{1270626;}

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

1. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FORENSIC )
COUNSELORS, INC., a Nevada Non-Profit )
Corporation; et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No. 6:14-cv-00187-RAW
)
1. NARCONON INTERNATIONAL, a )
California Non-Profit Corporation; et al., )
)
Defendants. )


MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANT
RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, INC.
FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OR, ALTERNATIVELY,
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT


David L. Bryant, OBA No. 1262
David E. Keglovits, OBA No. 14259
Amelia A. Fogleman, OBA No. 16221
GABLEGOTWALS
1100 ONEOK Plaza
100 West Fifth Street
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103-4217
(918) 595-4800
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER



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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................... 3
I. THE COURT LACKS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER RTC ............... 3
A. Law of General or Specific Personal Jurisdiction ................................. 3
B. RTC Lacks the Minimum Contacts to Support General or
Specific Jurisdiction Over RTC ............................................................. 6
1. RTC has no contacts with Oklahoma ............................................. 6
2. The allegation that RTC controls Narconon is baseless ................. 6
3. Plaintiffs website allegations cannot establish personal
jurisdiction over RTC.................................................................... 7
4. Plaintiffs conspiracy allegations do not support personal
jurisdiction over RTC.................................................................... 8
C. The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over RTC Would Violate Due
Process .................................................................................................. 11
1. Burden on the defendant of litigating in the forum ...................... 11
2. Forum states interest in adjudicating the dispute ........................ 12
3. Plaintiffs interest in convenient and effective relief .................... 12
4. Interstate judicial systems interest in obtaining efficient
resolution .................................................................................... 13
5. State interest in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies ....................................................................................... 13
II. ALTERNATIVELY, PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS AGAINST RTC
SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM............. 14
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 18



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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Am. Educ. Corp. v. Chase,
2006 WL 2044932 47788 (W.D. Okla. July 13, 2006) ..................................................... 3
Am. Land Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappij, N.V.,
710 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1983) ........................................................................................ 9
Annie Oakley Eaters., Inc. v. Sunset Tan Corporate & Consulting, LLC,
703 F. Supp. 2d 881 (N.D. Ind. 2010) ............................................................................ 11
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007) ................................................................................................ 16, 17
Bridges v. Lane,
351 Fed. Appx. 284 (10th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................. 16
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462 (1985) .................................................................................................... 4, 5
Busch v. Viacom Intl, Inc.,
477 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Tex. 2007) ........................................................................... 11
Clark v. Tabin,
400 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Okla. 2005) ...................................................................... 8, 9
Daimler AG v. Bauman,
134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) ............................................................................................... 4, 5, 7
Doe v. Natl Med. Servs.,
974 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1992) .......................................................................................... 4
Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermillion Fine Arts, Inc.,
514 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2008) ................................................................................ 3, 4, 5
Firemans Fund Ins. Co. v. Thyssen Mining Construction of Canada, Ltd.,
703 F.3d 488 (10th Cir. 2012) .......................................................................................... 5
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1984) ........................................................................................................ 4
Intl Shoe Co. v. Wash.,
326 U.S. 310 (1945) ................................................................................................ 3, 4, 5
Kerber v. Qwest Group Life Ins. Plan,
647 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2011) ........................................................................................ 15
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Mandelbaum v. Fiserv, Inc.,
787 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Colo. 2011) ........................................................................... 15
OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada,
149 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1998) .......................................................................... 11, 13, 14
Outdoor Channel, Inc. v. Performance One Media, LLC,
826 F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Okla. 2011) ................................................................................ 10
Peay v. Bellsouth Med. Assn Plan,
205 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2000) ........................................................................................ 3
Peterson v. Grisham,
2008 WL 4363653 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2008) .............................................................. 17
Rambo v. American S. Ins. Co.,
839 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1988) ........................................................................................ 4
Robbins v. Okla.,
519 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................... 16
Shrader v. Biddinger,
633 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2011) .................................................................................... 7, 8
Sleepy Lagoon, Ltd. v. Tower Grp., Inc.,
809 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (N.D. Okla. 2011) ........................................................................ 12
Soma Medical Intl v. Standard Chartered Bank,
196 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999) ........................................................................................ 7
Woods v. Prestwick House, Inc.,
2011 OK 9 ..................................................................................................................... 13
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1979) ...................................................................................................... 11


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Statutes and Other Authorities:
15 U.S.C. 1125 ....................................................................................................................... 14
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)............................................................................................................ 4
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) ............................................................................................................... 1
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ......................................................................................................... 1, 14
12 O.S. 1449 .................................................................................................................... 13, 14
12 O.S. 2004(F) ........................................................................................................................ 4


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{1270626;} 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

1. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FORENSIC )
COUNSELORS, INC., a Nevada Non-Profit )
Corporation; et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No. 6:14-cv-00187-RAW
)
1. NARCONON INTERNATIONAL, a )
California Non-Profit Corporation; et al., )
)
Defendants. )


MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANT
RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, INC.
FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OR, ALTERNATIVELY,
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
Defendant Religious Technology Center (RTC) moves the Court to dismiss RTC from
this action, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), for lack of personal jurisdiction. Alternatively,
RTC, specially appearing, moves to dismiss Plaintiffs claims against RTC, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim against RTC.
1

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs are two Nevada entities with a principal place of business in Indiana. They
have sued RTC, a California non-profit religious corporation with a principal place of business in
California. There is no personal jurisdiction over RTC.
Specifically, Plaintiffs National Association of Forensic Counselors (NAFC) and its
subsidiary American Academy of Certified Forensic Counselors, Inc. (CCFC), are Nevada

1
RTC has not opted into the optional unified responsive pleadings schedule proposed by
Plaintiffs and Defendant Narconon of Oklahoma, Inc. in their Joint Application (Doc. 237) filed
June 24, 2014. Accordingly, the normal briefing schedule established by the Courts local rules
will apply to this Motion.
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entities based in Indiana. (Compl. 1-2). Plaintiffs claim to provide nationally accredited
certifications for professionals working with criminal offenders in the fields of criminal justice,
corrections, addictions and mental health. (Id. 88). NAFC and CCFC bring this action
against 82 Defendants, including RTC. NAFC and CCFC allege five substantive counts against
all Defendants, without differentiation or distinction between or among Defendants,
purportedly seeking redress for alleged infringements of Plaintiffs trademark rights in their logo,
accreditations and accreditation initials, by organizations and individuals involved in various
Narconon treatment facilities and programs.
RTC is a California non-profit religious corporation established in 1982 to own and
maintain trademarks associated only with the religious services and products of the Scientology
religion founded by L. Ron Hubbard. RTC does not own or license the mark Narconon or any
other trademark or the L. Ron Hubbards technologies used in the secular and educational fields.
Nor does RTC own, control, employ, participate in management or operation, or receive any
funds from Narconon of Oklahoma, or from any of the secular social betterment organizations
which license or use Mr. Hubbards technologies for secular, charitable, or educational purposes,
including the Association for Better Living and Educational International (ABLE), Narconon
International, Friends of Narconon International, or any of the organizations or individuals the
Complaint refers to as the Narconon Network (Compl. 111), the Narconon Treatment
Centers (Id. 112), or the Narconon Referral Entities (Id. 113).
RTC does not belong in this lawsuit. First, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
RTC. RTC has no contacts with Oklahoma related to this controversy or even generally. This
undeniable truth is demonstrated by the facts presented in the Affidavit of Warren McShane,
RTCs President, attached hereto as Exhibit 1 (McShane Aff.). The Complaint accurately
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alleges that RTC is not an Oklahoma resident. (Compl. 19). The Complaint barely attempts to
plead any factual basis for personal jurisdiction over RTC, and to the nominal extent it does,
Mr. McShanes Affidavit shows that Plaintiffs allegations are incorrect. The Complaint alleges
nothing more than conclusory allegations most notably that RTC participated with other
Defendants in a conspiracy to infringe Plaintiffs trademarks and related rights which are
also refuted by Mr. McShanes Affidavit and in any event could not support a constitutional
exercise of personal jurisdiction over RTC.
Second, even if RTC were subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma, which it is not,
Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed against RTC because it fails to state a claim for relief
against RTC.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I. THE COURT LACKS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER RTC.
A. Law of General or Specific Personal Jurisdiction
A court cannot grant any form of relief against a defendant unless the defendant is
amenable to the courts personal jurisdiction. See Intl Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945). Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over each defendant. See
Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermillion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2008).
Before a federal court can assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a
federal question case, the court must determine (1) whether the applicable
statute potentially confers jurisdiction by authorizing service of process on
the defendant and (2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with
due process.
Peay v. Bellsouth Med. Assn Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotations and
citations omitted). The Lanham Act, under which Plaintiffs assert a claim, does not provide for
nationwide service of process. See, e.g., Am. Educ. Corp. v. Chase, 2006 WL 2044932 47788, at
*2 n.4 (W.D. Okla. July 13, 2006) (citing Sunward Elecs., Inc. v. McDonald, 362 F.3d 17, 22 (2d
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Cir. 2004)). Therefore, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) requires the Court to apply the law of the
forum state (Oklahoma). See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014); Dudnikov,
514 F.3d at 1070. Oklahoma permits personal jurisdiction to be exercised on any basis
consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States. 12 O.S.
2004(F). Accordingly, this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over RTC only if the due
process requirements of the U.S. Constitution are met.
The Supreme Court has held that to exercise jurisdiction in harmony with due process,
defendants must have minimum contacts with the forum state, such that having to defend a
lawsuit there would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070 (quoting Intl Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). In assessing a defendants
contacts with the forum state, the Court may consider two types of personal jurisdiction: general
and specific. See Rambo v. American S. Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1418 (10th Cir. 1988).
Jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the
defendants contacts with the forum state is specific jurisdiction. In
contrast, where the suit does not arise from or relate to the defendants
contacts with the forum and jurisdiction is based on the defendants
presence or accumulated contacts with the forum, the court exercises
general jurisdiction.
Id.; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.15 (1985).
Consistent with constitutional due process, a court may exercise general personal
jurisdiction over a defendant who has continuous or systematic contacts with the forum state.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8 & 9 (1984). But, as
Daimler warns, a corporations continuous activity of some sorts within a state is not enough to
support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757 (quoting Intl Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318). The contacts must be such that
the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in that forum. See Doe v. Natl
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Med. Servs., 974 F.2d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1992). The paradigm forum where a corporate
defendant is subject to general personal jurisdiction is its place of incorporation and/or its
principal place of business. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759. In determining whether a corporation is
subject to general personal jurisdiction in another forum, the question is not whether a foreign
corporations in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense continuous and systematic, it is
whether the corporations affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to
render it essentially at home in the forum State. Id. at 762 (emphasis added); see Firemans
Fund Ins. Co. v. Thyssen Mining Construction of Canada, Ltd., 703 F.3d 488, 493 (10th Cir.
2012) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011))
(same).
Indeed, the Daimler Court rejected the notion that a corporation could be subject to
general personal jurisdiction in numerous venues merely because it performs substantial
activities or engages in substantial business in each of those venues:
[T]he general jurisdiction inquiry does not focu[s] solely on the
magnitude of the defendants in-state contacts. General jurisdiction
instead calls for an appraisal of a corporations activities in their entirety,
nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places
can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them. Otherwise, at home
would be synonymous with doing business tests framed before specific
jurisdiction evolved in the United States.
Id. at 762, n. 20 (quoting id. at 767 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment)).
A court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant has
purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum state and the plaintiffs injuries
arise out of defendants forum-related activities. Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1071 (quoting
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472). Any assertion of specific jurisdiction must always be
consonant with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at
1071 (citing Intl Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
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B. RTC Lacks the Minimum Contacts to Support General or Specific
Jurisdiction Over RTC.
1. RTC has no contacts with Oklahoma.
The Complaint fails to allege any facts showing that RTC has contacts with Oklahoma so
continuous and systematic as to render it at home here, as necessary to support general
personal jurisdiction over RTC. Nor could Plaintiffs possibly demonstrate that RTC has such
contacts with Oklahoma. As shown by the McShane Affidavit:
RTC is a California nonprofit religious corporation located in Los Angeles,
California. (McShane Aff. 3.)
RTC has no footprint in Oklahoma. It has no property in Oklahoma, no office or
place of business, no mailing address or telephone listing, no bank accounts, no staff,
and no registered agent. (Id. 5.)
RTC does not conduct any business in Oklahoma. It has not contracted with any
Oklahoma residents (including any of the Defendants in this case), has not recruited
any Oklahoma residents for any staff position with RTC in Oklahoma or elsewhere,
and has not committed any acts in Oklahoma. (Id. 6.)

