,udge contends that under =ection 1/, .ule 102 of the .ules of Court, he has the discretion to allo& -e to be released on bail. 5o&ever, the Court reiterates its pronouncement in its .esolution of 2ebruary 1B, 2001 in 9... +1=. 1/0C10-1> that =ection 1/, .ule 102 of the .ules of Court applies only to cases &here the applicant for the &rit

of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against him and not in an instance, as in the case involved in the present controversy, &here the applicant is serving sentence by reason of a final ,udgment. -he Court agrees &ith the observation of the 1CA that respondent ,udgeDs ignorance or disregard of the provisions of =ection 2/, .ule 11/ and =ection 1/, .ule 102 of the .ules of Court is tantamount to gross ignorance of the la& and procedure. A ,udge is called upon to eEhibit more than ,ust a cursory ac(uaintance &ith statutes and procedural rules. C )t is imperative that he be conversant &ith basic legal principles and be a&are of &ell-settled authoritative doctrines. > 5e should strive for eEcellence eEceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of ,ustice and the .ule of %a&. B 'hen the la& is sufficiently basic, a ,udge o&es it to his office to simply apply it* anything less than that &ould be gross ignorance of the la&. 10
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)n the present case, considering that the granting of bail is common in the litigation of criminal cases before trial courts, &e are not impressed &ith the eEplanation of respondent ,udge in granting bail to -e. .espondent ,udge contends that he &as caught in a dilemma &hether or not to grant bail in favor of -e. 5o&ever, he thought that it &ould be better for him to release -e on bail rather than deny her application* for if such denial is later found out by the appellate courts to be erroneous, -e could charge him &ith gross ignorance of the la& and abuse of discretion, or hold him liable for rendering an un,ust order or for damages. 5ence, to obviate such possible move on -eDs part, he simply allo&ed her to be released on bail and relieved himself of any burden brought about by the case of -e by certifying the same to this Court contending that, D7a8ny&ay, the =upreme Court has the last say on !the" matter. -he Court finds respondentDs reasoning shallo& and un,ustified. 5e cannot simply shir$ responsibility by conveniently passing the buc$, so to spea$, to this Court on the preteEt that &e have the final say on the matter. -his is hardly the $ind of trait eEpected of a ,udge. .ule 3.02, Canon 3 of the Code of :udicial Conduct provides that in every case, a ,udge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable la& uns&ayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. )n (imatulac v. Villon ,11 &e held that4
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-he ,udge, on the other hand, Dshould al&ays be imbued &ith a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer ,ustice. 5e must vie& himself as a priest for the administration of ,ustice is a$in to a religious crusade. -hus, eEerting the same devotion as a priest Din the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy, the ,udge must render service &ith impartiality commensurate &ith public trust and confidence reposed in him. 12
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)n the present case, respondent ,udge fell short of the above-cited ideals eEpected of a magistrate. ComplainantDs allegation that no petition for habeas corpus&as filed does not hold &ater. As borne by the records, the Certification issued by one Atty. 6lmer 3. %astimosa, Cler$ of Court of the .egional -rial Court of 9eneral =antos City, sho&s that 6velyn -eDs petition for habeas corpus&as incorporated in the pleadings she filed in Criminal Cases +os. B/0A-B/A0, although no doc$et fees and other charges &ere paid.13 -here is no sho&ing that respondent should be held administratively liable for the non-payment of doc$et and other la&ful fees. At any rate, the matter may be considered in the appeal ta$en by -e, as earlier adverted to in 9... +1=. 1/0C10-1>. Complainant further claims that on several occasions, respondent ,udge allo&ed -e to be released and confined at a local hospital on account of false illnesses. 5o&ever, the Court does not find sufficient evidence to prove this charge. 1n the contrary, records on hand sho& that the confinement of -e in the hospital is recommended by a panel of government doctors and that such confinement is made &ithout the ob,ection of the public prosecutor. 1/ 5ence, the Court finds respondent ,udgeDs act of allo&ing the temporary confinement of -e in the hospital as ,ustified. -he Court agrees &ith the observation of the 1CA that in the absence of contradictory evidence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty should be upheld in favor of respondent ,udge. 10
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-he Court li$e&ise finds no sufficient evidence to find respondent ,udge guilty of the charge that he uses his clout and po&er to stifle criticism and dissent. )n the present case, the Court finds nothing irregular or arbitrary in his act of re(uiring a number of ,ournalists to sho& cause &hy they should not be cited for indirect contempt. 2reedom of speech and of eEpression, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is not absolute.1A 2reedom of eEpression needs on occasion to be ad,usted to and accommodated &ith the re(uirements of e(ually important public interests such as the maintenance of the integrity of courts and orderly functioning of the administration of ,ustice. 1C )n the instant case, the Court finds nothing &himsical or despotic in respondent ,udgeDs act of issuing the sub,ect sho&-cause order. )nstead, respondent is merely eEercising his right to protect his honor and, more importantly, the integrity of the court &hich he represents. As to the issue that respondent ,udge allo&ed the release of an accused in Criminal Case +o. 1/0C2, entitled People v. )hoyce 1ersonin$ Palma, &ithout the re(uired bail bond being posted, it is not &ithin the ,urisdiction of this Court to resolve the same on the basis of the 1CA .eport as it is already the sub,ect of a separate administrative case against respondent. 1>
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5aving found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the la&, as discussed earlier, the Court no& determines the proper imposable penalty. =ection >!B", .ule 1/0 of the .ules of Court, as amended, classifies gross ignorance of the la& or procedure as a serious charge. @nder =ection 11!A" of the same .ule, the imposable penalties, in case the respondent is found culpable of a serious charge, range from a fine of not less than 20,000.00 but not more than /0,000.00 to dismissal from the service &ith forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, eEcept accrued leaves, and dis(ualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government-o&ned or controlled corporations. 5o&ever, on 2ebruary 2/, 2002, respondent retired upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of C0. 1B Considering that respondent can no longer be dismissed or suspended, the Court is left &ith no recourse but to impose the penalty of fine. 2urther, it is noted that on :uly >, 2002, the -hird 3ivision of this Court, in Administrative ;atter +o.10>C/-.et., concerning the compulsory retirement of respondent, resolved to release his retirement benefits but set aside cases still pending against him. 20
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100,000.00 thereof in vie& of several administrative

