Nagarjuna Twelve Gate Treatise Hsueh Li Cheng Ed

Twelve Gate Treatise
by Nagarjuna
Translated, with Introductory Essays, Comments, and Notes
by Hsueh-li Cheng
Dept. of hilosophy and !eligious "tudies,
#ni$ersity of Hawaii at Hilo
[Text Layout by Jampa Namgyal Milan, Italy, April 2009]
Nagarjuna T!el"e #ate Treati$e %&$ue'li('eng e)*+
%&' (C)NTENT"* '%&
%&' (C)NTENT"* '%&
%&' (Introduction* '%&
%+' (,adhyami-a* '%+
%+' (.itanda* '%+
%+' (rasanga* '%+
%+' (Two %e$els of Truth* '%+
%+' (Notes* '%+
%&' (reface* '%&
%+' (&. Nagar/una and the spread of his teachings* '%+
%+' (0. "an-lun approaches to emptiness* '%+
%+' (+. The nature and $alue of the te1t* '%+
%+' (Notes* '%+
%2' (reface* '%2
%2' (&. Nagar/una and the spread of his teachings* '%2
%2' (0. "an-lun approaches to emptiness* '%2
%2' (+. The nature and $alue of the te1t* '%2
%&' (N343!5#N36" T7E%.E 43TE T!E3TI"E* '%&
%0' (Table of contents ("eng-/ui** '%0
%0' (reface ("eng-/ui** '%0
%0' (I. Causal Conditions* '%0
%0' (II. 7ith or 7ithout Effect* '%0
%0' (III. Conditions* '%0
%0' (I.. Characteristics* '%0
%0' (.. 7ith or 7ithout Characteristics &* '%0
%0' (.I. Identity or Difference* '%0
%0' (.II. 8eing or Non-8eing* '%0
%0' (.III. Nature* '%0
%0' (I9. Cause and Effect* '%0
%0' (9. The creator* '%0
%0' (9I. The three times* '%0
%0' (9II. roduction* '%0
%&' (Notes* '%&
%+' (Table of contents ("eng-/ui** '%+
%+' (reface ("heng-5ui** '%+
%+' (Chapter &' Causal conditions* '%+
%+' (Chapter 0' 7ith or without effect* '%+
%+' (Chapter +' Conditions* '%+
%+' (Chapter 2' Characteristics* '%+
%+' (Chapter :' 7ith or without characteristics* '%+
%+' (Chapter ;' Identity or difference* '%+
%+' (Chapter <' 8eing or non-being* '%+
%+' (Chapter =' Nature* '%+
%+' (Chapter >' Cause and effect* '%+
%+' (Chapter &?' The creator* '%+
%+' (Chapter &&' The three times* '%+
%+' (Chapter &0' roduction* '%+
%&' (4lossary* '%&
%&' (The 0; .erses @ added section* '%&
2 , -0.
%2' (I.. Characteristics 2* '%2
%2' (.. 7ith or 7ithout Characteristics* '%2
%2' (9. The Creator* '%2
%2' (9I. The Three Times* '%2
.
(i.e. Note' Chinese characters and words are not reproduced in this file.
I ha$e added some Auotes from another translation of the Bari-as by Crederi- "treng.*
.
%&' (Introduction* '%&
%+' (,adhyami-a* '%+
.
The hallmar- of ,adhyami-a philosophy is DEmptinessD, sunyata. This is not a $iew of reality. In
fact it is emphatically denied that sunyata is a $iew of reality. If anybody falls into such an error as
to construe emptiness as reality Eor as a $iew, e$en the right $iew, of realityF, he is only grasping the
sna-e at the wrong end E,-, 02.&&FG
.
H (3nother translation' ,- 02'&&.
H Emptiness, ha$ing been dimly percei$ed, utterly destroys the slow-witted.
H It is li-e a sna-e wrongly grasped or (magical* -nowledge incorrectly applied.*
.
Nagar/una in ,-, 02.&=, has referred to at least four ways by which the same truth is con$eyed'
.
I 7hate$er is dependent origination,
I we call it emptiness.
I That is EalsoF dependent conceptualiJationK
I that is, to be sure, the ,iddle 7ay.
.
H (,- 02'&=.
H The Loriginating dependentlyL we call LemptinessLK
H This apprehension, i.e., ta-ing into account (all other things*, is the understanding of the
middle way.
.
H 02'&>.
H "ince there is no dharma whate$er originating independently,
H No dharma whate$er e1ists which is not empty.*
.
The two terms, pratitya samutpada and upadaya pra/napti, which I ha$e translated here as
Ddependent originationD and Ddependent conceptualiJationD need to be e1plained. The
interdependence of e$erything Eand under De$erythingD we may include, following the ,adhyami-a,
all items, ontological concepts, entities, theories, $iews, theses and e$en relati$e truthsF, i.e., the
/ , -0.
essential lac- of independence of the origin Ecf. utpadaF of e$erything pro$es or shows that
e$erything is essentially de$oid of its assumed essence or its independent Down natureD or its Dself-
e1istenceD Ecf. s$abha$aF. 8esides, our cognition of anything lac-s independence in the same way.
)ur conception Ecf. pra/naptiF of something a essentially depends upon something b, and so on for
e$erything ad infinitum. Emptiness is thus shown in both ways, from the ontological point of $iew
and from the epistemic point of $iew. "ometimes, this is e1pressed in the form of an argument' The
truth of e$erything is emptiness because of the dependent origination of e$erything. ECompare the
introductory comments of Nagar/una in .igraha$ya$artani.F The abo$e description, shorn of its
aw-ward technicalities inherited through translation, from the style of the original "ans-rit
formulation, can be re-stated for moderners as follows. The ,adhyami-a argues that what we might
call Dthe absolute conception of realityD should be regarded as entirely empty. 3n absolute
conception of reality M a reality which all representations represent but is itself independent of
them M is what is presupposed by our traditional natural science and also forced upon us by our
$ery conception of Bnowledge. Bnowledge, understood as distinct from error etc., is presumably
-nowledge of a reality that may e1ist independently. It is -nowing what is there anyway, and what
is there anyway is supposed to be unaffected, unmodified, by our -nowing it in any particular way.
3nd -now we must always in some particular way or other.
.
3ssuming that we wish to combat solipsism or some e1treme form of idealism, we may put the
point in another way. 7e seem to ha$e a determinate picture of the world, what it is li-e,
independent of any Bnowledge, i.e., any representation of it in thought, any conceptualiJations,
beliefs, e1periences and assumptions. 8ut that picture is e$er elusi$e to us, for we ha$e only
different, endless representations of it. No matter how deeply we may thin-, we may only ha$e
another representation of it in thought. It seems that each representation, barring gross absurdities
and incoherence, could claim to be D-nowledgeD, and, what is worse, there is no $antage point from
which we ha$e an absolute representation of reality. )ur conception of -nowledge unfolds the
implicit parado1' it pro/ects the conception of an independent reality but also turns it into an e$er
receding picture M a mirage. No representation can pro$ide finally sufficient substance to that
picture. 3n absolute conception of reality is therefore empty M a DtruthD that dawns upon us as it
did, so it is claimed, to the final meditati$e insight of the ,adhyami-as.
.
Emptiness or $acuity seems to be at times horrifying, and, to be sure, at times attracti$e and
alluring. The modern man, particularly the 7estern man, finds this boldness to be rather intriguing
and it e$o-es two $ery different sorts of response or reaction. There are those who find in such
forms of 8uddhism an escape route from e$erything that they need to get away from, dogmas,
superstitions, irrational beliefs, faith and e$en rationalityG Cor emptiness seems to change the $ery
meaning of rationality.
.
%ao TJu begins Tao Te Ching with this $erse' &
.
I The 7ay that we can tal- about or describe is not the 7ay.
.
I am not sure whether the Taoist and the ,adhyami-a meant the same thing, but undoubtedly they
used $ery similar language to say what they wanted to say. This contributed to the creation of the
7estern notion of D)riental mysticismD as the ta-e-off point to the realm of irrationality. Those who
boast of 7estern rationality, therefore, find such 8uddhism positi$ely repulsi$e and maddening. It
is, they claim, the realm of DillogicD, and therefore, of insanity. 8oth of these attitudes towards
,adhyami-a philosophy are wrong and misleading. 8oth of them grab, to repeat Nagar/unaDs own
imagery, emptiness at its wrong end.
0 , -0.
.
I do not need to repeat Nagar/unaDs cynical warning'
.
I Emptiness grabbed at the wrong end is li-e a sna-e grabbed at its tailK it is fatal.
.
H (,- 02'&&.
.
The philosophy of emptiness is not a regress into the primordial chaos of irrationality. It is true
historically that ,adhyami-a supplied the broad philosophical basis for $arious forms of 8uddhist
practices ranging from pure meditation to e1otic 8uddhist Tantra rituals for ecstasy. 8ut this will be
a sub/ect for historians, not philosophers. 7hat should interest the philosophers today is the fact
that ,adhyami-a philosophical te1ts Eand the present te1t is a good specimenF constitute
undoubtedly an important component of our global heritage in philosophy. ,adhyami-a is a
$aluable e1pression of human rationality. This point needs to be stressed in order to counteract the
widespread 7estern misconception to the effect that ,adhyami-a is of a piece with the so-called
irrational )riental mysticism. ,adhyami-a, for me, is philosophy, i.e., an integral part of what we
call today philosophic acti$ity. It is a-in to the position of radical s-epticism only if a radical
sceptic can be said to ha$e a position at all. I do not see how a radical sceptic can consistently hold
to a position that can be formulated and defended. 3nd the ,adhyami-a will say D),D EN DittoF.
.
Nagar/una says in .igraha$ya$artani E$. 0>F'
.
I I ha$e no prati/na EN proposition, positionF to defend.
.
H (.g. 0>.
H If I would ma-e any proposition whate$er, then by that I would ha$e a logical errorK
H 8ut I do not ma-e a propositionK therefore I am not in error.*
.
,adhyami-a is sceptical of all philosophical doctrines, tenets, categories. It could be argued that
,adhyami-a is therefore not philosophy, it is anti-philosophical. I consider this argument to be
fallacious. If DphilosophyD is understood to mean broadly rational discourse on demonstrable
answers to some meaningful Auestions, ,adhyami-a certainly falls into this category. hilosophy is
one of the few disciplines which turns to itself. 3 comparison comes to my mind. It is a comparison
with the discipline called Dnatural theologyD.
.
3nthony Benny has recently written EThe 4?d of the hilosophersF' 0
.
I ... If we ta-e natural theology to be philosophical analysis of the concepts used in thin-ing
and tal-ing about 4?d, then a disproof of 4?dDs e1istence, or a demonstration that the $ery notion of
4?d was incoherent, would itself be a successful piece of natural theologiJing, Ep. 2, )1ford, &><>F.
.
The ,adhyami-a attempt to show that all philosophical Eor e$en common-sensicalF $iews of reality
are basically incoherent would, I assert, be also a successful piece of philosophiJing in the same
manner.
.
%+' (.itanda* '%+
. , -0.
.
3 few words about the nature of the philosophical arguments used by the ,adhyami-as may be in
order here. Their method of argument belonged undoubtedly to the tradition of philosophic debate
E$ada or $i$ada traditionF that e$ol$ed out of the earlier tradition of sophistry and eristic. In a
philosophic debate, the general strategy is to refute Ecf. dusanaF the ri$al positions, and establish and
defend EsthapanaF the philosopherDs own position. 3 sceptic or a ,adhyami-a e1celled in the first
EdusanaF. In fact, the second was thought by some either unnecessary Ee.g., one might formulate
oneDs own position but not thin- it necessary to establish or defend it, cf. the 3d$aita .edanta of
"riharsaF or impossible or both Ee.g., a true sceptic, or e$en a ,adhyami-a, in order to be
consistent, had to say that he was unable to formulate his position for there was no position he held
toF. This type of debate where refutation was the only game that could be played was called $itanda
Ecf. Nydyasutra, &.0.+F. +
.
.itanda was ob$iously used in a pe/orati$e sense as is e$ident from the comments of the Naiyayi-as
li-e .atsyayana. 3 debater who indulged in $itanda was pictured generally as an iconoclast, who
had nothing at sta-e, or was a moti$eless, maligning sort of person. 8ut this was both incorrect and
unfair when we thin- of such philosophers as Nagar/una, "ah/aya Ean agnosticF, 5ayarasi Ea scepticF
and "riharsa Ea .edantinF, who restricted their philosophic acti$ity to the Drefutation onlyD -ind of
debate E$itandaF. Elsewhere I ha$e shown that the later Nyaya tradition ac-nowledged this fact and
said that the Drefutation onlyD -ind of debate can also claim philosophical respectability. 2
.
.
%+' (rasanga* '%+
.
The argument-pattern used by the ,adhyami-as as well as other debaters was called prasanga. It
literally means an implication or a conseAuence, but it is used in the technical sense of an argument
that has undesirable and unacceptable implications, or leads to absurd conseAuences. In fact, a
position Eor, a philosophic conceptF is here e1amined in the light of one or se$eral alternati$e Eand
mutually e1clusi$eF interpretations or formulations and it is shown that in each case we end up with
some absurdity or other. Hence the position is refuted, for otherwise the argument will lead to an
absurd situation. In this general sense, therefore, we can call it a reductio.
.
How can one refute all positionsO Is it not itself a position' refutation of all positionsO If we say that
there is no fact of the matter, is it not another fact of the matterO How can we a$oid this ob$ious
parado1O I ha$e discussed elsewhere how a ,adhyami-a can a$oid the parado1 or how a radical
form of scepticism can be made consistent. : 8riefly spea-ing, a debater can go on refuting all
possible, and formulable, positions each at a time and then, when no position is forthcoming, can
stop without ma-ing the ob$ious claim that all positions ha$e been refuted, for the mere statement
of that claim would engender a new position that needs to be refuted again. )b$iously we cannot
ma-e noise crying out D"ilenceGD when all noise-ma-ings ha$e already stopped, for if we did, another
shout of D"ilenceGD would indeed be needed to silence the first shouting. 3nd then another and
another. Nagar/una himself uses this analogy of silence and noise-ma-ing in his .igraha$ya$artani
E$erses +, 2, 0:F to ma-e the same point.
.
H (.g +.
H "hould your opinion be that (your statement* is li-e LDo not ma-e a sound,L this is not
possibleK
H Cor in this case by a (present* sound there will be a (future* pre$ention of that (sound*.
.
1 , -0.
H 2.
H If (your statement* were that' LThis is a denial of a denial,L that is not trueK
H Thus your thesis, as to a defining mar- Ela-sanataF - not mine - is in error.
.
H 0:.
H (!egarding* LDo not ma-e a soundLMthis e1ample introduced by you is not pertinent,
H "ince there is a negation of sound by sound.
H That is not li-e (my denial of self -e1istence*.*
.
The second point that needs to be made in this connection is that refutation here need not, and
should not, be construed as the standard logical negation of a position or proposition. It seems better
to $iew such a refutation as an illocutionary act in the manner suggested by "earle where some
illocutionary force is negated rather than a proposition. ; If this is done, then also the air of
parado1ically in$ol$ed in the ,adhyami-a arguments seems to disappear.
.
To e1plain briefly' when a ,adhyami-a refutes some position in a debate, it should be construed as
what the "ans-rit philosophers call prasa/ya pratisedha, or simply pratisedha. I am now inclined to
describe it as an act of illocutionary negation, where the spea-er or the person who negates,
assumes pro$isionally Ecf. prasa/yaF something to be the case and then DnegatesD it or re/ects it. This
negating act need not commit him to anything else e1cept the re/ection of what was assumed to be
the case. 3 distinction between re/ection and denial may be understood as follows' denial of
something to be the case amounts to assertion of something not being the case, i.e., assertion of the
falsity of that case. 8ut re/ection is non-asserti$e in withholding assent to something being the case,
and this will then lea$e it open for us to withhold assent to the same thing not being the case. 7e
may consider "earleDs e1ample in this light. LI do not promise to comeL does not ob$iously
constitute another Dnegati$eD promise, and hence it is possible to say that I do not promise to come
nor do I promise not to come. EIn fact, I should say that I do not promise anything /ust as the
,adhyami-a says, LI do not assert anything.LF
.
%+' (Two %e$els of Truth* '%+
.
3 ,adhyami-a, strictly spea-ing, is not a radical sceptic, but a 8uddhist. 8eing a 8uddhist, he must
ma-e a s-ilful use of the doctrine of the two le$els of truth' the con$entional or DconcealingD truth
and the ultimate truth. Cor Nagar/una himself has warned'
.
I Those who do not understand the distinction between these two truths, do not understand the
deep significance of the 8uddhaDs teaching. E,-. 02.>F
.
H (,- 02'=.
H The teaching by the 8uddhas of the dharma has recourse to two truths'
H The world-ensconced truth ET&F and the truth which is the highest sense ET0F.
.
H >.
H Those who do not -now the distribution E$ibhagamF of the two -inds of truth
H Do not -now the profound LpointL Etatt$aF ET+F in the teaching of the 8uddha.
.
H &?.
H The highest sense (of the truth* ET0F is not taught apart from practical beha$ior ET&F,
2 , -0.
H 3nd without ha$ing understood the highest sense ET0F one cannot understand nir$ana ET+F.*
.
In a way, it can be said that the doctrine of the two le$els of truth is implicit in almost e$ery
metaphysical inAuiry. 3 philosopher loo-s for the reality behind appearance, a doctrine of
phenomena is circumscribed by a postulate of noumena, a reductionist tries to reach the basic
elements out of which the gross world has been constructed, an analysis of physics ma-es room for
the entrance of metaphysics. 8ut the ,adhyami-a use of this doctrine of the two le$els of truth is
$ery different. The ,adhyami-a does not as- us to penetrate through the seeming reality, the
appearance, to reach the roc--bottom reality in the usual sense. Cor there is no roc--bottom reality
to begin with Eor to arri$e at, as the case may beF e1cept what our inherent tendency to misconcei$e
and to misconstrue Ecf., a$idyaF creates for us for the time being. !eality is emptiness, $oid,
$acuityK or, to put the matter differently, the seeming reality or the appearance is all that there is and
it is e1actly as it is supposed to be, i.e., de$oid of any Down natureD, of any essence, any $alue M it is
empty. The DconcealingD reality does not, in fact, conceal anything, or what amounts to the same
thing, it conceals E,TINE"". Therefore, according to the ,adhyami-a, the philosophersD search
for the ultimate reality must end up in a Auagmire of confusion, unless it leads him to Emptiness. To
say that emptiness is the ultimate reality is again li-e the attempt to shout D"ilenceD when all noises
ha$e already died down and hence it will only destroy silence. If the philosophers are loo-ing for an
ultimate reality, besides what is called the 3ppearance, a reality which is better and more secure
than the 3ppearance, then the truth is that there isnDt any such thing. The 3ppearance is the reality
when it is properly understood.
.
The samsara is the nir$ana, says Nagar/una E,-. 0:.&>F. <
.
H (,- 0:'&>.
H There is nothing whate$er which differentiates the e1istence-in-flu1 EsamsaraF from nir$anaK
H 3nd there is nothing whate$er which differentiates nir$ana from e1istence-in-flu1.*
.
This realiJation of the $acuity, if the 8uddha was right, is not, and should not be, horrifying, for it is
the $ery essence of peace, it is bliss, it is santa and si$a. It is the cessation of all our discursi$e
thoughts, all misguided dri$es and misconcei$ed propensities and their attendant frustrations. It is
prapancopasama, = Da complete reco$ery from the malady of manifoldnessD.
.
H (,- &=.>.
H LNot caused by something else,L Lpeaceful,L Lnot elaborated by discursi$e thought,L
H LIndeterminate,L LundifferentiatedL' such are the characteristics of true reality Etatt$aF.*
.
rofessor Hsueh-li Cheng has prepared this annotated translation of the Chinese $ersion of the
D$adasa-d$ara which will unearth further materials of the ,adhyami-a philosophy for modern
scholars. This will certainly stimulate further research in the history of Indian philosophy. ,ore
importantly, this, we hope, will also show the rele$ance of the study of the ,adhyami-a te1ts in the
present-day conte1t. )ne of the e1press aims of our series has been to pro$ide annotated
translations of important philosophical te1ts of classical India. 7e ha$e already presented two such
$olumes M one on "riharsa and the other on #dayana Esee .olumes & and 2F. The present te1t is
attributed to Nagar/una. I am sure the scholarly world in general, and 8uddhologists in particular,
will welcome this $olume.
.
8I,3% B!I"HN3 ,3TI%3%
3ll "ouls College, )1ford
3 , -0.
.
%+' (Notes* '%+
.
& 7ing-tsit Chan, The 7ay of %ao TJu, New Por-, &>;+.
0 3nthony Benny, The 4?d of the hilosophers, )1ford, &><>, p. 2.
+ Nyayasutra &.0.+. sa pratipa-sa-sthapana-hino $itanda. Here LsaL can refer to, according to
"anatani, either to L/alpahL in &.0.0 or L$adahL in &.0.&.
2 8. B. ,atilal, Nyaya-.aisesi-a, )tto HarrassowitJ, 7iesbaden, &><<, p. >0.
: 8. B. ,atilal, The %ogical Illumination of Indian ,ysticism, )1ford, &><<, - &?-&2, and Notes
&0 and &+.
; 5. "earle, "peech-3cts' 3n Essay in the hilosophy of %anguage, Cambridge, &>;>, pp. +0-++.
,y point is further discussed in 8. B. ,atilal' %ogical and Ethical Issues in !eligious 8elief,
Calcutta #ni$ersity, &><=, "tephanos %ectures EforthcomingF.
< ,r. Cheng, howe$er, does not agree with this comment of mine.
= Nagar/una, ,adhyama-a--ari-a E,-.F, Ch. &=, $erse >.
9 , -0.
%&' (reface* '%&
.
"ince the beginning of the twentieth century there has been a growing interest in 8uddhism in the
7est. ,any )ccidental scholars, philosophers and psychologists are engaging in the study of
8uddhist thought, and young people are reading 8uddhist literature and practicing meditation. The
ma/or purpose of this boo- is to facilitate understanding of 8uddhism, especially of Nagar/unaDs
thought, by presenting his Twel$e 4ate Treatise in English translation.
.
Nagar/una li$ed in the second century 3.D. and founded ,adhyami-a 8uddhism. He is considered
one of the greatest thin-ers of India and his philosophy is thought of as Lthe central philosophy of
8uddhismL &. "cholars ha$e done e1tensi$e studies and systematic presentations of Nagar/unaDs
writings since early in the century. Howe$er, certain aspects of his teachings ha$e not been
adeAuately treated. This is partly due to the fact that some important te1ts of ,adhyami-a
8uddhism are still un-nown to scholarsK one of these is the Twel$e 4ate Treatise. Cor instance, T.
!. .. ,urti, a well--nown contemporary ,adhyami-a scholar, wrote, LNowhere does the
,adhyami-a concern itself directly with issues li-e 4?d, soul, matter, creation, etc.L 0
.
8ut actually, the ,adhyami-a does discuss those issues in the Twel$e 4ate Treatise. Nagar/una
does not e1plicitly claim that he is a ,ahayana 8uddhist in the ,iddle Treatise or the
,ulamadhyami-a-ari-a, which does not mention the term. This has led some scholars to wonder
whether Nagar/una is really a ,ahayanist. 3. B. 7arder once stated,
.
I ,odern students ha$e sometimes supposed that he ENagar/unaF is criticiJing early 8uddhism,
or the early schools, in order to set up ,ahayana instead. Is there any truth in this suppositionO
I 7e ha$e already pointed out that there is nothing o$ertly ,ahayanist . . . +
.
It seems to me that the problem of whether Nagar/una was a ,ahayana 8uddhist would be resol$ed
if one had /ust read only the first few paragraphs of the Twel$e 4ate Treatise, where Nagar/una
clearly stated that the treatise was gi$en to e1pound the essential teachings of ,ahayana.
.
In China, Borea and 5apan, Nagar/unaDs school of thought is -nown as the "an-lun Tsung Ethe Three
Treatise "choolF for it is based upon three main te1tsK namely, the ,iddle Treatise, the Twel$e 4ate
Treatise and the Hundred Treatise.
.
3ccording to Chinese "an-lun masters, one should study these three te1ts together in order to gain a
broad philosophical understanding of 8uddhist thought. These wor-s comprise the canonical
literature of many other 8uddhist schools. Nagar/una became the re$ered patriarch of $arious
,ahayana sects. #nfortunately, the Twel$e 4ate Treatise, which is a concise summary of
Nagar/unaDs philosophy, e1ists only in Chinese. This boo- introduces the Twel$e 4ate Treatise to
English readers and presents ,adhyami-a teachings from Chinese sources.
.
In the translation I ha$e attempted to be as close as possible to the original te1t. Howe$er, when the
literal Chinese would con$ey little or no meaning in English, I ha$e e1pressed the Chinese freely. In
Chinese grammar the sub/ect or predicate of a sentence is often understood and therefore not
included. "o in some instances I ha$e ta-en the liberty of pro$iding the sub/ect or predicate in the
translation for the sa-e of readability in English. To assist the general reader as well as the specialist
in understanding ideas and technical terms, I ha$e gi$en a brief introduction to each chapter and
included paragraphs of e1planation in the body of Nagar/unaDs argumentsK these are labeled
C),,ENT. 7ords enclosed in brac-ets are additions not contained in the original. E1pressions in
-0 , -0.
parentheses are alternati$e translations, principally by "ans-rit terms or romaniJed Chinese
characters.
.
3 list of Chinese terms has been pro$ided for those who want to refer to the Chinese originals of
certain -ey terms in the te1t. The glossary will ser$e as a brief 8uddhist dictionary of important
"ans-rit, ali, Chinese, 5apanese and English words used in the boo-. Throughout the wor-, the
abbre$iation LTL is gi$en to indicate the Taisho "hinshu DaiJo-yo. 2
.
I wish to gratefully ac-nowledge the assistance of faculties of the Center for 8uddhist "tudies at the
#ni$ersity of 7isconsin ,adison, and #ni$ersity of Hawaii at Hilo. 3 special word of appreciation
is due to the late Dr. !ichard !obinson, Dr. ,. Biyota and Dr. ,artin Huntley for their great help
in my research on 8uddhist religion and philosophy. I also wish to ac-nowledge my indebtedness to
Dr. Timothy 7oo, Dr. Benneth B. Inada, Dr. aul ,cCarthy, 5ohn a1son, ,arc Cohen, 7alter
7estcott, ,rs. 5ac- Hoes and 5udy 4raham who read the manuscript and offered suggestions. The
encouragement of my colleagues, Dr. E$yn 3dams, Dr. Donald 7ells and the late Dr. Hideo 3o-i
has been a powerful stimulus to the completion of this wor-. 3 sincere appreciation is e1tended to
Dr. Da$id C. urcell 5r., Dean of the College of 3rts and "ciences, #ni$ersity of Hawaii at Hilo, for
pro$iding secretarial assistance in typing and copying the manuscript. I am grateful to rof. 8imal
B. ,atilal of )1ford #ni$ersity and rof. 5. ,oussaieff ,asson of #ni$ersity of Toronto, who
re$iewed the manuscript at the final stage and ga$e $aluable comments. "pecial ac-nowledgement
is due the following publishers, for their permission to use certain materials' Cambridge #ni$ersity
ress, Cordham #ni$ersity ress, #ni$ersity of 7isconsin ress, and Dialogue ublishing
Company. I ha$e used some materials from my own articles in the following /ournals' DNagar/una,
Bant and 7ittgenstein' The "an-lun ,adhyami-a E1position of EmptinessD, !eligious "tudies
E,arch, &>=&F, and DTruth and %ogic in "an-lun ,adhyami-a 8uddhismD, International
hilosophical Quarterly E"eptember, &>=&F. Cinally I than- my wife, 3lice Chiong-huei Cheng, for
her acute criticism, enlightened ad$ice and wholehearted support.
.
%+' (&. Nagar/una and the spread of his teachings* '%+
.
It is difficult and e$en impossible to arri$e at a completely accurate, historical account of
Nagar/unaDs life because later 8uddhists ha$e tended to embellish and fictionaliJe him. There are
often different and conflicting accounts of the life and wor- of ,adhyami-aDs founder. "ome
sources confuse 3rya Nagar/una E%ung-shu' c. &&+M0&+F, the founder of ,adhyami-a 8uddhism,
with "iddha Nagar/una who li$ed some four hundred years later. 3nd two birthplaces, .idarba and
Banchi, are gi$en for Nagar/una.
.
3lmost all accounts, howe$er, agree that Nagar/una was born in "outh India, came from the
8rahman caste and recei$ed a 8rahmanical education. 3lso, that he nearly died while still a youth.
3ccording to Tibetan sources, astrologers had predicted that Nagar/una would die prematurely at
the age of se$en. His parents belie$ed the astrologers and sent him away because they could not
bear to witness his death. This source of tradition alleges that he escaped death by entering the
8uddhist order. 3ccording to his translator Bumara/i$a, Nagar/una was o$erpowered with sensuous
desire and passion in his early days. He and three friends entered a royal palace, by ma-ing
themsel$es in$isible, and seduced its women. 8ut royal guards soon disco$ered and slew
Nagar/unaDs three friends. This e1perience stirred him deeply and awa-ened him to the truth that
lust is an origin of suffering and misfortune. He $owed to become a sramana, a 8uddhist mon- or
ascetic, if he could escape ali$e. He did escape, entered the 8uddhist order and studied all the
-- , -0.
8uddhist scriptures then a$ailable to him. He recited and mastered the Hinayana Tripita-a in ninety
days, but was not satisfied and sought further. Nagar/una is said to ha$e obtained the ,ahayana
scriptures from a Naga Edragon, elephant or serpentF and to ha$e been satisfied with the teachings of
the te1ts. He de$oted his life to e1pounding and propagating the ,ahayana message. He spent his
later days at 8hramaragiri E"ripar$ataF in a monastery built for him by a "ala$ahana Bing. &
.
,any wor-s ha$e been credited to Nagar/una, but it is difficult to -now e1actly how many are
authentic. Howe$er, if we accept the ,ulamadhyama-a-ari-a as authentic, we can accept the
authenticity of D$adasa-d$ara-sastra Ethe Twel$e 4ate TreatiseF, .igraha-$ya$artani and Pu-ti-
sasti-a, for the contents of these are similar and e1hibit the essentials of Nagar/unaDs philosophy. 0
,adhyami-a 8uddhism was further de$eloped by 3ryade$a ETDi-pDo' c. &;+-0;&F. He, too, was a
nati$e of "outh India and came from the 8rahman caste. 4enerally spea-ing, Nagar/una used
dialectic to attac- Hinayana 8uddhism. 3ryade$a belie$ed that Nagar/unaDs dialectic could also be
used to refute all other philosophies, and he used it to criticiJe 8rahmanism. He debated publicly
with the 8rahmanists and con$erted themK he also proselytiJed a hostile "outh Indian Bing.
.
3ryade$aDs main teachings are found in Catuhsata-a ECatuh"ati-a or simply "ata-aF, his most
important wor-. 3lthough the "ans-rit original has been lost, the te1t is preser$ed in its entirety in
Tibetan. There are also three different Chinese $ersions' E&F "ata-sastra EHundred TreatiseF, E0F
"ata-sastra-$aipulya E8road Hundred TreatiseF and E+F a commentary by Dharmapala on the "ata-
sastra-$aipulya. The 3-sara-sata-a, falsely attributed to Nagar/una in the Tibetan source, is
probably the wor- of 3ryade$a. Its "ans-rit original is also lost, but it is preser$ed in the Chinese.
In addition, 3ryade$a composed four other wor-s.
.
3fter the fifth century, Indian ,adhyami-a 8uddhism was di$ided into two schools, the rasangi-a
and the "$atantri-a. The founder of the rasangi-a "chool was 8uddhapalita and its most eminent
philosopher was Chandra-irti E;??M;:?F. 3ccording to this school, the real and only method of
Nagar/una and 3ryade$a was prasanga Ereductio ad absurdumF wherein the true ,adhyami-a does
not and should not ta-e any position of his own. His chief and sole tas- is to reduce to contradiction
or inconsistency the systems and arguments of opponents proceeding from principles accepted by
them. Cor the rasangi-a, all mental acti$ity produces illusion, and what we call e1istence is simply
a fabrication of images and does not ha$e reality. The real and true language of 8uddhist emptiness
E"unyataF is silence. Chandra-irti wrote se$eral important and authoritati$e commentaries on
Nagar/una and 3ryade$aDs wor-sK of these the rasannapada is the most $aluable. It is a
commentary on the ,ulamadhyama-a-ari-a and pro$ides the chief "ans-rit source for the study of
Nagar/unaDs philosophy among contemporary scholars.
.
8ha$a$i$e-a was the founder of the "$atantri-a "chool. He held that the 8uddhist doctrine of
emptiness does not assert the non-e1istence of things but only denies the erroneous assertion of
e1istence. Cor this school, empirical things are not real from the standpoint of ultimate truth, but
ha$e empirical reality. "$atantri-a ,adhyami-as criticiJed rasangi-a ,adhyami-as for engaging
in mere negation and refutation without offering a positi$e $iewpoint. They e$en seemed to hold
that it is not necessary to realiJe "unyata in order to enter into nir$ana.
.
In e1pounding their teachings, the "$atantri-as had made certain compromises with earlier Indian
"autranti-a and Pogacara philosophical thought, and subseAuently di$ided into the "autranti-a
"$atantri-a and the Pogacara "$atantri-a. The first school was introduced to China in the se$enth
century and the second school to Tibet in the eighth century. Pogacara "$antantri-a ,adhyami-a
has continued to be the ma/or philosophy in Tibet and ,ongolia to this day.
-2 , -0.
.
Nagar/unaDs ,iddle Treatise and Twel$e 4ate Treatise and 3ryade$aDs Hundred Treatise ha$e been
emphasiJed by Chinese ,adhyami-a 8uddhists, de$oted to the doctrine of emptiness. "o
,adhyami-a 8uddhism is called the "an-lun Tsung EThree Treatise "choolF in China.
.