Far from being essentially at home in Oklahoma, RTC has no presence in or contact with
Oklahoma at all.
2. The allegation that RTC controls Narconon is baseless.
The Complaint alleges [u]pon information and belief that RTC and ABLE strictly
control Narconon as an arm of the Defendant Church of Scientology International through
licensing agreements and L. Ron Hubbards teachings. (Compl. 247). In reality, RTC has no
such licensing agreements. (McShane Aff. 10-12.) Furthermore, RTC has no authority to
control, and does not control or attempt to control, any operations or activities of ABLE,
Narconon International, or any of Narconon Internationals licensees, including Narconon of
Oklahoma. (Id. 15.) Similarly, RTC has no authority to control, and does not control or
attempt to control, any use of the Narconon mark or any other secular trademarks by any of
those organizations. (Id. 8, 15.) RTC has never possessed, exercised, or attempted to
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exercise, any control, over any of the day to day operations of Narconon of Oklahoma, including
student intake and staffing personnel or any use of any of Plaintiffs logos, trademarks or
certifications. (Id. 15.) The allegation of RTC control over Narconon based on
information and belief thus provides no basis for general or specific personal jurisdiction over
RTC.
3. Plaintiffs website allegations cannot establish personal jurisdiction over
RTC.
The Complaint alleges that [p]ersonal jurisdiction exists over all Defendants because
they purposefully directed their continuous and systematic activities at the forum state through
the maintenance and operation of active websites to engage individuals in the forum state, which
constitutes the requisite minimum contacts. (Compl. 86 (emphasis added).) That vague and
conclusory allegation does not support general or specific jurisdiction over RTC. Although RTC
has a website, this fact would clearly be insufficient in itself to subject RTC to general personal
jurisdiction in Oklahoma under the standards set forth in Daimler. 134 S. Ct. at 761-62; see also
Soma Medical Intl v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa. 1997)). Indeed,
even prior to Daimlers recent recognition of the limitations of general jurisdiction, the Tenth
Circuit held that [a] web site will subject a defendant to general personal jurisdiction only when
the defendant has actually and deliberately used its website to conduct commercial transactions
on a sustained basis with a substantial number of residents of the forum.
2
Shrader v. Biddinger,
633 F.3d 1235, 1243 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Smith v. Basin Park Hosp., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d
1225, 1235 (N.D. Okla. 2001)) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have not, and cannot, allege such

