ISN Security Watch Questions on Somalia

24 November 2009
David H. Shinn

1. Question: As there is increasing reporting about some young members of the Somali
diaspora (e.g. from Minnesota) returning to their country, do you see Somalia becoming a
training ground for jihadis from Somalia’s huge diaspora? Might it even become a wider
training ground for people with no direct family connection to Somalia?

Answer: Somalia has become a training ground for Somali jihadis from the diaspora.
The percentage of Somalis engaging in this kind of activity remains, however,
exceedingly small. There are an estimated 200,000 Somalis in the United States. The
largest Somali community in the United States is in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area.
According to court documents, twenty young men from Minnesota, all but one of Somali
descent, went to Somalia where they trained with the extremist al-Shabaab organization.
Most of them left the United States in 2007 and 2008 while Ethiopia still had significant
numbers of troops in Somalia. They may have been attracted to al-Shabaab, which
opposed Ethiopia, largely for that reason. Perhaps a couple dozen Somalis from other
U.S. cities also trained with al-Shabaab. In addition, small numbers of Somalis from the
diaspora in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Australia and other countries trained with al-
Shabaab.
Although Somali jihadi web sites continue to urge Somalis in the diaspora to join
al-Shabaab, my sense is that this recruitment activity may have peaked in the Somali
diaspora of western countries. The families of these young men now understand the
threat to their children, and they are paying closer attention to the problem. Security
authorities in countries where there are significant Somali communities are being much
more vigilant. Finally, the departure of Ethiopian military forces from Somalia has
diminished the ardor of disaffected Somalis in the diaspora from joining al-Shabaab.
The status of al-Shabaab recruitment of Somalis is less clear in the Somali-
inhabited parts of neighboring Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti and in Somali diaspora
communities found closer to Somalia in other parts of Africa and the Middle East. There
are no meaningful estimates on Somalis already recruited from these regions nor are there
reliable reports on whether this recruitment is increasing or decreasing. It deserves close
monitoring.
There will always be some persons with no ethnic connection to Somalia who are
attracted to organizations like al-Shabaab. Most experts believe that a few hundred non-
Somali jihadis, mostly from Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, have joined al-
Shabaab. Some of these jihadis have connections with al-Qaeda. This group, although it
has no particular interest in Somalia, is more worrisome because it is dedicated to
extremism and a new world order. It follows jihadi activity wherever the opportunity
occurs, including Somalia.
 2

2. Question: If so, is there a danger that they will return, i.e. become a terror threat to
Western countries, in particular the ones with a huge Somali diaspora like the U.S., UK,
etc?

Answer: So far there is very little evidence that Somalis have returned to their countries
of refuge to engage in terrorist activity. The most celebrated case involved four young
men of Somali and Lebanese descent from Australia who had been affiliated with al-
Shabaab and returned to Australia to stage in mid-2009 a guerrilla attack on a military
complex southwest of Sydney. It is not clear if they hatched this plot on their own or
with the connivance of al-Shabaab. While there is a danger of similar threats, this has not
been the pattern so far.

3. Question: In this context I would also like to know if you see al-Shabaab and Hizbul
Islam today as nationalist or transnational movements. Do you think the movements
changed their nature in the past year?

Answer: Hizbul Islam was at one time closely allied with al-Shabaab. That alliance is
breaking down, especially following competition between Hizbul Islam and a group
affiliated with al-Shabaab for control of the southern Somali port of Kismayo. It remains
to be seen if Hizbul Islam and al-Shabaab can patch up their differences.
From the beginning, Hizbul Islam has been a nationalist organization that wishes
to impose a strict form of sharia over Somalia. It also favors incorporation of Somali-
inhabited territory in neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia into Somalia. It is not clear that it
has links with al-Qaeda and apparently it is not recruiting non-Somalis to join its ranks.
Al-Shabaab has openly acknowledged links with al-Qaeda, has recruited several
hundred non-Somali jihadis and threatened countries in the region including Ethiopia,
Kenya, Djibouti, Ghana, Israel, Uganda, Burundi and, recently, even Eritrea which is
believed to have provided assistance to al-Shabaab. An al-Shabaab statement said Eritrea
opposes the interests of Muslims. These threats would seem to qualify al-Shabaab as a
transnational movement. Both Hizbul Islam and al-Shabaab want to control Somalia.

4. Question: On what ground do al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam rule the areas they
control, as they lost the bulk of their legitimacy with the withdrawal of the Ethiopian
troops. Although militarily strong, do you think the two movements are loosing the battle
over hearts and minds on the ground? In the current state of play, do you think the TFG
will be able to get the upper hand in the struggle over south/central Somalia?

Answer: Al-Shabaab in particular is decentralized with little pyramidal top-down

leadership. In fact, there is considerable fluctuation in leadership along clan and regional
lines. It has been successful through intimidation, a higher degree of commitment and
the ability to pay its foot soldiers on a regular basis. Hizbul Islam probably has more
leadership loyalty but is also subject to clan and regional differences. Both organizations
lost some of their credibility once Ethiopian forces left the country. The problem is that
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is exceptionally weak. While there is
minimal support for al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, the TFG has not yet been able to
capitalize on the weakness of both organizations. Too few Somalis are willing to fight
 3

and die for the TFG. A foreign force, including the Ugandan and Burundi troops under
African Union command, will not be able to keep the TFG in power indefinitely. The
TFG must attract a sufficient number of trained and loyal Somali security forces if it has
any hope of prevailing over al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam.