Trends Organ Crim (2013) 16:156176 DOI 10.

1007/s12117-012-9185-x

The unintended consequences of kingpin strategies: kidnap rates and the Arellano-Flix Organization
Nathan Jones

Published online: 16 January 2013 # Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Abstract Kingpin strategies the targeting of the top-levels of terrorist or drug trafficking organization hierarchies has become a centerpiece of US and Mexican efforts to combat drug trafficking. This study addresses the unintended consequences of these strategies by assessing the impact of the arrest or deaths of Arellano Felix Organization leaders on kidnap and homicide levels from the late 1990s to 2011. Based on the study, the arrest of important AFO lieutenants increased kidnap rates. Arrests or the deaths of organization kingpins did not result in increased homicides or kidnappings, if respected successors were ready to fill leadership vacuums. When leadership succession was in question, the arrest of kingpins did result in internecine conflict and thus increased homicide and kidnapping rates. Following internecine conflict, kidnap and homicide rates dropped, but not to pre-conflict levels. This is likely attributable to the use of kidnapping and homicide as a dispute resolution mechanism in the growing Tijuana consumer drug market. Keywords AFO . Arellano Felix Organization . Counternarcotics . Decapitation strikes . High value targets . Kidnapping . Kingpin . Mexican drug trafficking organizations . Second order effects . Tijuana Cartel

Introduction Decapitation or kingpin strategies play an important role in counter-narcotic and counter-terror policy in both the United States and Mexico (Dudley 2011).

N. Jones (*) Alfred C. Glassell III Postdoctoral Fellow in Drug Policy, Rice Universitys James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 6100 Main Street, Rice University, Baker Hall, Suite 120, Houston, TX 77005, USA e-mail: npj2@rice.edu

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Decapitation strikes involve targeting for arrest the highest levels or core leadership of terror or criminal networks. While kingpin strategies can be highly effective in disrupting both terror and drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), they can also have unintended consequences (Johnson 2010). In the course of in-depth archival and interview-based research on the history of the Arellano Felix Organization (Tijuana Cartel), these consequences, including increased homicide and kidnap rates, became apparent (Jones and Cooper 2011).1 This is not a polemic against the use of kingpin strategies, but rather an attempt to understand the negative externalities associated with them. Kingpin strategies in the fight against the Arellano Felix Organization in the early 2000s resulted in internecine conflict that caused homicide and kidnap rates to surge by 2008 (Jones 2011b). With the destruction of one faction, which emphasized kidnapping in its business model, kidnap rates have since declined, but remain higher than their pre2008 levels (Jones 2011a, b).

Kingpin strategies A kingpin strategy is the term US law enforcement uses to refer to the targeting for arrest of the leadership of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The strategy can also be applied to counterterrorism; referring to the strategy of targeting terrorist leaders in an attempt to disrupt illicit networks (Dudley 2011; Pachico 2011). These strategies are embodied by the Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) programs of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which identifies important DTOs and their leadership (DEA 2006a, b; DEA OCDETF 2010). While these strategies disrupt network operations, they can also disrupt them to the point of creating internecine conflict, resulting in spikes in homicides as various factions and lieutenants vie for control of illicit networks. This has become commonplace in Mexico among the various cartels as violence surges following the arrest of important leaders (Guerrero Gutierrez 2010; Jones 2011a, c). The Mexican government argues that violence in areas where the military is present is the result of preexisting conditions (Escalante Gonzalbo 2011; Rios 2011). Mexican scholars have countered that following the removal of major DTO leaders like Arturo Beltran-Leyva, homicides have surged only to return to lower levels; but not as low as the periods before their removal (Guerrero Gutierrez 2010). For supporters of these strategies, the logic is cut off the head of the beast and the body ceases to function: In March 2002, the Office of the Attorney General announced a comprehensive six-part drug enforcement strategy designed to identify and target the worlds most significant drug supply organizations and their related components. The central element of the strategy was the development of the CPOT List, a rogues gallery of international kingpins who were responsible for the command and

The author would like to thank the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation, which funded 9 months of fieldwork in Mexico; the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine, and the Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies, which funded preliminary research trips; and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, where much of the editing of this project was completed.

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control of the most sophisticated and far reaching drug trafficking and money laundering organizations (DEA 2006a, b; DEA 2010). The above exert from the US attorney general illustrates the emphasis and dominance of kingpin strategies in counternarcotics and counter-terror operations. But what are the unintended consequences that policy-makers and public officials must be aware of when utilizing these strategies? Before we can answer that question, we must understand the existing literature on the structures of illicit networks, examine the history and sociology of kidnapping in Tijuana, and analyze the kidnap rates in relation to important decapitations.

