Chad KOHALYK Fundamentals of Modularity
Alternative force structures for the future
Fundamentals of Modularity
The push towards modularity in mili-
tary organizational structures is an exten-
sion of the goal for military transforma-
tion in the post-Cold War period. Modu-
larity is thought to be effective in provid-
ing the agility to quickly deploy and sus-
tain forces involved in missions around
the world, and develop forces with great
flexibility that can be “tailored” to spe-
cific mission types. Yet a consensus on
how this type of organizational design is
to be accomplished has not been reached.
Advanced militaries — including the
United States, Canada, France, etc. —
are all heading in similar yet different
directions in regards to the concept of
modularity.
Most of the practical knowledge
about modularity comes from advances
in the computing industry.1 Starting from
developments in modular product design,
generalized theories of modularity have
been applied across a number of fields
including physics, chemistry, biology,
social science, neuroscience and of
course organizational design. This final
application has spun off whole fields of
management research dealing with
“Complex Adaptive Systems” and “stra-
tegic flexibility.”
This study will examine the funda-
mental principles of modularity as it is
presented in the literature. Each of the
major principles described below are a
large dedicated research field unto them-
selves. The purpose is to introduce these
concepts in a holistic fashion and begin
to apply them in a military context. Thus
this study serves as a broad map plotting
the major contours in the field of modu-
lar systems design to act a gateway for
further research in the pursuit of military
modularization.
By analysis of various models of
military modularity, through the lens of
specific modular systems design princi-
1 Baldwin and Clark (1997), pp. 160.
2 Sanchez and Mahoney (1996), pp. 68.
3 Langlois and Robertson, pp. 84.
4 META Group, pp. 2.
5 Godefroy, pp. 54.
6 See DLSC Figure 1.
7 Pengelley (2000).
ples, this study endeavors to illuminate
the fundamentals of modularity by ex-
ample. The analysis examples presented
in the examples are by no means exhaus-
tive, and many real-world problems such
as personnel issues (ie. recruitment, re-
tention, promotion, etc.) are left to the
operational researchers that will imple-
ment a modular system in the future.
What the models explored should illus-
trate is that modularity is not necessarily
binary, but can be represented by a whole
spectrum of possibilities. Certain princi-
ples may have to be loosely obeyed or
outright ignored to develop a functional
organization for the real world. That
said, the final section of the study will
propose a military modular organization
that strictly adheres to the principles of
modular design. Hopefully, the principles
presented in this work will be observed
by those intending to reform their mili-
tary organizations.
Why modularity?
In a rapidly changing environment,
an organization must be flexible. A
modular firm can quickly link the re-
sources and capabilities of many organi-
zations to deal with a changing environ-
ment flexibly.2 Modularity endows the
ability for parallel work; since modules
are largely independent from one another
a module can be repaired or upgraded
without impacting the rest of the system.
Thus a modular system is tolerant of
uncertainty, meaning that elements of a
modular system's design can be changed
after the fact. This makes modular sys-
tem designs “future proof,” and an ideal
structure for organizations in an unpre-
dictable environment. Furthermore,
modularity allows for rapid innovation.
In a decentralized network of modules
conducting parallel work, many alternate
approaches to a complex problem can be
1
tested simultaneously. There are also
more entry points for new ideas in a
modular system. Thus, a modular system
can progress and improve faster than a
closed, vertically integrated system. 3
The recent push for modularity in
military circles follows the modular evo-
lution that has been taking place in the
business sector for the past few decades.
A recent survey conducted by the META
Group asked 308 subjects about their
opinion on becoming an “adaptive or-
ganization,” defined as an organization
that is “flexible and dynamically change-
able, in both business processes and
technology.”4 The survey showed that
firms feared falling behind competitors,
and saw adaptive solutions as a method
to reduce costs and increase revenues.
57% of firms surveyed intended to be-
come an adaptive organization. Another
23% had instituted broad initiatives to
become more adaptive, and 13% consid-
ered themselves already adaptive. Only
7% of firms covered in the survey had no
plan to become adaptive.