2
It is questionable even whether a defendants use of a website in this manner may subject it to
general jurisdiction over the defendant in a post-Daimler world. But in light of the nature of
RTCs website, the Court need not decide that issue here.
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conduct here. RTC is a religious tax-exempt church and has never used its website to conduct
any commercial transactions with any residents of Oklahoma, nor to direct any RTC activity into
Oklahoma with the intent of engaging in any commercial interaction with Oklahoma or any
residents of Oklahoma. (McShane Aff. 17.)
Similarly, Plaintiffs website allegations fail to show any basis for specific jurisdiction
over RTC. The Complaint specifically identifies the websites that allegedly use the NAFC logo
and certifications improperly and without authorization. (Compl. 250.) RTC neither owns
nor controls any of those website domains. (McShane Aff. 17.) And importantly, Plaintiffs do
not and could not allege that any of their trademarks, logos, or certifications have ever appeared
on RTCs website or in any other RTC materials. (Compl. 116-235, McShane Aff. 17.)
4. Plaintiffs conspiracy allegations do not support personal jurisdiction
over RTC.
The Complaint also alleges that personal jurisdiction exists over all Defendants due to
Defendants participation in a civil conspiracy with its [sic] co-Defendants located in this
forum. (Compl. 86.) But to establish personal jurisdiction based on a conspiracy theory, a
plaintiff must offer more than bare allegations that a conspiracy existed, and must allege facts
that would support a prima facie showing of a conspiracy. Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1242 (quoting
Melea, Ltd. v. Jawer SA, 511 F.3d 1060, 1069 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted)).
Indeed, [f]or jurisdiction based on the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction to exist in Oklahoma, an
overt act of the conspiracy must have taken place in Oklahoma. Clark v. Tabin, 400 F. Supp.
2d 1290, 1297 (N.D. Okla. 2005) (citing Kohler Co. v. Kohler Intl, Ltd., 196 F. Supp. 2d 690,
697 (N.D. Ill. 2002)). Moreover, [t]he overt act must not just be alleged, but must be shown by
affidavit that it likely took place. Mere allegations of conspiracy are insufficient. Clark, 400 F.
Supp. 2d at 1297 (citing Baldridge v. McPike, Inc., 466 F.2d 65, 68 (10th Cir. 1972)); see also
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Am. Land Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappij, N.V., 710 F.2d 1449, 1454
(10th Cir. 1983) (finding that the plaintiff failed to establish personal jurisdiction based on
conspiracy because the defendants [] countered [plaintiffs allegations] by sworn affidavits that
no conspiracy . . . existed, and the plaintiff failed to controvert defendants affidavits other
than by conclusory allegations in its complaint and briefs).
Here, Plaintiffs conspiracy allegations consist entirely of the following conclusory
assertions, unsupported by any alleged facts:
(1) RTC, Mr. Miscavige, ABLE and Church of Scientology participated
in a scheme with the other Defendants to use the NAFC certifications to
bolster the Narconon Network and its counselors in the public perception.
(Compl. 249 (emphasis added).)
(2) RTC and the other Defendants operate a common scheme . . . to
promote the Narconon Network through the misuse of NAFC logos,
trademarks, and certifications (Id. 253 (emphasis added).)
(3) Defendants intentionally engaged in common plan to utilize NAFCs
Certification, Mark and Logo to attract customers to Defendants drug
treatment facilities. (Id. 293 (emphasis added).)
(4) Defendants were aware of the common plan and the common
purpose: to receive acclaim in the industry and consequently profit and to
attract new members to the Church of Scientology, based on the use of the
NAFC Certifications, Mark and Logo. (Id. 294 (emphasis added).)
(5) Defendants acted in concert, agreed and cooperated to achieve such
misuse and took affirmative steps to encourage the achievement of their
plan. (Id. 295 (emphasis added).)
None of these allegations states that RTC committed an overt act in Oklahoma in furtherance of
the conspiracy. Clark, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1297. And RTC has submitted a sworn affidavit[]
that no conspiracy . . . existed, Am. Land Program, Inc., 710 F.2d at 1454, including that RTC
never communicated to any other defendant about the use or potential use of Plaintiffs marks or
logos. Thus, Plaintiffs allegations are precisely the type of naked conclusions that cannot
support personal jurisdiction under a conspiracy theory. Repeated incantations of common
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plan, common scheme, or conspiracy, are no substitute for specific facts and fall far short of
establishing a basis for specific personal jurisdiction over RTC in Oklahoma. See Schrader,
supra.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that in order to promote Defendants Church of Scientology,
RTC and the Narconon Treatment Centers, and ostensibly to further some sort of conspiracy
to infringe the logos, marks, or certifications of NAFC or CCFC, RTCs Chairman made
misstatements about NBAE (National Board of Addiction Examiners) certifications during an
event held in Florida. (Compl. 248.) Specifically, in an apparent effort to suggest a
connection between a Church event and Oklahoma, Plaintiffs allege that the Chairmans remarks
were transmitted via satellite from a packed Ruth Eckerd Hall in Clearwater, Florida . . . . (Id.
(emphasis added).) However, Plaintiffs do not identify the audience or destination for the
satellite transmission and in no way link this transmission to Oklahoma. The referenced event
was a religious convocation in celebration of the birth date of L. Ron Hubbard, Founder of the
Scientology religion, and presided over by the ecclesiastical leader of the Scientology religion
and RTCs Chairman of the Board, David Miscavige, as described in the McShane Affidavit.
(McShane Aff. 18). The event was relayed by satellite only to the Church of Scientologys
main church also in Clearwater, Florida, to accommodate an overflow of attendees. (Id.)
Mr. Miscaviges remarks were not intended to be and were not broadcast into Oklahoma by any
means. (Id).
Plaintiffs allegations about the Florida event provide no support for general or specific
jurisdiction over RTC here. Indeed, this would be so even if Chairman Miscaviges remarks had
been broadcast into Oklahoma, which they were not. See, e.g., Outdoor Channel, Inc. v.
Performance One Media, LLC, 826 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1282 (N.D. Okla. 2011) (national
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broadcast of allegedly infringing programming did not constitute a relevant contact for purposes
[of] the personal jurisdiction analysis); Annie Oakley Enters., Inc. v. Sunset Tan Corporate &
Consulting, LLC, 703 F. Supp. 2d 881, 893 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (as a matter of law, the national