Flat versus hierarchical networks There have been extensive debates about the value of flat versus hierarchical illicit networks in the post 9/11 discussions of terrorism and drug trafficking. Kenney has argued that flatter networks, with fewer layers of management, are more nimble and adaptive than their hierarchical bureaucratic state counterparts (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Kenney 2007a, b). Others like, Privette, have pointed to the advantages hierarchy provided the Cosa Nostra in surviving the arrest or killing of key leadership figures (Privette 2006). But in reality, all illicit networks have varying degrees of hierarchy and centralization as they, like governments, face the challenges of managing the free flow of information and the security compartmentalization provides (Kenney 2007a). This study provides detail to this debate by specifying when a semi-hierarchical illicit network suffered following decapitation strikes. Increased homicide and kidnap rates are signs of internal network weakness because they are signs of profit-starvation and internecine conflict. Thus, this study provides lessons learned on how decapitation strikes weaken illicit networks and when illicit networks prove themselves resilient to these strategies.

Kidnapping in the context of Mexican drug trafficking Kidnapping has been an intrinsic part of Mexican drug trafficking since at least the 1980s. Traffickers held members of other organizations to collateralize delivery or payment of cocaine. Kidnapping has many variants and has taken on a more nefarious tone in drug trafficking in Mexico since 2005. According to the former head of AntiOrganized Crime Unit of the Mexican Federal Attorney Generals Office (SIEDO), the Arellano Felix Organization was the first major Mexican drug trafficking organization to significantly increase its kidnapping prior to President Calderons offensive against the cartels beginning December 2006 (Blancas 2008). Kidnapping can serve numerous functions in drug trafficking. Kidnapping is a means by which to (1) enforce the payment of drug transactions in the illicit underworld, (2) enforce the payment of protection services or extortion in the illicit world, (3) enforce extortion payments in the licit business world and, finally, (4) as a profit-seeking enterprise in and of itself. Recently, Mexican DTOs have adopted a tactic of kidnapping journalists for the purpose of having their videos broadcast on

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air. This would suggest that kidnapping can also be used for political purposes; a possible fifth function of kidnapping. This is however a new and untested phenomena and how widespread it is remains to be seen (Malkin 2010). According to law enforcement sources that specialize in the AFO, kidnapping may be as profitable as drug trafficking and is motivated by the need of the network to pay the large overhead they have due to the number of enforcers they employ (Duncan 2009). Kidnapping is notoriously difficult to study systematically due to a lack of accurate data. Most kidnapping data comes from the state, but it is also estimated that 90 % of kidnappings go unreported because Mexicos public does not trust law enforcement institutions (Thompson 2004). One telling statistic is that it is estimated that Mexican police do not solve 98.5 % of crimes (Shirk 1999, 2006; Shirk and Donnelly 2009). Thus, inference becomes important in attaining a picture of kidnapping in Mexico in specific geographic locations. What are typical stories of kidnappings? What patterns emerge among these stories from primary sources? And what will this tell us about the structure of the organization and its business model? Tijuana kidnapping in the 1990s In Mexico, kidnapping has long been famous as a means by which to enforce the payment of drug transaction debts; particularly in the state of Sinaloa. This could involve the kidnapping of the individual who owes money to a drug trafficking organization or the capture of his family members or business partners. Sometimes valued cartel members were held as collateral to enforcement the payment of debts between Mexican and Colombian trafficking groups. Kidnapping expanded into a means by which to enforce protection/extortion payments in the illicit world. However in the Tijuana area, controlled by the Arellano-Felix Organization, the practice of kidnapping expanded into the extortion of licit businesses and as a business in and of itself in the years preceding 2008. Most of these kidnappings were attributed to the El Teo faction of the organization, led by Eduardo Teodoro Garcia Simental (El Teo). Before we can discuss this spike in kidnappings, a history of the illicit networks use of kidnapping must be elucidated for context (Duncan 2009). The AFO was profit-starved in the immediate aftermath of the killing of Cardinal Arch-Bishop Posadas Ocampo in 1993. AFO gunmen attempting to kill Chapo Guzman of the rival Sinaloa Cartel had mistakenly killed the Cardinal at the Guadalajara airport in his white Grand Marquis (Caldwell 2007a, b). From 1993 to the late 1990s, all top-level AFO leadership were laying low, some in the United States, some engaging in legitimate occupations in rural Mexico. In this period, they made calculated top-down decisions to engage in kidnapping, typically as needed and for high-profile targets. Prior to 1993, the AFO rarely engaged in kidnapping, deriving nearly all profits from drug trafficking (Duncan 2009). These high-profile kidnappings required intelligence on the targets habits, surveillance of the target, safe-houses and the capability to hold the victim for long periods of time. Typically, the AFO had inside-information about the target and a corrupted official within the Mexican anti-kidnap unit. Usually, someone on the targets security detail would make a commission from the ransom for providing information. Thus, the intelligence often came to the AFO based upon their

