Compendium Appellant :

 THE CONSTITUTION OF ALBERIA, 1950, ART. 25.

Article 25 in The Constitution Of Alberia:
25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all
persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise
and propagate religion
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State
from making any law
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which
may be associated with religious practice;
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious
institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus Explanation I The
wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh
religion Explanation II In sub clause (b) of clause reference to Hindus shall be construed as
including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the
reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly

 THE CONSTITUTION OF ALBERIA, 1950, ART. 26.

26. Freedom to manage religious affairs Subject to public order, morality and health,
every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right

(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;

(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;

(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and

(d) to administer such property in accordance with law

 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES, December 13, 1946 speech by Dr.

Ambedkar
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who mentioned this phrase in the Constituent Assembly Debates stating that :
“The religious conceptions in this country are so vast that they cover every aspect of life,
from birth to death. There is nothing which is not religion and if personal law is to be saved, I
am sure about it that in social matters we will come to a standstill. I do not think it is possible
to accept a position of that sort. There is nothing extraordinary in saying that we ought to
strive hereafter to limit the definition of religion in such a manner that we shall not extend
beyond beliefs and such rituals as may be connected with ceremonials which are essentially
religious. It is not necessary that the sort of laws, for instance, laws relating to tenancy or
laws relating to succession should be governed by religion”.

 COMMISSIONER OF POLICE & OTHERS V. ACHARYA

JAGADISHWARANANDA AVADHUTA & ANOTHER, (2004) 12 SCC 770.

Supreme Court of India

The Commissioner Of Police & Ors vs Acharya Jagdishwarananda ... on 11 March,
2004
Author: . A Lakshmanan
Bench: Dr. Ar. Lakshmanan
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 6230 of 1990

PETITIONER:
The Commissioner of Police & Ors.

RESPONDENT:
Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avadhuta & Anr.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/03/2004

BENCH:
Dr. AR. Lakshmanan

In the case of Ratilal Pannachand Gandhi vs. State of Bombay (supra), this Court emphasized
that "No outside authority has any right to say that these are not essential parts of religion and
it is not open to a secular authority of the State to restrict and prohibit them in any manner
they like under the guise of administering the trust estate." This Court quoted with
approval Jamshedji vs. Soonabai (supra) where the Bombay High Court held, "if this is the
belief of the community......a secular judge is bound to accept that belief - it is not for him to
sit in judgment on that belief, he has no right to interfere with the conscience of a donor who
makes a gift in favour of what he believes to be the advancement of his religion and the
welfare of his community or mankind."
As late as 2002, this Court has reiterated this in N. Adithayan vs. Tranvancore Devaswom
Board [(2002) 8 SCC 106 at 123]. This Court observed that "as to what really constitutes an
essential part of religion or religious practice has to be decided by the Courts with reference
to the doctrine of a particular religion or practices regarded as parts of religion."

The obiter of Gajendragadkar, J. in Durga Committee, Ajmer vs. Syed Hussain Ali (supra) to
the effect that the Court may have carefully scrutinized the practices to find out whether they
constitute an essential or integral part of religion is not in line with the above decisions
including that of seven Judges Bench in the case of Shirur Mutt (supra).

Seervai in Constitutional Law of India (4th Edition), Volume-II at page 1268 has criticized
this as obiter as inconsistent with earlier decisions of this Court cited above. Subject to
consideration of public order, health and morality, it is not open for anybody to question the
tenets and practices of religion, however, irrational they may appear to an outsider.

It is brought to our notice that the following observation in Acharya Jagdishwaranand

Avadhuta etc.'s case (supra) is not correct in law :- "Mr. Tarkunde has claimed protection
of Article 25 of the Constitution but in view of our finding that Anandamarga is not a
separate religion, application of Article 25 is not attracted".

As rightly stated by this Court in Bijoe Emmanuel's case (1986 (6) SCC 615 at 631. This
sentence appears to have crept into the judgment by some slip.

Hence, to preserve public peace and to avoid damages to public properties and keeping this in
mind the Anand Margis are permitted to go on procession and perform Tandva dance with
skull, Trishul, knife, damroo, sword subject to the following terms and conditions:-

1. The Commissioner of police may prescribe the route;

2. REGULATION:

(i) The participants to the procession shall not carry wooden bars, weapons, metal rods,
weapons capable of inducing violence.

(ii) Loud speakers shall not be used.

