The Israeli Kibbutz: From Utopia to

Dystopia
Author: Uri Zilbersheid
Published in: Critique, Volume 35, December 2007

Abstract
The Israeli Kibbutz has undoubtedly been one of the greatest utopian experiments in modern
times. It should also be seen as part of the utopian tradition in Zionism. Utopia is in the first
place a scheme for building a socially, economically and politically good society, in accordance
with the supreme moral 'good'. Utopian visions, contrary to eschatological visions that seek to set
aright the whole universe, including human society, do not transcend the possibilities of human
nature. As such, they can become the content of social experiments. The Israeli kibbutzim
constituted a radical transformation of human nature into a new, better nature: private property
and exploitation were abolished; organizational aspects analogous to the state were also
abolished; and labor was partially turned into non-instrumental activity. The Israeli welfare state
created a supportive framework for the utopian experiment in the kibbutzim by reducing to
power of the free market. In the mid-1990s the kibbutzim began, by their own free choice, to
dismantle their utopian society and to adopt a partially capitalist way of life, thus changing their
nature for the second time in a matter of 70-80 years. The destruction of the welfare state in
Israel since the early 1980s has brought about-by encouraging non-utopian decisions-deep
changes in kibbutz way of life: labor has become instrumental again; the 'state' has been
introduced in the form of a professional management and a small community council that have
replaced the traditional democratic bodies (the general assembly, etc.). The economic means,
legally still common property, are controlled and abused by a small group that has encouraged
the introduction of a differential wage system characterized by large gaps, which is all but
exploitation. A relatively small stream in the kibbutz movement still adheres to the old, utopian
way of life. Its fate depends to a large extent on the outcome of the struggle, led by this stream
itself, to rebuild the country as a welfare state.
Keywords: Utopia; Dystopia; Kibbutz; Abolition of private property; Abolition of the state;
Welfare state; Differential wage system

The Israeli kibbutz has long been regarded as a utopian experiment that has been successful, i.e.
as an attempt to build a form of life-that can be characterized as utopian-that has turned into
reality most of the envisaged utopian features and gained viable durability. The first kibbutz
(Degania) that was established in 1910 soon became the birthplace of a unique utopian
movement, which belonged to the larger stream of Socialist Zionism; the latter itself was part of
the broader-socioeconomically very diverse-Zionist movement. The kibbutz movement grew
steadily within successive state frameworks: the Ottoman Empire until its fall in 1918, the
English rule from 1918 to 1948 (most of the time as the English Mandate of Palestine) and the
State of Israel since 1948. According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), at the end
of 2004, 116,300 people lived in 266 kibbutzim (and in addition four new 'urban kibbutzim', i.e.
kibbutzim that have been established in recent years within towns).1 The kibbutz movement
maintained its utopian character almost entirely for some 80 years. An internal revolution that
began in the mid-1990s, and may be defined as 'non-utopian' or even as 'dystopian', has largely
changed the socioeconomic and political landscape in the kibbutzim: utopianism has ceased to
characterize the kibbutz movement as a whole. Thirty-two per cent of kibbutzim still adhere to
the original, utopian way of life.2 These grouped themselves, at the end of 2006, as the
Communal Staff, a submovement within the kibbutz movement; an inner circle of this
submovement, or 28 kibbutzim, is additionally organized as the more ideological Communal
Stream (or Egalitarian Stream). However, a large majority of the kibbutzim have adopted a new
way of life that has been officially defined as the New Kibbutz, and unofficially as the
'differential kibbutz'. The New Kibbutz is characterized by an uneven distribution of wealth,
often to a large degree, which is all but a mode of exploitation (as will be later explained in more
detail), and the use of legal arrangements, above all the old form of common property, as a
means for securing the existence of the new, exploitative system. The New Kibbutz, undoubtedly
a misleading term, is the social phenomenon that will be analyzed in this article.
The rise of the New Kibbutz is connected, to a certain degree, with the socioeconomic and
political processes that have taken place in Israel since the 1980s, namely the rise of
neoliberalism, the partial destruction of the welfare state, and the decline of the labor movement
and its political parties. However, social and political processes are not natural, evolutionary
processes; their direction is determined by normative decisions and political struggles, and
individuals and groups can either join their dominant direction or try to oppose or change it at
different levels-local, national or international. Sometimes the ability to oppose such 'processes'
is very limited, as the forces furthering them are very powerful, both economically and
politically. However, the existence of the Egalitarian Stream within the kibbutz movement
suggests that the rise of the New Kibbutz has mainly been a free choice, and not a decision that
has been imposed upon the kibbutzim by superior economic and political forces or by as-if-
natural social and political circumstances; that is, this rise has rather stemmed from a decision
that essentially could have been avoided. The study of the New Kibbutz is therefore a study of a
normative choice to build a society that is not utopian any more; as will be shown, in many
aspects it is a conscious choice to build a bad society.
As a utopian way of life, the Israeli kibbutzim have been part of the general utopian tradition, but
also part of the Zionist utopian tradition. The last tradition, not large in its scope, culminated in
the development of the kibbutzim, who transformed a mainly intellectual trend in Zionism into a
practical one. Not typical of utopian experiments, the kibbutzim played, as a matter of political
choice, a central role in the Socialist Zionist Movement, which became the leading force in
Zionism in the 1930s and maintained that position in the first three decades of the existence of
the state of Israel (established in 1948).
We will first discuss the term 'utopianism' in order to understand better the Israeli kibbutz and its
place in the general and Zionist utopian tradition. Secondly, we will present and analyze the
different utopian dimensions of the kibbutz as they existed in the 'golden age' of the kibbutz.
Thirdly, we will discuss the different non-utopian, or even dystopian, aspects of the New
Kibbutz, comparing them with the utopian aspects of the traditional kibbutz. The grounds for the
rise of the 'differential kibbutz' will be discussed in due place-not as a natural process and its
results, but rather as 'circumstances' that have 'encouraged' a certain choice, not determined an
unavoidable direction of action.