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reputation for violence and their reputation for paying commissions to those who provided intelligence (Duncan 2009). The AFO had offices where enforcers were expected to be ready to work each morning. No advance warning would be given to those participating in a kidnapping. A lieutenant of the organization would arrive at the office on the morning of a kidnap operation and give minimal instructions to enforcers participating in the kidnapping. Generally, these were instructions on what to wear, what arms to carry, and what type of vehicle to drive. This is an example of information compartmentalization through procedures within the organization. It is also an example of the need for security coming into conflict with the need for information flows within an illicit network. The AFO failed in some of their attempts to kidnap high profile targets during this period, likely due to the compartmentalization of information. It also likely survived this period intact without large numbers of major arrests because of its compartmentalization (Duncan 2009). The new kidnap wave (mid-2000s) The early 2000s was a period in which the AFO was considered one of the most profitable DTOs in Mexico. It was at this time that it suffered major arrests and the events of September 11th resulted in increased US border enforcement. This made drugs more difficult to traffic across the border and forced some elements of the organization to diversify their activities into retail drug sales and kidnappings. In the early to mid-2000s, an AFO lieutenant, El Cris, began kidnapping more individuals for smaller and smaller ransoms. In 2004, he was arrested but his brother El Teo continued the practice with his enforcer cells. This would lead to one of the most important splits within the AFO (Marosi 2008a, c; Ojeda 2008; Reza Gonzalez 2011; Zeta 2010a, 2007). Eduardo Teodoro Garcia Simental (El Teo) relied heavily on kidnapping as a revenue source. It should be noted that it is universally recognized that El Teo engaged in a much larger use of kidnapping than other factions as per media sources, and interviews with journalists, local citizens, and law enforcement in Mexico and the United States (Marosi 2008a). The kidnapping operations were not sophisticated, though they did include a large number of people, cell phones, and safe-houses. Most of the people operating these kidnap cells were mugrosos young teenagers doing the dirty work of the cartel. There was very little previously collected intelligence on the targets and they were typically not held for very long period; usually 4 to 5 days. The victims were often killed. The advantage to the strategy of using mugrosos is that an illicit network relying on them is highly resilient because they can be constantly recruited and replaced, due to a large number of highly impoverished young people in Mexico (Anonymous Tijuana business leader 2011). Holding the victims for short periods allowed an increase in the number of kidnappings that could be undertaken. Once the El Teo faction began kidnapping professionals and petit bourgeoisie, e.g. taco stand owners, doctors, and engineers, they were kidnapping for much smaller amounts, usually $5,00010,000 US dollars. This dramatically increased the number of people who could be kidnapped and the

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number of people in Tijuana who had been touched by the phenomena. The psychological impact upon the victims was devastating. Female victims were raped repeatedly and would never be the same. The sense of security of all of the victims was shattered (Anonymous Tijuana resident 2009; Duncan 2009; Ramos 2011). Determining the patterns of kidnappings in Tijuana in the 2000s was very difficult. Initially, it seemed likely that extortion moving from the illicit to the licit worlds targeted certain industries where the line between the licit and illicit blurred, e.g. an auto-shop can also be used as a chop-shop by breaking down stolen cars and selling their parts. Anecdotally, there did appear to be a pattern to the businesses which were targeted, which included many auto-shops. However, based on interviews of Tijuana residents and business-owners, the apparent patterns came about very differently. According to multiple Tijuana citizens and confirmed by anonymous government officials, kidnap victims, usually business-owners, would be abducted and held for ransom. They often negotiated their own ransom and were asked for exorbitant amounts. The victim would offer a lower amount which they could produce. The kidnapping cell would accept the lower amount on the provision that the victim provide ten names of people who could pay the same amount. In this fashion, the kidnappings occurred along the lines of social networks, e.g. an auto-mechanic knows other auto-mechanics and those of similar socio-economic status. Eventually, kidnappings entered the professionally educated class including doctors, engineers, and lawyers and triggered a societal backlash (Anonymous Tijuana resident 2010; Anonymous Tijuana business leader 2011). To avoid being kidnapped, an illicit or licit business owner was usually given an opportunity to pay cuota (tax) regularly (the tax is also sometimes referred to as piso or plaza). Again, anecdotally, the pattern appeared to be that the business-owner had a protector whom he could contact to arrange payments. Sometimes payments would become dramatically larger when for example the boss has a birthday coming (Anonymous Tijuana businessman 2011). If a business-owner wanted to shut down his business, he had to arrange a final payment; usually larger than his regular payments. This was not uncommon in the period in which the Fernando Sanchez Arellano El Ingeniero faction and the El Teo faction of the AFO were in internecine conflict from 2008 to 2010. One business owner lamented being told by police that it was not a good time to be in business, fatalistically acknowledging that they could not keep the business safe (Anonymous Tijuana business leader 2011). Business people paying cuota, or extortion tax, were also given an opportunity to provide ten names of people that would not be kidnapped based on this arrangement. This usually included immediate family and employees. There were also anecdotal accounts of kidnap victims being asked for lists of names of other potential kidnap victims (Anonymous Tijuana business leader 2011). After the experience of narco-juniors in the 1990s, Tijuana society wanted a separation between polite society and the criminal under-world; although there were some who may have blurred the line. The Rhon family and other Tijuana elites are reported to have functioned as the money-laundering side of the illicit criminal world in Tijuana, though this has never been proven (Bergman 2000). The criminal world was allowed to function and was largely ignored provided that polite society, the elites of the licit world, went unmolested (Anonymous Tijuana business leader 2011; Anonymous Tijuana resident 2010).

