Religious Marijuana Breif

According to Hindu belief there is 1 God who takes 3 forms, one of those forms is Shiva
(or Siva), and each of those three forms has various other forms. Shiva is worshipped by
about 15% of the World's population, most of which Worship and pray by consuming
Marijuana via Smoking or Drinking it in a Milk Extraction. Primarily it is smoked in a
Chillum or Pipe and in the form of Buds or Hash, usually while wearing Rudraksha beads
which are considered Holy to Lord Shiva. Marijuana itself is believed to be both a gift to
the World from Lord Shiva after it gave him shade and believed to be a representation of
Shiva on Earth. Marijuana Milk extractions are also central to the Holiday called Holi, a
day in which all Hindus come together to drink Bhang in the form of a Milk Extraction and
celebrate the phenomenon of sight and color. These uses of Marijuana both by
Worshipers of Lord Shiva and General Hindus are Historic in nature and the modern
Religious use of Marijuana by Hindus in India, Nepal, America, etc is based on ceremonies
written in Sanskrit involving the Gods Soma (Sanskrit for Liquid) and Agni (Sanskrit for
Fire) and made for Lord Shiva by using the plant Sacred specifically to him.

The Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report (1894), comprising some seven volumes and 3,281 pages,
is by far the most complete and systematic study of marijuana undertaken to date.
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/Library/effects.htm
A British report authored by J. M. Campbell in 1893-94 suggested: To forbid or even seriously to
restrict the use of so holy and gracious a herb as the hemp would cause widespread suffering and
annoyance..."
US Research on Lord Shiva and Marijuana

In India, Cannabis Indica has been used for literally thousands of years in the worship of the god
Shiva. Cannabis is used in an orally administered form called bhang which can be either the wet
resinous leaves formed into pills of a drink made of milk, cannabis, and various spices consumed by
worshipers of Shiva on festival days or by smoking the flowering buds of cannabis-a practice generally
reserved for holy men who dedicate their lives to ascetic practice and the worship of Shiva. This
practice is codified in the Vedas as well as in legends about the origin of cannabis and its relationship
to Shiva.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22742944
Public Polls about Hinduism
http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-hindu/
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/
Free Exercise Clause
"Congress shall Establish... no laws prohibiting the Free Exercise of Religion"
Due Process Clause

"Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"

Equal Protection Clause

"Nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Sherbert V Verner
"If Goverment confronts an individual with a choice that pressures the individual to
forego a relgious practice, whether by imposing a penalty or witholding a benefit, then
the Government has burdened the individuals free exercise of Religion"
"The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental
regulation of religious beliefs as such, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S.
303. Government may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U. S. 488; nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups
because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities, Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U. S. 67; nor employ the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of particular
religious views, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105; Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S.
573; cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co.,"
Frazee V Illinois Employment Security Dept.
"The notion that one must be responding to the commands of a particular religious
organization to claim the protection of the Free Exercise clause is rejected"
RLUIPA
(7) Religious exercise
(A) In general
The term religious exercise includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled
by, or central to, a system of religious belief.
Presbytarian V Hull
"The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the
establishment of no sect. . . . All who unite themselves to such a body [the
general church] do so with an implied consent to [its] government, and are bound
to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent, and would lead to the total
subversion of such religious bodies, if anyone aggrieved by one of their
decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them
reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to
establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that
those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance,
subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for."
Wisconsin V Yoder

"Within that phrase would come all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or
upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. The test
might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption
comes within the statutory definition. This construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent to

classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord with the wellestablished congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded
in their religious tenets."
Coppedge V United States
"When society acts to deprive one of its members of his life, liberty or property, it takes its most
awesome steps. No general respect for, nor adherence to, the law as a whole can well be expected
without judicial recognition of the paramount need for prompt, eminently fair and sober criminal law
procedures. The methods we employ in the enforcement of our criminal law have aptly been called the
measures by which the quality of our civilization may be judged."
Brown V New Jersey

