Case digest:

Hidalgo enterprises vs balandan

FACTS:
Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the
sum of P2,000 for the death of their son, Mario.

Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their
premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory was
fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made because the
gates were always open and there was no guard assigned in
the said gate. Also the tanks didnt have any barricade or
fence. One day when Mario was playing with his friend, they
saw the tank inside the factory and began playing and
swimming inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom
of the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a cadaver,
having died of asphyxia secondary to drowning. The lower
decided in the favor of the parents saying that the petitioner
is liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive
nuisance.

ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable
in this case?

RULING: NO.
The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that One who
maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or
appliances of a character likely to attract children in play,
and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children
from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a
child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child
is technically a trespasser in the premises. American
Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance
doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water,
artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual
condition or artificial feature other than the mere water
and its location. In the case bar, the tanks themselves
cannot fall under such doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be
held liable for Marios death

Homeowners association of el dipositor vs lood
Facts:
Petitioners filed on April 15, 1970 this action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
to set aside respondent court's questioned orders dated February 9, 1970 and March 30, 1970
denying petitioners' motions for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the demolition and
removal of their houses and structures on a parcel of public land in barrios Corazon de Jesus and
Halo Halo in San Juan, Rizal, (more popularly known as "El Deposito" from the Spanish times),
pending final outcome of Civil Case No. 11078 filed by them before respondent court.
Petitioners' action below was one for declaratory relief to declare as null and void as ex post facto
legislation, municipal ordinance No. 89, as amended, of respondent Municipality of San Juan,
prohibiting squatting on public property and providing a penalty therefor, under which ordinance,
petitioners claimed, respondents were summarily demolishing and removing their houses and
improvements.
On April 20, 1970, upon issuance of summons requiring respondents to answer the petition, the
Court issued a temporary restraining order restraining respondents, until further orders, "from
proceeding with the summary destruction, removal and demolition of all other houses found in the
premises of the land in barrio Corazon de Jesus and barrio Halo Halo, San Juan, Rizal, by reason of
Ordinance No. 89-Amd. as amended, passed by the Municipal Council of San Juan, Rizal, on April
26, 1968 ... ."
Respondents filed their answe
r in due course and the case was thereafter submitted for decision with the filing by the parties of
their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
Issue:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion.
Held:
As was well stated in then Judge Reyes' order of September 19, 1968, petitioners failed after several
hearings "to show that they have even a color of title to entitle them to exercise the right of
possession to the premises in question. On the other hand, the land is admittedly public land and
consequently the petitioners have no right to possession
The question of validity or unconstitutionality of municipal ordinance No. 89-Amended need not be
resolved in this proceeding, as it should first properly be submitted for resolution of the lower court in
the action below. Suffice it to note that the Solicitor General appears to have correctly stated the
actual situation in that petitioners do not dispute the authority of the San Juan council to pass
ordinances providing for the summary abatement of public nuisances, and that the ordinance in
question may not be faulted for being ex post facto in application since it "does not seek to punish an
action done which was innocent before the passage of the same. Rather, it punishes the present
and continuing act of unlawful occupancy of public property or properties intended for public use.




Jarco marketing vs CA
Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo
Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and
supervisor, respectively. Private respondents Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are spouses
and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.
On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the department store. Criselda was signing
her credit card slip when she heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and beheld her
daughter pinned beneath the gift-wrapping counter structure. She was crying and shouting
for help. He was brought to Makati Medical Center, where she died after 14 days. She was 6
years old.
Private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitalization,
medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred. Petitioners refused
to pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages wherein they
sought the payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages,
P20,000 for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary
damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the proximate cause of the fall
of the counter was Zhieneths act of clinging to it. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a
structurally dangerous counter. The counter was defective, unstable and dangerous. It also
ruled that the child was absolutely incapable of negligence or tort. Petitioners now seek for
the reversal of this decision.
Issues:
(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence
(2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private
respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing
to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises
Held:
(1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to
the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening
without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an
event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it
happens." On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of
another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." The test in determining the
existence of negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. We rule that the tragedy which befell
ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to
negligence.
(2) It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements
made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. All that is
required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered
under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and
concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the
circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age
and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore
accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act
that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or omission
to secure or make stable the counter's base.
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed
of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to
remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the
situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good
father of a family. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive
presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of
contributory negligence. Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and
assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept
petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail
six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the
counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on
record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted "L," the
counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer
waiting area and its base was not secured. CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any
contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the
latter's hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she
signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for
CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the
counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just
four meters away from CRISELDA. The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH
was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She
even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything;
the counter just fell on her.