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Kidnappings of those who were uninvolved in illegitimate activities and owners of middle-class businesses, were shocking to Tijuana society. Doctors installed panicrooms in their offices and threatened to refuse to treat police officers and the public, until the kidnappings of doctors ended (Anonymous family member of Tijuana doctor 2009; Marosi 2008b). The abduction of Dr. Guzman the general surgeon of a leading Tijuana hospital, was a turning point: Guzmans abduction came amid a plague of crime targeting the citys medical community. About 20 doctors have been kidnapped and dozens have received calls demanding as much as $50,000, according to the citys medical associations (Marosi 2008b). In response to the kidnappings, civil society groups representing doctors mobilized and threatened a strike. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Guzman was released (Marosi 2008b). Kidnapping was at the center of the split between the El Teo and the Fernando Sanchez Arellano El Ingeniero factions in April of 2008. The El Ingeniero faction believed the Teo cells were calentando la plaza, that is heating up the turf, with too many kidnappings and drawing negative attention which could hurt the drug trafficking business. El Teo believed El Ingeniero was a weak leader who had inherited leadership from his uncles; a spoiled child not from the Tijuana streets and unworthy of leadership in the organization. He also needed the profits kidnapping brought his faction, while El Ingeniero needed a calm plaza to traffic drugs and operate money laundering front-businesses. Neither El Teo nor El Ingeniero was present for the violent April 2008 gun-battle on the streets of Tijuana that marked their split (Fox News 2009; Marosi 2008c). Most Tijuana citizens attributed kidnappings to the El Teo faction of the Arellano Felix Organization. This is consistent with media reports which suggested that El Teo had a network of kidnapping houses and kidnap cells throughout Tijuana (Anonymous Tijuana businessman 2011; Anonymous Tijuana resident 2009; Marosi 2008a). He also had a higher propensity for violence and the public use of violence. He employed El Pozolero who used acid to dissolve the bodies of cartel victims. El Teo is rumored to have had a drug-use problem though this is unconfirmed (cristal or methamphetamine). This, in addition to his youthful and inexperienced leadership, could have contributed to higher levels of violence (Marosi 2008a). El Teo had many advantages in the internecine conflict with El Ingeniero. First, he and his brothers were Tijuana natives. They had grown up within the city and had operated as enforcers there for most of their lives. It is reported that El Teo and his brother began their illicit careers in human-smuggling, guiding undocumented aliens across the border on foot. Second, El Teo was able to establish a 6-month alliance with the Sinaloa cartel led by Chapo Guzman and Mayo Zambada. Widely considered the most powerful cartel in Mexico, this alliance provided El Teo with the drug connections he lacked. The Sinaloa cartel had already taken control of Mexicali by 2004, facilitating this alliance. Third, El Teo had extensive contacts within the local police force (Anonymous Tijuana resident 2009). Fourth, El Teos use of public violence was very high (Carroll 2010; Ellingwood 2009; Jones 2011a; Marosi 2008c). He was known for leaving the decapitated heads of victims on top of vats of acid where their bodies were dissolved. This, in effect, defeated the purpose of

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Fig. 1 Kidnappings in Tijuana as reported by the SSP (2012) Baja California

having a Pozolero to hide the carnage, but had a strong psychological impact upon rival cartels and the local population (de Mauleon 2009; Dudley 2010; Marosi 2008a). He was known for having many local police on his payroll but also for killing police that did not cooperate with him.2 Such violence was a double-edged sword for this faction. It terrorized and cowed the population into submission, but also led to a societal backlash (Kenney 2007a) Fig. 1. Figure 2 shows average registered monthly kidnappings in Tijuana for the years from January 2006 to September 2011 and makes the relationship between internecine illicit network conflict and kidnapping clear (SSP 2012). Before 2008, the average number of monthly kidnappings was 2.5 and 1.17 in 2006 and 2007, repectively. It spiked dramatically in 2008 to 7.67 and 2009 to 7.92, coinciding with the AFOs internecine conflict. The average number of monthly kidnappings in 2010 was 5.67, lower than the internecine conflict period, but still higher than previous years. By 2011, average monthly kidnapping were down to 4.33 (data through September 2011) (SSP 2012). There are multiple explanations for this new higher rate of kidnapping following the AFOs internecine conflict (Jones 2011c). The first has to do with the data. Following the Calderon administrations war on organized crime, local governments received federal money if their area was identified as prone to organized crime violence. Thus, the issue may be that local and state

Before El Teos arrest in January 2010, I visited Tijuana in 2009 and noticed that municipal police always travelled in groups of two trucks, with at least two men each sitting in the truck bed with automatic weapons. Motorcycle police, that typically enforce traffic violations individually, rode in groups of three. Seven months after Teos January 2010 arrest, Police appeared calmer and rode in their trucks with one partner in the cab with them and no one in the truck bed. This is evidence of the impact that Teos arrest had on the Tijuana psyche. It has calmed municipal police by reducing the daily threat of police assassination (Anonymous Tijuana resident 2009).