Some Aspects of the Concept of Utopia and the Place of the

Kibbutz in the General and Zionist Utopian Tradition

Utopian Thinking in General

When we take upon ourselves the task of defining utopianism, we should use Thomas More's
Utopia as the point of departure. This unique work, published in 1516, has laid in modern times
the foundations for a new literary genre that is different in scope and content from other genres
whose subject is the ideal society. Socialist experiments, such as the Israeli kibbutzim, were
defined as utopian, because their visions, and their way of life, seemed to show similarity to the
visions presented by works belonging to this genre.
Utopia is in the first place a scheme-created by an imaginative mind, but firmly anchored in real
dimensions of life-for building a good society, in accordance with the conventional meaning of
the concept 'good', i.e. its meaning as fully respecting the fellow human being as such, namely
regarding and treating him or her as a subject, as a being acting consciously (consciously shaping
its activity), and not as an object, not as an entity whose subjectivity is just a secondary,
unsubstantial attribute, which does not determine its activity. Utopian visions are characterized
by giving the purely moral demand, which I may call the 'Kantian demand', a social, economic
and political form-thus transforming a purely moral demand for a good society into an ideal
socioeconomic and political scheme for such a society. A good society, a society in which pure
morality has been given a socioeconomic and political form, is a society without any form of
economic exploitation and political suppression, i.e. a society that has abolished the relationship
of domination in all its forms, that is, the relationship which reduces, to a small or large extent,
the subjectivity (the attribute of being a subject, an entity consciously determining its mode of
activity) of the majority of human beings. Utopian visions often outline ways of life, or forms of
activities, the essence of which is the liberation of human beings from their submission under
anonymous, as-if-natural socioeconomic forces, such as the rigid division of labor or the market.
The liberation from those forces enables human beings to realize the human essence to the full.
Utopia, a socioeconomically and politically good society, which abolishes all forms of economic
and political domination, direct and indirect, is therefore essentially an ideal socialist scheme.
Second, utopia is a scheme for a better society that looks unrealistic from the standpoint of
current social thinking. This characteristic distinguishes it from other socialist schemes that do
not demand, for example, the abolition of the state and all forms of governmental hierarchy.
However, considering the possibilities of human nature, there is nothing that prevents in
principle the realization of that scheme. The impossibility here is not objective but solely
subjective.
Human nature is essentially historical. Humans, contrary to animals, permanently change their
needs, capabilities and social relations. Humans have no constant nature, nor do they have a
nature that is changed by the evolutionary processes only, without their knowing participation in
bringing about the changes. If there is no historical conception of human nature, then there is no
utopia. The great adversaries of authentic utopian thinking argue that humans have constant
nature. Thus, all humans are characterized by primary, unchangeable egoism, and human society
is therefore necessarily organized as different forms of exploitation and economic competition.
All social formations, from slavery to capitalism, are all but manifestations of the same,
unchangeable human nature. In conceiving of human nature as historical, utopian thinking does
not stand alone. Non-utopian socialist thinking shares the same historical world view. With no
belief in the historicity of human nature, there is no socialism! The difference between the two
forms of socialist thinking is a matter of degree: utopian thinking is more radical regarding the
possibilities of human nature. Thus, utopian visions may go so far as to envisage the abolition of
the division of labor, the full or partial transformation of productive activity into non-
instrumental, artistic activity, and the complete abolition of all forms of exploitation and
domination.
Utopia does not transcend-by uncritical imaginative thinking-the possibilities of human historical
nature, i.e. it is not a biological or psychological fantasy. A scheme for building a society based
on common ownership of the means of production and the democratic regulation of production at
all levels and on the abolition of the state does not contradict the possibilities of human-
historical-nature. Nor does a scheme for the abolition of the division of labor and for turning
productive activity into non-instrumental, creative activity contradict the potentials of our
historical nature. On the other hand, visions that portray a human society, in which death and all
kinds of illness and all kinds of sorrow and mental sufferings have ceased to exist, contradict the
very possibilities of human nature. Such human eschatological visions are often integral part of
cosmic eschatological visions that seek to put the Creation aright-to transform a defective
universe, as it was originally created by God, and make a perfect one. With respect to human
nature, such visions go beyond the biologically and mentally possible. As such they do not
belong to utopian thought. Martin Buber writes in his Paths in Utopia that the utopian vision
confines itself to putting aright human society by humans themselves, whereas the eschatological
vision views the act of putting the humankind aright as an integral part of a cosmic (namely
divine) action that will put aright the whole universe. In the action of putting aright the Creation,
'the crucial act is done from above'.3
It should be emphasized that utopian visions and schemes presume that the ordinary, or average,
human being is capable of achieving the highest degree of human perfection and do not consider
such an achievement the privilege of a small minority.4
Utopian visions have often been put into practice, i.e. people believing in them have tried to
realize them. Utopian experiments, such as the many communes that have been built, and often
dismantled, in America from the 18th century to the present and the kibbutzim in Israel, can take
place, seemingly contrary to all odds, as they do not contradict in principle the possibilities of
human nature.
We can distinguish between two attitudes regarding the realization of the utopian vision. The
first attitude suggests that the realization of the utopian vision should begin here and now,
without any interim stage that is supposed to create the preconditions for transforming the
utopian vision into reality. It presumes that such preconditions are unnecessary, and that the
radical change in human nature can take place immediately by means of free decision of those
human beings that are voluntarily involved in the radical social transformation. The second
attitude suggests that an interim stage, often a long one, should precede the radical
transformation. To the first attitude belong the first utopian visionaries, such as Thomas More,
Francis Bacon and Thomas Campanella, and such thinkers as Charles Fourier, Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon, Robert Owen, Peter Kropotkin, Gustav Landauer, and the Zionist philosopher Aaron
David Gordon. To this utopian school we can also add the Israeli kibbutzim as they existed from
the second decade of the 20th century until the mid-1990s, when they began, by their own free
choice, to dismantle their utopian society and to adopt a partially capitalist way of life (thus
changing their nature for the second time in a matter of 70 to 80 years), and many communes
that existed in the past, or exist in the present, in different parts of the world. However, the
kibbutzim also belong in a certain way to the second attitude.
The most conspicuous representative of the second attitude is Karl Marx. His picture of
communism is undoubtedly utopian. Its main pillars are the 'abolition of labor' (also defined as
the 'abolition of industry'), namely the transformation of production into non-instrumental
activity, the abolition of the division of labor, the abolition of private property, and the abolition
of the state. Actually, the centrality of the abolition of labor, with which the other abolitions are
intrinsically connected, makes Marx's communist vision much more utopian than the visions of
such utopists as Proudhon or Robert Owen, and even more utopian than the schemes of the first
utopists who created and developed the literary genre of utopianism. However, Marx believed
that the radical change in human nature he envisaged cannot happen at once, and that an interim
stage should precede the utopian stage. This gradualist approach is the basis of his theory of
revolution. Thus, the interim stage should include such measures as partial state ownership of
economic means (land, financial capital, and the means of transportation would be nationalized,
while industrial and commercial capital and small businesses of all kinds, including peasantry,
would not be nationalized), elements of democratically planned economy, and universal social
services, e.g. free ed ucation in public schools. The establishment of this stage would be the
creation of the preconditions for the utopian, communist society. Within this stage that today
would be classified as a form of the welfare state there would gradually emerge new human
beings for whom the communist way of life would be a prime need.
The kibbutzim supported the establishment of a welfare state not so much as an interim stage out
of which a new, utopian society will emerge in Israel, but much more as a good arrangement for
the Israeli society as whole that will also be supportive of the utopian experiment in the
kibbutzim themselves.

