DOCUMENT 50 INFANTRY IN BATTLE IN WORLD WAR II

INFANTRY IN BATTLE IN WORLD WAR II

CONTENTS

Chapters Paras

1. Introduction 1-5

2. The New Zealander's Reaction to War

Section 1 - Approach to War 6-7

Section 2 - Reaction to Killing 8-11

Section 3 - Indoctrination for Battle 12

Section 4 - Empty Battlefields 13

Section 5 - Before the Attack 14-17

Section 6 - Recovery of Courage 18

3. The Infantry Team

Section 1 - Benefit of Battle Experience 19

Section 2 - Posting Men to Sections 20-21

Section 3 - The Group Spirit 22-25

Section 4 - The Aggressive Fighter in the Rifle Section 26-28

Section 5 - Imitation and Example 29-31

4. Discipline

Section 1 - Reactions to Army Discipline 32-33

Section 2 - Formal Discipline and Battle Discipline 34

Section 3 - The Officers' Discipline 35-36

5. Tactics and the Fire Fight

Section 1 - Application of Fire 37-39

Section 2 - Using the Maximum Weight of Fire 40-46

Section 3 - The Bayonet 47-48

Section 4 - Fire Control 49

Section 5 - Bunching 50-53

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Section 6 - The Exercise of Command in Battle 54-57

Section 7 - The Passage of Information 58-60

6. Leadership

Section 1 - Verbal Orders in Battle 61

Section 2 - The Essence of Command 62-64

Section 3 - The Position of the Commander in Battle 65-70

7. Conclusion

Section 1 - The Infantryman's Pride of Corps 71-72

Section 2 - Retrospect on War 73-75

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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION

1. In the preparation of officers and men for war one aspect of training presents serious
difficulties. The handling of weapons, the application of fire, the routine of administration, even the
techniques of battle, can all be taught effectively both to the individual and to the group. Realistic
battle practices and full-scale tactical exercises under well simulated active service conditions can do
much to develop the teamwork required in war.

2. But the approach of the individual to the sensations of actual combat and the training of
leaders in the technique of command consequently required under fire present a much more complex
problem. It has often been said that experience of battle is the only effective teacher in these
respects. Yet we would not wish to see men committed to battle unprepared in any respect; and in
the increasing tempo of modern war, we can ill afford to learn by initial mistakes.

3. It is, therefore, most important that no aspect of preparation for battle should be neglected.
This training note has been prepared in an effort to bridge the gap between technical proficiency in
peacetime training and practical experience of war. It attempts to show the approach of the average
New Zealander to the Army and to the emotional stresses of battle, and make certain suggestions to
leaders regarding the handling of men under fire.

4. The training note (1) is the product of battle experience in the New Zealand Divisions in
World War II. It is based on research conducted by the New Zealand War History Branch under the
direction of the Editor-in-Chief, Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger, KBE, CB, DSO, himself an
infantry soldier of wide experience. In 1947, a book (2) was published in the United States, attempting
to explain the reaction of the average American to battle experiences. Major General Kippenberger
wished to know whether the well-authenticated conclusions reached by the author were of equal
application to the New Zealand soldier. Accordingly he addressed a detailed questionnaire, based
upon the book, to some fifty officers who had given distinguished service with infantry units of the 2nd
or 3rd New Zealand Divisions. Their findings were collated, and are contained in the pages that
follow. In order to give point to the opinions stated, many individual examples drawn from all
campaigns are quoted in the text. These are set out in italics throughout and are the words of the
experienced officers who participated in these events. As the replies to the original questionnaire
were not made with a view to publication, personal names have been omitted from all examples.

5. It will be noted that the views here expressed have application to the infantry, as distinct
from the other arms, and to New Zealand infantry in particular. Nevertheless the conclusions offered
are of importance to any officer commanding New Zealand soldiers in any arm of the Service.

Notes

1. Training Note 10 was first published in 1949 as the NZ P4 - Infantry in Battle.

2. "Men Against Fire" by Colonel S.L.A. Marshall.

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CHAPTER TWO – THE NEW ZEALANDER'S REACTION TO WAR

SECTION 1 – APPROACH TO WAR

6. The New Zealand soldier will readily accept the sacrifice of war provided that he feels the
national cause to be just. Belief in the cause may be largely inarticulate, perhaps achieved without a
definite process of reasoning but it will underlie the actions of the average soldier and sustain his
sense of purpose for the duration of the war. Belief in a common cause provides the initial cohesion
among the individuals assembled to form a national army, and grows in time into the team spirit that is
indispensable to really first class infantry formations and units.

7. It is probable that, once esprit de corps has developed, belief in the cause recedes into the
subconscious mind of the average man. Certainly it is doubtful whether a positive realisation of the
justness of the cause can sustain the soldier in actual battle. The motives which make him risk his life
bravely in action are discussed later. Briefly they are: the team spirit (that is, knowledge that others
have faith in him and rely upon him), confidence in his leaders, a sense of duty towards any
responsibility which he may have undertaken, self-respect (that is, a determination not to be found
wanting by his comrades), pride in his country or his unit, and finally, the determination to kill rather
than be killed. Each may sustain individual men to differing degrees. It is probable, however, that all
will affect the average soldier to some extent.

‘I remember how at Ruweisat, the battalion transport officer insisted on going

into the attack simply because his closest friend had been lost a few days before.
That may be called friendship or it may be called desire for revenge.’