The state has full control over the procedure in its courts, both in civil and criminal cases, subject only
to the qualification that such procedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights or conflict with
specific and applicable provisions of the federal Constitution. Ex Parte Reggel; Iowa Central Railway
v. Iowa; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago.
Coffin V United States
The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law,
axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law. [156 U.S. 432, 454] It is stated as unquestioned in the textbooks, and has been referred to
as a matter of course in the decisions of this court and in the courts of the several states. See 1 Tayl.
Ev. c. 5, 126, 127; Wills, Circ. Ev. c. 5, 91; Best. Pres. pt. 2, c. 1, 63, 64; Id. c. 3, 31-58; Greenl. Ev. pt.
5, 29, etc.; 11 Cr. Law Mag. 3; Whart. Ev. 1244; 2 Phil. Ev. ( Cowen & Hill's Notes) p. 289; Lilienthal's
Tobacco v. U. S., 97 U.S. 237; Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 , 7 Sup. Ct. 614; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush.
320; State v. Bartlett, 43 N. H. 224; Alexander v. People, 96 Ill. 96; People v. Fairchild, 48 Mich. 31,
11 N. W. 773; People v. Millard, 53 Mich. 63, 18 N. W. 562; Com. v. Whittaker, 131 Mass. 224; Blake v.
State, 3 Tex. App. 581; Wharton v. State, 73 Ala. 366; State v. Tibbetts, 35 Me. 81; Moorer v. State, 44
Ala. 15.
Yick Wo V Hopkins

A municipal ordinance to regulate the carrying on of public laundries within the limits of the
municipality violates the provisions of the Constitution of the United States if it confers upon the
municipal authorities arbitrary power, at their own will, and without regard to discretion in the legal
sense of the term, to give or withhold consent as to persons or places, without regard to the
competency of the persons applying, or the propriety of the place selected, for the carrying on of the
business.
An administration of a municipal ordinance for the carrying on of a lawful business within the
corporate limits violates the provisions of the Constitution of the United States if it makes arbitrary and
unjust discriminations, founded on differences of race between persons otherwise in similar
circumstances.
The guarantees of protection contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution extend to all
persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, without regard to differences of race, of
color, or of nationality.

US Constitution Article III

Section 1.
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme
and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive
for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
Section 2.
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws
of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;--to all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction;--to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to controversies between
two or more states;--between a state and citizen of a different state;--between citizens of different
states;--between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between
a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall
be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned,
the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and
under such regulations as the Congress shall make.
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in
the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state,
the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.
United States V Hudson

"The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and
declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence."
Hilton V Guyot
"No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority
was derived"
Counsel Clause
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence."
Bounds V Smith
Although it is essentially true, as petitioners argue, that a habeas corpus petition or civil
rights complaint need only set forth facts giving rise to the cause of action, but see Fed
Rules Civ.Proc. 8(a)(1), (3), it hardly follows that a law library or other legal assistance is
not essential to frame such documents. It would verge on incompetence for a lawyer to
file an initial pleading without researching such issues as jurisdiction, venue, standing,
exhaustion of remedies, proper parties plaintiff and defendant, and types of relief
available. Most importantly, of course, a lawyer must know what the law is in order to
determine whether a colorable claim exists, and, if so, what facts are necessary to state
a cause of action.

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.