The Utopian Tradition in Zionism

Strictly seen, Zionism has not produced many utopias. Rachel Elboim-Dror classifies, in her
panoramic book Yesterday's Tomorrow,5 as Zionist utopias different messianic visions that were
composed by 19th-century ultra-orthodox religious Zionist heralds, who envisaged Zionism as
the revival of Jewish religious law. She also defines as utopias futuristic visions that describe the
Land of Israel, at that time-namely in the 19th century-thinly populated and economically
backward, as a modern, cultivated, populous and economically prosperous country, the result of
a hundred years or more of Zionist enterprise. I would suggest that she sometimes applies the
term 'utopianism' indiscriminately, blurring the boundary between utopian and other kinds of
future visions. Even when some socioeconomic arrangements that should be seen as components
of a 'welfare state', such as free education and free health care and state ownership of economic
means, are included in such messianic and futuristic visions, this does not turn these visions into
utopias. Thus, for example, Looking Ahead: Twentieth Century Happenings, written by the
American orthodox rabbi Henry Pereira Mendes (published in 1899), envisages a religious
revival of humankind-preceded by an apocalyptic war between Christianity, or the forces of
Good, and Islam, or the forces of Evil-that culminates in a Jewish religious revival of the Land of
Israel. This revival, characterized by the universal belief in God and the supreme political rule of
the priests, maintains the capitalist order and inequality between men and women, while
mitigating them by some 'welfare state' and charity arrangements, such as state ownership of
means of transport (railways and other 'transit lines') and means of communication (telegraph,
telephone, post), supply of water and electricity by the state, compulsory, general and religious,
education, and state pensions, and 'benefit societies' for the poor.6 This and other such visions,
which include apocalyptic dimensions, cannot be regarded as utopian, not even partially; as they
don't entertain, within the imaginary apocalyptic framework, a radical change in human nature
characterized by the abolition of all forms of exploitation and domination, the authors of which
are humans themselves.
Moses Hess's Rome and Jerusalem: The Last National Question (written in German and
published in 1862) is the first utopia in the strict sense in the history of Zionism. Hess envisions
Zionism as the establishment of socialist associations (Gesellschaften) in all economic fields, i.e.
agriculture, industry and commerce (distribution).7 This socialist revival of the Jewish people in
its old land would be an integral part of the socialist revival of humankind that would bring about
the abolition of all forms of exploitation and domination and establish material and cultural
equality between all nations and races. In other works, which are usually not included in his
Zionist writings, other dimensions of Hess's utopianism find expression. Thus, he speaks of
communism, the highest stage of the socialist revival of humanity, as a social formation
characterized by 'free human activities that cease to be "labor" and are completely identical with
"pleasure" (Genu)'.8 This transformation of production into non-instrumental activity, also
defined as the 'disappearance' of the 'antithesis between labor and pleasure',9 is the culmination
of the reconciliation between humankind and nature (the exploitation of nature, inherent in
instrumental production, has always been connected with the exploitation of one's fellow human
being).
Elchanan Lev Levinski's A Journey to the Land of Israel in the Year 2040 (written in Hebrew
and published in 1892) can be seen as the second classical utopia in the history of Zionism. His
vision is sometimes vague and self-contradictory, and the changes in human nature he envisages
often lack the radicalism so typical of utopianism. Nevertheless, several classical utopian
features are discernable in his work. Although all members of the new Jewish society established
in the Land of Israel own private property, large property is not allowed to be accumulated, and
each individual owns economic means, mostly in the form of a small farm. Thus, exploitation is
substantially reduced: 'the most terrible war, the war between labor and capital', would come to
an end, and 'peace and tranquility [would dominate the relations] between them'.10 In the new-
largely modern-agrarian society, education at all levels and health care are free. The government
owns the means of transport (railways and trains, steamships and zeppelins), as well as
communication (telegraph and telephone) and the raw material industry. Levinski suggests that
the new society should foster as political and economic leaders persons who are paragons of
virtue, i.e. who have no will to power and easily return to their smallholdings-each to 'his field
and plough'-after having served the public in governmental roles.
A third Zionist utopia is that of Nachman Syrkin, one of the founders of Socialist Zionism. In his
book The Jewish Question and the Jews' Socialist State (published in German in 1898 under the
pseudonym Ben Elieser) he first defines as utopia 'any social scheme of some individual, which
either contradicts the general trend of the [social] aspirations of human beings [in a certain
period] or lacks adequate motives for being realized within society'.11 Obviously this definition
was intended to prevent the impression that his work was a utopia. However, his vision is
utopian by its very nature. Thus, he envisages the rejuvenation of the Jewish people in the Land
of Israel (or in some other territory) as the establishment of a commonwealth of socialist
associations, which are shaped as co-operatives based on non-differential collective ownership of
the economic means (i.e. the ownership is not divided into definite shares that are allocated to the
members). The democratic and minimal management of this commonwealth regulates only its
economic affairs. As a result, 'the state becomes redundant [Der Staat wird berflssig]; it is
replaced by an association of free producers'.12 Syrkin also envisages the abolition of the
distinction between town and country. Economically and culturally, this abolition would take the
form of convergence of agriculture and industry, described by him as building culturally and
scientifically highly developed large industrial villages.13
Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, is the fourth classical utopist in the history of
Zionism. His utopia, published in the utopian novel Old-New Land in 1902, preceded in several
years the birth of the kibbutzim. His utopia undoubtedly belongs to the second attitude, or
school, regarding the realization of the utopian vision. Like Marx, he divides the process of the
social renewal into two stages: the first stage, which can be characterized as a welfare state, and
the second stage, which is utopian in its very nature. The first stage finds expression in The Jews'
State and the Diaries; and the second stage is mainly presented in the novel Old-New Land.
There is considerable similarity between the first stage in Herzl's vision and that stage in Marx's
theory of revolution. According to Herzl the first stage should include such measures as the
nationalization of financial mea ns (banks and the stock exchange), insurance companies, major
means of transport (railroads, trains, water canals, ships, etc.), along with the raw-materials
industry, and introducing free education at all levels. The utopian stage includes the
establishment of a nationwide federation of co-operatives, with different degrees of common
ownership, the abolition of the economic competition, the abolition of the state, and the creation
of a new, artistic mode of productive activity. With regard to the abolition of the state, we read in
Old-New Land: 'We are not a state [Wir sind kein Staat], but a large cooperative society ...'.14
That Herzl, the 'father of the [Jewish] state', had a dream of abolishing the state is mostly ignored
in the Zionist historiography.
The rise of the Israeli kibbutzim since the establishment of the first kibbutz in 1909 was a major
development in Zionist utopianism. The kibbutzim were a unique utopian phenomenon
characterized by the interwoven development of praxis and theory. Different utopian aspects that
find expression in European and American utopian visions and in Zionist utopias were integrated
into the kibbutz life: common ownership of the means of production; the abolition of the wage
system; shaping productive activity, at least partially, as non-instrumental activity; the partial
abolition of the division of labor; the democratic regulation of production; and the-internal-
abolition of the state, i.e. of institutions analogous to the state.
The kibbutzim basically belong to the first school regarding the realization of the utopian vision.
However, in a certain way they also belong to the second school, whose main exponent was Karl
Marx. Thus, on the one hand, they began realizing the utopian vision immediately, here and now,
without going through a-short or long-interim stage. Every new kibbutz that was built before and
after the establishment of the state of Israel usually immediately adopted the major utopian
features that characterized all the kibbutzim until the mid-1980s. People who established a
kibbutz began at once to live according to a new, utopian mode of life. By choosing to live in a
kibbutz they consciously opted for changing their nature, both individually and as a community.
On the other hand, the kibbutzim, playing a leading role in the Israeli labor movement, which
was the major political force in Israel until the late 1970s, were also very active in establishing
and furthering the system of the welfare state in Israel, thus creating a supportive socioeconomic
environment that helped them exist and flourish. The welfare state did not function in this regard
as an interim stage in which new humans would develop, as Marx and Herzl envisaged, but
rather as a system that substantially reduced the pressure of capitalism, thus helping the people in
the kibbutzim, a small minority in Israeli society, to live as new human beings. The partially
planned economy, which included subsidies for agriculture, enabled the kibbutzim to be viable
and-mostly-successful economic units, thus making the choice to live in a kibbutz, i.e. in an
existing utopia, an easier matter. The partial destruction of the Israeli welfare state that has taken
place since the 1980s has created a much less favorable environment for the kibbutzim. But the
existence of the Egalitarian Stream suggests that this pressure has not been the reason, even if it
has been a catalyst, for the emergence of the New Kibbutz.