SECTION 2 – REACTION TO KILLING

8. The average New Zealander on entering the Army has an aversion to killing a fellow man.
This aversion will be partially overcome during the training period when he learns to fire automatically
at enemy figure targets, and to use his longer range weapons with technical accuracy. This the
aversion will survive into battle. Once he comes under fire, however, and especially when he has
seen his comrades wounded or killed by enemy fire, it will be submerged by a desire to kill the enemy,
if only to save himself. In hot blood, the average infantryman will kill without hesitation and without
subsequent misgivings.

‘I remember reducing one of my chaps to tears by admonishing him for shooting

an enemy soldier attempting to surrender during a bayonet charge at Fort Capuzzo.
He was not a 'tough' man, but worked up to a high state of tension’

9. These remarks apply to killing at close quarters. At ranges over 100-200 metres killing
becomes much more impersonal, and few men will turn away from it in these circumstances.
Nevertheless, the New Zealander is not unaffected by human feelings, even in the heat of battle.
Generally he will prefer to take prisoners rather than to kill.

‘In Crete, before the fighting, I heard many a Maori swear that he would kill
every enemy and take no prisoners. Yet the first parachutists to put up their
hands were all spared, even though they arrogantly kept telling us that we would
be blown out of Crete in a few days.’

10. However, the enemy who continues firing and causing casualties until the last possible
moment, and then attempts to surrender, will often be killed without compunction, as will the prisoner
who offers treachery. It may be accepted that the least courageous soldiers will, in normal
circumstances be the least inclined to show mercy to a defeated enemy. The inclination to take
prisoners when possible will be paralleled in defence by an unwillingness to open fire on an exposed
and perhaps unconscious enemy (as in an ambush).

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11. It should be understood that these reactions are for the most part unconscious rather than
reasoned, they reflect the New Zealander's attitude to normal life. They will almost certainly be
affected by the degree to which a soldier believes in his cause, and also by the characteristics of his
enemy, brutal or chivalrous. The infantryman's reactions to killing may be affected by his pre-service
background, certainly it can be conditioned to a certain extent by training. But in battle the
New Zealander will accept the principle of kill or be killed, and his mind will not be unbalanced by the
necessity of killing his enemy.

SECTION 3 – INDOCTRINATION FOR BATTLE

12. The infantryman must therefore be taught from the start that his job is to kill, and must be
encouraged to develop confidence in himself and his weapon to that end. His collective training must
be made as realistic as possible, so that he will be prepared for the noises and mental strains of
battle, and will go on with his job of killing when he meets enemy fire. Provided that such training is
properly planned by officers who understand these human factors and take account of the national
temperament, individual treatment should not be necessary. (In battle, individual treatment will
frequently be required.) The infantryman, having been given every opportunity to anticipate and
overcome his own mental reactions in battle must be taught to regard the enemy as his human,
personal enemy, and to act aggressively to exterminate him.

‘We left good evidence of no hesitation to kill on the field at the Minq'ar Qaim
breakthrough.’

SECTION 4 – EMPTY BATTLEFIELDS

13. It should be pointed out to the infantryman during training that he will frequently be fighting
an unseen enemy - who is no less dangerous for being invisible. When that fact is realised, the
infantryman will not be distressed by the apparent emptiness of his first battlefield in close country, the
presence of companions will offset this sensation.

SECTION 5 – BEFORE THE ATTACK

14. Before an attack all men will feel a nervous tension, physical sickness, and even fear, but
most New Zealanders will control and conceal their fear.

‘I remember an attack in the desert where we had to advance over a ridge on

which the enemy were putting down a heavy artillery concentration. As we
approached the ridge on which the shells were falling, there was a lot of
back-chat and jokes among the men, which was very heartening.’

15. The sensation of fear is, of course, most pronounced among men who are taking part in
their first attack and among those who have become stale with too much fighting. It will be reduced
by proper battle drill, since if the unit is fully trained it will not normally be necessary to hold assaulting
companies for any length of time on the start line, which is always undesirable. Generally, the feeling
of nervousness will be reduced if officers are in firm control of their units, and if clear and definite
orders have been issued, whether in attack or in defence. Men who know what they have to do are
more certain of themselves, and of their place in the team. Once battle has been joined the necessity
for action will to a large extent sweep away the feeling of nervousness, and this will be replaced by the
excitement of battle.

‘When the lust of the fight is in a man, he does not consider death. I have seen
many a man with a light in his eye in a fight.’

16. Exhilaration will sustain the average soldier throughout the action and after its successful
conclusion. Later this will be succeeded by a feeling of weariness, which calls for even greater

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exertions on the part of the leader to prepare for enemy reactions. During this vital period of
reorganisation on the objective, the commander must overcome his own weariness and exercise firm
control. First and foremost, he must get his men reorganised and dug in to meet a counter-attack.
Simultaneously he must make sure that his communications are in order. Then he will see to the
evacuation of wounded and the burial of the dead. Hot food will come forward after dark. Until it
does, the men will have the 24-hour ration which they carry and forward commanders can do no more
than provide guides for the ration parties. A visit by the higher commander during reorganisation will
be of great value.

17. In the average body of troops, there will be a small proportion of men (between 3% and 5%)
who will be unable to control their fear, and who will fail in action unless assisted by their leaders. At
best they will become passengers and will make no positive contribution to the defeat of the enemy.