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Fig. 2 Average monthly kidnappings Tijuana as reported by SSP (2012)

governments have been incentivized to keep better or inflate counts of violent crimes (Ilescas 2011). A second explanation has to do with the remnants of the El Teo faction. Not every member of the illicit network has been arrested or killed following this period. Some were annexed by the Sinaloa Cartel in a highly compartmentalized fashion (Borderland Beat 2010; Zeta 2011). Others were killed or rejoined the Cartel Arellano Felix. Still others likely continue to free-lance as kidnap cells without paying taxes or tribute to a larger trafficking network. Finally, the environment of legal impunity created likely encouraged newcomers and amateur cells (Jones 2011b; Zeta 2010a, b, c, 2011). AFO spin-off kidnap cellsLos Palillos Kidnapping can also serve to assist in the cannibalization process of the illicit network. The case of Los Palillos or the toothpicks is illustrative. The kidnap cell leadership had a personal conflict with AFO leadership. They relocated their operations to the United States to kidnap wealthy members of the AFO residing in the United States. They utilized their knowledge of those involved in the network to spin-off into their own group, which could profit from the exploitation of their knowledge. They were eventually captured by authorities that were notified by the wife of a victim in the United States. Los Palillos could be considered an example of spillover violence from Mexico into the United States. It should be noted that this spillover violence is typically directed toward members of the illicit network

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themselves. The Los Palillos story is also an example of self-cannibalization of compartmentalized illicit networks. In the words of one cross-border taskforce member, these guys make their own enemies (Duncan 2009). The need for security, results in a compartmentalization of an illicit network into cells, which are loyal to each other, but not necessarily to the larger network (Kenney 2007a).

Kidnapping in Tijuana post AFO conflict Following the AFO internecine conflict, kidnapping in Tijuana also appears linked to narcomenudeo or retail drug trafficking. Kidnapping is used to enforce payment on drug trafficking debts among those involved in selling drugs locally in Tijuana. A recent case is illustrative. A mother and son were kidnapped in an urban area in Tijuana. According to a Baja California state kidnap unit representative, they were both involved in local drug trafficking and distribution (Jones 2011b). Drug consumption has been on the rise in Mexico due to a number of factors including the emergence of methamphetamine as an inexpensive synthetically produced drug, the hardening of the US border, and a deliberate strategy by MDTOs to diversify their consumer markets beyond the US consumer (Jones 2011b). The relationship between decapitation strikes and the kidnap rate in Baja California I attempt here to establish a relationship between the removal by arrest or killing of key AFO leaders and the kidnapping rate in Baja California by analyzing the ICESI kidnap data for Baja California and SSP state and local data, in the context of disruptive events within the AFO and based upon what position within the hierarchy they occupy. The general argument is that when the AFO is profit-starved, enforcers raise funds by engaging in more kidnapping. This argument was identified in interviews of law enforcement officers who had, in turn, learned about the phenomenon from interrogations of Arellano Felix Organization members and during wiretapped conversations (Duncan 2009). The removal of high-ranking AFO leaders with critical business ties can increase the networks propensity for kidnapping. In addition to demonstrating the importance of those with business connections in the organization to the kidnap rate and total kidnappings, the analysis revealed that charismatic enforcement-oriented leaders provided control over enforcer cells and their removal also accelerated kidnappings. Using the logic of John Stuart Mill for establishing causation, proper time-order, correlation, and a causal mechanism are needed to demonstrate a link between internal AFO events and changes in the number of kidnappings in Baja California (Mill 2009). Figure 3 shows the number of kidnappings in Baja California from 1997 to 2009 as reported by Instituto Ciudano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad (ICESI) with important AFO decapitations marked. Baja California data provides a better basis of analysis over a longer time-span than solely Tijuana kidnap data for numerous

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Fig. 3 Kidnappings and kidnap rates per 100,000 Baja California (ICESI 2012)

reasons. First, it includes Tijuana. Second, the AFO plaza or territory at different points in this epoch included Rosarito, Ensenada, and, at different points, Tecate and Mexicaliall of which are included in Baja California. Third, ICESI aggregate data is more accessible (ICESI 2010). All of these statistics should be considered suspect due to underreporting, probably by a factor of 10. Historically, in Mexico there has been a lack of trust in local and state police many of which are feared to be involved in kidnapping. Also, threats to victims and their families may result in underreporting by victims.3 Nonetheless, this graph demonstrates data and trends that fit with the qualitative history of the AFO, the accounts of local citizens, and the relationship of profit-starvation to increased kidnappings. The arrest in 1997 of Kitty Pez, a key AFO lieutenant and leader of a narcojunior cell in Tijuana, had a detrimental effect on the AFO. It led directly to Jesus Blancornelas, editor of Zeta Magazine, publishing stories on the AFO which David Barron Corona, an important enforcer lieutenant and connection to the Logan Street gang and La Eme prison gang, decided to kill him for. In the attempt, Corona was killed by ricochet fire and died. The loss of these two important figures could explain the spike in kidnappings in the area in the following year. Kitty Pez had married an important Tijuana businessmans daughter. He had important business connections and profitable narco-juniors working for him (Caldwell 2007a, b). David Barron Corona was an important enforcer lieutenant commanding loyalty within the AFO and likely control over many other soldiers recruited from his
3

