Secret Disagreements Have Emerged in the Negotiations between Russia and the United States on

Strategic Offensive Weapons

by Vladimir Solovyev
Kommersant
12 Nov 09
U.S. Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher has announced that Washington "is very disappointed"
with Moscow's reaction to its proposals for the new strategic offensive arms reduction treaty (START).
She refused to reveal the essence of the disagreements - the sides have agreed to classify the work on
the document. Nevertheless, this statement has become the first official acknowledgement of the
presence of problems at the negotiations, which should be completed by December 5. Kommersant has
ascertained that one of the contradictions consists of Washington's desire to maintain strict monitoring
over Russian "Topol" mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles at all costs, with which Moscow does not
concur.
ITAR-TASS Russian Information Agency cited Mrs. Tauscher's statement yesterday. "We are very
disappointed with the response, which we received to our package of proposals (on strategic offensive
weapons - Kommersant), which James Jones, the National Security Advisor to the U.S. President,
delivered 10 days ago", the U.S. under secretary of state for arms control and international security said,
while commenting on the progress of the negotiations on strategic offensive weapons, the next round of
which began in Geneva on Monday.
And although the diplomat stipulated that the United States "wants to move forward" and "is very
interested in hearing the position of our Russian colleagues", her words became the first official
acknowledgement in recent weeks of the presence of serious problems in the preparation of the new
START treaty, which both Moscow and Washington consider to be the year's key document. And really
just last month the sides were radiating optimism: Barack Obama's National Security Advisor James
Jones visited Russia on October 29, having transferred to the Russian negotiators package proposals on
strategic offensive weapons. After that, the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs made an entire series of
statements, the essence of which was reduced to the fact that the new treaty will be signed on December
5 of this year, as the leaders of Russia and the United States had conceived.
Ellen Tauscher preferred not to clarify precisely what had not proceeded as planned after that. The fact
is that Moscow and Washington have agreed not to disclose the details of the work on the new strategic
offensive arms agreement until it will be ready in its final version. And while the sides have been
steadfastly observing that understanding - Kommersant sources at the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
in the Russian President's Administration, who are familiar with the progress of the strategic offensive
weapons negotiations, refuse to reveal any of their details even under the conditions of anonymity. "A
strict embargo has been imposed on the negotiators' association with the press. This is a sensitive topic
and any leak could, if not disrupt the signing of the document, then do serious damage," a Kremlin source
told Kommersant.
The experts, who have been enlisted in the treaty preparation process, have turned out to be more
open. Kommersant's interlocutor, who is familiar with the content of the American proposals that were
transferred to Moscow, reported some contradictions that have not yet been resolved by the sides. In his
words, as before the divergences concern the minimum level of nuclear warhead delivery vehicles, which
must be consolidated in the future strategic offensive weapons treaty, and also the mechanism for
monitoring mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
"In their package, the Americans designated a new ceiling for warhead delivery vehicles, with which we
do not entirely agree", Kommersant's interlocutor said, having refused to reveal the number of delivery
vehicles that have been announced by the United States.
The sides had already set forth polar positions with regard to delivery vehicles in July, when Russian
and American Presidents Dmitriy Medvedev and Barack Obama signed the "Joint Understanding on the
Issue of Further Strategic Offensive Weapon Reductions and Restrictions" in Moscow. In it, the United
States designated the figure of 1,100 delivery vehicles when the RF proposed a more radical approach
and advocated their reduction to 500. And, judging by the words of Kommersant's interlocutor and Ellen
Tauscher's statement, right now the sides are far from a compromise variant on that score.
 Kommersant's source explains the discrepancies surrounding ICBM monitoring by the fact that
Washington has proposed to retain in the new START treaty the monitoring mechanism, which was
stipulated in the expiring START I Treaty. "They propose to preserve and even strengthen the monitoring
of the 'Topol' mobile ICBMs", the expert explained. "We oppose assigning the 'Topol' missiles to a class
of their own".
Kommersant's interlocutor pointed out that Moscow's position is associated with the fact that right now
the United States doesn't have mobile, ground-based ICBMs in its inventory and therefore the American
proposal "is unilateral in nature". Judging by everything, while proposing to establish monitoring over
Russian mobile ICBMs, the American Side is attempting in part to restore the balance, which was
disrupted after the United States terminated the program for the development of its own mobile
complexes in 1991. In July 1991, Moscow and Washington signed the START I Treaty. And already in
September, then American President George Bush, Sr., ordered a freeze of the expensive nuclear
weapons improvement programs and initiated the terminator of the financing of the mobile variant of the
ICBM, which was known as Midgetman, and a number of other developments. In the words of
Kommersant' source, the Russian Side is insisting that there is no need for stricter limitations on mobile
ICBMs as compared with other mobile systems, "such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles".
But then again, the expert is not inclined to dramatize the discrepancies that have emerged, just like he
is not inclined to dramatize Ellen Tauscher's statement. "Progress is being made and all of the
divergences are ultimately resolvable", he summarized. "I would take Tauscher's words with a grain of
salt. Her statement could very well be explained by a desire to slightly pressure us".