(iii) Traffic regulations should be observed.

(iv) Traffic should not be obstructed.

(v) Normal activities of common man should not be disturbed.

(vi) Objectionable slogans and illegal slogans or provocative slogans affecting others'
sentiments shall not be expressed or voiced.

(vii) Processionists shall proceed in five persons row and shall keep one side of the road by
keeping other side for transport.

(viii) Crackers are prohibited

(ix) They should not spray colour powders The instructions of police officers and other
regulations as above should be followed."

For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that the appeal filed by the appellats has no
merits and is, therefore, dismissed.

In my opinion, it is a fit case for awarding of exemplary costs to the respondents. Since the
respondents were prevented from practising their religion and perform the religious Tandava
dance, they were compelled to come before this Court. In this appeal, since the appellant is a
Government, by taking a lenient view, I order no costs.

 COMMISSIONER HINDU RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENT MADRAS V. SRI

LAKSHMINDRA OF SHRI SHIRUR MUTT AIR 1954 SC 282.

Supreme Court of India

The Commissioner, Hindu ... vs Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar ... on 16
April, 1954
Equivalent citations: 1954 AIR 282, 1954 SCR 1005
Author: B Mukherjea
Bench: Mahajan, Mehar Chand (Cj), Mukherjea, B.K., Das, Sudhi Ranjan,
Bose, Vivian, Hasan, Ghulam & Bhagwati, N.H. & Aiyyar, T.L.
Venkatarama
PETITIONER:
THE COMMISSIONER, HINDU RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS, MADRAS

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
SRI LAKSHMINDRA THIRTHA SWAMIAR OF SRI SHIRUR MUTT.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:
16/04/1954

BENCH:
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
BENCH:
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
HASAN, GHULAM
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA
MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ)
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
BOSE, VIVIAN

The contention formulated in such broad terms cannot, we think, be supported. In the first
place, what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with
reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the
Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the
day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the
year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or ablations to the sacred fire, all
these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that they involve expenditure
of money or employment of priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities would
not make them secular activities partaking of a commercial or economic character; all of
them are religious. practices and should be regarded as matters of religion within the meaning
of article 26(b). What article 25(2)(a) contemplates is not regulation by the State of religious
practices as such, the freedom of which is guaranteed by the Constitution except when they
run counter to public order, health and morality, but regulation of activities which are
economic, commercial or political in their character though they are associated with religious
practices. We may refer in this connection to a few American and Australian cases, all of
which arose out of the activities of persons connected with the religious association known as
"Jehova's Witnesses." This association of persons loosely organised throughout Australia,
U.S.A. and other countries regard the literal interpretation of the Bible as fundamental to
proper religious beliefs. This belief in the supreme Authority of the Bible colours many of
their political ideas. They refuse to take oath of allegiance to the king or other
Constituted human authority and even to show respect to the national flag, and they decry all
wars between nations and all kinds of war activities. In 1941 a company of " Jehova's
Witnesses " incorporated in Australia commenced proclaiming and teaching matters which
were prejudicial to war activities and the defence of the Commonwealth and steps were taken
against them under the National Security Regulations of the State. The legality of the action
of the Government was questioned by means of a writ petition before the High Court and the
High Court held that the action of the Government was justified and that section 116, which
guaranteed freedom of religion under the Australian Constitution, was not in any way
infringed by the National Security Regulations(1). These were undoubtedly political activities
though arising out of religious belief entertained by a particular community. In such cases, as
Chief Justice Latham pointed out, the provision for protection of religion was not an absolute
protection to be interpreted and applied independently of other provisions of the Constitution.
These privileges must be reconciled with the right of the State to employ the sovereign power
to ensure peace, security and orderly living without which constitutional guarantee of civil
liberty would be a mockery.
In view of our decision on this point, the other ground hardly requires consideration. We will
indicate, however, very briefly our opinion on the second point raised. The first contention,
which has been raised by Mr. Nambiar in reference to article 27 of the Constitution is that the
word "taxes", as used therein, is not confined to taxes proper but is inclusive of all other
impositions like cesses, fees, etc. We do not think it necessary to decide this point in the
present case, for in our opinion on the facts of the present case, the imposition, although it is
a tax, does not come within the purview of the latter part of the article at all. What is
forbidden by the article is the specific appropriation of the proceeds of any tax in payment of
expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious
denomination. The reason underlying this provision is obvious. Ours being a secular State
and there being freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution, both to individuals and to
groups, it is against the policy of the ,Constitution to pay out of public funds any money for
the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. But the
object of the contribution under section 76 of the Madras Act is not the fostering or
preservation of the Hindu religion or any denomination within it. The purpose is to see that
religious trusts and institutions,, wherever they exist, are properly administered. It is a secular
administration of the religious legislature seeks to control and the in the Act, is to ensure that
the institutions that the object, as enunciated endowments attached to the religious institutions
are properly administered and their income is duly appropriated for the purposes for which
they were founded or exist. There is no qustion of favouring any particular religion or
religious denomination in such cases . In our opinion, article 27 of the Constitution is not
attracted to the facts of the present case.The result, therefore, is that in our opinion sections
21, 30(2), 31,55,56 and 63 to 69 are the only sections which should be declared invalid as
conflicting with the fundamental rights of the respondent as Mathadhipati of the Math in
question and section 76(1) is void as beyond the legislative competence of the Madras State
Legislature. The rest of the Act is to be regarded as valid. The decision of the High Court will
be modified to this extent, but as the judgment of the High Court is affirmed on its merits, the
appeal will stand dismissed with costs to the respondent. Appeal dismissed.