SECTION 6 – RECOVERY OF COURAGE

18. The man who is really afraid - so afraid that he is prepared to let the team down - wants to
do nothing but stay in any cover that is available. He may have a shocked blank appearance, and will
be incapable of responding to a normal order. This condition calls for rapid understanding and the
exertion of personality by the leader. Shouting or reproach will rarely have any effect. The affected
man can only be given a chance to rehabilitate himself by a stern order to get on with a specified duty
or to perform some simple action, often not an aggressive one. For example, a man may be
persuaded to readjust his own or a companion's equipment. In less serious cases, he may be
persuaded to carry a message, or to perform some accustomed routine - even to make tea. From
these actions, other actions will follow, and self-control will return. A man who has overcome fear in
this way will often make a first-rate soldier. If he is allowed to fail, his fighting usefulness - and in fact
his life - may be ruined.

‘At Cassino, a platoon commander reported that one of his men would not leave
his sangar, and was relieving himself even in there with his comrade. That
night I had a talk with the man and told him to accompany me on my rounds
of the platoons. His rifle was loaded and handed to him. I started out with
him following. As we progressed, I explained our own and enemy positions, and
all the details I could of the situation. Next night he was waiting for me.
Later he took complete control of himself (and of several others) and made a
journey under fire which I should not have cared to take myself.’

‘In Crete, enemy parachutists fell on and around my company area, which
was somewhat detached. The situation was confused, and bullets were
coming and going in every direction. I noticed my cook, a young lad, hiding in
fright in a clump of bamboos. He was dragged out, declaring rather pathetically,
that he had never fired a rifle in his life. We gave him a rifle, and coached his
shooting. He fired at a German about 40-50 yards away and missed. His
second shot was a hit. He turned round to me with a broad grin on his face
and said “I'm all right now, sir,” and went up the creek bed hunting Germans.’

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CHAPTER 3 – THE INFANTRY TEAM

SECTION 1 – BENEFIT OF BATTLE EXPERIENCE

19. The officer or non-commissioned officer who has had battle experience will be a better
leader, since men will have greater confidence in his judgement and will follow him more willingly. The
seasoning effect of battle is of benefit to all, since it increases self and mutual confidence and
develops the team spirit. Much can be done to prepare unseasoned units by realistic training, but the
highest point of battle efficiency will not be reached until after the first action. Experience and
confidence are the essentials of good units and good soldiers. Too much experience of battle will,
however, have an adverse effect on the fighting qualities of any infantry soldier in the long run.

SECTION 2 – POSTING MEN TO SECTIONS

20. It may be accepted that a man will fight hardest when he has full confidence in himself and
in his ability to use effectively the weapon with which he is armed. It is therefore necessary to treat
men as individuals when making postings to sections and to allocate them to duties in the battalion
which are in character. Thus a man who is a strong individualist may be a better soldier if employed
as a sniper than he would be in, say, the anti-tank platoon. On the other hand, an indifferent
performer in a rifle section may do well in a less exacting role with a mortar, perhaps because he
needs the reassurance of other men working with him in the team, perhaps because he has more
confidence in his ability with that weapon.

‘It could be seen from his reactions that he was absolutely terrified of front
line action in a rifle section. He was placed in charge of a bren gun and as
such took part in the Battle of Takrouna. With his machine-gun trained on to
one of the approaches to the pinnacle itself, he stuck to his job during one
of the enemy counter-attacks and simply mowed them down until the path was
almost blocked with enemy dead. This man was one of the unsung heroes of Takrouna’

21. In general the most determined fighters should be found in the rifle sections, they are the
essence of the fighting qualities of the unit and must be drawn from the finest material available.

SECTION 3 – THE GROUP SPIRIT

22. The infantry leader, in training his men and in controlling them in battle, should understand
that most men are reassured by the presence (or presumed presence) of companions. For this
reason, weapon pits should be occupied by two or even three men, especially at night or in close
country. This calls for a dog-leg pit in order to avoid unnecessary casualties. (It should be noted,
however, that in very open country with unrestricted observation, weapon pits should be manned
singly.) Similarly, most patrols should consist of a team of men who know each other. This tendency
to rely on known companions is a valuable factor in maintaining morale, and it will be assisted by any
activity which develops a team spirit in a detachment or sub-unit. The keeping together of a group of
friends with peacetime associations will therefore be justified.

23. The infantry leader must also understand however, that there is an element of danger in this
group tendency. When under fire, men will tend to bunch together and thus render themselves more
vulnerable. This must be corrected by thorough training in battle drill, so that the individual comes to
rely on the known positions of his immediate neighbours, even though they may not be physically
close to him, nor even visible.

‘I can picture the men in the advance at Tebaga Gap, and there was no serious
bunching there - but at that stage all the men were fully trained and had become
battle-seasoned troops.’

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24. While these reactions are typical of the majority of men, the leader should realise that there
will be individuals who by temperament or previous social environment are happiest when working
alone. It is from these individualists (who are not necessarily leaders) that selection should be made
for jobs requiring an independent attitude - the battalion snipers, observers, etc.

25. These remarks must not be taken to imply that training in initiative and individual effort
should not form part of the training of infantrymen. As far as possible, they must be trained to carry
on with the job, even without the support of their comrades.

‘(In the attack on Takrouna) two non-commissioned officers and one soldier reached
the objective of the 21st Battalion. They were all that were left of four platoons
of A and B Companies, they kept going without any support.’

