Article 25 petitioner

25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all
persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise
and propagate religion.
As the Supreme Court has observed :1

“ ‘Religion is the belief which binds spiritual nature of men to super-natural being‘. It includes
worship, belief, faith, devotion, etc. and extends to rituals. Religious right is the right of a person
believing in a particular faith to practice it, preach it and profess it.”

Explaining the scope of Art.25 the Supreme Court has observed in Sri Lakshmana: 2

“Article 25 as its language amplifies, assures to every person subject to public order, health and
morality, freedom not only to entertain his religious beliefs, as may be approved of by his judgment
and conscience, but also to exhibit his belief in such outwardly act as he thinks Proper and to
propagate or disseminate his ideas for the edification of others.”

In present case TRISCO trust put the life time ban on them to become member of SONDHEIM
religion trust and they are accordingly not allowed to enter in the religious place made by the trust
which violates the fundamental right under Art. 25.

CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY IS ABOVE PUBLIC OR SOCIAL MORALITY

Constitutional Morality in a secular polity would imply the harmonisation of the Fundamental
Rights, which include the right of every individual, religious denomination, or sect, to
practise their faith and belief in accordance with the tenets of their religion, irrespective of
whether the practise is rational or logical.

The term 'morality' occurring in Article 25(1) of the Constitution cannot be viewed with a
narrow lens so as to confine the sphere of definition of morality to what an individual, a
section or religious sect may perceive the term to mean. Since the Constitution has been

1
P.M.A. Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma. AIR 1995 SC 2001 . 2026 : 1995 Supp (4) SCC 286.
2
.Sri Lakshmana Yatendrulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 1414, 1421-1427 : (1996) 3 SCC 705.
adopted and given by the people of this country to themselves, the term public morality in
Article 25 has to be appositely understood as being synonymous with constitutional morality.

Constitutional morality embraces within its sphere several virtues, foremost of them being the
espousal of a pluralistic and inclusive society. The concept of constitutional morality urges the organs
of the State, including the Judiciary, to preserve the heterogeneous nature of the society and to curb
any attempt by the majority to usurp the rights and freedoms of a smaller or minuscule section of the
populace. Constitutional morality cannot be martyred at the altar of social morality and it is only
constitutional morality that can be allowed to permeate into the rule of law. The veil of social morality
cannot be used to violate fundamental rights of even a single individual, for the foundation of
constitutional morality rests upon the recognition of diversity that pervades the society

In Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors v The State of Kerala & Ors3

Justice Indu Malhotra (Dissenting)- “India has diverse religious practices and constitutional
morality would allow anyone to profess and practise a religion she or he believes in and it is
not for the court to interfere in such religious practices, even it may appear discriminatory.
Issues of deep religious sentiments should not interfere into. What is essential practice in
religion is for the religion to decide. It is a matter of personal faith and India is a land of
diverse faiths. Constitutional morality in a pluralistic society gives freedom to practice even
irrational customs. Judges cannot intervene and decide on whether a practice is violative of
fundamental rights or not. Personal views of judges do not matter. A religious denomination
has freedom to believe and even practice even if their beliefs are illogical or irrational.”

In Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir,4 the Supreme Court has said that Fundamental Rights do not touch
upon the personal law of the parties. Art. 25 thus involves a separation between ‘religious’ activities,
on the one hand, and ‘secular’ and ‘social’ activities, on the other. While the former are protected the
latter are not.

3
I.A. NO. 10 OF 2016 IN WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 373 OF 2006
4
AIR 1980 sc 707 (1981) 3 scc 689.