)n the administrative complaints filed against respondent, t&o cases have, so far, resulted in his being fined. )n Chan v. /a5aducon ,21 respondent &as found guilty of violating among others, .ules 1.01 and 2.01 and Canon 2 of the Code of :udicial conduct and &as meted the penalty of fine in the amount of 10,000.00. )n the more recent case ofAlconera v. /a5aducon,22 respondent &as found guilty of gross ignorance of procedure and &as fined /0,000.00. )n vie& of the foregoing, it is proper to impose the maEimum fine of /0,000.00 to be deducted from the 100,000.00 set aside from respondentDs retirement benefits in A.;. +o. 10>C/-.et. '"ERE ORE, respondent ,udge is found 9@)%-< of gross ignorance of the la& or procedure. 5e is ordered to pay a 2)+6 of be deducted from the 100,000.00 set aside from his retirement benefits in A.;. +o. 10>C/-.et. [G.R. NO. 1607)2 : Au8u/t 25, 2005] #N !"E %A!!ER O !"E PE!#!#ON OR "A&EAS ,ORPUS O ,AP!. GAR= ALEJANO, PN >%AR#NES? ,AP!. N#,ANOR AEL$ON, /0,000.00 to

PN >%AR#NES? ,AP!. GERAR$O GA%&ALA, PA L!. SG JA%ES LA=UG, PN ,AP!. %#LO %AES!RE,A%PO, PA L!. SG AN!ON#O !R#LLANES #+, PN "O%O&ONO A$A-A, and RO&ER!O RA AEL >ROEL? PUL#$O, Petitioners, v. GEN. PE$RO ,A&UA=, GEN. NAR,#SO A&A=A, SE,. ANGELO RE=ES, and SE,. RO#LO GOLE-, Respondents. $E,#S#ON ,ARP#O, J.: !he ,a/e -his etition for .evie& 1 see$s to nullify the 3ecision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 1C =eptember 2003 and .esolution dated 13 +ovember 2003 in CA-9... = +o. C>0/0. -he Court of AppealsD 3ecision and .esolution dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed by la&yers 5omobono AdaGa and .oberto .afael ulido !# etitioners#" on behalf of their detained clients Capt. 9ary Ale,ano ! +-;arines", Capt. +icanor 2aeldon ! +-;arines", Capt. 9erardo 9ambala ! A", %t. =9 :ames %ayug ! +", Capt. ;ilo ;aestrecampo ! A", and %t. =9 Antonio -rillanes )? ! +" !#detainees#". etitioners named as respondent 9en. edro Cabuay !#9en. Cabuay#", Chief of the )ntelligence =ervice of the Armed 2orces of the hilippines !#)=A2 #", &ho has custody of the detainees. etitioners impleaded 9en. +arciso Abaya !#9en. Abaya#", =ec. Angelo .eyes and .oilo 9oleG, &ho are respectively the Chief of =taff of the Armed 2orces of the hilippines !#A2 #", =ecretary of +ational 3efense and +ational =ecurity Adviser, because they have command responsibility over 9en. Cabuay. Ante.edent a.t/