SECTION 4 – THE AGGRESSIVE FIGHTER IN THE RIFLE SECTION

26. It has already been suggested that an aggressive fighting spirit will develop more rapidly and
to a greater extent in certain individuals than in others. Such individuals, frequently the younger men,
will initiate aggressive action within the section or platoon. By reason of the increased prestige which
battle seasoning gives, these men will especially carry the burden of the fight when they are amongst
inexperienced troops, and although their initiative will be rapidly and readily supported by others, they
will bear a disproportionate share of danger. For this reason such aggressive spirits will inevitably
become casualties early, but their places will be taken by the men whom they have inspired and
taught by example. Leaders are always thrown up by a group.

‘The majority may have been prepared to accept the offensive initiative of
the minority, but when some of that minority were casualties, there always
seemed to be a few from the 'passenger' group who came forward and continued
the fight.’

27. Such men are essential to high fighting qualities in a unit, and their value increases with
experience. At the same time, unless they are transferred to less perilous positions they have only
death or disablement to look forward to. It is therefore essential, for reasons of morale and of justice,
to maintain a system of transferring the warriors to less exacting positions, when they have survived a
number of major operations.

‘As vacancies occurred in B Echelon, they were filled by applicants with the
longest service from rifle companies. This policy had a definite good effect
on morale in the unit.’

28. Such a system cannot be codified without an adverse effect on morale, it must remain an
unwritten law of every New Zealand battalion - for upon it much of the fighting morale of the unit will
depend.

SECTION 5 – IMITATION AND EXAMPLE

29. Many actions in battle are imitative or contagious. For instance there is an instinctive
tendency to run when others run, it springs from the same impulse as the emulation of sterling
actions. It becomes serious only when the running is rearward. It is not desirable, however, to attempt
any specific training to restrict the tendency to run when others run, for it will rarely occur among
New Zealand infantrymen.
‘One of the most dangerous things that you can do in close action is to ask your
men to turn their backs on the enemy.... During our attack on Miterya Ridge my
battalion was left with an open flank, and there was no option but to retire so as
to tie up with the new line of 24th Battalion. The reason for this withdrawal could not,
of course, be communicated to every man in the front line, and I realised that it was a

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very dangerous operation that I was undertaking. In spite of my exhortations not

to run but to withdraw quietly, a few broke as soon as we turned our backs on the
enemy, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that I managed to halt what
might have become a stampede.’

30. Troops who are properly disciplined, well trained, and self-confident will hold to the leader
whom they respect. By the exercise of immediate and (if necessary) ruthless control, the leader must
be ready to halt any threatened panic started by the action of one or two weak men, otherwise a high
degree of fear in a few men can infect the whole group. For this reason, men who have given up the
fight must be removed lest they corrupt others.

‘Fear spreads quickly over a large number of men. Courage is appreciated quickly
by a few, and gradually spreads to the many.’

31. It is not less true, however, that a display of personal courage can inspire a group to greater
endurance, and even to like acts of courage. This is particularly true of a brave personal example set
by a leader. While this may not inspire every individual to act like a hero, it will certainly hearten and
steady the whole group in a critical moment. This emphasises the necessity for a commander to
preserve a serene and controlled demeanour in the presence of critical events and of danger.

‘(At Maleme) the men had taken cover against opposition from the air and from
the ground and were not willing to move any further forward.... The CO
shouted, “Call yourselves bloody soldiers”, and began to move forward on
his own. To a man the battalion rose and followed.’

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CHAPTER 4 – DISCIPLINE

SECTION 1 – REACTIONS TO ARMY DISCIPLINE

32. The average New Zealander is a good soldier and will behave well both during the training
period and in action. A proportion of hard cases will express their high spirits and independence of
mind by frequent if minor misdemeanours, calculated to enliven the tedium of training, but neither
vicious nor criminal. Such men will often turn out well in action, and may, in fact, react well if given
responsibility.

‘Certain original members of the battalion were a continuous embarrassment until

we fought in Greece, when they proved their worth.... Their conduct sheets were
things of the past. Most of these men became the best NCOs I had.’

33. On the other hand, a man of really bad character - the vicious or criminal or bullying type -
will never make a good soldier, and throughout his service will be more trouble than he is worth. The
officer must be able to differentiate between the hard case soldier and the criminal type, and be
prepared to treat them differently.

SECTION 2 – FORMAL DISCIPLINE AND BATTLE DISCIPLINE

34. Efficiency on the parade ground is not necessarily an indication of a future good
performance in action. At the same time it must be remembered that intelligent military discipline has
as one of its aims the development of character, and that precision drill and training in obedience are
conditioning factors in achieving that development. A properly disciplined soldier is one who
possesses a clear sense of purpose, who has self-confidence and confidence in his leaders and
comrades, who is conscious of being a member of a fighting team, and has the determination not to
let that team down in any circumstances. It is probable that the soldier who possesses or has
absorbed these higher principles will also absorb the outward form of minor discipline that, by long
tradition, forms the initial vehicle of his training. To put it slightly differently, the man who proves
reliable and well disciplined during training is usually showing that he has absorbed the higher and
more valued facets of discipline. To this extent, he has more chance of performing well in action than
the man who displays none of the outward forms of discipline. Nevertheless, there will be many
disappointments caused by apparently good soldiers failing to perform well in action, because they
have absorbed only the outward forms and not the ultimates of true discipline. Only a battle trained
officer can hope to predict the performance of his men under fire, until he has that experience
soldierly qualities must suffice as a reasonable guide to success.