 SESHAMMAL V. STATE OF TAMILNADU (1972) 2 SCC 11.

Supreme Court of India

Seshammal & Ors, Etc. Etc vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 14 March, 1972

Bench: S.M. Sikri, Cj, A.N. Grover, A.N. Ray, D.G. Palekar, M.H. Beg

PETITIONER:
SESHAMMAL & ORS, ETC. ETC

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
STATE OF TAMIL NADU

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/03/1972

BENCH:

ACT:
The Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act
(Tamil Nadu 12 of 1959) as amended by Amending Act of 1970, ss.
28 55, 56 and 116--Hereditary right of succession to office of
Archaka abolished--If violative of Arts. 25 and 26 of
Constitution.

Mr.Palkhivala on behalf of the petitioners insisted that the appointment of a person to a

religious office in accordance with the hereditary principle is itself a, religious usage and
amounted to a vital religious practice, and, hence falls within Articles 2 5 . and 26. In his
submission, priests, who are to perform religious ceremonies may be chosen by a temple on
such basis as the temple chooses to adopt. It may be election, selection, competition.
nomination or hereditary succession. He, therefore, contended that any law which interferes
with the aforesaid basis of appointment would violate religious freedom guaranteed by
Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. . In his submission the right to select a priest has an
immediate, bearing on religious practice and the eight of a denomination to manage its own
affairs in matters of religion. The priest is more important than the ritual and nothing could be
more vital than chosing the priest. Under the pretext of social reform. he contended, the State
cannot reform a religion out of existence and if any denomination has accepted the hereditary
principle.for chosing its priest that would be a religious practice vital to the religious faith and
cannot be changed on the ground ,that it leads to social reform. Mere substitution of one
method of appointment of the, priest by another was, in his submission no social reform.

It was, however. submitted before us that the State had taken power under section
116(2) clause (xxiii) to prescribe qualifica- tions to be possessed by the Archakas and, in
view of the avowed object of the State Government to create a class of Archakas irrespective
of caste, creed or race, it would be open to the Government to prescribe qualifications for the
office of an Archaka which were in conflict with Agamas. Under Rule 12 of the Madras
Hindu Religious Institutions (Officers and Servants) Service Rules, 1964 proper provision
has been made for qualifications of the Archakas and the petitioners have no objection to that
rule. The rule still continues to be in force. But the petitioners. apprehend that it is open to the
Government to substitute any other rule for rule 12 and prescribe qualifications which were in
conflict with Agamic injunction. For example at present the Ulthurai servant whose duty it, is
to, perform, pujas and recite vedic mantras etc. has to obtain the fitness certificate for his
Office from the head of, institutions which-impart instructions in Agamas and ritualistic
mattors. The; Government,, however, it is submitted, may hereafter change its mind, and
prescribe qualifications which take no note "of Agamas and Agamic rituals and direct that the
Archaka candidate? should produce a fitness certificate from an institution which, does not
specialize in teaching Agamas and rituals. It is submitted, that the Act does, not provide
guidelines to the Government in; the matter of prescribing qualifications. with regard to the
fitness of an Archaka for performing the rituals and ceremonies in these temples and it will be
open to the Government to prescribe a simple standardized curriculum for pujas in the several
temples ignoring the tradition pujas and rituals followed in those temples. . In our opinion
the, apprehensions-;of the petitioners are unfounded;, Rule 12 referred to above still holds-
the field and there is no good reason to think that the State Government wants to revolutinise
temple worship by introducing methods of worship not current in the several temples. The
rule making power con- ferred on the . Government by section 116, is only intended with a
view to carry out the purposes of the Act which are essentially secular.. The Act no where
gives the indication that one of the purposes of the Art is to effect change in the rituals and
cere- monies: followed in the terms. On the other hand, section 107 of the Principal Act
emphasizes that nothing contained in the Act would be deemed to confer any power or
impose any duty in con- travention of 4th rights conferred on any religious denomination or
any section there of by Article 26 of the Constitution. Simi- larly section 105 provides that
nothing contained in the Act shall (a) save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act or the ,
rules made thereunder, affect any honour emolument or perquisite to which any person is
entitled by custom or otherwise in any religious institution, or its established usage in regard
to any other matter. Moreover, if any rule is framed by the Government which purports to
interfere with the rituals and ceremonies of the temples the same will be liable to be
challenged by those who are interested in the temple worship. In out opinion, therefore, the
apprehensions now expressed by the petitioners are groundless and premature.

