Determinism and Free-Will

MM-Theory - Determinism and Free-Will http://www.mm-theory.com/detandfw/detandfw.
htm
Bookmark this page now!
The Problem
The Conceptual The
Cleaning Up Finding Objectifying of Free-Will -
Introduction Experience of Compatibilism Realities and Subjective
The Mess Randomness Free-Will Why There Is
Freedom Their Rules Perspective
One
The Random
Quantum A Question of The Clarity of Quantum Some Reconciling Some
Challenge to Fluctuations
Theory Lawfulness Meaning Consciousness Criticisms The theories Implications
Necessity in Realness
Quantum Participation In
The Freedom of Expanding The The Value of
Consciousness and The Universal Some Objections Conclusion
The Universe Universe - Again Freedom
Classical Neurology Will
Determinism and Free-Will

In this paper, we explore the philosophy of determinism and
free-will from four vantage points: 1) Compatibilism, in
which case the notion that the freedom of the will as uncaused
is dropped in favor of the notion that freedom comes from
control over one's actions. 2) The subjective perspective, in
which case freedom is constituted by the sense that one's
actions and choices are not caused but justified, and that these
justifications map onto what would be considered causes from
an objectified perspective, the validity of which is questioned.
3) Quantum mechanics and quantum consciousness, in which
case freedom can be accounted for by the non-determinism that
seems to occur at nanoscopic scales, and which Penrose and
Hameroff propose is amplified by structures within our
neurons called microtubules. 4) The universe as a whole, in
which case we consider the non-deterministic status of the
universe when taken in a spaceless and timeless context. This
non-deterministic status may account for the freedom we, and
all other components of the universe, experience, the only
difference being the objectives we strive for.
Introduction
Perhaps the world can be
sorted out along a spectrum
where, on one end, we have
those with an insatiable desire
to understand, and on the
other, those with a lust to engage in life. The world may not fall neatly onto this spectrum after all, but let's
suppose it can. Although there have been occasions where it was the thrill of the moment that drove me, the
joy of experiencing the changes and effects I could bring about in the world, I am, for the most part, a
reflective and withdrawn type. I prefer to step back from the world, observe it with objective spectacles,
and glean a clear understanding of what I see. This places me unambiguously on the side of understanding. I
would say it is this drive, the drive to understand, which makes me partial to determinism, and I would go so
far as to suppose that most, if not all, who fall on the side of understanding have an affinity for determinism.
Those who fall on the opposite end of the spectrum, the end of engaging in life, most probably are partial to
free-will. They love the notion that the world is their oyster, and that they can make of it whatever they
1 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
MM-Theory - Determinism and Free-Will http://www.mm-theory.com/detandfw/detandfw.htm
please. This view I have of where people fall is not an official stance I'm taking, but it is an opinion I feel
explains a lot about why we prefer one side of the debate of determinism versus free-will over the other.
Determinism promises a full and coherent understanding of the world we live in, which is very appealing to
all. On the other hand, free-will promises that nothing can override our freedom to make our own choices in
life, and this too is very appealing to all. Unfortunately, these ideas are philosophically against each other.
Therefore, each one of us, if we are to think about the issue seriously, ends up having to choose what we
cherish more: understanding the world or engaging in it.
I once believed that determinism had to be the correct view, if for no other reason than it was more
parsimonious. Occam's razor states that a hypothesis should never be multiplied beyond necessity - that is,
when all else is equal, one should never posit any proposition more complicated than any alternative
propositions that are simpler. The same razor can be applied to explanations that are too simple, in which
case they fail to fully explain the phenomenon in question. As Einstein once said "Everything should be made
as simple as possible, but not simpler." Parsimony is the characteristic of an explanation that makes it simple
but also complete. This is why when it comes to determinism and free-will, I deemed determinism to be
more parsimonious. That is, given a choice between the two views "everything can be explained" and "not
everything can be explained", guess which one is going to be the better explanation? That is, which one is
Occam's Razor more parsimonious? Determinism, of course. Although to reduce some things to inexplicable and elusive
phenomena such as free-will makes it simpler, it reduces it below the level that is at least needed for an
explanation to be complete. Therefore, it is simpler than it needs to be. Why submit to the notion that some
things might not be explicable when one has the alternative to see everything as having a potential
explanation?
These were my reasons for putting faith in determinism anyway. Alas, I eventually came to see that one's
desire for parsimony doesn't make the world parsimonious. The world is as complicated and enigmatic as it
wants to be - it cares not for what the human mind finds easy to digest. In the end, I had to come to grips with
the fact that what I once took as justifications for a belief in determinism were really only a desire to
understand. If there really are things we can't understand, I soon realized, they are going to be beyond our
grasp regardless of whether determinism promises a comprehensive and clear view or not.
One of the most undeniably non-deterministic phenomena in the universe, the phenomenon that led to the
collapse of the mainstream view of physical determinism held by the scientific community (and myself for a
while), was that of quantum mechanics. It knocked the pillars out from under the deterministic construct we
know today as classical mechanics, ushering in a new era in science characterized as more flexible on the
whole view that the laws of nature are rigid and unyielding. Quantum mechanics, at once, baffles our
common expectations of how the world should work and opens us up to the possibility that some things might
truly be random. We are baffled when we see subatomic particles existing in more than one place at the same
time, or spinning both up and down at the same time, or seeing effects come before causes, or seeing one
Quantum
particle instantaneously affect another from across vast distances. We are confronted by what appears to be
Mechanics
randomness when, after almost a century of study, we still have no way of predicting what our measurements
of subatomic particles will yield. We know that we cannot predict, for example, what the exact measure of
an electron's position will be if we've measured its momentum with precision. If these assertions seem
obscure, never fear; I have written a paper that explains more in depth the fascinating field of quantum
Classical mechanics for the reader to look at (and should look at if he/she wants to be prepared for the current paper).
Mechanics It is the apparent randomness quantum mechanics introduces that many have theorized accounts for free-will.
Whether this is true or not, quantum mechanics does challenge any theory of reality that grounds itself in a
deterministic model. It is therefore up to us, having presented such a theory, to reconcile it with quantum
mechanics - that is, with randomness. In doing so, we will have made room for free-will, and therefore
shown how it can play a role in our theory.
Free-will has always been a thorn in determinism's side, and so this will be no easy task. The problem
seems almost to reduce to the equivalent of trying to reconcile two blatantly opposing propositions such as X
and not-X. That is, it is like trying to explain how X can be true while at the same time not-X can also be
true. The very definition of determinism is that nothing is random - everything is caused - and so to fit it
together with a notion like free-will, which is by definition uncaused, seems like a hopeless endeavor.
Something obviously has to yield. In light of our quantum mechanical discoveries, it seems that determinism
is the unlucky candidate. So the best hope for free-will is to bring determinism down a notch. It doesn't need
to be expelled outright, but it does have to loosen its monopolistic grip on our perspective of the universe.
We will see, in this paper, that among the many arguments we will put forward in favor of free-will, the
strongest ones will be those in which determinism has been humbled in this way. There are other arguments
in which we will take the universe to be fully and relentlessly deterministic, but in these cases, the only
means by which free-will will be reconciled is by changing the way we conceive or define it. The latter may
be less than satisfactory for free-will proponents, but the former doesn't quite satisfy our need to understand.
2 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
Any system that is to any degree non-deterministic forces us to forgo any hope of fully understanding the
nature of that system. These difficulties make the task ahead onerous, but hopefully there will be something
for everyone as I have tried my best to argue for and against free-will from various angles. If one idea
doesn't strike you as workable, perhaps another will.
Cleaning Up The Mess

I title this section "Cleaning Up The Mess" because that's exactly what the debate over determinism and
free-will is - a horrid mess! There are numerous misconceptions and unchallenged assumptions that we tend
to take for granted. Therefore, before we get into anything substantial or enlightening, we need to sort through
these misconceptions and confused understandings and render them more clear. We need to understand what
exactly we mean by "cause" and "effect", "freedom" and "control", or the difference between randomness
and non-determinism (they're not necessarily the same). Once this is done, we will be able to make headway
much more effectively.
This section will be more or less independent from MM-Theory. We will discuss the concepts of
determinism and free-will as they are understood by the majority of people. We will then tie these
discussions into our theory to see where, or if, we can fit in free-will. This will be done sporadically
throughout this paper - that is, when deemed appropriate, we will digress from our discussions to show how
they tie into MM-Theory. There will be more need for this as the paper progress from the more simple ideas,
which will be presented early, to the more complex, which will be present later.
Finding Randomness
Let's begin by point out that one cannot discover randomness. It cannot be proved that no explanation exists
for some phenomenon - not in principle, anyway. If we fail to understand some phenomenon, the best we can
say is that no explanation has surfaced as yet - even if the only conceivable explanation we can expect would
have to throw our entire understanding of how the world works through enormous loops. This, of course, is
only true in principle, but as a principle, it should be kept in mind at all times. It means that we are dabbling
in guesswork when we take up the position that there truly is randomness in nature.
This is even true of the so-called randomness of quantum mechanics. There are many physicists who will tell
us that their science features true bona fide randomness, but one has to understand the scientific mindset to
make sense of this. In particular, one has to understand what the scientific attitude is with respect to
metaphysical accounts for the anomalies of quantum mechanics. Although we can't make such a sweeping
statement as that all scientists are steadfast against metaphysics, we can make such a statement about the
archetypal scientific attitude towards metaphysics. The attitude is that if it isn't measurable or observable,
and such things count as quintessentially metaphysical, then we have no business claiming knowledge of it
nor, if this attitude is taken to extremes, is it even a meaningful concept. What this has to do with the
possibility of randomness can be understood in light of Bell's Theorem. Bell's Theorem tells us that no
hidden local variable theory can account for all the anomalies of quantum mechanics. What a "hidden local
Bell's Theorem variable theory" is is a theory that attempts to explain some, or all, quantum mechanical phenomena by
positing the existence of hidden variables - that is, factors or causes that we either haven't or can't measure
or observe - local to the phenomenon in question. What "local" means, in turn, is that such variables would
be within the spatial vicinity of the phenomenon in question. What this permits, however, is that we have the
right to posit the existence of non-local hidden variables - but not without a catch. The catch is that to posit
the existence of anything non-local is, to the scientific mindset, the equivalent of metaphysics. That is to say,
to be non-local is to be non-physical, because physicality, according to the scientific mindset, means to take
Local Hidden
a position or occupy a volume in space. Where quantum superposition is concerned, this spatial position or
Variables
volume may have "fuzzy" boundaries, but it is still to be contrasted with non-locality, which means having
nothing to do with spatial positions or volumes whatever. The latter falls unambiguously into the camp of
metaphysics, and is abhorred by those who adopt the scientific attitude. Thus, putting non-local hidden
variables out of the question, the hardnosed scientific mind has limited his/her options only to that which can
be measured and observed. If such measurements and observations come up empty handed, which hitherto
appears to be the case with respect to quantum indeterminism, he/she is left with but one conclusion: that
quantum indeterminism is authentic randomness.
3 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
But if we relax our attitude towards metaphysics - and towards MM-Theory in particular - we can entertain a
number of non-local accounts - and many have been entertained. One in particular can be understood by
looking at another strange phenomenon that Bell's Theorem touches on, also out of quantum mechanics, and
that is quantum entanglement. This phenomenon can be described as particles, having once interacted
locally somehow, affecting each other instantaneously no matter how far apart they have been taken from
each other (although "affecting each other" carries a special meaning in this case - see sidenote ). This
Quantum
should not happen according to classical theories. In classical theories, one entity cannot have an effect on
Entanglement
another entity unless that effect travels through space like a messenger carrying information. According to
Einstein's theory of special relativity, nothing can travel faster than light, and so it needs to take some finite,
but non-zero, amount of time for one entity to affect another if some distance separates them. Quantum
entanglement proves this wrong. It has therefore been suggested that the underlying structure of the universe
is not really spatial - at least, not what we perceive to be space (3 dimensions extending infinitely at 90
Effects of degree angles from each other). What might account for the instant effects seen in quantum entanglement is an
Quantum underlying structure to the universe that doesn't need to transport effects across vast amounts of space
Entanglement because it's not really space at that level. It would be much like the 2D space seen on a computer screen in
relation to the data stored in the computer. That is, suppose you had a white pixel near the bottom left corner
of the screen and another white pixel near the top right corner (like in figure 1). Suppose also that the user
can change the color of the bottom left pixel simply by clicking on it with the mouse. A program can be
written such that any change in color that the bottom left pixel undergoes instantly changes the top right pixel
Theory of to the same color. The user doesn't need to move the mouse cursor over to it, nor does the program need to
Special create an animation of anything moving from the bottom left pixel to the top right pixel. It does it instantly
Relativity because all information about the states of each pixel are stored in the computer's memory, which so happens
to process information in nanoseconds - for all intents and purposes, instantly. When it detects that the user
has delivered a mouse click while the mouse cursor is over the bottom left pixel, it is instantly notified and
changes the color of the top right pixel.
Figure 1: Pixels on a computer screen.
What this metaphor says about the underlying structure of the universe is that no matter where something is in
space, like the bottom left pixel, it has direct and immediate access to a non-local metaphysical structure
(represented by the computer hardware). Whatever happens to that something, its effects can be transported
by that structure anywhere else in space instantly, and thus any other object in space can be affected just as
instantly. Perhaps, then, what we see of the physical universe and the spatial medium that permeates it is just
a simulation of sorts, like the pixels on the computer monitor, and what controls this simulation is something
like a metaphysical "computer" that needs no space to move data about - and therefore no time - in order to
compute the states of the simulated universe we see. And if indeed such a structure like a metaphysical
"computer" exists at such a fundamental level, could it not also account for the randomness we see in other
quantum phenomena? Could it not be that it is such a complex structure, and the methods it uses to determine
the seemingly random outcomes of quantum phenomena are equally complex, that we shouldn't expect to
notice a neat and orderly pattern in these outcomes - at least, not for several more centuries or even millennia
of research and experimentation? This is most certainly possible in principle. And so, in principle, we have
no right to claim that we've ever discovered true randomness, whether in quantum phenomena or otherwise,
nor will we ever be able to.
Principle: The Unprovability of Randomness

One cannot discover randomness (lack of
explanation) for a given phenomenon. One can only
assert that no explanation for that phenomenon has
4 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
been discovered yet.
Having said that, our goal is not to deny the commonly held conviction that there is randomness in nature.
There are very few scientists today who still hold onto a rigidly deterministic view of the world. Most are
aware that randomness cannot be proven in a strictly technical sense, but as science, after almost a century of
study, has yet to unveil any determining variables for quantum phenomena, most feel that the infinitesimal
degree of faith needed to believe in randomness is worth investing in. We shall take the same position in this
paper. We already know that our theory works in a deterministic system and so the remaining work to be
done is to think about how it might work out with randomness added to the model. We will always keep in
mind that this is ultimately a (very small) leap of faith, but since our goal is to reconcile our theory with the
possibility of randomness, there is no point in harping over the lack of unquestionable proof.
The Experience of Freedom

Before we delve into a world of probabilities and uncertainties, let's at least see how free-will would be
reconciled with determinism if we held determinism, in its most radical form, constant. In other words, how
would our understanding of free-will have to change if determinism was true. The most obvious change that
comes to mind is that the term "free" would have to be dropped. In its place, we would have to posit an
illusion of freedom. The word "illusion" comes straight out of a mentalistic vocabulary - that is, to be an
illusion is to be perceptual only. In other words, what we would have to consider is what accounts for the
experience of freedom. So let's consider this.
Experiences are the specialty of MM-Theory. The solution becomes laughably simple. We simply posit that
there must be a MOD in the brain whose activity corresponds to the sense of freedom we feel whenever we
do something we take to be our choice. In fact, we can probably even point it out in the brain: it's the motor
cortex. This is the area of the brain that becomes active when we
make the decision to carry out certain actions. There is also the
Experiences premotor cortex that seems to be involved in planning to carry out
certain actions, but unless the motor cortex is also active, no such
actions will occur. This has been demonstrated in experiments in
which subjects were asked to only think about performing certain
actions while others were asked to actually execute those actions
Motor Imagery: (see link ). When asked to only think about performing actions,
Never In Your only the premotor cortex showed signs of activity, whereas when
Wildest Dreams asked to carry out those actions, both the premotor and the motor
[PDF] cortices became active. This shows that it must be the motor cortex
alone that is directly linked to the experience of the will.
However, carrying out bodily movements is not the only thing we can will ourselves to do. We also have
control over our thoughts. This can be explained easily by supposing that while the majority of nerve fibers
leave the motor cortex and head towards the various muscles of our bodies, some fibers return to the
cognitive centers where they can influence our thoughts. Of course, this might not be an appropriate function
of a MOD called the "motor" cortex, but there's nothing saying that some small sample of fibers can't break
away from the more traditional role of controlling "motor" functions and specialize in cognitive control
instead. Furthermore, there is no reason the specific MOD(s) responsible for the control we have over our
thoughts must be localized with the motor cortex. It could be elsewhere in the brain, corresponding to the
same kind of experience. There are many examples of MODs scattered all over the brain whose
corresponding experiences appear to be very similar to each other (pleasure centers, for example). Overall,
it is not an absurd proposal at all to say that the feeling of freedom that we associate with our will is an
experience like all other experiences in the human mind, and therefore corresponds to one or more MODs in
the brain.
Of course, there is a very profound error in this reasoning, and that is this: if we are reconciling the
experience of freedom with MM-Theory in particular, then we need to take into account that the experience
of freedom will project itself. That is, not only will it be an experience, it will be something real. It will be
real freedom. This, then, defeats the entire purpose of reconciling the experience of freedom with a theory
Projection like ours which is grounded in strict determinism. So what do we want to say about this?
5 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
There are two things we need to recognize in order to resolve this problem. First, we need recognize the
difference between the feeling of freedom and the idea of freedom. Second, we need to ask ourselves, of
both the feeling and the idea, what is the exact form in which it is projected. Let's ask this of the idea first.
The idea of freedom - or rather the belief in freedom - is a property of a universe that one knows only in the
form of a mental model. A mental model is just a conglomeration of
truths, facts, principles, and the like. If one of these truths includes
"there is free-will", it wouldn't instantiate the actual phenomenon of
Mental Models free-will itself; it would only instantiate the fact that "there is
free-will". Taking a page out of our paper Reality and Perception,
we also know, from the design analogy, that this property - the
property of freedom - is an element in a design for a reality. It
therefore serves to define that reality as one containing free-will,
and it does this regardless of whether or not that reality is reality.
The Design Furthermore, given that beliefs are never meant to be taken as true
Analogy except in relation to the reality they define (in accordance with the
reality qualifier rule), this reality is therefore necessarily a
different reality than the one our theory is a design for. Hence, one's
belief in free-will does nothing to upset the reality defined by our
theory. Putting this another way, one's beliefs never have any effect
The Reality on reality except by introducing facts and truths about it. Furthermore, the reality for which these facts or
Qualifier Rule truths hold may not even be the reality we are concerned with, and in this particular case, it clearly is not.
This cannot be said quite as easily when it comes to the feeling of freedom. In this case, what's being
projected really is freedom. It is the experience of the thing itself, and so it must actually be freedom. In
conceding this, however, we also have the opportunity to contemplate what this feeling really projects itself
to be. We know its "freedom", but what is freedom? We might assume that freedom is what one has when
he/she is not determined. That is, freedom is the state something is in when its actions are uncaused. We
could do this, but then we run the risk of confusing the idea of freedom with the feeling of freedom. That is,
of course the idea of freedom is that it is the state of being uncaused, but have we got the right idea? Does
this idea, as we've expressed it (i.e. as a state of being uncaused), really capture the feeling of freedom?
This is a very good question, and we shall now see that in answering it, we will have cleaned up a great
portion of the disarrayed mess that this whole debate has become.
Compatibilism
Well, we certainly don't experience any causes when we feel we're behaving freely - at least, none that work
against our volition. But it doesn't follow from this that we do experience a lack of cause. To assume that it
does follow is equivalent to assuming that if one doesn't believe X, then one must believe not-X (this is often
a very confused point about what it is to be an atheist). This, of course, is absurd since one's failure to
believe X might be due to one's never having even thought of X, let alone not-X. All the same, one's not
experiencing a cause doesn't mean that one experiences a lack of cause. But there is more in the experience
of freedom than a failure to experience a cause. One must also attribute his/her actions to his/her own
intention to act. That is, one must attribute his/her actions to him/herself. One must experience him/herself as
the cause of the action. Whether or not this cause is also an effect in an infinite chain of cause-and-effect that
stretches back to the beginning of time seems to play no part in this feeling. So long as it issues from the self,
it makes no difference to the feeling of freedom whether an effect comes from a prior cause or from a void.
As Nietzsche once put it:
"Freedom of the will"-that is the expression for the complex state of delight of the
person exercising volition, who commands and at the same time identifies himself
with the executor of the order-who, as such, enjoys also the triumph over
obstacles, but thinks within himself that it was really his will itself that overcame
them. In this way the person exercising volition adds the feelings of delight of his
successful executive instruments, the useful "under-wills" or under-souls-indeed,
our body is but a social structure composed of many souls-to his feelings of delight
as commander. L'effect c'est moi: what happens here is what happens in every
well-constructed and happy commonwealth; namely, the governing class identifies
itself with the successes of the commonwealth. In all willing it is absolutely a
6 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
question of commanding and obeying, on the basis, as already said, of a social

structure composed of many "souls".
What Nietzsche is saying here is that the feeling of freedom we enjoy in the act of willing comes from
identifying ourselves as the cause of our actions - as the "commander". We are also the executor of our own
self-directed commands, and in this light we are subjugated by a cause, but this doesn't block out the joy of
knowing we are also the commander. In other words, the feeling of freedom is nothing more than a pleasure -
the joy of being commander. This is a very fitting analogy because, as a commander, like in the military, the
commands one issues don't always originate from one's own objectives. That is, sometimes commands issue
from higher up in the chain of command. A captain gives orders to his soldiers even though he may have been
instructed to do so by the general. He may still take joy in the feeling of power that comes with issuing these
commands, and this he may take to be the freedom of his will, but as we see, this feeling can arise regardless
of whether he was the originator of the command or not. There can be a series of indefinite length composed
of prior commands that came before.
At this point, the objection is often raised: if all our actions have always been pre-determined by all the
causes that came before them, then it's not really us who are willing these actions. The prior causes are the
ones that are owed the credit. This is one of the biggest misconceptions about the implications determinism
has for the place of the will in the causal structure of the world. Far too many interpret determinism to mean
that the will is outside the picture and therefore so is the self, for without a will, the self is rendered
powerless to do anything in the world except to passively watch it. Figure 2a depicts this (mis)understanding
of the difference between determinism and free-will, whereas figure 2b depicts what we're currently
proposing.
Figure 2a: Classic models of free-will and

Figure 2b: Our model of free-will and determinism
determinism
Figure 2a is the classical model. Because the will is assumed to be free in the sense that it is uncaused, the
only feasible condition under which the self can be plugged into a chain of events linked by causes and
effects is if it is the first cause. This is the only way it could remain uncaused. Consequently, a self cannot
play any role in a fully deterministic system, and is therefore relegated to the sidelines where all it can do is
watch as deterministic forces take over the motions of its own body. It is assumed that these same
deterministic forces mercifully provide the self with the feeling of control by making a false connection
between the actions of the body (or thought) and the self - that false connection manifesting as "will".
Figure 2b corrects this misconception. It is based on our assertion that the feeling of freedom is really the
sense that our actions come from ourselves, and therefore can remain caused or uncaused without
consequence. Figure 2b reminds us that we are a link in the chain. Nothing can have effects on those of our
actions that we will unless it works through us.
This is one way to salvage the idea of freedom - by redefining it as actions issuing from the self. Of course,
this is noticeably different from the idea of freedom as actions that are uncaused. So if figure 2b is more
accurate, it fails to show how we are free in the latter sense. In fact, it reinforces a hard view of
determinism. It shows that we are indeed confined to a chain of cause-and-effect, and that all our actions
7 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
have been determined beforehand. Nonetheless, we are placed back into the system unlike the classical
models that place us outside.
Are we in control? Although figure 2b clears up a lot about the place of the self in a deterministic system, it
isn't so clear on whether or not we have full control over our actions. In one sense, we do, but in another
sense, we don't. We do in the sense that the actions which immediately proceed us come directly from us. We
don't in the sense that there are causes that come before us that bring these actions about less directly. In
effect, we are controlled. If we are under the control of something else, something that is dictating our every
action, can we really say that we are in control of our own actions? Can one be in control while at the same
time be controlled?
It would make sense that whatever is in control is that which is also the cause of the actions of the controlled.
But in a deterministic system, everything that comes before a specific point in the chain of cause-and-effect
could count as a cause for that point. So to answer the above question, let's ask another question: what
constitutes a "cause"? What does it take for a given factor to be the cause of an effect? What it takes is this: if
the effect could not have happened without it, it is a cause. In this case, if we want to know whether a given
term in the chain of cause-and-effect is a bona fide cause of a particular effect, then we have to ask whether
the effect would come about regardless of whether we removed the cause or not. What we realize in this
case is that each and every
term in the chain of cause-
and-effect may simultaneously
count as a cause for whatever
term they precede. So, for
example, suppose I got myself
into a car crash. I could blame
my drowsiness. I'd say that my
drowsiness caused my car
crash because without it, I'd
be more alert and I wouldn't
crash. But if it was due to my
drowsiness, then maybe I
ought to place the blame on
my getting to bed late last
night. But that was due to the
fact that I had to work late
yesterday. But that in turn was due to the tight deadline of the project I'm working on. The fact of the matter
is, if we removed any one of these factors, I would never have crashed my car. Furthermore, I could also
blame the icy roads for my car crash. I could blame the poor traction on my tires, or the dim lighting of the
roads, or even the other car I crashed into. If the removal of any one of these would have prevented my car
crash, they too would count as causes. So we see that in a deterministic system, there is never only one cause
for a specific effect. There is a whole multitude of causes, some in a series, others occurring in parallel, but
each one is fully effective in and of itself as a cause.
Definition: Cause
An event or entity belonging to a group of like events
or entities that, if removed, would prevent some other
event or entity, known as the effect, from realizing.
And while we're at it, let's formally define "effect":
Definition: Effect
An event or entity that is necessitated by a cause.
It is important to define "cause" in terms of membership to a group. It is the group we have to consider
removing. If we considered removing any one cause from the car crash scenario above, it would not
guarantee that my car would never have crashed. For example, if we removed to ice from the roads, I still
may have crashed in virtue of the dim lighting or my drowsiness. But if we removed the whole group - the
8 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
ice, the dimness of the lighting, my drowsiness, and all else therein - I would not have crashed. Also note
that it would not necessarily
require the removal of the
whole group. I may be able to
stop before crashing if we
removed only the ice on the
roads and my drowsiness - the
dim lighting may not be
enough in and of itself to
cause a car crash.
Nevertheless, removing the
whole group would still
prevent the accident, and
moreover, the dim lighting
still contributes in some
measure to the accident and so
it still belongs in the group.
Furthermore, because all these
causes are links in a chain of
cause-and-effect, all prior causes that precede them would have to be included in the group as well. That is,
the removal of any cause no matter how far back along the chain of cause-and-effect would impinge on the
more immediate causes. The removal of the project I was working on, for example, would mean that I
wouldn't have to stay up late working to meet a deadline, which in turn means I would have gotten enough
sleep, which in turn means I would not be drowsy when driving my car. If we wanted, we could trace the
chain all the way back to the Big Bang or whatever origins we take to be the cause of the universe in its
entirety. So long as its removal could potentially make a difference to the effect in question, it belongs to the
group.
So if we define "being in control" as "being a cause", we see that there can be a whole series of causes in
control of a particular effect. There can be more than one series as some causes take concurrent positions
with respect to each other. We also see that for any one cause to be in control of its effects, it must be
controlled by causes further back along the chain of cause-and-effect. Without these precedent causes, there
can be no causes at all - at least, none to bring about the effect in question. Therefore, we must conclude that
there is no such thing as an entity that is in control yet uncaused - that is, without some other entity controlling
it. So either nothing is in control of anything, which is absurd, or to be in control necessarily requires being
controlled.
Principle: Being in Control

In a deterministic system, for anything to be in
control of its own actions, it must be controlled by all
that precedes it in the chain of cause-and-effect.
This makes sense when we think about it. If we went with the classical model of free-will, we would be led
to conclude that control only comes from one whose will is uncaused. This means that the control imposed
stems from a void, a missing link in the chain of cause-and-effect. What kind of control would this be though?
When the actions one takes in imposing control over something comes from a void, from nothingness, the
structure and pattern of those actions can be nothing other than random. If there is nothing determining what
those actions turn out to be, there can be nothing guiding the form they take. But what kind of control would
that be if every action constituting it is utterly random? It would be chaotic, disordered, and unpredictable -
even to the one executing it! It would be as if the one imposing it were him/herself unable to restrain it.
He/she would feel helpless, trapped, out of control. So control can't possibly come from a lack of causation.
Control can only be realized if it is itself controlled. One can only authentically be in control if his/her
control is being controlled further back along the chain of cause-and-effect. So long as one fails to directly
experience these prior causes, one will perceive only him/herself to be in control, and thus perceive that
control to emanate from his/her own free-will alone.
Principle: The Chaos of Randomness
9 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
The pattern of random outcomes is chaotic and

unpredictable. If free-will is genuinely random, we
would not feel any sense of control over our thoughts
and actions, for they would be chaotic and
unpredictable even to ourselves.
This line of thought does need a little more refinement before we close the matter. We need to exclude a few
scenarios in which we causally bring about events in the world without being in control - accidents, in other
Flow words. If I accidentally knock over a cup of coffee, I have to say that it was indeed me who did it - I caused
the cup of coffee to spill - but I wasn't in control. This also goes to show, in the context of MM-Theory, that
the act of "willing" cannot correspond simply to the flow of experiences leaving the human mind. A lot of the
energy being processed by our brains escapes the system as heat. This corresponds to experiences flowing
out of the mind even without our knowing it. That is to say, certain experiences of which we are
Epistemic epistemically aware may, and do, entail other experiences of which, not only are we not epistemically
Awareness aware, but we are not epistemically aware of their being entailed by the experiences we are epistemically
aware of. Obviously, the actions that come from our will must correspond to experiences flowing out of the
system in some way, but what way is that? It must be in a specific way, for too many examples exist that
correspond to accidental or unintentional effects on our environments.
Entailment
Those actions that we are truly in control of must be those that we intend or want to bring about and are
brought about by the intention. In other words, they must flow from a desire to see the
actions realized. So what it means to be "in control" is the capacity one has to allow
his/her desires or intentions to be the cause of the actions so desired or intended. This,
in essence, is compatibilism. Compatibilism is the view that free-will and determinism
Compatibilism
are compatible with each other. The brand we are offering here is most representative
of David Hume's take on the issue. Hume believed that one is free when his/her desires
or intentions are sufficient for bringing about the actions and results so desired or
intended. The way he put it was that if one's desires or intentions were different, his/her
actions and the results in the world brought by those actions would also be different
and as intended by his/her desires or intentions.
David Hume
Definition: Control
In the context of agentic beings, control is the capacity
to allow one's desires or intentions to be a cause of the
actions so desired or intended.
This version of compatibilism allows us to define "freedom" as "being in control". This avoids the absurdity
of the chaos and unpredictability that come with actions arising from a void. The helplessness and lack of
control that one experiences as a result of the void is hardly what we have in mind when we speak of
"freedom". What we really mean - what the experience is like - is to be in control. In the end, we can
preserve the will in a deterministic model by defining it as actions originating from the self, and we can
preserve its freedom by defining it as the state of being in control of one's actions. This is one way we can
reconcile free-will with determinism. The fact that free-will had to be redefined might prove less than
satisfying for some, but I must say that, in doing so, we have actually reconceptualized free-will in
Where Are The
accordance with how we talk about it on a day-to-day basis. That is, when we talk about free-will, we are
MODs?
obviously referring to actions that we ourselves take credit for and that we feel in full control of. This, to
most people, is what captures the essence of "freedom" and "will". It is what we value about it; not the chaos
and unpredictability of a void; not the lack of causation that precedes us; just being in control of our own
actions. That is the thought that we take comfort in.
Principle: Accommodation of Free-Will With

Determinism
10 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
In a fully deterministic system, free-will can be

reconciled by acceding to the following
accommodations:
1) That "freedom" be defined as the state of being in
control of one's actions.
2) That "will" be defined as a causal relation between
one's self and one's intended actions where the self
is the cause and the actions, the effect.
Objectifying Free-Will
In the previous section, we gave a few formal definitions. We gave definitions for the terms "cause",
"effect", and "control". It might strike some readers as funny that we didn't define "freedom" or "free-will" -
at least, not formally. Although we did define these terms in the principle of Accommodation of Free-Will
With Determinism, these were conditional definitions only - conditional on the particular compromise
free-will was faced with making when confronted with an unyielding determinism. We refrain from formally
defining these terms because to do so would defeat the entire purpose of this paper. In this paper, we want to
explore different ways of conceptualizing free-will and the idea of freedom, and so no formal definition
would be appropriate. In this section, for example, we are going to look at one way in which we can
preserve the notion of freedom being "that which is uncaused". And, yes, we will still attempt to reconcile it
with determinism. This task will require thinking a little more deeply into the problem of free-will itself -
not the concept of free-will - the problem of free-will.
Conceptual Realities and Their Rules