6arly morning of 2C :uly 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the no& detained ,unior officers, entered and too$ control of the 1a$&ood remier %uEury Apartments !#1a$&ood#", an upscale apartment compleE, located in the business district of ;a$ati City. -he soldiers disarmed the security officers of 1a$&ood and planted eEplosive devices in its immediate surroundings. -he ,unior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of resident 9loria ;acapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.

Around C400 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations &ith government emissaries. -he soldiers later defused the eEplosive devices they had earlier planted. -he soldiers then returned to their barrac$s. 1n 31 :uly 2003, 9en. Abaya, as the Chief of =taff of the A2 , issued a directive to all the ;a,or =ervice Commanders to turn over custody of ten ,unior officers to the )=A2 3etention Center. -he transfer too$ place &hile military and civilian authorities &ere investigating the soldiersD involvement in the 1a$&ood incident. 1n 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an )nformation for coup$d$etat &ith the .egional -rial Court of ;a$ati City, Branch A1, against the soldiers involved in the 2C :uly 2003 1a$&ood incident. -he government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d etat as defined and penaliGed under Article 13/-A of the .evised enal Code of the hilippines, as amended. -he case &as doc$eted as Criminal Case +o. 03-2C>/. -he trial court later issued the Commitment 1rders giving custody of ,unior officers %t. =9 Antonio -rillanes )? !#-rillanes#" and Capt. 9erardo 9ambala to the Commanding 1fficers of )=A2 . 1n 2 August 2003, 9en. Abaya issued a directive to all ;a,or =ervice Commanders to ta$e into custody the military personnel under their command &ho too$ part in the 1a$&ood incident eEcept the detained ,unior officers &ho &ere to remain under the custody of )=A2 . 1n 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus &ith the =upreme Court. 1n 12 August 2003, the Court issued a .esolution, &hich resolved to4 !a" #SSUE the 'R#! O "A&EAS ,ORPUS* !b" re(uire respondents to ma$e a RE!URN of the &rit on ;onday, 1> August 2003, at 10400 a.m. before the Court of Appeals* !c" refer the case to the Court of Appeals for RA LE among the :ustices thereof for hearing, further

proceedings and decision thereon, after &hich a REPOR! shall be made to this Court &ithin ten !10" days from promulgation of the decision.3 -hus, the Court issued a 'rit of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents to ma$e a return of the &rit and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for hearing and further proceedings. 1n the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed &ith the .egional -rial Court of ;a$ati City a ;otion for reliminary )nvestigation, &hich the trial court granted. 1n 1> August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their .eturn of the 'rit and Ans&er to the petition and produced the detainees before the Court of Appeals during the scheduled hearing. After the parties filed their memoranda on 2> August 2003, the appellate court considered the petition submitted for decision. 1n 1C =eptember 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the petition. +onetheless, the appellate court ordered 9en. Cabuay, &ho &as in charge of implementing the regulations in the )=A2 3etention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance &ith =tanding 1perations rocedure +o. 02A3-0/. -he appellate court directed 9en. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the detaineesD right to eEercise for t&o hours a day. !he Ru04n8 15 the ,1u6t 15 A::ea0/ -he Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. -he appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup d etat before the .egional -rial Court of ;a$ati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detaineesD confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of &hich the detainees and petitioners do not even (uestion. -he Court of Appeals recogniGed that habeas corpusmay also be the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. 5o&ever, the appellate court held that the constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detaineesD liberty. -he appellate court ruled that the regulation of the detaineesD right to confer &ith their counsels is reasonable under the circumstances. -he appellate court declared that &hile the opening and reading of -rillanesD letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not ,ustify the issuance of a &rit of habeas corpus. -he violation does not amount to illegal restraint, &hich is the proper sub,ect of habeas corpus proceedings.