Utopian Aspects in the Kibbutz

The Abolition of Private Property and Wage System

A major feature of the kibbutzim was, from the very beginning, the abolition of private
ownership of the means of production and the introduction of common ownership of economic
means, which I may define as communal, or collective, ownership. Even major objects of
consumption, most notably apartments and cars, ceased to be private property and became part of
the communal property; as such they were individually used, or consumed, but not individually
owned. Water and electricity, as another example, were consumed by the families individually
but were purchased and supplied by the kibbutz as a whole. No wage system existed, and there
was no direct connection between work and remuneration. That is, the economic role or office of
the kibbutz member and the amount of work they performed were not connected with any
payment (high or low salary) reflecting a certain rank or performance. Work was essentially
collective activity, i.e. it was not perceived as a social combination of the activities of unrelated
individuals pursuing different interests, as work is organized in a capitalist enterprise, but rather
as common activity expressing a common will. Work itself was only partially perceived and
shaped as a means to an end-the final product or the profit to be gained from its sale. As will be
explained later, work was perceived and shaped, at least partially, as creative activity that is an
end in itself. Consumption should have satisfied two kinds of needs: general human needs, i.e.
needs shared by all members (housing, food, clothing, education), and particular intellectual
needs, such as the needs, in materials, space and time, of an artist (painter, sculptor, professional
photographer, and musician), an author, a scientist, an athlete, etc. The standard of living and the
degree of satisfying particular intellectual needs were determined by the degree of productivity,
and rose permanently. The classical socialist proverb-'from each according to his/her ability, to
each according to his/her needs'-was only partially true, as work was not perceived as a pure
means to an end, i.e. as necessary activity, in the execution of which each member should
participate according to their intellectual and physical professional skills. When activity is
creative in its nature, obligatory labor expressing different capabilities, or skills, becomes
irrelevant. In this regard, the kibbutzim even transcended utopian socialist visions that still
perceive work as a sheer means to an end but sever the connection between work and
remuneration.
The form of ownership that developed in the kibbutzim was not typical of that of co-operative
societies. We are familiar with different kinds of producers' co-operatives. We should mention
that there are co-operatives in which the ownership of the means of production and of the means
of distribution is entirely common, with the members holding no shares representing portions of
the common property, and each member receiving a wage that is divided into two parts: an equal
basic wage, which expresses the individual's status as an equal co-owner and co-producer, and an
additional wage, essentially differential, which expresses their personal contribution to
production according to their role as a manager or a simple worker or their personal performance
(output). Another structure of co-operative societies is based on the conception of a complex
common ownership, in which the portion of ownership of each member is recognizable and
translated into a share or shares. The portions of ownership are not necessarily equal, although
the differences cannot be large. I will define this system as differential common ownership.
Accordingly, a portion of the revenues is recognized as profit to be distributed between the
members according to the exact share of each member in the ownership, either in the form of
profit-sharing beyond the wage payment or as part of the wage.
As we will see later, by legally maintaining the old form of communal (collective) ownership
and rejecting the idea of co-operative ownership in one of its two major forms, the differential
kibbutzim have created a system that enables, legally and practically, the development of large
inequality, or exploitation.