In the paper The Inconceivability of Consciousness, we presented the idea of the objectification process. To
briefly summarize, the objectification process is the process whereby concepts are made to exude the
property of "thingness" - that is, they are treated as though they were things with an ontological status akin to
material objects. We are usually fully aware that they are not literally things with a non-conceptual existence,
but they are molded into a form that makes them suitable for treatment as such. The objectification process
also distinguishes them from the self such that they become "observable" to the mind's eye - that is, they are
The made fit for examination and testing in our mental laboratories. The objectification process is what all
Objectification concepts undergo when we want to contemplate or question them. It is the tool we use for this very exercise.
Process It is the same tool that is brought to bear on all questions concerning free-will. The idea of free-will is
objectified. One needs to know this before attempting to philosophize about it, and one must ask, "What does
this entail about the philosophies I will yield?"
When we objectify things, we make them into mental models and we find a place for them in a conceptual
reality. What we mean by "conceptual reality" is the
background against which we conceive of our mental
models. This background consists of other mental models
representing all other things constituting that reality. In
total, they constitute a network of mental models, and this
network is our conceptual reality. If the mental model in
question is to find a place in a conceptual reality, it must
abide by the rules of that reality. If reality is believed to be
Mental Models a place in which deterministic laws govern everything,
then the thing represented by the mental model must be
subject to those laws. If, however, reality is believed to be
a place in which certain laws can be violated or
preempted, then the thing represented by the mental model
may be exempt from those laws. To get to the point, the
way we conceptualize things in reality is to assume that, as
11 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
a thing in reality, it must be subject to the rules or nature of

that reality. We think in this manner much like we think of
a foreigner entering a strange country. Every country has its laws, and no one, not even foreigners who may
know very little about those laws, are above them. The law applies to everyone so long as they are within
the borders of that country. We think of conceptual objects as relating to conceptual realities in much the
same way. Whatever the rules of that reality, any object that is placed into it must abide by those rules.
For example, if we imagine a fire breathing dragon, we will imagine that it budges when a force pushes it,
that it falls when it stumbles off a cliff, that the fire it breaths singes all that it engulfs, and so on. We are free
to imagine anything happening to the dragon - we could image that our dragon falls up when it stumbles off a
cliff - but this is what we do in our more leisurely moments, when we allow our minds to roam freely. But
when we're contemplating what really would happen, we like to stick to the rules underlying our conceptual
realities. These rules will differ from one person to another, of course, but where determinists are
concerned, they are exhaustive and inviolable for all events and phenomena.
So great difficulty exists for a determinist in imagining free-will as a phenomenon in his/her conceptual
reality. If it's represented as an object in reality, it must abide by the rules of that reality (like a visitor to a
foreign country). How can something like free-will abide by any rules. The very notion is absurd and defies
the very essence of the phenomenon. Therefore, whether a determinist or not, one has no choice but to
imagine free-will as violating the rules of the reality it is pictured in. To imagine violations of these rules is
to introduce randomness and chaos. If it weren't random and chaotic, there would be some order to it. But
this, then, would simply be the emergence of another rule or set of rules. They may be overriding the original
set, but they would be rules nonetheless. If all one wants to do is imagine a set of rules being violated,
without any order filling in the void created by these violations, then randomness and chaos is all that would
appear. In the worst-case scenario, we might have to call it "supernatural". This is not a problem for
free-will proponents per se - in believing that the will is free in the classical sense (uncaused), they posit the
existence of randomness (and perhaps the supernatural) in the same stroke. In other words, free-will
proponents may very well believe in randomness, and therefore the rules governing their conceptual realities
must make room for it. The rules simply wouldn't be all encompassing and pervasive. But either way,
whether one believes this or not, any attempt to posit free-will in a conceptual reality comes up against a
choice: either 1) accept randomness, or 2) give up the concept of free-will all together. When our goal is to
reconcile free-will with determinism, neither of these is very appealing. The second option, for obvious
reasons, is out of the question, whereas the first option is, as we've seen, a terrible way of conceptualizing
freedom.
Principle: The Paradox of Objectifying Free-Will

1) When one objectifies a phenomenon, the resulting
mental model representing that phenomenon is
beheld against a "conceptual reality" in which it
must either i) abide by the rules of that reality, or
ii) violate the rules of that reality in which case
randomness and chaos are introduced.
2) The implication 1) has for objectifying free-will is
that it is either i) non-existent, or ii) random and
chaotic.
3) If free-will exists, neither conditions i) nor ii) work.
This is the choice one is faced with when free-will is made into a mental model and contemplated against a
conceptual reality in the background. This is the framework that results from the objectification process.
Free-will is objectified, and as such becomes an "object". As an object, it is seen as something that exists in
reality. That is, it is seen as a member of reality, like a visitor to a country, and therefore must submit to the
rules of that reality. But what way is there to contemplate free-will other than to objectify it?
12 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
Well, consider this. The other trick that the objectification process plays, besides making things into
"objects", is to put things into the role of the observed. This cannot be done to free-will unless it is also done
to the self. That is, one cannot imagine free-will without a conscious agent to own that will. So using one's
self as such an agent, one objectifies him/herself and becomes the observed. Now, this turns out to be a
peculiar situation. We have the self being observed, but also the self observing. Essentially, there are two
selves. The observed self is, of course, just a
mental model much like in figure 2b, but as such,
it becomes subject to all the rules of the
conceptual reality it has become a member of.
Therefore, as a determinist, one ends up seeing
one's self at the mercy of the laws of nature. Yet,
at the same time, one is still the observer, and in
that position, one experiences him/herself to be
an overseer of the conceptual reality in question,
not a subject of it, not a member, not an object in
reality whose actions are fully under the control
of all the overarching rules. Instead, one feels as
though he/she is in a position of non-participation
- that is, a position that is not affected by, nor is
able to affect, the conceptual reality being
observed. This is the experience of observing.
This is the state one's self is in prior to objectification.
Now, say what you want about the effects of observing the real world, but recall that we are talking about a
conceptual reality and the role the observer plays with respect to it. The objectification process never
involves the observer in the observed - that would defeat the entire point - it would defeat the purpose of
enforcing the separation of the two. The objectification process makes absolutely certain that, as the
observer, we are in a position of absolute ineffectual non-participation.
In effect, we as the observers are not objects in our conceptual realities, and therefore we don't feel obliged
to abide by its rules. The state of being uncaused is felt in this position - at least, uncaused by the rules of the
conceptual reality under observation. Naturally, this doesn't mean we are uncaused with respect to our
position in the real world, but these causes are not under observation in this context. What this means is that,
in modeling reality, we never really get to observe its laws enforcing themselves upon us. We observe these
laws being enforced on a representative model of ourselves, the self that is an object in our conceptual
reality, but since it is observed, it can never really be the most authentic representation of ourselves. Our
most true selves are those who are observing, and thus not affected in the least by the rules of our conceptual
reality.
The Subjective Perspective