broadcast of a television program does not give rise to personal jurisdiction in every state);
Busch v. Viacom Intl, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 764, 772 (N.D. Tex. 2007) ([I]n the context of a
media or libel case, in order to support a finding of specific jurisdiction, Plaintiff must establish
that [the forum] was the focal point of both the challenged broadcast and the harm suffered.).
C. The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over RTC Would Violate Due Process.
Even if Plaintiffs could make a prima facie showing of RTC minimum contacts with
Oklahoma, an exercise of personal jurisdiction over RTC would be unreasonable, unfair, and in
violation of due process. The Tenth Circuit has identified the following factors to be considered
in determining the reasonableness of the assertion of personal jurisdiction:
In determining whether exercise of jurisdiction is so unreasonable as to violate
fair play and substantial justice, we consider: (1) the burden on the defendant,
(2) the forum states interest in resolving the dispute, (3) the plaintiffs interest in
receiving convenient and effective relief, (4) the interstate judicial systems
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the
shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.
OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1095-96 (10th Cir. 1998).
These factors demonstrate the unreasonableness of exercising personal jurisdiction over RTC in
Oklahoma.
1. Burden on the defendant of litigating in the forum
While not dispositive, the burden on the defendant of litigating the case in a foreign
forum is of primary concern in determining the reasonableness of personal jurisdiction. World-
Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1979). The burden on RTC in this case
is significant. RTC is a California nonprofit corporation with its principal place of business in
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California. It has no offices, assets, or employees in Oklahoma. Accordingly, this factor weighs
in favor of RTC.
2. Forum states interest in adjudicating the dispute
Plaintiffs are not Oklahoma residents. They are Nevada corporations with their principal
places of business in Fort Wayne, Indiana. They have brought claims against 82 Defendants
13 living in Oklahoma and the others residing in at least 14 states, Canada, and the United
Kingdom. Those claims are based on conduct that was not centered in Oklahoma but rather
allegedly occurred in the various places where the Defendants reside. Thus, Oklahoma has no
greater interest in adjudicating the dispute than any of these other jurisdictions. Compare Sleepy
Lagoon, Ltd. v. Tower Grp., Inc., 809 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1310 (N.D. Okla. 2011) (holding that
forum state has an interest in exercising personal jurisdiction over a defendant where one or
more of the plaintiffs is a resident of the forum state).
3. Plaintiffs interest in convenient and effective relief
This element hinges on whether Plaintiffs may obtain convenient and effective relief in
another forum. This factor may weigh heavily in cases where a plaintiffs chances of recovery
will be greatly diminished by forcing it to litigate in another forum because of that forums laws
or because the burden may be so overwhelming as to practically foreclose pursuit of the lawsuit.
Id. at 1097. No such danger exists here. As noted above, Plaintiffs are Nevada corporations
based in Indiana. There is no reason to believe that Oklahoma is a more convenient forum than
the courts in or closer to their home states. Nor do they suggest that there is a peculiarity of
Oklahoma law that greatly enhances their chances of recovery here. Thus, this factor does not
support this Courts assertion of jurisdiction over RTC.
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4. Interstate judicial systems interest in obtaining efficient resolution
This factor examines whether the forum state is the most efficient place to litigate the
dispute. OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1097. Key parts of this inquiry are where the wrong
underlying the lawsuit occurred and what states substantive law governs the case. Id. As noted
above, this case involves plaintiffs who are Nevada entities with a principal place of business in
Indiana and 82 Defendants, with only 13 residents of Oklahoma and the others from numerous
states and two foreign countries. Oklahoma is far from the epicenter of this dispute it is merely
one of many places in which the alleged wrongful conduct has occurred. The majority of the
claims asserted are either based on federal statutes or common law. And the single Oklahoma
statutory claim involves a right-of-publicity statute, 12 O.S. 1449, of the type that is hardly
unique to Oklahoma and which does not apply as a matter of law. See Woods v. Prestwick
House, Inc., 2011 OK 9, 1 (noting that section 1449 protects individuals from unauthorized
use of the persons name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness, indicating that the statute
may only be invoked by individuals rather than corporate entities such as Plaintiffs (emphasis
added)). Thus, Oklahoma is in no way the most efficient place in which to litigate this dispute.
5. State interest in furthering fundamental substantive social policies
The final factor to be considered is the interests of the several states, in addition to the
forum state, in advancing fundamental substantive social policies. OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at
1098. The analysis of this factor focuses on whether the exercise of jurisdiction by the forum
state affects the substantive social policy interests of other states. This factor does not appear to
apply in this case.
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit has noted that: personal jurisdiction analysis requires
that [the court] draw a line in the sand. At some point, the facts supporting jurisdiction in a
given forum are so lacking that the notions of fundamental fairness inherent in the Due Process
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Clause preclude a district court from exercising jurisdiction over a defendant. Id. Even if the
Complaints paltry allegations against RTC were true, or were assumed to be true, RTCs contact
with Oklahoma would be so slight that forcing RTC to litigate this action in Oklahoma would be
unreasonable and inconsistent with the notions of fair play and substantial justice which form
the bedrock of the due process inquiry. Id.
II. ALTERNATIVELY, PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS AGAINST RTC SHOULD BE
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM.
Alternatively, RTC specially appears and moves for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
The Complaint falls woefully short of stating a claim against RTC, in particular because it fails
to sufficiently allege that RTC engaged in any of the conduct at issue in this action.
Plaintiffs first four causes of action hinge on their contention that Defendants have
used NAFCs trademarks, logo and certifications, without authorization, to promote their