In the result these Petitions fail but in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as
to costs.

V.I.P.S.

Petitions dismissel.

 BIJOE EMMANUEL V. STATE OF KERALA (1986) 3 SCC 615.

Supreme Court of India

Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors vs State Of Kerala & Ors on 11 August, 1986

Equivalent citations: 1987 AIR 748, 1986 SCR (3) 518

Author: O C Reddy
Bench: Reddy, O. Chinnappa (J)
 PETITIONER:
BIJOE EMMANUEL & ORS.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
STATE OF KERALA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/08/1986

BENCH:
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
BENCH:
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
DUTT, M.M. (J)

3. The Kerala Education Act contains no provision of relevance and the appellants in the
present case have never been found guilty of misconduct such as that described in Chapter
IX, Rule 6 of the Kerala Education Rules. On the other hand, the report of the Commission, is
to the effect that the children have always been well-behaved, law-abidingand respectful.
4. The question is not whether a particular religiousbelief or practice appeals to our
reason or sentiment but whether the belief is genuinely and conscientiously held as part of
the profession or practice of religion. Personal views and reactions are irrelevant.
If the belief isgenuinely and conscientiously held it attracts the protection of Art. 25 but
subject, of course, to the inhibitions contained therein.
In the instant case, what the petitioners truly and conscientiously believe is not in doubt.
They do not hold their beliefs idly and their conduct is not the outcome of any perversity.
The petitioners have not asserted those beliefs for the first time or out of any unpatriotic
sentiment Jehovah's Witnesses, as they call themselves, appear to have always expressed
and stood up for such beliefs all the world over.

We, therefore, find that the Fundamental Rights of the appellants under Art. 19(1)
(a) and 25(1) have been infringed and they are entitled to be protected. We allow the appeal,
set aside the judgment of the High Court and direct the respondent authorities to re-admit the
children into the school, to permit them to pursue their studies without hindrance and to
facilitate the pursuit of their studies by giving them the necessary facilities. We only wish to
add: our tradition teaches tolerance; our philosophy preaches tolerance; our constitution
practices tolerance; let us not dilute it.

The appellants are entitled to their costs.

M.L.A. Appeal allowed.

 STATE OF BOMBAY V. NARASU APPA MALI AIR 1952 BOM 84.

Bombay High Court

The State Of Bombay vs Narasu Appa Mali on 24 July, 1951

Equivalent citations: AIR 1952 Bom 84, (1951) 53 BOMLR 779, ILR 1951 Bom 775

Author: Chagla
Bench: Chagla, Gajendragadkar

JUDGMENT Chagla, C.J.

" 'Laws is force' includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority
in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution sad cot previously
repealed, not withstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then is operation
either at all or in particular areas."