The military intends to take full ad-
vantage of the benefits of flexibility. The
Canadian Forces’ concept of the Army of
Tomorrow requires a “fluid force struc-
ture" that may be "configured as required
to meet a specific mission or aim.”5 A
forced tailored to a specific mission is
high level concept not only for Canada,
but for Australia and New Zealand future
forces as well. 6 The French began to
transform their forces in 1996 disbanding
standing divisional organizations and
replacing them with four two-star EMF
(État Major des Forces) force headquar-
ters staffs, capable of controlling two to
four brigades. 7 The US Army modular
redesign is intended to address “the need
for a more responsive, deployable, joint,
and expeditionary force,” but also aims
at providing a larger pool of deployable
Chad KOHALYK Fundamentals of Modularity 2

units.8 With a larger number of smaller watches were highly sought after, thus ponent that fails will cause a total sys-
units, the US can deploy and rotate units Hora and Tempus were constantly inter- tem breakdown, thus increasing the in-
in a parallel fashion without detriment to rupted by constant calls from new cus- centive to ensure every part is of the
the overall strategic mission. In the post- tomers during their work. The watches highest quality, resulting in higher costs.
Cold War era it is natural that advanced were complex affairs made from about Bottlenecks and inconsistencies within a
military forces would aim to follow the 1000 parts each. Tempus’s watch design nondecomposable system are also
business world in developing flexible was highly integrated, so much so that if highlighted. 12 If the effectiveness of a
organizations. But the military has a long he was interrupted during assembly — component depends on the design of
tradition of rigid hierarchy, and moving say, to answer the phone — it immedi- another, the system needs to be redes-
to a modular system design will be a ately fell to pieces. Hora on the other- igned to minimize this dependency, pos-
more difficult experience than the busi- hand, had designed his components to be sible by combining the components.13
ness world. put together in subassemblies of about Interdependency in mechanical struc-
ten parts each, which would then be tural designs is similar to information
What is modularity? combined into a larger subassembly. Ten transmission — or communication — in
of these larger subassemblies would then formal organizational structures or social
Modularity is a set of principles for
constitute the entire watch. Hence, when systems. An example would be organiz-
managing complexity. The world is full
Hora put down a partially assembled ing teams for a project. If the project
of complex systems from organisms and
watch to answer the phone, he only lost a tasks are partitioned in a decomposable
ecosystems to electronics and social sys-
small part of his work. Consequently manner, each research and development
tems. One way to manage these systems
Hora could assemble his watches in a team will work in parallel without much
is to group elements together into smaller
fraction of the time it took Tempus. 10 communication between teams. This is
subsystems. Herbert Simon argued that
The interdependency of Tempus’s the basis of object-oriented approach to
“complexity frequently takes the form of
watch design caused his watches to fall computer programming.
hierarchy.”9 He saw hierarchical organ-
apart, where as Hora’s decomposable If the project is not organized in a
izational structures everywhere: cells,
design proved resilient in the face of decomposable manner interdependency
tissues, atoms, molecules, planetary sys-
disruption. Furthermore, based upon will be high as each team will constantly
tems, galaxies, businesses, governments,
Simon's work, Langlois states: 11 have to be receiving and processing in-
universities, books, music and technol-
formation about what every other team is
ogy. A modular system on the otherhand,
In a nondecomposable system, the doing. To illustrate this point Langlois
while it may resemble a hierarchy, does
successful operation of any given gives the example of the IBM System/
not have an authoritative structure. In a
part is likely to depend on the 360 project manager who “insisted on a
formal organization each subsystem will
characteristics of many other parts conscious attention to interdependencies
have a “boss” responsible for those be-
throughout the system. So when and a high level of communication
low and answering to those above. In a
such a system is missing parts among all participants.” Copies of a pro-
modular system subsystems are not nec-
(because it is not finished, for ject workbook, which constantly had to
essarily subordinate.
example, or because some of the be maintained, were distributed so each
Modularity is a special form of sys-
parts parts are damaged), the worker could determine how changes
tems design in that it intentionally cre-
whole ceases to function and the elsewhere would impact his or her part
ates components that have a high degree
system becomes evolutionary of the overall project. Soon the work-
of independence. It emphasizes the parts
shark bait. In a decomposable book was five feet thick, with daily
of a system over the system as a whole.
system, by contrast, the proper changes measuring 2 inches of paper.