‘Generally speaking, a soldier who is loyal and disciplined is efficient

in his work, and from such efficiency he derives confidence for the
actual fight.’

SECTION 3 – THE OFFICERS' DISCIPLINE

35. The discipline of every unit depends upon that of its officers. Unless the officers have a full
sense of their responsibilities and observe at all times all the requirements of military discipline, and of
self-discipline, they will not command the full respect of their men. It is the responsibility of the
commanding officer to induce and maintain the correct attitude among his officers, this will
automatically be reflected throughout the unit.

36. The young officer especially must be made to understand that although he must be in close
contact with his men and interest himself closely in their affairs, he cannot indulge in familiarity and
retain full control. Mere popularity is not a substitute for respect. It makes the already exacting task
of the leader much more difficult in war if his command of men is in any way inferior. An officer is an

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example to his men, inefficiency and indiscipline will be imitated just as readily as good soldierly
behaviour.

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CHAPTER 5 – TACTICS AND THE FIRE FIGHT

SECTION 1 – APPLICATION OF FIRE

37. Infantry fire in the attack has two purposes, namely to:

a. demoralise the enemy as a whole, and

b. kill any individuals who expose themselves.

38. In a night attack, the former may often be decisive when the latter cannot be achieved. Both
can be effectively carried out with the scale of weapons and ammunition in the present infantry
battalion.

‘We never fully learned the lesson the Germans taught in Crete, that in
close wooded country there is no factor that undermines morale more
rapidly than the constant firing of an enemy whom you cannot see.’

39. The infantryman who has completed his initial training, must be given realistic exercise on
the battle practice range, with ample ammunition and lifelike targets and situations, before he can be
considered fit for battle. He must develop confidence in his weapon from the knowledge that he can
use it effectively as an individual. Both as an individual and as a member of the section and platoon
he must be taught to shoot to kill whenever a target offers. He must also be taught that there will be
occasions when he must use fire to suppress an invisible enemy, and that such fire will be more
effective if controlled by the section or platoon commanders. The latter must be taught to control it.

‘(During the fighting in October 1942) my company relieved two British

companies. These two companies had been ordered to fire only at observed
targets. They were pinned down all day and received heavy casualties.
As my orders were to hold at all costs, I instructed all platoons to meet
fire with fire. We held the position for our full period and received only
two casualties. Morale was high, being able to hit back has this effect.’

SECTION 2 – USING THE MAXIMUM WEIGHT OF FIRE

40. The necessity for maximum effective fire against enemy positions in the assault is generally
accepted.

‘In the attack on Takrouna, my men knew they were in for a tough job.
I consider that though much of their fire found no targets, the volume of the
fire carried my men along.’

41. Well trained and well led infantrymen will engage the enemy at every opportunity, especially
when the situation is most critical.

‘When we moved over the area (at Bel Hamed) in which the 20th Battalion
was over-run, we remarked that invariably in each hastily dug slit trench
there was a small pile of expended small arms cartridge cases, and this
applied also to mortar pits and gun sites.’

42. Nevertheless, there will always be a small proportion of men who will be reluctant to use
their weapons, either through fright, or the feeling of drawing enemy attention to themselves, or
through mistaken feelings of humanity.

‘On the Senio, a forward platoon phoned battalion headquarters to say that a

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German was lying out in front of their position, and they wanted a mortar
concentration on the poor unfortunate. No one seemed anxious to fire a Bren,
rifle, or SMG. An order from the commanding officer put this right - and the
'German' was found to be nothing more than a steel helmet!’

43. This hesitation will be greatest among unseasoned troops, and especially among those who
have not been fully trained to place confidence in their own weapons.

‘During the 1941 Libyan campaign, I witnessed the phenomenon of a few men
carrying out the attack drill faithfully and yet not even bothering to look
up at the enemy whenever they took to ground. They seemed to be just lying
there waiting for the next order to charge. I remember ordering these men
to use their rifles. Now and again they did, but I feel certain to no good
effect. At the next stop the same thing would happen again.’

‘In the battle of Tanaheran I attacked with two platoons in jungle warfare.
The men were heavily armed - about four grenades each, 100 rounds per rifle
and a full complement of ammunition for Bren and SMG. At the conclusion of
the battle, the platoon that had borne the brunt of the fight were, to a man,
nearly out of ammunition. These men had been painstakingly trained, time and
ammunition being no object.’

44. It is important that the proportion of passengers be kept as low as possible, in order that the
great fire potential of the infantry battalion may take its full effect on the enemy.

45. This great volume of fire will normally be supplemented by the heaviest fire support that the
formation commander can provide from other sources. It is the primary task of artillery and other
arms to provide the maximum available fire support in order to help the infantry forward to their
objectives, all other tasks are of secondary importance. At the same time, the battalion commander
must appreciate the tremendous firepower that is available under his hand in the unit. If heavier
support is not available, for any reason, his own resources are normally sufficient to enable him to get
forward against anything but strongly fortified opposition.

‘I am convinced that my own unit was tremendously improved by the period

on the Senio when we had no artillery support. Men developed a new confidence
and delight in the Bren, sniping became almost common, and most valuable of
all, we suddenly found that we could use the PIAT (1) for a great variety of
useful purposes. The PIAT was a great infantry weapon, which we only really
used to the full effect in the very last campaign.’