There can be no doubt that the personal laws are in force in a general sense; they are in fact
administered by the Courts in India in matters falling within their purview. But the expression
' laws in force" is, in my opinion, used in Article 13(1) not in that general sense. This
expression refers to what may compendiously be described as statutory laws. There is no
doubt that laws which are included in this expression must have been passed or made by a
Legislature or other competent authority, and unless this test is satisfied it would not be
legitimate to include in this expression the personal laws merely on the ground that they are
administered by Courts in India. Article 372 which provides for the continuance in force of
existing laws and their adaptation uses the expression "all the law in force" and defines it in
terms substantially similar to those of Article 13(3)(b). It seems to me that the provision for
the adaptation of the laws in force could not have been intended to apply to the personal laws
in this country. the President's power to make adaptations and modifications was clearly
intended to apply to the statutory law and it is the statutory law which is intended to be
included in the expression "laws in force' in Article 13(1).

31. In the result I agree with the learned Chief Justice in holding that the impugned Act is
valid and must be enforced.

32. Per Curiam : In appeal No. 231 there is a finding that accused No. 1 married a second
wife with the consent and approval of his first wife. In those circumstance we do not think
that a sentence of imprisonment is justified. Therefore, we will alter that sentence to one
merely of fine and impose a fine of Rs. 100 in default simple imprisonment for one month.
With regard to accused Nos. 5, 6 and 7, we do not think a sentence of imprisonment should
be imposed. We, therefore, alter the sentence to one of fine and impose a fine of Rs. 50 on
accused No. 5 and a fine of Rs. 20 each on accused Nos. 6 and 7, in default one week's
simple imprisonment.

33. In revision application No. 193 we will alter the sentence by sentencing accused No. 1 for
a period of imprisonment already undergone by her, and we will alter the sentence of fine to
Rs. 25.

34. In appeal No. 173 accused No. 1 is sentenced to one month's simple imprisonment and
accused No. 2 to pay a fine of Rs. 35.

35. Order accordingly.

 AHMEDABAD WOMEN’S ACTION GROUP V. UNION OF INDIA (1997) 3

SCC 573.

Supreme Court of India

Ahmedabad Women Action Group ... vs Union Of India on 24 February, 1997
Author: Venkataswami.
Bench: Sujata V. Manohar, K. Venkataswami

PETITIONER:
AHMEDABAD WOMEN ACTION GROUP (AWAG) & ORS.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/02/1997

BENCH:
CJI, SUJATA V. MANOHAR, K. VENKATASWAMIW I T HWRIT PETITION (CIVIL)
NO. 196 OF 1996LOK SEVAK SANGH & ORS.V.UNION OF INDIAW I T HWRIT
PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 721 OF 1996YOUNG WOMAN CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION
(YWCA) & ORS.V.UNION OF INDIA

Gajendragadkar j. also expressed his opinion on the question whether Part III of the
Constitution applies to personal laws. The learned Judge observed as follows :-

"The Constitution of India itself recognises the existence of these personal laws in terms
when it deals with the topic falling under personal law in item 5 in the Concurrent List-List
III. This item deals with the topics of marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption;
wills, intestacy and succession; joint family and partition; all matters in respect of which
parties in judicial proceedings were immediately before the commencement of this
Constitution subject to their personal law. Thus it is competent either to the State or the
Union Legislature to legislate on topics falling within the purview of the personal law is not
used in Art. 13, because, in my opinion, the framers of the Constitution wanted to leave the
personal laws outside the ambit of Part III of the Constitution. They must have been aware
that these personal laws needed to be reformed in many material particulars and in fact they
wanted to abolish these different personal laws and to evolve one common code. Yet they did
not wish that the provisions of the personal laws should be challenged by reason of the
fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the constitution and so they did not intend to
include these personal laws within the definition of the expression laws in force. Therefore, I
agree with the learned Chief Justice in holding that the personal laws do not fall
within Article 13(i) at all."

We, therefore, find that there is no substance in the challenge by the petitioner-husband to the
vires of the provisions of Section 10 as being discriminatory against the husband and,
therefore. violative of Article 14 of the Constitution."

So far as the challenge to the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is
concerned, we understand that the said issue is pending before the Constitution Bench. we,
therefore, do not see any reason to multiply proceedings in that behalf.

In the result and having regard to the earlier decisions of this Court noticed above, we decline
to entertain these writ petitions. Accordingly, these writ petitions are dismissed.

 SHAYARA BANO V. UNION OF INDIA (2017) 9 SCC 1.