Modules interact with one another on a
working of a given part will de- Technology came to the rescue and the
weak basis known as “loose coupling.”
pend with high probability on the team changed to microfiche to maintain
Since interdependence between subsys-
characteristics of other parts the project work, yet this didn't solve the
tems is minimal, the system as a whole
within the subassembly — but problem of excessive time managing
will not suffer if some subsystems are
will depend with relatively lower information rather than developing the
damaged or are being upgraded. Simon
probability on the characteristics software. The lesson is that “a nonde-
used a parable to illustrate the concept of
of parts outside of the assembly. composible system incurs high commu-
decomposability.
nications cost.”14
The story, a favourite of modularity
Furthermore, Langlois points out that David Parnas invented a key concept
researchers, has two watchmakers named
in a nondecomposable system any com- in solving interdependency issues be-
Hora and Tempus. Their very fine

8 Feickert, pp. 2 and 13.

9 Simon (1962), pp. 16.
10 Ibid, pp. 19.
11 Langlois (2000), pp. 5.
12 Ibid, pp. 13.
13 Simon (1962), pp. 41.
14 Ibid, pp. 6-7.
Chad KOHALYK Fundamentals of Modularity
tween teams working on a project called
"information hiding."15 He argued that
modularization of large projects should
not be based on a simple flow chart ap-
proach, but should concentrate on mini-
mizing interdependencies. If knowledge
is hidden within a module, that knowl-
edge cannot affect other parts of a system
and therefore need not be communicated
to the rest of the system. Thus a project
is ideally decomposed into a series of
task modules that have no interdepend-
encies. Furthermore, each module is not
privy to the inner-workings of every
other module. Only the function of an
individual module's task is known. This
result combines with all other module
results to create the completed project.
Design principles
Baldwin and Clark took the experi-
ences of IBM and developed a set of
general principles for modular systems
design. 16 Designers decompose a system
into modules by partitioning information
into visible design rules and hidden de-
sign parameters. The visible design rules
(or visible information) have three
categories: 17
• An architecture, which specifies
what modules will be part of the
system and what their functions
will be.
• Interfaces that describe in detail
how the modules will interact,
including how they fit together and
communicate.
• Standards for testing a module's
conformity to the design rules, and
measuring performance relative to
other modules
These visible design rules must be
shared widely across a modular system.
The hidden design parameters on the
other hand, are decisions that do not af-
fect the design beyond the local module.
This information need not be shared, and
thus permits flexibility as the parameters
can be chosen late and changed often.
15 Parnas (1972).
16 Baldwin and Clark (1997), pp. 151.
17 Baldwin and Clark point out that in the literature some writers refer to the visible design rules as a whole as either “the architec-
ture,” “the interfaces” or “the standards.” In the examples presented below I will adhere to the terminology developed by Baldwin
and Clark.
18 Langlois (2000), pp. 38.
19 See DLSC’S "The ABCA Future Concept."
Thus in an ideal modular system each
module must conform to the visible de-
sign rules, but the actual structure/design
of individual modules is not important.
An illustrative example of such a
system would be a company manufactur-
ing a product that outsources the con-
struction of components to contractors.
The company relates the required func-
tion of the component, how the module
must interface with the rest of the sys-
tem, and any standards that must be
obeyed. Manufacturers give the suppliers
the interface specifications and encour-
age the suppliers to design the compo-
nents as they see fit. Although some col-
laboration may take place, the underlying
design parameters of the component are
hidden information. 18 The company is
not concerned with the inner workings of
the component (or the contractor’s or-
ganizational structure for that matter) as
long as it can complete its function and
adhere to all the standards necessary. If a
second contractor developing a compo-
nent with the same function and interface
makes the component smaller and/or
faster, the company may replace the first
contractor without a hitch in production.