services to the public. (See Compl. 260-91.) Based on this allegation, Plaintiffs assert the
following four claims:
First Claim: Federal trademark infringement (Id. 260-70 (contending that
Defendants uses of NAFCs Mark, Logo and Certification on Defendants
websites and in Defendants publications are unauthorized and constitute
infringement of Plaintiffs alleged federal trademark));
Second Claim: Common law trademark infringement (id. 271-77 (citing
Defendants unauthorized uses of NAFCs Certifications and Logo to
promote their facilities and staff));
Third Claim: Federal infringement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1125 (id. 278-
83 (Defendants marketing, promotion, and offering of services while using
the NAFC Certifications, Marks and Logo constitute false designations of
origin and false descriptions or representations that Defendants [sic] services
are certified by NAFC and/or ACCFC when in fact they are not.)); and
Fourth Claim: Violation of right of publicity pursuant to 12 O.S. 1449 (id.
284-91 (Defendants knowingly used NAFCs name and likeness for the
purposes of advertising, soliciting, and selling Defendants services to the
public.)).
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Although Plaintiffs assert these claims generally against all Defendants, their
Complaint contains no allegation that RTC has ever used NAFCs Mark, Logo and
Certifications in any way. As noted above, RTC is conspicuously absent from the list of
Defendants with allegedly infringing websites and publications, which is set forth in paragraphs
116 through 242 and paragraph 250 of the Complaint. Moreover, the services promoted by the
alleged use of NAFC certifications and logo were not the services of RTC, which is not even
alleged to be the type of entity that might utilize the certifications and logo. In fact, the
Complaint merely identifies RTC as an entity holding the rights to use L. Ron Hubbards name
and writings . . . (Compl. 243), and not as a provider of drug treatment and rehabilitation
services. Thus, there is simply no allegation that RTC itself has utilized the mark, logos or
certifications of Plaintiffs to promote its own services. Because Plaintiffs do not allege that RTC
itself used their mark, certifications or logos, the first four causes of action in their Complaint fail
as a matter of law. See Kerber v. Qwest Group Life Ins. Plan, 647 F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir.
2011) (to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to make the
claim plausible on its face) (citation omitted)); Mandelbaum v. Fiserv, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1234 (D. Colo. 2011) (In evaluating the plausibility of a given claim, the Court need not
accept conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments. (quoting S. Disposal, Inc.
v. Tex. Waste Mgmt., 161 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998)).
Implicitly recognizing that they have alleged no wrongful conduct on the part of RTC,
Plaintiffs attempt to impose vicarious liability against RTC, with respect to their first through
fourth claims, under two theories: (1) that [u]pon information and belief, RTC . . . strictly
control[s] [Defendant] Narconon . . . . (Compl. 247); and (2) that RTC participated in a
scheme with the other Defendants to use the NAFC certifications to bolster the Narconon
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Network and its counselors in the public perception (id. 249). This alleged scheme also
forms the basis for Plaintiffs fifth claim, for civil conspiracy. However, these theories are
supported only by conclusory allegations that fail to state a claim for relief against RTC.
First, Plaintiffs conclusory allegation based only on information and belief (Compl.
247) that RTC controls Narconon does not support a claim for relief against RTC.
Plaintiffs make no attempt to connect this stray, unsupported allegation to any legal theory of
vicarious liability (e.g., agency, alter ego, etc.). Nor do they provide any examples of, or allege
any facts demonstrating, the alleged control. The Complaint thus fails to put RTC on notice of
the nature of any such claim against it and the facts supporting that claim. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs control allegation does not provide the basis for a claim against RTC. See Bridges
v. Lane, 351 Fed. Appx. 284, 286 (10th Cir. 2009) (The burden is on the plaintiff to craft an
adequate complaint that contains enough factual allegations to state facially plausible claims for
relief and provide fair notice to defendants of the nature of the claims against them.); Robbins v.
Okla., 519 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007) requires enough allegations to give the defendants notice of the theory under
which [plaintiffs] claim is made).
Second, Plaintiffs have failed sufficiently to allege the existence of a conspiracy. In
Twombly, the Supreme Court held that to state a claim for antitrust conspiracy, a complaint must
provide enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest than an agreement was made. 550
U.S. at 556 (emphasis added). The Court concluded
[A]n allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will
not suffice [to render a conspiracy plausible]. Without more, parallel
conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of
agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to
show illegality.
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This Court has applied the Twombly standard to a civil conspiracy claim like the one in this case.
Peterson v. Grisham, 2008 WL 4363653 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2008). In Peterson, the Court
held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for civil conspiracy where their complaint cited only
the defendants parallel conduct in publishing the books at issue in that case and contained no
allegation suggesting a preceding agreement by the defendants to write and publish these
books. Id. at *9.
As discussed above, Plaintiffs conspiracy allegations here are purely conclusory.
Although they repeatedly and summarily refer to an alleged scheme to promote the Narconon
network, they assert no facts showing that the alleged co-conspirators entered into an agreement
to utilize Plaintiffs mark, logos and certifications. Moreover, although they arguably allege
parallel conduct among some Defendants (which, under Twombly, is insufficient to state a
conspiracy claim), they do not allege any parallel conduct by RTC.
3
Indeed, as shown above,
they do not even allege that RTC engaged in the allegedly wrongful conduct. Plaintiffs
conspiracy allegations against RTC constitute the type of bare assertions of conspiracy that the
Supreme Court and this Court have squarely rejected as a basis for a legally cognizable
conspiracy claim. Accordingly, Plaintiffs fifth claim for civil conspiracy as well as any
attempt to use the conspiracy allegation as a basis for imposing liability on RTC relating to the
first four causes of action involving conduct in which RTC is not alleged to have participated
fail as a matter of law.

