Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Theory and the US Case
IRCO 411
Stephan Haggard
October 10, 2006
Outline
• Interest group models of trade policy
• The effects of institutions on policy
• An overview of US trade policy: the politics
of free trade and protection
• [The TPA case]
From Economics to Politics
• Factor endowments drive:
– Relative prices
– Factorintensity of activities
– And therefore the composition of exports (embodying
abundant factors) and imports (embodying scarce
factors)
• Trade policy affects the interests of different
factors and activities (which can be thought of as
sectors, industries or even firms)
• Affected groups do not take policy as a given, but
seek to influence trade policy in their favor
The Role of Interest Groups:
The Demand Side of the Political
Market
• Interest group models: policy as an
exchange between politicians (the “supply
side” of the political market) and interest
groups (the “demand side”)
• What is the value of protection to those
seeking it? (see next slide for a simple
analysis of static effects)
1. Foreign importer pays tax…
2. …increasing cost of foreign steel…
3. …reducing quantity imported…
4. …and allowing domestic suppliers to meet an increased
share of total demand
Means of Interest Group
Influence: the Supply Side of the
Political Market
• Money: “rentseeking” models
– Legal: campaign contributions
– Illegal: bribery, corruption
• Votes
• Information (lobbying)
• Politicians compete by offering packages of
policies that maximize their chances of election by
maximizing their expected rents and votes…
• …subject to the constraint that policies have costs
– In the form of taxes
– In the form of other costs imposed directly
Who Should Support Free Trade?
• In our model, abundant factors
– Capital in capitalabundant economies, but also labor in
laborabundant ones (a counterintuitive result for anti
globalization arguments?)
• Consumers
– The collective action or free rider problem
• Costs are diffuse…
• But benefits (and losses) are concentrated.
– Corporate vs. individual consumers
– Importers: MNCs, wholesalers, retailers
• Exporters
– “Tariffs are a tax on exports”
Opponents of Free Trade
• In our model, scarce factors
– Capital in labor abundant economies
– Labor (and particularly unskilled labor) in capital
abundant economies
• [Increased imports could adversely affect
employment and wages in particular sectors, but
so does domestic demand and technological
change.]
– Cline (1997): 2025 percent of increase in skilled/unskilled wage
gap 19751995 due to combined effects of trade and immigration.
– Kletzer (2002): increasing trade accounts for small share of total
job displacement, but workers in importcompeting industries face
largest earnings loss if displaced (think cars and steel).
The Rising Skill Premium
One Puzzle: Specific Factors
• If trade politics pits abundant vs. scarce factors,
why do we sometimes find capitallabor alliances
in favor of protection, such as in the steel
industry?
• In our simple model, capital in a capitalabundant
country should favor free trade…
• …but “specific factors” (such as investment in a
steel mill) cannot be reallocated easily to new
activities
The Role of Interest Groups:
Summing Up
• Trade policy involves conflicts among interest
groups.
• Changes in trade policy reflect the shifting balance
of power among interest groupsand the parties
that represent themover time…
• […but sidepayments, compensation or insurance
can be used to affect trade policy outcomes;
“buying off” opposition)]
The Role of Institutions I
• Institutions influence how interests are
represented (PMP).
• The politics of trade in a presidential system
– The interests of the president
– The interests of legislators
• …and the biases in particular institutions
– The example of the US Senate
From SmootHawley to the
RTAA
• The origins of SmootHawley (1930)
– Depression in agriculture
– Congressional process produces high levels of
protection
• The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA,
1934)
– Delegation to the president...
– …to negotiate concessions abroad; the political logic of
trade negotiations and “concessions”
Dilemmas of Delegation
• How does the legislature control the behavior of
the president?
– Ex ante controls
– Ex post controls and ratification
– Inefficiencies in the ex post control mechanism: the
power to amend and the problem of (endless) re
negotiation
• Fast track (Mastel reading)
– Limiting amendment power…
– …but does this really decrease Congresional influence
over negotiations?
Delegation II: Administrative
Procedures
• Not all policy is the result of legislation directly;
legislators also design administrative and quasijudicial
processes
• Examples from trade:
– Assessing unfair trade practices (dumping and subsidies)
– The escape clause
– Trade Adjustment Assistance (1962)
• The politics of administrative process: “structure and
process”
• Delegation provides “protection” for Congress.
Some Hypotheses
• #1. If the simple factor model is right, we would
expect
– Parties more sympathetic to capital to be in favor of FT
– Parties more sympathetic to labor to oppose free trade
• #2. That US trade policy interests would reflect
changing comparative advantage
• #3. Presidents are more free trade than legislators,
ceteris paribus (ie., controlling for partisanship).