The decision today recognizes that a prison inmate has a constitutional right of access to the courts to
assert such procedural and substantive rights as may be available to him under state and federal law.
It does not purport to pass on the kinds of claims that the Constitution requires state or federal courts
to hear. In Wolff v. McDonnell
To give indigent inmates "a meaningful appeal" from their convictions. Douglas v. California
Wolff v. McDonnell, despite differences over other issues in the case, the Court unanimously reaffirmed
that Gilmore requires prison officials "to provide indigent inmates with access to a reasonably
adequate law library for preparation of legal actions."
It should be noted that, while adequate law libraries are one constitutionally acceptable method to
assure meaningful access to the courts, our decision here, as in Gilmore, does not foreclose alternative
means to achieve that goal. Nearly
In Strickland v. Washington, (1984) , we held that a criminal defendants Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is violated if his trial attorneys performance falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness and if there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been
different absent the deficient act or omission. Id., at 687688, 694. Anthony Ray Hinton, an inmate on
Alabamas death row, asks us to decide whether the Alabama courts correctly applied Strickland to his
case. We conclude that they did not and hold that Hintons trial attorney rendered constitutionally
deficient performance. We vacate the lower courts judgment and remand the case for reconsideration
of whether the attorneys deficient performance was prejudicial.
Essentially the same standards of access were applied in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483
(1969), which struck down a regulation prohibiting prisoners from assisting each other
with habeas corpus applications and other legal matters. Since inmates had no
alternative form of legal assistance available to them, we reasoned that this ban on
jailhouse lawyers effectively prevented prisoners who were "unable themselves, with
reasonable adequacy, to prepare their petitions," from challenging the legality of their
confinements.
Mark A Christeson V Don Roper

Requested substitute counsel who would not be laboring under a conflict of interest. The District
Court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit summarily affirmed. In so
doing, these courts contravened our decision in Martel v. Clair, 565 U. S. ___ (2012). Christesons
petition for certiorari is therefore granted, the judgment of the Eighth Circuit is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings.
Douglas V California
When an indigent is forced to run this gantlet of a preliminary showing of merit, the right to appeal
does not comport with fair procedure. In the federal courts, on the other hand, an indigent must be
afforded counsel on appeal whenever he challenges a certification that the appeal is not taken in good
faith. Johnson v. United States, 352 U. S. 565. The federal courts must honor his request for counsel

regardless of what they think the merits of the case may be; and "representation in the role of an
advocate is required." Ellis v. United States, 356 U. S. 674. In California, however, once the court has
"gone through" the record and denied counsel, the indigent has no recourse but to prosecute his appeal
on his own, as best he can, no matter how meritorious his case may turn out to be. The present case,
where counsel was denied petitioners on appeal, shows that the discrimination is not between "possibly
good and obviously bad cases," but between cases where the rich man can require the court to listen to
argument of counsel before deciding on the merits, but a poor man cannot. There is lacking that
equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys
the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments
on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is
without merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are
hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal.
Pollock V Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
"Whenever a distinction is made in the burdens a law imposes or in the benefits it confers
on any citizen by reason of their birth, or wealth, or religion, it is class legislation, and
leads inevitably to oppression and abuses, and to general unrest and disturbance in
society. It was hoped and believed that the great amendments to the Constitution which
followed the late civil war had rendered such legislation impossible for all time"

For the purposes of consolidating various drug laws into a comprehensive statute, providing
meaningful regulation over legitimate sources of drugs to prevent diversion into illegal channels, and
strengthening law enforcement tools against international and interstate drug trafficking, Congress
enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Title II of which is the
CSA. To effectuate the statutory goals, Congress devised a closed regulatory system making it unlawful
to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substance except as authorized by the
CSA. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 844(a). All controlled substances are classified into five schedules, 812,
based on their accepted medical uses, their potential for abuse, and their psychological and physical
effects on the body, 811, 812. Marijuana is classified as a Schedule I substance, 812(c), based on
its high potential for abuse, no accepted medical use, and no accepted safety for use in medically
supervised treatment, 812(b)(1). This classification renders the manufacture, distribution, or
possession of marijuana a criminal offense. 841(a)(1),
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) establishes the procedures federal administrative agencies use
for rule making, defined as the process of formulating, amending, or repealing a rule. 5 U. S. C.
551(5). The APA distinguishes between two types of rules: So-called legislative rules are issued
through notice-and-comment rulemaking, see 553(b), (c), and have the force and effect of law,
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 302303. Interpretive rules, by contrast, are issued . . . to
advise the public of the agencys construction of the statutes and rules which it administers, Shalala v.
Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U. S. 87, 99, do not require notice-andcomment rulemaking, and
do not have the force and effect of law, ibid.
Which, is a direct Violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution "Congress shall
not establish... laws prohibiting the Free Exercise of Religion", as well as USC Title 42
Chapter 21I "Laws Neutral towards Religion may burden Religious exercise as surely as
those intended to interfere with Religion" and Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code Title
5 Chapter 110 "Free exercise of religion means an act or refusal to act that is

substantially motivated by sincere religious belief" and Article 1 Section 6 of the Texas
State Constitution "Freedom of Worship, All men have a natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences."
Burwell V Hobby Lobby