3
Although Plaintiffs allege (Compl. 248) that during a Church event in Florida (2002)
(discussed above) RTCs Chairman made false claims concerning certifications of NBAE
which is alleged to have been a short-lived sub-board under NAFC (id. 239) that was
dissolved in 1999 (id. 240) and ceased to exist in any form in 2006 (id. 241) the Complaint
does not allege any facts showing that those allegedly false claims were made in furtherance of
the alleged conspiracy to misuse Plaintiffs trademarks, logo or certifications. Indeed,
Plaintiffs allege that the conspiratorial misuse (by Defendants other than RTC) of Plaintiffs
trademark rights occurred years after the 2002 Church event. (See id. 110-236).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant RTC should be dismissed from this action for lack
of personal jurisdiction. Alternatively, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs claims against RTC
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ David L. Bryant
David L. Bryant, OBA No. 1262
David E. Keglovits, OBA No. 14259
Amelia A. Fogleman, OBA No. 16221
GABLEGOTWALS
1100 ONEOK Plaza
100 West Fifth Street
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103-4217
(918) 595-4800
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of July, 2014, I electronically transmitted the attached
document to the Clerk of Court using the ECF system for filing. Based on the records currently
on file, the Clerk of Court will transmit a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following ECF
registrants:
David R. Keesling
david@KLGattorneys.com
Heidi L. Shadid
heidi@KLGattorneys.com
Sloane Ryan Lile
sloane@KLGattorneys.com
Keesling Law Group, PLLC
401 South Boston Avenue
Mid-Continent Building, 4th Floor
Tulsa, OK 74103
Attorneys for Plaintiffs National Association
of Forensic Counselors, Inc.;
American Academy of Certified Forensic
Counselors, Inc.
Donald M. Bingham
don_bingham@riggsabney.com
M. David Riggs
driggs@riggsabney.com
Wm. Gregory James
gjames@riggsabney.com
Riggs Abney Neal Turpen Orbison & Lewis
502 West Sixth Street
Tulsa, OK 74119
Attorneys for Defendant Narconon of
Oklahoma, Inc.;
Derry Hallmark; Janet Watkins;
Tom Widman; Vicki Smith;
Michael Otto; Michael J. Gosselin;
Kathy Gosselin; Michael George;
Kent McGregor; Dena G. Goad;
Michael St. Amand; Gary W. Smith