Lunod vs Menesses
Facts:
Plaintiffs own farmlands situated near a lake. Meneses owns a fishpondand piece of land
between the lake and a river. The plaintiffs claim theexistence, in favor of their rice fields,
of a statutory easement permittingthe flow of water over Men
eses land. This allowed water collected upontheir land and the lake to flow through Meneses land and into
the river.Plaintiffs lands were flooded and their plantations destroyed.

Issue: whether or not menses is liable or not
Held:
Meneses cannot block the flow of water. Art. 552 (A637, NCC): Lowerestates must receive
the waters which naturally and without intervention of man descend from the higher
estates, as well as thestone or earth which they carry with them. Neither may the owner of
thelower estate construct works preventing this easement, nor one of thehigher estates
works increasing this burden. In addition, under the landof waters, Meneses had no right to
construct the works which blocks thepassage through his land and the outlet to the river.
Having done so, tothe detriment of the easement charged on his estate, he violated the law

Masallo vs cesar
Facts:
Plaintiff in this action, averring that he is the owner of the tract of land in question, brought
an action of desahucio [eviction] in the court of the justice of the peace of the municipality
of Lezo against the defendant, for the purpose of recovering possession thereof. From the
decision of the justice of the peace an appeal was taken to the Court of First Instance of
Capiz, and the case there tried de novo.
It is averred in the complaint that on or about the 12th day of June, 1915, the defendant by
force and intimidation deprived plaintiff of the possession of the land in suit, and has since
that time withheld it from him to his damage in the sum of P25. The defendant answered,
denying the averments of the complaint regarding the alleged eviction, and asserted, by
way of defense, that the land in question is her property and has been in her possession
without interruption for more than twenty years. The trial court gave judgment in favor of
the plaintiff in accordance with the prayer of his complaint.
From the evidence taken at the trial it appears that the defendant had been in possession of
the land in question for a long period prior to the occurrence of the incidents out of which
this litigation arose.
On March 8, 1915, while the defendant was in possession of the land in question, one Matea
Crispino executed a deed to the plaintiff herein, whereby she undertook to sell and transfer
to him the land in question. It was admitted by Matea Crispino in her testimony at the trial
that she has not been in possession of the land which is the subject-matter of her deed to
plaintiff, since the cessation of the Spanish sovereignty in these Islands. (Stenographic
notes, p. 10.) She stated, however, that he land in question had been mortgaged by her to
one Eugenia Perez, who testified on behalf of plaintiff that she, Perez, had been in
possession of the land from 1889 until 1914.
Issued: who is the lawful owner of the property