Alternatively, the company could even
keep the first contractor in reserve in
case of supply chain problems or other
disasters.
Firms that provide services, rather
than tangible products, will modularize
their service outlets creating more com-
petitive, specialized service while cutting
costs. Instead of providing all banking
services across every branch at high cost,
financial institutions will focus certain
services where they are most likely to be
accessed. This type of market-dependent
service optimization offers a high degree
of expertise in key areas which can be
altered or upgraded without changes
needed across every single branch, which
would be costly to implement.
One final principle for designing
modular systems is encapsulation. In
decomposing a system finding the opti-
mal encapsulation boundaries can be
3
extremely challenging. How far down
the hierarchy does one devolve auton-
omy? This question must be answered by
the system architecture.
Current model analysis
In the post-Cold War era militaries
have felt the need to restructure their
forces to deal with the current and future
security environment. America, Britain,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand
share a common outlook on the future
security environment. ABCA planners
see themselves as having to “operate
within an environment that spans from
peace to war” include some of the fol-
lowing characteristics:19
• Irregular warfare will be more
prominent
• Conflicts will be more protracted
• Emphasis on non-state as opposed
to state actors will increase
• Threats will be more transnational
and cross border in character
• Defeating armed forces will be less
significant than affecting an oppo-
nents will and resolve
• Operations in complex terrain will
increase
• The focus on humanitarian and
reconstruction requirements, as
part of stabilization operations will
rise
• The use of non-scripted strategies
and tactics to overcome problems,
especially in a networked envi-
ronment, will gain in importance
• All levels of command and indi-
viduals will be networked
In such an unpredictable environ-
ment, reforming force structure to lever-
age the inherent flexibility of a modular
organizational design seems a logical
conclusion. In the following sections we
will examine the US and Canada’s push
for modularity, and determine how well
the proposals adhere to the design prin-
ciples discussed above. The following
analysis is not exhaustive and only cov-
Chad KOHALYK Fundamentals of Modularity
ers the surface attributes of each system.
The intention is to apply the design prin-
ciples in a military context and exem-
plify the spectrum of modularity includ-
ing what degree both countries plan to
take their modular design.
Modularization of the US Army
The US Army is well down the path
of modularizing its forces. Since World
War II the Army has been organized into
divisions. The division is the largest
permanently-organized combat unit and
is made up of some 10,000 to 18,000
personnel. Divisions are made up of
three brigades of 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers
and a number of smaller support units.
The Army’s inability to quickly and ef-
fectively deploy such a large organiza-
tion as the division has drawn much
criticism. 20 Calls were made for a redes-
ign of the Cold War-focused Army, and
led to the decision to decompose Army
organizational structure down to the bri-
gade level. In 2003 the Army decided to
push ahead in a modular redesign of it’s
force structure with the goal of fully
transforming its land forces by FY2009.
This transformation will affect over
100,000 active and reserve personnel. 21
The redesign will transform the
Army’s eight brigade designs into three
brigade Units of Action (UA) — Ar-
moured, Infantry and Stryker. These UAs
will replace the division as the primary
component of the US Army. These three
types of UA will be augmented by “Sup-
port Units of Action” which can range in
size from a brigade to a platoon (30 sol-
diers). The Army has identified five
types of support UAs including: aviation;
sustainment; maneuver enhancement;
fires; and reconnaissance, surveillance
and target acquisition. 22 Also, UAs could
have access to Army aviation units of
action as the mission requires, helping to
devolve corps assets to the lowest levels.
Every element of the UA will linked to a
networked battle command system. The
structure of each UA is as follows: 23
Armoured UA
(approximately 3,800 soldiers)
20 Feickert (pp. 3) notes that, “Many experts consider the Army’s 1999 controversial Task Force Hawk deployment to Kosovo and
Albania as the event that triggered the Army’s transformation. ... The most often cited criticism was that it took the Army more than
30 days to deploy 28 Apache attack helicopters from their bases in Germany to Albania and when they finally arrived, they were
unable to conduct combat operations due to training and equipment deficiencies.”