John H. Tucker
jtuckercourts@rhodesokla.com
Colin H. Tucker
chtucker@rhodesokla.com
Denelda L. Richardson
drichardoncourts@rhodesokla.com
Kerry R. Lewis
klewis@rhodesokla.com
Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable
P.O. Box 21100
Tulsa, OK 74121
Attorneys for Association for Better Living
and Education International;
Narconon International; Clark Carr


Richard P. Hix
Richard.hix@mcafeetaft.com
Alison A. Verret
Alison.verret@mcafeetaft.com
McAfee & Taft, P.C.
1717 South Boulder Avenue, Suite 900
Tulsa, OK 74119
Attorneys for David S. Lee
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Charles D. Neal, Jr.
cdn@steidley-neal.com
Steidley & Neal
P.O. Box 1165
McAlester, OK 74502
Attorney for Defendants Friends of Narconon
International;
Best Drug Rehabilitation, Inc.;
A Life Worth Living, Inc.;
Golden Millennium Productions, Inc.;
Joseph Guernaccini; Thomas Garcia;
David S. Lee, III; Richard Hawk;
Anthony Bylsma; Glen Petcavage;
Narconon Freedom Center, Inc.;
Jonathan Beazley;
Narconon Spring Hill, Inc.;
Royalmark Management, Inc.;
International Academy of Detoxification
Specialists; Premazon, Inc.;
Jonathan Moretti; Luria K. Dion

Rachel D. Parrilli
rdp@steidley-neal.com
Stacie L. Hixon
slh@steidley-neal.com
Steidley & Neal
2448 East 81st Street, Suite 5300
Tulsa, OK 74137
Attorneys for Defendant Friends of Narconon
International;
Best Drug Rehabilitation, Inc.;
A Life Worth Living, Inc.;
Golden Millennium Productions, Inc.;
Joseph Guernaccini; Thomas Garcia;
David S. Lee, III; Richard Hawk;
Anthony Bylsma; Glen Petcavage;
Narconon Freedom Center, Inc.;
Jonathan Beazley;
Narconon Spring Hill, Inc.;
Royalmark Management, Inc.;
International Academy of Detoxification
Specialists; Premazon, Inc.;
Jonathan Moretti; Luria K. Dion


/s/David L. Bryant
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