Non-instrumental Production

The idea of a new form of production that would radically differ from the hitherto mode of
production has been a major feature of many utopian visions. We find the idea in a vague form in
Thomas More's Utopia. Charles Fourier envisaged the transformation of production into a new
form of activity that would be a kind of play. Moses Hess, as we have seen, suggested that in
communism production would cease to be labor in the usual sense and become pleasant activity
that would not be essentially different from activities outside the realm of production, such as
play and artistic activity. Similarly, at the core of the highest phase of communist society, i.e. the
utopian social phase, as it appears in Marx's writings, is the abolition of labor, i.e. the
transformation of production into a new form of activity that would be artistic in its very essence.
The more famous abolition of private property, the well-known abolition of the state and the
lesser-known abolition of the division of labor, are all predicated upon the abolition of labor, as
will be later explained in relation to the abolition of exploitation.
The utopian vision of new productive activity that would constitute a radical change of the nature
of human production is based on the distinction between two kinds of human activity:
instrumental and non-instrumental activity. Any activity of the first kind is a means to an end, i.e.
an activity that serves as a tool, as an instrument, for achieving a certain purpose outside itself.
Such activity is a necessary mediator between the subject and its purpose. Activity of this kind is
subject to efficiency criteria; that is, its purpose should be achieved in the shortest way possible
with the least investment of resources and energy. Such activity may be foregone, if the purpose
can be achieved without it. Following Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, we refer in
modern philosophy to such activity as 'instrumental activity'.
Activity of the second kind is that which is desired and performed for its own sake, that is, the
activity itself is the doer's purpose. Such activity is not a means to an end, i.e. it is not perceived
as a tool, as an instrument, for achieving another aim outside itself. Being the aim itself of the
subject doing it, such activity is not subject to efficiency criteria and may be performed at will.
Marx terms such activity 'self-purpose' (Selbstzweck). We may term such activity 'non-
instrumental activity'. For many utopists, the model of such activity is artistic activity. When I
play the violin, draw a picture or sculpt a statue, my activity is done for its own sake, not as a
means to an end.
Drawing this distinction between two kinds of human activity, utopianism follows Aristotle. In
the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses the relationship between activities and their ends.
After describing the end as the good at which every activity aims, he says: 'But a certain
difference is found among ends; some are activities; others are products apart from the activities
that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the results to
be more valuable than the activities.'15 Activity that is done for its own sake and is desirable in
itself is the supreme good and the fulfillment of happiness. Aristotle had a hard time clarifying
this distinction. For him, it seems, if an activity has a tangible result, i.e. it creates a material
product, or a certain state or condition, such as health, wealth or welfare, it is a means to an end,
namely instrumental activity. It follows that every material activity, either productive or artistic
(both subsumed by him under the term 'poiesis,' which is often translated into English as
'production' in a broad sense), is instrumental. Aristotle therefore concludes in the
Nichomachean Ethics that only philosophical activity is not instrumental, 'for nothing arises from
it apart from contemplation, while from practical activities we gain much or little apart from the
action.'16
Utopian thinking has overcome Aristotle's difficulties, and could characterize certain material
activities, especially those that are artistic in their nature, as non-instrumental, by shifting the
emphasis from the result to the activity itself, namely to the relationship between the subject and
its activity. Thus, when I draw a picture, my activity is not a means, since I don't subject it to
efficiency criteria, but rather a path toward an end that is itself an end. Applying the distinction
between two kinds of human activity to human production, utopianism differentiates between
two kinds of the latter: productive activity that is a means to an end, namely instrumental
production, and productive activity that bears an artistic character (i.e. it is an end in itself)-non-
instrumental production. In the utopian society the latter would be the dominant or sole mode of
production.
Non-instrumental production had always been integral to kibbutz life. The idea was
conceptualized as the 'self-value of work', that is, work as an end in itself, and was realized, inter
alia, by maintaining productive branches, in which the members found satisfaction at the mode
of their activity, often contrary to pure economic considerations. Aaron David Gordon (1856-
1922), a philosopher who lived in the nascent kibbutz movement, gave expression in his writings
to the new mode of activity that became an important aspect of production in the kibbutzim at an
early sage of their history. Distinguishing between 'creation' and 'action', he wrote, contrasting
the kibbutzim with other practical forms of the Zionist movement, namely other modes of
economic organization and activity, that were also established at that time in the Land of Israel
by Jewish emigrants:
The difference between us and our rivals does not lie therein, as some suppose, that we are
laborers while they are employers, but rather in our views on the work in the Yishuv [the Zionist
Jewish community in the Land of Israel]. We regard this work as creation and they regard it as
action. This small difference is the root of all great differences and sharp contrasts between us
and them in our life as whole and in all our deeds. Even the basic difference between them and
us-namely that we work and they do not work-stems from this prime difference. We are not
laborers in a social sense, but rather workers in a national sense. We have come to work [in the
Land of Israel] solely because we view the work that would bring about a [Jewish] national
revival as creative work, and not because we have some socioeconomic conception.17
Adhering to the new, non-instrumental mode of production and practicing it as a way of life was
also defined in the kibbutzim as the 'religion of work'. The term, which originally described the
concept of work in the teaching of A.D. Gordon, also gives expression, in another way, to the
idea that work should not be shaped and performed just as a means to an end but rather, as much
as possible, as an end in itself. For the religious person the practice of the religious way of life is
an end in itself, and-as such-self-fulfillment. Thus, work should be practiced as a way of self-
fulfillment, not as an indispensable economic means.
The kibbutzim did practically abolish exploitation, but this success, I would suggest, was not
only due to the abolition of private property. Common property has indeed been an important
aspect of non-exploitative relations in small communities all over the world. However, common
property is not an arrangement that brings about non-exploitative relations as its natural result.
Common property is basically a legal arrangement, which helps humans to create and maintain
social relations free from economic exploitation; but it does not create such relations. The
normative decision to abolish exploitation can be realized by a complex of organizational
arrangements and activities. Shaping production as non-instrumental activity is a major
component of this complex. Thus, non-instrumental activity, while having a high value in itself,
fosters and helps maintain non-exploitative relations.
Instrumental activity, as Marx and A.D. Gordon suggested, tends to bring about, or at least to
strengthen, exploitation. Instrumental activity is not only a self-relationship-i.e. activity in which
the subject uses their own self, their body and soul, as a means to an end-but a relationship with
the outside world as well. In such activity the environment, or nature, is perceived and treated as
a complex of means, in a form of tools and material, for achieving the final goal-the requested
products. Nature is not perceived as something to be enjoyed in the process of production-for
example, as diversified objects that may be experienced esthetically in an artistic mode of
production. However, other human beings are part of the environment, part of nature, so they are
viewed and treated as a means to an end, mainly as live tools. In this way, exploitation can
develop as social reality. Exploitation is in its essence the use of the fellow human being as a
means to an end, and this use ensues from instrumental production, or is enhanced by it. Marx,
who believed, very radically, that all forms of exploitation ensue from instrumental production,
said in this regard:
The whole of human servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production, and all
relations of servitude [slavery, feudalism, capitalism] are but modifications and consequences of
this relation.18
By shaping their production as non-instrumental activity, humans substantially reduce the inner
drive to exploit their fellow humans-a drive that is largely inherent in instrumental activity. It
should be emphasized: what largely ensues from instrumental activity is the drive to exploit other
human beings, not exploitation itself. Exploitation itself is a result of a normative decision.
Anyway, by shaping work, at least partially, as non-instrumental activity, the kibbutzim not only
turned work into a kind of self-fulfillment, but substantially reduced the inclination toward
exploitation within their society.
The main criterion of instrumental production, as of every instrumental activity, is efficiency.
This means that as many as possible products should be produced, or attained, in the shortest
way possible and with the smallest investment of energy and resources. Modern production is
subject to the criterion of efficiency, which, it is believed, guaranties high productivity. The
kibbutzim, which deliberately gave up persistent application of this criterion, were nonetheless
very productive. Labor productivity of the kibbutz industry was, over the 15 years from 1976 to
1990, on average, 17 per cent higher than labor productivity of the Israeli industry.19
Another aspect of the-partial-abolition of instrumental production in the kibbutzim was a partial
abolition of the division of labor. This abolition should not be understood as the abolition of the
economic branches, but rather as shaping the economy as a multifaceted whole enabling diverse
creative activity. This abolition can also be understood as the possibility, in principle, to be
active in different branches at different times and the inner ability, usually intrinsically connected
with creativity, to change branches as a way of increasing satisfaction from work and enhancing
the feeling of self-fulfillment in the economic domain. The multifarious economy built in the
kibbutzim, in which branches were often maintained contrary to purely economic considerations,
was traditionally one of the enigmatic aspects of the kibbutz economic way of life. Being termed
'mixed economy', it was often perceived in studies of kibbutz economics as a method of securing
self-sufficiency or as a system ensuring the kibbutz economy against difficult times or crises, of
national or international magnitude, in certain branches. While the first explanation cannot be
accepted, as the kibbutzim never sought to be an economic autarky, the second explanation is
undoubtedly of some truth. Thus, mainly in the 1960s and 1970s, but to a small degree even prior
to that, the kibbutzim branched out from agriculture into manufacturing. This late
industrialization undoubtedly increased the economic viability of the kibbutzim; nevertheless,
the 'mixed economy' had never been a purely economic system, and even in times-as in the years
of industrialization-when economic considerations gained more weight, branches continued to be
maintained because of the satisfaction they offered to the kibbutz members. This aspect has
become much more apparent since the rise of the 'differential kibbutz', the development of which
has been connected with scarping out 'non-economic' branches.
Comprehensive Democracy or the Internal Abolition of the State