21 Ibid, pp. 20.
22 Ibid, pp. 7.
23 From the Congressional Research Service’s report on the Army’s Modularization, Feickert, pp. 8-10.
24 Steele (2004).
• One Brigade Troops Battalion in-
cluding the UA staff; military po-
lice (MP) and security platoons; a
signal company; a military intelli-
gence company; and a joint fire
coordination cell (to coordinate Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
fires in support of the UA);
• One Armed Reconnaissance Bat-
talion consisting of three recon-
naissance troops and one surveil-
lance troop and a forward support
company;
• Two Combined Arms Battalions
with two tank companies and two
mechanized infantry companies in
each battalion as well as an engi-
neer and a forward support com-
pany each;
• One Fires Battalion consisting of a
target acquisition cell, and two
batteries of self-propelled artillery
and a forward support company;
and
• One Support Battalion.
Infantry UA
(approximately 3,000 soldiers)
• One Brigade Troops Battalion in-
cluding the UA staff; a military
police (MP) platoon; a signal com-
pany; an intelligence company, an
engineer company; and a joint fires
cell;
• One Reconnaissance, Surveillance,
and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
Battalion with both motorized and
dismounted reconnaissance units, a
surveillance unit including ground
radars, sensors, and unmanned
aerial vehicles; and a forward sup-
port company;
• Two Infantry Battalions consisting
of three rifle companies and one
combat support company each; and
a forward support company capa-
ble of moving one company by
truck;
• One Strike Battalion consisting of
a target acquisition platoon, an
unmanned aerial vehicle unit, and
4
two batteries of towed artillery; a
forward support company; and
• One Support Battalion consisting
of a transport platoon capable of
• moving almost an entire infantry
battalion by truck.
Striker UA
(approximately 4,000 soldiers)
• A headquarters company, a signal
company, and a military intelli-
gence company;
• Three Stryker Motorized Infantry
Battalions with one headquarters
and three Stryker motorized infan-
try companies each;
• A Reconnaissance and Surveil-
lance Battalion;
• An Artillery Battalion;
• An engineer company;
• An anti-tank company; and
• A Support Battalion.
All of these UAs, both combat
and support, will be combined under a
Unit of Employment (UE) — a special
headquarters unit formed from the cur-
rent division headquarters. Each UE will
have the capability to command up six
UAs including combat and support units.
The new staff structure allow brigades to
conduct operations on their own, by vir-
tue of the commander’s intent, enabling a
commander to carry out more decentral-
ized operations. 24
The US Army’s modularization
seems to be fairly developed along the
spectrum of modularity vis-à-vis the de-
sign principles of modular systems de-
sign. The system architecture has deter-
mined the need for three types of mod-
ules and their functions. Though how
modules interact with one another is un-
clear, each module (UA) must interface
with a UE in the same way. Besides
equipment specifications and possibly
personnel requirements (for deployment
considerations), the standards for meas-
uring a module’s performance are un-
clear from the accessible data. The only
design principle that the US Army is in
direct violation of is hidden design pa-
rameters. Each module exhibits a highly
specific structure as determined by a
Chad KOHALYK Fundamentals of Modularity
central authority. This will adversely
impact the organization’s flexibility, as
any changes will have to be implemented
across the entire system as defined by
policy. Furthermore, the architecture-
defined modules functions may be too
general, though the support UA’s exhibit
a much more specialized approach (as
well as looser restrictions on hidden de-
sign parameters such as size of unit).
Canada’s Army of Tomorrow
Modularity is much less defined in
the Canadian Forces, but is one of the
enabling concepts for Canada’s Army of
Tomorrow project even if in the very
early stages of conceptualization. 25 One
proposal for a “Tactical Self-Sufficient
Unit” (TSSU) groups capabilities based
25 Godefroy, pp. 54.
26 Ibid, pp. 34.
on the Canadian Army’s five operating
functions: Command, Act, Shield, Sense
and Sustain. (diagram below)
The base unit of organization (ie.
module) is a uniform TSSU — of an
unspecified size — which contains a
broad range of specialized information.
This is in contrast to the US model which
has developed three optimized units of
action that provide a particular combat
function. Canada’s modularity has the
advantage to “be configured as required
to meet a specific mission or aim, allow-
ing the commander to only take what he/
she needs for a given task without com-
promising the overall integrity of the
combined effects that TSSUs can de-
liver.” Unfortunately this is a misunder-
standing of the principle of decompos-
ability. Modules should not be split up,
5
as they are by definition the base build-
ing blocks of a larger system. In the
Army of Tomorrow’s Force Employment
concept document modular structure
“should be designed to strengthen cohe-
sion [and] discipline.” Rending the base
unit of organization would negatively
impact cohesion.
The TSSU model violates some of
the design principles for modular sys-
tems. The architecture does not specify a
function for the module. Devolving the
base unit of organization to the five op-
erating functions could achieve the con-
figuration requirements sought, and sat-
isfy the architecture design rule. Inter-
faces are not specifically addressed in
this model, but like the US Army design
Canada intends to link all units through a
Network to “achieve situational under-
standing through a Common Operation
Picture.”26 Standards for measurement
are also not addressed. Like the US
Army model the TSSU has specified
internal parameters. The TSSU has an
advantage here, as it has specified only
functions and not structure. Specific
numbers of soldiers etc. are not defined,
which conforms with the principle of
hidden information. This also supports
the argument to devolve the encapsula-
tion of the module below the level of the
TSSU, possibly to the operating func-
tions or lower.
A model proposal
What would an organizational model
that strictly conformed to the modular
systems design principles illustrated
Chad KOHALYK Fundamentals of Modularity
above? Using the Canadian Forces as a
test I will present a thumbnail sketch to
explore some of the broad design choices
that could be made. First we will begin
with the visible design rules: architec-
ture, interfaces and standards.
Visible design rules
The architecture would determine the
functions of each module. Currently the
Canadian Forces are organized into dif-
ferent services (Air Force, Navy, Army)
with specific capabilities. Instead of or-
ganizing along the lines of capability,
modules have to be formed based on
function. A good example of this is Spe-
cial Operations Forces. Special Opera-
tions might represent the most modular
organization in the Western military
sphere, not only in their manner of task-
based organization, but also in their in-
teractions with other units in the field.
SOF are formulated and trained to pro-
vide a specific function including uncon-
ventional warfare, counter-terrorism,
reconnaissance, direct action and foreign
internal defense. This example could be
followed in designing the architecture for
a fully modular conventional force.
Rather than air, land or sea capabilities,
certain mission types such as direct ac-
tion, force protection, civil affairs etc.
would become the new basis for organi-
zation. The point is to design modules
that do a specific job well, rather than
module that can do every job with medi-
ocrity. This is similar to what the US has
done, with it’s Infantry, Armoured and
Stryker Units of Action, but taken further
along the spectrum of modularity. Mis-
sions with a high market value, such as
direct action, will require a number of
modules providing that service. Other
functions may only require a small num-
ber of modules providing that service.
Some modules might be tasked with a
function for a specific region of the
world. Theoretically there could be doz-
ens of functions served by hundreds of
modules.
Standards for performance (measures
of effectiveness) would be instituted to
determine whether or not a module is
improving or providing satisfactory serv-
ice. This provides healthy market compe-
tition between modules, and also pro-
vides a tracking system for innovation.
27 Sheffi, Chapter 11 pp. 183-193.
28 I leave special operations forces out of this diagram because in general military modular reform targets conventional forces. Fur-
thermore, special forces tend to be quite modular inherently due to their task-focused orientation.
29 This lesson has also been learned by US Special Operations Forces. The lack of special operations pilots during Operation Eagle
Claw is considered one of the prime reasons for failure. Subsequently, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
was designed with an integrated air capability with pilots who trained to SOF standards. See Marquis for more on USSOCOM.
Furthermore, certain equipment and
training standards will have to be insti-
tuted to maintain flexibility in the face of
disruption. 27
Various types of interfaces will also
have to be developed. A centralized
command interface — as instituted by
the US Army’s Units of Employment —
may offset command and control issues.
Other types of interfaces can and should
be instituted. Each module should not
necessarily have only one type of inter-
face. Some modules may have more in-
terface types than other modules. The
number of interfaces does not have to be
uniform, but the type of interface should
be standardized and kept to a minimum
to avoid confusion. Some examples of
interface rules include how two modules
work in conjunction in absence of that
control element, or how modules share
knowledge across the system without
overtaxing knowledge management
processes.
Hidden design parameters
The principle of hidden information
holds that the modules need to minimize
interdependency by keeping certain
knowledge hidden. This knowledge can-
not affect the rest of the system, and
therefore need not be communicated.
The structure of each module is part of
that hidden information. As each module
must provide a specific and specialized
service — in the interest of efficiency —
each module should not be restricted by
architecturally defined standards on
characteristics such as size or capability.
Here is where the explicit structure of the
US Army’s UAs violates the modularity
design principles. Yet the UAs also pro-
vide an excellent example in showing
6
that uniformity has no place in modular-
ity. The combat and support UAs are of
all different sizes. Encapsulation may be
different among modules. Unfortunately,
due to the nature of the service organiza-
tion of the US military, the modules have
been limited in terms of capability.
Currently the Canadian Forces are
organized into three major services and a
number of guilds within the Army that
reflect a centralization of capability (see
diagram above).28
Functions cross capabilities. In a
strictly modular system modules will
require whatever capability is necessary
to complete their function. For example
direct action may require close air sup-
port or joint fires support from naval
platforms. Under the design principles it
is illogical to separate these capabilities
into different modules, as they are highly
dependent on one another. 29 Thus they
need to be rolled into one module, and
train together. Function-based modules
will draw on capabilities across the serv-
ices, will replicate other modules and be
of varying sizes (see diagram next page).
In the diagram above, Module A pro-
vides a full spectrum direct action func-
tion that utilizes a joint fires capability
from both air and sea. Modules B and K
provide similar functions but are lighter,
possibly rapid attack modules. Modules
G and H provide similar functions across
a short span of the capabilities spectrum,
namely Engineers and Infantry. These
could be reconstruction teams, and num-
ber only a few dozen soldiers. Module D
could provide a sea-based power projec-
tion function. Note that this diagram is
for illustrative purposes, and modules
designed in this matter need not be con-
Chad KOHALYK Fundamentals of Modularity
tiguous. A module combining Navy +
Infantry + Air Force is entirely conceiv-
able. Furthermore, more specialized ca-
pabilities within the guilds could also be
first order capabilities under a modular
system.
By developing modules across the
major capabilities of the Canadian
Forces new capabilities could be formed
in new and inventive ways, demonstrat-
ing the innovation inherent in decentral-
ized modular systems.
Once a modules is created, its mem-
bers must train together constantly, per-
fecting their function. Various modules
with the same function might innovate in
novel ways, developing new strategies
and tactics for completing their function
more efficiently. Joint exercises between
modules of the same function, or mod-
ules of different functions as part of a
task force will be conducted to exercise
inter-module interface protocols.
In order to increase effectiveness,
social and task cohesion, modules will be
longterm structures requiring personnel
on a longterm basis. Personnel will be
posted to a module for most of their ca-
reer. This way the strong ties among
module members will engender strong
leader/follower relationships, and fur-
thermore soldiers will have a more stable
home life, empowering them further.
This model proposal is by no means
exhaustive and is meant to be a broad
take on what a strictly modular military
might look like. Following are only two
of the many issues that need to be con-
sidered when transforming the military
into a 21st century organization.
Strategic lift presents a design prob-
lem. Should it be part of it’s own mod-
ule, providing that function for a number
30 Sheffi, pp. 175-179.
31 Ibid. pp. 255-258.
of other modules? Or should it be inte-
grated into individual models them-
selves? This is the decision of the system
architecture, which defines the identity/
function of the individual module. If a
certain module’s role is as a rapid de-
ployment unit, strategic lift is part of its
identity and should be logically included
into that module. If a module’s function
is not highly dependent on strategic lift
(eg. reconstruction teams) then they
could be serviced by an exclusively air-
capable module specifically tasked with
the function of strategic lift.