Judging by everything, RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials adhere to a similar point of view. In any
case, the department's Official Spokesman Andrey Nesterenko said yesterday that the Geneva strategic
offensive arms negotiations "are practically occurring in an uninterrupted mode". The atmosphere at the
negotiations is businesslike and constructive. The sides are actively working on the convergence of their
positions and are conducting the coordination of the specific wording. We hope that this round will
become the concluding round and that the treaty will be approved by December 5, as that is stipulated by
the instructions of the presidents of Russia and the United States", Mr. Nesterenko reassured us.
Kremlin officials are also inclined to search for compromises. In the words of Kommersant's interlocutor
in the RF President's Administration, Moscow has the desire to complete the signing on schedule. "The
current situation is distinguished from the times of the preparation of START I by the fact that at that time
the work was occurring in an atmosphere of hostility. Probable enemies were sitting at the negotiating
table. Right now, that is not so - we are working in confidence", a high-ranking Kremlin official pointed
out. In his words, certain difficulties are still emerging during the coordination of a series of parameters of
the future agreement at the defense ministers' level: "Both our and the American diplomats have to work
a bit in order to convince their military personnel of the need for compromises".
The two countries' leaders will have to find the final resolutions on the START treaty. Dmitriy Medvedev
and Barack Obama will see each other on November 14-15 at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Organization Summit in Singapore, and the topic of strategic offensive weapons will be the primary topic
at that meeting. According to Kommersant's information, the presidents will be briefed both about the
work that has been completed and also about the remaining problems, on which they will personally have
to make a fundamental decision.
Judging by everything, there is the hope that Misters Obama and Medvedev will reach an agreement
since in any case Russian and American diplomats have been involved with the selection of a treaty
signing location. They explained to Kommersant that the ceremony will most likely take place on the
territory of a third country and Geneva is being cited as one of the variants.
How They Monitor the "Topols" Right Now
The Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction and Limitation Treaty (START I), dated July 31, 1991, that is in
force has a number of fundamental restrictions, which affect mobile intercontinental ballistic missile
launchers.
First of all, more than 1,100 warheads cannot be installed on these launchers. Second, the deployed
ground mobile launchers can be based only in limited areas of no more than five square kilometers - and
no more than 10 launchers in each area. Third, the mobile launchers' deployment area must not exceed
125,000 square kilometers, and no more than one mobile missile base can be located in that area. The
launchers can leave the deployment area "only during redeployments or operational dispersals" and, in
the process, all of the launchers and missiles cannot participate in the redeployment at the same time.
Finally, each of the sides is obliged, based upon a request from the other side, to transfer to it
information about the movements and dispersals of the mobile launchers. The sides use their national
technical means to support monitoring. To "assist monitoring", each missile for the mobile launchers gets
its own unique identifier. Such a measure has also been stipulated as the "display of the mobile
launchers under the open sky" - indeed, each side can request that action no more than seven times per
year.
Russia's Mobile Monopoly
The USSR was already seeking to obtain mobile ballistic missiles in the 1960s. American
intercontinental missiles had high accuracy and were able to destroy with a very high probability Soviet
launch silos, the coordinates of which became known sooner or later. Mobile missiles, the patrol areas of
which were able to constitute thousands of square kilometers, are extremely difficult to locate (based
upon the available information, even right now American satellite track their basing areas in Russia no
more than one hour per day). That dramatically increased the strategic nuclear weapons' survivability.
However, Soviet high technology did not permit them to do that in the 1960s.
The "Temp-2S", which was developed at NII-1 [Scientific Research Institute-1] (subsequently, Moscow
Thermotechnical Institute), became the first mobile intercontinental missile complex in the USSR and in
the world. In the 1970s, Moscow Thermotechnical Institute developed the RSD-10 "Pioner" medium
range complex, which became known throughout the world as the SS-20, based upon the "Temp"
missile's two upper stages. It could be fired to a range of 5,000 kilometers. By 1987, the USSR had
manufactured 650 "Pioner" missiles, of them 2/3 were designated to destroy targets in Europe and in the
Middle East - and 1/3 to destroy targets in Asia and the United States. They destroyed the "Pioner"
missiles in accordance with the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles that was signed by the USSR and the United States in December 1987.
By that time, the production of the RT-2PM "Topol" mobile intercontinental complexes had been
launched in the USSR. Its missile with a launch weight of 45 tonnes was able to deliver a one-tonne
reentry vehicle [to a range of] 10,000 kilometers. In the 1990s, Moscow Thermotechnical Institute
developed a modernization of the "Topol" - the "Topol-M" missile, which already exists in both the mobile
and also the silo variants. It also carries one warhead. At the present time, Russia's RVSN [Strategic
Missile Troops] has 174 mobile "Topol" and 15 "Topol-M" missiles.
The United States was also concerned about the mobility of its missiles in the 1960s. In the 1970s, the
LGM-118A Peacekeeper (MX) mobile missile was developed in America. They were supposed to deploy
in a random manner 200 of these missiles between 4,600 possible launch points so that the enemy would
not know where the missiles were located at each specific moment. They abandoned this scheme due to
its high cost, having decided to deploy the MX in conventional silos. The United States undertook a
second attempt to develop a mobile intercontinental missile in the 1980s. The complex received the
designation XMGM-134A Midgetman and it was assumed that the small (a launch weight of 16.8 tonnes)
missiles, which would be launched from trailer trucks, would have an 11,000-kilometer range. They also
terminated the project soon after the signing of the START I Treaty in 1991.