Held:
In this case the defendant Maria Cesar is shown to have had the prior peaceful possession
of the disputed parcel of ground for an indefinite period of time in the part. Therefore,
when the plaintiff, after acquiring a deed to the land from a third person, entered upon the
premises with his laborers and began plowing the land, it was he who was guilty of the
wrongful seizure of the property; and the defendant undoubtedly then had a perfect right
to maintain an action of unlawful detainer against the plaintiff to regain possession. Instead
of instituting such an action, as the defendant was well entitled to do, she warned the
plaintiff off, or as he would have us believe, ejected him by force, intimidation, and violence.
Availing himself of the situation thus created, the plaintiff now seeks to turn the tables, so
to speak, upon the original possessor, and founding his right upon the transitory
possession which he had wrongfully acquired, he would not employ against the defendant
the same remedy which might properly have been used against himself if he had not
vacated the premises.
The mere suggestion of such a possibility carries its own refutation on its face. The law
discourages continued wrangling over the possession of property, as being fraught with
danger to the peace of society; and the purpose of the action of forcible entry and detainer
is to make the right of possession secure. This purpose would be totally frustrated, if a
petty warfare could be conducted by two rival claimants who might alternate with each
other in possession, one putting the other out to-day, only to be in turn himself forcibly
ejected tomorrow. The only way to prevent this is to hold, in conformity with the evident
intent of the statute, that the remedy of forcible entry and detainer was intended to be used
against the usurper and not against the person wronged. The rule thus to be applied may
be simply summed up by saying that the plaintiff in an action of forcible entry and detainer
cannot succeed where it appears that, as between himself and the defendant, the latter had
a possession antedating his own; and to ascertain this it is proper to look to the situation as
it existed before the first act of spoliation occurred.
It is stated in the decision that "the plaintiff had acquired possession of the parcel of land in
dispute on or about the 8th of March, 1915, by purchase from Matea Crispino, who sold it
to him by the deed Exhibit A."

Monteblanco vs hinigaran sugar plantation
Facts:
On September 18, 1924, case No. 299 of the justice of the peace court of Hinigaran was
instituted in said court. The Philippine National Bank intervened therein, filing its pleading
in intervention to that effect on October 18, 1924, and the plaintiff amended his complaint
on the same date praying that the defendant the Hinigaran Sugar Plantation Inc. be ordered
to return to him the land described therein, having alleged in his former complaint that said
defendant and its codefendants Nicetas Siguenza and Agustin Corua have been detaining
it since the month of August, 1924; that in the meantime a preliminary injunction be issued
against them and their agents or representatives to prevent them from continuing to
perform acts in violation of his right of possession, and that they indemnify him in the sum
of P500, with costs of the suit.
On December 11, 1924, the justice of the peace court of Hinigaran, considering that the trial
of the case devolved upon the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, forwarded it to
the latter court, issuing its order to that effect on said date. The Court of First Instance
remanded the case to the justice of the peace court with instructions to the effect that if it
was of the opinion that the case did not come within its jurisdiction it should issue an order
that effect and later inform the parties thereof so that they might bring the action they
deemed proper. The justice of the peace court, acting in pursuance of said instructions,
rendered its decision on January 6, 1925, dismissing the case and ordering the dissolution
of the writs of preliminary injunction issued by it, notifying the parties that they could
bring the action or actions they deemed proper in the competent court. The plaintiff
appealed from this decision to the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros which, after
due hearing, again ordered the case remanded to the justice of the peace court of Hinigaran
in its order of April 6, 1925, directing said court to try it and pass upon the questions raised
therein on the ground that it merely involved forcible entry and detainer which is of the
nature of those coming under its exclusive jurisdiction. This was done without the least
objection on the part of the defendants or the intervenors, much less the plaintiff.
The justice of the peace court of Hinigaran received the case so remanded to it on June 15,
1925, and on the same date notified the interested parties of the fact that the case had
again been remanded to it. Thereafter, it took no other action thereon until
November 20, 1933, when, after Nicetas Siguenza had filed her motion to be permitted to
intervene therein, it ordered that the hearing be held on December 20, 1933, at 10 o'clock
in the morning. Six days after the date of the hearing which was attended by the interested
parties, the justice of the peace court rendered its judgment which was declared null and
void by the lower court on the grounds already stated, that is, that said justice of the peace
court had no jurisdiction to render it. The lower court, in annulling said judgment, based its
opinion upon the provisions of section 64 of Act No. 190,
Held:
The purpose of the law in fixing at one year the period within which actions for forcible
entry and detainer may be brought, is undoubtedly to require cases of said nature to be
tried as soon as possible and decided promptly, this being likewise inferable from the
provisions thereof to the effect that appeals in said cases must be perfected within the
peremptory period of ten days; that in case of an appeal by the defendant, the judgment
shall be executed unless he files a bond with sufficient sureties to answer for the payment
of rents, damages and costs; and that in any case must pay to the plaintiff or into the Court
of First Instance, at the option of the defendant, the amount of the rent due or determined
by the judge in his judgment, said payments to be made on the tenth of each calendar
month (sec. 88, Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 4115). Furthermore, the law itself (sec.
83, Act No. 190) provides that in cases of forcible entry and detainer, no continuance of
hearings shall be granted for more than one week unless the defendant files a bond in favor
of the plaintiff, which shows that the purpose of the law in these cases is to avoid any delay
in the proceedings in the justice of the peace courts.
The parties and the justice of the peace court allowed not only the said eleven months and
some days but nearly about eight years to elapse without making any effort or taking any
action to terminate the case. With this inaction or rather neglect on their part, they made it
understood that they abandoned the case, particularly the plaintiff, being no longer
interested in the result thereof. There was necessity for the justice of the peace court to
revive it by ordering the hearing thereof, after having forgotten and abandoned it for eight
years, five months, and five days, in order to be able to render judgment in question.
For purposes of the law, the case had died in the justice of the peace court one year after it
had been remanded thereto by the Court of First Instance, with no step having been taken
towards its termination in one way or another. To revive it, it was necessary to the new
pleadings, and even admitting the fiction that prior to the trial had eight years later, the
parties again presented the pleadings already presented by them, the result would be the
same because, as the year during which the justice of the peace court could act with
jurisdiction had already elapsed, said court already lost its jurisdiction and could not again
have it whether by its own will or by the will of the parties.