46. A commander may anticipate that about one-quarter of his (infantry) weapons will be
effective at any one time in the attack, but this will be reduced in conditions of poor visibility. Infantry
moving forward close behind an artillery barrage (leaning on the barrage) may have little necessity to
fire, other than to demoralise the enemy further. It is unnecessary to emphasise that every worthwhile
target should be engaged, even when opposition is light.

Note

1. The PIAT was an infantry anti-armour weapon.

SECTION 3 – THE BAYONET

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47. The bayonet is a weapon of great morale value. Even a resolute enemy will rarely fight to
the last when faced with a determined bayonet assault. The long bayonet is a more obvious (and
therefore more effective) weapon than the short. Even though the opportunities for its use will be
infrequent, and at best fleeting, its threatened use in battle remains a morale weapon of the first order.
It is still necessary for the infantryman to be fully trained in its use, and to be confident of his ability to
kill with it. With highly civilised troops there will be an instinctive reluctance to use the bayonet in cold
blood, but in moments of crisis the enthusiasm of even a few men for this weapon may be sufficient to
inspire a whole company to their example. The use of the bayonet at such a moment will frequently
be decisive, especially if a surprise has been gained.

48. It must not be assumed that the use of the bayonet is a separate or special act of war. The
rifleman in the attack will fire from the hip or shoulder, and may frequently kill his enemy in this way
without coming literally face-to-face. In fact many, even most, infantry actions will be fought in this
manner. But there will occur favourable opportunities for the use of the bayonet in the last surprise
rush, to strike terror not only into the individual who is attacked, but at second-hand into all of his
comrades who escape.

‘There was a pitched bayonet battle at close quarters at Galatos on Crete. In a

company of sixty men, at least fifty took part, and of these, I should say ten made
real use of their bayonet or rifle butts. The rest got their man with a bullet,
took a prisoner, or got a bullet themselves.’

SECTION 4 – FIRE CONTROL

49. As has been stated, the infantryman must, as a first essential, be capable of using his
weapon effectively as an individual. But beyond this, there will frequently be a requirement, especially
in defence, for the use of concerted fire by the section and even platoon. Apart from its effect on the
enemy, it has a steadying effect on our own troops. This is part of the team work of the infantry
sub-unit. Our present training methods include the teaching of fire control within the section and
platoon, the former must become an accustomed drill and every man should be capable of replacing
the section leader in giving fire orders to the section. The form of the order must be close enough to
the correct sequence of orders to produce effective direction and timing of the resultant fire. In battle,
and especially in the attack, the transmission of orders will be difficult because of noise and dispersal.
Infantry commanders should, therefore, in future training, aim to give all section and platoon leaders
experience in controlling the fire of their sub-unit under realistic conditions of battle noise and battle
formation.

SECTION 5 – BUNCHING

50. Men show an instinctive tendency to bunch together in action, resulting in unnecessary
casualties under concentrated fire. Bunching will be aggravated at night and over rough country, it
may be further aggravated by units or sub-units getting off line in an attack and crowding their
neighbours. At night, also, men will tend to bunch together to deal with enemy positions.

51. Owing to the serious casualties which will almost always result it is essential to use every
means to overcome the bunching habit. Much can be done during the training period to point out the
dangers of the practice. Battle practice under realistic conditions will accustom men to moving at fixed
intervals and distances. They should also be shown on the ground the contrast between a bunched
and dispersed section as a target.

52. The hard experience of battle will do much to teach the lesson of dispersal to raw troops.
But even men who have been in action may tend to bunch unless constantly urged by their section
leaders to keep distance. These leaders must be trained to keep constant watch on the danger.

53. As has been mentioned previously, it is important that men should have clear orders before
action. They will then be confident of their tasks, and will more willingly disperse, confident that their

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comrades are working as part of the same pattern. This can be assisted by prior training, including
the practice of standard battle drills.

SECTION 6 – THE EXERCISE OF COMMAND IN BATTLE

54. Control of sub-units once they have been committed to battle will present great difficulty to
the commander. Much can be done beforehand by proper training and careful planning for the actual
operation. With seasoned troops it should not be necessary for a commander to shout orders if an
attack is progressing according to plan. In fact, undue shouting in such circumstances may only
confuse and distract the men. But there will be occasions, especially when an unforeseen or critical
situation arises, when it will be essential for the commander to resume control of the operation by
issuing calm and crisp orders without giving any appearance of being 'rattled'. Battle noise and
confusion may make this difficult, but leaders must be trained to place themselves in the best position
to make themselves heard.

‘I saw an officer take complete control of a company by voice at Point 201 and
wheel it in action to outflank a (hostile) machine-gun post.’

55. The section leader and even the platoon commander must habitually exert personal
leadership and use their voices to control action. Company and (occasionally) battalion commanders
may also have to do so in special circumstances. Command in battle is the first and probably most
difficult task of all commanders.

‘The voice of the CO was obeyed by the 23rd Battalion at Takrouna, and the
battalion went forward to take up ground across the Enfidaville Road which
ran behind Takrouna. His voice rang out as that of a leader, and men who
followed him that night will remember that voice as long as they remember the war.’

56. Once mutual knowledge and confidence have been established between a commander and
his men, there will be a ready response to the orders of the commander in action. The necessity for
spoken orders will be reduced to a minimum, and instructions need be given only loud enough to be
heard.

‘In Crete I heard presumably a German officer shouting out orders to his troops,
and it was just what I wanted, as he disclosed his exact position before he attacked.’