The spread of the "an-lun "chool in China began with ad$ent of Bumara/i$a E+22M2&+F, the most
important person in the history of "an-lun in China, Borea and 5apan. He arri$ed at ChDang-an about
2?& where he translated and handed down Nagar/unaDs wor-s and other 8uddhist scriptures until his
death in 2&+. It is said that Bumara/i$a had three thousand disciples, but most were not intellectuals
and did not truly understand ,adhyami-a philosophy. E$en Bumara/i$a complained about the poor
Auality of his disciplesK LIf I applied my writing-brush and wrote a ,ahayana 3bhidharma, I would
surpass Batyayaniputra. 8ut now in the land of ChDin EChinaF the profoundly intelligent are rare. ,y
wings are bro-en here, and what would I discourse aboutOL +
.
Ne$ertheless, a few students were well educated and made a great contribution to Bumara/i$aDs
wor-. They helped him translate 8uddhist te1ts and wrote prefaces to the important translations
which are in$aluable sources for understanding ,adhyami-a 8uddhism. Bumara/i$aDs most
brilliant disciple seems to ha$e been "eng-chao E+<2M2&2F, born in the $icinity of ChDang-an.
"engchao grew up in a poor family, but determined to pursue his studies under ad$ersity and
recei$ed a good education. He wrote se$eral essays and treatises to propagate 8uddhism. They
show that he had mastered the ,adhyami-a theory of -nowledge, ontology and philosophy of
language. Bumara/i$a read the writings and wrote, L,y understanding does not differ from yours,
and in phrasing we might borrow from each otherL 2. 7ith "engchao, 8uddhism entered upon a
new stage in China. Cor the first time there was a systematic 8uddhist philosophy presented by a
Chinese. His philosophical essays helped to root the ,ahayana philosophy from India in Chinese
soil.
.
Ne1t to Bumara/i$a, Chi-tsang E:2>M;0+F was the most important "un-lun master in establishing
the "an-lun ,adhyami-a "chool and e1pounding "an-lun doctrine. 3 nati$e of Nan-ing, he heard
about 8uddhist teachings while attending lectures by aramartha E:??M:;>F and /oined the
8uddhist order at the age of se$en. He recei$ed special training for twenty-fi$e years and e$entually
became an outstanding Chinese commentator as well as one of the great systematiJers of Chinese
8uddhist philosophy. He wor-ed in the Chia-hsiang ,onastary and was -nown as the 4reat ,aster
Chia-hsiang. Throughout his career he was highly esteemed and honored by both "ui and TDang
emperors.
.
Chi-tsang wrote commentaries on the ,iddle Treatise, the Twel$e 4ate Treatise, the Hundred
Treatise, other wor-s by Nagar/una and other 8uddhist te1ts. erhaps his most important boo- is
the rofound ,eaning of Three Treatises E"an-lun-hsuan-iF : in which he e1pounded the doctrine
of emptiness as the teaching of pDo-hsieh-hsien-cheng. The so-called pDo-hsieh-hsien-cheng means
that the refutation of erroneous $iews is the illumination of right $iews. Cor Chi-tsang, to see that all
things are empty is to understand that all $iews are erroneous and ought to be re/ected. 3nd to
refute erroneous $iews neither implies nor entails that one has to establish or ta-e any $iew. It
simply means the absence of $iews. The 8uddhaDs teaching of emptiness does not aim to present
any $iew, but to be DemptyD of conceptual speculations. In another important wor-, the ,eaning of
the Twofold Truth, ; Chi-tsang e1amined the nature and function of truth, and pointed out that
Nagar/unaDs idea of the 8uddhist twofold truth does not stand for two fi1ed sets of truth nor refer to
two realities. It is merely a tactical de$ice used to show that no truth is absolutely true, and thereby
to help rid people of dogmatic $iews.
-/ , -0.
.
Chi-tsang presented se$eral reasons for asserting that the ,iddle Treatise, the Twel$e 4ate Treatise
and the Hundred Treatise should be grouped together for study, and due to him the Chinese "an-lun
"chool was firmly established. The "an-lun philosophy he presented was authentic Indian
,adhyami-a thought. Howe$er, the philosophy became too abstract for the Chinese, and
conseAuently the school declined after Chi-tsang died.
.
3lthough the "an-lun "chool has not been a sectarian school in China since the eighth century, it
has been reAuired as an academic discipline and its teachings ha$e been accepted by many
8uddhists throughout East 3sia. Nagar/unaDs philosophy has inspired 8uddhists to create $arious
philosophical and religious mo$ements. Different 8uddhist schools selected certain aspects of
,adhyami-a teachings and regarded them as essential, the original teachings of the 8uddha, and
therefrom de$eloped their own doctrines and religious practices. "ome used Nagar/unaDs thought to
support an ontological commitment so as to establish a new metaphysicsK this is well illustrated in
the formation and de$elopment of TDien-tDai and Hua-yen 8uddhism. )ther 8uddhists employed
Nagar/unaDs teaching to support the $iew that one has to discard not only intellect but also the entire
human effort to obtain sal$ationK this can be seen in ure %and 8uddhism. ,adhyami-a thought has
led some 8uddhists to embrace nihilism and turned others to mysticism.
.
Hui-wen E::?M:<<F, the founder of TDien-tDai 8uddhism, attributed his understanding of 8uddhism
to Nagar/una. He is said to ha$e been awa-ened to the truth by Nagar/unaDs statement, LEmptiness is
called the middle way. Cor it is a pro$isionary name for the fact that all things are causally
dependent upon each other.L < The $erse seems to assert that dependent co-arising Eall things are
causally relatedF is synonymous with emptiness E-DungF and the temporary name Echia-mingF of the
middle way Echung-taoF. !eading this, Hui-wen at once percei$ed the triple truth'., namely, the
truth of emptiness, the truth of temporariness and the truth of mean. Cor Hui-wen, E&F all things or
dharmas are empty because they are produced by causal conditions and hence are de$oid of self-
natureK but E0F they do ha$e temporary e1istenceK and E+F being empty and temporary is the nature
of dharmas and is the mean. These three M emptiness, temporariness and mean - penetrate one
another and are found perfectly harmoniJed and united. 3 thing is $oid but e1ists temporarily. It is
temporary because it is $oid, and the fact that e$erything is $oid and at the same time temporary is
the middle truth. )ne should not consider the three truths as separate but as the perfectly
harmonious threefold truth.
.
3ccording to the TDien-tDai "chool, the three truths are, in reality, three-in-one and one-in-three. The
principle is one, but the way of e1planation is threefold, and each of the three truths has the $alue of
all. If we argue from the standpoint of emptiness, we may deny the e1istence of the temporary and
the middle, for we consider emptiness as transcending all. The three would be empty. The same will
be the case if we argue from the standpoints of temporariness or mean. "o when one is empty, all
will be emptyK when one is temporary, all will be temporaryK when one is middle, all will be middle.
They are otherwise called the identical emptiness, identical temporariness and identical meanK and
also the absolute threefold truth. = 3lthough TDien-tDai doctrine may not be a correct interpretation of
Nagar/unaDs teaching, it de$eloped out of ,adhyami-a thought.
.
Hua-yen 8uddhists de$eloped the somewhat similar one-in-all and all-in-one philosophy. Ca-tsang
E;2+M<&0F, the founder of Hau-yen 8uddhism E-nown as the Begon "chool in 5apanF, was once a
,adhyami-a disciple. He seemed to ha$e been fond of the Twel$e 4ate Treatise and wrote a boo-
on it E"hih-erh-men-lun-tsung-chih-i-chiF. )ne of the most important messages in his boo- is that if
one thing is empty, all will be empty. Ca-tsang seemed to ha$e been inspired to an idea of a world
-0 , -0.
in which all things are interwo$en in perfect harmony by mutual penetration and mutual
identification. 3ccording to Ca-tsang and his followers, true 8uddhism is not merely a criticism of
all $iews, but should aim at establishing a harmonious whole, ha$ing the perfectly enlightened
8uddha as the essence at the center. Hua-yen 8uddhists made an ontological commitment to the
8uddha as infinite, all-per$ading and omnipresent. E$erything in the uni$erse, animate and
inanimate, performs the wor- of the 8uddha, and inspired by his spiritual influence, e$en inanimate
things lead us to the state of enlightenment. >
.
7hile TDien-tDai and Hua-yen 8uddhists were engaged in establishing certain metaphysical systems,
other 8uddhists attended to Nagar/unaDs criticism of metaphysics. The ,adhyami-a teaching of
emptiness as the re/ection of speculati$e theory seemed to suggest that reason, intellect or other
human effort could not be used to -now the mystery of the world or to find true wisdom and obtain
nir$ana. This laid the foundation for the de$elopment of ure %and 8uddhism and the formation of
the anti-intellectual, irrational and uncon$entional teachings and practices in ChDan ERenF
8uddhism, &?
.
ure %and 8uddhists hold that one cannot achie$e the goal of nir$ana by effort, but may attain it by
the grace or help of 3mita 8uddha. 3ccording to these 8uddhists, Nagar/una disco$ered the
8uddhaDs DoriginalD teaching of the 7ay of Caith. Nagar/una is reported to ha$e said, L3lthough
there are innumerable ways in the teachings of the 8uddha, they can be classified roughly' the
Difficult 7ay and the Easy 7ayL &&. The so-called difficult way is to approach 3$ai$arti-a Ea state
of no return to the delusi$e worldF by the practice of the eightfold path or the si1 paramitas Ethe si1
$irtues of perfectionFK the easy way teaches us faith in 3mita 8uddha. TDan-luan E2<;M:02F, a great
ure %and master in China, held that in the Dasabhumi-$ibhasa-sastra Nagar/una recommended to
us, with poor spiritual capacity, the way of faith. TDan-luan claimed to follow Nagar/una when he
distinguished between the teachings of self-power E/iri-i in 5apaneseF and other-power Etari-iF. The
first means Lto be a lamp unto yourselfDK one achie$es personal sal$ation or enlightenment by
oneself. 8ut the second tells us that we are sa$ed by the 8uddhaDs compassion and power, not our
own. 3lthough Nagar/unaDs teachings bore only a remote relation to the later popular ure %and
doctrine, he was gi$en the great honor by "hinran E&&<+M&0;0F, the founder of the "hin sect of
ure %and 8uddhism in 5apan, of being the Cirst atriarch in the transmission of 3mita 8uddhaDs
L4ospel of ure 4raceL &0.
.
The ,adhyami-a teaching that all things are de$oid of nature, characteristic and function led other
8uddhists to ta-e a nihilistic $iew. In fact, the "an-lun "chool and the Cheng-shit "chool, which
holds that nothing e1ists at all, were sometimes treated as the same sect in China and 5apan. The
"atyasiddhi, the main te1t of Cheng-shin nihilism, was studied along with ,adhyami-a wor-s by
many of Bumara/i$aDs disciples and other 8uddhists.&+ Nagar/unaDs criticism of realism ga$e some
stimulus to the acceptance of Cheng-shih 8uddhism among Chinese and 5apanese mon-s. It also
turned 8uddhists to mysticismK ,adhyami-a emptiness seems to suggest that Dharma or the true
state of things has to be -nown not by discursi$e reasoning, but through mystical intuition. ,ystical
8uddhists such as the Chen-yen E-nown as the "hingon in 5apanF attributed their understanding of
the 8uddhaDs teachings to Nagar/una and accepted him as their patriarch, one of the most important
lin-s in the transmission of Dharma since "a-yamuni. Bobo Daishi, the founder of the "hingon
"chool in 5apan, was named after the doctrine of emptiness and called Bu-ai, which means literally
Lthe empty oceanL.
.
In $iew of its importance in 8uddhism, Nagar/unaDs thought can well be rec-oned as the foundation
of ,ahayana religion. )ne cannot adeAuately comprehend 8uddhist teachings and practices without
-. , -0.
at least indirectly -nowing his philosophy.
.
%+' (0. "an-lun approaches to emptiness* '%+
.
The word -Dung Eempty or emptinessF, which is the main theme of Nagar/unaDs Twel$e 4ate
Treatise, seems to ha$e multiple usages and multiple meanings in Chinese "an-lun literature. 3
$ariety of implications are well de$eloped in the Chinese master Chi-tsangDs rofound ,eaning of
Three Treatises E"an-lan-hsuan-iF and his The ,eaning of Twofold Truth EErh-ti-iF. 8oth were a
result of years of study of Nagar/unaDs wor-, including the Twel$e 4ate Treatise.
.
8y itself the term has no definite meaning, but acAuires $arious meanings on different occasions. It
is often used by "an-lun 8uddhists to mean the absence of something. "an-lun 8uddhists may claim
that all things are empty in the sense that things are de$oid of definite nature, characteristic and
function.
.
3s Nagar/una wrote in the Twel$e 4ate Treatise,
.
S (T4T I.'&*
S 3ll things are empty. 7hyO
S Neither created nor non-created things ha$e characteristics.
S "ince they ha$e no characteristics they are empty. &
.
The term empty is also used to discount and discredit things or concepts. eople tend to employ
conceptual schemes to describe the nature of things. To say that all things are empty is to suggest
that concepts or categories through which one constructs e1perience are unintelligible. In arguing,
for e1ample, that the reality of things cannot be e1plained by the interplay of concepts, such as
being and non-being, or e1istence and non-e1istence, Nagar/una claimed,
.
S (T4T .II*
S L3gain, all things are empty. 7hyO
S 8eing and non-being are neither obtainable at the same time nor at different times.L 0
.
Empty or emptiness is sometimes used to de$alue things and to designate wea-ness. Empty things
are worthless and should be discarded. 3s a result, to realiJe emptiness is to eliminate disaster, the
"an-lun master Chi-tsang said.
.
I LThe essence of the sageDs teaching EemptinessF consists in the elimination of disaster.L +
.
)n occasion, to empty oneDs mind is to change oneDs mind. 2 )r emptiness is regarded as a medicine
EyaoF : for Lcuring the disease of all sentient beingsL ;. Emptiness, according to "an-lun masters, is
mainly a soteriological de$ice or pedagogic instrument Echiao-tiF < - a tool used to help people
obtain enlightenment. =
.
The way of emptiness is essentially the way of nir$ana, and in$ol$es mental, physical, intellectual
and spiritual aspects.
.
!eligiously, emptiness connotes mo-sa, a total freedom or liberation from ignorance, e$il and
suffering in this world. >
-1 , -0.
.
sychologically, emptiness is non-attachment. It reAuires that emotional and intellectual
attachments, which are sources of e$il and suffering in life, should be purged. The doctrine of
emptiness ad$ocates that one empty the mind of passions and illusions. &?
.
Ethically, this negation of cra$ings, especially of egoistic desire, will enable one to lo$e all men
eAually. Nir$ana is for all people. && The man of emptiness is the man of -aruna EcompassionF, who
helps all sentient beings obtain nir$ana. &0
.
Epistemologically, emptiness is pra/na, an unattached insight that no truth is absolutely true. The
so-called ultimate truth Echen-ti, paramartha-satyaF and worldly truth Esu-ti, sam$rti-satyaF are
relati$e to each other Ehsiang-tai or hsiang-chiF. &+ "uch wisdom is a positi$e force in the
elimination of e1tremes and ignorance so that one may be enlightened. &2
.
,etaphysically, emptiness means that all things are de$oid of nature, character and function. It
teaches that an ontological entity Eor entitiesF gi$en by metaphysicians is not real in the uni$erse,
but a mental fabrication. ,etaphysical speculation should be discarded as one see-s nir$ana.
.
Cor "an-lun 8uddhists, the doctrine of emptiness suggests a way of life. )rdinary men desire
sensual pleasure and often belie$e it Dis one of the most $aluable things in life. )n the other hand,
religious persons who lo$e spiritual $alues may loo- down upon sensualists and thin- that the
spiritual life has nothing to do with pleasure. Cor the ,adhyami-as, the hedonistic way of life is
one e1treme and the ascetic way of life is another. The doctrine of emptiness is gi$en to LemptyL a
person of these e1tremes and prepare him to li$e Lthe middle wayL. Hence it is regarded as the same
as the doctrine of the middle way Echung-tao--uariF. This teaching of emptiness as the middle way,
according to "an-lun 8uddhists, was the 8uddhaDs original teaching. It was e1pressed in the
8uddhaDs Cirst "ermon &: to fi$e medicants as follows'
.
I To de$ote oneself to ascetic practice with an e1hausted body only ma-es oneDs mind more
confused. It produces not e$en a worldly -nowledge, not to spea- of transcending the senses. It is
li-e trying to light a lamp with waterK there is no chance of dispelling the dar-ness....
.
I To indulge in pleasures also is not rightK this merely increases oneDs foolishness, which
obstructs the light of wisdom ....
.
I I stand abo$e these two e1tremes, though my heart is -ept in the ,iddle. "ufferings in me
ha$e come to an endK ha$ing been freed of errors and defilements, I ha$e now attained peace. &;
.
Cor the ,adhyami-a, the 8uddhaDs teaching aims at re/ecting dualistic thought and feeling.
hilosophers may use polar concepts such as origination or e1tinction, permanence or
impermanence, sameness or difference, and arri$al or departure, to describe the nature of e$ents.
These conceptual $iews are e1treme and should be refuted, Nagar/una wrote.
.
I I salute the 8uddha,
I The foremost of all teachers,
I He has taught
I The doctrine of dependent co-arising,
I (The reality of things is mar-ed by*
I No origination, no e1tinctionK
-2 , -0.
I No permanence, no impermanenceK
I No identity, no differenceK
I No arri$al, no departure. &<
.
H (,- Introductory $erse'
H LI salute him, the fully-enlightened, the best of spea-ers,
H who preached the non-ceasing and the non-arising,
H the non-annihilation and the non-permanence,
H the non-identity and the non-difference,
H the non-appearance and the non-disappearance,
H the dependent arising,
H the appeasement of obsessions and the auspicious.L*
.
Nagar/unaDs idea of emptiness as the middle way of eightfold negation Epa-pu-chung-taoF does not
imply eight negations merely, but the total negation of all e1treme $iews, a process of purifying the
mind. Negation has to be employed until intellectual and emotional attachments are eradicated from
oneDs life. This process is dialectical in character. The denial of the concept is does not entail the
affirmation of the concept is not, because the latter is shown to be as contradictory or absurd as the
former. ,adhyami-a dialectic aims not to establish a thesis, but merely to e1pose the absurdity or
contradiction implied in an opponentDs argument. It is purely analytic in nature until there is no
position left to be pro$ed. Chi-tsang wrote,
.
I In order to ma-e this point clear, "an-lun doctrine teaches that each thesis that may be
proposed concerning the nature of truth must be negated by its antithesis, the whole process
ad$ancing step by step until total negation has been achie$ed. Thus the idea of e1istence,
representing worldly truth, is negated by that of non-e1istence, representing ultimate truth. In turn
the idea of non-e1istence, which now becomes the worldly truth of a new pair, is negated by the
idea of neither e1istence nor non-e1istence, and so forth until e$erything that may be predicated
about truth has been negated. &=
.
This dialectical method is well illustrated in the Chinese "an-lun analysis of the concepts yu
E8eingF and wu ENon-beingF. hilosophers may dispute whether 8eing or Non-being is the reality
of the uni$erse. ,etaphysicians may assign what is real or what is to the realm of 8eing, and what
is unreal or is not to the realm of Non-being. 3nd they may ma-e ontological commitments to Non-
being as well as to 8eing. Nothing or non-being, as the name of something, may be regarded as
more real than 8eing itself. Thus %ao-tJu claimed that Lbeing comes from non-beingL &>. 8ut since
"an-lun 8uddhists contended that all metaphysical $iews are dogmatic, the concepts of being and
non-being are both unintelligible. To say that either 8eing or Non-being is the reality of the
uni$erse, and has priority o$er the other, is an e1treme $iew. 8uddhaDs Dharma, according to "an-
lun masters, is gi$en to LemptyL the concepts of is and is not. Nor does this teaching of the middle
way Echung-taoF, for which ,adhyami-a is named, 0? imply that reality is beyond 8eing and Non-
being, but, again, that metaphysical or conceptual speculations should be eliminated.
.
Ta-ing another approach, "an-lun 8uddhists pointed out that what is real must ha$e its own
essential nature, and cannot be dependent upon other things or come from causal conditions. 8ut to
claim that anything is ultimately real would contradict the fact that all phenomena are bound by the
relations of cause and effect, unity and di$ersity, and duration and destruction. Cor the
,adhyami-as, the percei$ed ob/ect, the percei$ing sub/ect, and -nowledge are mutually
interdependent. 7hate$er we can -now through e1perience is conditioned, so it cannot be
-3 , -0.
ultimately real. 0&
.
3lternati$ely, "an-lun 8uddhists argued that that which is unreal can ne$er come into e1istence. If
it e1ists, it must ha$e certain characteristics through which we -now its e1istence. 8ut that which is
unreal has no characteristics, so it is absurd to say that something is unreal. Therefore 8eing as
something unreal cannot be established. Thus 8eing cannot be defined or described as real or
unreal. Hence it is unintelligible to use 8eing to e1plain the true nature of the uni$erseK this $iew,
too, is untenable and should be ruled out.
.
Cor "an-lun 8uddhists, the denial of 8eing does not, further, entail that Non-being can be used to
e1plain and describe the true nature of the uni$erse. To say that Non-being is real is a contradiction
in terms and hence ma-es no sense. Cor so-called Non-being is without characteristics, while that
which is real has characteristics. "o, to say that Non-being is the reality of the uni$erse is the same
as saying that that which has no characteristics has characteristicsK this is contradictory. "o, the
assertion of the reality of Non-being is unintelligible and should be refuted. 00
.
3ccording to "an-lun masters, Non-being cannot be defined or described as unreal either. Cor that
which is unreal can ne$er come into e1istence and hence cannot be percei$ed. If it can ne$er be
percei$ed, it cannot be described and defined. If it is indescribable or indefinable, how can it be
described or defined as Non-beingO
.
3ccording to Chi-tsang, metaphysical speculation about 8eing and Non-being is at the root of
erroneous or per$erted $iews. 0+ It in$ol$es an attached way of thin-ing. 7hen people ha$e an
ontological commitment to something Ewhether 8eing, Non-being, or other thingsF, they ascribe a
determinate or own nature Es$abha$a, ting-hsing or tJu-hsingF to it. The thing is belie$ed to possess
an essence or Auality of being itself. 02
.
Cor Chi-tsang, this attached way of thin-ing is a -ind of disease EpingF, 0: which leads people to
ob/ectify $arious concepts of the world and multiply realities or ontological entities beyond
necessity. #nfortunately, "an-lun 8uddhists argued, people fail to see this and continue to ma-e
ontological commitments to things and become attached to them. 0; Early scholastic 8uddhist
philosophy, according to Nagar/una and his followers, was a good e1ample of this.
.
Cor the early scholastic 8uddhists, it was erroneous to affirm the reality of absolute 8eing, atman.
8ut it was not erroneous to affirm the reality of momentary beings, dharmas EfaF. The real,
according to them, is not permanent, uni$ersal and unitary, but momentary, particular and multiple.
The world is composed of an unceasing flow of particular momentary entities. Those entities are the
constituents of our e1perience and are the truly real e$ents in the uni$erse. Each dharma e1ists for
only an instant, 0< and yet is self-sufficient and possesses its own mar- or characteristic, which
defines its essential nature as different from all others. Cor e1ample, consciousness is the state of
Lbeing awareD, and ignorance, of Dlac- of cognitionD. Though distinct and separated from one
another, the dharmas are lin-ed together according to the principle of causation. They are not
supported or attached to any substance or self. 0=
.
The ,adhyami-as countered that although it was correct for early scholastic 8uddhists to repudiate
the concept of atman, they suffered from the same disease as Hindu philosophers' both had made an
ontological commitment to something and became attached to it Eor themF. Cor the ,adhyami-as,
the concept of dharmas is as unintelligible as that of atman. They argued that the claim, Ldharmas
e1istL, is a contradictory or absurd statement. To pro$e this, they e1amined the meaning of
-9 , -0.
e1istence, obser$ing that Lto e1istL means Lto be causedL, Lto be conditionedL, Lto be producedL, or
Lto be dependent on somethingL. 0> 8ut a dharma, as an ontological entity, is by definition a thing
which has essential or own nature Es$abha$aF. +? The so-called own nature is something which is
independent and which ma-es an ob/ect what it is and not something else. Therefore to say that a
dharma .e1ists would be the same as saying that a thing which is independent of e$erything else is
dependent on something. This is a contradiction in terms and hence ma-es no sense. +&
.
H (,- &:'&.
H The production of a self-e1istent thing by a conditioning cause is not possible,
H (Cor,* being produced through dependence on a cause, a self-e1istent thing would be
Lsomething which is producedL E-rta-aF.
.
H 0.
H How, indeed, will a self-e1istent thing become Lsomething which is producedLO
H Certainly, a self-e1istent thing (by definition* is Lnot-producedL and is independent of
anything else.*
.
3ccording to the ,adhyami-as, other ontological entities can be refuted in a similar way. They are
only human concepts and one should not be attached to them. Howe$er, philosophers continue to
manufacture entities and realities, and pro/ect them onto the world. Cor the ,adhyami-as, this
metaphysical speculation is a disease, and the cure of the disease lies not so much in de$eloping a
new metaphysical theory as in understanding the nature and function of conceptualiJation and
language. Nagar/una claimed that the $ery language men create and use plays tric-s on them and
destroys their Leyes of wisdomL +0.
.
H (,- 00'&:.
H Those who describe in detail the 8uddha, who is unchanging and beyond all detailed
descriptionM
H Those, completely defeated by description, do not percei$e the Lfully completedL (being*.*
.
Enlightened men should discard conceptualiJation so as to a$oid being ta-en in. Emptiness, for
"an-lun masters, is a medicine for curing the Lphilosophical diseaseL ++
.
)ne of the chief sources of confusion in philosophical reasoning, "an-lun 8uddhists contended, is
that philosophers often fail to see the emptiness of words and names. eople tend to thin- that
words, names and concepts are attached to ob/ects and belong to them inherently. They belie$e that
words name or denote ob/ects, and that sentences are combinations of such names. ,eaning is the
thing for which a word stands. If the word does not denote an ordinary ob/ect, it may stand for a
transcendental or non-empirical entity, and if one -nows something, there must be LsomethingL
which one -nows. ,en tend to loo- for a real ob/ect for a word, a real distinction behind a linguistic
distinction, a real essence for a linguistic class, a true reality for -nowledge. Thus they are led
unsuspectingly into metaphysical dilemmas of their own ma-ing. hilosophers indulge in
metaphysical disputes about Auestions such as' 7hat is the true state of the uni$erseO Is it 8eing or
Non-beingO Is 8eing one or manyO Is it permanent or impermanentO Does Non-being stand for
somethingO Does it ha$e priority o$er 8eingO "uch metaphysical Auestions seem genuine, and the
chief tas- of philosophy is to answer them.
.
3ccording to "an-lun masters, 8uddhaDs Dharma is an awareness that metaphysicians ha$e
intellectual attachment. They are misled by human concepts and fail to see that metaphysical
20 , -0.
Auestions are not genuine. "o-called orthodo1 8uddhist philosophy is, for the "an-lun, /ust another
dogmatic $iew. It does not eliminate metaphysical speculation but merely shifts position from a
monistic $iew E8eing is oneF to a pluralistic $iew E8eing is manyF. "o the same -ind of
metaphysical concerns repeatedly occur. Cor Nagar/una and his "an-lun followers, one cannot sol$e
the problem by presenting a new metaphysical theory. The complete solution lies rather in ta-ing all
metaphysical problems as conceptual confusion without e1plaining the initial metaphysical mista-e
by another metaphysical theory.
.
In his critiAue of all $iews, Nagar/una wrote,
.
I LI ha$e no $iewL +2 ET4T .IF.
.
3ccording to "an-lun masters, the refutation of erroneous $iews EpDo-hsiehF is the same as the
illumination of right $iews Ehsien-chengF. This means that a critiAue of a $iew does not aim to
present another $iew but simply to discard the $iew. Nagar/unaDs dialectic is not merely to limit the
$alidity of intellect and logicK it is also to declare that reasoning and conceptual speculation are
absurd. 3ccording to this idea of emptiness as Lno $iewL, to loo- for pra/na EwisdomF is not to loo-
for something, but rather to -now that LsomethingL is empty. 7isdom is not the attainment of a
theory but an absence of it. No truth is Lreally trueL +:.
.
In e1pounding on this, Nagar/una and his "an-lun followers analyJed the nature of language and
pointed out that the meaning of a term does not lie in an ob/ecti$e or e1tra-linguistic entity to which
that term corresponds, but lies in the conte1t. If the conte1t changes, the meaning of the word
changes or e$en disappears. In the strict sense, meaning is not part of an ob/ect or thing itself, but a
human pro/ection. Those who insist that there must be some e1tra-linguistic reality or essence to
which words refer, are Lli-e a man who, percei$ing the body of a .woman created by magic as really
e1istent, feels desire for herL +;.
.
7hen men ha$e the attached way of thin-ing, they ma-e ontological commitments to truth and
falsity as well as to ontological entities. 3ccording to Chi-tsang, one should also eliminate
attachments to right and wrong, true and false, or affirmation and negation. Cor him, so-called right
and wrong, true and false are eAually emptyK they do not stand for any essence or self-e1isting
thing. The LrightL $iew is not a $iew in itself but merely an absence of $iews. 3 right $iew is called
LrightL because all $iews ha$e been abandoned. If it were accepted as a $iew, it would become a
wrong $iew which ought to be re/ected. +<
.
3s we ha$e seen, in "an-lun philosophy the illumination of right $iews and the refutation of
erroneous $iews are not two separate things. Thus, when the 8uddha denied that a dharma is
e1istent, he did not hold another $iew that a dharma is non-e1istent. If someone were to hold that a
dharma is non-e1istent, this $iew would be another e1treme to be refuted. 3lthough the 8uddha
sometimes used the word non-e1istence in his dialogues, one should -now that Lthe idea of non-
e1istence is brought out primarily to handle the disease of the concept of e1istence. If that disease
disappears, then useless medicine is also discardedL +=.
.
Chi-tsang further said,
.
I L)riginally there was nothing to affirm and there is not now anything to negateL +>.
.
"an-lun masters maintained that no truth is absolutely true. 2? E$ery true claim which is so, is so
2- , -0.
for a particular obser$er or is made from a particular standpoint. Its truth $alue is not purely
ob/ecti$e. In the strict sense, all truths are con$entionalK they are human pro/ections. )ur minds are
often deluded by all sorts of illusions, pre/udices and attachments. The truth $alue of the statements
we ma-e, according to the ,adhyami-a, lies in whether they in$ol$e attachment or not. Those
which in$ol$e attachment or ma-e men clinging are called su-ti Eworldly, relati$e or low truthF, and
those which do not in$ol$e attachment or ma-e men non-clinging, are chen-ti Eultimate,
transcendent or high truthF. Howe$er, if ultimate truth is regarded as something fi1ed or standing
for an absolute or self-e1isting thing, it becomes a new attachment and worldly truth. )ne has to re-
e1amine it from yet another, higher standpoint and see that all truths are empty.
.
#ltimately, to realiJe this empty nature of truth is pra/na. True wisdom is -nowing nothing
substantial. In a strict sense, it has no -nowing or -nowledge. ra/na is an insight that the act of
-nowing, the -nower, the ob/ect to be -nown, the distinction between the sub/ect and the ob/ect,
truth and falsity, are all empty. This is a wisdom without attachmentK it is synonymous with
sunyata.
.
This no--nowing and empty nature of pra/na is well stated by "eng-chao'
.
I Thus in pra/na there is nothing that is -nown, and nothing that is seen .... It is e$ident that
there is a mar-less -nowing and un-nowing illumination .... !eal pra/na is as pure as empty space,
without -nowing, without seeing, without acting, and without ob/ects. Thus -nowledge is in itself
without -nowing, and does not depend on anything in order to be without -nowing. 2&
.
#nfortunately, the doctrine of emptiness in ,adhyami-a 8uddhism is often interpreted as
absolutism or nihilismK the word empty or emptiness is regarded as a descripti$e name referring to
3bsolute 8eing or 3bsolute Non-being. 20 3ctually, the "an-lun 8uddhist teaching of emptiness as
the middle way is the denial of both e1tremes. The claim that all things are empty means that all
things are neither absolutely e1istent nor absolutely non-e1istent.
.
This point was succinctly drawn by "eng-chao as follows'
.
I Cor what reasonO If you would say that (things* e1ist, their e1istence arises non-absolutely. If
you would say that they do not e1ist, their forms ha$e ta-en shape. "ince they ha$e forms and
shapes, they cannot be the same as Line1istentL. "o, this e1plains the idea of the emptiness of the
non-absolute. 2+
.
If the e1istence of a thing were absolutely real, it would then be self-e1istent and independent of
causes and conditions. 8ut all things are dependent on causes and conditions. "o a thing cannot be
self-e1istent and absolutely real. )n the other hand, if the uni$erse were non-e1istent and absolutely
nothing, it would be motionless and its phenomena would not arise. 8ut we see that myriad things
do arise from $arious causes and conditions, so they cannot be absolutely unreal. Thus the doctrine
of emptiness in "an-lun ,adhyami-a thought is a middle way, and should not be identified with
absolutism or with nihilism. 22
.
3ctually, the word -Dung, emptiness, according to "an-lun 8uddhists, is merely La con$enient
means to lead sentient beings and to enable them to be free from $arious attachmentsL 2:. This tool
has multiple functions and uses. The 8uddha was considered by "an-lun masters to be a
soteriologist at heart and his teaching to be practical hi character. His main concern was the nir$ana
of man-ind from e$il and suffering, and his teachings were upaya, s-illful means, used to achie$e
22 , -0.
this goal. The 8uddha found that the minds of ordinary people were always attached and bound to
$iews, difficult to emancipate from birth, old age, suffering and death. He intended to help them
gain enlightenment, yet he realiJed that they could understand only mundane things and ordinary
language. In order to sa$e them, he used common words, such as cause and effect, e1istence and
non-e1istence, right and wrong, affirmation and denial, and empty and not-empty, to e1plain his
teachings. In fact, all the words used are nothing more than tools to aid in purifying the mind.
.