-he Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered 9en. Cabuay to fulfill the promise he made in open court to uphold the visiting hours and the right of the detainees to eEercise for t&o hours a day. -he dispositive portion of the appellate courtDs decision reads4 '56.621.6, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby 3)=;)==63. .espondent Cabuay is hereby 1.36.63 to faithfully adhere to his commitment to uphold the constitutional rights of the detainees in accordance &ith the =tanding 1perations rocedure +o. 02A3-0/ regarding visiting hours and the right of the detainees to eEercise for t&o !2" hours a day. =1 1.36.63./ !he #//ue/ etitioners raise the follo&ing issues for resolution4 A. -56 C1@.- 12 A B. -56 C1@.- 12 A C. -56 C1@.- 12 A 6A%= 6..63 )+ .6?)6')+9 A+3 .6?6.=)+9 A 36C)=)1+ 12 -56 =@ .6;6 C1@.-* 6A%= 6..63 )+ +1- ACY+1'%639)+9 -56 A .1 .)A-6+6== 12 -56 .6;63< 6-)-)1+6.= =66Y* and

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6A%= 6..63 )+ A==6.-)+9 -56 %69A%)-< 12 -56 C1+3)-)1+= 12 -56 36-A)+63 :@+)1. 122)C6.=D 36-6+-)1+. 0 !he Ru04n8 15 the ,1u6t

-he petition lac$s merit. etitioners claim that the CourtDs 12 August 2003 1rder granted the petition and the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing. etitioners thus argue that the CourtDs 1rder had already foreclosed any (uestion on the propriety and merits of their petition. etitionersD claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 1rder sho&s that the Court referred to the Court of Appeals the duty to in(uire into the cause of the ,unior officersD detention. 5ad the Court ruled for the detaineesD release, the Court &ould not have referred the hearing of the petition to the Court of Appeals. -he Court &ould have forth&ith released the detainees had the Court upheld petitionersD cause. )n a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition. A -he respondent must produce the person and eEplain the cause of his detention. C 5o&ever, this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by the remedy. -hus, the CourtDs order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing &as not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus. 2or obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. )f a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unla&ful, then it should issue the &rit and release the detainees. )n the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no ,urisdiction to in(uire into the merits of their petition. -he Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the detaineesD complaint against the regulations and conditions in the )=A2 3etention Center. -he remedy of habeas corpus has one ob,ective4 to in(uire into the cause of detention of a person.> -he purpose of the &rit is to determine &hether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. B )f the in(uiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. )f, ho&ever, the detention is proven la&ful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. -he use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. )t is not a &rit of error.10 +either can it substitute for an appeal.11 +onetheless, case la& has eEpanded the &ritDs application to circumstances &here there is deprivation of a personDs constitutional rights. -he &rit is available &here a person continues to be unla&fully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, &here there is denial of

due process, &here the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and &here a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.12 5o&ever, a mere allegation of a violation of oneDs constitutional right is not sufficient. -he courts &ill eEtend the scope of the &rit only if any of the follo&ing circumstances is present4 !a" there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unla&ful restraint of a person* !b" the court had no ,urisdiction to impose the sentence* or !c" an eEcessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the eEcess.13 'hatever situation the petitioner invo$es, the threshold remains high. -he violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.1/ etitioners admit that they do not (uestion the legality of the detention of the detainees. +either do they dispute the la&ful indictment of the detainees for criminal and military offenses. 'hat petitioners be&ail is the regulation adopted by 9en. Cabuay in the )=A2 3etention Center preventing petitioners as la&yers from seeing the detainees - their clients - any time of the day or night. -he regulation allegedly curtails the detaineesD right to counsel and violates .epublic Act +o. C/3> !#.A C/3>#". 10 etitioners claim that the regulated visits made it difficult for them to prepare for the important hearings before the =enate and the 2eliciano Commission. etitioners also point out that the officials of the )=A2 3etention Center violated the detaineesD right to privacy of communication &hen the )=A2 officials opened and read the personal letters of -rillanes and Capt. ;ilo ;aestrecampo !#;aestrecampo#". etitioners further claim that the )=A2 officials violated the detaineesD right against cruel and unusual punishment &hen the )=A2 officials prevented the detainees from having contact &ith their visitors. ;oreover, the )=A2 officials boarded up &ith iron bars and ply&ood slabs the iron grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and ventilation in the detaineesD cells. re-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement. 1A 5o&ever, the fact that the detainees are confined ma$es their rights more limited than those of the public. 1C .A C/3>, &hich specifies the rights of detainees and the duties of detention officers, eEpressly recogniGes the po&er of the detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. =ection /!b" of .A C/3> provides4 =ection /. Penalty Clause. - a" E E E b" Any person &ho obstructs, prevents or prohibits any la&yer, any member of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family &ith him, or from eEamining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at an< h1u6 15 the da< 16, 4n u68ent .a/e/, 15 the n48ht shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four !/" years nor more than siE !A" years, and a fine of four thousand pesos ! /,000.00". -he provisions of the above =ection not&ithstanding, any security officer &ith custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may unde6ta@e /u.h 6ea/1na20e 9ea/u6e/ a/ 9a< 2e ne.e//a6< t1 /e.u6e h4/ /a5et< and :6e;ent h4/ e/.a:e . !Emphasis supplied"
HIrJLlJLHWlJSbrJLrMN