Supreme Court of India

Shayara Bano vs Union Of India And Ors. Ministry Of ... on 22 August, 2017

Author: . ..………………..…..………
Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Original Civil Jurisdiction

Writ Petition (C) No. 118 of 2016

Shayara Bano … Petitioner

versus
Union of India and others … Respondents
with
 Suo Motu Writ (C) No. 2 of 2015

In Re: Muslim Women’s Quest For Equality

versus
Jamiat Ulma-I-Hind

Writ Petition(C) No. 288 of 2016

Aafreen Rehman … Petitioner

versus
Union of India and others … Respondents

Writ Petition(C) No. 327 of 2016

Gulshan Parveen … Petitioner

versus
Union of India and others … Respondents

Writ Petition(C) No. 665 of 2016

Ishrat Jahan … Petitioner

versus
Union of India and others … Respondents

Writ Petition(C) No. 43 of 2017

Atiya Sabri
Signature Not Verified
… Petitioner
Digitally signed by
SARITA PUROHIT
versus
Date: 2017.08.23
13:12:55 IST
Reason:
Union of India and others … Respondents

J U DG M E N T
Jagdish Singh Khehar, CJI.

Applying the aforesaid tests, it is clear that Triple Talaq is only a form of Talaq which is
permissible in law, but at the same time, stated to be sinful by the very Hanafi school which
tolerates it. According to Javed (supra), therefore, this would not form part of any essential
religious practice. Applying the test stated in Acharya Jagdishwarananda (supra), it is equally
clear that the fundamental nature of the Islamic religion, as seen through an Indian Sunni
Muslim’s eyes, will not change without this practice. Indeed, Islam divides all human action
into five kinds, as has been stated by Hidayatullah, J. in his introduction to Mulla (supra).
There it is stated:

“E. Degrees of obedience: Islam divides all actions into five kinds which figure differently in
the sight of God and in respect of which His Commands are different. This plays an
important part in the lives of Muslims.

57. Given the fact that Triple Talaq is instant and irrevocable, it is obvious that any attempt at
reconciliation between the husband and wife by two arbiters from their families, which is
essential to save the marital tie, cannot ever take place. Also, as understood by the Privy
Council in Rashid Ahmad (supra), such Triple Talaq is valid even if it is not for any
reasonable cause, which view of the law no longer holds good after Shamim Ara (supra).
This being the case, it is clear that this form of Talaq is manifestly arbitrary in the sense that
the marital tie can be broken capriciously and whimsically by a Muslim man without any
attempt at reconciliation so as to save it. This form of Talaq must, therefore, be held to be
violative of the fundamental right contained under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In
our opinion, therefore, the 1937 Act, insofar as it seeks to recognize and enforce Triple Talaq,
is within the meaning of the expression “laws in force” in Article 13(1) and must be struck
down as being void to the extent that it recognizes and enforces Triple Talaq. Since we have
declared Section 2 of the 1937 Act to be void to the extent indicated 
above on the narrower ground of it being manifestly arbitrary, we do not find the need to go into
the ground of discrimination in these cases, as was argued by the learned Attorney General and
those supporting him.

…………………………………J.

(Rohinton Fali Nariman) …………………………………J.

(Uday Umesh Lalit) New Delhi;

August 22, 2017.

 SAHARA INDIA REAL ESTATE CORPN. LTD. V. SEBI (2012) 10 SCC

603.

Supreme Court of India

Sahara India Real Estate ... vs Securities & Exch.Board Of India & ... on 11 September,
2012

Author: …..……………………….......
Bench: D.K. Jain, Surinder Singh Nijjar, Ranjana Prakash Desai, Jagdish Singh
Khehar

24. The New Zealand Approach: It recognizes the Open Justice principle. However, the
courts have taken the view that the said principle is not absolute. It must be balanced against
the object of doing justice. That, the right to freedom of expression must be balanced against
other rights including the fundamental public interest in preserving the integrity of justice and
the administration of justice.

Indian Approach to prior restraint

(i) Judicial decisions

25. At the outset, it may be stated that the Supreme Court is not only the sentinel of the
fundamental rights but also a balancing wheel between the rights, subject to social control.
Freedom of expression is one of the most cherished values of a free democratic society. It is
indispensable to the operation of a democratic society whose basic postulate is that the
government shall be based on the consent of the governed. But, such a consent implies not
only that the consent shall be free but also that it shall be grounded on adequate information,
discussion and aided by the widest possible dissemination of information and opinions from
diverse and antagonistic sources. Freedom of expression which includes freedom of the press
has a capacious content and is not restricted to expression of thoughts and ideas which are
accepted and acceptable but also to those which offend or shock any section of the
population. It also includes the right to receive information and ideas of all kinds from
different sources.