Though language may play tric-s on us, the ,adhyami-as do not deny its practical $alue. They
ac-nowledge that language is useful and e$en necessary in daily life, for without language we could
neither spea- nor write. 3ccording to Nagar/una, ultimate truth has to be e1plained by speech, and
speech is con$entional and conditional. %anguage as worldly truth is essential for the attainment of
ultimate truth and nir$ana.
.
Nagar/una wrote,
.
I L7ithout worldly truth, ultimate truth cannot be obtained. 7ithout obtaining ultimate truth,
nir$ana cannot be obtained.L 2; E"ee also Twel$e 4ate Treatise, .III T 'F
.
H (,- 02'=.
.
H >.
.
H &?.
.
In order to communicate with others, we need conceptualiJation and predication. The mista-e lies
in identifying meaning with ob/ect, and concept with reality. To a$oid this, one should -now that
words and names are empty. 7hen our words are not regarded as standing for any essence or self-
e1isting ob/ect, they can be used to e1pose the absurd implications of metaphysical speculations.
The function of language can be li-ened to a raft. 3 man intending to cross a ri$er to get to the other
ban-, where it is safe and secure, ma-es a raft. 7ith its help he safely reaches the other shore. 8ut
howe$er useful the raft may ha$e been, he will now lea$e it aside and go his way without it. "o also
language, including the term Dharma, is li-e the raft, to be discarded after nir$ana.
.
Clinging to or longing for things or ideas is also li-ened by "an-lun 8uddhists to fire, and as such a
source of suffering, delusion and ignorance. In this analogy, emptiness as a soteriological de$ice
becomes li-e water. 8ut the analogy is comple1. Chi-tsang wrote, If water could e1tinguish fire and
then again produce fire, what would we use to e1tinguish itO The $iew that things come to an end or
are eternal is the fire and emptiness can e1tinguish it. 8ut if one still clings to emptiness, then there
is no medicine that can eliminate the disease. 2<
.
)ne who -nows the proper nature and function of the word emptiness and other terms can
ne$ertheless use these concepts to resol$e philosophical confusion. Chi-tsang himself used the
terms being and non-being, to clear away a problem in his teaching of Twofold Truth on three
2/ , -0.
le$els Esan-tsung-erh-ti or erh-ti-san--uanF. 2=
.
)rdinary people usually belie$e that the uni$erse is real and what appears to them through the
senses is considered true. They affirm the reality of appearances and hold that they belong to the
realm of being EyuF. 8ut saints or enlightened men, Chi-tsang pointed out, would not accept this
realism, and would realiJe instead that all things are empty. 7hat appears to us through the senses
belongs to the realm of non-being EwuF rather than being. !ealism is treated by Chi-tsang as
worldly truth Eyu-wei-su-tiF and the denial of it as ultimate truth Ewu-wei-chen-tiF. This is the first
le$el of spiritual growth.
.
)n this le$el, one may be attached to the concept of being. This attachment can be eliminated by
-nowing that the true state of things is more li-e non-being than being. Howe$er, men may still
ha$e an attached way of thin-ing. Now they ma-e a distinction between being and non-being and
hold that the terms being and non-being are descripti$e names standing for two completely different
states of affairs. The denial of being is belie$ed to entail the affirmation of non-being. This dualistic
way or reasoning is an attachment, a -ind of worldly truth Eyu-wu-erh-wei-su-tiF. To -now that both
being and non-being are empty is ultimate truth Efei-yu-fei-wu-pu-erh-wei-chen-tiF. This second
le$el of spiritual growth lets people realiJe that the true state of the uni$erse cannot be described as
being or non-being.
.
8ut men continue to long for something. They may thin- that if reality is neither being nor non-
being, it must be something beyond being and non-being. Cor Chi-tsang, this monistic absolutism is
another e1treme $iew to be refuted, for that which is beyond being and non-being is really empty.
%i-e the pre$ious, dualistic ways of thin-ing, this metaphysical $iewpoint belongs to worldly truth
Eerh-yu-pu-erh-wei-su-tiF. The denial of both dualistic and non-dualistic metaphysics is ultimate
truth Efei-erh-fei-pu-erh-wei-chen-tiF. 2>
.
Chi-tsangDs critical e1amination of the problem of being and non-being is a means of purifying the
mind from $arious attachments. BDung, emptiness, is used whene$er e1treme $iews occur. It has
different connotations and implications on $arious le$els. )n the first le$el, emptiness means that
common-sense things are illusory and unreal. It is e1pressed by Chi-tsang as the denial of being. )n
the second le$el, emptiness implies that the nihilistic as well as common-sense $iews of the
uni$erse are unacceptable and that all discriminations or dualistic ways of thin-ing should be
dismissed. )n the third le$el, emptiness displays that monistic as well as the dualistic and pluralistic
$iews of the uni$erse should be re/ected. It is e1pressed as the denial of both duality and non-
duality. 7hen all conceptualiJations and other attachments are completely eliminated, emptiness
means Labsolutely non-abidingL, clinging to nothing.
.
Thus the word -Dung has no meaning by itself, but acAuires a meaning in conte1t. It gains its true
connotation only in process. 7hen nir$ana is achie$ed, it loses its meaning and should be
discarded. 3s with medicine, emptiness is of use to a man only so long as he is ill, but not when he
is well again.
.
Chi-tsang said,
.
I )riginally, it was to counter the disease of (belief in* 8eing that we preached Non-being. If
the disease of (belief in* 8eing $anishes, the ,edicine of Emptiness is also useless. Thus we -now
that the way of the sage has ne$er held to either 8eing or Non-being. 7hat obstacle can there be,
thenO :?
20 , -0.
.
%+' (+. The nature and $alue of the te1t* '%+
.
Nagar/unaDs Twel$e 4ate Treatise was a principle document in the "an-lun tradition for centuries
and was also accepted as canonical literature by many other schools. 8ut because it e1ists only in
Chinese translation, modern 7estern scholars ha$e seldom studied the Twel$e 4ate Treatise.
!ecently a few ha$e Auestioned the authenticity of the three treatises, and doubted if they are
Nagar/unaDs and 3ryade$aDs wor-. &
.
Contemporary ,adhyami-a scholars accept the rasannapada of Chandra-irti as the authentic
,ulamadhyama-a-ari-a of Nagar/una. It seems that if the rasannapada is genuine, then the
,iddle Treatise is also authentic, because the two are almost identical. "ince both the main $erses
and commentaries of the Twel$e 4ate Treatise resemble the main $erses of the ,iddle Treatise in
their philosophical reasoning, religious assertion and literary style, the Twel$e 4ate Treatise is most
li-ely an authentic Nagar/una boo-. The ,iddle Treatise was written before the Twel$e 4ate
Treatise, as can be seen by the fact that the ,iddle Treatise is mentioned se$eral times in the
Twel$e 4ate. In e1amining the issues of being and non-being, the Twel$e 4ate Treatise states,
.
I LThis has been discussed in the ,iddle TreatiseLK 0 ET4T .IIF
.
and his analyJing the notion of a ma-er, the Twel$e 4ate Treatise mentions,
.
I L3s it has been written in the ,iddle Treatise ... L + ET4T 9F
.
Now, since the ,iddle Treatise was written first and the two wor-s are similar, one may as- why
Nagar/una wrote the Twel$e 4ate Treatise at all. 7hy did "an-lun masters insist that one should
study the boo-O "e$eral purposes and reasons can be offered.
.
E&F The Twel$e 4ate Treatise pro$ides a concise account of Nagar/unaDs thought. In a sense it is a
simple crystalliJation of his main teachings in the ,iddle Treatise.
.
E0F The ,iddle Treatise was written primarily for Hinayana 8uddhists, while the Twel$e 4ate
Treatise was presented for non-8uddhists as well as 8uddhists.
.
E+F The Twel$e 4ate Treatise discusses certain important religious and philosophical issues which
the ,iddle Treatise does not touch on.
.
E2F The Twel$e 4ate Treatise clarifies certain problems which the ,iddle Treatise does not e1plain
clearly.
.
Nagar/unaDs ,ulamadhyama-a-ari-a has 0< chapters and consists of 22: $erses, or 22> $erses in
the rasannapada $ersion. It seems to ha$e been too much for ordinary laymen and e$en many
professional mon-s to study. In order to ma-e 8uddhism easier to understand, a brief but
comprehensi$e presentation of 8uddhist thought was needed. The Twel$e 4ate Treatise, which has
only 0; $erses, seems to ha$e fit the need. Nagar/una opened the boo- with these words'
.
I Now I shall briefly e1plain the teachings of ,ahayanism ....
.
2. , -0.
I Question' ,ahayana teachings are too many to be counted.
I E$en the sayings of the 8uddha alone cannot be e1hausted.
I How can you e1plain and e1pound them (all* O
.
I 3nswer' 8ecause of this, I said at the beginning (this would be* a brief e1planation. 2 ET4T
IF
.
In e1pounding the doctrine of emptiness, the ,iddle Treatise discusses eight negations or the
eightfold negation of the middle wayK namely,
.
I Lno origination, no e1tinctionK no permanence, no impermanenceK no identity, no
differentiationK no coming, no departureL :.
.
H (,- Introductory $erse'
H LI salute him, the fully-enlightened, the best of spea-ers,
H who preached the non-ceasing and the non-arising,
H the non-annihilation and the non-permanence,
H the non-identity and the non-difference,
H the non-appearance and the non-disappearance,
H the dependent arising,
H the appeasement of obsessions and the auspicious.L*
.
8ut the Twel$e 4ate Treatise chooses the first negation and concentrates its argument on the
concept of origination or production EshengF. Instead of spending time e1amining the other se$en
negations, the entire treatise aims at showing that
.
I Lall things ha$e no production' therefore all things are ultimately empty and tranAuilL ; ET4T
9IIF.
.
The presentation of 8uddhist thought in the Twel$e 4ate Treatise is simple and yet comprehensi$e
enough to lead people to -now the central message of 8uddhism.
.
"o Nagar/una told readers,
.
I LTo e1plain emptiness and enter into its meaning one should use the Twel$e 4ateL < ET4T
IF.
.
It seems that if one studies the Twel$e 4ate Treatise first, it is easier to understand ,adhyami-a
teachings in the other treatises. erhaps this is why Bumara/i$a translated the Twel$e 4ate Treatise
into Chinese first, then the ,iddle Treatise.
.
3lthough both treatises argue for the doctrine of emptiness, the aim of Nagar/unaDs criticism in the
,iddle Treatise is mainly to refute Hinayana philosophy, and to this end it e1amines in detail the
concepts of the si1 sense faculties Eliu-chingF, fi$e s-andhas Ewu-yinF, si1 dhatus Eliu-chungF and
passions E/an-/an-cheF. The aim of the criticism in the Twel$e 4ate Treatise is to refute both
anatman and atman traditions. It tries to achie$e this goal by analyJing the concepts of nature
EhsingF, mar- EhsiangF and function EyungF, and demonstrating that all things, whether atman or
anatman Esubstance or elementsF, are de$oid of nature, mar- and function. #nli-e the ,iddle
Treatise, the Twel$e 4ate Treatise de$otes comparati$ely little effort to a discussion of Hinayana
21 , -0.
issues, such as the s-andhas, dhatus and passions, but it deals with common mista-es of Hinayana
and non-8uddhist philosophies.
.
3ccording to the ,adhyami-a, a central mista-e made by 8uddhist and non-8uddhist
metaphysicians is that they fail to see that nature, mar- and function cannot be established, and
hence falsely assert the reality or e1istence of things. The ,adhyami-a argues that if people -now
that nature, mar- and function cannot be established, they will not ma-e ontological commitments.
The reasoning is Auite simple. Cor a thing to be real or to e1ist, it must ha$e a certain nature, mar-
or function. The ,adhyami-a shows that nature, mar- and function cannot be established. Thus, for
the ,adhyami-a, to -now that nature, mar- and function are empty is the same as -nowing that all
things are empty. This is one of the main points brought out in the Twel$e 4ate Treatise.
.
3s Nagar/una e1amined the concepts of nature, mar- and function in the Twel$e 4ate Treatise, he
also discussed certain important religious and philosophical issues which he did not e1amine in
other wor-s. )ne of these issues is the problem of the e1istence of 4?d. Nagar/una not only ruled
out 4?dDs e1istence as the creator of the uni$erse, but also repudiated the concept of 4?d as the
sa$ior of man-ind. !eligious men often thin- of 4?d as a sa$iorK our fate, destiny and happiness are
controlled by Him. If we surrender to Him, He will redeem us from sin and gi$e us happiness.
7ithout 4?dDs grace sal$ation is impossible. Nagar/una attac-ed these ideas and argued that we
ha$e certain Lself-ma-ing powersL such as controlling our passions and beha$ior so as to produce
good and a$oid e$il. = ET4T 9F If sal$ation is only from 4?d, it would destroy Lthe principle of the
worldL, namely, that men do good and obtain reward, and do e$il and recei$e punishment. > ET4T
9F )ne would not need to be mindful, for good deeds might not produce good reward, while e$il
could bring about sal$ation. "ince this is absurd, sal$ation cannot be dependent upon 4?dDs grace. If
4?d is the sole source of sal$ation, religious discipline would be of no use. Pet this is not the case,
and therefore 4?d cannot be the sole source of sal$ation.
.
3nother important issue discussed in the Twel$e 4ate Treatise is whether the principle of causality
can be pro$ed empirically. eople usually belie$e it can, and the uniformity of causal law is
considered an inducti$e inference. 7e obser$e a constant con/unction of causes and effects that
/ustifies the principle that similar causes produce similar effects. Howe$er, Nagar/una argued that
the principle of causality cannot be pro$ed empirically. The constant con/unction of e$ents in the
past does not guarantee that similar e$ents will produce similar effects unless we assume that
similar causes produce similar effects. The empirical /ustification of the causal principle is really
based upon the $ery principle which we attempt to pro$e. &?
.
"ometimes Nagar/una did not present his $iewpoint clearly in the ,iddle Treatise, and scholars
ha$e been perple1ed about his position.
.
Cor instance, in Chapter 99.I of the ,iddle Treatise he described the twel$e chains of causal
conditions'
.
I 3ll sentient beings are deluded by ignorance and hence ha$e caused three -inds of action. &&
I "ince $arious actions arise, (the sentient beings* go through si1 forms of life. &0
.
I "ince it is conditioned by $arious -inds of action, the consciousness establishes itself with
respect to si1 forms of life.
I "ince consciousness is established, name and form are instilled.
.
22 , -0.
I "ince name and form are instilled, the si1 sense faculties arise. &+
I Through a combination of ob/ects, Aualities and discernments, si1 touches Eor perceptionsF
e$ol$e.
I "ince si1 touches e$ol$e, three feelings arise. &2
I "ince three feelings arise, desire is produced.
I Through desire are four clingings &: produced, and through the clinging perceptions being is
generated.
.
I If the percei$er has no clinging perception, he will be freed and there will be no being.
.
I Crom being birth arises, and from birth old age and death arise.
I Crom old age and death, misery, grief, despair, and disturbance arise.
.
I These $arious things arise from birth.
I "o owing to the twel$e chains of causal conditions, great sufferings are produced.
.
I The so-called wheel of life and death is the source of all actions.
I The ignorant creates it, but the wise does not.
.
I 8y the cessation of each component, each subseAuent lin- will not arise.
I The accumulation of sufferings is thus completely e1tinguished. &;
.
H (,- 0;'&.
H L7hat is hidden by ignorance E&FL Ea$idyani$rtaF has caused the three -inds of conditioned
things E0F Esams-araF to be made for rebirth M
H 8y those actions it (i.e., L what is hidden by ignoranceL* goes forward.
.
H 0.
H Consciousness E+F, presupposing that which is conditioned Esams-araF, enters on its course.
H 7hen consciousness is begun, the Lname-and-formD- EnamarupaF E2F is instilled.
.
H +.
H 7hen the Lname-and-formL is instilled, the si1 domains of sense perceptions E:F EayatanaF
are produced.
H Ha$ing arri$ed at the si1 domains of sense perceptions, the process of perception begins to
function.
.
H 2.
H Consciousness begins to function presupposing the eye, the $isual forms, and ability of
mental associationM
H resupposing Lname-and-form.L
.
H :.
H That which is the coincidence E;F EsamnipataF of $isual form, consciousness, and the eye'
H That is sensual perceptionK and from perception, sensation E<F begins to function.
.
H ;.
H LCra$ing E=FL EtrsnaF (for e1isting things* is conditioned by sensation.
H Certainly (a person* cra$es for the sa-e of sensation. The one who cra$es acAuires the four-
23 , -0.
fold acAuisition E>F EupadanaF (namely se1ual pleasure, false $iews, ascetic morality and $ows, and
the doctrine of self-e1istence*.
.
H <.
H 7hen the acAuisition e1ists, the acAuirer begins to function E&?F Ei.e. e1istence, becomingF.
H If he were someone without acAuisition, that being would be released, and would not e1ist.
.
H =.
H That being is the fi$e Lgroups of uni$ersal elementsL Es-andhaF. 8ecause of a being, birth
E&&F begins to function.
H 4rowing old, dying, sorrow Edu--haF E&0F, etc., grief and regrets,
.
H >.
H Despair and agitation' all this results from birthK
H That Lproduced beingL is a single mass of sorrows Edu--haF.
.
H &?.
H Thus the ignorant people construct the conditioned things Esams-araFK (that is* the source for
e1istence-in-flu1.
H The one who constructs is ignorantK the wise person is not (one who constructs* because he
percei$es true reality.
.
H &&.
H 7hen ignorance ceases, the constructed phenomena do not come into e1istence.
H 3 personDs cessation of ignorance proceeds on the basis of LbecomingL (enlightened*
through -nowledge.
.
H &0.
H Through cessation of e$ery (component* none functionsK
H That single mass of sorrow Edu--haF is thus completely destroyed. *
.
The teaching is Auite different from the message in the pre$ious 0: chapters of the ,iddle Treatise,
and has the appearance of Hinayana thought.
.
Benneth B. Inada, who has translated the ,ulamadhyama-a-ari-a, comments upon the chapter'
.
I In this chapter and the final one to follow, Nagar/una goes into the analysis of Hinayanistic
doctrines. The present chapter discusses the twel$efold causal analysis which is the basis of the
endless process of suffering incurred by all li$ing beings. The discussion is Hinayanistic and it
re$eals that the source of trouble lies in ignorance which in turn initiates all -inds of mental
conformations Esams-araF .... The discussion of the doctrine of causal analysis indicates the strong
influence of Hinayanistic or 3bhidharmic teachings during this period. &<
.
The teaching here has puJJled many scholars' how do we interpret itO 7hat was Nagar/unaDs real
$iew concerning the twel$e chains of causal conditionsO Did he become a Hinayanist at the end of
writing the ,iddle TreatiseG It seems that these Auestions can be sol$ed by study of the Twel$e
4ate Treatise where Nagar/una clearly presented his $iew of the twel$e chains of causal conditions
in the first chapter, and demonstrated that the twel$e chains cannot be concei$ed as the causal law
of the world. He used a scriptural passage from the "e$enty Treatise to introduce his standpoint'
29 , -0.
.
S (I.0*
S L(Twel$e chains of* causal conditions really ha$e no production. If they ha$e production, do
they ha$e it in one mind-moment or in many mind-momentsOL &=
.
Nagar/una argued that if the twel$e chains of causal conditions are the real causal law of the world,
they must happen or be produced EaF in one mind-moment, or EbF in many mind-moments. 8ut one
cannot say that all twel$e causal factors appear in one mind-moment, for if they occur in one mind-
moment, then causes and effects would happen at the same time. This is impossible because a cause
must be prior to an effect. Nor can one say that the twel$e appear in many mind-moments, for if
they occur in different mind-moments, they would be distinct and ha$e no particular relation to each
other. Each would occur with a particular mind-moment, then disappear with that mind-moment. If
so, how can any of them be a causal conditionO Thus, both cases EaF and EbF cannot be established,
and hence the twel$e chains of causal conditions cannot be concei$ed as the real internal causal
law' they are empty. Nagar/unaDs definiti$e $iew is presented in the Twel$e 4ate Treatise. This
e1plains in part why the Twel$e 4ate Treatise is $aluable for -nowing ,adhyami-a thought and
also why "an-lun masters insisted that one should study the boo-. !ecently some scholars Auestion
whether Nagar/una was really a ,ahayana 8uddhist and whether he had e$er read the
pra/naparamita sutras. Cor the ,iddle Treatise does not mention the words L,ahayanaL and
Lra/naparamita sutraL.
.
3. B. 7arder argues,
.
I The doctrine of the 8uddha, according to Nagar/una, consists essentially of the Cour Truths
and Conditioned )rigination. There are no terms peculiar to the ,ahayana. There is no e$idence
that Nagar/una had e$er seen any pra/naparamita te1t M Cor him the most important canonical te1t
is the Nidana "arhyu-ta M ,odern students ha$e sometimes supposed that he is criticiJing early
8uddhism, or the early schools, in order to set up ,ahayana instead. Is there any truth in this
suppositionO 7e ha$e already pointed out that there is nothing o$ertly ,ahayanist in the , B
E,ulamadhyama-a-ari-aU. E$en in its deeper implications there seems to be nothing distincti$ely
,ahayanist in this reading of the Nidana "arhyu-ta. It is not early 8uddhism which is being
attac-ed . . . &>
.
)ne who reads the Twel$e 4ate Treatise will ha$e cause to dispute this thesisK the opening
statement clears away our doubts. The te1t describes itself as a concise summary of ,ahayana
teachings, and Nagar/una begins with se$en reasons why ,ahayana is superior to Hinayana, each of
them a discussion of the word great, as in,
.
I This is the $ehicle which is ridden by 8uddhas and great men, and hence is called great ....
3gain, in the pra/na-sutra, the 8uddha himself says that the teachings of ,ahayana are
immeasurable and boundless. Cor this reason it is called great. 0? ET4T IF
.
If one studies the Twel$e 4reat Treatise and the ,iddle Treatise together, it becomes clear that the
logic in Nagar/unaDs writing is not purely formal. 7hen Nagar/una argued, he did not adhere rigidly
to form. The four e1pressions he used are not entirely de$oid of logical meaning, yet the meaning of
each e1pression depends on conte1t. Nagar/una often $iewed each lemma in se$eral different ways.
This is especially the case with the third and fourth lemmas.
.
3ccording to !ichard !obinson, the third lemma is a con/unction of the I and ) forms of
/0 , -0.
3ristotelian logic. Howe$er, a careful study of the Twel$e 4ate Treatise and the ,iddle Treatise
shows that Nagar/una $iewed the third lemma in at least three different ways, namely Ep V HpF, Ep .
HpF and EI V )F. Nagar/unaDs arguments sometimes suggest that he regarded or used the third lemma
not as a con/unction of I and ), but of p and Hp. In his critical analysis, Nagar/una often argued that
the lemma itself in$ol$es mutually conflicting theses Ehsiang-weiF and hence is not possible. This is
clearly stated in the Twel$e 4ate Treatise when he e1amined the third possible $iew of causation'
.
I It is also untenable that a cause can both include and e1clude an effect and then produce the
effect. 7hyO 8ecause including and e1cluding are contradictory in nature. How can things which
are contradictory in nature be togetherO 5ust as brightness and dar-ness, suffering and pleasure,
going and staying, binding and loosening cannot be together, so a cause which both includes and
e1cludes an effect cannot produce. 0& ET4T IIF
.
The ,iddle Treatise also suggests this $iew'
.
I LCor, how could the mutually conflicting DbeingD and Dnon-beingD co-e1ist as oneOL Eyu-wu
hsiang-wei -u, i-chDu tse wu-erhF. 00
.
H (,- ='<.
H 3nd a real-nonreal producer does not produce in a real-nonreal manner.
H Cor, indeed, how can LrealL and Lnon-real,L which are mutually contradictory, occur in one
placeO*
.
In tal-ing about the third lemma in connection with nir$ana, Nagar/una li-ewise $iewed it as of the
Ep V HpF form and said,
.
I LHow could nir$ana be (in the realm of* both e1istence and non-e1istenceO 8oth cannot be
together in one place /ust as the situation is with light and dar-ness.L 0+
.
H (,- 0:'&2.
H How can nir$ana e1ist as both an e1istent and a non-e1istent thingO
H There is no e1istence of both at one and the same place, as in the case of both dar-ness and
light.*
.
)n other occasions, Nagar/una seemed to treat the third lemma as a dis/uncti$e affirmation Ep .
HpF. He did not say that the third lemma is self-contradictory, but that it may ha$e two fallacies
Eerh--uoF. Cor e1ample, in e1amining the third alternati$e $iew of suffering, Nagar/una wrote,
.
I LNor can it EsufferingF be made by both itself and another, for this in$ol$es two fallacies . ..
the fallacy of self-made and a fallacy of other-madeL 02 ET4T 9F.
.
If either of them EDself-madeD and Dother-madeDF can be established, then a third alternati$e can be
established'
.
I LIf suffering could be made indi$idually by itself and by other, then there should also be
suffering made /ointlyL 0:.
.
H (,B &0'>.
H "orrow Edu--haF could be made by both (self and the LotherL* EiiiF if it could be produced
/- , -0.
by either one.
H (8ut* not produced by another, and not self-produced Ei$F Mhow can sorrow Edu--haF e1ist
without a caused*
.
"ince neither of them can be established'
.
I LIn truth then, suffering could not be made by itself for a thing could not ma-e itself. Neither
could it be made by other for the other is insubstantial.L 0;
.
H (,- &0'=.
H "orrow Edu--haF is not self-produced EiF, for that which is produced is certainly not
produced by that (personality*.
H If the LotherL EparaF is not produced by the indi$idual self EatmaF, how would sorrow
Edu--haF be that produced by anotherO*
.
"o the third alternati$e cannot be established. 3s !obinson suggested, Nagar/una did sometimes use
the third lemma as a con/unction of particular statements EI V )F. In discussing the third alternati$e
$iew of the relation between man and 4?d, Nagar/una interpreted
.
I Lboth eternal and non-eternalL as Lone part is di$ine and one part is humanL 0<.
.
H (,- 0<'&<.
H If one part were di$ine and another part human, Ei.e. a man with an eternal soulF
H Then there would be something non-eternal (together with* that which is eternal EiiiFK but
that is not possible.*
.
erhaps one reason why !obinson and other scholars 0= insist that the third lemma is of the EI V )F
form e1clusi$ely is that it is more plausible than the Ep V HpF or Ep . HpF forms. Cor Nagar/una,
howe$er, it does not ma-e any difference which logical form is used to describe reality. 3ll theories
about reality, no matter what their logical forms are, are erroneous, and none can be claimed more
plausible than others. He aimed to show absurdity in each of them.
.
It seems that Nagar/una also $iewed and treated the fourth lemma in se$eral different ways. He
sometimes spo-e of it as the contrary or negation of the third. Cor e1ample, in discussing the third
alternati$e $iew of nir$ana, he wrote that nir$ana is characteriJed by both being and non-being Eyu
wuF, and in disputing upon the fourth alternati$e $iew, declared that nir$ana is not characteriJed by
both being and non-being Efei-yu fei-wuF 0>.
.
H (,- 0:'&:.
H The assertion' LNir$ana is neither an e1istent thing nor a non-e1istent thingL
H Is pro$ed if (the assertion*' LIt is an e1istent thing and a non-e1istent thingL were pro$ed.
.
H &;.
H If nir$ana is neither an e1istent thing nor a non-e1istent thing,
H 7ho can really arri$e at (the assertion*' Lneither an e1istent thing nor a non-e1istent
thingLO*
.
Howe$er, Nagar/una also seems to ha$e treated the fourth lemma as the contrary or opposite of the
first three lemmas together. Cor instance, in arguing upon the first three lemmas of suffering, he
/2 , -0.
stated that suffering Lhas causeL Eis caused by itself, by other, or by bothFK and in discussing the
fourth lemma, he claimed that suffering Lhas no causeL Ewu-yinF. +? ET4T 9IIF
.
H (,- &0'>.
H "orrow Edu--haF could be made by both (self and the LotherL* EiiiF if it could be produced
by either one.
H (8ut* not produced by another, and not self-produced Ei$F Mhow can sorrow Edu--haF e1ist
without a caused*
.
The conciseness of the Twel$e 4ate Treatise made it of real use to "an-lun masters in China and
their pupils. Crom its pages one gathers that Nagar/una may be definiti$ely placed among
,ahayana 8uddhists, and there is, further, the remar-able dispensing with cause and effect, a
standard 8uddhist tenet. The te1t is abbre$iated, focusing on but one, rather than all eight, of the
8uddhist eightfold negations. It shows a fle1ibility of logical forms, when read in con/unction with
the ,iddle Treatise, that ma-es it of interest to specialists in that area. These are all aspects of the
importance of the te1t.
%+' (Notes* '%+
%2' (reface* '%2
.
& T. !. .. ,urti says, LConsidering the role and the importance of the ,adhyami-a, I ha$e
$entured to appraise it as the Central hilosophy of 8uddhismL. The Central hilosophy of
8uddhism E3llen and #nwin, %ondon &><?F, p. $ii. ,. Hiriyanna says, LIn one sense it Ethe
,adhyami-aF is the most important outcome of 8uddhaDs teachingL. )utlines of Indian hilosophy
E3llen and #nwin, %ondon, &>+0F, p. 0?;.
0 T. !. .. ,urti, D"arhrti and aramartha in ,adhyami-a and 3d$arta .edantaD, in The roblem of
Two Truths in 8uddhism and .edanta, ed. by ,er$yn "prung ED. !eidel, 8oston, &><+F, p. &+.
+ 3. B. 7arder, DIs Nagar/una a ,ahayanistOD, Ibid., pp. =?M=&.
2 The Taisho "hinshu DaiJo-yo is the Chinese Tripita-a in &?? $olumes, ed. by 5un/iro Ta-a-usu
and Baiyo-u 7atanabe EDaiJo "huppan Company, To-yo, &>00-+2F.
.
%2' (&. Nagar/una and the spread of his teachings* '%2
.
& Cor a detailed life of Nagar/una, see ,. 7alleserDs The %ife of Nagar/una from Tibetan and
Chinese "ources, Hirth 3nni$ersary .olume, trans, by 3. 3. robsthain, ed. by 8. "chindler
E%ondon, &>00F, pp. 20&-::. "ee also B. .en-ata !amanan, Nagar/unaDs hilosophy as resented in
The ,aha-ra/naparamita-sastra E.aranasi, India, &><&F, pp. 0:M+?, ++;.
0 Cor the wor- of Nagar/una, see B. .en-ata !amanan, Ibid, pp. +2M+<. "ee also T. !. .. ,urti,
The Central hilosophy of 8uddhism, pp. ==->&K !ichard !obinson, Early ,adhyami-a in India
and China E#ni$ersity of 7isconsin ress, ,adison, 7isconsin, &>;<F, pp. 0;M0<.
+ Bao-seng-chuan ET 0:?>F. . ++0K see !ichard !obinson, Ibid., p. >;.
2 Bao-seng-chuan, p. +;:.
: T &=:0 in .ol. 2:.
; Erh-ti-i' T &=:2 in .ol. 2:. < ,iddle Treatise, 99I.' &=.
= "ee 5un/iro Ta-a-usu, The Essentials of 8uddhist hilosophy, ed. by 7. T. Chan and Charles 3.
,oore E#ni$ersity of Hawaii ress, Honolulu, &><2F, pp. &0;-&+<.
> Cor Hua-yen thought, see 5un/iro Ta-a-usu, pp. &?=M&0:. "ee also 4arma C. C. Chang, The
8uddhist Teaching of Totality Eennsyl$ania "tate #ni$ersity ress, #ni$ersity ar-, &><2F.
&? Cor the influence of ,adhyami-a philosophy upon Ren, see Hsueh-li Cheng, DRen and "an-lun
// , -0.
,adhyami-a Thought' E1ploring the Theoretical Coundation of Ren Teachings and racticesD,
!eligious "tudies &: 9&><>F, +2+-+;+.
&& !yu-yo Cu/imoto, 3n )utline of the Triple "utra of "hin 8uddhism EHonpa Hongwan/i ress,
Byoto, &>::F, I, p. +2.
&0 Ibid., pp. 0=, +2, 2&K see also 3lfred 8loom, "hinranDs 4ospel of ure 4race E#ni$ersity of
3riJona ress, Tucson, 3riJona, &>;=F, pp. <M=, 2<, ;2.
&+ "ee 5un/iro Ta-a-usu, Essentials, pp. <2M<<. "ee also Tang Pung-tung, Han 7ei %iang-chi Na-
pei ChDao Co-chiao-shih E"hanghai, &>+=F, chs. &?, &&.
.
%2' (0. "an-lun approaches to emptiness* '%2
.
& Twel$e 4ate Treatise, I.' &.
0 Ibid., .II.
+ Chi-tsang, The rofound ,eaning of Three Treatises E"an-lun-hsuan-i, T &=:0F, p. la.
2 Chi-tsang, The ,eaning of the Twofold Truth EErh-ti-i, T &=:2F, pp. <>c, =?a, >>b, and &?<a.
: Chi-tsang. Three Treatises, p. >&c.
; Chi-tsang, Twofold Truth, p. >& a. "ee also rofound ,eaning, pp. >2 and &&2.
< Twofold Truth, pp. <=b, ==->? and &&2b. Three Treatises, pp. 2c and <.
= Twofold Truth, pp. =>c and >+b.
> Ibid., pp. <>c and =?c.
&? Chi-tsang, Three Treatises, pp. la, :a, ;a, <-=, &&b, &0 and &+.
&& Chi-tsang, Twofold Truth, p. 00.
&0 Chi-tsang, Three Treatises, p. &.
&+ Chi-tsang, Twofold Truth, pp. <>c, >=c, l?lc and &?0.
&2 Ibid., p. <>b.
&: "ee "hoson ,iyamoto, DThe 8uddhaDs Cirst "ermon and the )riginal atterns of the ,iddle
7ayD, Indoga-u 8u--yoga-u Ben-yu, 9III, 0 E&>;:F, pp. =::M=2:, and Chudo shiso oyobi sono
hattatsu E,iddle 7ay Thought and Its De$elopmentF EHoJo-an, Byoto, &>22F.