Supia vs Quintero
Facts:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul the proceedings had in civil case No. 3206 of
the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, entitled Juan L. Ayala, plaintiff, vs. Fermin Supia and
Gavina Batioco, defendants. The facts are not in dispute. The only question presented is one of
law, and may be stated in a general way as follows: In an action of forcible entry and detainer,
will the mere filing of an answer, claiming title to the premises involved, divest a justice of the
peace of jurisdiction?
Issue:

Held:
Our statute clearly contemplates that the mere fact that the question of title is raised in the
answer, should not oust a justice of the peace of jurisdiction; and so it provides that "he may
receive evidence upon the question of title therein solely for the purpose of determining the
character and extent of possession and damages for detention.
, the general purpose of the statutes creating the action is "that, regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable and quiet possession shall not be
turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. One who is guilty of a forcible entry, therefore, or
of a forcible detainer after a peaceable but unlawful entry, is not only subject to indictment, but
is required to restore possession to the party from whom it was so taken or detained, and in a
proper case is often required to pay him treble damages, notwithstanding the fact that the
entrant may have had the superior title or the better right to present possession. In affording
this remedy of restitution the object of the statutes is to prevent breaches of the peace and
criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable
hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who,
believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession
rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims. This is the
philosophy at the foundation of all these actions of forcible entry and detainer which are
designed to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain
what he claims is his

CIVIL CODE provides:
Anyone deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth, and any landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or determination
of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, and the legal
representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person, shall at any
time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession be entitled,
as against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or against
any person or persons claiming under them, to restitution of the land, building, and premises
possession of which is unlawfully withheld, together with damages and costs: Provided,
however, That no landlord shall commence any action against a tenant for restitution of
possession of any land or building for failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of his
lease, unless the tenant shall have failed, for a period of three day, to pay the rent due or
comply with the conditions of his lease after demand therefor. The demand for payment or for
the performance of any condition of the lease may be made upon the tenant personally, or by
serving written notice of such demand upon any person who may be found upon the premises,
or by posting such notice on the premises, if neither the tenant nor any other person can be
found thereon at the time the landlord or his agent may have gone there for the purpose of
making such demand.