Now, the most challenging part of this line of argument is to show how this non-participation or exemption
from the rules of reality applies even to the observing self with respect to the actual reality. One point that
can now be made, a point that will help us a great deal in this endeavor, is to note that any perspective one
wants to take on reality must be either of two forms: 1) its objectified form, or 2) its subjective form. If we
want to take an objectified perspective, what we're dealing with is none other than the conceptual reality thus
far considered. We would be dealing with an abstract mental model, a conceptual representation of reality
and the way it works. The self would be objectified too, filling the role of the observed. We've seen what the
result of this is: we either come to see that it is exhaustively deterministic in which case there is no place for
free-will, or we must accede the possibility that there is randomness in nature and maybe even supernatural
events. The other perspective we could take is the subjective one. This perspective isn't really a conceptual
one - it is the authentic, all engulfing, fully engaged experience of being in the moment. It is the experience of
being in the world, of actively participating in it, of not withdrawing into an abstract region of one's mind
where we can contemplate the metaphysical implications of whether our acts are truly deterministic or free.
Although there is always an element of the subjective perspective within the objectified perspective, it is
only the first-person perspective we take of our objectified models - that is, the self who is the observer. But
in general, the subjective experience itself is absolutely not objectified - it is experience in its raw, natural
form.
13 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
Now we ask the crucial question. Is one determined in the fully subjective experience? At first, this might
seem like a trivial question. Of course, one is determined, even in the subjective experience, we'd say.
Experiencing the world subjectively - or being "in the moment" as one would say - does not liberate one
from causal forces. One may not recognize these forces, but they are still there. However, note what we are
doing when we dish up this kind of response. We are essentially reverting back into an objectified
perspective. That is, if we suppose that one doesn't feel any causal forces while in the subjective experience,
then to posit such forces is to ignore the subjective experience in favor of a conceptual framework in which
mental models of "causes" and "forces" and "deterministic systems" stand in. Essentially, we are projecting
these deterministic forces onto the observed self. What we want to ask is whether we can project these
deterministic forces onto the observing self - that is, the self who is always engaged in the subjective
experience, the self who doesn't participate in the model. We want to answer this question without using the
objectification process.
But how can this be done? The only way to answer the question while remaining in the subjective
perspective is to describe what the experience feels like. What does it feel like to be, as the objectified
perspective would have it, "caused" or "forced"? Well, when we make decisions to follow a certain course
of action, we don't really feel caused or forced. Instead, we feel our choices stem from reasons and
justifications. That is, for example, if we wanted to make a decision on the best pair of shoes to buy, we
wouldn't make our choice haphazardly or randomly. We would compare prices and qualities of a wide
variety of shoes, and after perusing over a few, we would try to optimize the best quality for the best price.
We may not do this as algorithmically as a computer program would - there is still some subjectivity
involved in our assessment - but in the end, we would feel that our decision, a decision taken to be freely
chosen, is backed by good reasons. We may even see other kinds of situations in which it is the overbearing
power of heightened emotions that drive us as bearing reasons for choosing these actions. The classic
example of being forced to obey commands at gunpoint is a case in point. The fear of death in this scenario is
presumed to be so overwhelming that one cannot help but to comply with the instructions of the gun bearer.
Of course, this example is typically used to
demonstrate how emotional influences can be a
determining factor in which case one loses
his/her freedom. But the argument being made
here is that, although there is a point to this
deterministic perspective, the subjective
perspective is also applicable. In the latter case,
we would say that the insurmountable fear is just an extremely good reason to comply with the demands of
the gun bearer. From every angle and vantage point, the fear is experienced as the perfect justification to go
along with those demands. One's life, in these situations, is too highly valued for it to be worth sacrificing.
This doesn't force one to protect his/her own life, it simply justifies doing so in a most radical sense. So with
the subjective perspective, although one is free to choose, one is inclined to seek out the right choice, and so
one chooses the course of action that is judged, either with a clear head or clouded by a flurry of emotion, to
have the best reasons behind it.
This is not to say that one never feels forced or caused in the subjective experience. Indeed, how else would
one describe being physically manhandled in some way? For example, if a thief rips a poor lady's purse out
from her hands, she would hardly describe her actions as a choice to give her purse away. Or how about
cases in which one trips over his/her untied shoelaces? One didn't plan to do this, and one certainly doesn't
choose to submit to the downward pull of gravity. But for cases in which one takes his/her actions to be
freely chosen, the word "forced" is a poor descriptor - "justified" is better.
Now, the move from one vocabulary featuring words like "caused" and "forced" into another featuring words
like "reasons" and "justifications" marks a critical point. Crossing over this point entails that we have shed
ourselves of the deterministic language. The sense we get from words like "reason" and "justification" is not
one of necessity or being forced. The sense is more akin to morality. That is, when it comes to morality, we
can only go so far as to determine what's right and wrong, what should be done and what shouldn't. But the
central dilemma of any morality is that it is impotent in the face of what actually is. There is an undeniable
schism between what should be and what is. For example, we can harp all we want about the moral
atrocities of criminal acts or violations of human rights, but our understanding that these are intractably
wrong fails to make even the slightest dent in their actual happening. If moral transgressions are going on,
they will go on regardless of their immoral status. In order for any awareness of such transgressions to make
a real difference, this awareness must work its way into willed action, and there is nothing that can bridge
the schism between this awareness and the necessary action except a choice made out of freedom. So like the
moral impotence that depends on one's freedom of choices in order to fulfill its decree, reasons and
justifications are also bound by a similar dependence. One must choose out of freedom in order for them to
be fulfilled.
14 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
Yet, this does not break the ties linking the subjective perspective with the objectified one. For every reason
and justification one serves up for his/her actions, they can be traced back into the objectified perspective
where they match up with a cause or force. Indeed, these very reasons and justifications are what a
determinist arguing in defense of psychological determinism (see the paper Preliminary Concepts) would
refer to in pointing out the causal variables responsible for one's actions. He/she would say that our reasons
are the things that make us act in accordance with them. But what we have to understand is that to say such
things is always to revert back to the objectified perspective. It is to make an "object" out of the reasons and
to model them as entities in a reality that spares none of its members from its rules. At the same time,
however, the acausal description of reasons and justifications is still legitimate in the subjective context.
Although a determinist might have a coherent model in which reasons and justifications are objectified, and
thus put into a causal framework, the actual experience of reasons and justifications are never felt this way -
they always feel divided from our
actions by a gulf of free choices. We
always want to keep in mind that, as
proponents of MM-Theory, we will
always take the experiences to be the
most authentic form of any phenomenon.
The objectified model is never anything
more than a representation. In other
words, the way reasons and
justifications are experienced are at
least as real, if not more so, than the
way they are modeled by the
objectification process. They are not
experienced as random - that is, reasons
and justifications do guide our
decisions - but they are not experienced
as forced either. Nevertheless, the
model yielded by the objectification
process cannot be denied. In building it,
we strive for validity and internally
consistency. It thus claims itself to be a
faithful representation of the way the
world really works. So overall, there is a one-to-one correspondence linking these two perspectives, a
mapping so to speak, whereby causes map to reasons, forces to justifications, and this we cannot escape.
Principle: Mapping of The Objectified and Subjective

Perspectives
There is a one-to-one mapping from the objectified
perspective to the subjective perspective. Causes that
enforce their effects by necessity map onto reasons
that justify choices made freely.
This, then, is a real dilemma. It really is a paradox. The subjective perspective doesn't exactly feel like it
breaks from a deterministic path - our reasons and justifications certainly seem to have predictive power
over our actions - yet we fail to see this as "forced". It's not random, but it's not determined either. In any
case, it does seem fitting to call it "uncaused" which brings the classic notion of "freedom" with us this far.
Necessity In the end, "uncaused" may be a word for which we have no clear meaning except to say that it is not random
yet not determined. The freedom of the will may just be a third way of being. This, of course, clashes with
the necessity of entailment we find at the heart of MM-Theory, for this necessity makes our theory a
deterministic one. What we have to understand about the central point being made here, however, is that
MM-Theory itself is a conceptual reality, an objectified model, and therefore has no choice but to be
Entailment constituted in a fully determined way (or as featuring sporadic pockets of randomness here and there, but
we'd like to avoid that as much as possible). Thus, even if it really is freedom that we find in the subjective
perspective, it could never be mirrored in any corresponding objectified model (whether MM-Theory or
otherwise). Naturally, such freedom could never be antithetical to the determinism we find in our objectified
models - the above principle guarantees this - and so we have no right to construe such freedom as
Flow undetermined however much it may be "uncaused". If such a notion seems irreconcilably incoherent, it can
15 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
only be because such freedom is of an all together unfathomable sort. Alas, the objectification process is
limiting. It permits us only to understand necessity, not the uncaused nature of flow (if that is indeed its
nature). Though not wrong per se, this would mean that there is something missing in our objectified model
of flow, and so the picture we're left with is incomplete.
The Problem of Free-Will - Why There Is One