&; 7m. Theodore de 8ary, The 8uddhist Tradition in India, China and 5apan EThe ,odern %ibrary,
New Por-, &>;>F p. <&K it was translated from the 8uddhacarita, "ans-rit te1t ed. by E. H. 5ohnson
E8aptist ,ission ress, Calcutta, &>+:F, pp. &2?-&20.
&< This is the opening statement of the ,iddle Treatise.
&= Chi-tsang, Three Treatises, p. ;.
&> %ao-tJu, Tao-te-ching, 2?. "ee The 7ay of %ao TJu, tr. by 7ing-tsit Chan E8obbs-,errill, New
Por- &>;+F, p. &<+.
0? The name D,adhyami-aD was deri$ed from the "ans-rit noun madhyama, meaning Dthe middleD,
and the suffi1 -a. The "an-lun Tsung in China, Borea and 5apan is -nown as Chung-tao Tsung
E"chool of the ,iddle 7ayF as well as BDung Tsung E"chool of EmptinessF.
0& Chi-tsang, Twofold Truth, pp. =0c, =+b, =<a, ==a, >:b, >>b, &?0c, &?:c and &&?K Three
Treatises, pp. =a and l?aK 3 Commentary on the ,iddle Treatise, pp. &&0-&&+.
00 Chi-tsang, w2 Commentary on the ,iddle Treatise, p. 0>.
0+ Ibid., pp. &&&b and &&+a.
02 Nagar/una attac-ed the early scholastic "ar$asti$ada for adhering to self-nature of the dharmas.
Chi-tsang accepts Nagar/unaDs criticism of 3bhidharma philosophy and e1tends the idea of
s$abha$a to co$er all ontological entities which may be used by philosophers.
0: Chi-tsang, Three Treatises, pp. :a, ;, l?c and &&aK Twofold Truth, pp. =0, =<a, >&a, >2, &?=c and
&&2bK 3 Commentary on the ,iddle Treatise, pp. &&&-&&+.
0; 3 Commentary on the ,iddle Treatise, p. &&+aK Twofold Truth, p. >&c.
0< 8uddhist schools such as the 3bhidharma-osa, the ,ahasanghi-a, the ,ahisas-a and the
/0 , -0.
"autranti-a hold that only the present is real. 8ut the "ar$asti$adas maintain that the past, the
present and the future are real.
0= "ee Edward ConJe, 8uddhist Thought in India E#ni$ersity of ,ichigan ress, 3nn 3rbor,
&>;<F, pp. +2-+; and >0-&?;.
0> 3ccording to the 8uddhaDs teaching of pratityasamutpada, whate$er is e1istent is caused or
conditioned. In the ,iddle Treatise 9.' ;M< and &?M&&, Nagar/una argued against the static
notions of e1istence and e$en non-e1istence. He said, LThose who see the concepts of e1istence and
non-e1istence (in terms of* self-nature and other-nature, do not percei$e the true meaning of the
8uddhaDs teachingL E$erse ;F. Chi-tsang, Three Treatises, p. =aK Twofold Truth, p. >:bK 3
Commentary on The ,iddle Treatise, pp. &&0-&&+.
+? Cor a discussion of the word s$abha$a or own nature, see !ichard H. !obinson, The 8uddhist
!eligion EDic-enson ublishing Company, Inc., 8elmont, Calif., &><?F, pp. :&-:0.
+& ,iddle Treatise 9.' &-0.
+0 ,iddle Treatise 99II' &:. "ee Chi-tsang, 3 Commentary on the ,iddle Treatise, pp. &+>b, &2la,
&22a.
++ "hang-mei hsi-lun. Chi-tsang, Ibid., pp. &0= and &+>. Chi-tsang, Three Treatises, pp. l?c and
&&aK Twofold Truth, pp. =0a, c, &?=c and &&2b.
+2 "ee the Twel$e 4ate Treatise, .I, and Hui-cheng-lun, ;+, ;2.
+: Chi-tsang, Twofold Truth, p. ><.
+; Hui-cheng-lun, 0<.
+< Chi-tsang, Three Treatises, pp. <, &2.
+= Ibid.,pp. ;, &&.
+> Ibid.
2? Chi-tsang, Twofold Truth, p. >=..
2& "eng-chao, Chao-lun, art III in T &=:=, p. &:+.
20 H. Bern, %a .allee oussin, ,a1 7alleser, 3. 8. Beith and Harsh interpreted the ,adhyami-a
teaching of emptiness as the philosophy of Non-being or nothing EnihilismF, while T. !. .. ,urti,
Th. "tcherbats-y, Edward 5. Thomas, . C. Casey, H. N. Chatter/ee and ". !adha-rishnan regarded
the term emptiness as referring to absolute 8eing or reality EabsolutismF.
2+ "eng-chao, op. cit, art II, p. &:0c.
22 Cor a detailed discussion of this, see Hsueh-li Cheng, DNagar/unaDs 3pproach to The roblem of
the E1istence of 4?dD, !eligious "tudies &0 E&><;F, 0?<-0&;.
2: Chi-tsang, Three Treatises, p. <. This Auotation was ta-en from Chapter )ne of the %otus
"cripture E"addharmapundari-a sutraF.
2; ,iddle Treatise, 99I.' &?. "ee also Twel$e 4ate Treatise, .III.
2< Chi-tsang, Twofold Truth, p. &&&.
2= Ibid.
2> Ibid., p. >&.
:? Ibid., p. &&. Cor a detailed discussion of "an-lun e1position of emptiness, see Hsueh-li Cheng,
DNagar/una, Bant and 7ittgenstein' The "an-lun ,adhyami-a E1position of EmptinessD, !eligious
"tudies &< E&>=&F, ;<-=:.
%2' (+. The nature and $alue of the te1t* '%2
& !ichard 3. Card, D)n the 3uthenticity of the ai-lun and the "hih-erh-men-lunD, Indoga-u
8u--yoga-u Ben-yu II E&>:2F, <:&-<20K D)n the 3uthenticity of the Chung-lunD, Indoga-u
8u--yoga-u Ben-yu III E&>:2F, +<;-+<?.
0 Twel$e 4ate Treatise, .II.
+ Ibid., 9.
/. , -0.
2 Twel$e 4ate Treatise, I.
: The opening statement of the ,iddle Treatise.
; Twel$e 4ate Treatise, 9II.
< Ibid., I.
= Twel$e 4ate Treatise, 9.
> Ibid.
&? Twel$e 4ate Treatise, II.
&& L3ctionsL here refers to dispositions which affect -arma. The three -inds of action are related to
the body, speech and mindD.
&0 The si1 forms of life are' hellish things, hungry ghosts, beasts, e$il spirits, human beings and
hea$enly beings.
&+ The si1 sense faculties are eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind.
&2 The three feelings are pain, pleasure and freedom from both.
&: The four clingings are the clingings of passions, dogmatic $iews, rigid rules of conduct and
selfhood.
&; ,iddle Treatise, 99.I' &-&2.
&< Benneth B. Nagar/una' Translation of his ,ulamadhyama-a-ari-as with an introductory essay
EHo-useido ress, To-yo, &><?F, p. &;?.
&= Twel$e 4ate Treatise, I' 0.
&>. 3. B. 7arder, WIs Nagar/una a ,ahayanistO6, The roblem of Two Truths in 8uddhism and
.edanta, ed. by ,er$yn "prung, pp. =?-=&.
0? Twel$e 4ate Treatise, I.
0& Twel$e 4ate Treatise, II.
00 ,iddle Treatise, .III' <.
0+ Ibid., 99.' &2.
02 Twel$e 4ate Treatise, 9.
0: ,iddle Treatise, 9II' >a.
0; Ibid., 9II' =.
0< Ibid., 99.II' &<.
0= see B. N. 5ayatme-e, DThe %ogic of Cour 3lternati$esD, hilosophy East and 7est E5an., &>;<F,
.ols. &;-&<.
0> ,iddle Treatise, 99.' &:-&;.
+? Ibid., 9II' >K Twel$e 4ate Treatise, 9. Cor a detailed discussion of Nagar/una6s logic, see
Hsueh-li Cheng, WTruth and %ogic in "an-lun ,adhyami-a 8uddhism6, International hilosophical
Quarterly, No 0&, "eptember, &>=&.
.
/1 , -0.
%&' (N343!5#N36" T7E%.E 43TE T!E3TI"E* '%&
%0' (Table of contents ("eng-/ui** '%0
.
I. Causal Conditions l
.
In the inAuiry for the causes of things, it seems that e$erything possesses a nature of itself. 0 3
careful analysis shows that such a self-nature does not really e1ist. The word L4ateL means a way
leading to a thorough understanding without a residue of doubt.
.
II. 7ith or 7ithout Effect
.
This is a further e1amination of the principle of $oidness of self-nature. It begins with the Auestion
whether things ha$e been already in e1istence or ha$e not been in e1istence prior to their
production. Neither alternati$e is possible to establish the process of production. This e1amination
constitutes one of the L4atesL.
.
III. Conditions
.
)ne pre$ious chapter e1amines causes and this one e1amines conditions. Effects cannot be found
either in conditions in general or in any one of the four conditions. + This e1amination constitutes
one of the L4atesL.
.
I.. Characteristics 2
.
The pre$ious three 4ates show that production does not e1ist in the e1amination of causes and
conditions. This one shows that production does not e1ist in the e1amination of the three
characteristics. : This e1amination constitutes one of the L4atesL.
.
.. 7ith or 7ithout Characteristics
.
This e1amines the reality of the three characteristics' whether they characteriJe an ob/ect with or
without characteristics. It shows that there can be no characteriJation in either case. This constitutes
one of the L4atesL.
.
.I. Identity or Difference
.
The issue of the reality and unreality of characteristics ha$e been e1amined, (Nagar/una studies*
whether an ob/ect and characteristics are identical or different from each other. ; Neither case can
be established. This constitutes one of the L4atesL.
.
.II. 8eing or Non-8eing
.
The pre$ious chapters show that the three characteristics cannot really characteriJeK this one shows
that the four characteristics < cannot, either. L)riginationL and LdurationL belong to L8eingL, while
LdecayL and LdestructionL belong to LNon-8eingL. L8eingL and LNon-8eingL cannot e1ist either
together or separately. This constitutes one of the L4atesL.
.
.III. Nature
.
/2 , -0.
The e1amination of 8eing and Non-8eing shows that things are always changing in nature. "ince
things are originated from conditions, there cannot be any self-nature. This constitutes one of the
L4atesL.
.
I9. Cause and Effect
.
Things can neither be found from their Lself-natureL, nor can be found from the process of
causation. This constitutes one of the L4atesL.
.
9. The Creator
.
There cannot be creation without cause and effect. In the e1amination of four alternati$e cases, =
there cannot be any creation. This constitutes one of the L4atesL.
.
9I. The Three Times >
.
In the e1hausti$e study of creation, it is necessary to e1amine it with respect to time. Then one will
find that creation is impossible in all three times. This constitutes one of the L4atesL.
.
9II. roduction &?
.
LCreationL means that something new is formedK LroductionL means that something new is
originated. "ince they cannot be established in all three times, how can there be such a thing as
productionO This constitutes one of the L4atesL.
/3 , -0.
%0' (reface ("eng-/ui** '%0
.
The Twel$e 4ate Treatise is a refutati$e and correcti$e & e1position on the nature of reality 0 and
the essential way to the place of enlightenment. +
.
Twel$e is the great number which comprises all branches (of teachings on emptiness*. 4ate is the
term for opening up, clearing the way and remo$ing hindrances. Treatise is the complete
e1amination of sources and the thorough e1position of principles. 2 If one principle is not
thoroughly e1plained, many different $iews will arise and the point will be missed. : If one source
is not completely e1amined, many people will go astray and become heterodo1.
.
If heterodo1 $iews are not corrected, and the erroneous not eliminated, great men will be grie$ed.
Therefore Nagar/una 8odhisatt$a opened a way for those who want a solution and wrote the
Twel$e 4ate to set them right. 8y using the Twel$e 4ate, the issue of being and non-being is
cleared away, and no (other* problem remains. ; )nce the issue of being and non-being is sol$ed,
the problem of 4?d as the creator disappears. 7hen principles culminate in the empty position, the
self is lost along with the two e1tremes. Howe$er, losing the self reAuires the discard of the fishtrap
ElanguageF. < Discarding the fishtrap reAuires lea$ing behind reliance (on the doctrine of
emptiness*. = )nly when the fishtrap and the self are both forgotten can one comprehend reality.
7hen one comprehends reality, the real and the unreal both disappear, and possessing and losing
$anish. )nce these disappear and $anish, one can remo$e haJards > in the double mystery &? (of the
doctrine of emptiness*, eliminate all erroneous $iews, && turn the carriage toward the place of
enlightenment and set the mind fully on the 8uddha-stage.
.
How glorious (is the Twel$e 4ate Treatise* G &0 Truly, it is li-e brandishing an empty blade in an
empty space, playing inaudible music in the cosmos, &+ sa$ing the drowned with a profound ford
and going beyond the boundary of being and non-being.
.
How fortunate the scholars of later timesG 3 le$el road is already prepared, and a hidden pass is
already disclosed. Truly, they can ride a gentle phoeni1 in the Northern )cean, &2 dri$e a white o1
bac- to the south, be awa-ened from the dream state, attain a hundred transformations and turn
homeward in peace. 3s when the bright sun shines forth, there is no dar- place that is not
illuminated when this is understood. &:
.
I, "eng-/ui, not $ery talented, still dare to clarify and $erify the empty gate. I long to realiJe the
ultimate ideal, and hope there may be benefits in daily life, and e1pect there will be good effects in
coming years. ,oreo$er, how greatly I respect such talented wor-. ("o* I dare to use my poor pen
and limited thoughts to write a preface and add a table of contents at the front. I ha$e done so not
because it can increase the $alue (of the treatise*, &; simply with the hope that I may open a way to
impro$e myself.
.
.
X-- This chapter is di$ided into two parts.
.
X-- -- The first part is the preface of the treatise. It states the main theme of the boo-.
.
X-- -- The second part is de$oted to the e1amination of the concept of ... Eyin-yuanF.
/9 , -0.
.
X-- The word yin EhetuF means cause or reason. It often refers to primary cause. The term yuan
EpratyayaF means conditions, cause, relationship by fate or margin. It often refers to secondary
cause. Cor e1ample, a seed is yin, while rain, wind, sun, farmer, etc. are yuan. 8ut in this chapter
yin and yuan seem to be used together. Pin-yuan here means causal condition, causal relation,
conditioning cause, or causality.
.
X-- Causality has been an important issue in Indian philosophy. The principle of causality is often
regarded by 8uddhists as well as non-8uddhists & as the ob/ecti$e law regulating the rise and fall of
all factors or phenomena in the uni$erse. There are four e1ternal causal conditions E... nei-yin-yuanF
and twel$e internal causal conditions E... , nei-yin-yuanF which are enumerated in early 8uddhist
treatises. Each of them is conditioned EpaticcasamuppannaF as well as conditioning
EpaticcasamuppadaF. 7hen $iewed from the antecedent cause, each is an effect, but when $iewed
from its effect, it is a cause. 0 The twel$e chains of causal conditions are considered as the true
picture of the wheel of e1istence. In this chapter Nagar/una argues that all causal conditions are
empty.
.
Nagar/una says'
.
Now I shall briefly e1plain the teachings + of ,ahayana.
.
Question' 7hat are the benefits of e1plaining ,ahayanaO
.
3nswer' ,ahayana is the profound dharma-store 2 of the 8uddhas in the ten directions of space :
and the three periods of time. ; It is spo-en for the people of great $irtue and intelligence. <
.
H (,- 02'&0.
H Therefore the mind of the ascetic (4uatama* was di$erted from teaching the dharma,
H Ha$ing thought about the incomprehensibility of the dharma by the stupid.*
.
(8ut* the sentient beings of late times are hardly $irtuous and talented. 3lthough they see- (and
study* the sutras, they cannot understand. =
.
H (,- 02'&&.
.
I sympathiJe with these people and want to enlighten them. >
.
H (,- 0<'+?.
H To him, possessing compassion, who taught the real dharma
H Cor the destruction of all $iewsMto him, 4autama, I humbly offer re$erence.*
.
3nd also I want to re$eal and ma-e clear the supremely great teachings of the Tathagata. &?
Therefore, I will briefly e1plain the teachings of ,ahayana.
.
Question' ,ahayana teachings are too many && to be counted. E$en the sayings of the 8uddha
alone cannot be e1hausted. How can you e1plain and e1pound them (all* O
.
00 , -0.
3nswer' 8ecause of this, I said at the beginning (this would be* a brief e1planation.
.
Question' 7hy is it called ,ahayanaO
.
3nswer' ,ahayana is the superior of the two $ehicles, &0 and hence is called the 4reat .ehicle.
This $ehicle can (help people* reach the ideal of the 8uddhas, and hence is called great. This is the
$ehicle which is ridden by 8uddhas and great men, &+ and hence is called great. It can eliminate the
great sufferings of sentient beings and gi$e great benefits, and hence is called great. It is the $ehicle
ridden by great persons such as bodhisatt$as 3$alo-ites$ara, &2 ,ahasthamaprapta, &: ,an/usri &;
and ,aitreya, &< and hence is called great. This $ehicle can e1haust the bottom of all truths and
hence is called great.
.
3gain, in the pra/na-sutra, the 8uddha himself says that the teachings of ,ahayana are
immeasurable and boundless. Cor this reason it is called great.
.
)ne of the profoundest teachings of ,ahayana is called emptiness. If one can understand this
doctrine, he can understand ,ahayana and possess the si1 paramitas &= without hindrance.
Therefore, I want only to e1plain emptiness. To e1plain emptiness and enter into its meaning one
should use the Twel$e 4ate (Treatise*.
.
X-- C),,ENT' This statement concludes the preface of the boo-. The following is the main body
of Chapter I.
.
The first gate is concerned with causal conditions. It is said,
.
S (I'&*
S Things are produced from $arious conditions,
S and hence ha$e no self-nature.
S If they ha$e no self-nature,
S how can there be such thingsO
.
X-- C),,ENT' The whole treatise includes twenty-si1 $erses. This is the first $erse.
.
X-- "elf-nature EtJu-hsing, s$abha$aF is the -ey concept Nagar/una wants to refute. He is against the
ontologiJation of any entity or ob/ect. 3 similar issue is e1amined in &' 0, &+ and &:' &-2 in the
,iddle Treatise. Emptiness here means Lwithout self-natureL or Lwithout own essenceL.
.
H (&'0.
H There are four conditioning causes
H 3 cause EhetuF E&F, ob/ects of sensations E0F, Limmediately preceding condition,L E+F and of
course the predominant influence E2F there is no fifth.
.
H &'&+.
H )n the one hand, the product (consists in its* conditioning causesK
H on the other hand, the causes do not consist of themsel$es.
H How can a product (resulting* from (conditioning causes* not consisting of themsel$es be
consisting of those causesO
.
H &:'&.
0- , -0.
.
H &:'0.
anything else.
.
H &:'+.
H If there is an absence of a self-e1istent thing, how will an other-e1istent thing Eparabha$aF
come into being O
H Certainly the self-e1istence of an other-e1istent thing is called DDother-e1istence.L
.
H &:'2.
H Curther, how can a thing (e1ist* without either self-e1istence or other-e1istenceO
H If either self-e1istence or other e1istence e1ist, then an e1isting thing, indeed, would be
pro$ed. *
.
3ll things produced by $arious conditions are of two -inds, one internal and the other e1ternal. 3ll
conditions are also of two -inds, one internal and the other e1ternal. E1ternal causal conditions are,
for e1ample, clay, turning string and a craftsmanK together they produce a /ar. 3s another e1ample, a
rug is produced from the causal conditions of yarn, a loom and a wea$er. "imilarly, site preparation,
foundation, poles, wood, mud, grass and labor are e1amples of e1ternal causal conditionsK together
they produce a house. "till other e1amples are mil-, a curdling $at and laborK they are combined to
produce cheese.
.
3gain, seed, earth, water, sunshine, wind, air, seasons and labor are combined to produce the
sprout. )ne should -now that the so-called e1ternal causal conditions are all li-e these. The so-
called internal causal conditions are ignorance, action, consciousness, name-form, the si1 sense
faculties, touch, feeling, desire, clinging, formation of being, birth and old age, deathK each has a
cause first and then is produced.
.
Thus both internal and e1ternal things are produced by $arious conditions. "ince they are produced
by $arious conditions, is it not true that they ha$e no self-natureO
.
Now if a thing has no self-nature, it cannot ha$e other-nature nor both self-nature and other-nature.
7hyO 8ecause the so-called other-nature has, in fact, no self-nature. &>
.
H (,- &'&.
H Ne$er are any e1isting things found to originate
H Crom themsel$es, from something else, from both, or from no cause.
.
H 0.
course the predominant influence E2F there is no fifth.*
.
H (,- &:'+.
02 , -0.
come into being O
H Certainly the self-e1istence of an other-e1istent thing is called DDother-e1istence.L*
.
If we say that something e1ists because of other-nature, then a cow e1ists because of horse natureK a
horse e1ists because of cow natureK a peach e1ists because of apple natureK an apple e1ists because
of peach nature, and so on. (They are all* really impossible. )ne might say that something e1ists not
because of a certain other-nature, but because of a certain other. 8ut this cannot be the case either.
7hyO If one says that a mat e1ists because of a certain grass, then the grass and the mat would be
one body, and the grass could not be called other. If one says that the grass is other with respect to
the mat, then he could not claim that the mat e1ists because of the grass. ,oreo$er, the so-called
grass has no self-nature either. 7hyO 8ecause the grass is also produced from $arious conditions.
"ince grass has no self-nature, one cannot say that because of grass nature the mat e1ists. Therefore,
the mat cannot ha$e grass as its substance. Thus, for the same reason the production of a /ar, cheese
and other things from e1ternal causal conditions cannot be established.
.
"imilarly, production by internal causal conditions cannot be established.
.
3s it is stated in the "e$enty Treatise,
.
S (I'0*
S (Twel$e chains of* causal conditions really ha$e no production.
S If they ha$e production,
S do they ha$e it in one mind-moment or in many mind-momentsO
.
H ("hunyatasaptati =.
H The twel$e dependently arising members, which result in suffering, are unborn. They are
possible neither in one mind nor in many.*
.
The so-called twel$e causal conditions really and originally ha$e no production. If there is
production, does it occur in one mind-moment or in many mind-momentsO If it occurs in one-
moment, then a cause and an effect would happen together at the same time. 8ut this is impossible.
7hyO 8ecause a cause is prior to an effect. If production occurs in many mind-moments, then the
twel$e causal conditions would be distinct from one another. Each of the earlier ones would occur
within a particular mind-moment and disappear with that mind-moment. Then, what would be the
causal condition of the later onesO "ince what disappears with a particular mind-moment is non-
e1istent, how can it affect othersO If there are twel$e causal conditions, they should either be in one
mind-moment or in many mind-moments. 8ut neither is possible.
.
X-- C),,ENT' Nagar/una here discusses an idea which is not well e1amined in the ,iddle
Treatise 02' &-&2. He wants to show that the so-called twel$e chains of causal conditions are really
empty. He also argues that one cannot use mind, consciousness or an internal element to e1plain the
reality of the uni$erse.
.
H (,- 02'&.
H If e$erything is empty, there is no origination nor destruction.
H Then you must incorrectly conclude that there is non-e1istence of the four holy truths.
.
H 0.
0/ , -0.
H If there is non-e1istence of the four holy truths, the sa$ing -nowledge, the elimination (of
illusion*,
H The LbecomingL (enlightened* Ebha$anaF, and the LrealiJationL (of the goal* are impossible.
.
H +.
H If there is non-e1istence, then also the four holy LfruitsL do not e1ist.
H In the non-e1istence of fruit there is no Lresiding in fruitL nor obtaining.
.
H 2.
H 7hen the community (of 8uddhists* does not e1ist, then those eight L-inds of personsL (i.e.,
four abiding in the fruit and four who are obtaining* do not e1ist.
H 8ecause there is non-e1istence of the four holy truths, the real dharma does not e1ist.
.
H :.
H 3nd if there are no dharma and community, how will the 8uddha e1istO
H 8y spea-ing thus, (that e$erything is empty* certainly you deny the three /ewels (i.e., the
8uddha, the dharma, and the community*.
.
H ;.
H Pou deny the real e1istence of a product, of right and wrong,
H 3nd all the practical beha$ior of the world as being empty.
.
H <.
H 7e reply that you do not comprehend the point of emptinessK
H Pou eliminate both LemptinessL itself and its purpose from it.
.
H =.
.
H >.
.
H &?.
H 3nd without ha$ing understood the highest sense ET0F one cannot understand nir$ana ET+F.
.
H &&.
H It is li-e a sna-e wrongly grasped or (magical* -nowledge incorrectly applied.
.
H &0.
H Ha$ing thought about the incomprehensibility of the dharma by the stupid.
.
H &+.
H Time and again you ha$e made a condemnation of emptiness,
H 8ut that refutation does not apply to our emptiness.
00 , -0.
.
H &2.
H 7hen emptiness Lwor-sL, then e$erything in e1istence Lwor-sL. E3F
H If emptiness Ldoes not wor-L, then all e1istence Ldoes not wor-L. E8F
.
H Y*
.
Therefore, all conditions are empty. "ince conditions are empty, things produced by conditions are
also empty. Thus, one should -now all created things 0? are empty. If created things are empty,
how much more so with the selfO 0& 8ecause of created things such as the fi$e s-andhas, the twel$e
sense fields EayatanaF and the eighteen elements EdhatuF, one can say there is the self. )nly if there
is something burnable can there be the fact of burning. Now since s-andhas, sense fields and
elements are empty, nothing can be called self. If there is nothing burnable, there cannot be the fact
of burning.
.
X-- C),,ENT' 8uddhists di$ide e1istence into two main groups, sams-na and asams-rta. The
sams-na comprise such dharmas as are tied to chains of causation and are capable of producing
effects, while the asams-rta e1ist unconditionally. The fi$e s-andhas, twel$e sense fields and
eighteen elements belong to the sams-rta. "pace, nir$ana and a negati$e state due to the absence of
proper conditions belong to the asams-rta.
.
X-- The fi$e s-andhas are form ErupaF, sensation E$edanaF, perception Esan/naF, impulse Esams-araF
and consciousness E$i/nanaF. The twel$e sense fields EayatanaU are the eye, ob/ects of sight, the ear,
sounds, the nose, smells, the tongue, tastes, body, touchable ob/ects, mind and mind-ob/ects. The
eighteen elements are the si1 sense faculties, the si1 sense ob/ects and the corresponding si1 sense
consciousnesses.
.
X-- Nagar/una argues that both the sams-na and the asams-rta are empty. "ince they are empty, all
things are empty.
.
The sutra says,
.
I LThe 8uddha told bhi-sus 00 that because of self there can be self belongings. If there is no
self, then there are no self belongings.L 0+
.
Thus, since created things are empty, we should -now that the non-created nir$ana is also empty.
7hyO The elimination of the fi$e s-andhas without producing another fi$e s-andhas is called
nir$ana. (8ut* the fi$e s-andhas are originally empty. 7hat is to be eliminated to be called nir$anaO
3nd the self is also empty. 7ho can obtain nir$anaO ,oreo$er, non-produced things are called
nir$ana. If produced things can be established, non-produced things can be established. 3s
mentioned in the pre$ious e1amination of causes and conditions, produced things cannot be
established. This will be discussed again. "o produced things cannot be established. 8ecause there
are produced things, others can be called non-produced. If produced things cannot be established,
how can non-produced things be establishedO
.
Therefore created things, non-created things and the self are all empty.
.
0. , -0.
X-- This is the longest chapter in the treatise. Nagar/una e1amines here the relationship between
cause and effect to show that causal relation cannot be e1plained rationally. If there is a causal
relation, is cause with effect and then produces itO )r is the cause first without the effect and then
produces itO Nagar/una argues that neither case can be established. The issue is also whether an
effect is already real in a cause or at the outset unreal in a cause, and whether an effect pre-e1ists in
a cause or not. Nagar/una tries to point out that causal production is impossible by showing that
causal relation cannot be established.
.
X-- Nagar/una uses the logic of the tetralemma to discuss the issue. There are four possible $iews of
causality, namely E&F an effect is already real in a cause, E0F an effect is at the outset unreal in a
cause, E+F an effect is both real and unreal in a cause, and E2F an effect is neither real nor unreal in a
cause. His analysis is concentrated on the first two cases.
.
N 3gain, things are not produced. 7hyO
.
S (II.&*
S If an effect is already real (in a cause*,
S there can be no production.
S If at the outset unreal (in a cause*,
S there can be no production either.
S If both real and unreal,
S How can there be productionO
.
H (,- &';.
H There can be a conditioning cause neither of a non-real thing E&F nor of a real thing E0F.
H )f what non-real thing is there a conditioning causeO 3nd if it is (already* real, what use is a
causeO
.
H <.
H If an element EdharmaF occurs which is neither real nor non-real E2F nor both real- and-non-
real E+F,
H How can there be a cause which is effecti$e in this situationO*
.
If an effect is already real in a cause, then there will be no production. If an effect is at the outset
unreal, there will not be production either. If an effect is both real and unreal, there will be no
production either. 7hyO
.
If an effect is already real in a cause and becomes (again* a product, there will be an infinite regress.
If an effect is that which is not yet produced and becomes a product, then that which is already
produced should ha$e a product again. 7hyO 8ecause they are originally real in a cause. E$en the
effect of that which is already produced should ha$e production again. "o there will be an infinite
regress.
.
If it is said that that which is already produced can ne$er be produced again, but that which is not
yet produced can be produced, there is no principle of production (in the situation*.
.
Therefore, it is impossible that an effect is already real in a cause and becomes a product.
.
01 , -0.
X-- C),,ENT' Nagar/una seems to say that since an effect is already real, both wei-sheng Ethe
production which is not yet producedF and chin-sheng or i-sheng Ethe production which is already
producedF are eAually real. If the former is to be produced or can be produced, then the latter in
principle will be produced again and again. "o there will be infinite regress. 3lso, if both wei-sheng
and i-sheng are eAually already real, then the one cannot be produced if the other is not produced.
Therefore, production cannot be established.
.
3gain, to say that an effect is already real in a cause and that that which is not yet produced will be
produced but the product which is already produced will not be produced (again* is unintelligible.
Cor that which is not yet produced and that which is already produced are both realK (they ha$e the
same nature*. There is no reason (for them to ha$e different functions*, for the one to be produced
and the other not.
.
X-- C),,ENT' The opponent may argue that wei-sheng and i-sheng are the same only with
respect to LessenceL or nature but are different with respect to LfunctionLK wei-sheng and i-sheng
cannot EaF both be produced or EbF both not be produced as Nagar/una argued in the preceding two
paragraphs. To deal with this ob/ection, Nagar/una wants to point out that there is no ontological
ground for wei-sheng and i-sheng to ha$e different functions. If two things ha$e the same essence,
they should ha$e the same function. "o it is untenable to say that wei-sheng can produce but i-sheng
cannot.
.
3gain, if that which is not yet produced is truly real, & then that which is already produced would
(by your logic* be unreal. 7hyO 8ecause that which is already produced and that which is not yet
produced are opposite. "ince that which is already produced and that which is not yet produced are
opposite their production should be different.
.
X-- C),,ENT' In pre$ious paragraphs it is argued that if the opponent holds that wei-sheng and i-
sheng are eAually real, he should not ma-e a distinction between them by saying that the one can be
produced and the other cannot. In this paragraph Nagar/una argues that if the opponent, on the other
hand, holds that wei-sheng and i-sheng are different and that wei-sheng is real, it would go against
common sense to say that i-sheng is unreal. Cor two different things should ha$e two different
appearances or essencesK if one is real, the other should be unreal. This is absurd, and therefore it is
untenable that an effect is already real in a cause and then becomes a product.
.
3gain, real and unreal are opposite. 0 "uppose that which is produced is real and that which is not
yet produced is also real. Then the two should not be different. 7hyO If both are real, what is the
difference between themO 8ut it is not true that they are not different. "o if (an effect is* real (in a
cause*, there can be no production.
.
3gain, whate$er is real has already been realiJed, why must it be produced againO 5ust as that
which has been done need not be done again, and that which has been achie$ed need not be
achie$ed again, so what is real would not be produced again.
.
3gain, if an effect is real in a cause, then the effect should be obser$able before it is produced, but
actually it is not obser$able. Cor e1ample, the /ar should be seen in the clay and the straw mat in the
straw, but in fact they are not obser$able. Therefore, if (an effect is* real (in a cause*, there is no
production.
.
Question' (8ut* although an effect pre-e1ists, it has not yet undergone change and hence is not
02 , -0.
obser$able.
.
3nswer' If when the /ar has not been produced, its form has not undergone change and hence it
cannot be obser$ed, by what mar- do we -now and say that the /ar pre-e1ists in the clayO Is it by a
/ar mar-, a cow mar- or a horse mar- we claim there is a /arO If the clay does not contain a /ar
mar-, nor a cow mar- nor a horse mar-, is it not the same as saying that the /ar does not e1istO
Therefore, it is not tenable to say that an effect pre-e1ists in a cause and will be produced.
.
3gain, a thing which has undergone change is called an effect, and hence change must ha$e already
occurred in the cause. 7hyO 8ecause you claim that an effect pre-e1ists in a cause. If things such as
/ars ha$e undergone change and pre-e1isted (in their causes*, they should ha$e been obser$able. 8ut
in fact they were not obser$able. Therefore it is un/ustifiable to say that an effect has not undergone
change and hence is not obser$able.
.
If what has not undergone change is not called an effect, an effect is ultimately unobtainable. 7hyO
8ecause change does not occur before (production* nor does it occur after (production*. "o effects
such as a /ar are ultimately unobtainable.
.
If what has been changed is called an effect, then an effect is not in a cause. Thus you are uncertain
about whether an effect is already in a cause or is not in a cause.
.
Question' Change pre-e1ists but cannot be seen. 3 thing may actually e1ist although its e1istence is
unobser$able. Cor e1ample, a thing is not percei$ed because it is too closeK or it is not percei$ed
because it is too far awayK or it is not percei$ed because of sensory defectK or it is not percei$ed
because we fail to notice it. 3 thing cannot be -nown because of obstacles or because of similarity.