This goes against the Cold War era
logic of cutting overall costs by consoli-
dating capabilities and preventing each
service from, for example, having its
own air capability. With a fully modular
design there will no longer be an over-
arching air service, and replicating air
capability across a number of modules is
good for resiliency as it provides redun-
dant capacity in case of disruption. 30
Information sharing is also an obsta-
cle that needs to be overcome. Modular
systems design endeavors to decompose
tasks in such a manner than they reduce
the need for communications between
modules, lowering interdependencies and
reducing communications costs. This
counters basic tenets of Network En-
abled Operations (NEOps). NEOps is a
common high-level operating concept
across a number of western allies which
attempts to achieve a networked force
with a high degree of information shar-
ing, increasing situational awareness
leading to novel collaboration and self-
synchronization.
As Simon (1962) noted the interac-
tions within subsystems will far out-
weigh interactions between subsystems.
7
A highly internally networked module
is a desirable thing, but inter-module
networking will be determined by inter-
face rules. The Soldier Information Re-
quirements (SIREQ) Technology Dem-
onstration Project has shown the bene-
fits of increased situational awareness
through networked information systems
on a small scale, but larger scale ex-
perimentation may be necessary. Com-
panies like Dell, UPS and Toyota con-
tinuously transmit information through-
out their organizations, but this infor-
mation is targeted at management staff,
rather than the lowest individual.31 To
prevent “stove pipes” of information,
interface rules governing information
sharing will have to be worked out, a
task that will be much easier once
interdependency-free modules are de-
signed.
Attaining a modular force structure
Transforming the Canadian Forces
into a modular structure resembling the
above model will be nothing short of
revolutionary. Considering the character-
istics of the future security environment,
Canada’s military would be well-served
by the flexibility afforded by a modular
organizational structure. One strategy for
ensuring a more evolutionary transfor-
mation could be assigning, or having a
bid system for modules. Functions that
need to be provided (for example, in Af-
ghanistan) could be advertised and bid
upon by current regiments and battalions
one by one. Over time a modularity tip-
ping point will be reached, allowing the
rapid modularization of the remaining
force structure. There will of course be
some extra infrastructure and training
costs as units that take on certain func-
tions may need to transfer or develop
certain capabilities such as airstrips and
vehicles.
Before assigning task-functions a
well thought out blueprint for modularity
will need to be hammered out. This plan
should include a well designed architec-
ture, specifying what modules will be
part of the system and what their func-
tions will be; interfaces defining how
modules will interact; and standards
including methods of evaluation for per-
formance measuring of modules. Encap-
sulation, or how far down the military
hierarchy designers want to decompose
the system will also need to be hashed
out. Each of these could be tested in
simulated environments to find the right
Chad KOHALYK Fundamentals of Modularity 8

balance of module size, function and
interaction patterns.
One important lesson is not to be-
come distracted by the explicit structure
of individual modules. The highly sought
after characteristic of flexibility requires
that modules not be strictly defined.
Modules need room to develop, innovate
and evolve when necessary in the chang-
ing environment. This is critical to the
strategic flexibility of the organization.
Sanchez and Mahoney argue that
during the modular development process
the key is to specify and standardize in-
terfaces since it is these rules that deter-
mines the flexibility of the architecture to
configure new variations, allowing a
system to respond to the changing
environment. 32 Furthermore, these inter-
faces not only determine intrafirm inter-
action, but also interfirm and institutional
interactions. 33 In consideration of these
levels of analysis modules should be
designed to interact with one another as
they would interact with modules in an
instituional environment such as a
NATO-led battlegroup. This is especially
relevant for a smaller power such as
Canada, which will most likely be op-
erating within an alliance setting. Of
course, this sort of interoperability — the
ability of our modules to combine with
the modules of diverse nations — intro-
duces a whole new level of complexity
in designing a modular national force
structure.
The next stage in exploring modular-
ity in the Canadian Forces should be a
close examination of the interface design
principle, as well as appropriate man-
agement strategies for capable command
and control in the age of modularity. ■

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