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) prohibits the Government [from]
substantially burden[ing] a persons exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability unless the Government demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U. S. C. 2000bb1(a), (b). As
amended by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), RFRA covers
any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.
2000cc5(7)(A).
(i) Nothing in RFRA suggests a congressional intent to depart from the Dictionary Act definition of
person, which include[s] corporations, . . . as well as individuals. 1 U. S. C. 1. The Court has
entertained RFRA and free-exercise claims brought by nonprofit corporations. See, e.g., Gonzales v. O
Centro Esprita Beneficiente Unio do Vegetal, 546 U. S. 418. And HHSs concession that a nonprofit
corporation can be a person under RFRA effectively dispatches any argument that the term does not
reach for-profit corporations; no conceivable definition of person includes natural persons and
nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit corporations.
Why should decisions of this order be made by Congress or the regulatory authority, and not this
Court? Hobby Lobby and Conestoga surely do not stand alone as commercial enterprises seeking
exemptions from generally applicable laws on the basis of their religious beliefs. See, e.g., Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 256 F. Supp
Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) provides that
[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of an institutionalized
person unless the government demonstrates that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering
[a] compelling governmental interest. 42 U. S. C. 2000cc1(a).
"The Court found that the government was unable to detail the government's compelling interest in
barring religious usage of Hoasca when applying strict scrutiny as the RFRA demands of such
regulations."
"The Department of Justice has, for the most part, treated the factual and legal issues raised by the
plaintiffs in this case (UDV) in a similar fashion as it has regarding the Santo Daime Church," Haber
wrote.
Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code Title 5 Chapter 110 :

(a) This chapter applies to any ordinance, rule, order, decision, practice, or other exercise of
governmental authority.
(b) This chapter applies to an act of a government agency, in the exercise of governmental authority,
granting or refusing to grant a government benefit to an individual.
(c) This chapter applies to each law of this state unless the law is expressly made exempt from the
application of this chapter by reference to this chapter.
Peyote Way Church of God V Smith

There is ample precedent applying this analysis to the question before the court. We
begin with Leary v. United States,35 in which this court held that the federal drug control
laws relating to marijuana serve a compelling governmental purpose to avert a
"substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." In reaching this result, we
distinguished the decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Woody,36 holding
the use of peyote by members of the Native American Church constitutionally protected,
on the basis that peyote played a central role in the ceremony and practice of that
church. Leary had testified that he used marijuana only as a means for practicing his
religion, rather than as a formal requisite of his faith. Its use was only one of many means
to practice that religion, and deprivation of it would not have prevented him from
achieving or practicing his religious beliefs. Leary, unlike the Church here, sought
unrestricted freedom to possess and use the controlled substance in any manner that his
religious beliefs permitted.

In Hindu Religious Belief Marijuana (called Bhang in Flower form or Milk extractions and
Charas in Hash form) is connected to the God Shiva, in Hindu Religious Exercise Marijuana
is used by Sadhus on a regular basis as well as in the Temples to Shiva and on the Holiday
called Holi and at Shivarati festivals it is used in the form of Bhang by all Hindus. This is
not different from Christian Communion and is done in according with Rigvedic (The
Rigveda being the Oldest Sacred Hindu Text, written in Sanskrit) Soma rituals involving
Wool Seives and Sacred Plants, Cruz V Beto.
Cruz V Beto

