Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Save to My Library
Look up keyword
Like this
5Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
Where Is The Social? A Critique of Social Constructionism

Where Is The Social? A Critique of Social Constructionism

Ratings: (0)|Views: 117 |Likes:
Published by joshsoffer1
Common to different versions of social constructionism is the definition of discourse as taking place between persons. Experiences which take place in the absence of immediate others, such as thinking to oneself or reading a text, are treated as secondary phenomena, as introjected versions of social utterance-gestures. This article asserts that representative constructionist articulations of between-person relationality rest on abstractions masking a more primary locus of sociality. I offer an alternative formulation of the social as the embodiment of sensate experience, borrowing from Merleau-Ponty's and Gendlin's accounts. Sensate experience is already radically relational before and beyond any notion of sociality as between-person voices-gestures, generating more intimate and mobile possibilities of interpersonal understanding than is offered via discursive readings of terms like social, language and embodiment.
Common to different versions of social constructionism is the definition of discourse as taking place between persons. Experiences which take place in the absence of immediate others, such as thinking to oneself or reading a text, are treated as secondary phenomena, as introjected versions of social utterance-gestures. This article asserts that representative constructionist articulations of between-person relationality rest on abstractions masking a more primary locus of sociality. I offer an alternative formulation of the social as the embodiment of sensate experience, borrowing from Merleau-Ponty's and Gendlin's accounts. Sensate experience is already radically relational before and beyond any notion of sociality as between-person voices-gestures, generating more intimate and mobile possibilities of interpersonal understanding than is offered via discursive readings of terms like social, language and embodiment.

More info:

Published by: joshsoffer1 on Dec 02, 2009
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as RTF, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

05/06/2013

pdf

text

original

 
Embodied Perception... 1
Joshua Soffer 5701 N.Sheridan Rd.#29R Chicago,Il. 60660AbstractCommon to different versions of social constructionism is the definition of discourse as taking place between persons. Experiences which take place in the absence of immediate others, such asthinking to oneself or reading a text, are treated as secondary phenomena, as introjected versionsof social utterance-gestures. This article asserts that representative constructionist articulations of  between-person relationality rest on abstractions masking a more primary locus of sociality. Ioffer an alternative formulation of the social as the embodiment of sensate experience, borrowingfrom Merleau-Ponty's and Gendlin's accounts. Sensate experience is already radically relational before and beyond any notion of sociality as between-person voices-gestures, generating moreintimate and mobile possibilities of interpersonal understanding than is offered via discursivereadings of terms like social, language and embodiment.Key Words:constructionism, perception, embodiment, language, implicate order 
 
Embodied Perception... 2
Embodied Perception:Redefining the SocialWriters affiliated with the growing social constructionist movement in psychology havemade powerful claims concerning its efficacy in the understanding of persons (Gergen(1985),Harre(1986), Shotter(1993), Potter(1987)). It's purported advantages over other psychologicaltraditions depend on it's radical treatment of the nature of the relationship between self andworld. Shotter(1993) explains,Common to all versions of social constructionism is the central assumption that-insteadof the inner dynamics of the individual psyche (romanticism and subjectivism), or the alreadydetermined characteristics of the external world (modernism and objectivism)-it is thecontingent, really vague (that is, lacking any completely determinate character) flow of continuous communicative activity between human beings that we must study.(p.179)The poles of this responsive conversation are no longer objective entities encapsulated in termslike drive and stimulus, or schema and input, but a relational horizon of collective processes,interdependencies, discursive practices and conventions, a joint-negotiation of reality. What isthe ethical-political achievement of what has been referred to as the `discursiverevolution'(Potter,1987)? A constructionist rethinking of the subject-object relation generatestwo crucial, and paradoxical, ethical implications. On the one hand, it transforms meaning from a positive in-itself into an indeterminate border. But at the same time that it destabilizessignification, it locates larger patterns of stability in cultural practices. In sum, even as it eschewsartificial orders based on mental or society mechanisms, it understands in all engagements acertain minimal relational coherence missing from more traditional psychologies.Constructionism liberates persons from the tyranny of reified schemes, but protects them from
 
Embodied Perception... 3
the arbitrariness of the punctual self. Gergen(1994) argues,If one believes that the central unit of society is the individual self, then relationships are by definition artificial contrivances, unnatural and alien. For the individualist, people are bounded entities leading separate lives on independent trajectories: we can never be certainthat anyone else understands us, and thus, that they can care deeply about us. (p.213)(footnote 1)Where is the Other?While Gergen's intent here is to point to the 'pathology' inherent in reifying content of experience, one can just as well apply these comments to the way that many variants of socialconstructionism reify and polarize the PROCESS of experience. The flavor of alienness,separateness, interpersonal polarization Gergen mentions as the legacy of intellectualRomanticism still asserts itself in a muted way in their thinking.Who we perceive ourselves to be is indeed formed and reformed through our encounterswith an other, but the question that needs to be raised is, does this shaping depend on the fact thatthe othernesses which impinge upon us are formulated as other voices, other persons? What does`person' or `other' mean? If language, as `forms of life'(Wittgenstein(1953)), is at the root of discourse, what is the fundamental requirement for language? I suggest that the very idea of a person, voice, gesture, even as a fully discursive, socially saturated linguistic participant, is anartifact, a lingering vestige of Modernism's faith in anthropos, and is not in fact the mostfundamental `site' of interaction.There is a way of understanding communication, even such experiences as solitaryreflection, the reading of a text, or the encounter with a work of art, as fully social and discursiveevents, without relying on the more obviously formulated notion of actual other speakers being

Activity (5)

You've already reviewed this. Edit your review.
1 hundred reads
reismr liked this
DongMinLee liked this
DongMinLee liked this
schmalan liked this

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->