As Daniel Dennett explains, human consciousness is an experience of phenomena. There arevarious items of conscious experience that have to be explained. For this he uses the termphenomenology. Phenom, our experience of phenomena, can be classified as three distincttypes:  experiences of the 'external' world
sights, sound, smells, positions of our limbs,textures etc;  experiences of the internal world
fantasy images, daydreaming,recollections, bright ideas; and  experiences of emotion or 'affect'
bodily pain, hunger,thirst, anger, joy, lust, pride, fear etc.
It is the job of any materialistic 'theory of mind' to beable to do these phenom justice.
Historically, we can see this problem began with Descartes, who considered the body andsoul to be ontologically separate yet interacting through the pineal gland at the base of thebrain.
The body (in our case the brain) is physical and the soul (the mind) is non-physical.There are various philosophical problems associated with this. For example, how doimmaterial substances affect material substances? Dualists, those who hold such a belief,have various answers to these problems which are generally found lacking; but the biggestproblem would seem to be an empirical one. Looking at one particular part of the brain to seeits affect on the mind, it becomes evident that we don't really need an immaterial mind whenwe can explain it as a material one quite well.The amygdala is an almond-shaped area of the brain that is responsible for the sense of fear.
When an individual is frightened, the neurones in their amygdala are highly active. If the amygdala is lesioned, the individual looses their sense of fear. For example, monkeys withdamage to the amygdala have a dramatic drop in fearfulness and rats with targeted amygdaladamage loose their fear of cats.
Here we can see that tampering with the brain,inadvertently or not, most certainly affects the mind. Adding the further hypothesis of theimmaterial mind is without any sound scientific point. As William of Ockham said, "It is vain todo with more what can be done with fewer."
Of course, a material mind has its ownassociated problems.
The Problem of Phenomenology
Cast your mind back to the last brilliant sunset you saw. Imagine the delicate pink, orange,yellow and red hues of the clouds. This is a personal item of your own phenomenology. Howcan science explain this? "Nothing could be less like an electron, or a molecule, or a neuron,than
the way the sunset seems to me now
or so it seems... How could anything composed of material particles
the fun I'm having now?"
As mentioned earlier, a good theory of mindshould be able to explain this. Consider another example.The version of a classic thought experiment I will now consider involves the colour-blind'super-scientist' (call him Dr. Grey) and the normal colour perceiving subject (call him Mr.