Voluntary and anonymous surveys conducted regularly throughout Mexico might help to provide a more accurate picture of the kidnapping problem than reports based on statistics provided by law enforcement institutions that lack the faith of the populace. Indeed, websites like www.notecalles.org.mx appear to attempt to address this issue in this fashion by allowing Mexican citizens to self-report crime anonymously (No Te Calles - No+Inseguridad 2010).

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Logan Street Gang and La Eme prison gang. The loss of these two figures represented the loss of profits and control over enforcers within the organization. According to law enforcement interviews, with lower profits and the same number of enforcers to be paid, the organization found alternative sources of profit. Kidnapping for ransom was one of those alternatives according to California Department of Justice Investigator Steve Duncan, a member of the AFO taskforce (Duncan 2009). Without Corona, there may not have been sufficient control over low-level soldiers to prevent the rise in kidnappings in 1998. The year 1999, however, sees a drop in kidnappings, which suggests that the AFO may have reasserted control over the organization to minimize kidnappings, which draw negative attention to the drug trafficking business. The arrest of Jesus Chuy Labra Aviles, chief financial adviser to the organization and Ismael Higuera Guerrero, formerly the operational head of the organization for Tijuana while Benjamin and Ramon were laying low in the 1990s, saw a slight increase in the number of kidnappings in Tijuana in 2000 (Duncan 2009). The most interesting finding of the analysis is the most counterintuitive. The loss of the most important figures in the organization saw no increase in the number of kidnappings, but rather a slight decrease. Benjamin Arellano Felix was the strategic head of the organization and his brother Ramon was the chief enforcer. They were arrested and killed, respectively, in short order in March 2002. This lack of a surge in kidnappings following their removal can be attributed to the control maintained by their brother El Tigrillo who was very experienced by 2002 and was able to maintain firm control over the organization. This suggests Privettes view that hierarchy provides advantages in terms of clear lines of succession that allow criminal organizations to continue to function efficiently is accurate (Privette 2006). Another possible factor may have been the funneling of profits upward. If Ramon and Benjamin, at the top of the AFO, were owed a great deal of payments from below as a form of internal taxation, the removal of these figures and replacement with El Tigrillo may have reduced the payments owed to the peak of the AFO by consolidating two payments into one. It should be noted that these are plausible but speculative explanations. The greatest spike in kidnappings is attributable to a split in the organization, a direct result of the removal of El Tigrillo and later El Doctor from leadership positions in the AFO. This allowed El Teo to fragment the organization into internecine conflict and focus his business model on kidnapping, in part, because he had little access to drug profits. The drop in kidnappings in 2009, though they remained at a higher level than previous years, could be attributed to the truce established between the two factions as they reinforced their organizations after high levels of violence in 2009. Part of that truce may have included the reduction of kidnappings to reduce societal backlash. This interpretation is consistent with media and law enforcement reports at the time (Zeta 2011; Marosi 2008a, c, 2009). See the Fig. 4, below, for an illustration of monthly kidnap, homicide, and extortion cases with the arrest and killing of key AFO figures noted. The data was entered by hand into a spreadsheet from PDF files from the Baja California Secretary of Security Website (SSP 2012). Once kidnapping is widespread, as it became in 2008 (as depicted in Fig. 4), it is likely to remain high. There are, and will continue to be, many kidnap cells operating without access to drug trafficking profits in Tijuana. They will continue until they are

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Fig. 4 Homicides, kidnappings and extortion cases in Tijuana (SSP 2012)

arrested or killed. This is likely to occur even if kidnap cells do not have permission from cartel leaders that have been weakened by internecine conflict. Many kidnapping cells may be operating as free-lance cells, with no permission to kidnap from larger trafficking networks and no affiliation with them. This may explain many recent arrests of kidnapping cells. Larger trafficking organizations with superior intelligence may provide this intelligence to police to remove these cells and garner support from the population, as insurgencies do (Brands 2009).4 The relationship between the removal of cartel figures and the number of kidnappings appears to be caused by a combination of (1) the importance of figure being removed, (2) his ability to produce profits, and (3) his ability to exert control over enforcers for the organization. Interestingly, it is not the removal of top figures that increases the number of kidnappings (if successors are in place) nor is it the countless number of low-level enforcers who are arrested daily. Rather, it is the removal of midlevel lieutenants that appeared to most increase kidnappings. This finding is logical given the important operational role these lieutenants play in compartmentalized drug trafficking organizations (Kenney 2007a). Thus, the relationship between the cartel figure removed through arrest or death and kidnapping is parabollically related to his importance in the organization; the more in the middle a figure is, the more his arrest will increase kidnappings. The exception to this rule is when a top level leader is removed and his successors lack
4

This argument posits that certain factions of the organization became profit-starved while others may have continued to thrive. The profit-starved factions began to focus on the taxation of territory and the expansion into high impact crime like kidnapping and extortion. This was especially true in the internecine conflict period where the enforcers of the Teo faction attempted to take control of the territory and network. Thus, the argument is not dependent upon a commensurate reduction in drug trafficking, which might be measured or correlated with a reduction in confiscated drugs at the border. Rather drug confiscations at the border would represent an irrelevant variable because another portion of the illicit network continued to traffic.

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sufficient legitimacy within the organization to prevent internal conflict from profitstarved lieutenants in need of new revenue streams. Also, the presence of kidnap cells with no access to drug trafficking profits will keep kidnapping at a higher level until they are removed from the system, which may be a long and daunting process (Duncan 2009). It is important to rule out the possibility that these surges in kidnappings are not attributable to other causes. One alternative hypothesis is that the surges in kidnapping in Tijuana were not attributable to what was happening inside the AFO, but resulted from broader economic trends. The Mexican peso collapse of 1994 was a severe economic dislocation that might have had a delayed impact upon kidnap rates in Mexico; potentially explaining increases in petty crime and kidnappings for profit in 1998. However, as Fig. 5 illustrates, Tijuanas kidnap rate surges cannot be explained by national kidnap rates; thus ruling out the economic dislocation alternative hypothesis. During the internecine conflict between El Teo and El Ingeniero, the Sinaloa Cartel established a presence and cells inside Tijuana. Some suggest that the arrest of El Teo was arranged by the Sinaloa cartel (his one time ally) to reduce violence in the Tijuana corridor, though this is not verifiable. Remembering its violent split with the Beltran-Leyva Organization, the Sinaloa Cartel kept its Tijuana affiliates operating autonomously and in competition with each other (Zeta 2011). Based upon reduced violence levels, arrests, statements from the arrested and interviews of Tijuana businessmen, the Sinaloa Cartel appears to have achieved some sort of arrangement with the remaining elements of the AFO to minimize violence; despite their long history of animosity (Jones 2011d). Notably absent from this discussion is the role of the state security institutions including the military and municipal police in the reduction of kidnapping. These

Fig. 5 National and Baja California kidnap rates (ICESI 2011)

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institutions played a role in reducing kidanapping, but did so in the context of assisting in the elimination of the El Teo faction. In this sense, the successes of the state had less to do with an improved capacity to address kidnapping and more to do with swaying the results of the internecine conflict in favor of groups that did not engage in the activity (Jones 2012b). Thus, even though the state security apparatus played a role in reducing kidnappings, it was in the context of illicit network internecine conflict dynamics, the level of analysis used here. Through early 2012 the AFO and the Sinaloa cartel maintain a presence in Tijuana. Despite the presence of two large illicit networks, Tijuana has lower levels of violence than the internecine conflict era. This suggests that the two illicit networks are not in open conflict with each other and have achieved some sort of truce. The November 2011 arrest of Juan Francisco Sillas Rocha a key enforcer lieutenant for El Ingeniero and his statements to police appear to confirm the truce assessment and also suggest that the AFO is stronger than many believe (Jones 2011d). The extemely low levels of kidnappings in early 2012 further suggest that kidnapping is a crime illicit networks in Tijuana strongly discourage (Jones 2011d, 2012a).

Conclusions Kingpin strategies can effectively disrupt and fragment an illicit network, whether it be insurgent or profit-seeking. However, the consequences of that disruption can be dire for the society in which these illicit networks are embedded. Consequences may include increased kidnap, extortion, and homicide rates. Homicide rates increase as members of the network struggle to fill the leadership vacuums left by the removal of leadership figures. When there are clear successors, this does not occur until a network is decapitated to the point that it has no clear succession. Hierarchy thus can have advantages for illicit networks in addition to increasing their vulnerabilities (Kenney 2007a; Privette 2006). An identifiable hierarchy becomes more susceptible to decapitation strike, but can prevent internal succession struggles when the network loses leadership figures. Kidnap rates generally change when cells within a network are profit-starved. Sometimes this is the result of a lack of trafficking connections be they source or distribution connectionswhich would allow them to become highly profitable drug traffickers (Duncan 2009; Kenney 2007a). Decapitation or kingpin strategies may be most disruptive to kidnap rates when key lieutenants who provide control over low level enforcers, or lieutenants who generate profits for the network, are removed. For example, the arrest of Kitty Pez and the death of David Barron Corona appear to have resulted in the increase in kidnapping the next year according 1998 ICESI data which shows a significant spike in kidnappings. Thus, the removal of lieutenants who serve as key managers and control the periphery of the network for the core may be more important for understanding kidnap spikes than the removal of strategic leadership (Kenney 2007a) (see Appendix). The removal of the strategic leadership appears to be most important when there is a lack of legitimate succession depth as the analysis of SSP data demonstrated. Eventually, if sufficient state or rival network pressure is applied, the line of succession is exhausted and internal struggles raise violence in terms of homicide and kidnap rates, as the need to establish new revenue streams arises for enforcer-heavy