57. Cheerfulness, steadiness and knowledge of what to do at all times will, in a commander, be
reassuring to men. The value of personal example in battle cannot be over-stressed, it is a vital factor
in establishing confidence. In moments of crisis, however, more will be needed than even personal
example. Troops who have faltered in the attack, or who are in danger of giving ground in the face of
enemy attack, can only be rallied by the exercise of firm and confident command, including the use of
voice control. The initiation of the necessary action may well be effected by some physical act on the
part of the commander, but it must be supported by his incisive orders. It is more than ever the
responsibility of the commander to take over personally when the situation looks uncertain.

SECTION 7 – THE PASSAGE OF INFORMATION

58. If unnecessary friction is to be avoided, all officers must understand the importance of a free
passage of information. The company commander must appreciate that battalion and higher
commanders require the most complete and up to date information to enable them to make sound
decisions. All contributory information should therefore be passed automatically from front to rear,
and the procedure must be constantly practised during formation training. The higher commander on
the other hand should appreciate that information must travel downwards as well as upwards. The
unit or sub-unit commander has many vital problems on his hands and should not be distracted by
frequent calls for progress reports. (Special reports may, of course, have to be called for if unusual
information is anticipated or required.) In a fully trained formation, higher and subordinate

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commanders will have mutual confidence and standing operating procedures will have been adopted
and practised for the passing of information in good time and without irritating demands.

59. Certain types of information will be vital in battle. For instance, it is important that units
should have full and early information of events occurring on the front of the flanking units. Within the
battalion the passing of information between companies is generally well attended to.

60. The passage of information between adjoining companies of different battalions is often
inadequate. The same may be said of battalions of the same or different brigades, naturally the
sub-units joining flanking divisions will have the greatest difficulty in keeping each other informed by
signal means. It is important that attention should be paid to the provision of lateral communications,
as a standard procedure as soon as possible after the completion of front-to-rear communications.
Lateral communications will be assisted, of course, by the possession of good radio facilities and
properly trained operators, but none will be effective until commands at all levels understand the need
for the lateral passage of information. The demands of security will probably continue to impose
delays on the passage of operational information by radio, certainly at the battalion headquarters
level, line communications may still be required and lateral lines, laid right to left must be regarded as
a standard service, without which the battalion communications are incomplete. Commanders, at all
levels, must establish personal contact with flanking commanders whenever opportunity offers.

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CHAPTER 6 – LEADERSHIP

SECTION 1 – VERBAL ORDERS IN BATTLE

61. An infantry battalion or company that has developed a high standard of battle drill will
normally be able to carry out any pre-arranged operation without progressive oral orders from its
commander. On the section level, however (and frequently on the platoon level) the commander will
have to make his voice heard above the noise of battle in clear and incisive tones, to encourage and
direct the actions of his men. To this end, commanders must be trained to give orders forcefully but
without excitability. Combined with personal example in action, such ability spells good command.
This is more than ever necessary when difficulties are encountered, especially when situations arise
(or seem likely to arise) which are not covered by battle drills, or which may cause disorganisation or
even disaster. At these times, the commander who directs his men with clear, loud, and unflurried
orders will be obeyed and will remain in command of the situation. In fact, it may often be necessary
for a company commander to rally his men at a moment of crisis by the powerful use of his voice.
When a situation is most dangerous the need for such personal leadership is greatest.

‘Outside Tobruk the 20th Battalion was being overrun by tanks, and on
the flank of the 18th, men not in immediate danger were standing up to
surrender because the 20th were having to do so. The CO's full voice
boomed out, “get down and fight or die”, or words to that effect. The
immediate result was that men returned to their slit trenches and many
told me afterwards that they had an instant feeling of being under control.’

SECTION 2 – THE ESSENCE OF COMMAND

62. It has already been stated that men will fight best when they have full confidence in their
leaders. This confidence will be encouraged during the initial training period before troops have seen
action, and during spells out of the line by the commander who shows sincere concern for their
general welfare. Popularity is not a substitute for possession of the confidence of one's men. In
action, a leader, whether popular or not, will gain the confidence of his men to the extent that he
shows himself able to understand tactical problems, and to bring every available means to their
assistance in overcoming those problems. As stated earlier he must set a high personal standard of
conduct in action, but personal bravery will not excuse carelessness with their lives in the eyes of the
men. The leader must at all times show an understanding of his men and of their problems. He must
establish and maintain a firm but just system of discipline, permitting no inefficiency either in himself or
in them, he must be consistent in all his actions, and lastly he must be soldierly in appearance and
gentlemanly in his habits. The officer who possesses all these admirable qualities in sufficient degree
will win and hold not only the confidence but also the respect of his men.

63. The soldier who has confidence in his leaders will fight better because he has faith in the
tactics used, and, as his experience grows, he will be able to judge of their soundness for himself. To
this end he must be told the reasons for the actions required of him. A good leader will always pass
out to his men the best information he can give them of current events and anticipated events, and will
explain the tactics on which battle drills are based. The New Zealander demands a reason for his
actions and a worthy object for his sacrifice. But it must be emphasised that units which are well
commanded - and therefore well disciplined - will do their full duty even if all men do not possess a full
picture of what is happening.