The kibbutzim developed a comprehensive democratic way of life that was a clear utopian
feature of their society. We can define this democratic way of life, which encompassed both
economic and social aspects of their life, as direct participatory democracy. This democracy
found expression in certain institutions and activities. The first and most important institution
was the General Assembly, i.e. the assembly of all kibbutz members, which usually convened
once a week, and in which all the important decisions were made after a general debate. The
assembly also functioned as a source of information for the members in all important matters. No
important aspect of kibbutz life was hidden from the members.
The various committees that were active in all fields of life-culture (in general), feasts and
festivities, education, higher education, economic matters, labor (in general), personal matters,
sports, etc.-were another important institution, which enabled the members to participate in
shaping their life in its various dimensions. In all branches of the kibbutz economy, decisions
concerning the daily running of the branch were made by the members working in the branch.
Sessions, both official and unofficial, of the branch workers were routine. Managerial rotation
was a rigid principle. The various kibbutz committees and the branch sessions were a
decentralized democratic process that was an important component of a large direct participatory
democracy. Most of the members, if not all of them, could continuously participate in shaping
different aspects of their society. If we define the state as a central body managing the public
affairs, usually by means of a professional administration, without any continuous involvement
of the people subject to this management, so the kibbutzim succeeded in abolishing the 'state',
namely the bodies and modes of action analogous to the state.

The Abolition of Utopia

The Socioeconomic and Political Background

As we have said, the rise of the New Kibbutz has been connected, to a certain degree, with the
socioeconomic and political processes that have taken place in Israel since the 1980s. Some of
these processes are part of international processes. We may count here the rise of economic
neoliberalism as a partially universal phenomenon, the decline of the welfare state, also a
partially universal process that has been very intense in Israel, and the decline of the Israeli labor
movement. That movement has ceased to be the major political force, or the leading power, in
Israel since the end of 1970s. The decline of the Labor Party has not been just an electoral
matter, namely the loss of political power it has sustained, but also an ideological decline. Thus,
the Labor Party has adopted a neoliberal stance in national economic matters. But we cannot
speak of general processes only. Some decisions that were made by the Israeli governments that
consisted of both the conservative Likud and the Labor Party have directly affected the
kibbutzim and other productive segments of the Israeli economy. Thus in the mid-1980s Israel
was in a very dire economic situation that was caused by the neoliberal policy of the Likud-led
government. A very high rate of inflation (more than 400 per cent), an economic stagnation, and
a very high unemployment rate were the main aspects of that crisis. A government of national
unity, in which the Labor Party was an equal partner, adopted a program for overcoming the
crisis-a program that was the statist side of neoliberalism, i.e. it consisted of monetarist
interventionism (and was actually a deliberate transfer of resources from the productive sector to
the financial sector).20 The program focused on controlling inflation by freezing prices, wages
and interest rates. As a result, the real interest rate for short-term credit rose in 1985 to a level of
100 per cent; in 1985 this rate was almost 30 per cent. The kibbutzim, who at that time borrowed
money more than usual in order to ensure continuous production and full employment, became
deeply indebted to the banks and were practically bankrupt. As a result of that debt crisis, which
severely hurt the kibbutzim, those groups within the kibbutzim that advocated a deep change in
the kibbutz way of life, namely giving up the traditional communal way of life and integrating
capitalist elements in the kibbutz economy, increased and became considerably emboldened. The
demand to abolish non-instrumental production and reduce democracy soon followed. As a
matter of fact, those groups who advocated these changes did not support the efforts of the
kibbutzim to gain-by a political decision at the national level, to be taken either by the
government or by the Knesset (the parliament)-a substantial reduction of the debt owed by the
them. A decade later, the banks and the government agreed to forgive two-thirds of the debt,
acknowledging that it had been caused by the excessive interest rates levied on the kibbutzim.
However, the debt forgiveness has not fully solved the problem, and the kibbutzim continue to
serve an unfair debt. The kibbutzim have never fully recovered from the debt crisis of the 1980s
and 1990s; moreover, while being weakened from that crisis, they have had to manage in a
neoliberal environment. Nevertheless, as was said above, the dystopian changes in the kibbutzim
have not been a result of a decision that was imposed on the kibbutzim by superior political and
economic forces; nor have they been a result of a deterministic process that does not leave room
for a free choice.
The changes have usually been advocated and introduced under the pretext of a dire economic
situation that would be overcome by integrating capitalist elements into the kibbutz economy,
and actually into kibbutz society as a whole.