It cannot be seen because it is o$erwhelmed by something else. 3nd a thing may be too small to be
-nown. ,edicine in the eye is an e1ample of a thing which is not seen because it is too near. 3 bird
flying high and disappearing in the s-y is an e1ample of a thing which cannot be seen because it is
too far. "ome e1amples in which a thing cannot be -nown because of sensory defects are' the blind
cannot see colorsK the deaf cannot hearK the stopped nose cannot smellK the mouth of a sic- person
cannot tasteK the paralyJed body cannot feelK the craJy mind cannot -now reality. 3n e1ample of a
thing which is not -nown because we do not pay attention to it is this' when we concentrate on
certain colors or other things we do not hear a $oice. Instances in which a thing is not -nown
because of obstacles are these' the earth bloc-s (the $iew of* floods and a wall bloc-s (the $iew of*
ob/ects. 3n e1ample of a thing not -nown because of similarity is a blac- spot on a blac- color. 3n
e1ample of a thing not -nown because it is o$erwhelmed by another is that we do not hear a soft
$oice when bells and drums play. 3n instance of a thing not -nown because of its small siJe is that
we do not see dust. Thus although things e1ist, they may not be -nown because of these eight
causal conditions. It is not right for you to say that, /ust as a /ar cannot be found in its cause, so
cause cannot contain change. 7hyO 3n ob/ect may e1ist and yet is not obser$able because of the
eight causal conditions.
.
3nswer' The fact that changes and effects such as a /ar cannot be obser$ed, has nothing to do with
the eight causal conditions. 7hyO Changes and effects which are too near to be seen, would be
obser$able if they were not too nearK and those which are too far away to be obser$ed, would be
obser$able if they were nearer. 3lthough our mental faculties are not good enough to obser$e them,
they would be obser$able if our faculties were pure and good. 3lthough the mind is too inattenti$e
to obser$e them, they could be obser$ed if the mind were attenti$e. )bstacles may -eep us from
seeing something, but changes and effects can be seen when there are no obstacles. 7hen ob/ects
03 , -0.
are similar, they may not be percei$ed, but when dissimilar, they can be percei$ed. 7hen ob/ects
are o$ershadowed they may not be percei$ed, but when not o$ershadowed they can be percei$ed.
3n ob/ect may be too small to be seen, but /ars and other effects are big and can be seen.
.
If a /ar is too small to be percei$ed (in its cause*, it could not be percei$ed after it is produced.
7hyO 8ecause what is already produced and what is not yet produced ha$e the same characteristic
of smallness, for they are both real.
.
X-- C),,ENT' If an effect such as a /ar is too small to be seen, it would not be seen e$en after it
has been produced. Cor wei-sheng and i-sheng ha$e the same essence. 3s they ha$e the same
essence, they should ha$e the same appearance. "o if one cannot be seen, the other will not be seen.
.
Question' 3n ob/ect is small when it is not yet produced, but it becomes large after it has been
produced. Therefore, that which is already produced is obser$able, while that which is not yet
produced is not obser$able.
.
3nswer' If this is the case, a cause does not include an effect because there is nothing large in the
cause.
.
3gain, there is nothing large in the cause before (production*. If there is something large in the
cause, you should not say that the effect is too small to be seen. Now the effect is large, yet you say
it is too small to be seenK then what is large cannot be called an effect. "o an effect ultimately
cannot be obtained. Pet actually the effect can be obtained. (Then you should admit that* it is not
too small to be seen. (Thus your position is really inconsistent or contradictory.* Therefore, it is not
/ustifiable to say that a cause includes an effect and that, because of the eight causal conditions, the
effect cannot be obser$ed.
.
3gain, if a cause includes an effect and then produces the effect, both the cause and the effect lose
their characteristics. 7hyO It is /ust li-e a blan-et in threads or a piece of fruit in a utensil. The so-
called cause would be only a location and cannot be called a cause. 7hyO 8ecause the thread and
the utensil are not the causes of the blan-et and the fruit. If a cause is destroyed, the effect will be
destroyed. "o (in this sense* a thing such as a thread is not the cause of a thing such as a blan-et. If
there is no cause, there will be no effect. 7hyO 8ecause of a cause, an effect can be established. If a
cause cannot be established, how can an effect be establishedO
.
3gain, if there is no ma-ing, nothing can be called an effect. Causes such as threads cannot produce
effects such as blan-ets. 7hyO It is that the threads do not produce the blan-et /ust because they
pro$ide a place for the blan-et. Thus there is neither cause nor effect. If there is neither cause nor
effect, one should not see- whether cause includes effect or does not include it.
.
3gain, assume that a cause includes an effect and (grant that the substance of* the effect is not
obser$able. 8ut the characteristics of the effect should be obser$able. Cor e1ample, we smell a
fragrance and -now there are flowersK we hear sounds and -now there is a birdK we hear the sound
of laughter and -now there is a manK we see smo-e and -now that there is fireK we see the crane and
-now that there is a pond nearby. Thus, if a cause includes an effect, there should be some signs.
Now neither the substance nor the characteristics of an effect are obtainable. "o we should -now
that a cause does not ha$e an effect included in it.
.
3gain, if a cause has an effect included in it and then produces the effect, one should not say that
09 , -0.
threads cause a blan-et nor that straws cause a mat. If a cause does not produce an effect, nothing
can produce it. Cor e1ample, if a blan-et is not made by threads, can it be made by strawsO If it is
not made by threads or straws, shouldnDt we say that it is not producedO If it is not produced, we
cannot call it an effect. If there is no effect, then there is no cause, as has been pointed out before.
Therefore, it is not true that a cause has an effect included in it and then produces the effect.
.
3gain, if an effect is not made (by anything*, then it is permanent li-e nir$ana. If the effect is
permanent, all created things are permanent. 7hyO 8ecause all created things are effects. If all
things are permanent, then there is no impermanence. If there is no impermanence, there is no
permanence. 7hyO 8ecause of permanence there is impermanence, and because of impermanence
there is permanence. Thus there is neither permanence nor impermanence. 8ut this is impossible.
Therefore one should not say that a cause has an effect included in it and produces the effect.
.
3gain, if a cause has an effect included in it and produces the effect, then the effect would cause
another effect. Cor e1ample, a blan-et would cause sitting, a cloa- would cause hiding and a cart
would cause loading. 8ut in fact these effects are not so caused. Thus one should not say that a
cause has an effect included in it and produces the effect.
.
"omeone may argue that earth has a certain good smell, but without rain the good smell does not
come out. 3n effect is /ust li-e this' (gi$en it is already included in a cause* it would not occur
without a combination of conditions. 8ut (I contend that* this is untenable. 7hyO 3s you (the
opponent* say, since something is called an effect only after it has been made, then things such as a
/ar would not be effects. 7hyO 8ecause what has been made has been made. 8ut (by your logic*
things such as /ar are already real and cannot be those which are made. Thus, if an effect is what has
been made, it is not /ustifiable that a cause has an effect included in it and produces the effect.
.
3gain, the illuminating cause + can illuminate but cannot produce ob/ects. Cor e1ample, when a
lamp is lighted to illuminate a /ar in the dar-, it also illuminates the bed and other things (but cannot
produce them*. The conditions which are gathered to ma-e a /ar cannot produce a bed and other
things. Therefore one should -now that a cause does not ha$e an effect included in it.
.
3gain, if an effect is already real in a cause and then is produced, one should not ma-e a distinction
between what has been made and what is yet to be made. 8ut you do ma-e this distinction.
Therefore, it is not true that a cause already includes an effect and produces it.
.
X-- C),,ENT' Nagar/una has argued that his opponent confuses the illuminating cause with the
producing cause. 8oth his e1amples of rain and a lamp would be illuminating cause, not producing
cause.
.
X-- Nagar/una has now finished e1amining the assumption that an effect is already real in a cause or
that a cause includes an effect and produces it. In the following paragraphs, he discusses the
assumption that an effect is at the outset unreal in a cause or that a cause does not include an effect
and produce it. He presents se$eral arguments to refute the assumption.
.
Now assume that a cause does not ha$e an effect included in it and produces the effect. This is not
tenable either. 7hyO If something is produced from nothing, then a second head and a third hand
should be produced. 7hyO 8ecause something could be produced from nothing.
.
Question' Things such as a /ar ha$e causal conditions (and hence can be produced*. 8ut a second
.0 , -0.
head and a third hand do not ha$e causal conditions, so how can they be producedO Therefore, what
you say is not right.
.
3nswer' 3 second head, a third hand, a /ar and other effects are all not real in their causes. Cor
e1ample, there is no /ar in clay and there is no /ar in stone. 7hy do we call clay, not stone, the cause
of a /arO 7hy do we call mil- the cause of cheese, and call yarn, not grass, the cause of a rugO
.
3gain, if a cause does not ha$e an effect included in it and yet produces the effect, then anything
can produce anything else. 3 finger should also produce carts, horses, food and other things.
"imilarly, yarn should produce not only rugs, but also carts, horses, and food. 7hyO If something
can be produced from nothing, why does yarn produce only rugs, but not carts, horses, food and
other unrelated things, since none of them is real in the causeO
.
If the cause does not include the effect and yet produces it, then the cause should not ha$e a certain
distinct and particular power to produce a certain (distinct and particular* effect. (#sually* if we
want oil, we get it from sesame, not from sand. 8ut if they ha$e no relation to one another, why do
we get oil from sesame and not from sandO
.
erhaps you would say that we ha$e been sesame produce oil, but ha$e ne$er seen sand produce it.
Therefore, we see- oil from sesame, not from sand. 8ut this is not tenable. 7hyO If the mar- of
production is established, then one can say that since we ha$e seen sesame produce oil but ha$e
ne$er seen sand produce oil, we see- oil from sesame but not from sand. Howe$er, the mar- of
production has not been established, and hence one cannot legitimately claim that since we ha$e
seen sesame produce oil, we see- oil from sesame, not from sand.
.
3gain, what I am doing now is not only refuting one instance of causation, but all causes and
effects. That a cause has an effect included in it and produces it, that a cause does not ha$e an effect
included in it and produces it, and that a cause both has and does not ha$e an effect included in it
and produces it, cannot be established. Pour e1ample, that you ha$e seen sesame produce oil, is
based on the $ery idea of causation which is yet to be established.
.
X-- C),,ENT' Nagar/una points out that the obser$ation of the constant con/unction of certain
e$ents in the past does not guarantee that similar e$ents will produce similar effects unless we
assume the principle of causality, the $ery principle which we want to pro$e. He e1amines not a
particular causal law in a particular instance, but the $ery idea of causation, to show that the
uni$ersal principle of causality cannot be /ustified on empirical grounds.
.
3gain, if a cause does not ha$e an effect included in it and yet produces the effect, the characteristic
of cause Cannot be established. 7hyO If a cause has nothing (included in it*, how can it ma-e
anythingO How can it produce or achie$eO If there is no ma-ing and no producing, how can it be
called a causeO Thus (really*, a ma-er cannot ma-e anything and what is made cannot ma-e
anything either.
.
If a cause has an effect included in it, then there should be no distinction between ma-ing, a ma-er
and that which is made. Cor if the effect is already real, why should it be made againO "o you may
say that since ma-ing, a ma-er, that which is made and other causes cannot be established, (I ha$e
to accept the thesis that* a cause does not ha$e an effect included in it. Howe$er, this is not
necessarily true. 7hyO If one accepts the distinction between ma-ing and a ma-er and (the reality
of* causality, he has to accept your charge. 8ut I say that ma-ing, a ma-er and causality are all
.- , -0.
empty. Curthermore, your refutation of ma-ing, a ma-er and causality $erifies my position, and
should not be called against me. Thus I still maintain that the thesis, that a cause does not include an
effect and then produces the effect, is untenable.
.
3gain, if someone accepts that a cause includes an effect, your charge is a charge against him. 8ut I
do not say that a cause has an effect included in it, hence I do not ha$e to accept your charge, and
also I do not ha$e to accept the thesis that a cause does not ha$e an effect included in it.
.
X-- C),,ENT' Nagar/una stresses that he does not hold any $iew and that the denial of
affirmation does not entail the assertion of negation. 7hen he denies that a cause includes an effect,
he does not necessarily assert that a cause does not include an effect.
.
X-- He also points out that the opponentDs hypothetical charge $erifies his position. Cor the opponent
at this point of the argument will grant that it is untenable that cause includes an effect and then
produces it. That has been Nagar/unaDs intent in the first half of the chapter.
.
X-- Nagar/una has finished the e1amination of the second possible $iew of causal relation. In the
following paragraphs, he discusses the third possible $iew, namely, that a cause both includes and
e1cludes an effect and then produces the effect. He also wants to refute this $iew.
.
It is also untenable that a cause can both include and e1clude an effect and then produce the effect.
7hyO 8ecause including and e1cluding are contradictory in nature. How can things which are
contradictory in nature be togetherO 5ust as brightness and dar-ness, suffering and pleasure, going
and staying, binding and loosening cannot be together, so a cause which both includes and e1cludes
an effect cannot produce.
.
3gain, a cause which (both* includes and e1cludes an effect has been refuted pre$iously when we
e1amined including and e1cluding cases (indi$idually*.
.
Therefore, if a cause has an effect included in it, there is no production. If a cause does not ha$e an
effect included in it, there is no production either. This is also true of a cause that both includes and
e1cludes an effect. !easoning can go no furtherK we ha$e e1amined all aspects and cannot find
(production*. Therefore, the effect is ultimately not produced.
.
"ince the effect is ultimately not produced, all created things are empty. 7hyO 8ecause all created
things are causes and effects.
.
"ince created things are empty, non-created things are also empty.
.
"ince e$en created and non-created things are empty, is it not more so with the selfO
.
X-- 3ccording to the 3bhidharma "chool, all dharmas are real, and are produced by four conditions'
E&F the cause-condition Eyin-yuan, hetu-pratyayaF, which acts as the primary cause, for e1ample, the
wind and water that cause the wa$eK E0F the seAuential condition ErJDu-ti-yuan, anantara-pratyayaF
which ma-es one e$ent occur after another, such as wa$es that follow each otherK E+F the
appropriating condition Eyuan-yuan, dlambana-pratyayaF which is the ob/ecti$e or sub/ecti$e
en$ironment, as concurring causeK for e1ample, wa$es are conditioned by the basin or the boat or
.2 , -0.
the pondK and E2F the uphea$ing condition Etseng-shang-yuan, adhipati-pratyayaF which brings all
conditions to the clima1, such as the last wa$e that upsets the boat. Nagar/una e1amines the four
conditions in this chapter.
.
N 3gain, the conditions of things cannot be established. 7hyO
.
S (III.&*
S 8riefly and broadly,
S conditions do not contain effect.
S If there is no effect within conditions,
S how can it be claimed to come from conditionsO &
.
H (,- &'&&.
H The product does not reside in the conditioning causes, indi$idually or collecti$ely,
H "o how can that which does not reside in the conditioning cause result from conditioning
causesO*
.
Effects such as a /ar are not in any of the conditions nor are they in their aggregate. If they are not in
either, how can they be said to come from the conditionsO
.
Question' 7hat are those conditionsO
.
3nswer'
.
I Cour conditions produce thingsK
I there is no fifth condition.
I (They are* the cause-condition,
I the seAuential condition,
I the appropriating condition
I and the uphea$ing condition 0.
.
H (,- &' 0.
course the predominant influence E2F there is no fifth.*
.
The so-called four conditions are the cause-condition, the seAuential condition, the appropriating
condition and the uphea$ing condition. The cause-condition is called so because it produces effects,
such as what is already produced, what is being produced and what will be produced. The
seAuential condition is called so because it ma-es one e$ent occur after another. The appropriating
condition is called so because it pro$ides the sub/ecti$e setting, li-e body--arma, mouth--arma and
Aualities of the mind. The uphea$ing condition is that by which other things are culminated. 7ith
respect to the others, this is the uphea$ing condition.
.
These four conditions show that a cause + does not include an effect. If there were an effect in a
cause, the effect would e1ist e$en without conditions 2. 8ut in fact there is no effect without the
conditions. If an effect were in the conditions, there would be effect without cause. 8ut, in fact,
there is no effect without cause. It might be assumed that there is an effect within (both* conditions
and causes. 8ut after rational analysis, this is shown unpro$able. Therefore, both instances come to
./ , -0.
naught. Thus, effect is neither in each indi$idual condition nor in their combination. How can it be
asserted that effect comes from conditionsO
.
3gain,
.
S (III.0*
S If effect does not e1ist within conditions
S and yet comes from the conditions,
S can it not come from non-conditionsO :
.
H (,- &' &0.
H Then the Lnon-realL would result from those conditioning-causes.
H 7hy then would a product not proceed also from non-causesO*
.
If it is said that effect is not within conditions and yet is produced by the conditions, why is it not
(also* produced by non-conditionsO 8ecause it does not e1ist in eitherK therefore, there are no such
things as causal conditions which can produce effect.
.
"ince effect is not produced, conditions are not produced. 7hyO 8ecause conditions are prior to
effect. "ince conditions and effect do not e1ist, all created things are empty. "ince created things are
empty, non-created things are also empty. "ince created and non-created things are both empty, can
there be a selfO
%0' (I.. Characteristics* '%0
.
X-- ... EhsiangF in Chinese sutras can be the translation of the "ans-rit terms la-sana, nimitta or
abhasa. %a-sana means characteristic, mar-, sign, aspect or appearance. It usually means the
indi$idual characteristic or mar- by which one ob/ect is distinAuished from another. Nimitta means
appearance or tangible formK and abhasa is image or shadow. Hsiang in this conte1t means
primarily the characteristic, mar-, sign, property, appearance or $isible form of things.
.
X-- In this chapter Nagar/una wants to show that all things are de$oid of characteristics, mar-s, or
properties. The same issue is discussed in Chapter .II of the ,iddle Treatise.
.
3gain,
.
N 3ll things are empty. 7hyO
.
S (I..&*
S Neither created nor non-created things
S ha$e characteristics.
S "ince they ha$e no characteristics,
S they are both empty. EI.'&F
.
Created things are not formed by characteristics.
.
Question' 7hat are created characteristicsO
.
3nswer' E$erything has certain created characteristics. Cor e1ample, the horn of an o1 is sharp and
.0 , -0.
the tip of its tail has hairK these are characteristics of an o1. The bottom of a /ar is flat, its bowl is
big, its nec- is small, its mouth is round, its edge is roughK these are characteristics of a /ar. 7heel,
a1le, shaft and yo-e are the characteristics of a wagon. 3 man has a head, eyes, body, spine,
shoulders, elbows, hands and feet as his characteristics. (Now I as-* if origination, duration and
destruction are the characteristics of created things, are they created or non-createdO
.
Question' 7hat is wrong with saying that characteristics are created thingsO
.
3nswer'
.
I If origination is a created thing,
I it should ha$e three characteristics.
I If origination is a non-created thing,
I how can it be called a created characteristicO &
.
H (,- <'&.
H If origination EutpadaF is a composite product, then the three characteristics (of e1istence'
Lorigination,L Lduration,L and LdissolutionL* are appropriate.
H 8ut if origination is a non-composite EasamstrtaF, then how (could there be* characteristics
of a composite productO
.
H 0.
H 7hen the three are separate, origination of either of the other two characteristics does not
suffice to function as a characteristic.
H If united in a composite product, how could they all be at one place at one timeO
.
H +.
H If origination, duration, and dissolution are other (secondary* characteristics of composite
products,
H It is an infinite regress. If this is not so, they are not composite products.*
.
If origination is a created thing, it should ha$e the three characteristics (of origination, duration and
destruction*, and these three characteristics should ha$e three other characteristics, to infinity. This
applies also to duration and destruction. If origination is a non-created thing, how can that which is
non-created be the characteristic of a created thingO 7ho can -now origination without origination,
duration and destructionO
.
3gain, origination, duration and destruction are differentiated and hence there is origination. 8ut
non-created things cannot be differentiated into origination, duration and destruction, and hence
cannot ha$e origination. This also applies to duration and destruction.
.
)rigination, duration and destruction are empty. Therefore created things are empty. "ince created
things are empty, non-created things are empty, for there are non-created things because of created
ones. Now since created and non-created things are empty, all things are empty.
.
X-- C),,ENT' In the argument that follows, Nagar/una focuses on origination. The
characteristics of duration and destruction can be e1amined - and refuted in the same way.
.
Question' Pou say that the three characteristics (each* ha$e three other characteristics, and hence
.. , -0.
there is an infinite regress.
.
"o origination cannot be a created thing. (8ut* one should say'
.
S (I..0*
S The origination of origination
S comes from the primal origination.
S ()n the other hand*, the primal origination
S is originated by the origination of origination. 0
.
H (,- <'2.
H The Loriginating originationL EutpadotpadaF Ei.e. the beginning of the originationF is only the
origination of the basic origination EmulotpadaF Ei.e. the beginning of the productFK
H 3lso the origination of the basic (origination* Ei.e. the beginning of the beginning of the
productF produces the Loriginating origination.L Ei.e. the beginning of the originationF*
.
7hen a thing originates there are se$en phenomena' E&F thing, E0F origination, E+F duration, E2F
destruction, E:F origination of origination, E;F duration of duration and E<F destruction of
destruction. 3mong these se$en phenomena, primal origination can originate si1 other phenomena
besides itself. 3nd the origination of origination can originate primal origination. Then primal
origination originates the origination of origination again. Therefore, although these three
characteristics are created, they do not in$ol$e an infinite regress. + This is also the case with
duration and destruction.
.
3nswer'
.
I If it is said that the origination of origination
I originates the primal origination,
I how can the origination of origination
I originate primal origination
I if itself is originated by primal originationO 2
.
H (,- <':.
H 8ut if, according to you, the originating origination Ei.e. self-originating originationF
produces basic origination, Ei.e. also causes the beginning of the productF
H How, according to you, will this (originating origination* Ei.e. self-originating originationF
produce that (basic origination* Ei.e. the beginning of the productF if (it itself* is not produced by
basic origination Ei.e. the beginning of the productFO*
.
If it is said that the origination of origination can originate the primal origination, how can the
origination of origination originate the primal origination when the primal origination has not
originated the origination of originationO
.
S (I..+*
S If it is said that the primal origination
S originates the origination of origination,
S how can the primal origination
S originate the origination of origination
S if itself is originated by the origination of originationO :
.1 , -0.
.
H (,- <';.
H If, according to you, that which has originated through basic (origination* Ei.e. referring to
the dependent originating originationF produces basic (origination*, Ei.e. li-e affirming that the
effect e1ist before the causeF
H How does the basic (origination*, which is yet unproduced by that (originating origination*
Ei.e. self-originating originationF, cause that (originating origination* Ei.e. self-originating
originationF to be originatedO*
.
To say that primal origination can originate the origination of origination, and that the origination of
origination which is already originated can originate primal origination, cannot be true. 7hyO The
origination of origination should originate primal origination, and hence is called the origination of
origination. 8ut the primal origination has not yet been originated, so how can it originate the
origination of originationO
.
To say that while the origination of origination is being originated, it can originate primal
origination, cannot be true either. 7hyO
.
S (I..2*
S 7hen the origination of origination is being originated
S it may originate primal origination.
S How can it originate primal origination
S if itself has not yet been originatedO ;
.
H (,- <'<.
H 3ccording to you, this, while originating, would certainly cause that to originateM
H If this, not being produced, would be able to cause origination.
.
H =.
H (The opponent claim'*
H 3s a light is the illuminator of both itself and that which is other than itself,
H "o origination would originate both itself and that which is other than itself.*
.
7hen the origination of origination is being originated, it may originate primal origination. 8ut the
origination of origination itself has not yet been originated and hence cannot originate the primal
origination.
.
To say that when the origination of origination is being originated it can originate itself and also
originate others, /ust as when light is lighting it can illuminate itself and others, < cannot be true.
7hyO
.
S (I..:*
S There is no dar-ness in the light
S nor is there dar-ness in that place.
S The elimination of dar-ness is called illumination.
S Now what could the light illuminateO =
.
H (,- <'>-&?.
H (Nagar/una answers'*
.2 , -0.
H There is no dar-ness in the light and there where the light is placed.
H 7hat could the light illumineO Indeed illumination is the getting rid of dar-ness.
.
H &?.
H How is dar-ness destroyed by the light being originated,
H 7hen the light, being originated, does not come in contact with dar-nessO*
.
The body of light itself has no dar-ness. The illuminated place has no dar-ness either. If there is no
dar-ness in the light nor dar-ness in the location, how can one say that light illuminates itself and
other thingsO The elimination of dar-ness is called illumination. (8ut* the light does not eliminate
its own dar-ness nor the dar-ness of other things. Therefore it illuminates neither itself nor other
things. Thus your statement that, /ust as light illuminates itself and other things, so origination
originates itself and other things, is untenable.
.
Question' 7hen the light is being lighted, it can eliminate dar-ness. Therefore, there is no dar-ness
in the light or in the location.
.
3nswer'
.
I How can dar-ness be eliminated
I by the light being lighted,
I when the light, /ust being lighted,
I does not come in contact with dar-nessO >
.
H (,- <'&&.
H 8ut then, if dar-ness is destroyed by a light ha$ing no contact with (dar-ness*,
H (3 light* placed here will destroy the dar-ness of the entire world.*
.
If the light cannot come in contact with dar-ness when it is being lighted, and if it does not come in
contact with dar-ness, one should not say that it eliminates dar-ness.
.
3gain,
.
S (I..;*
S If the light can eliminate dar-ness
S while ha$ing no contact with dar-ness,
S then the light here
S should eliminate all dar-ness. &?
.
H (,- <'&0.
H If the light illuminated both itself and that which is other than itself,
H Then, without a doubt, dar-ness will co$er both itself and that which is other than itself.*
.
If it is said that, although the light does not come in contact with dar-ness, its power can eliminate
dar-ness, the light here should eliminate all the dar-ness of the world, for all the dar-ness does not
come in contact with the light. 8ut actually if you light a lamp here, it cannot eliminate all the
dar-ness of the world. Therefore, your thesis that although the light does not come in contact with
dar-ness, it can destroy dar-ness, is untenable.
.
.3 , -0.
3gain,
.
S (I..<*
S If the light illuminates itself and other things
S then dar-ness will also co$er itself and other things. &&
.
H (,- <'&+.
H If it has not yet originated, how does origination produce itselfO
H 3nd if it has already originated, when it is being produced, what is produced after that
which is already producedO*
.
If you say that light illuminates both itself and other things, dar-ness, which is contrary to light,
should co$er both itself and other things. If dar-ness, which is contrary to light, cannot co$er itself
and other things, it is incorrect to say that light can illuminate both itself and other things.
Therefore, your e1ample is incorrect.
.
)ne should say,
.
S (I..=*
S If origination is not yet originated,
S how can it originate itselfO
S If it is already originated and then originates itself,
S why should it need originatingO &0
.
H (,- <'&2.
H In no way does anything originate
H by what is being originated EiiF,
H by what is already originated EiiiF,
H or by what is not yet originated EiFM
H 5ust as it has been said in (the analysis of* Lpresently going to EiiF,L Lthat which is already
gone to EiFL and Lthat which is not yet gone to EiiiF.L*
.
7hen this origination is about to originate, it is either li-e that which is already originated or li-e
that which is not yet originated, and then originates. If it is li-e that which is not yet originated and
then originates, how can it originate itself, since what is not yet originated is not yet in e1istenceO If
it is said that it is li-e that which is already originated and then originates itself, why should it need
originatingO In it there is no more originating acti$ity, and in that which is made there is no more
ma-ing acti$ity. Therefore, origination does not originate itself. If origination does not originate
e$en itself, how can it originate other thingsO It is wrong for you to say that origination originates
itself and other things. The case is the same with duration and destruction.
.
Therefore, the thesis that origination, duration and destruction are created characteristics is not
right. "ince the thesis that origination, duration and destruction are created characteristics cannot be
established, created things are empty.
.
Created things are empty, therefore non-created things are empty. 7hyO The destruction of created
things is called non-created nir$ana. Therefore nir$ana is empty.
.
3gain, no origination, no duration and no destruction are claimed to be characteristics of non-
.9 , -0.
created things. 8ut nothing e1ists without origination, duration and destruction. That which is non-
e1istent cannot be characteristic of anything.
.
It may be said that Lno characteristicL is the characteristic of nir$ana, but this is untenable. If Lno
characteristicL is the characteristic of nir$ana, by what characteristic do we -now it as Lno
characteristicLO If we -now Lno characteristicL by a certain characteristic, why is it called Lno
characteristicLO If we -now Lno characteristicL by no characteristic, it is not -nowable since no
characteristic does not e1ist.
.
It may be said that it is li-e clothes which ha$e character, but one garment has no characterK it has
Lno characteristicL as its characteristic. If someone says to bring the one with no characteristic, we
-now this can be done. &+ "imilarly, origination, duration and destruction are characteristics of
created things. 7hene$er there are no-origination, no-duration and no-destruction, we can -now
they are characteristics of non-created things. Therefore, a state of lac-ing characteristics is nir$ana.
8ut this thesis is untenable. 7hyO .arious causal conditions li-e origination, duration and
destruction are empty. Created characteristics cannot be established. How can one claim that non-
created things are -nowableO 8y what (other* determinate characteristics of created things do you
-now that lac- of (those* characteristics shows the e1istence of a non-created thingO Pour thesis,
that the one with no characteristic among all the clothes is an e1ample of the Lno characteristicL of
nir$ana, is untenable. (The issue in$ol$ed in* the e1ample of clothes will be discussed in detail in
Chapter ..
.
Therefore created things are all empty. "ince created things are empty, non-created things are
empty. "ince created and non-created things are empty, the self is empty. These three are empty and
hence all things are empty.
%0' (.. 7ith or 7ithout Characteristics &* '%0
.
X-- In this chapter Nagar/una argues that the characteriJation or description of anything is empty.
He classifies all things into the characteriJable E... -Do-hsiangF and characteristics E... hsiangF.
,etaphysically, the distinction between the two is a distinction between substance and attribute.
4rammatically, it is a distinction between a sub/ect and a predicate. %inguistically, it is a distinction
between the part of a sentence which ser$es to identify or designate an ob/ect being discussed and
that part which ser$es to describe or characteriJe the ob/ect. Nagar/una points out that one who
indulges in conceptualiJation and has the dualistic way of thin-ing, e.g., di$ides things into those
with characteristics and those without characteristics or into the characteriJable and characteristics,
will not ha$e an accurate perception and understanding of reality.
.
3gain,
.
N 3gain, all things are empty. 7hyO
.
S (..&*
S There is no functioning of characteriJation
S in the case of a thing with characteristics.
S Nor is there functioning of characteriJation
S in the case of a thing without characteristics.
S 8esides these, what can characteristics characteriJeO 0
.
10 , -0.
H (,- :'+.
H There is no functioning of a defining characteristic in a case where there is (already* a
defining characteristic or where there is not a defining characteristic.
H 3nd it can function in nothing e1cept where there is a defining characteristic or where there
is not a defining characteristic.*
.
There is no function of characteriJation where things ha$e characteristics. 7hyO If things already
ha$e characteristics, why do they need more characteristicsO
.
3gain, if there were functioning of characteriJation in the case of things with characteristics, there
would be a mista-e of ha$ing two (-inds of* characteristics' the characteristics which are already
possessed by things and the characteristics which are to be used to characteriJe things. Therefore,
there cannot be functioning of characteriJation when things ha$e characteristics. +
.
Nor can there be functioning of characteriJation when things ha$e no characteristics. 7hat can be
lac-ing characteristics and yet be characteriJed by characteristicsO 3n elephant has two tus-s, a
long trun-, a large head, ears li-e plates, spine li-e an arrow, a large belly, hair at the tip of its tail,
four strong round feetK these are characteristics of an elephant. 7ithout these characteristics there
would be no elephant to be characteriJed. 3 horse has raised ears, a mane, four hoo$es and fine hair
in its tail. 7ithout these characteristics there would be no horse to be characteriJed. Thus there is no
functioning of characteriJation either when things ha$e characteristics or when they do not. )ther
than the e1istence and the non-e1istence of characteristics, there is no third possibility where
characteriJation can occur. Therefore there is no functioning characteriJation. 2
.
"ince there is no functioning characteriJation, there cannot be the characteriJable. 7hyO 8ecause of
characteristics something can be called the characteriJable. (8ut* owing to causal conditions,
characteristics and the characteriJable are empty. : "ince characteristics and the characteriJable are
empty, all things are empty. 7hyO (8ecause* there cannot be anything without characteristics and
the characteriJable. "ince entities ; do not e1ist, there cannot be nonentities. < The destruction of an
entity is called the non-e1istence of something. (8ut now* if the entity does not e1ist, what is to be
destroyedO 7hat is to be called nonentityO 8oth entity and nonentity are empty. Hence all created
things are empty. "ince created things are empty, non-created things are empty. "ince created and
non-created things are empty, the self is also empty.
.
X-- In this chapter Nagar/una continues to e1amine critically the functioning of characteriJation or
description of things. He argues that a conceptual description of reality is impossible by showing
that the adeAuate relation between the characteriJable and characteristics cannot be established.
.
X-- Nagar/unaDs analysis is concerned with what 7estern philosophers would call substance-
attribute relations. He Auestions the $iew that a thing or ob/ect consists of a substance and attributes.
He points out that the so-called substance and attributes are empty for they are neither identical nor
different from each other.
.
X-- %inguistically, the problem of characteriJation is the problem of predication. In this and
pre$ious chapters Nagar/una is Auestioning the adeAuacy of our language or $erbal statements. In
both metaphysical and ordinary uses of language a statement usually consists of a sub/ect and a
predicate. Nagar/una wants to show that the relationship between the sub/ect and the predicate
1- , -0.
cannot be adeAuately established. Hence, predication is really impossible.
.
.
S (.I.&*
S Characteristics and the characteriJable
S are neither the same nor different.
S If they are neither the same nor different,
S how can both be establishedO
.
Characteristics and the characteriJable are neither identical nor different from each other. If their
sameness and difference cannot be established, neither can be established. Therefore characteristics
and the characteriJable are empty. "ince characteristics and the characteriJable are empty, all things
are empty.
.