64. Troops who are poorly led or insufficiently trained may lose confidence in their leaders and in
the soundness of operations, especially if they feel they are at a tactical disadvantage owing to lack of
fire support, or lack of effective weapons. This will affect adversely their fighting value. If it occurs,
confidence can only be restored by the influence of a strong commander, by the redress of the
unfavourable tactical balance, and (this being the most important) by a resoundingly successful
operation.
SECTION 3 – THE POSITION OF THE COMMANDER IN BATTLE

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65. A good commander must continually reconcile two conflicting requirements - namely, that
while much of his control can only be exercised from a headquarters in rear of the fighting echelons,
he must also visit his forward troops in order to make his presence felt by the fighting men. On the
one hand, it is the duty of a commander to control the fight, to make the best use of his reserves and
of the supporting fire available, and to be accessible at all critical times to his subordinate
commanders. This normally requires an established headquarters or a known location, with all the
paraphernalia of command. On the other hand, the morale value - both to the fighting troops and to
the commander himself - of forward visits is inestimable. In fact they are essential to battle
leadership.

66. To assist the commander in reconciling these requirements the following general points may
be made:

a. The commander must not usurp the functions of his subordinates. Nor should he
become too involved in the battle at the lower level.

b. The subordinate commander has his own urgent problems in action and will not
always welcome the presence of his senior.

c. The nature of the operation and the reliability of signal communications will to some
extent influence the advisability of making visits.

d. Knowledge of a situation on the ground is essential; map knowledge or second-hand

knowledge is not sufficient.

‘That CO's reports after his dawn reconnaissances across

the battalion front were first class, and so much better than those
given by commanders who attempted to collate the reports they
got by phone or radio from their company commanders.’

e. In moments of crisis a commander who is on the spot may be able to influence the
battle successfully by personal intervention.

f. A commander who cannot be located when he is wanted may prejudice success.

g. It is not part of a commander's duty to take needless risks.

67. In the light of these general comments, some rules are suggested below for the various
commanders. It must be remembered, however, that circumstances will alter cases. Other than in
the instances quoted, it may be taken that the commander should be at his established headquarters
whence the function of higher command will be exercised.

68. The battalion commander should carry out forward visits as follows:

a. in static positions - at least once per 24 hours;

b. on the line of departure before an attack;

c. on the objective - but not until consolidation is under way, and his own plan to deal
with counter-attacks has been completed;

d. at any time when the situation is critical or a check has been suffered and personal
intervention forward may effect a successful outcome;

e. after a company has received a severe knock; and

f. to obtain personal knowledge of terrain, etc.

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He should visit all company headquarters, and should also at intervals visit platoons. Such visits will
often be made at first light, or last light, or during darkness.

69. The brigade commander should not normally require to go forward of battalion headquarters
except for terrain reconnaissance. Subject to this condition, he may follow the procedure suggested
above for a battalion commander.

70. The essential thing is that the commander must be located where he can exercise the
greatest effect on the battle, according to the circumstances. While the situation is fluid, this will
generally be at his main headquarters. In times of crisis or opportunity he may require to be at the
point where a decision will be most effective. If this involves absence from his headquarters, he must
leave a responsible deputy in his place, and maintain the best possible contact. Finally, he must have
continual regard for the morale of his fighting troops and exert his personal influence to sustain and
develop their confidence by his presence among them.

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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION

SECTION 1 – THE INFANTRYMAN'S PRIDE OF CORPS

71. The New Zealand infantryman well equipped, well led, and adequately supported, will feel an
intense pride in his corps, and his unit, and will even welcome the measure of hardship and danger
which falls to his lot.

‘At Orsogna, when we were practically on our objective and had passed
through some very heavy fire and lost quite a number of men, I asked a Bren
gunner in the front of our advance how things were going. His reply was,
“she's just the top gear.” His tone indicated his lack of terror.’

72. This pride will be enhanced by proper treatment during the training period and will be
confirmed by his first battles - especially if these battles are even reasonably successful.

SECTION 2 – RETROSPECT ON WAR

73. The New Zealand peoples have an aversion to war, yet history often shows the expression
of their finest qualities in the test of battle. The same apparent contradiction may be seen in the
individual. The New Zealander is not military minded and approaches the Army with some misgivings,
yet his conduct in war bears the most critical examination. The New Zealand infantryman accepted
the full measure of hardship, danger, horror, filth, discomfort, and sacrifice demanded of him. Yet his
memories are not all of the filth and destruction of war, on the contrary there remain in his mind many
experiences which the continued acquaintance of danger made more vital, more satisfying.

‘I think the most exhilarating day of my life was the 20th of May, 1941 -
the day the parachutists first landed in Crete.’

74. It is, therefore, clear that experience of battle and the hint or presence of danger may make
for an increased awareness of life. Some fortunate individuals will feel this increased awareness even
in the presence of the danger, many more will feel it as soon as the immediate danger has passed.

‘I well remember how happy I was on Sfasciata Ridge before the crossing of the
Orsogna Road. We were getting a certain amount of attention from enemy artillery
and mortars, but the company was in good heart, and we had just the right number
of houses in our area to enable men to dry out their clothes and cook a bit of
extra food.’

75. It is also fair to say that at the war's end the infantry soldier who played his full part emerged
strengthened and enlivened by the experience of battle. Above all, he knew the true meaning and
true value of comradeship. Fostered by unity of purpose, the team spirit of the New Zealand
battalions was a force of great power, rarely encountered in other walks of life. The sense of
comradeship and mutual reliance was new in degree to those who found themselves in the team, and
in itself was enough to submerge much of the uncertainty and unpleasantness of war.

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