-rue, =ection /!b" of .A C/3> ma$es it an offense to prohibit a la&yer from visiting a detainee client #at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night.# 5o&ever, the last paragraph of the same =ection /!b" ma$es the eEpress (ualification that # n1t34th/tand4n8# the provisions of =ection /!b", the detention officer has the po&er to underta$e such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. -he last paragraph of =ection /!b" of .A C/3> prescribes a clear standard. -he regulations governing a detaineeDs confinement must be #reasonable measures E E E to secure his safety and prevent his escape.# -hus, the regulations must be reasonably connected to the governmentDs ob,ective of securing the safety and preventing the escape of the detainee. -he la& grants the detention officer the authority to #underta$e such reasonable measures# or regulations. etitioners contend that there &as an actual prohibition of the detaineesD right to effective representation &hen petitionersD visits &ere limited by the schedule of visiting hours. etitioners assert that the violation of the detaineesD rights entitle them to be released from detention.

etitionersD contention does not persuade us. -he schedule of visiting hours does not render void the detaineesD indictment for criminal and military offenses to &arrant the detaineesD release from detention. -he )=A2 officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detaineesD right to counsel. -he purpose of the regulation is not to render ineffective the right to counsel, but to secure the safety and security of all detainees. American cases are instructive on the standards to determine &hether regulations on pre-trial confinement are permissible. )n Bell v. Wolfish,1> the @nited =tates !@.=." =upreme Court held that regulations must be reasonably related to maintaining security and must not be eEcessive in achieving that purpose. Courts &ill stri$e do&n a restriction that is arbitrary and purposeless. 1B 5o&ever, Bell v. Wolfish eEpressly discouraged courts from s$eptically (uestioning challenged restrictions in detention and prison facilities. 20 -he @.=. =upreme Court commanded the courts to afford administrators #&ide-ranging deference# in implementing policies to maintain institutional security.21 )n our ,urisdiction, the last paragraph of =ection /!b" of .A C/3> provides the standard to ma$e regulations in detention centers allo&able4 #such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the detainee's safety and prevent his escape .# )n the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the la&yers of the detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees. 'hile petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they &ant, the fact that the detainees still have face-to-face meetings &ith their la&yers on a da40< 2a/4/ clearly sho&s that there is no impairment of detaineesD right to counsel. etitioners as counsels could visit their clients bet&een >400 a.m. and 0400 p.m. &ith a lunch brea$ at 12400 p.m. -he visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours &hen la&yers normally entertain clients in their la& offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness. ;oreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could al&ays see$ permission from the )=A2 officials to confer &ith their clients beyond the visiting hours. -he scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer &ith the detainees. -he detaineesD right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. 6ven in the hearings before the =enate and the 2eliciano Commission,22 petitioners &ere given time to confer &ith the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit. 23 -hus, at no point &ere the detainees denied their right to counsel. etitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells &ith ply&ood amount to unusual and eEcessive punishment. -his argument fails to impress us. Bell v. Wolfish pointed out that &hile a detainee may not be punished prior to an ad,udication of guilt in accordance &ith due process of la&, detention inevitably interferes &ith a detaineeDs desire to live comfortably.2/ -he fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detaineesD desire to live comfortably does not convert those restrictions into punishment.20 )t is &hen the restrictions are arbitrary and purposeless that courts &ill infer intent to punish.2A Courts &ill also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears eEcessive in relation to that purpose. 2C :ail officials are thus not re(uired to use the least restrictive security measure.2> -hey must only refrain from implementing a restriction that appears eEcessive to the purpose it serves. 2B 'e (uote Bell v. Wolfish4 1ne further point re(uires discussion. -he petitioners assert, and respondents concede, that the #essential ob,ective of pretrial confinement is to insure the detaineesD presence at trial.# 'hile this interest undoubtedly ,ustifies the original decision to confine an individual in some manner, &e do not accept respondentsD argument that the 9overnmentDs interest in ensuring a detaineeDs presence at trial is the only ob,ective that may ,ustify restraints and conditions once the decision is la&fully made to confine a person. #)f the government could confine or other&ise infringe the liberty of detainees only to the eEtent necessary to ensure their presence at trial, house arrest &ould in the end be the only constitutionally ,ustified form of detention.# -he 9overnment also has legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in &hich the individual is detained. -hese legitimate operational concerns may re(uire administrative measures that go beyond those that are, strictly spea$ing, necessary to ensure that the detainee sho&s up at trial. 2or eEample, the 9overnment must be able to ta$e steps to maintain security and order at the institution and ma$e certain no &eapons or illicit drugs reach detainees. .estraints that are reasonably related to the institutionDs interest in maintaining ,ail security do not, &ithout more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee &ould not have eEperienced had he been released &hile a&aiting trial. 'e need not here attempt to detail the precise eEtent of the legitimate governmental interests that may ,ustify conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention. )t is enough simply to recogniGe that in addition to ensuring the detaineesD presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is a valid ob,ective that may ,ustify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment. 30