"Because inmates of the Buddhist faith are being denied the right to participate in the religious
program made available for Protestant, Jewish and Roman Catholic faiths by the Defendants, Plaintiff
and the members of the class he represents are being subjected to an arbitrary and unreasonable
exclusion without any lawful justification which invidiously discriminates against them in violation of
their constitutional right of religious freedom and denies them equal protection of the laws."
"A statute burdens the free exercise of religion if it put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981), including when, if enforced, it results in
the choice to the individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing criminal
prosecution. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961). A
substantial burden must be more than an inconvenience. Worldwide Church, 227 F.3d at 1121.
Guam argues... a statute proscribing simple possession of marijuana might substantially burden
Guerrero's ability to practice Rastafarianism"
Further, a Sadhu is a Hindu Monk of Shiva who grows Marijuana and creates Hash
(Charas) and Bhang, Shiva is the most widely Worshipped God in India and in general
Hinduism which is currently being denied to American Hindu Ministers, Church of the Holy
Trinity V United States & Southern Pacific Co. V Jensen
"It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers. This has
been often asserted, and the reports are full of cases illustrating its application. This is
not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words

of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in
question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances
surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad
meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to
include the particular act"
Further, In order to properly pray to Shiva a person must wear Rudraksha beads and
consume Marijuana which is made criminal by the current Statutes, Leary V United States
"and thus those provisions created a 'real and appreciable' hazard of incrimination within
the meaning of Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes"
Hinduism is a Religion within the meaning of the first Amendment, with a Historic
tradition of Marijuana use, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye V City of Hialeah
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof . . . ." U. S. Const., Amdt. 1 (emphasis added). The city does not
argue that Santeria is not a "religion" within the meaning of the First Amendment. Nor
could it. Although the practice of animal sacrifice may seem abhorrent to some, "religious
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order
to merit First Amendment protection." Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment
Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). Given the historical association between animal
sacrifice and religious worship, see supra, at 2, petitioners' assertion that animal sacrifice
is an integral part of their religion "cannot be deemed bizarre or incredible." Frazee v.
Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829, 834, n. 2 (1989). Neither the city nor
the courts below, moreover, have questioned the sincerity of petitioners' professed desire
to conduct animal sacrifices for religious reasons. We must consider petitioners' First
Amendment claim.
Further, USC Title 42 Chapter 21C S 2000cc-5 states "Religious Exercise includes any
exercise of Religion, whether or not compelled by or central to a system of Religious
Belief"

S 2000cc-2
(a) Cause of action
A person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and
obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this
section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the Constitution.
and defines Government as:

(4) Government
The term government

(A) means
(i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of a State;
(ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); and
(iii) any other person acting under color of State law

42 U.S. Code 1983

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officers judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall
be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
a) When the Government obtains information by physically intruding on persons,
houses, papers, or effects, a search within the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment has undoubtedly occurred. United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. ___, ___, n. 3.
Pp. 34.
(b) At the Fourth Amendments very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Silverman v.
United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511. The area immediately surrounding and associated
with the homethe curtilageis part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment
purposes. Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 180. The officers entered the curtilage
here: The front porch is the classic exemplar of an area to which the activity of home life
extends. Id., at 182, n. 12. Pp. 45.
(c) The officers entry was not explicitly or implicitly invited. Officers need not shield
their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares, California v. Ciraolo, 476
U. S. 207, 213, but no man can set his foot upon his neighbours close without his
leave, Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K. B. 275, 291, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817. A police
officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home in hopes of speaking to its
occupants, because that is no more than any private citizen might do. Kentucky v.
King, 563 U. S. ___, ___. But the scope of a license is limited not only to a particular area
but also to a specific purpose, and there is no customary invitation to enter the curtilage
simply to conduct a search. Pp. 58.
(d) It is unnecessary to decide whether the officers violated Jardines expectation of
privacy under Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347. Pp. 810.