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networks (Duncan 2009; Privette 2006). A similar pattern is apparent in the split between the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas. The split was structurally preconditioned on the arrest and later extradition of leader Gulf Cartel leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen in 2007. While actual fighting between the two did not occur until 2010, the conflict would not have been possible had Cardenas not been extradited from his Mexican prison cell, resulting in the Zetas declaring independence in 2007 (Insight Crime 2010). The Los Zetas business model emphasizes kidnapping and extortion more than that of the long-time traffickers of the Gulf Cartel. Just as decapitations of the AFO resulted in more kidnapping by one faction of the AFO, a Gulf Cartel decapitation led to an increase in kidnappings by Los Zetas. Thus, this analysis appears to have broader applicability; especially in the Mexican context. This analysis has provided important insights into the unintended consequences of kingpin strategies that law enforcement and counter-terror agencies should consider when arresting or killing leadership figures of various levels and social network positions. It adds specificity to debates about the advantages of flat versus hierarchical network resilience (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001). More studies of a wider variety and number of illicit networks could help to glean further lessons from the relationship between decapitation strikes and increased kidnap and homicide rates in the regions wherein illicit networks function. Studies of this kind could help to increase understanding of the unintended consequences of kingpin strategies and how to prepare for them.
Acknowledgments I would like to take this opportunity to thank my dissertation committee members Professors Caesar Sereseres, Etel Solingen, Kamal Sadiq and Louis Desipio. I would also like to thank Steve Duncan of the California Department of Justice for opening important doors for me in the course of my research on the AFO. Finally, I would like to thank the Institute Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), the UC Irvine Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies (CGPACS) and the UC Irvine Department of Political Science for funding various phases of research on which this analysis is based.

Appendix

Data ICESI annual kidnap data

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 28 72 23 47 25 22 20 9 9 38 20 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 1

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2008 2009 2010 2011

115 103 79 64

4 3 2

ICESI Baja/National Kidnap Rates

Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Kidnap Rate Baja California 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 4 3 2 Kidnap Rate National 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1.1 1.1

Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SSP) data on homicides, kidnappings and extortion cases in Tijuana.
Homicides - Tijuana 2006-1-January 2006-2 -February 2006-3-march 2006-4-april 2006-5-may 2006-6-june 2006-7-july 2006-8-august 2006-9-September 2006-10-october 2006-11-november 2006-12-December 2007-1-January 2007-2 -February 2007-3-march 2007-4-april 25 27 20 26 27 28 25 29 32 26 23 26 22 27 24 25 Kidnappings Tijuana 3 3 1 3 4 1 5 3 0 3 1 3 0 0 2 2 Extortions in Tijuana 10 5 4 5 10 23 17 21 23 20 7 19 13 19 12 5

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2007-5-may 2007-6-june 2007-7-july 2007-8-august 2007-9-September 2007-10-october 2007-11-november 2007-12-December 2008-1-January 2008-2 -February 2008-3-march 2008-4-april 2008-5-may 2008-6-june 2008-7-july 2008-8-august 2008-9-September 2008-10-october 2008-11-november 2008-12-December 2009-1-January 2009-2 -February 2009-3-march 2009-4-april 2009-5-may 2009-6-june 2009-7-july 2009-8-august 2009-9-September 2009-10-october 2009-11-november 2009-12-December 2010-1-January 2010-2 -February 2010-3-march 2010-4-april 2010-5-may 2010-6-june 2010-7-july 2010-8-august 2010-9-September 2010-10-october 2010-11-november 2010-12-December

22 32 22 27 24 23 38 24 30 33 48 42 21 33 28 29 32 87 123 71 56 36 47 38 43 31 41 51 45 32 38 98 99 51 57 54 50 44 52 45 58 50 69 59

1 0 4 1 0 1 2 1 11 11 10 10 5 3 5 5 7 7 16 2 7 9 12 7 15 3 3 5 5 5 12 12 9 3 4 5 6 6 6 9 5 3 7 5

7 7 7 7 11 6 8 6 5 7 11 10 17 29 14 4 11 23 19 17 14 14 21 9 9 9 9 18 26 17 22 18 19 19 23 25 25 22 20 16 21 14 13 15

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2011-1-January 2011-2-February 2011-3-March 2011-4-April 2011-5-May 2011-6-June 2011-7-July 2011-8-August 2011-9-September Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12 May-12

51 27 45 28 42 41 35 38 33 28 24 26 39 22 24 26 27

4 11 4 4 4 5 1 0 6 4 1 1 1 0 1 0 1

18 13 9 16 6 8 14 11 14 12 11 19 19 26 16 12 14

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