Conclusion

46. Accordingly, IA Nos. 4-5 and 10 are disposed of.

47. For the reasons given above, we do not wish to express any opinion on the merit of the
other IAs. Consequently, they are dismissed.

…..……………………….......CJI (S. H. Kapadia) .........…………………………..J.

(D.K. Jain) .........…………………………..J.

(Surinder Singh Nijjar) .........…………………………..J.

(Ranjana Prakash Desai) .........…………………………..J.

(Jagdish Singh Khehar) New Delhi;

September 11, 2012.

 STATE OF BOMBAY V. BOMBAY EDUCATION SOCIETY (1955) 1 SCR

568.
Supreme Court of India
The State Of Bombay vs Bombay Education Society And ... on 26 May, 1954

Equivalent citations: 1954 AIR 561, 1955 SCR 568

Author: S R Das
Bench: Mahajan, Mehar Chand (Cj), Das, Sudhi Ranjan, Hasan, Ghulam, Bhagwati,
Natwarlal H., Jagannadhadas, B.

PETITIONER:
THE STATE OF BOMBAY

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
BOMBAY EDUCATION SOCIETY AND OTHERS.(With Connected App

DATE OF JUDGMENT:
26/05/1954

BENCH:
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
BENCH:
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ)
HASAN, GHULAM
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
JAGANNADHADAS, B.

CITATION:
1954 AIR 561 1955 SCR 568

Where, however, a minority like the Anglo-Indian Community, which is based, inter
alia, on religion and language, has the fundamental right to conserve its language,
script and culture under article 29(1) and has the right to establish and administer
educational institutions of their choice under article 30(1), surely then there must be
 implicit in such fundamental right the right to impart instruction in their own
institutions to the children of their own Community in their own language. To hold
otherwise will be to deprive article 29(1) and article 30(1) of the greater part of their
contents. Such being the fundamental right, the police power of the State to determine
the medium of instruction must yield to this fundamental right to the extent it is
necessary to give effect to it and cannot be permitted to run counter to it.

-Asiatic descent, it quite clearly prevents the Anglo-Indian Schools including Barnes High
School from performing their constitutional obligations and exposes them to the risk of losing
the special grant. The learned Attorney-General refers to clause 7 of the impugned order and
suggests that the authorities of Anglo-Indian Schools may still discharge their constitutional
obligations by following the advice given to them in that concluding clause. The proviso
to article 337 does not impose any obligation on the Anglo- Indian Community as a condition
for receipt of the special grant other than that at least 40 per cent. of the annual admissions
should be made available to non-Anglo-Indian pupils. The advice, tendered by the State to
the Anglo- Indian Schools by clause 7 of the impugned order, will, if the same be followed,
necessarily impose an additional burden on the, Anglo-Indian Schools to which they are not
subjected by the Constitution itself. The covering circular No. SSN 2054(b), which was
issued on the same day, throws out the covert hint of the possibility, in consequence of the
impugned order, of some change becoming necessary in the existing procedure for
the equitable distribution of the total grant among AngloIndian Schools, although the
impugned order was not intended to affect the total grant available for distribution to Anglo-
Indian Schools under the Constitution. If, in the light of the covering circular, clause 7 is to
,be treated as operative, in the sense that a noncompliance with it will entail loss of the whole
or part of this grant as a result of the change' in the existing procedure for the equitable
distribution, then it undoubtedly adds to article 337 of the Constitution a further condition for
the receipt by Anglo- Indian Schools, of the special grant secured to them by that article. On
the other hand if clause 7 is to be treated merely as advice, which may or may not be accepted
or acted upon,then clause 5 will amount to An absolute prohibition against the admission of
pupils who are not AngloIndians or citizens of non-Asiatic descent into AngloIndian Schools
and will compel the authorities of such Schools to commit a breach of their Constitutional
obligation under article 337 and thereby forfeit their constitutional right to the special grants.
In either view of the matter the impugned order cannot but be regarded as unconstitutional. In
our opinion the second question raised in these appeals must also, in view of article 337, be
answered against the State.

The result of the foregoing discussion is that these appeals must be dismissed and we order
accordingly. The State must pay the costs of the respondents.

Appeals dismissed.