In effect, the Plaintiff complains that legal Religious Sacrements are unlawfully seized by the State of
Texas, and its Agencies, and Challenges the Statute under Rule 5.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure

(2) serve the notice and paper on the Attorney General of the United States if a federal statute is
questionedor on the state attorney general if a state statute is questionedeither by certified or
registered mail or by sending it to an electronic address designated by the attorney general for this
purpose.
Federal courts may grant habeas corpus relief if the underlying state-court decision was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by this
Court. 28 U. S. C. 2254(d)(1). Here, the Sixth Circuit held that respondent Cory Donalds attorney
provided per se ineffective assistance of counsel under United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648 (1984),
when he was briefly absent during testimony concerning other defendants. Because no decision from
this Court clearly establishes that Donald is entitled to relief under Cronic, we reverse.
When a state prisoner seeks federal habeas relief on the ground that a state court, in adjudicating a
claim on the merits, misapplied federal law, a federal court may grant relief only if the state courts
decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U. S. C. 2254(d)(1).
Respondent Otis Lee Rodgers, challenging his state con-viction, sought a writ of habeas corpus from
the United States District Court for the Central District of California. He claimed the state courts
violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by declining to ap-point an
attorney to assist in filing a motion for a newtrial notwithstanding his three prior waivers of the right
to counseled representation. The District Court denied respondents petition, and he appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which granted habeas relief. 678 F. 3d 1149, 1163 (2012).
Because the Courtof Appeals erred in concluding that respondents claim is supported by clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, 28 U. S. C.
2254(d)(1), its judgment must be reversed.
Dart and Cherokee sought to remove the case to federal court, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
1332(d), commonly known as the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).
A plaintiff must make four showings in order to obtain a preliminary injunction in this Circuit as set
down in Canal Authority of the State of Florida v. Calloway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974). Those four
showings are:
1. a substantial likelihood the plaintiff will prevail on the merits,
2. a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted,
3. that the threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to
defendant, and
4. that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.

Serbian Orthodox Diocese V Milivojevich

"Per the Establishment Clause, decisions imposed by hierarchical religious organizations are binding
in civil court"

Watson V Jones
1) Courts can not rule on the truth or falsity of a religious teaching
2) Where a previous authority structure existed before the dispute, courts should defer to
the decision of that structure, and
3) In the absence of such an interal authority structure, courts should defer to the wishes
of a majority of the congregation

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was discharged by her South
Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her
faith. 1 When she was unable to obtain other employment because from conscientious
scruples she would not take Saturday work, 2 she filed a claim for [374 U.S. 398, 400]
unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation Act. 3 That law provides that, to be eligible for benefits, a claimant must
be "able to work and . . . available for work"; and, further, [374 U.S. 398, 401] that a
claimant is ineligible for benefits "[i]f. . . he has failed, without good cause . . . to accept
available suitable work when offered him by the employment office or the
employer . . . ." The appellee Employment Security Commission, in administrative
proceedings under the statute, found that appellant's restriction upon her availability for
Saturday work brought her within the provision disqualifying for benefits insured workers
who fail, without good cause, to accept "suitable work when offered. . . by the
employment office or the employer . . ." The Commission's finding was sustained by the
Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County. That court's judgment was in turn
affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, which rejected appellant's contention
that, as applied to her, the disqualifying provisions of the South Carolina statute abridged
her right to the free exercise of her religion secured under the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment. The State Supreme Court held
specifically that appellant's ineligibility infringed no constitutional liberties because such
a construction of the statute "places no restriction upon the appellant's freedom of
religion nor does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her right and freedom to
observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the dictates of her conscience." 240 S. C.
286, 303-304, 125 S. E. 2d 737, 746. 4 We noted probable [374 U.S. 398, 402]
jurisdiction of appellant's appeal. 371 U.S. 938 . We reverse the judgment of the South
Carolina Supreme Court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

The Fifth Circuit declined in Leary to follow the ruling of these two cases. But that declination was not
all encompassing. A distinction was made between Leary's use of marihuana as "... an aid to attain
conscious expansion by which an individual can more easily meditate or commune with his god"
(Leary, p. 860) and the Native American Church's "`ceremony marked by the sacramental use of
peyote, composes the cornerstone of the peyote religion.'"
The Worship of Shiva and to be a Sadhu requires the use of Marijuana or Hash called Bhang or Charas
which represents Shiva on Earth, similarly to the Christian Worship of Wine in the form of their Lord's
Blood and the Native American Church's Worship of Peyote.
Church of the Holy Trinity V United States