An action constitutes a punishment &hen !1" that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or #disability,# and !2" the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate.31 unishment also re(uires that the harm or disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.32 Block v. Rutherford,33 &hich reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blan$et restriction on contact visits as this practice &as reasonably related to maintaining security. -he safety of innocent individuals &ill be ,eopardiGed if they are eEposed to detainees &ho &hile not yet convicted are a&aiting trial for serious, violent offenses and may have prior criminal conviction. 3/ Contact visits ma$e it possible for the detainees to hold visitors and ,ail staff hostage to effect escapes. 30 Contact visits also leave the ,ail vulnerable to visitors smuggling in &eapons, drugs, and other contraband.3A -he restriction on contact visits &as imposed even on lo&-ris$ detainees as they could also potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and &eapons. 3C -he security consideration in the imposition of blan$et restriction on contact visits &as ruled to out&eigh the sentiments of the detainees. 3> Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational connection to the legitimate goal of internal security. 3B -his case reaffirmed the #hands-off# doctrine enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of ,udicial self-restraint, based on the premise that courts should decline ,urisdiction over prison matters in deference to administrative eEpertise. /0 )n the present case, &e cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees from their visitors by iron bars, &hich is merely a limitation on contact visits. -he iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct physical contact but still allo& the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical contact &ith their visitors. -he arrangement is not unduly restrictive. )n fact, it is not even a strict non-contact visitation regulation li$e in Block v. Rutherford. -he limitation on the detaineesD physical contacts &ith visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns. -he boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security &ithin the )=A2 3etention Center. -his measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on contraband and &eapons from one cell to another. -he boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime &ithin the facility. -he diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on the detainees. 'e accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions in the )=A2 3etention Center are not inhuman, degrading and cruel. 6ach detainee, eEcept for Capt. +icanor 2aeldon and Capt. 9erardo 9ambala, is confined in separate cells, unli$e ordinary cramped detention cells. -he detainees are treated &ell and given regular meals. -he Court of Appeals noted that the cells are relatively clean and livable compared to the conditions no& prevailing in the city and provincial ,ails, &hich are congested &ith detainees. -he Court of Appeals found the assailed measures to be reasonable considering that the )=A2 3etention Center is a high-ris$ detention facility. Apart from the soldiers, a suspected +e& eopleDs Army !#+ A#" member and t&o suspected Abu =ayyaf members are detained in the )=A2 3etention Center. 'e no& pass upon petitionersD argument that the officials of the )=A2 3etention Center violated the detaineesD right to privacy &hen the )=A2 officials opened and read the letters handed by detainees -rillanes and ;aestrecampo to one of the petitioners for mailing. etitioners point out that the letters &ere not in a sealed envelope but simply folded because there &ere no envelopes in the )=A2 3etention Center. etitioners contend that the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citiGenDs privacy rights unless authoriGed by la&. -he =olicitor 9eneral does not deny that the )=A2 officials opened the letters. Courts in the @.=. have generally permitted prison officials to open and read all incoming and outgoing mail of convicted prisoners to prevent the smuggling of contraband into the prison facility and to avert coordinated escapes. /1 6ven in the absence of statutes specifically allo&ing prison authorities from opening and inspecting mail, such practice &as upheld based on the principle of #civil deaths.# /2 )nmates &ere deemed to have no right to correspond confidentially &ith anyone. -he only restriction placed upon prison authorities &as that the right of inspection should not be used to delay unreasonably the communications bet&een the inmate and his la&yer. /3 6ventually, the inmatesD outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court officials received respect. // -he confidential correspondences could not be censored./0 -he infringement of such privileged communication &as held to be a violation of the inmatesD 2irst Amendment rights./A A prisoner has a right to consult &ith his attorney in absolute privacy, &hich right is not abrogated by the legitimate interests of prison authorities in the administration of the institution. /C ;oreover, the ris$ is small that attorneys &ill conspire in plots that threaten prison security./>