Indeed, it may be that so long as we rely on the objectification process, the picture will forever be
incomplete. This tells us something quite interesting about the whole problem of free-will. The clever reader
may have already hit upon it, but in case not, let's spell it out. What are we doing when we objectify things?
Essentially, we objectify things when we want to understand the nature of things. We want to craft a concept
that will suffice for that "Ah-ha!" feeling - that sense that we now grasp "how it works". It's true that, as
we've seen, objectification can yield models of reality that make room for the truly random or the
supernatural - things that defy understanding - but this is not useful towards the ends that objectification was
meant for. We've seen what ends objectification was meant for in the paper The Inconceivability of
Consciousness where we proposed that objectification is the tool we have evolved to use in order to build
models of our world, abstract or concrete, for the sake of understanding. Understanding the world is our most
prized gift, the lack of which would leave us hopeless in a game of survival. So we engage in objectification
when we want to understand.
But now let's think about the implications of this when it comes to free-will? What are we trying to do when
we attempt to understand free-will? What does it mean to understand something anyway? What it means is
that we are searching for an explanation. Whatever the phenomenon in question, we ask "How does it
work?", "What accounts for its unique nature?", "What brought it into being, into the form it now takes?",
"Why does it do the things it does?", "What is its fundamental essence?", and so on. These questions are all
getting at one thing: an explanation. But what counts as a valid explanation? The only form a valid
explanation takes is a causal account of the phenomenon in question. All the questions above can be
rephrased simply as "What are its causes?" If you know what causes a phenomenon, you have an explanation,
and you understand it. What this means, however, is that in constructing an explanation for some
phenomenon, we are building it such that it fits into a causal framework - that is, we are making it
deterministic in our minds. The reader can now see the blatant futility in trying to understand a phenomenon
like free-will. It can't be placed into a deterministic framework. It is the very antithesis of determinism.
Therefore, it is, by its own nature, beyond understanding.
It's much like the problem of mind and matter itself. If one goes about solving the problem by seeking a
materialist explanation for mind - that is, insisting that mental things be reduced to purely material things -
he/she is sure to end with nothing but frustrated aspirations (unless the very definition of "mind" is altered -
as is often the case in materialist circles). The reason is, of course, that mind, as something totally
immaterial, can't possibly be put into materialist terms. Likewise, something non-deterministic, like
free-will, can't be put into determinist terms - it can't be accounted for by a model whose structure is fully
deterministic. If it could, then everything about free-will would be rendered completely predictable. In order
for there to be at least something unpredictable about it, we would have to resign to the fact that there is no
way to understand how those unpredictable outcomes turn out as they do.
This should be expected of the objectification process. We know the utility it came to enjoy in our
evolutionary history. We are unlike other animals - we depend, for our survival, on our understand the
world. It is our primary survival tool. What good does understanding do us? It helps in making the world
more predictable and thus easier to control. This can only be done if the understandings we craft are of a
causal nature. That is, we have to understand things in terms of A consistently bringing about B. This, of
course, makes things predictable, and that is key. We need to predict that B will come about when A is the
case. This is a heuristic, of course - an ideal. The world seldom works this way, and we know that. But the
mental machinery that rises to the task when we seek an understanding of some phenomenon aims to
approximate a model of that phenomenon that is as close to absolutely deterministic, predictable, or causal
as possible. The closer the approximation, the stronger the feeling of "Ah-ha! I understand!" Therefore, if the
fundamental nature of the phenomenon this process is brought to bear upon is of an utterly non-deterministic,
unpredictable, or acausal sort - like free-will - then the objectification process fails at the task the more it
succeeds.
The insight this leaves us with is that the entire problem of free-will, the whole reason why, all these years,
we have been unable to reconcile it with any deterministic model of the world, is because the very question
we're asking defeats the purpose. To ask "How does free-will work?" or "What is it?" or any other question
of this kind is to expect that it be conceptually molded into a causal form - that it be deterministic. This, of
16 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
course, is ludicrous. The whole project dies just as it's born. This is what we meant at the beginning of this
section when we said we would focus on the problem of free-will - not free-will itself. The problem of
free-will is insoluble - at least, to the objectification process it is.
Principle: The Insolubility of The Free-Will Problem

The problem of free-will cannot be solved
intellectually. Any attempt to solve the problem
requires the use of the objectification process, which
will ultimately conceptualize free-will in such a form
that it be forced into a causal or deterministic
framework, thereby making it into something it is not.
So where do we go from here? Well, we still have our "uncaused" freedom in which its uncaused status is
not random yet not determined. What can we do with this? We can't do anything with this from the objectified
perspective - it is inconceivable - but we can do a lot from the subjective perspective, for that is its proper
place. In order to experience the uncaused nature of our will, we must engage ourselves in the moment. It is
only when we stop thinking about the will and start using it that we finally feel free. It is there in the moment,
right at the core of the subjective experience, in being plugged into the world, in being one with life itself.
That's where our freedom lies. Unfortunately, this means we have to forgo any hope of understanding it. We
have to give up our quest to come up with a philosophical theory of how free-will works, how it exists.
Free-will is not something to be understood, it is something to be used.
Of course, this doesn't prove that free-will is really there in the subjective experience. We are merely
hypothesizing that if it exists, it can only be experienced in the moment rather than in our contemplations. The
fact of the matter is, we might be fooling ourselves into thinking that it is a failure on the part of the
objectification process to grasp free-will in its true form. When our objectified models of the world and
ourselves tell us that there can be no free-will, it may be telling us this because it's true. After all, the models
we build of the world are supposed to be true depictions of how our world works. If we can't see the causal
forces that govern our actions from one moment to another, but our mental models tell us that those forces are
really there, maybe we ought to trust the models. This may be so. But our present purpose is not to argue in
favor of determinism - what need would there be for that when we're already sanctioning it? - but to
accommodate free-will with determinism. In the last section - the one on compatibilism - we did so by
putting free-will in terms of determinism. Here, we are putting it in terms of a "third way" - a way that is not
deterministic, but not random and chaotic either. It is a third way that must not violate the terms of
determinism yet without being deterministic itself. Alas, the principle of The Insolubility of The Free-Will
Problem tells us that such a notion is forever beyond our grasp. We may not have proven the existence of
free-will, but at least we've shown that, because we'd be stuck with deterministic models even it did exist,
those models are no indication of its lacking. We've shown that the very act of bringing free-will into
question is the main crux of the problem, and so if one wishes to go on believing in it, one now knows that
the road to travel is not one of analysis and contemplation, but of engagement in life - of actually using the
will.
Quantum Theory
We have already made clear the relevance of quantum theory to MM-Theory - at least, in its more
deterministic articulations. Quantum theory is that realm of science that studies what is commonly accepted
as non-deterministic phenomena. Physicists now-a-days have, by and large, abandoned all attempts to uphold
a strict deterministic account of quantum phenomena, and the view that there really is randomness in nature is
widely accepted. Therefore, unlike in the previous sections, it will be determinism that yields to randomness
Stuart Hameroff in this section. That being said, we will do all that we can to avoid the use of the word "randomness" and opt
for "non-deterministic" instead. We entertained the idea that "freedom" is poorly
understood when considered random, and even in the field of quantum mechanics,
there are some who are skeptical about the notion of randomness. Stuart
Hameroff, for example, prefers the term "non-computable" which means,
Computability roughly, "cannot be computed or calculated". Furthermore, although the results of
quantum mechanical experiments cannot be predicted with absolute certainty,
17 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
most of the time the probabilities of making a correct prediction are greater than
chance. This tells us that there is some kind of underlying order even though it
may not be perfectly deterministic. But whatever term we use, we most certainly
will not use "deterministic". In this section, the goal is to accommodate
determinism to free-will.
But we won't delve into free-will just yet. We are first going to look at the implications that quantum
mechanics has for MM-Theory overall. Once we reconcile the deterministic structure of our model with the
non-determinism of quantum mechanics, we will then turn to the brain and the question of free-will therein.
We will see how quantum theory, the brain, and free-will all tie into each other. Needless to say, if the
reader doesn't feel he/she has a good grasp of the principles of quantum mechanics, now is the time to read
my brief overview of the subject here. From here on in, it will be assumed that the reader understands
quantum mechanics sufficiently well - be forewarned.
One theory that has already made the connection between quantum theory and consciousness is that of
Quantum Consciousness. First introduced by Roger Penrose and championed today
by Stuart Hameroff (see link above ), this theory extends quantum theory through the
Quantum
brain and into consciousness. It proposes that microscopic structures called
Consciousness
"microtubules" exist within neurons and go into quantum states regularly. Because these
states are non-deterministic, this, Hameroff proposes, accounts for the
non-deterministic nature of consciousness. We certainly will have a few things to say
about this, some for and some against. At first glance, this comes across as a competing
theory to ours, and so long as it's presented as a theory of consciousness overall, it is a
competing theory. However, we will argue that where weaknesses exist in the theory of
Quantum Consciousness (from here on in, QC), our theory is much stronger, and where
Roger Penrose weaknesses exist in our theory, QC is much stronger. Overall, our approach will not be
to attack QC outright, but to show how the complimentary nature of the strengths and
weaknesses of both theories might be a cue to find a way for them to work together. More specifically, QC is
an excellent theory of free-will, but as we will see, it is bankrupt of its explanatory power when it comes to
qualia. Our theory, on the other hand, revolves around qualia, or what we have dubbed experiences, but as
Qualia
it works best in a deterministic framework, it is a poor theory of free-will. Therefore, our approach will be
to reconcile our theory with QC by showing how Hameroff's theory of microtubules is the perfect mechanism
to posit in order to make room for free-will in our theory. The only concession QC must make is to leave
qualia, or experience, to our theory.
Experiences
A Question of Lawfulness
When faced with quantum mechanics, the vulnerability of our theory lies in its dependence on the necessity
of entailment. Our theory says that meaning entails by necessity and this accounts for the self-sustaining
basis of all experience. It's what makes them fully real and determined to be exactly what they feel like they
are. So if the picture that quantum mechanics paints of the universe is one in which non-determinism emerges
here and there, and our theory makes the correspondence between those non-deterministic phenomena and the
experiences they represent, then we have no choice but to submit to the implication that the meaning
Necessity
supporting these experiences can't be necessary. The necessity of meaning is what we see in the rigid
certainties of mathematics and formal logic. The fact that 4 + 5 = 9 always and unconditionally is a reflection
of the necessity of our thoughts about it. We attributed this necessity to the laws of nature,
using logic and mathematics as cognitive analogies. We said, in the Advanced Theory,
that "the day a physical law is violated is the day that 4 + 5 = 10." But what quantum
Entailment
mechanics tells us is that the laws of nature are not perfect. They can be broken. What this
says about our theory is that 4 + 5 can equal 10 every now and then, and this defies the
necessary relations of mathematics and those connecting all other experiences. If necessity
can be broken, then the very existence of experiences is in jeopardy. Therefore, we are in
trouble with respect to our account of the self-sustaining nature of experience. We need to
Meaning
resolve this. We need to understand exactly what is happening to the experiences that correspond to quantum
phenomena.
First of all, let's make a distinction between a law violation and