Question' Characteristics and the characteriJable ha$e always been established. 7hy can they not
be establishedO Pou say that characteristics and the characteriJable are neither the same nor
different. Now you should say that the characteristics of anything are either identical to, or different
from, the characteriJableK or things may be partially characteristics and partially the characteriJable.
Cor e1ample, the characteristic of consciousness & is being consciousK without the act of being
conscious there is no consciousness. The characteristic of sensation 0 is sensingK without the act of
sensing there is no sensation. "o characteristics are identical to the characteriJable.
.
The 8uddha says that the cessation of desire is called the characteristic of nir$ana. Desire is created
asra$a +K cessation is non-created anasra$a. 2 3 belie$er has three characteristics' he wants to be
with good men, he is eager to hear truth and he wants to gi$e alms. These three are the -armas of
body and mouth, and belong to outward appearances. : 8ut belief is of the mind and belongs to
mental acti$ities. ; Here characteristics and the characteriJable are different from each other.
.
!ight $iew < is a characteristic of the (Eightfold Noble* ath, and is partially the same as the
(Eightfold Noble* ath. )rigination, duration and destruction are the characteristics of created
thingsK they are partially the same as created things. Thus the characteriJable is partially identical
with characteristics.
.
X-- C),,ENT' The Eightfold Noble ath is composed of eight factors' namely, E&F right $iew, E0F
right thought, E+F right speech, E2F right action, E:F right li$elihood, E;F right effort, E<F right
mindfulness and E=F right concentration. The eight factors are not to be followed and practiced one
after the other in numerical order, but to be e1ercised and de$eloped simultaneously. They are all
lin-ed together and each helps the culti$ation of the others. "o the opponent claims that right $iew
is a characteristic of the Eightfold Noble ath and is also partially the same as the Eightfold Noble
ath, and argues that the characteriJable is partially identical to characteristics.
.
"o characteristics are either the same as, or different from, or partially the same as the
characteriJable. Pour thesis that since sameness and difference cannot be established,
characteristics and the characteriJable cannot be established, is untenable.
.
3nswer' Pour thesis that characteristics are the characteriJable, /ust as with consciousness and so
forth, is not tenable. 7hyO 8ecause that which can be -nown through characteristics is called the
characteriJableK what has been used in -nowing is called characteristics. (8ut* a thing cannot -now
12 , -0.
itself. Cor e1ample, a finger cannot touch itself and an eye cannot see itself. Therefore your thesis
that consciousness is both a characteristic and the characteriJable is untenable.
.
3gain, if characteristics are the same as the characteriJable, there is no distinction between them. If
we ma-e a distinction, we should not say that they are the same.
.
3gain, if characteristics are the same as the characteriJable, cause and effect would be one. 7hyO
Characteristics are cause and the characteriJable, effectK two are one. 8ut in fact they are not one.
Therefore, it is not right to say that characteristics and the characteriJable are the same.
.
Pour thesis is that characteristics and the characteriJable are different from each other is also
untenable. Pou say that the cessation of desire is the characteristic of nir$ana, not that desire is the
characteristic of nir$ana. If it is said that desire is the characteristic of nir$ana, then the
characteristic is different from the characteriJable. If it is said that the elimination of desire is the
characteristic of nir$ana, then it should not be said that the characteristic is different from the
characteriJable.
.
Pou also say that a belie$er has three characteristics. (8ut in fact* a belie$er and the three
characteristics are not different from each other. (Cor they are related in such a way that* if there is
no belief there are no three e$ents. Therefore, characteristics and the characteriJable cannot be
different. ,oreo$er, if characteristics and the characteriJable are different, a characteristic can ha$e
other characteristics, and there would be an infinite regressK but this is impossible. Therefore,
characteristics and the characteriJable cannot be different.
.
Question' 5ust as the light can illuminate itself and other things, so characteristics can characteriJe
themsel$es and other things.
.
3nswer' Pour e1ample of the light has been refuted pre$iously when we discussed three created
characteristics. 8esides you seem to contradict your own former $iew' pre$iously you said that
characteristics and the characteriJable were different, but now you say that characteristics can
characteriJe themsel$es and other things. This is untenable.
.
3gain, you say that the characteristics are part of the characteriJable. This is untenable. 7hyO
8ecause the meaning lies in sameness or in difference. 8ut the meanings of sameness and
difference ha$e been refuted pre$iously. "o you should -now that the $iew that the characteristics
are part of the characteriJable should be refuted.
.
Thus, characteristics and the characteriJable of $arious causal conditions are neither identical nor
different from each other. There is no other possibility. Therefore, characteristics and the
characteriJable are both empty. "ince both are empty, all things are empty.
.
.
X-- This chapter discusses four characteristicsK namely, origination, duration, change and
destruction. 8eing EyuF in this conte1t refers to origination and duration, and non-being EwuF refers
to change and destruction. Nagar/una argues that these four characteristics cannot be established.
He also wants to assert that the teachings gi$en by the 8uddha cannot be grasped by an interplay of
concepts, such as being and non-being or e1istence and non-e1istence.
1/ , -0.
.
N (.II*
N L3gain, all things are empty. 7hyO
N 8eing and non-being are neither obtainable at the same time nor at different times.L &
.
3s it is written,
.
S (.II.&*
S There cannot be being with non-beingK
S nor can there be being without non-being.
S If there can be being with non-being,
S then being should always be non-being. 0
.
H ("unyatasaptati &>.
H !eply' 8eing and non-being are not simultaneous.
H 7ithout non-being, no being.
H 8eing and non-being would always be.
H There is no being independent of non-being.*
.
8eing and non-being are contradictory to each other in nature. )ne thing cannot include both of
them. Cor e1ample, when there is life there is no death. 7hen there is death there is no life. This has
been discussed in the ,iddle Treatise. Pou may say that there is no mista-e (in the $iew that* being
e1ists without non-being. 8ut this is not the case. 7hyO How can there be being without non-beingG
3s pointed out pre$iously, when something is produced the se$en phenomena are produced
together. + ET4T I.F 3s stated in the 3bhidharma, being and impermanence are produced together.
Impermanence is the characteristic of destruction and hence is called impermanence. Therefore,
without non-being (and its characteristic, impermanence*, being cannot be produced. If being can be
produced with impermanence, then being would always be non-being. If being is always non-being,
duration cannot be originated, because permanence is destroyed. 8ut in fact there is duration.
Therefore being is not always non-being. (3nd to say* that being can be produced without
impermanence cannot be true either. 7hyO 7ithout impermanence being really cannot be
produced.
.
Question' 7hen being is produced, impermanence is already included in it and yet does not go into
action. 7hen there is destruction, impermanence goes into action and being is destroyed. Thus,
origination, duration, destruction and decay ha$e to wait for their time to go into action. 3t the
beginning (of production*, origination is effecti$e and hence being is originated. 8etween
origination and destruction, duration is effecti$e and hence being is upheld. 3t the end,
impermanence is effecti$e and hence being is destroyed. Decay is a change from origination to
duration and from duration to destruction. Impermanence destroys permanence and this ma-es the
four phenomena possible. Therefore, although a thing is produced with impermanence, being is not
always non-being.
.
3nswer' Pou say that impermanence is also the characteristic of destruction and is produced with
being. Then at the time of being produced, being is being destroyedK and at the time of being
destroyed, being is being produced. 2
.
3gain, there cannot be production and destruction. 7hyO 3t the time of being destroyed, there
cannot be production. 3nd at the time of being produced, there cannot be destruction, for
10 , -0.
production and destruction are contradictory.
.
3gain, you say that impermanence and duration are produced together. (8ut* at the time of
destruction, there cannot be duration, and at the time of duration there cannot be destruction. 7hyO
8ecause duration and destruction are contradictory.
.
3t the time of decays there is no duration, and at the time of duration there is no decay.
.
Therefore, your thesis that impermanence is originally with origination, duration, destruction and
decay is absurd. 7hyO "uppose that being is produced with impermanence. Impermanence is the
characteristic of destruction. 7hen a thing is produced it has no characteristic of destruction and
when it e1ists it has no characteristic of destruction either. 7hen, then, can there be impermanenceO
.
8ecause of Lbeing consciousL, there can be consciousnessK without being conscious there can be no
characteristic of consciousness. 8ecause of Lbeing able to senseL there can be sensationK without
being able to sense, there can be no characteristic of sensation. ,emory can be called such because
of Lbeing able to rememberLK there can be no characteristic of memory without being able to
remember. )rigination is a characteristic of productionK non-origination is not a characteristic of
production. Endurance is a characteristic of durationK non-endurance is not a characteristic of
duration. Change is a characteristic of decayK no change is not a characteristic of decay. Destruction
of life is a characteristic of deathK no destruction of life is not a characteristic of death. Thus,
destruction is a characteristic of impermanence. 7ithout destruction there is no characteristic of
impermanence.
.
X-- C),,ENT' Nagar/una refutes the opponentDs argument by pointing out that whate$er can be
concei$ed to e1ist must, in principle, be cogniJable, obser$able or $erifiable. Nothing can be said to
e1ist if there is no distinguishing mar- or sign by which we -now of its e1istence. "o the idea of the
e1istence of impermanence is unintelligible if it does not ha$e any distinguishing mar- or
characteristic EdestructionF which is capable of being percei$ed. )ne should not say that origination
and impermanence are produced together at the same time since at the time of origination nothing is
capable of being obser$ed as LimpermanenceL.
.
"uppose that although there is impermanence, it does not destroy being at the time of origination
and duration, but it will later. 7hy are they produced togetherO It is only at the time when being is
destroyed that impermanence is needed. "o it is incorrect to say that impermanence is produced
together with being and later destroys it.
.
Thus the unity of being and non-being cannot be established, nor can their disunity. Therefore,
being and non-being are empty.
.
"ince being and non-being are empty, all created things are empty. "ince all created things are
empty, non-created things are empty. "ince created and non-created things are empty, all sentient
beings are also empty.
.
.
X-- Nature E... hsingF here refers to essence, self-nature or fundamental nature behind a
manifestation or e1pression. Nagar/una wants to show that the characteristic of nature cannot be
1. , -0.
established, and hence to demonstrate that all things are empty. Nagar/una also argues that the
doctrine of emptiness is not nihilism and does not ma-e 8uddhism impossible. Instead, the doctrine
is gi$en to sa$e, or account for, empirical phenomena and religious practices.
.
N 8ecause things ha$e no nature. 3s it is written,
.
S (.III.&*
S 8y obser$ing that the characteristics (of all things* change
S 7e -now all things are de$oid of nature.
S Things which are de$oid of nature are also non-e1istent,
S so all things are empty. &
.
H (,- &+'+.
H (3n opponent says'*
H There is non-self-e1istence of things (since* a thing, by obser$ation, (becomes* something
else. Ei.e. impermanenceF
H 3 thing without self-e1istence does not e1istMdue to the emptiness of e1isting things.*
.
If things ha$e a nature, they should not be changing. 8ut we see that all things are changing.
Therefore we -now that they are de$oid of nature.
.
3gain, if things ha$e a determinate nature, they should not be produced by conditions. If nature is
produced by conditions, then it is that which is made. 0 (Pet* nature (as defined* is that which is not
made and not causally dependent upon other things. + Therefore, all things are empty.
.
H (,- &:'&.
Lsomething which is producedL E-rta-aF.*
.
Question' If all things are empty, then there can be no origination or destruction. If there are no
origination and destruction, then there can be no truth of suffering. If there is no truth of suffering,
there can be no truth of the arising of suffering. If there are no truths of suffering and its arising,
there can be no truth of the cessation of suffering. If there is no cessation of suffering, there can be
no way leading to the cessation of suffering. If all things are empty and without nature, there can be
no four noble truths. If there are no four noble truths, there can be no four fruits of sramana. 2 If
there are no four fruits of the sramana, there can be no sainthood. If there are none of these things,
there can be no 8uddha, Dharma and "angha, : and there can be no principle of worldly affairs.
8ut these are not so. Therefore, things cannot all be empty. ;
.
H (,- 02'&-;.
H &.
H If e$erything is empty, there is no origination nor destruction.
H Then you must incorrectly conclude that there is non-e1istence of the four holy truths.
.
H 0.
H If there is non-e1istence of the four holy truths, the sa$ing -nowledge, the elimination (of
illusion*,
11 , -0.
H The LbecomingL (enlightened* Ebha$anaF, and the LrealiJationL (of the goal* are impossible.
.
H +.
H If there is non-e1istence, then also the four holy LfruitsL do not e1ist.
H In the non-e1istence of fruit there is no Lresiding in fruitL nor obtaining.
.
H 2.
H 7hen the community (of 8uddhists* does not e1ist, then those eight L-inds of personsL (i.e.,
four abiding in the fruit and four who are obtaining* do not e1ist.
.
H :.
H 3nd if there are no dharma and community, how will the 8uddha e1istO
H 8y spea-ing thus, (that e$erything is empty* certainly you deny the three /ewels (i.e., the
8uddha, the dharma, and the community*.
.
H ;.
H Pou deny the real e1istence of a product, of right and wrong,
H 3nd all the practical beha$ior of the world as being empty.*
.
3nswer' There are two truthsK namely, con$entional truth and ultimate truth. 8ecause of
con$entional truth, ultimate truth is attainable. 7ithout relying on con$entional truth, ultimate truth
cannot be attained. 7ithout attaining ultimate truth nir$ana cannot be attained. <
.
H (,- 02'=-&?.
H <.
H 7e reply that you do not comprehend the point of emptinessK
H Pou eliminate both LemptinessL itself and its purpose from it.
.
H =.
.
H >.
.
H &?.
.
If one does not -now two truths, he cannot -now self-interest, other-interest and common interest. =
Thus, if one -nows con$entional truth, he then -nows ultimate truth, and if one -nows ultimate
truth, he -nows con$entional truth. > Now you hear of con$entional truth and call it ultimate truth,
and hence become lost. The doctrine of causation gi$en by 8uddhas is called the profound truth.
Causation is de$oid of self-nature, and hence I say (all things are* empty.
.
If things are not produced by conditions, they should ha$e their own determinate nature.
.
12 , -0.
H (,- 02'&&-&>.
H &&.
H It is li-e a sna-e wrongly grasped or (magical* -nowledge incorrectly applied.
.
H &0.
H Ha$ing thought about the incomprehensibility of the dharma by the stupid.
.
H &+.
H Time and again you ha$e made a condemnation of emptiness,
H 8ut that refutation does not apply to our emptiness.
.
H &2.
H 7hen emptiness Lwor-sL, then e$erything in e1istence Lwor-sL. E3F
H If emptiness Ldoes not wor-L, then all e1istence Ldoes not wor-L. E8F
.
H &:.
H Pou, while pro/ecting your own faults on us, Ei.e. ob/ectifying emptinessF
H 3re li-e a person who, ha$ing mounted his horse, forgot the horseGEi.e. a toolF
.
H &;.
H If you recogniJe real e1istence on account of the self-e1istence of things,
H Pou percei$e that there are uncaused and unconditioned things.
.
H &<.
H Pou deny Lwhat is to be produced,L cause, the producer, the instrument of production, and
the producing action,
H 3nd the origination, destruction, and Lfruit.L
.
H &=.
H The Loriginating dependentlyL we call LemptinessLK
H This apprehension, i.e., ta-ing into account (all other things*, is the understanding of the
middle way.
.
H &>.
H "ince there is no dharma whate$er originating independently,
H No dharma whate$er e1ists which is not empty.*
.
There can be no mar-s of origination and destruction in the fi$e s-andhas. If there is no origination
and no destruction in the fi$e s-andhas, there can be no impermanence. &? If there is no
impermanence, there can be no noble truth of suffering. If there is no noble truth of suffering, there
can be no noble truth of the arising of suffering. If things ha$e a determinate nature, there can be no
noble truth of the remo$al of suffering. 7hyO 8ecause natures cannot be changed. If there is no
noble truth of the remo$al of suffering, there can be no way leading to the remo$al of suffering.
Therefore, if we do not accept the doctrine of emptiness, there can be no four noble truths. If there
are no four noble truths, there can be no possession of the four noble truths. If there is no
possession. of the four noble truths, there can be no such things as -nowing suffering, eliminating
the cause of suffering, pro$ing the remo$al of suffering and culti$ating the way leading to the
13 , -0.
remo$al of suffering. If those things cannot be, there can be no four fruits of sramana. If there are
no four fruits of sramana, there can be no goal (for the religious life*. If there is no goal, there can
be no 8uddha. If the truth of causation is denied, there can be no Dharma. If there is no Dharma,
there can be no "angha. If there are no 8uddha, Dharma and "angha, then there can be no Three
5ewels. If there are no Three 5ewels, the principle of the world is denied. 8ut this is absurd.
Therefore all things are empty. &&
.
H (,- 02'0?-+?.
H 0?.
H If all e1istence is not empty, there is neither origination nor destruction.
H Pou must wrongly conclude then that the four holy truths do not e1ist.
.
H 0&.
H Ha$ing originated without being conditioned, how will sorrow Edu--haF come into
e1istenceO
H It is said that sorrow Edu--haF is not eternalK therefore, certainly it does not e1ist by its own
nature Es$abba$aF.
.
H 00.
H How can that which is e1isting by its own nature originate againO
H Cor him who denies emptiness there is no production.
.
H 0+.
H There is no destruction of sorrow Edu--haF if it e1ists by its own nature.
H 8y trying to establish Lself-e1istenceL you deny destruction.
.
H 02.
H If the path (of release* is self-e1istent, then there is no way of bringing it into e1istence
Ebha$anaFK
H If that path is brought into e1istence, then Lself-e1istence,L which you claim does not e1ist.
.
H 0:.
H 7hen sorrow Edu--haF, origination, and destruction do not e1ist,
H 7hat -ind of path will obtain the destruction of sorrow Edu--haFO
.
H 0;.
H If there is no complete -nowledge as to self-e1istence, how (can there be* any -nowledge of
itO
H Indeed, is it not true that self-e1istence is that which enduresO
.
H 0<.
H 3s in the case of complete -nowledge, neither destruction, realiJation, Lbringing into
e1istence,L
H Nor are the four holy fruits possible for you.
.
H 0=.
H If you accept Lself-e1istence,L and a LfruitL is not -nown by its self-e1istence,
H How can it be -nown at allO
.
19 , -0.
H 0>.
H In the non-e1istence of Lfruit,L there is no Lresiding in fruitL nor obtaining (the LfruitL*K
H 7hen the community (of 8uddhists* does not e1ist, then those eight L-inds of personsL do
not e1ist.
.
H +?.
H 3nd if there is no dharma and community, how will the 8uddha e1istO
.
H +&.
H Cor you, either the one who is enlightened EbuddhaF comes into being independent of
enlightenment,
H )r enlightenment comes into being independent of the one who is enlightened.
.
H +0.
H Cor you, some one who is a non-buddha by his own nature Es$abha$aF but stri$es for
enlightenment Ei.e. a 8odhisatt$aF
H 7ill not attain the enlightenment though the Lway of life of becoming fully enlightened.L*
.
3gain, if things ha$e determinate natures, there can be no origination, no destruction, and no good
or e$il. If there is no reward or punishment for good and e$il, the world can be but one scene.
Therefore, we should -now that things ha$e no nature. &0
.
H (,- 02'++-+=.
H ++.
H Neither the dharma nor non-dharma will be done anywhere.
H 7hat is produced which is non-emptyO Certainly self-e1istence is not produced.
.
H +2.
H Certainly, for you, there is a product without (the distinction* of dharma or non-dharma.
H "ince, for you, the product caused by dharma or non-dharma does not e1ist.
.
H +:.
H If, for you, the product is caused by dharma or non-dharma, be non-emptyO
H How can that product, being originated by dharma or non-dharma emptyO
.
H +;.
H Pou deny all mundane and customary acti$ities
H 7hen you deny emptiness (in the sense of* dependent co-origination Epatytya-samutpadaF.
.
H +<.
H If you deny emptiness, there would be action which is unacti$ated.
H There would be nothing whate$er acted upon, and a producing action would be something
not begun.
.
H +=.
H 3ccording to (the doctrine of* Lself-e1istenceL the world is free from different conditionsK
H Then it will e1ist as unproduced, undestroyed and immutable.
.
20 , -0.
H +>.
H If non-emptiness does not e1ist, then something is attained which is not attainedK
H There is cessation of sorrow Edu--haF and actions, and all e$il is destroyed.
.
H 2?.
H He who percei$es dependent co-origination Epatytya-samutpadaF
H 3lso understands sorrow Edu--haF, origination, and destruction as well as the path (of
release*.*
.
If it is argued that things ha$e no self-nature and are made from other-nature, this cannot be true
either. 7hyO 8ecause if there is no self-nature, how can they come into being from other-nature, for
owing to self-nature there is other-nature. &+
.
H (,- &'0.
H 0.
course the predominant influence E2F there is no fifth.
.
H +.
H Certainly there is no self-e1istence Es$abha$aF of e1isting things in conditioning causes, etcK
H 3nd if no self-e1istence e1ists, neither does Lother-e1istenceL Eparabha$aF.*
.
3nd other-nature is (a -ind of* self-nature too. 7hyO 8ecause other-nature is the self-nature of
others. &2
.
If self-nature cannot be established, other-nature cannot be established either. 7ithout self-nature
and other-nature, how can there be anythingO If being cannot be established, non-being cannot be
established either. &:
.
H (,- &:'
H &.
.
H 0.
anything else.
.
H +.
come into being O
H Certainly the self-e1istence of an other-e1istent thing is called DDother-e1istence.L
.
H 2.
H Curther, how can a thing (e1ist* without either self-e1istence or other-e1istenceO
H If either self-e1istence or other e1istence e1ist, then an e1isting thing, indeed, would be
2- , -0.
pro$ed.
.
H :.
H If there is no proof of an e1istent thing, then a non-e1istent thing cannot be pro$ed.
H "ince people call the other-e1istence of an e1istent thing a Lnon-e1istent thing.L
.
H ;.
H Those who percei$e self-e1istence and other-e1istence, and an e1istent thing and a non-
e1istent thing,
H Do not percei$e the true nature of the 8uddhaDs teaching.
.
H <.
H In LThe Instruction of BatyayanaL both Lit isL and Lit is notL are opposed
H 8y the 4lorious )ne, who has ascertained the meaning of Le1istentL and non-e1istent.L
.
H =.
H If there would be an e1istent thing by its own nature, there could not be Lnon-e1istenceD of
that (thing*.
H Certainly an e1istent thing different from its own nature would ne$er obtain.
.
H >.
H (3n opponent as-s'*
H If there is no basic self-nature Epra-tiF, of what will there be LothernessLO
.
H (Nagar/una answers'*
H If there is basic self-nature, of what will there be LothernessLO
.
H &?.
H LIt isL is a notion of eternity. LIt is notL is a nihilistic $iew.
H Therefore, one who is wise does not ha$e recourse to LbeingL or Lnon-being.L
.
H &&.
H That which e1ists by its own nature is eternal since Lit does not not-e1ist.L
H If it is maintained' LThat which e1isted before does not e1ist now,L there annihilation would
logically follow.*
.
Now we infer, therefore, that since there is no self-nature, no other-nature, no being and no non-
being, all created things are empty.
.
"ince created things are empty, non-created things are empty. "ince e$en created and non-created
things are empty, what of the selfO
.
.
X-- In the first few chapters of the treatise Nagar/una e1amined the concept of causation and argued
that cause and effect are de$oid of any nature. In this chapter he stresses that the mar-s of causal
phenomena cannot be established, for the mar-s of effect cannot be in any causal condition nor in
their combination. Nagar/una also argues that since the mar- of effect cannot be established, effect
22 , -0.
is empty. 3nd if effect is empty, all things are empty because all things are products EeffectsF of
other things.
.
N Things by themsel$es ha$e no natureK nor do they come from elsewhere.
N 3s it is written,
.
S (I9.&*
S 7ithin all conditions effect is ultimately unobtainable.
S Nor does it come from elsewhere.
S How can there be an effectO &
.
H (,- &0'&.
H "ome say'
H "orrow Edu--haF is produced by oneself EiF,
H or by another EiiF,
H or by both (itself and another* EiiiF,
H or from no cause at all Ei$FK
H 8ut (to consider* that (sorrow Edu--haF* as what is produced is not possible.*
.
3s stated pre$iously, there is no effect within any one of the conditions nor within the unity of all
conditions. Effect does not come from elsewhere either. If it comes from elsewhere, it would not be
produced by causal conditions. 3nd the combination of $arious conditions would ha$e no function.
0 If effect is not in conditions and does not come from elsewhere, it is empty.
.
Effect is empty, so all created things are empty. Created things are empty and hence non-created
things are empty.
.
E$en created and non-created things are empty' consider then the self as also empty.
.
%0' (9. The creator* '%0
.
X-- The opening $erse denies the four possible ways of $iewing the cause of sufferingK that is, self-
caused, other-caused, both self-caused and other-caused, and non-caused. The term other E... tDaF
here and in the rest of the chapter means anything other than itself or oneself. It may refer to a
person or persons as well as a thing or things. In what follows, Nagar/una uses the logic of reductio
ad absurdum to show the absurdity and untenability of each causal $iew. In doing this, he
repudiates the concept of 4?d as the creator and sa$ior.
.
N 8ecause it is impossible for a thing to be made by itself, by another, by both (itself and
another*, or from no cause at all.
N 3s it has been said,
.
S (9.&*
S It is not /ustifiable
S that suffering is made by itself,
S by another, by both or from no cause at all.
2/ , -0.
S Therefore there is no suffering. &
.
H (,- &0'&.
H "ome say'
H "orrow Edu--haF is produced by oneself EiF,
H or by another EiiF,
H or by both (itself and another* EiiiF,
H or from no cause at all Ei$FK
H 8ut (to consider* that (sorrow Edu--haF* as what is produced is not possible.*
.
"uffering cannot ma-e itself. 7hyO If it ma-es itself, it ma-es its own substance. 8ut a thing cannot
use itself to ma-e itself. Cor e1ample, consciousness cannot be conscious of itself, and a finger
cannot touch itself. Therefore nothing can be said to ma-e itself.
.
"uffering is not made by another either. How can it be made by the otherO
.
Question' Conditions are called other. Conditions ma-e suffering' this is called Lto be made by
otherL. How can you say suffering is not made by otherO
.
3nswer' If conditions are called other, suffering is made by conditions. If suffering is produced
from conditions, then it has conditions as its substance. If it has conditions as its substance, why are
the conditions called otherO Cor e1ample, in a clay /ar, clay is not called otherK in a golden bracelet,
gold is not called other. This also applies to the case of suffering. If it is produced by conditions, the
conditions cannot be called other.
.
3gain, conditions do not ha$e self-nature. They are not self-e1istent. Therefore it cannot be said
that effect is produced from conditions.
.
3s it has been written in the ,iddle Treatise,
.
S (9.0*
S Effect is produced from conditions,
S (but* conditions are not self-e1istent,
S If conditions are not self-e1istent,
S how can conditions produce effectO
.
X-- C),,ENT' This is ta-en from $erse &+ of Chapter I of the ,iddle Treatise. 3ccording to
ingala, whate$er can be concei$ed to e1ist must ha$e a certain nature or self-nature. If causal
conditions do not ha$e self-nature, they cannot be concei$ed to e1ist. 3nd if the conditions are non-
e1istent, how can we say that effect is produced by themO
.
H (,- &+'&.
H 3 thing of which the basic elements are deception is $ain, as the glorious one said.
H 3ll conditioned elements Esams-araF are things that ha$e basic elements EdharmaF which are
deceptionK therefore, they are $ain.*
.
Thus suffering cannot be made by other. Nor can it be made by both itself and other, for this
in$ol$es two fallacies. If you say that suffering is made by itself and by other, then there would be
the fallacies of self-made and other-made (which ha$e both been refuted*. Therefore it is not
20 , -0.
/ustifiable that suffering is made by both.
.
That suffering is produced from no cause at all cannot be true either, for that in$ol$es that fallacy of
eternalism. 0
.
3s it is written in the scripture, a na-ed Tirthi-a as-ed the 8uddha, LIs suffering made by itselfOL
The 8uddha -ept silent and did not answer. L7orld-honoredG + If suffering is not made by itself, is
it made by otherOL The 8uddha still did not answer. L7orld-honoredG Is it then made by itself and
by otherOL The 8uddha still did not reply. L7orld-honoredG Is it then made by no cause at allOL The
8uddha still did not answer. Thus, as the 8uddha did not answer these four Auestions, we should
-now that suffering is empty.
.
X-- C),,ENT' 3 Tirthi-a is a heretical or non-8uddhist religious man. There were si1 famous
Tirthi-as' namely, urana-Basyapa, ,as-arin, "an/ayin, 3/ita--esa-ambala, Ba-uda-Batyayana,
and Nirgrantha. The na-ed Tirthi-as, according to the Chinese master TDai-hsu, belonged to the
Nirgrantha sect of na-ed de$otees who abandoned all ties and forms.
.
Question' 8uddhaDs teaching in the scripture is not that suffering is empty, but he did this for the
sa-e of sa$ing sentient beings.
.
X-- C),,ENT' This e1change /u1taposes Hinayana and ,ahayana $iews. 3ccording to
Hinayanists, the 8uddha -ept silent when non-8uddhists such as the Tirthi-a as-ed him about the
cause of suffering because they had pre/udices and false $iews in mind before they as-ed the
Auestions. #nless they abandoned their pre/udices, they could not understand the truth, so the
8uddha did not answer. In fact, suffering is real, not empty. 8ut according to the ,adhyami-a, the
real reason the 8uddha -ept silent was that all things are empty and cannot be e1pressed or
discussed in the form of the four alternati$e $iews.
.
3nswer' The Tirthi-as say that man is the cause of suffering. Those who belie$e in the real
e1istence of the self say good and e$il are made by the self. 2 The self is clean and pure and has no
suffering and troubles. That which -nows and understands is the self. It ma-es good, e$il, suffering
and happiness, and is embodied in $arious forms. "ince they ha$e those wrong $iews and as- the
8uddha, LIs suffering made by itselfOL the 8uddha does not answer. "uffering is really not made by
the self.
.
If the self is the cause of suffering, suffering is produced owing to the self. The self would be
impermanent. 7hyO If things are causes and produced from causes they are all impermanent. :
Now if the self is impermanent, then the fruits and the conseAuences of good and e$il (deeds* would
disappear. The performance of 8rahmanic deeds to obtain good rewards would also be empty.
.
X-- C),,ENT' The self or atman is supposed to be permanent. Nagar/una points out that if the
self is the cause of suffering it would be impermanent, and therefore the opponentDs $iew in$ol$es a
contradiction. Empty in the last sentence suggests Lwould e$entually disappearL. Traditional
religious practice would be in $ain.
.
If the self is the cause of suffering, there can be no liberation. 7hyO If the self ma-es suffering,
without suffering there will be no self which is the ma-er of sufferingK if there is no self, then who
will achie$e liberationO If suffering can be made without the self, there will be suffering e$en after
liberationK and there is no (real* liberation. 8ut in fact, there is liberation. Therefore, it is not
2. , -0.
/ustifiable that suffering is made by itself.
.
"uffering is not made by other either. If suffering is separated (from the other*, how can there be
another self who ma-es suffering and bestows it on the recipientO
.
X-- C),,ENT' This in$ol$es two absurdities' EaF without suffering itself there is nothing that can
be called LotherL, EbF without suffering, who is going to be the recipient to recei$e sufferingO
!easoning here is similar to the argument in the ,iddle Treatise 9II' : and ;.
.
H (,- &0':.
H If sorrow Edu--haF were produced by a different personality EiiF EparapudgalaF,
H How would he, to whom is gi$en that sorrow Edu--haF by another after he had produced it,
be without sorrow Edu--haFO
.
H ;.
H If sorrow Edu--haF is produced by a different personality, who is that different personality
H 7ho, while being without sorrow Edu--haF, yet ma-es and transmits that (sorrow Edu--haF*
to the otherO*
.
3gain, L"uffering is made by otherL may mean it is made by 4?d EIs$araF. "ome who hold this
heterodo1 $iew as-ed the 8uddha (about the creation of the uni$erse*. "o the 8uddha did not
answer. !eally it was not made by 4?d. 7hyO 8ecause (4?d and suffering Ethe uni$erseF ; * are
contradictory in nature. 3 calf born of a cow is still a cow. If creatures are created by 4?d, they
should be similar to 4?d. Cor they are His sons.
.
X-- C),,ENT' .... ETJu-tsai-tienF literally means Lself-e1isting Hea$enFL. It refers to Is$ara, the
title of "i$a, the -ing of the de$as or 4?ds. Here Nagar/una uses the self-e1isting Hea$en of Is$ara
to e1amine the concept of 4?d and to show that 4?d cannot be used to e1plain the origin, duration
and destruction of the uni$erse.
.
3gain, if 4?d created all li$ing beings, He would not gi$e them suffering. Therefore one should not
say that 4?d created suffering.
.
Question' 3ll li$ing beings are created by 4?d, and suffering and happiness are also gi$en by 4?d.
8ut they do not -now the cause of happiness, and hence 4?d gi$es them suffering.
.
3nswer' If all li$ing beings are the sons of 4?d, He should use happiness to co$er suffering and
should not gi$e them suffering.
.
3nd .those who worship Him should not ha$e suffering but should en/oy happiness. 8ut this is not
true in reality. They act by themsel$es and ha$e happiness and suffering, and recei$e rewards
according to the principle of causal conditions. 3ll these are not made by 4?d.
.
X-- C),,ENT' Nagar/una has presented the problem of e$il to Auestion whether 4?d is all good.
In the ne1t paragraphs, he Auestions whether 4?d is self-sufficient, self-caused and omnipotent, and
touches on predestination.
.
3gain, if 4?d is self-e1istent, He should need nothing. If He needs something, He should not be
called self-e1istent. If He does not need anything, why did He (cause* change, li-e a small boy who
21 , -0.
plays a game, to ma-e all creaturesO
.
3gain, if 4?d created all li$ing beings, who created HimO That 4?d created Himself, cannot be
true, for nothing can create itself. If He were created by another creator, He would not be self-
e1istent.
.