The Introduction of a Differential Wage System and the Misuse of Communal

Property

The introduction of a differential wage system has been a major change in the kibbutz way of
life. The new course began in the mid-1990s and has since then been introduced in many
kibbutzim, mostly in the 21st century. The introduction of the new system is defined as the
establishment of a direct connection between labor, or economic contribution, and remuneration.
Typically enough, the place of the kibbutz member in the economic hierarchy, that is, the office
held by him, has become the main, and practically the sole, factor determining the salary level.
There have developed two major systems of differential wage: in the first, which is much more
prevalent, and was adopted by the end of 2005 by 59 per cent of the kibbutzim,21 remuneration
is a full 'private' salary and all consumption is paid by the salary. This system is defined as the
'safety-net model', as in most of the kibbutzim that have adopted this system, by no means in all
of them, there exists an arrangement, usually a special fund financed by an internal tax, that
guarantees a minimum income for the disabled and unemployed. This income is $770 on
average. In the second system, called the 'combined model', each member receives an amount of
means for their consumption that consists of three components: a normative egalitarian
component (that is, all the members get the same personal budget or the same sum of money); a
slightly unequal component based on seniority, namely length of 'service' in the kibbutz; and a
third, differential salary based on their individual contribution to the kibbutz economy, as
measured by the office they hold. This model has been adopted by the end of 2005 by nine per
cent of the kibbutzim.22 This model is often an interim stage on the way toward a full
differential wage system.
Over the last decade, large social gaps have emerged in most of the differential kibbutzim. Thus,
managers may earn $5,000-8,000 a month, or even more, whereas unskilled workers earn $800-
1,000 a month (close to the legal minimum wage). The internal tax system, which is only
partially progressive, reduces the gaps, but not to a large extent (contrary to the arguments of
several researchers). According to a survey by Rosner, Palgi and Goldenberg, the average
internal tax paid by a single member is $183. The highest total tax paid in any of the differential
kibbutzim is about $372.23 I would suggest-contrary to the calculations of Rosner and his fellow
researchers, who are inclined to underestimate the total sum earned by the top-salaried members-
that the net income of the top-salaried members, usually managers, is five or six times that of the
ordinary member, usually an unskilled laborer. Such vast differences are all but plunder of the
common property by the top-salaried members-that is, they reflect exploitation. This exploitation
can be substantially reduced by adopting the model of a producers' co-operative, in which the
members would hold equal shares of the ownership of the means of production, thus receiving a
substantial part of their income as a component reflecting their equal share in the ownership of
the economic means. Only the second part of their income would be paid as a differential salary.
Adherence to the legally common (communal, collective) property actually enables much larger
exploitation than any legally less socialistic form of ownership. Thus, co-operative ownership,
which is seemingly less socialistic, would be much fairer and less subject to exploitation.
The misuse of common property in the kibbutzim can be compared with the misuse of common
property that took place in the countries of Soviet socialism. In those countries the means of
production, which were owned commonly-legally in the form of state ownership, and not as
equal shares held by all citizens-were practically managed by the high level of the Communist
Party as its own property. Common property, if not legally defined and really managed as
property equally owned and controlled by all community members, can easily become a means
of exploitation, as was the case in Soviet socialism and as is the case in the differential
kibbutzim. The deliberate misuse of communal property in the kibbutzim as a means for
maintaining large wage gaps, which are all but exploitation, is what I define as a dystopian
moment in the New Kibbutz-the deliberate building, by a leading group, of a bad society by a
sophisticated distortion of the essence of common ownership.
Most of the members in the differential kibbutzim, being misled by the 'revolutionary'
managerial elite, do not recognize the benefits, in terms of fairness and standard of living, of
adopting a co-operative structure of ownership. Such ownership is defamed-and perceived-as a
'socialist' form that would restrict personal freedom, as seemingly did all forms of socialism,
including the kibbutzim. In 1999 I was asked by several members of one of the kibbutzim to help
them expose the real, exploitative nature of a reform that had been initiated by some leading
members of their kibbutz, and work out a plan for a just change. I suggested that the kibbutz
become a producers' co-operative. Most of the kibbutz members, however, would not hear of
such a plan, and have opted for the reform suggested by their leaders, thereby practically losing
their share in the common property, that is, letting themselves being exploited. The same
phenomenon repeats itself in all the kibbutzim that have opted to reform their 'old-fashioned'
way of life. The 'differential kibbutz', which combines large salary gaps with legally common
property, is viewed as less socialistic than the producers' co-operative and should exist, as an
interim stage, until some new form of just capitalist ownership emerges (that is, the members
would receive more or less equal shares without forming a co-operative, with all its legal and
moral obligations). However, privatization of the means of production has been dealt with
slackly. Legal barriers are often cited as an unexpected obstacle that cannot be overcome in the
near future. I would suggest that the top-salaried members who have been leading the
'differential revolution' are not interested in privatizing the means of production, as any just
division of ownership would reduce the possibility of their having such high salaries at the cost
of the ordinary members.

The Abolition of Non-instrumental Production

Non-instrumental production, which was a major utopian feature of the kibbutzim, was one of
the first victims of the 'differential revolution'. As was said above, non-instrumental production
had always been an integral feature of kibbutz life. Work in the kibbutzim was partially shaped
as an end in itself. That aspect of production in the kibbutzim substantially reduced the
inclination toward exploiting the fellow human being, making it easier to realize the normative
decision to avoid exploitation. The introduction of the differential wage system has been
accompanied by the rise of the ideology of efficiency. Productive activity has ceased to be
perceived and shaped, at least partially, as a kind of self-fulfillment bearing a creative character.
Efficiency is now demanded from every single member, and their individual contribution should
be assessed (but not paid) according to this criterion only. Branches of the economy that were
maintained because of the satisfaction they offered to the members working in them have been
scrapped in all the differential kibbutzim, unless they could prove plausible profitability. The
partial abolition of the division of labor has been scrapped as contradicting the principle of
efficiency. Members are not supposed to change branches in order to increase their satisfaction
from work and their feeling of self-fulfillment. Efficiency, and its concomitant concept of
profitability, is the sole criterion dominating production in the differential kibbutzim.
Amazingly, and undoubtedly instructing, the rate of labor productivity of kibbutz industry as a
whole has been deteriorating since the early 1990s and has permanently been below that of
Israeli industry.24 Instrumental productive activity and its criterion, efficiency, are not a
guarantee of higher productivity. Suppression of creativity may negatively affect productivity.
The abolition of non-instrumental production, or the rise of instrumental production, strengthens
the inner drive to exploit the fellow human being. The normative decision to exploit other
kibbutz members is more easily taken, when the dominant atmosphere is not of viewing and
shaping production as a communal enterprise having creative dimensions, but rather as a
combination of individual works aimed at gaining an individual wage. That exploitation has
become so prevalent in the differential kibbutzim is largely due to the abolition of non-
instrumental production.

The Abolition of Democracy

The abolition of internal democracy is undoubtedly a major change-and one of the most
significant changes-in the differential kibbutzim. In a way, this change is dramatic: a highly
democratic society has become much less democratic or non-democratic, and this transformation
has been accepted by most of the members as unavoidable. It has been accepted as such for two
major reasons: as a necessary way for achieving greater efficiency in the economy; and as an
unavoidable surrender to the demands of the leaders of the 'differential revolution' who have
often been viewed as irreplaceable leaders of an unavoidable social transformation. And these
leaders have openly been demanding the reorganization of kibbutz society in a less democratic
way. The deliberate abolition of internal democracy, or in other words the deliberate building of
a non-democratic society, is another dystopian aspect dominating life in the New Kibbutz.
Thus, the General Assembly has been abolished in all the differential kibbutzim and has been
replaced by the Kibbutz Council or Council of Representatives. This council, consisting of some
20 to 30 members, is periodically elected by all members and acts as the supreme authority in the
kibbutz. Direct democracy has been replaced by a much less democratic representative
apparatus.
The committees that shaped and managed the various domains of life in the kibbutzim have
disappeared from the political, social and cultural landscape of the kibbutzim to a large extent, as
the members are no longer involved in shaping their daily life in all its domains. Thus, for
example, cultural activities and the national feasts and festivities have either ceased to be part of
the communal life in the New Kibbutz: they have been individualized, or 'privatized'-i.e., become
a matter for the families-or their organization as communal events is routinely outsourced. The
community is managed, in all aspects of its life, by the Kibbutz Council and by the Community
Management, which usually consists of two elected Community Managers. As we learn, the old
Kibbutz Secretary/Secretaries have been replaced by a managerial team.
A great transformation has taken place in the economic branches. Their democratic running by
the members working in them has been turned into a non-democratic, business-like management
that is typical of private and state companies. Small branches are managed, or run, by appointed
managers, not by the members themselves, who were organized in the past in each branch as a
group headed by the so-called Branch Coordinator. Large branches, such as factories (usually
defined in the kibbutzim as 'industry'), are managed by a Board of Directors, a term that prevails
in the business world. Accordingly, the top office-holder in the factory (or 'industry') has become
the General Manager or CEO (Chief Executive Officer), and the head of the Board of Directors,
a totally new job in the kibbutz economy, is all but the Chair of the Board of Directors. The
principle of managerial rotation has been abolished. As Uriel Leviathn shows, the differential
kibbutzim simply imitate the economic organizational structure outside the kibbutz, namely the
one dominating the business community in both Israel and the world.25 Generally speaking, the
destruction of internal democracy in the kibbutzim is a dystopian development, whereby the
ordinary members, deceived by the 'reformist' leaders, who are usually the economic and social
leaders of the kibbutz community, accept this destruction of internal democracy as a necessary
evil.