• #4. Delegation to the president increases the
likelihood of trade liberalization, ceteris paribus
Recent Trade Votes
TPA and CAFTA
• Initial TPA (2001), passed House 215214
– For: 194 Republicans, 21 Democrats
– Against: 191 Democrats 23 Republicans
– But Senate, 6630
• CAFTA (2005), passed 217215
– For: 202 Republicans, 15 Democrats
– Against: 187 Democrats, 27 Republicans and one
independent
– But Senate, 5545
Political Foundations of Postwar
Liberalization (c. 19451965)
• US emerges from World War II in strong
economic position
– Germany and Japan defeated, but Europe also
devastated by war
– Russia and China weakened
– Developing countries still specialized primarily
in primary commodities, not manufactures
• Bipartisan consensus for free trade
The System Under Stress
(c. 19651985): Economic Forces
• The rise of Japan and the NICs of East Asia
and Latin America
• Oil crises and stagflation of the 1970s
• [Exchange rate misalignments in 1980s]
• Increasing openness to trade
US Trade 19602000
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Exports of goods and services/GDP 5.20 5.20 5.82 8.56 10.09 7.26 9.69 11.16 10.84
Exports of goods/GDP na. na. 4.14 6.62 8.09 5.17 6.76 7.86 7.88
Exports of services/GDP na. na. 1.12 1.44 1.72 1.75 2.55 2.96 2.96
Imports of goods and services/GDP 4.38 4.42 5.44 7.58 10.60 9.99 10.93 12.30 14.66
Imports of goods/GDP na. na. 3.89 6.07 9.01 8.10 8.68 10.21 12.45
Imports of services/GDP na. na. 1.43 1.38 1.48 1.73 2.04 1.93 2.21
Trade/GDP 9.59 9.62 11.26 16.15 20.69 17.25 20.62 23.46 25.50
Trade in goods/goods GDP na. 23.50 na. na. na. na. na. na. na.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002, accessed on CD ROM
The System Under Stress
(c. 19651985): Political Forces
• Labor politics: from support to opposition
• Increasing partisanship on trade…
• …and the socalled “new protectionism”
(textiles and apparel; footwear; steel; autos)
The System Under Stress
(c. 19651985):Consequences
• Special deals
– Textiles and apparel: the MFA
– Footwear
– Steel
– Autos; bilateral with Japan
• Tightening administrative procedures to allow action
through:
– Antidumping measures
– Subsidies
– The escape clause
New Forces in Trade Politics I
(c. 19852005)
• The decline of the old protectionists
• The emergence of “export politics” and pressures
to open foreign markets
– An example: China, textiles and grain (1983)
– Japan and the newly industrializing countries of East
Asia and Latin America are seen as “free riders”
• Who would lead the effort to open foreign markets
in the US? And what would there agenda be?
New Forces in Trade Politics II
(c. 19852005)
• Trade in goodspressing liberalization on the
developing countries in particularbut also…
• Multinational corporations and investment
• “Trade” in services
– Telecommunications
– Financial services
• Intellectual property rights
– The Hollywoodsoftware complex
– The biotechpharma complex
New Forces in Trade Politics
(c. 19852005)
• Multiple institutions for pursuing trade policy interests
(Feinberg reading)
• Multilateral trade negotiations through the GATTWTO
• Regionalism:
– In the Western Hemisphere: the CUSFTA, the NAFTA,
the FTAA, the Andean Initiative and the CAFTA (see
Background Brief)
– In Asia, ASEAN Initiative
– Elsewhere: African Growth and Opportunity Act
(2004); SACU FTA; Middle East Free Trade Area
Initiative
• Bilateral agreements: Australia, Chile, Peru, Singapore;
under negotiation, Korea. (USAustralia, USSingapore)…
New Forces in Trade Politics
(c. 19852000): Labor and the
Environment
• The battle against the NAFTA
• Labor standards
• The tradeenvironment link
• The long stalemate: 19942002
The Bush Administration I
• President Bush pursues TPAwhy?
• Composition of Congress
– House, 221 Republicans, 213 Democrats
– Senate, 5050
• Issues in the House
– The administration and Democrats on labor and the
environment
– Gephardt “my way or the hiway approach to solving a
problem
– Sidepayments
• Issues in the Senate: compensation and trade
remedies
The Bush Administration II
• …and pursues “competitive liberalization”
through FTAs (Feinberg):
– Regional
– Bilateral
• …but then imposes steel quotas (2002)…
• …and signs very generous farm subsidy bill (May
2002) with an emphasis on eight program crops
(cotton, wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, barley, oats,
and sorghum) that is probably beginning of the
end for the WTO negotiations.
Top farm subsidy programs in the
United States, 1995-2002
1 Corn subsidies 1,365,459 $34,552,627,460
2 Wheat subsidies 1,144,887 $17,247,966,489
• Conservation Reserve Program/627,618 $13,018,173,430
4 Soybean subsidies 791,340 $10,967,530,537
5 Cotton subsidies 204,182 $10,663,566,847
6 Rice subsidies 54,403 $7,795,799,116
7 Sorghum subsidies 512,005 $3,193,985,171
8 Livestock subsidies 656,255 $2,256,567,708
9 Dairy Program subsidies/142,860 $2,018,407,457
10 Barley subsidies 301,554 $1,411,386,147
11 Peanut subsidies 67,063 $1,265,735,609
12 Environmental Quality Incentives Program
84,723 $542,457,791
13 Tobacco subsidies 342,143 $479,469,789
14 Sunflower subsidies40,688 $377,346,688
15 Sugar subsidies 8,036 $299,778,377
Summing Up: The Complexity of
Public Opinion
• “In general do you think free trade with other countries is good or bad
for the United States?”
• Good 64%; Bad 27%, Don’t know 9%
• “…Is globalization mostly good or mostly bad for the United States?
• Elite opinion 87% “mostly good”; public opinion, 54% “mostly good”
• “Do you believe increased trade mostly helps or hurts American
companies?”
• Helps 56%, Hurts 39%, No opinion 5%
• “Do you believe increased trade mostly helps or hurts American
workers?”
• Helps 35%, Hurts 59%, No opinion 5%