3gain, if 4?d is the (omnipotent* creator, there should be no obstacle to the process of His creationK
He could ma-e (e$erything* in /ust one instant. (8ut* the scripture about 4?d says' 4?d wanted to
create all creatures. He practiced $arious ascetic deeds and then created all creeping insects. 3gain
He practiced ascetic deeds and then created all flying birds. 3gain He practiced ascetic deeds and
created men and de$as. < If it were a result of the practice of ascetic deeds that creeping insects
were first produced, and then flying birds, then men and de$as, we should -now that li$ing beings
were produced from -armas of causal conditions, not from 4?d who practiced ascetic deeds. =
.
3gain, if 4?d is the creator of all creatures, where did He create themO 7as the place (where He
performed creation* created by HimO 7as it created by anotherO If it was created by 4?d, then
where did He create itO If He stayed in another place to create this place, then who created the other
placeO Thus there would be an infinite regress. If that were created by another, there would then be
two 4?ds, but this cannot be true. Therefore all things in the uni$erse are not made by 4?d.
.
3gain, if 4?d is the creator, why should He practice ascetic deeds as if He were worshipping and
pleasing another in order to attend to His wishO If He has to practice ascetic life to beg the otherDs
fa$or, we should -now 4?d is not self-e1istent.
.
3gain, if 4?d created all things, things should be determinate (in nature* at the beginning of
creation and should not be changing. > 3 horse is always a horse and a man is always a man. 8ut
now all things are changing according to -arma. Therefore we should -now that all things are not
made by 4?d.
.
3gain, if 4?d is the ma-er (of all things*, there should be no sinfulness and blessedness because
good, e$il, beauty, and ugliness are all made by 4?d. 8ut actually there is sinfulness and
blessedness. Therefore all things are not made by 4?d.
.
3gain, if all li$ing beings come from 4?d, they should respect and lo$e Him /ust as sons lo$e their
father. 8ut actually this is not the caseK some hate 4?d and some lo$e Him. Therefore we should
-now that all things are not made by 4?d.
.
3gain, if 4?d is the ma-er (of all things*, why did He not create men all happy or all unhappyO
7hy did He ma-e some happy and others unhappyO 7e would -now that He acts out of hate and
lo$e, and hence is not self-e1istent. "ince He is not self-e1istent, all things are not made by Him.
.
X-- C),,ENT' 7hat Nagar/una wants to say seems to be this' 4?d can neither be all good nor
self-sufficient. If he is all good, why did He not create all men happyO If He is self-sufficient, why
did He ma-e some happy and others unhappyO 3lso, why does He worry about whether He should
lo$e or hate themO "ince 4?d cannot be all good or self-sufficient, the traditional 4?d, the di$ine
being, cannot e1ist.
.
X-- In the ne1t three paragraphs, Nagar/una Auestions the belief that manDs fate and sal$ation are
made and controlled by 4?d. He argues that the belief is empirically un/ustifiable and also ma-es
22 , -0.
moral and religious practices impossible.
.
3gain, if 4?d is the ma-er (of all things*, all li$ing beings cannot ha$e made (anything*. 8ut,
actually each li$ing being has s-illfully made something. Therefore, we should -now that all things
are not made by 4?d.
.
3gain, if 4?d were the ma-er, good, e$il, suffering and happiness would come without being made
(by men*. 8ut this would destroy the principle of the world (that men do good and obtain reward,
and do e$il and recei$e punishment*. The practice of an ascetic life and 8rahmanic deeds would be
in $ain. 8ut this is not the case. Therefore, we -now that all things are not made by 4?d.
.
3gain, if 4?d is great among sentient beings according to causal conditions, then all sentient beings
who practice the -arma of happiness &? should also be great. 7hy is 4?d only honoredO If 4?d is
self-e1istent without causal conditions, then all sentient beings should (in principle* be self-e1istent.
8ut actually this is not the case. "o you should -now that all things are not made by 4?d. If 4?d
(has a cause and* comes from another, then this other may come from still another. There will be an
infinite regress. If there is an infinite regress, there can be no cause.
.
Thus, there are $arious causal conditions which ma-e things. Pou should -now that all things are
not made by 4?d and also that 4?d does not e1ist. 7hen a person who held this heterodo1ical $iew
as-ed the 8uddha about suffering being made by another, he did not answer.
.
X-- C),,ENT' This paragraph summariJes the discussion of the impossibility of something made
or produced by other. In the following paragraphs Nagar/una e1amines the last two alternati$e
$iews of ma-ing M made by both self and other, and made by neitherDM and argues that they
cannot be established.
.
It cannot be the case that something is made by both (itself and other* either, for this (as has been
shown* has two fallacies.
.
The combination of causal conditions produces all things, so nothing is produced from no cause.
The 8uddha did not answer this (Auestion* either.
.
(Question*' Therefore the scripture only refutes four wrong $iews and does not say that suffering is
empty.
.
X-- C),,ENT' This statement, supposedly made by the opponent, claims that the silence of the
8uddha is only the denial of the four possible ways of $iewing things. It does not imply that all
things are empty.
.
X-- In the closing paragraphs, Nagar/una insists that the silence of the 8uddha is the same as the
teaching of the doctrine of emptiness. He reaffirms the main teaching of the ,adhyami-aK namely,
that pratityasamutpada or dependent origination is the same as sunyata.
.
3nswer' 3lthough the 8uddha says a combination of causal conditions produces suffering, to refute
the four wrong $iews is the same as saying suffering is empty. If suffering is produced from causal
conditions, it means that suffering is empty. 7hyO 8ecause anything which is produced by causal
conditions has no self-nature. 3nything which lac-s self-nature is empty.
.
23 , -0.
If suffering is empty, you should -now that created, non-created and all sentient beings are empty.
.
%0' (9I. The three times* '%0
.
X-- In this chapter Nagar/una e1amines the three temporal relations, namely, earlier than, later than
and simultaneous with. He attempts to show that the production of particular things is impossible
because it cannot occur in any temporal moment and because a temporal relation between e$ents
cannot be established. This chapter ends his discussion of the possibility that a particular ob/ect or
e$ent can be causally produced. In his last chapter Nagar/una will argue that production as such
cannot be established.
.
N 3 cause is neither earlier than, later than, nor at the same time as an effect.
N 3s it has been said,
.
S (9I.&*
S LEarlier thanL, Llater thanL and Lsimultaneous withL
S such e$ents are impossible.
S How can e$ents be produced by causesO &
.
H (,- &&'0.
H How could there be a middle portion of that which has no LbeforeL and LafterLK
H It follows that Lpast,L Lfuture,L and Lsimultaneous e$entsL do not obtain.
H 8irth and death are not separate Z different, not simultaneous Z the same.*
.
It cannot be true that a cause is prior to an effect. 7hyO If a cause e1ists earlier and from it an effect
is produced later, there would be no effect initially, and what would be its causeO If an effect is
prior to a cause, then the effect has already been established when there is no cause, and why must
it need a causeO If a cause and an effect e1ist at the same time, there would be no causal production
either. Cor e1ample, the horns of a cow are produced simultaneouslyK the left and the right do not
cause each other. Then the so-called cause cannot be the cause of the effect, and the so-called effect
would not be the effect of the cause, for they are produced at the same time. Therefore the three
temporal relationships between cause and effect are unattainable.
.
X-- C),,ENT' Causal production must be performed in certain temporal relationships' a cause is
either earlier than, later than or simultaneous with an effect. 8ut Nagar/una wants to show that the
temporal moments of priority, posteriority and simultaneity are empty' hence the functioning of
causal production cannot be established. "ince causality is empty, all things are empty. Cor all
things are causes and effects. Nagar/unaDs analysis of the three times and his argument for their
emptiness are intended to demonstrate that all things are empty.
.
Question' 0 Pour refutation of causation cannot be established in the three temporal relationships
either. If refutation is prior to the refutable, + then there would not be the refutable and what could
refutation refuteO If the refutable is prior to refutation, then the refutable has been established, and
why does it need to be refutedO If refutation and the refutable e1ist at the same time, there would be
no causal (relationship between them*. Cor e1ample, the horns of a cow are produced at the same
timeK the left and the right do not cause each other. Thus refutation does not cause the refutable, and
$ice $ersa.
29 , -0.
.
3nswer' Pour refutation and the refutable ha$e the same -ind of mista-e.
.
If all things are empty, there can be neither refutation nor that which is to be refuted. Now you say
that my refutation is emptyK this establishes what I say.
.
If I say that there must be refutation and the refutable, I would be mista-en, as you claimK but I do
not say there must be refutation and the refutable, so I should not be troubled by your charge.
.
X-- C),,ENT' The ,adhyami-as often claim that they do not hold any position or ha$e any
$iewpoint of their own. 7hat they are doing is simply using what other people belie$e to point out
that the opponentDs $iewpoint in$ol$es certain contradictions or absurdities. Their refutation and
criticism of the opponentDs theory are not a negation of something which is realK nor is it done for
the sa-e of the affirmation of their own $iewpoint, but as a complete negation. It does not
presuppose anythingK for them, all LaffirmationsL and LnegationsL should be gi$en up. Therefore
Nagar/una claims that the opponentDs refutation and criticism of his refutation of othersD theories, do
not trouble him, but rather support what he says. 2
.
Question' 7e do obser$e that a cause is prior to an effectK for e1ample, a craftsman ma-es a /ar. 3
cause could also be later than an effectK for e1ample, because of disciples there is a master, and they
are -nownL as the disciples (only* after teaching ta-es place. 3 cause and an effect may also e1ist at
the same timeK for e1ample, the light and its brightness e1ist at the same time. "o it is not right to
say that a cause is neither prior to, nor later than, nor at the same time as an effect.
.
3nswer' Pour e1ample of a craftsman ma-ing a /ar is not a correct one. 7hyO If there is no /ar
(yet*, what would the craftsman be the cause ofO 3s with the craftsman, nothing can be a cause
prior to an effect.
.
It is also untenable that there is a cause which is later than an effect. If there is no disciple, who can
be a masterO Therefore, a cause which is later than an effect is untenable.
.
If you say that li-e light and brightness, cause and effect e1ist at the same time, you still maintain a
doubtful cause. : "uppose the light and its brightness e1ist at the same time, how can they cause
each otherO
.
Thus causes and conditions are empty. Hence you should -now that all created things, non-created
things and all sentient beings are empty.
.
.
X-- The term sheng literally means production or origination. It can also refer to ma-ing, doing,
acting, changing and creating. In this chapter, Nagar/una e1amines the concept of sheng as such and
shows that it is an empty term. The function of production, originating, ma-ing, doing, acting,
changing and creating cannot be established.
.
X-- The way Nagar/una treats the concept of sheng is similar to his analysis of the concept of change
or motion in Chapter II of the ,iddle Treatise. He di$ides the path or passage of production into EaF
that which is already produced, EbF that which is not yet produced, and EcF that which is being
30 , -0.
produced. He e1hibits that none of the three moments can be established and thereby demonstrates
that production is really empty.
.
X-- It should be noted that there is no clear-cut distinction between acti$e and passi$e moods in
Chinese. "heng as a $erb means Lto be producedL and Lto produceL. "o EaF, EbF and EcF in this
conte1t can be that which has produced, that which has not yet produced or does not produce, and
that which is producing, respecti$ely.
.
N 8ecause that which is already produced, that which is not yet produced and that which is
being produced are unattainable. 7hat is already produced is not to be produced.
N 7hat is not yet produced is not produced yet.
N 7hat is being produced is not to be produced either.
N 3s it is said,
.
S (9II.&*
S The effect already produced is not to be producedK
S that not yet produced is not produced.
S 7ithout that which is already produced
S and that which is not yet produced,
S that which is being produced is not produced. &
.
H (,- <'&:.
H 7hen, in that-which-is-originated EiiiF, there is nothing which acti$ates that which is being
originated EiiF,
.
H How can one say' That which is being originated EiiF (e1ists* presupposing that which is
producedO*
.
That which is already produced refers to the effect which has already arisen. That which is not yet
produced refers to what has not yet arisen, does not come out or does not e1ist. That which is being
produced refers to what is /ust arising but is not yet accomplished.
.
3mong them the product of production is not to be produced. This is (partially* due to the fact that
what is already produced is not to be produced. 7hyO 8ecause it would in$ol$e the fallacy of an
infinite regress, the reproducing of what is done. If that which is already produced produces a
second product, this second product which is already produced would produce a third product, and
then the third product which is already produced would produce a fourth. This is /ust li-e the
original product which has already had the second product and then produces infinite productsK but
this is impossible. Therefore that which is already produced does not produce.
.
3gain, if you say that which is already produced produces, what it uses to produce is that (part*
which is not yet produced. 8ut this is impossible. 7hyO 8ecause to use what is not yet produced to
produce in$ol$es two -inds of productionK namely, what is already produced is produced and what
is not yet produced is produced. Pour position seems to be shifting and uncertain.
.
It is li-e this' what has been made need not be madeK what has been burned need not be burnedK
what has been pro$en need not be pro$ed. Thus what has been produced need not be produced.
Therefore what is already produced is not to be produced.
3- , -0.
.
The thing which is not yet produced 0 is not produced either. 7hyO 8ecause it has no connection
with production. + 3lso there would be the fallacy that all (effects* which are not produced are
produced. If that which is not produced is produced, there would be producing without production.
Therefore there is no production.
.
If there is producing without production, then there would be creating without creation, there would
be departing without departure and there would be consuming without consumption. This destroys
the principle of the world (that is, it is against common e1perience* and is untenable. Therefore, the
thing which is not yet produced is not produced.
.
3gain, if the thing which does not produce produces, then all things which do not produce should
produce. 3ll ordinary people who do not produce enlightenment E3nuttara-samya--sambodhiF
would produce enlightenmentK 2 an indestructible arhat who does not generate e$il passion would
generate e$il passionK and a rabbit and a horse which do not grow horns would grow horns. 8ut
these are impossible. Therefore you should not say that that which does not produce produces.
.
Question' That which does not produce produces (only* when it has a certain combination of causal
conditions. If causal conditions such as time, place, a ma-er and s-illful means are all present, some
of that which does not produce will produce, but not all will produce. "o you should not refute me
by saying that all should produce.
.
3nswer' "uppose that which does not produce produces when it has a combination of appropriate
conditions such as time, place, a ma-er and s-illful means. There is no production when it
prepossesses (a product* . : Nor is there production when it does not pre-possess (the product*. Nor
is there production when it both pre-possesses and does not pre-possess (the product*. Thus
production is unattainable in all three instances as pointed out before. ; Therefore that which does
not produce will not produce.
.
That which is producing does not produce either. 7hyO 8ecause it in$ol$es the fallacy that what
has already produced produces (again*, and also the fallacy that what has not yet produced
produces. It has been discussed pre$iously that what has produced, a part of what is producing, does
not produce. It has /ust been discussed that what has not yet produced, the (other* part of what is
producing, does not produce either.
.
X-- C),,ENT' That which is producing is supposed to be between EaF that which has produced
and EbF that which has not yet producedK in another $iew, EaF and EbF are considered its parts. Thus,
that which is producing depends on that which has produced and that which has not yet produced. If
the latter are denied, the former must be denied.
.
3gain, if there is that which is producing without production, then that which is producing
produces. 8ut actually without production there cannot be that which is producing. Therefore, that
which is producing does not produce.
.
3gain, if anyone says that there is production in that which is producing, then there would be two
productions' E&F that which is producing is produced, and E0F that which is producing produces. 8ut
neither of these two can be established, so how can one say there are these two productionsO
Therefore there is no production in that which is producing.
.
32 , -0.
3gain, without production there is not that which is producing. 7here would the production be
performedO If there is no place where that production is produced, then there cannot be that
producing. Therefore that which is producing does not produce. < Thus, that which is already
produced, that which is not yet produced, and that which is being produced cannot be established.
"ince production as such cannot be established, origination, duration and destruction cannot be
established either.
.
"ince origination, duration and destruction cannot be established. Created things cannot be
established. "ince created things cannot be established, non-created things cannot be established.
"ince created and non-created things cannot be established, all sentient beings cannot be
established.
.
Therefore you should -now all things ha$e no productionK they are ultimately empty and tranAuil.
.
3/ , -0.
%&' (Notes* '%&
.
)ne Nagar/una scholar has translated "hih-erh-men-lun E...F as Twel$e Topic Treatise. I prefer
Twel$e 4ate Treatise, for the word men E...F literally means gateK it is a way to get out of some
place and to enter into another, and shih-erh, twel$e, is a perfect number for the Chinese. The title
Twel$e 4ate Treatise fits the original purpose of the boo-, namely, that it is designed as the perfect
way to get rid of e1treme $iews and enter into the right $iew.
.
3ccording to tradition, the $erses of the ,iddle Treatise are gi$en by Nagar/una, but their
e1planations are gi$en by ihgala E...F. The $erses of the Hundred Treatise are gi$en by 3ryade$a,
but their e1planations are gi$en by .asu E...F. Howe$er, in the Twel$e 4ate Treatise, both $erses
and e1planation are gi$en by Nagar/una.
.
The reface and Table of Contents are gi$en by "eng-/ui, whose dates are +:0-2+;.
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%+' (Table of contents ("eng-/ui** '%+
.
& This can also be rendered as causal relation, relational condition, conditioning cause or causality.
0 ... Ehsing, s$abha$aF is the fundamental nature or essence behind manifestation or e1pression.
+ The four conditions are the cause-condition, the seAuential condition, the appropriating condition
and the uphea$ing conditionK see Chapter III.
2 ... Ehsiang, la-sanaF means mar-, characteristic, sign, indication, designation.
: The three characteristics are origination, duration and destruction.
; L3n ob/ect and characteristicsL are ... E-Do-hsiangF, the sub/ect, and ... EhsiangF, the predicate.
< The four characteristics are origination, duration, change and destruction.
= Cour cases are' made by itself, made by other, made by both itself and other, and made by neither
itself nor other.
> The three times are earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than.
&? ... Esheng, utpadaF means production, origination, beget, birth, begin.
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%+' (reface ("heng-5ui** '%+
.
& ... EcheF literally means snap, cut or prune. Here it means to refute erroneous or e1treme $iews, or
to prune inessentials. ... EchungF literally means center, middle, moderation. Here it means to
e1pound or to illuminate something correctly. It also means to bring out essentials. 3ccording to
Chi-tsang, che-chung is Lto prune things and ma-e them straight or harmoniousL. ECommentary on
the Twel$e 4ate Treatise, T. &=0:, p. &<& a.F
0 ... Eshih-hsiangF literally means the true mar-, the reality, but here it primarily means emptiness or
the middle way. The opening phrase can be rendered as LThe Twel$e 4ate Treatise is to e1pound
correctly the doctrine of emptiness by refuting e1treme $iewsL. It might also be rendered, LThe
Twel$e 4ate Treatise is the concise summary of the doctrine of emptinessL.
+ ... Etao-chDang, bodhimandalaF literally means the field or place of enlightenment.-Here it refers to
right obser$ation or enlightenment.
2 In his Early ,ddhyami-a in India and China, !ichard !obinson translated yuan and li as Lthe
source or the one sourceL and Lthe principle or the one principleL, respecti$ely Ep. 0?=F.
30 , -0.
: If translated literally, Lthere would be de$iations, attached inclinationsL.
; %iterally, Lno matter EshihF is une1haustedL. In the pre$ious paragraph, "eng-/ui tal-s about li E...FK
in this paragraph, he mentions shih E...F. "hih is phenomenon and acti$ity, in contrast with li, which
is theory, the underlying principle, noumenon or essence. The ideas of shih and li later become
important philosophical concepts in the Hau-yen and TDien-tDai "chools, and Neo-Confuncianism.
< ... EchDuanF. The term fishtrap comes from the Chuang-tJu, 0;.
= !eliance here means the reasons which ser$e to support the doctrine of emptiness. It also means
the de$ices which are used to show the emptiness of all things.
> The terms ... Echao-tJDuF are ta-en from the 3nalects 8oo- I.' Chapter ..
&? ... Eliang-hsuanF also means double profundity. Here it refers to the emptiness of emptiness or the
doctrine of emptiness. These Chinese terms are ta-en from the Tao-te-ching, Chapter I. "eng-/ui
used Taoist and Confucian terms and phrases to e1plain 8uddhist teachings.
&& )r eliminate erroneous $iews in one destination. ... Ei-chihF also come from the Tao-te-ching,
Chapter 999I9. They mean one destination or unity. The terms ... Etien-pDeiF come from the
3nalects 8oo- I.' Chapter ..
&0 Y Ehui-huiF literally means great or broad enough to embrace e$erything. The phrase comes
from the Chuang-tJu, +, 0a, 2b.
&+ The phrase comes from the Tao-te-ching, Chapter 9I..
&2 ... Eho-luanF, according to Chi-tsang, is an imperial carriage which has a phoeni1 singing in a
gentle $oice. Here it stands for the 4reat .ehicle. DThe Northern )ceanD is ta-en from Chuang-tJu &,
&3. la.
&: Chi-tsang comments that L/ust as when the sun comes out, there is no longer any dar- place, so
when this treatise is studied, there will be no more doubt and impedimentL, Eop. cit., p. &<2;F
&; %iterally, LIt is not because of any benefitL. This can also be rendered, LI ha$e done so not for the
benefit of othersL.
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%+' (Chapter &' Causal conditions* '%+
.
& "ee Da$id 5. Balupahana, Causality' The Central hilosophy of 8uddhism E#ni$ersity of Hawaii
ress, Honolulu, &><:F.
0 "ee 7alpola !ahula, 7hat The 8uddha Taught E4ro$e ress, New Por- &>:>F. pp. :0-:2.
+ ... EiF also means meaning, purpose, truth and righteousness.
2 ... Efa-tsangF is the treasury of 8uddhaDs teaching and the sutras.
: "hih-fang, referring to the eight points of the compass, the nadir and the D Jenith.
; "an-shih or the past, present and future.
< In the ,iddle Treatise the doctrine of emptiness is spo-en of as not for the unintelligent or slow-
witted E99I.' &0F.
= In the ,iddle Treatise Nagar/una also pointed out that the unintelligent people ha$e misconcei$ed
emptiness and hence ruined themsel$es E99I.' &&F.
> Here Nagar/una carries on the spirit of the 8uddhaDs compassion as stated at the end of the ,iddle
Treatise' LI re$erently bow to 4autama, who out of compassion taught this dharma in order to
eliminate all $iewsL. E99.II' +?F
&? Tathagata is normally interpreted as Lthus comeL, Lthus goneL, or by some as Lhe who has come
from the truth or absoluteL. It refers to one who has attained or arri$ed at the state of truth and is
one of the epithets of the 8uddha.
&& %iterally, Limmeasurable and boundlessL.
&0 The two $ehicles refer to sra$a-ayana and pratye-abuddhayana. The ob/ecti$e of both is
3. , -0.
personal sal$ation, while the ob/ecti$e of the ,ahayana or bodhisatt$a is the sal$ation of all
sentient beings. Thus ,ahayana is claimed to be superior to the two $ehicles.
&+ 3ccording to ,aster TDai-hsu, great men are the men of great $irtue and great wisdom. They are
the same as 8uddhas. "ee TDai-hsu, TDai-hsu-ta-shih-chuan-shu E3 Collection of 4reat ,aster TDai-
hsuDs 7ritingsF, .ol. &+ E4reat ,aster TDai-hsu Committee, Taipei, &>;>F, p. ;&<.
&2 ... EBuan-shih-yinF means L!egarder of the worldDs sounds, or criesL. 3$alo-ites$ara was
originally represented as a male, but his image was later changed to that of a female figure. 3mong
the Chinese, 3$alo-ites$ara is -nown as Buan-yin, 4?ddess of ,ercy. Buan-yin is one of the triad
of 3mitabha, and is also represented as crowned with 3mitabha.
&: ,ahasthamaprapta is a bodhisatt$a who has obtained great power and stability. He is on
3mitabhaDs rightK 3$alo-ites$ara is on his left. They are called the 8uddhist Trinity of "u-ha$ati.
&; ,an/usri, in past incarnations, is described as the parent of many 8uddhas and as ha$ing assisted
"a-yamuni into e1istence. His title was the supreme 8uddha of the NagasK now his title is the
spiritual 8uddha who /oyfully cares for the /ewel. His future title is to be the 8uddha uni$ersally
re$ealed. He is usually regarded as the guardian of wisdom and often holds a boo-, the emblem of
wisdom, or a blue lotus. %egends about him are many. In the introductory chapter of the %otus "utra
he is considered the ninth predecessor or 8uddha-ancestor of "a-yamuni. He appears in military
array as defender of the faith. His signs and magic words are found in $arious sutras. His most
famous center in China is 7u-tDai ,ountain in the pro$ince of "hansi, where he is the ob/ect of
pilgrimages.
&< ,aitreya is the 8uddhist messiah. 3ccording to tradition, he was born in "outhern India of a
8rahman family. He now li$es in the Tusita hea$en. He will come again some 2??? hea$enly years
after the nir$ana of "a-yamuni. He presides o$er the spread of the 8uddhist church, protects its
members and will usher in ultimate $ictory for 8uddhism.
&= The si1 paramitas are charity, moral conduct, patience, de$otion, contemplation and -nowledge.
They are the means of crossing o$er from this shore of births and deaths to the other shore or
nir$ana.
&> 3 similar issue is discussed in the ,iddle Treatise &' &M0 and &:'+.
0? ... Eyu-wei-fa, sams-rta dharmasF can also be rendered as conditioned things.
0& ... Ewo, atmanF.
00 ... Epi-chiu, bhi-suF means a religious man, an almsman, or one who has left home, been fully
ordained, and depends on alms for a li$ing.
0+ "elf belongings here refer to attributes or properties of the self.
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%+' (Chapter 0' 7ith or without effect* '%+
.
& 3 similar statement is gi$en in the ,iddle Treatise &' ;. ... Eting-yuF.
0 %iterally, Lreal and unreal Eyu wuF are contrary to each otherK unreal and real Ewu yuF are contrary
to each otherL.
+ ... Eliao-yinF.
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%+' (Chapter +' Conditions* '%+
.
& This $erse is similar to the ,iddle Treatise &'&&. 3ccording to Chi-tsang, there are fi$e
interpretations of Lbriefly and broadlyL' E&F briefly refers to the aggregate of all causal conditions
31 , -0.
and broadly refers to each indi$idual condition. E0F Chapter I has been a general e1amination of
causal conditions and hence is implied by brieflyK Chapter II has been an analysis of the status of
effect and hence is called broadly. This third chapter e1amines both conditions and effect, and
hence is both. E+F 8riefly means shortly, and broadly means comprehensi$ely. Chapter II discusses
causal relation at length and hence has a broad e1amination of causality. This third chapter does not
discuss causal relation at length and hence has a brief e1amination of causality. E2F 8riefly refers to
the fact that Chapter II studies merely whether an effect is in a cause. 8roadly refers to the fact that
this chapter e1amines whether an effect is in any of $arious conditions. E:F 8riefly means separately
and broadly means together. This third chapter e1amines causes and conditions separately and
togetherK it is a brief and broad study of causality. ET. &=0:, p. &>:aF.
0 This $erse is almost identical with the ,iddle Treatise &'+.
+ Cause here mainly refers to the cause-condition Ehete-pratyayaF.
2 Conditions here refer to the three other conditions.
: This $erse is almost the same as the ,iddle Treatise &'&0.
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%+' (Chapter 2' Characteristics* '%+
.
& This $erse is the same as the ,iddle Treatise <'&.
0 The same $erse appears in the ,iddle Treatise <' 2. .L
+ ihgalaDs commentary on the ,iddle Treatise <' 2 is identical.
2 This $erse is the same as the ,iddle Treatise <':.
: "ame as the ,iddle Treatise <' ;.
; "ame as the ,iddle Treatise <' <.
< "imilar to the ,iddle Treatise <' >. In the Hui-cheng-lun, +2-2&, Nagar/una used the e1ample of
fire to discuss the similar issue.
= "ame as the ,iddle Treatise <'&?.
> This $erse is almost the same as the ,iddle Treatise <'&&.
&? "ame as the ,iddle Treatise <'&0.
&& "ame as the ,iddle Treatise <'&+.
&0 "ame as the ,iddle Treatise <'&2.
&+ The similar e1ample is discussed by .atsyayana under Nyayasutra 0.0.&?K see 8imal Brishna
,atilal, The Na$ya-Nyaya Doctrine of Negation EHar$ard #ni$ersity ress, Cambridge, &>;=F,
.ol. 2;, p. &?<.
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%+' (Chapter :' 7ith or without characteristics* '%+
.
& ... EyuF here also means e1istence and Lto be withL. Is EwuF also means non-e1istence and Lnot to
be withL or Lto be withoutL.
0 The last sentence may also be rendered, Lthere cannot be the functioning of characteriJationL.
This $erse is Auite similar to the ,iddle Treatise :'+.
+ 3ccording to Chi-tsang, two fallacies are in$ol$ed' E&F things ha$e already been characteriJed and
need no characteristics, and E0F if they need to be characteriJed, it will lead to an infinite regress
Eop. cit., p. 0?&bF.
2 ingalaDs commentary on the ,iddle Treatise :' + is similar, Esee T. &:;2, p. <;b-cF.
: Characteristics and the characteriJable are causally co-arising and are de$oid of self-nature, hence
32 , -0.
they are empty. This sentence might also be rendered, L)wing to these reasons, characteristics and
the characteriJable are empty.L
; ... EwuF also means things or ob/ects.
< ... Ewu-wuF also means Lthere e1ists nothingL or Lnothing e1istsL.
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%+' (Chapter ;' Identity or difference* '%+
.
& ... Eshih, $i/nanaF.
0 ... Eshou, $edanaF is one of the fi$e s-andhas.
+ ... Eyu-lou, asra$aF is whate$er has -lesa, distress or trouble. It also means mortal life or the stream
of births and deaths.
2 ... Ewu-lou, anasra$aF means no drop, lea-, flow outside the passion stream, or passionless. It is
nir$ana as contrasted with ..., which is mortality.
: ... Ese-yin, rupaF.
; ... Ehsing-yin, sams-araF.
< ... Echeng-chien, samyag-drstsF.
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%+' (Chapter <' 8eing or non-being* '%+
.
& This sentence can also be rendered, L8eing and non-being are neither together nor separateL.
0 This $erse comes from $erse &> of the sunyata-saptati.
+ "ee Chapter I..
2 LroducedL EshengF can also be rendered as LoriginatedL.
: ... ElaoF also means old age.
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%+' (Chapter =' Nature* '%+
.
& This $erse is almost identical with &+' + in the ,iddle Treatise.
0 This sentence is the same as &:' Ib in the ,iddle Treatise.
+ "imilar to the ,iddle Treatise &:' 0b.
2 The term sramana refers to 8uddhist mon-s or ascetics of all -inds who ha$e left their families
and Auit the passions. 3 sramana must -eep well the truth, guard well e$ery uprising of desire, be
uncontaminated by outward attractions, be merciful to all and impure to none, not elated by /oy nor
harrowed by distress, and be able to bear whate$er may come. The four fruits of the sramana are the
four fruitions or rewards resulting from these practices' namely, srota-apanna-phala, sa-radagami-
phala, anagami-phala, and arhat-phala, i.e., four grades of sainthood. These four titles are also
referred to as the four grades of sramanas' namely, yellow and blue flower sramanas, lotus
sramanas, mee- sramanas and ultra-mee- sramanas.
: The 8uddha Ethe enlightened oneF, the Dharma Ehis doctrine or teachingF and the "angha Ethe
community of mon-s or followersF are -nown as the Three 5ewels. Cor mon-s and laymen,
initiation into 8uddhism starts with a proclamation of allegiance, which runs li-e this'
.
I I ta-e my refuge in the 8uddha.
33 , -0.
I I ta-e my refuge in the Dharma.
I I ta-e my refuge in the "angha.
.
; The entire paragraph is almost identical with the ,iddle Treatise 02' &M;.
< These statements are almost identical with the ,iddle Treatise 02' =M&?.
= The twofold truth is primarily a teaching de$ice and has three -inds of utility. 3ccording to Chi-
tsang, self-interest, other-interest and common interest ha$e the following meanings' E&F To
comprehend con$entional truth and then ultimate truth produces upayapra/na, the wisdom of using
s-illful means or e1pedient -nowledge' this is self-interest. To comprehend ultimate truth and then
con$entional truth produces pra/naupaya, the means of attaining wisdom' this is other-interest. To
produce these two forms of wisdom is common interest. E0F To ha$e oneDs own comprehension of
the twofold truth and oneDs own production of the two forms of wisdom is self-interest. To use the
twofold truth to help others in understanding the 8uddhaDs dharma so as to attain the two forms of
wisdom is other-interest. Enlightenment for oneself and others is common interest. E+F To produce
pra/na by means of the ultimate truth is self-interest. To produce upaya by -nowing the
con$entional truth is other-interest. To ha$e both pra/na and upaya is common interest Eop. cit., p.
0?;bF.
> In the ,iddle Treatise Nagar/una points out that ultimate truth needs con$entional truth, while
here he stresses the mutual dependence. The two truths are dependent on and relati$e to each other.
&? If the fi$e s-andhas ha$e determinate nature E..., ting-hsingF, they cannot be changed. Hence,
there can be no origination, destruction, impermanence, etc.
&& The argument here is similar to the reasoning in the ,iddle Treatise 02' 0?-+?.
&0 Nagar/una presents a similar argument in the ,iddle Treatise 02' ++-+=.
&+ The same issue is discussed in the ,iddle Treatise &' 0b.
&2 This is almost the same as the ,iddle Treatise &:'+.
&: The same reasoning is found in the ,iddle Treatise &:' 2M:a.
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%+' (Chapter >' Cause and effect* '%+
.
& This $erse appears to summariJe Nagar/unaDs argument in the ,iddle Treatise &0' &.
0 The combinations of conditions do ha$e function, so effect cannot come from elsewhere.
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%+' (Chapter &?' The creator* '%+
.
& This $erse is similar to the ,iddle Treatise &0'&.
0 ... Ewu-liangF here refers to sas$ata-$ada EeternalismF.
+ ... Eshih-tsunF is an epithet of e$ery 8uddha. This is a translation from L%o-anathaL or L8haga$atL.
2 ... EshenF usually means 4?d, di$inity or spirit, but here it refers to ... Eshen-woF, which is a self,
ego, soul or permanent person.