American ,urisprudence initially made a distinction bet&een the privacy rights en,oyed by convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. -he case of Palmigiano v. Travisono/BrecogniGed that pre-trial detainees, unli$e convicted prisoners, en,oy a limited right of privacy in communication. Censorship of pre-trial detaineesD mail addressed to public officials, courts and counsel &as held impermissible. 'hile incoming mail may be inspected for contraband and read in certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees could not be inspected or read at all. )n the subse(uent case of Wolff v. Mc onnell,00 involving convicted prisoners, the @.=. =upreme Court held that prison officials could open in the presence of the inmates incoming mail from attorneys to inmates. 5o&ever, prison officials could not read such mail from attorneys. 6Eplained the @.=. =upreme Court4 -he issue of the eEtent to &hich prison authorities can open and inspect incoming mail from attorneys to inmates, has been considerably narro&ed in the course of this litigation. -he prison regulation under challenge provided that D!a"ll incoming and outgoing mail &ill be read and inspected,D and no eEception &as made for attorney-prisoner mail. E E E etitioners no& concede that they cannot open and read mail from attorneys to inmates, but contend that they may open all letters from attorneys as long as it is done in the presence of the prisoners. -he narro& issue thus presented is &hether letters determined or found to be from attorneys may be opened by prison authorities in the presence of the inmate or &hether such mail must be delivered unopened if normal detection techni(ues fail to indicate contraband. EEE E E E )f prison officials had to chec$ in each case &hether a communication &as from an attorney before opening it for inspection, a near impossible tas$ of administration &ould be imposed. 'e thin$ it entirely appropriate that the =tate re(uire any such communications to be specially mar$ed as originating from an attorney, &ith his name and address being given, if they are to receive special treatment. )t &ould also certainly be permissible that prison authorities re(uire that a la&yer desiring to correspond &ith a prisoner, first identify himself and his client to the prison officials, to assure that the letters mar$ed privileged are actually from members of the bar. As to the ability to open the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no &ay constitute censorship, since the mail &ould not be read. +either could it chill such communications, since the inmateDs presence insures that prison officials &ill not read the mail. -he possibility that contraband &ill be enclosed in letters, even those from apparent attorneys, surely &arrants prison officialsD opening the letters. 'e disagree &ith the Court of Appeals that this should only be done in Dappropriate circumstances. D=ince a fleEible test, besides being un&or$able, serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of the possible constitutional rights enumerated by respondent, &e thin$ that petitioners, by acceding to a rule &hereby the inmate is present &hen mail from attorneys is inspected, have done all, and perhaps even more, than the Constitution re(uires.01 )n !udson v. Palmer,02 the @.=. =upreme Court ruled that an inmate has no reasonable eEpectation of privacy inside his cell. -he @.=. =upreme Court eEplained that prisoners necessarily lose many protections of the Constitution, thus4 5o&ever, &hile persons imprisoned for crime en,oy many protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries &ith it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights. -hese constraints on inmates, and in some cases the complete &ithdra&al of certain rights, are #,ustified by the considerations underlying our penal system.# -he curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of #institutional needs and ob,ectives# of prison facilities, chief among &hich is internal security. 1f course, these restrictions or retractions also serve, incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of ,ustice, deterrence and retribution are factors in addition to correction.03 -he later case of "tate v. unn,0/ citing !udson v. Palmer, abandoned Palmigiano v. Travisono and made no distinction as to the unn noted the considerable ,urisprudence in the @nited =tates holding that inmate mail may

detaineesD limited right to privacy. "tate v.

be censored for the furtherance of a substantial government interest such as security or discipline. "tate v.

unn declared that if complete unn4

censorship is permissible, then the lesser act of opening the mail and reading it is also permissible. 'e (uote "tate v.