Epilogue
The development of the kibbutzim as a unique utopia and the transformation of this utopia into a
dystopia is part of the history of Zionism and of the state of Israel. They are also part of the
general history of utopianism. They testify to the power of human free will to shape human
nature; they also testify to the power of free choice to create both good and bad human nature.
The kibbutzim had not been previously forced to develop a utopian way of life, as no
circumstances can force human beings into building a good society; nor have they been forced
by 'bad' economic circumstances to transform their utopia into dystopia, although such
circumstances have 'helped' to bring about this transformation. 'Bad' economic circumstances in
Israel have never reached the point of being so powerful as to leave no room for a free will and a
free choice. Such circumstances may exist in history, but they have not existed in the case of the
rise of dystopia in the Israeli kibbutzim. It should be emphasized that all so-called circumstances
are a product of human deeds. Those who have created them, as a direct or indirect result of their
action, may recognize them as their own creation and will not view them, or will view them to a
lesser degree, as 'circumstances'. For those who have not created them, they may appear as
natural social circumstances.
Historically, the dystopian transformation of the kibbutzim is occurring in a period characterized,
in both Israel and the world, by the rise of economic and political neoliberalism and the
concomitant destruction of the welfare state. In Israel itself, the economic crisis caused by
neoliberalism and 'cured' by the government along a neoliberal line, which directly affected the
kibbutzim, exacerbated the economic situation, with which the kibbutzim had to cope in the mid-
1980s and have had to deal with since. Those groups in the kibbutzim, mainly at managerial
level, and the 'masses' misled by them who have supported the radical changes, have transformed
two-thirds of the kibbutzim into a bad society. It has been their free choice to build such a
society; and those who have been stirring this transformation have been well aware of their
choice.
The Egalitarian Stream in the kibbutz movement is a proof, I would say a sociopolitical proof,
that even under opposing 'bad' circumstances humans can build a good society-even so good as
to be defined as utopian. The kibbutzim that belong to the Egalitarian Stream do not confine
themselves to the building of their own good society. As a matter of fact, they are closely
involved in the attempts made in Israel to restrict neoliberalism and rehabilitate the welfare state.
The latter is understood by them as both the building of a moderately good society for the large
public and the creation of a socioeconomically supportive framework for themselves. A new
Israeli welfare state would help them secure their prosperity and enlargement. Their efforts in
this direction could, if supported by other political groups, become the starting-point of the
resurrection of Israeli society itself.

Notes
Avraham Pavin, The Kibbutz Movement: Facts and Figures 2006 (Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin-
1

Research and Documentation Center of the Kibbutz Movement, 2006), p. 9 [Hebrew].

Avraham Pavin, The Kibbutz Movement: Facts and Figures 2006 (Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin-
2

Research and Documentation Center of the Kibbutz Movement, 2006), p. 9 [Hebrew], p. 90.
3Martin Buber, Ppfade in Utopia (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1950), p. 20.
4See Shyli Karin-Frank, Utopia Reconsidered (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1986), pp. 33,
35-36 [Hebrew].
5Rachel Elboim-Dror, Yesterday's Tomorrow (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Tzevi, 1993) [Hebrew].
Henry Pereira Mendes, Looking Ahead: Twentieth Century Happenings (London and New
6

York: F. Tennison Neely 1899).

7Moses Hess, Rom und Jerusalem: Die letzte Nationalittsfrage (Leipzig: M.W. Kaufmann, 1899
[1862]), pp. 97-98.
8Moses Hess, 'Socialismus und Communismus', in August Cornu and Wolfgang Mnke (eds)
Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften 1837-1850 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961), pp.
206-207.
Moses Hess, 'Socialismus und Communismus', in August Cornu and Wolfgang Mnke (eds)
9

Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften 1837-1850 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961), p. 204.

10Elchanan Lev Levinski, A Journey to the Land of Israel in the Year 2040 (Berlin: Klal, 1922
[1892]), p. 50 [Hebrew].
Nachman Syrkin (under the pseudonym Ben Elieser), Die Judenfrage und der socialistische
11

Judenstaat (Bern: Verlag von Steiger, 1898), p. 47.

Nachman Syrkin (under the pseudonym Ben Elieser), Die Judenfrage und der socialistische
12

Judenstaat (Bern: Verlag von Steiger, 1898), p. 63.

Nachman Syrkin (under the pseudonym Ben Elieser), Die Judenfrage und der socialistische
13

Judenstaat (Bern: Verlag von Steiger, 1898), p. 67.

14 Theodor Herzl, Altneuland (Vienna: R. Lwit Verlag, 1919 [1902]), pp. 321, 316.
'Ethica Nicomachea', transl. W. D. Ross, in Aristotle, The Works of Aristotle, Vol. IX (Oxford:
15

Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 1094a. I have slightly changed the translation.
'Ethica Nicomachea', transl. W. D. Ross, in Aristotle, The Works of Aristotle, Vol. IX (Oxford:
16

Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 1094a. I have slightly changed the translation, p. 1177b.
Aaron David Gordon, 'Letter to Joseph Aaronovich', in S.H. Bergman and E. Sohat (eds)
17

Writings, Vol. 3 (Tel Aviv: The Zionist Library, 1957), p. 64 [Hebrew].

Karl Marx, 'konomisch-philosophische Manuskripte', in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,
18

Werke, supplementary Vol. I (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1955), pp. 519-521.

See Uriel Leviathan, Is it the End of Utopia? The Israeli Kibbutz at the 21st Century (Haifa:
19

University of Haifa, Institute for Study and Research of the Kibbutz and the Cooperative Idea,
2002), p. 11.
20 At that time the major banks were nationalized after going through bankruptcy two years
earlier. However, they were held and managed by their managers as private banks and
collaborated with the economically conservative government (led by both the conservative Likud
Party and the economically conservative, or neoliberal, part of the Labor Party) in transferring
resources from the kibbutzim and other sectors of the economy and society to the financial sector
by implausibly high interest rates.
21Pavin, The Kibbutz Movement, op. cit., p. 90.
22Pavin, The Kibbutz Movement, op. cit., p. 90.
23Menachem Rosner, Micahl Palgi and Haim Goldenberg, Methods of Differential Budgeting in
the Kibbutzim and Their Characteristics (Haifa: University of Haifa, Institute for Study and
Research of the Kibbutz and the Cooperative Idea, 2002), p. 15 [Hebrew].
24Leviathan, op. cit., p. 20.
25Leviathan, op. cit., pp. 15-16.