"All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their
application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always therefore
be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this
character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter. The common sense of man
approves the judgment mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which enacted 'that whoever
drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity' did not extend to the surgeon
who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit. The same common sense accepts
the ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edw. II which enacts that a prisoner who breaks
prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire,
'for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.' And we think that a like common
sense will sanction the ruling we make, that the act of Congress which punishes the obstruction or
retarding of the passage of the mail, or of its carrier, does not apply to a case of temporary detention of
the mail caused by the arrest of the carrier upon an indictment for murder."
In the charter of privileges granted by William Penn to the province of Pennsylvania, in 1701, it is
recited:
"Because no People can be truly happy, though under the greatest Enjoyment of Civil Liberties, if
abridged of the Freedom of their Consciences, as to their Religious Profession and Worship; And
Almighty God being the only Lord of Conscience, Father of Lights and Spirits, and the Author as well
as Object of all divine Knowledge, Faith, and Worship, who only doth enlighten the Minds, and
persuade and convince the Understandings of People, I do hereby grant and declare,"
Coming nearer to the present time, the declaration of independence recognizes the presence of the
Divine in human affairs in these words:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that thet are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness. . . . We therefore the Representatives of the united states of America, in General Congress,
Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the
Name and by Authority of the good these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare,"
"And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence,
we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."
It may be only in the familiar requisition that all officers shall take an oath closing with the
declaration, "so help me God."
There is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a universal language pervading them all, having
one meaning. They affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation. These are not individual sayings,
declarations of private persons. They are organic utterances. They speak the voice of the entire people.
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute
because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers. This has been often asserted, and the
reports are full of cases illustrating its application. This is not the substitution of the will of the judge
for that of the legislator, for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad
enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the
circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad
meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the
particular act. As said in Plowden 205:

"From which cases it appears that the sages of the law heretofore have construed statutes quite
contrary to the letter in some appearance, and those statutes which comprehend all things in the letter
they have expounded to extend to but some things, and those which generally prohibit all people from
doing such an act they have interpreted to permit some people to do it, and those which include every
person in the letter they have adjudged to reach to some persons only, which expositions have always
been founded upon the intent of the legislature, which they have collected sometimes by considering the
cause and necessity of making the act, sometimes by comparing one part of the act with another, and
sometimes by foreign circumstances."
Chief Justice Marshall said:
"On the influence which the title ought to have in construing the enacting clauses much has been said,
and yet it is not easy to discern the point of difference between the opposing counsel in this respect.
Neither party contends that the title of an act can control plain words in the body of the statute, and
neither denies that, taken with other parts, it may assist in removing ambiguities. Where the intent is
plain, nothing is left to construction. Where the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it
seizes everything from which aid can be derived, and in such case the title claims a degree of notice,
and will have its due share of consideration."
MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The single question presented by this record is whether, in a civil action for an injury to the person, the
court, on application of the defendant and in advance of the trial may order the plaintiff without his or
her consent, to submit to a surgical examination as to the extent of the injury sued for. We concur with
the circuit court in holding that it had no legal right or power to make and enforce such an order. No
right is held more sacred or is more carefully guarded by the common law than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley: "The right to
one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity; to be let alone." Cooley on Torts 29.

42 U.S. Code 1988 - Proceedings in vindication of civil rights

(a) Applicability of statutory and common law
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of titles
13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil
rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the
United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they
are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies
and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far
as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to
and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in
the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
(b) Attorneys fees
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and
1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.], the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.
2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorneys fee as part of the costs, except that in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officers judicial capacity such
officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including attorneys fees, unless such action was clearly in
excess of such officers jurisdiction.
(c) Expert fees
In awarding an attorneys fee under subsection (b) of this section in any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of section 1981 or 1981a of this title, the court, in its discretion, may include expert
fees as part of the attorneys fee.