7A8 right of privacy in traditional 2ourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible &ith the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells re(uired to ensure institutional security and internal order. 'e are satisfied that society &ould insist that the prisonerDs eEpectation of privacy al&ays yield to &hat must be considered a paramount interest in institutional security. 'e believe that it is accepted by our society that #7l8oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement.# -he distinction bet&een the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and a convicted inmate has been blurred as courts in the @.=. ruled that pre-trial detainees might occasionally pose an even greater security ris$ than convicted inmates. Bell v. Wolfish reasoned that those &ho are detained prior to trial may in many cases be individuals &ho are charged &ith serious crimes or &ho have prior records and may therefore pose a greater ris$ of escape than convicted inmates. 00 #alencia v. Wiggins0A further held that #it is impractical to dra& a line bet&een convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining ,ail security.# American cases recogniGe that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detaineesD non-privileged mail poses a genuine threat to ,ail security.0C 5ence, &hen a detainee places his letter in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee $no&ingly eEposes his letter to possible inspection by ,ail officials. 0> A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable eEpectation of privacy for his incoming mail. 0B 5o&ever, incoming mail from la&yers of inmates en,oys limited protection such that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents &ithout violating the inmatesD right to correspond &ith his la&yer. A0 -he inspection of privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal contraband.A1 -hus, &e do not agree &ith the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the detaineesD letters in the present case violated the detaineesD right to privacy of communication. -he letters &ere not in a sealed envelope. -he inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. -he letters alleged to have been read by the )=A2 authorities &ere not confidential letters bet&een the detainees and their la&yers. -he petitioner &ho received the letters from detainees -rillanes and ;aestrecampo &as merely acting as the detaineesD personal courier and not as their counsel &hen he received the letters for mailing. #n the :6e/ent .a/e, /4n.e the 0ette6/ 3e6e n1t .1n54dent4a0 .199un4.at41n 2et3een the deta4nee/ and the46 0a3<e6/, the 1554.4a0/ 15 the #SA P $etent41n ,ente6 .1u0d 6ead the 0ette6/. )f the letters are mar$ed confidential communication bet&een the detainees and their la&yers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. -hat a la& is re(uired before an eEecutive officer could intrude on a citiGenDs privacy rights A2 is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons &ho are detained or imprisoned. -he right to privacy of those detained is sub,ect to =ection / of .A C/3>, as &ell as to the limitations inherent in la&ful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished eEpectation of privacy rights. )n assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to infringe on the constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, @.=. courts #balance the guarantees of the Constitution &ith the legitimate concerns of prison administrators.#A3 -he deferential revie& of such regulations stems from the principle that4 7s8ub,ecting the day-to-day ,udgments of prison officials to an infleEible strict scrutiny analysis &ould seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration. A/ -he detainees in the present case are ,unior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup d etat, a crime punishable &ith reclusion perpetua.A0 -he ,unior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the 1a$&ood incident involving an armed ta$eover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are sub,ect to the Articles of 'ar.AA ;oreover, the ,unior officers are detained &ith other high-ris$ persons from the Abu =ayyaf and the + A. -hus, &e must give the military custodian a &ider range of deference in implementing the regulations in the )=A2 3etention Center. -he military custodian is in a better position to $no& the security ris$s involved in detaining the ,unior officers, together &ith the suspected Abu =ayyaf and + A members.

=ince the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security ris$s involved, &e should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness. -he ruling in this case, ho&ever, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. .egulations and conditions in detention and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners &ill be revie&ed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. -he courts could afford in,unctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners sub,ected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. 5o&ever, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to (uestion conditions of confinement.AC -he &rit of habeas corpus&ill only lie if &hat is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement. A> '"ERE ORE, &e $#S%#SS the petition. 'e A #R% the 3ecision of the Court of Appeals in CA-9... = +o. C>0/0.