: This sentence seems to imply that anything which is a cause or an effect is impermanent.
; Here Nagar/una uses LsufferingL as an e1ample of a creature in order to discuss the origin,
duration and destruction of the uni$erse.
< ... EtDienF literally means hea$en, but here it is a name for de$as, 4?ds.
= Nagar/una seems to argue that the idea of 4?d as the omnipotent creator is incompatible with the
concept of -arma and the principle of causal conditions.
39 , -0.
> 7hat is made is supposed not to ha$e the power of self-ma-ing, and hence cannot be changed by
itselfK otherwise it can ma-e itself and should not be said to be made by 4?d or others.
&? ... Efu-yehF.
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%+' (Chapter &&' The three times* '%+
.
& This $erse is similar to the ,iddle Treatise &&'0.
0 The Auestion whether negation must be the negation of something has also been raised in the Hui-
cheng-lun, &&M&;.
+ ... E-Do-pDoF is the refutable, the ob/ect of refutation.
2 The argument is similar to the Hui-cheng-lun, ;&M;<.
: ... Ei-yinF. The causal relation between them is still doubtful.
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%+' (Chapter &0' roduction* '%+
.
& This $erse is similar to the ,iddle Treatise <'&:.
0 ... Ewei-shengF may mean simply Lis not producedL.
+ This sentence can also be rendered, LIt is contrary to productionL or Lthere is no principle of
producing in itL.
2 3nuttara-samya--sambodhi, also -nown as 3nubodhi, is the e1cellent, complete enlightenment,
the highest correct awareness. It is also considered to be the perfect wisdom of a 8uddha.
: )r Lwhen it pre-possesses (causal conditions* L.
; This has been discussed in Chapter II.
< L7ithout productionL in the first sentence can also be translated as Lbefore production as such is
establishedL. 3ccording to Chi-tsangDs Commentary on the Twel$e 4ate Treatise, that which is
producing Esheng-shrF must ha$e production as such EshengF as its substanceK without sheng there
can be no sheng-shr. "o before sheng is established, how can one use sheng-shr to establish itO
90 , -0.
%&' (4lossary* '%&
.
Note' " - "ans-rit, - ali, Ch - Chinese, 5ap - 5apanese.
.
3bhidharma E"F, 3bhidhamma EF' LHigher doctrineL, Lsuper-doctrineL dealing with 8uddhist
philosophy and psychologyK the third di$ision of the ali canon of scripture.
.
3mitabha E"F, )mito EChF, 3mida E5apF' The 8uddha of Infinite %ightK the founder of "u-ha$ati,
the 7estern aradiseK the ob/ect of worship in the ure %and "chool.
.
3natman E"F, 3natta EF' Non-ego, non-selfK the denial of the 3tman of Hindu philosophy
concei$ed as a personal immortal soul or a substantial self.
.
3nitya E"F, 3nicca EF' Impermanence, change.
.
3nuttara-samya--sambodhi E"F, 3nuttara-samma-sambodhi EF' #ne1celled complete
enlightenmentK an attribute of e$ery buddha.
.
3rhat E"F, 3rahant EF' The worthy oneK a saintly man, the highest type or ideal in Hinayana,
comparable to a bodhisatt$a in ,ahayana.
.
3sams-rta E"F, 3sams-hata EF' Non-created or unconditioned things.
.
3tman E"F, 3tta EF' Ego, self, soul, or indi$idual personality. In 8rahmanism the 3bsolute, the
unconditioned, the spirit, 8rahmanK also the reflection of the 3bsolute in the indi$idual.
.
3$alo-ites$ara' The bodhisatt$a representing compassionK in China -nown as Buan-yinK in 5apan,
Bannon.
.
3$idya E"F, 3$i//a EF' IgnoranceK lac- of enlightenment.
.
3yatana E" T F' "ense-fields. There are twel$e, corresponding to the si1 sense faculties Efi$e
senses and the mindF, and their ob/ects.
.
8ha$a$i$e-a E8ha$ya or 8ha$i$e-aF' The founder of the "$atantri-a school of the ,adhyami-a.
He criticiJed rasangi-a ,adhyami-a for merely indulging in refutation without ad$ancing a
counter-position and claimed that the true ,adhyami-a could consistently ad$ance an opposite
$iew.
.
8humi E"F' EarthK a stage. There are ten successi$e enlightenment stages of a bodhisatt$a.
.
8odhi E" T F' Enlightenment, enlightened mind, perfect wisdom, illumination, intuition, or inner
light.
.
8odhidharma' The first patriarch of ChDan 8uddhism in China.
.
8odhisatt$a E"F, 8odhisatta EF' 7isdom-being. It was first used in the sense of a pre$ious
incarnation of the 8uddha. ,any li$es before his final birth as "iddhartha 4autama, the 8odhisatt$a
did mighty deeds of compassion and self-sacrifice, as he gradually perfected himself in wisdom and
9- , -0.
$irtue. In ,ahayana, the bodhisatt$a is the ideal of the ath comparable to the arhat of the
Thera$ada. He is any indi$idual self-dedicated to the sal$ation of others and destined to the
attainment of buddhahood.
.
8rahman E"F' The 3bsolute, the ultimate substratum of all things.
.
8uddha E" T F' The awa-ened or enlightened one. "iddhartha 4autama after attaining
enlightenment. )ther indi$iduals who ha$e similarly attained enlightenment.
.
8uddhi E" T F' Enlightenment, intelligence, intuition, the faculty of direct awareness of reality.
.
Chandra-irti' 3n important philosopher of rasangi-a ,adhyami-a 8uddhism of the se$enth
century. It was due to his efforts that prasanga Ereductio ad absurdumF became the real and only
method of ,adhyami-a reasoning.
.
ChDan EChF' The Chinese word for dhyana, or meditation. The ChDan "chool was founded by
8odhidharma, and is -nown as Ren 8uddhism to the 7est.
.
Chi-tsang EChF' The greatest Chinese "an-lun philosopher of the se$enth century. He wor-ed in the
Chia-hsiang ,onastery and was -nown as Chia-hsiang Ta-shih Ethe 4reat ,aster Chia-hsiangF.
.
Ching EChF' "cripture.
.
Ching-tDu Tsung EChF' The ure %and "chool. Ching-tDu is a translation of the "ans-rit term
"u-ha$ati E%and of 8lissF. It is called 5odo in 5apanese. 3ccording to this school, anyone who
belie$es in 3mita 8uddha will be born in the ure %and to become a buddha.
.
Chung-lun EChF' The ,iddle Treatise ET &:;2 in .ol. +?F. )ne of three main te1ts of the "an-lun
"chool. It was translated by Bumara/i$a in 2?> 3.D. from the now lost ,adhyami-a-Dsastra. The
main $erses were written by Nagar/una, and its commentary was gi$en by ihgala.
.
Conditions' There are four' E&F The cause or chief condition Ehetu-pratyayaF which acts as the chief
cause, for e1ample, the wind and water that cause the wa$eK E0F the seAuential condition
Esamanantara-pratyayaF which immediately follows a preceding condition, such as wa$es following
each otherK E+F the appropriating condition Ealambana-pratyayaF which is the ob/ecti$e or sub/ecti$e
en$ironment as concurring cause, for e1ample, wa$es are conditioned by the basin or the boat or the
pondK and E2F the uphea$ing condition Eadhipati-pratyayaF which brings all conditions to the clima1,
such as the last wa$e that upsets the boat.
.
De$a E" T F' 3 4?d, angel, or bene$olent being.
.
Dharma E"F, Dhamma EF' Truth, law, norm, doctrine, teaching, sermon, righteousness, morality,
religion or doctrineK a thing, fact, element, factor, mar-, attribute or Auality.
.
Dhatus E"F' Element, factor, or constituent.
.
Dhyana E"F' ,editation, or direct absorption in truth.
.
Di$a-ara' The master of the "autranti-a "$atantri-a of ,adhyami-a 8uddhism in the se$enth
92 , -0.
century. He introduced the "autranti-a "$atantri-a to China from India.
.
Duh-ha E"F, Du--ha EF' "uffering, sorrow, pain.
.
D$adasa-d$ara-Dsastra E"F' The Twel$e 4ate Treatise. )ne of the three main te1ts of "an-lun
8uddhism.
.
Eightfold Noble ath' !ight $iew, right thought, right speech, right action, right li$elihood, right
effort, right mindfulness and right concentration.
.
Ca EChF' The Chinese term for dharma E"F or dhamma EF. 3 thing, fact, element, mar-, truth, law,
doctrine, norm, teaching, sermon, morality.
.
Ca-hsiang Tsung EChF' Chinese Pogacara "chool.
.
Ci$e s-andhas E"F' Ci$e aggregates, the sole constituents of personality. They are form ErupaF,
sensation E$edanaF, perception Esan/naF, impulses Esams-araF and consciousness E$i/nanaF.
.
Cour Noble Truths' The four basic principles of 8uddhism preached by 8uddha in his first sermon'
.
&. Duh-ha E"F, Du--ha EF. "uffering or sorrow.
0. "amudaya E" T F. The cause of suffering.
+. Nirodha E" T F. The cessation of suffering.
2. ,arga E"F, ,agga EF.The way leading to the cessation of suffering.
.
4autama E"F, 4otama EF' The clan name of the 8uddhaDs family.
.
Hinayana EF' The "mall .ehicle Eof achie$ing nir$anaF, a derogatory appellation gi$en by the
,ahayanists to denote early schools, of which the Thera$ada is the sole sur$i$or.
.
HsiangEChF' ,ar-, characteristic, sign, aspect, appearance, Auality or attribute.
.
Hsing EChF' )wn-nature or fundamental nature behind a manifestation or e1pression.
.
Hsuan-tsang EChF' 3n important Chinese 8uddhist translator and commentator of the se$enth
century.
.
Hua-yen Tsung EChF' Chinese 3$atamsa-a "chool.
.
Hundred Treatise' The ai-Iun EChF, T &:;> in .ol. +?. It was translated by Bumara/i$a in 2?2
3.D. from the "ata-sastra. Its main $erses were gi$en by 3ryade$a and its commentary was gi$en
by .asu.
.
Is$ara E" T F' )$erlord, a supreme personal 4?d.
.
5ih-chao E"hF' The Chinese name of Di$a-ara. He brought "autranti-a"$atantri-a-,adhyami-a
8uddhism to China from India in the se$enth century.
.
5iri-i E5apF' "al$ation by oneDs own efforts.
9/ , -0.
.
5odo E5apF' The 5apanese term for "u-ha$ati, ure %and or %and of 8liss.
.
Barma E"F, Bamma EF' 3ction, wor-, deed or productK the mysterious power which causes all
action to wor- itself out in reAuital in another lifeK moral action which causes future retribution, and
either good or e$il transmigration.
.
Baruna E" T F' CompassionK with pra/na one of the two pillars of the ,ahayana.
.
Begon E5apF' 5apanese Hua-yen "chool. It was brought to 5apan by Dosen in the eighth century.
.
BDung EChF' Emptiness or $oidness.
.
Bumara/i$a' 3 great 8uddhist scholar of the fifth century in Central 3sia. He introduced
,adhyami-a 8uddhism to China, and is noted for the number of his translations and commentaries.
.
%a-sana E"F' ,ar-s, characteristics, properties, or predicates.
.
li EChF' rincipleK reason.
.
%un EChF' Treatise.
.
%ung-shu EChF' Nagariuna.
.
%ung-shu-pDu-sa-chuan' The 8iography of 8odhisatt$a Nagar/una, T 0?2<.
.
,adhyami-a E"F' The ,iddle-7ay "chool founded by Nagar/una, -nown as "an-lun 8uddhism in
China.
.
,adhyami-a--ari-a. The ,iddle-7ay "tanJas, the original te1t of the ,adhymi-a teaching written
by Nagar/una.
.
,ahapra/naparamita E"F' The perfection of great wisdomK the title of a ,ahayana scripture.
.
,ahayana E" T F' The 4reat .ehicle Eof sal$ationFK the Northern 8uddhist "chool. This school
has been popular in China, Borea, 5apan, Tibet and ,ongolia.
.
,aitreya' 3n ad$anced 8odhisatt$a who is destined to be the 8uddha-to-come. He is often
considered to be the 8uddhist ,essiah. 3ccording to tradition, he was born in "outhern India of a
8rahman family. He now li$es in the Tusita hea$en. He will come again :??? or 2??? hea$enly
years Eabout 2,;<?,???,??? human yearsF after the nir$ana of "a-yamuni. He presides o$er the
spread of the 8uddhist church, protects its members and will usher in an ultimate $ictory for
8uddhism.
.
,an/usri' The 8odhisatt$a who is considered to be the embodiment of all the 8uddhasD wisdom.
.
,arga E"F, ,agga EF' ath or way. It is generally used to describe the Eightfold Noble ath or the
,iddle 7ay.
.
90 , -0.
,ing EChF' Name, symbol.
.
,o-sa E"F' %iberation from samsara and all its pains.
.
Naga E" T F' DragonK elephantK serpent.
.
Nagar/una' The great 8uddhist philosopher of the second century. He distincti$ely taught the
,ahayana doctrine of emptiness and founded ,adhyami-a 8uddhism. 3ccording to tradition, he
disco$ered many ,ahayana te1ts and established the ,ahayana "chool of 8uddhism, and hence
was often called the Lfather of ,ahayanaL.
.
Nidanas EF' The twel$e lin-s in the chain of causation.
.
Nirodha E" T F' Cessation, e1tinction, e1termination. It often refers to the third noble truth, the
cessation of suffering.
.
Nir$ana E"F, Nibbana EF' L8lown outL, Lgone outL, Lput outL, Le1tinguishedLK liberation from
e1istenceK deli$erance from all sufferingK the supreme goal of 8uddhist endea$or. Nir$ana is a state
attainable by right aspiration of life and the elimination of egoism. In the 8uddhist scriptures the
8uddha spea-s of nir$ana as Lunborn, unoriginated, uncreated, unformedL, contrasting it with the
born, originated, created and formed phenomenal world. The Hinayana tends to $iew nir$ana as
escape from life by o$ercoming its attraction. The ,ahayana $iews it as the fruition of life, the
unfolding of the infinite possibilities of the innate buddha-nature, and e1alts the saint who remains
in touch with life, rather than the saint who relinAuishes all connection with it.
.
ai-lun EChF' "ee the Hundred Treatise.
.
ali EF' )ne of the early languages of 8uddhism. It was later adopted by
.
the Thera$adins as the language in which to preser$e the memoriJed teachings of the 8uddha.
.
ali Canon' The Three 8as-ets of the "cripture, i.e. "uttapita-a, .inayapita-a and
3bhidammapita-a, in the ali language. The Canon contains the main sacred te1ts of Thera$ada
8uddhism. It was complied and edited by three monastic councils. The first council assembled /ust
a few months after the death of the 8uddha E2=+ 8.C.F in !a/agaha, the second about a hundred
years later Earound +=+ 8.C.F in .esali, and the third in 00: 8.C. in ataliputta.
.
aramarthasatya E"F' #ltimate or absolute truth.
.
aramita E" T F' Transcendental perfectionG, especially the perfected $irtue of a bodhisatt$a. In
,ahayana 8uddhism, there are usually si1 ma/or paramitas' charity, discipline, $igor, patience,
meditation and intuiti$e wisdom.
.
ita-a EF' 8as-et. The 8uddhist ali Canon is called the ita-as or the
.
Tipita-a Ethree bas-etsF.
.
ra/na E"F, arma EF' 7isdom, reason, insight.
.
9. , -0.
ra/naparamita E"F' The perfection of wisdomK the designation of a body of ,ahayana literature.
.
ramana E"F' The means, source, e$idence or proof of true cognition. Cour pramanas are perception,
inference, analogy and testimony.
.
rasangi-a' )ne of two ma/or ,adhyami-a schools. It was founded by 8uddhapalita Ec. 2??-2:?
3.D.F. 3ccording to this school, the real and true method of Nagar/una and 3ryade$a is prasanga
Ereductio ad absurdumF. The true ,adhyami-a does not and should not uphold any position of his
own.
.
ratltyasamutpada E"F, aticcasamuppada EF' Dependent origination or arisingK causality.
.
ratye-abudda E"F' Lri$ateL or LlonelyL buddha, so called because he reaps the fruits of his stri$ing
without returning to share that merit with man-ind.
.
"a-yamuni E" T F' The sage or holy man of the "a-yasK a title gi$en to the 8uddha by those
outside the "a-ya clan.
.
"amadhi E" T F' ,editation, contemplation, concentration, rapture, tranAuility.
.
"arhsara E" T F' LCaring onL, Lcoming-to-beLK the world of becomingK the realm of birth and death.
"arhsara is symbolically referred to as Lthis shoreL, nir$ana as Lthe other shoreL, and dharma as Lthe
raftL which carries us across.
.
"arhs-rta E"F, "ams-hata EF' Created or conditioned things and states. "amudaya E" T F' Cause of
sufferingK the second noble truth. "arh$rtisatya E"F' Con$entional, relati$e or worldly truth.
.
"an-lun Tsung EChF' %it. LThree Treatise "choolL. Chinese ,adhyami-a 8uddhism.
.
"an-lun hsuan-i EChF' The title of the boo-, the rofound ,eaning of Three Threatises ET &=:0 in
.ol. 2:F, written by Chi-tsang.
.
"ahgha E" T F' The )rder, the assembly or congregation of mon-s and nunsK the third of the three
/ewels of 8uddhism.
.
"an-shih EChF' Three times M earlier than, simultaneous with and later than.
.
"ans-rit' The classical 3ryan language of India. ,ost ,ahayana te1ts were written in "ans-rit.
.
"anron E5apF' 5apanese "an-lun 8uddhism.
.
"astra E"F, "attha EF' Commentaries or independent essays on 8uddhist teachings.
.
"ata-sastra E"F' "ee the Hundred Treatise.
.
"autranti-a' 8uddhists who hold the "utras as their authority and not the sastras. They do not admit
the authority of the 3bhidharma of the "ar$asti$adins. They assert the reality of both physical
ob/ects and the mind, but claim that we do not ha$e a direct perception of e1ternal ob/ects.
.
91 , -0.
"eng-chao' 3n eminent Chinese "an-lun philosopher of the fifth century. He is the author of the
Chao-lun.
.
"eng-/ui' 3n important Chinese "an-lun 8uddhist of the fifth century. He wrote prefaces to the
,iddle Treatise and the Twel$e 4ate Treatise.
.
"heng EChF' roduction, origination, arising.
.
"hih-erh-men-lun EChF' The Twel$e 4ate Treatise ET &:;= in .ol. +?FK one of the three main te1ts
of "an-lun 8uddhism. It was translated by Bumara/i$a in 2?=-2?> 3.D. from the now lost D$adasa-
d$ara-sastra. 8oth main $erses and commentary were gi$en by Nagar/una.
.
"hih-fang EChF' Ten directions, referring to the eight points of the compass, the nadir and the Jenith.
.
"iddhartha 4autama E"F' "iddhattha 4otama EF' The name of the 8uddha, the founder of
8uddhism. It was gi$en by his father, Bing "uddhodana of Bapila$astu.
.
"i1 famous Tirthi-as' 3 Tirthi-a is a heretical or non-8uddhist religious man. The si1 famous
Tirthi-as were urana-Basyapa, ,as-arin, "an/ayin, 3/ita-esa-ambala, Ba-uda-Batyayana and
Nirgrantha.
.
"i1 forms of life' Hellish things, hungry spirits, beasts, e$il spirits, human beings, and hea$enly
beings.
.
"i1 paramitas E" T F' "i1 perfections. They are charity, moral conduct, patience, de$otion,
contemplation and -nowledge.
.
"i1 sense organs' Eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind.
.
"-andhas E"F, Bhandhas EF' 3ggregates or heaps. The fi$e s-andhas are the sole constituents of
personality. They are form ErupaF, sensation \$edanaF, perception Esan/naF, impulses DEsams-araF
and consciousness E$i/nanaF.
.
"ramana E"F' 3n ascetic, a religious recluse.
.
"ra$a-a E"F' 3 hearer, disciple of the 8uddha who understands the Cour Noble Truths, rids himself
of the unreality of the phenomenal and enters the incomplete nir$ana. It is used by ,ahayanists, in
con/unction with pratye-abuddha, to describe Hinayanists.
.
"u-ha$ati E"F' ure landK the goal of the followers of the ure %and "chool. "unya E"F' Empty,
$oid, $acant, non-e1istent.
.
"unyata E"F' Emptiness, $oidness, non-e1istence.
.
"utra E"F, "utta EF' %iterally, a thread or string on which /ewels are strungK a sermon or discourse
of the 8uddha. It often refers to that part of the ali Canon containing narrati$es about dialogues by
the 8uddha. 3 number of ,ahayana scriptures are also called sutras.
.
"$abha$a E"F' )wn-nature, self-nature, self-e1istence, self-being, selfhood, that which does not
92 , -0.
depend on others for its e1istence.
.
"$atantri-a' )ne of the two ma/or schools of ,adhyami-a 8uddhism. It was founded by
8ha$a$i$ed-a in the si1th century. 3ccording to this school, empirical things are not real from the
standpoint of ultimate truth, yet ha$e phenomenal reality.
.
Ta-chih-tu-lun EChF' The 4reat 7isdom Treatise ET &=:0 in .ol. 2:F. Tari-i E5apF' "al$ation by
some Lother powerL.
.
Tathagata E" T F' LThus-goneL or LThus-comeL, LHe-who-has-thus-attainedLK a title of the 8uddha
by followers and also by himself.
.
Thera$ada EF, "tha$ira$ada E"F' LThe system or school of the EldersL, considered to be the
orthodo1 and original form of 8uddhism as accepted and followed mainly in Ceylon, 8urma,
Thailand, %aos and Cambodia.
.
Three feelings' ain, pleasure and freedom from both.
.
Three 5ewels' 8uddha, Dharma and "ahgha. Cor mon-s and laymen initiation into 8uddhism starts
with a proclamation of allegiance, which runs li-e this'
.
LI ta-e my refuge in the 8uddha.
I ta-e my refuge in the Dharma.
I ta-e my refuge in the "angha.L
.
TDien-tDai Tsung EChF' The Chinese 8uddhist school founded by Chih-i in the si1th century. It was
also called the Ca-hua after the title of the te1t "addharma-pundari-a from which the doctrine of the
school is deri$ed.
.
Tirthi-a' -3 heretic in India.
.
Tripita-a E"F, Tipita-a EF' The Three 8as-ets'
.
&. "utra E"F, "utta EF. Discourse, doctrine.
0. .inaya E" T F. !ules of discipline.
+. 3bhidharma E"F, 3bhidhamma EF. Discussion, metaphysics.
.
Twel$e ayatanas E" T F' Twel$e sense fields' eye, sight-ob/ects, ear, sounds, nose, smells, tongue,
tastes, body, touchable, mind and mind-ob/ects.
.
Twel$e 4ate Treatise' "ee "hih-erh-men-lun. TJu-tsai-tDien EChF' "ee Is$ara.
.
#panisads E"F' 3 body of Hindu sacred literature that elaborates on the philosophical teachings of
the .edas.
.
#paya E" T F' 3 de$ice, con$enient method, s-illful or temporary means. .i/nana E"F, .innana
EF' Consciousness.
.
.inaya E" T F' !ules of the 8uddhist orderK one of the three bas-ets of the ali Canon.
93 , -0.
.
7ei-sheng EChF' That which is not yet produced or originated.
.
7u EChF' Nothing, non-being, ine1istence.
.
7u. EChF' Thing.
.
7u-pu-chDien EChF' Things do not mo$e.
.
7u-hsin EChF' No thought or mind.
.
7u-wei EChF' Non-action, passi$ity, action without action.
.
7u-yin EChF' Ci$e s-andhas, fi$e aggregates.
.
Pin-yuan EChF' Causes and conditionsK causal conditionsK causality.
.
Pogacara E" T F' The ,ind-)nly "chool of 8uddhism. It was founded by 3sanga and .asubandu
in the fourth century. It is -nown as the Cahsiang "chool in China and the Hosso "chool in 5apan.
.
Pu EChF' 8eing, e1istence.
.
Puan EChF' Conditions or causal conditions.
.
Puan EChF' "ource.
.
Pung EChF' CunctionK acti$ityK use.
.
Ren E5apF' The 5apanese pronunciation of the Chinese ideograph for chDan, which is deri$ed from
the "ans-rit dhyanaK the Chinese and 5apanese ,editation "chool of 8uddhism, established by
8odhidharma, the 0=th atriarch in India, who came to China around :0? 3.D. as the Cirst atriarch
in China.
.
99 , -0.
%&' (The 0; .erses @ added section* '%&
.
X(Note some $erses bellow should probably be counted as two $erses.*
.
.
In the inAuiry for the causes of things, it seems that e$erything possesses a nature of itself. 3 careful
analysis shows that such a self-nature does not really e1ist. The word L4ateL means a way leading
to a thorough understanding without a residue of doubt.
.
S (I'&*
S Things are produced from $arious conditions,
S and hence ha$e no self-nature.
S If they ha$e no self-nature,
S how can there be such thingsO
.
S (I'0*
S (Twel$e chains of* causal conditions really ha$e no production.
S If they ha$e production,
S do they ha$e it in one mind-moment or in many mind-momentsO
.
X Ei.e. The reasoning of dependent origination' E$erything is empty of inherent e1istence because
dependently arisen Edependent on cause and conditionsF, because conceptually interdependent
Edependent on the conte1t, on the mind labeling them, on their conceptual opposite, dependent on
-armaF.
.
The problem of the /unction between cause T effect' The /unction between the cause Ethe pre$ious
momentF and the effect Ethe ne1t momentF cannot be e1plained. They cannot o$erlap or be separate
in time. The theory of moments is flawed. Causality cannot be e1plained in absolute terms. Cause,
effect, causality, production are all empty concepts.
.
E$erything is an effect, and is produce for its own effect. E$erything is both cause T effectK
continually changingK no continuity, no discontinuity.F
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
.
This is a further e1amination of the principle of $oidness of self-nature. It begins with the Auestion
whether things ha$e been already in e1istence or ha$e not been in e1istence prior to their
production. Neither alternati$e is possible to establish the process of production. This e1amination
constitutes one of the L4atesL.
.
S (II.&*
S If an effect is already real (in a cause*,
S If at the outset unreal (in a cause*,
S there can be no production either.
S If both real and unreal,
-00 , -0.
S How can there be productionO
.
X Ei.e. The reasoning of the refutation of the four e1treme types of production' 3nalysing the nature
of the effectK refuting an effectZproduct that is e1istent, non-e1istent, both, neither ZZ cause T effect
cannot be simultaneous, nor separate in time. There is no need to produce a real, non-real, both, or
neither effect. 3 real, non-real, both or neither cause does not produce a real, non-real, both or
neither effect. "ee ,- =F
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
.
)ne pre$ious chapter e1amines causes and this one e1amines conditions. Effects cannot be found
either in conditions in general or in any one of the four conditions. This e1amination constitutes one
of the L4atesL.
.
S (III.&*
S 8riefly and broadly,
S conditions do not contain effect.
S If there is no effect within conditions,
S how can it be claimed to come from conditionsO &
.
S (III.0*
S If effect does not e1ist within conditions
S and yet comes from the conditions,
S can it not come from non-conditionsO :
.
X Ei.e. The reasoning of the refutation of the four alternati$e of production (one or many causes -- ]
one or many effects* -- The effect is not contained in the causes and conditions indi$idually or
together. The effect is not without cause and conditions either. Cause and effect cannot be the same,
nor differentZseparate.F
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%2' (I.. Characteristics 2* '%2
.
The pre$ious three 4ates show that production does not e1ist in the e1amination of causes and
conditions. This one shows that production does not e1ist in the e1amination of the three
characteristics. : This e1amination constitutes one of the L4atesL.
.
S (I..&*
S Neither created nor non-created things
S ha$e characteristics.
S "ince they ha$e no characteristics,
S they are both empty.
.
S (I..0*
S The origination of origination
-0- , -0.
S comes from the primal origination.
S ()n the other hand*, the primal origination
S is originated by the origination of origination. 0
.
S (I..+*
S If it is said that the primal origination
S originates the origination of origination,
S how can the primal origination
S originate the origination of origination
S if itself is originated by the origination of originationO :
.
S (I..2*
S 7hen the origination of origination is being originated
S it may originate primal origination.
S How can it originate primal origination
S if itself has not yet been originatedO ;
.
S (I..:*
S There is no dar-ness in the light
S nor is there dar-ness in that place.
S The elimination of dar-ness is called illumination.
S Now what could the light illuminateO =
.
S (I..;*
S If the light can eliminate dar-ness
S while ha$ing no contact with dar-ness,
S then the light here
S should eliminate all dar-ness. &?
.
S (I..<*
S If the light illuminates itself and other things
S then dar-ness will also co$er itself and other things. &&
.
S (I..=*
S If origination is not yet originated,
S how can it originate itselfO
S If it is already originated and then originates itself,
S why should it need originatingO &0
.
X Ei.e. The problem of the origination' There is no real origination since the origination cannot be
e1plained without infinite regress, and since the origination of origination cannot originate itself nor
be originated by the effect. "o there cannot be any duration or cessation either. "ee ,- 0&.F
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%2' (.. 7ith or 7ithout Characteristics* '%2
.
This e1amines the reality of the three characteristics' whether they characteriJe an ob/ect with or
without characteristics. It shows that there can be no characteriJation in either case. This constitutes
-02 , -0.
one of the L4atesL.
.
S (..&*
S There is no functioning of characteriJation
S in the case of a thing with characteristics.
S Nor is there functioning of characteriJation
S in the case of a thing without characteristics.
S 8esides these, what can characteristics characteriJeO 0
.
X Ei.e. The emptiness of the characteriJation processZaction' The characteriJed, characteriJation and
characteristics cannot be differentZseparate, nor can they be the same. 3 thing cannot inherently
e1ist and then ha$e an origination, a duration and a cessation. "ee ,- :.F
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
.
The issue of the reality and unreality of characteristics ha$e been e1amined, (Nagar/una studies*
whether an ob/ect and characteristics are identical or different from each other. Neither case can be
established. This constitutes one of the L4atesL.
.
S (.I.&*
S Characteristics and the characteriJable
S are neither the same nor different.
S If they are neither the same nor different,
S how can both be establishedO
.
X Ei.e. The reasoning establishing the lac- of being one or many Eabout the sub/ect T ob/ectF' The
characteriJed and characteristics cannot be differentZseparate, nor can they be the same. "ee ,- :.F
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
.
The pre$ious chapters show that the three characteristics cannot really characteriJeK this one shows
that the four characteristics < cannot, either. L)riginationL and LdurationL belong to L8eingL, while
LdecayL and LdestructionL belong to LNon-8eingL. L8eingL and LNon-8eingL cannot e1ist either
together or separately. This constitutes one of the L4atesL.
.
S (.II.&*
S There cannot be being with non-beingK
S nor can there be being without non-being.
S If there can be being with non-being,
S then being should always be non-being. 0
.
X Ei.e. The ,iddle 7ay between e1istence and non-e1istence' 8eingZe1istence and non-beingZnon-
e1istence are not differentZseparate, nor can they be the same. The real nature of our own mind and
of e$erything is not e1istence, not non-e1istence, not both, not neither.F
.
-0/ , -0.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
.
The e1amination of 8eing and Non-8eing shows that things are always changing in nature. "ince
things are originated from conditions, there cannot be any self-nature. This constitutes one of the
L4atesL.
.
S (.III.&*
S 8y obser$ing that the characteristics (of all things* change
S 7e -now all things are de$oid of nature.
S Things which are de$oid of nature are also non-e1istent,
S so all things are empty. &
.
X Ei.e. E$erything is continually changingK nothing stays the same e$en for an infinitesimal moment.
"o nothing really e1ist through time. E$erything is empty of inherent e1istence.F
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
.
Things can neither be found from their Lself-natureL, nor can be found from the process of
causation. This constitutes one of the L4atesL.
.
S (I9.&*
S 7ithin all conditions effect is ultimately unobtainable.
S Nor does it come from elsewhere.
S How can there be an effectO &
.
X Ei.e. Emptiness of the effect' There is no real effect since it cannot be the same as the conditions
nor separateZdifferent from them.F
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%2' (9. The Creator* '%2
.
There cannot be creation without cause and effect. In the e1amination of four alternati$e cases,
there cannot be any creation. This constitutes one of the L4atesL.
.
S (9.&*
S It is not /ustifiable
S that suffering is made by itself,
S by another, by both or from no cause at all.
S Therefore there is no suffering. &
.
S (9.0*
S Effect is produced from conditions,
S (but* conditions are not self-e1istent,
S If conditions are not self-e1istent,
-00 , -0.
S how can conditions produce effectO
.
X Ei.e. The reasoning of the diamond sli$ers' !efuting production from self, other, both, neither.
Cause and effect are not the same, not different, not both, not neither Z without a cause. 3ll causes
are effect. 3n empty cause can only produce an empty effect.F
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
%2' (9I. The Three Times* '%2
.
In the e1hausti$e study of creation, it is necessary to e1amine it with respect to time. Then one will
find that creation is impossible in all three times. This constitutes one of the L4atesL.
.
S (9I.&*
S LEarlier thanL, Llater thanL and Lsimultaneous withL
S such e$ents are impossible.
S How can e$ents be produced by causesO &
.
X Ei.e. "ince the e1act time of the origination cannot be found, then the three times cannot be
defined in absolute terms. 3nd there is no real production.F
.
[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
.
.
LCreationL means that something new is formedK LroductionL means that something new is
originated. "ince they cannot be established in all three times, how can there be such a thing as
productionO This constitutes one of the L4atesL.
.
S (9II.&*
S The effect already produced is not to be producedK
S that not yet produced is not produced.
S 7ithout that which is already produced
S and that which is not yet produced,
S that which is being produced is not produced. &
.
X Ei.e. roduction is a relati$e concept. The three times are not separate Zdifferent, nor the same.
They are conceptually interdependent. There is no continuity, nor discontinuity.F
.
(End*
-0. , -0.

Nagarjuna Twelve Gate Treatise Hsueh Li Cheng Ed

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