simple lawlessness. A law violation is when one thing is supposed
to happen, presumably by necessity, but something else happens
instead. The experiential analogue of this would be the example we
18 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
gave above - namely, 4 + 5 = 10. Lawlessness, on the other hand, is

when no laws exist to govern what happens - and thus randomness
and chaos ensue. The experiential analogue of this would be
something akin to 4 + X = 10 where X is completely undetermined
(it doesn't equal 5; it really has no value). In other words, a law
violation corresponds to necessity being defied, whereas lawlessness corresponds to a lack of necessity
where something definite occurs anyway. Both things present problems to the necessity of meaning, and both
are going on in quantum mechanics. Law violations seem to be what's going on in states of superposition,
whereas lawlessness seems to be going on when decoherence results in what appears to be randomly chosen
states.
Definition: Law Violations vs. Lawlessness

1) Law Violations: When one outcome must
necessarily happen but a different one happens
instead.
2) Lawlessness: When no outcome must happen by
necessity but something definite happens
nonetheless.
Note that law violations are not necessarily non-deterministic. So long as they aren't random or
unpredictable, we can still describe them as determined. In the double-slit experiment, for example, we will
always get an interference pattern despite the fact that the superposition of the electron's position appears to
violate the laws governing its spatial location. Once the electron's position is measured, however, the wave
function collapses, and the state it collapses into appears to be random. This specific event, the collapse of
the wave function, is non-deterministic, but the state of superposition that exists before the collapse is not.
Every single time one does the experiment, the result is consistently an interference pattern, and we
consistently interpret this result as the particle existing in a state of superposition - always. This, of course,
is determinism - through and through.
Principle: Deterministic Law Violations

The violation of natural law is not necessarily
non-deterministic. So long as they are violated under
the same conditions and with the same outcomes, they
are deterministic.
One point this brings to mind, however, is that our assumption that states of superposition are examples of
law violations may be too arrogant of us - that is, it may be too presumptuous of us to assume that we know
what the true laws of nature are supposed to be. If these states are still deterministic, maybe the fault lies
with us and our inability to conceptualize the laws of nature properly. It could be that states of superposition
are phenomena that nature allows but has concealed from us macroscopic beings until we had the means by
which to discover them. In other words, it may not be that laws are being violated at all - it may be that we
have misunderstood what the laws of nature really are. There may be a law of superposition stated "when an
electron is fired at a wall with two slits in it, the electron will pass through both slits simultaneously".
If this is the case, then insofar as superposition is concerned, we can appeal to the principle of The
Unassailability of Science for reconciliation. Again, this principle states that whatever the discoveries of
science, the correlation between mind and matter, formulated by our theory, will hold. So if it turns out that
subatomic particles are not really perfectly round and rigid little balls akin to those found on a billiard table,
then whatever they are, we will always be able to claim that they correspond to an experience of some kind,
an experience that serves as the reasons why they behave as they do. It doesn't matter what they turn out to be
The - point particles, vibrating strings of energy, some kind of plasma, probability waves, or even tiny
Unassailability microscopic gremlins - they are physical representations of experiences, whether that be in conception or the
of Science senses. Of course, there is a hidden assumption behind this principle. It assumes that all laws of nature
maintain their consistency and exhaust the whole of all scientific discoveries. So if this assumption is not
19 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
met, like what appears to be the case in the non-determinism of quantum mechanics, we can't very well rely
on it. Nonetheless, the point remains that if superposition states represent a different, non-intuitive form of
natural law, then we are justified in standing behind this principle in that context.
That being said, there is the matter of superposition states defying the very logic with which we can form
conceptual representations. It doesn't even seem possible that a particle should have two mutually exclusive
The velocities or directions of spin (momentum, which can be broken down into mass and velocity, is known to
Inconceivability exist in superposition states - mass is always constant, and so velocity also exhibits superposition). For a
of Superposition particle to spin "up", it seems that it's doing the opposite of spinning "down", and therefore can't spin down
at the same time (mind you, a particle's spin is not quite the same thing as the spin of an ordinary
macroscopic object, like a baseball). We've even shown, in the paper Reality and Perception, that a
particle's position is mutually exclusive with all other possible positions (this was in a sidenote, so if the
reader missed it, I replicate it here ). At least, it is mutually exclusive in concept, as are all states of
The Caloric
superposition. The crucial question is, are they mutually exclusive in reality? That is, is what's going on in
Theory of Heat
quantum phenomena really a violation of natural laws or do we simply lack the capacity to understand them?
If the flaw is with our understanding, we must recognize that this is no ordinary misunderstanding of the way
nature works. We've had plenty of occasions in the history of science when one theory was proven to be a
grave misunderstanding of how a certain phenomenon works. The caloric theory of heat is a prime
The Kinetic example. Scientists used to believe that heat was the result of a fluid called "caloric" that flowed from warm
Theory of Heat objects to cool ones. Later, experiments showed this theory to be wrong, and the currently accepted kinetic
theory, whereby molecules are said to bombard off each other or vibrate, filled its place. At least in this
case, both theories are conceivable. But in the case of superposition, we have yet to fathom a model we can
fully conceptualize. This makes it difficult to say whether what's going on in quantum phenomena is law
abiding or law breaking (but see sidenote ). Either way, so long as our experiments keep yielding
Law Violations consistent results, it is still deterministic.
or No Laws At
All
The Challenge to Necessity
If quantum phenomena are law abiding after all, then we're out of the woods, and we need not press on with
the issue further (we'll get to randomness later). But let's suppose, for the sake of argument, that
Necessity superposition states really do represent law violations. The first point we should make, therefore, is that the
positing of the real existence of natural laws - despite being subject to violations - should not be understood
in terms of the classical metaphysical, or rather Platonic, sense. That is to say, we don't mean to suggest that
there are these non-physical entities existing independently of both our thoughts and the objects whose
behavior supposedly defies their dictates. We mean for the notion of real existing natural laws to be
Entailment understood in terms of MM-Theory - and more particularly, in terms of the necessity of entailment. That is,
suppose that when a particle splits into a multitude of positions, this corresponds to an experience somewhat
like "4 + 5 = {...7, 8, 9, 10, 11...}" - that is, 4 + 5 doesn't only equal 9 but a whole range of numbers. We can
clearly see that the necessity of entailment doesn't hold in this case because 4 + 5 necessarily equals 9 and
only 9. Nothing permits for 4 + 5 to equal 7, 8, 10, or 11, yet there it is - equaling them!
Duality of
Physical Entities
Well, first of all, the above equation is a poor representation of how superposition states evolve. We have
two very discrete and definite quantities on the left (4 and 5) with a well-defined operator (addition)
working on them. On the right, we have something not so definite and well defined (a range of numbers). The
physical picture this conveys is one of a particle with, at one moment, a definite and clear position, and then,
in an instant, leaps into superposition whereby its position is
spontaneously spread across a certain distance of space. True
superposition does not evolve this way. If we look at the double-slit
experiment, we see that an electron fired from a gun is initially in a
very confined and nearly definite position, and as it streams towards
the wall with the slits, its positions gradually disperse across a
macroscopic range. This is more like an equation where all
quantities have some uncertainty to them. The quantities on the left
might start out with a small range, but then multiply in the right-hand
side. For example, an equation like a × b = c where a = {0.5,...,1.5},
b = {2.5,...,3.5}, and consequently c = {1.25,...,5.25} would suffice.
If this is a more accurate representation, then it tells us that the
electron in the double-slit experiment is always in a state of
20 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
superposition to some degree.
This is consistent with how decoherence works.

All experiments that induce decoherence result in
a state of superposition collapsing, not into a
classical or absolutely certain state, but into a
less varied state. How varied this state is
depends on the constraints imposed on it by that
which brought on the collapse. We know from the
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle that neither
The Heisenberg of a pair of conjugate variables, such as a
Uncertainty particle's position and its momentum, can be
Principle measured with infinite precision. The precision
with which we measure position, say, is a
function of the wavelength we emit to do the
measuring. The smaller the wavelength, the more
precisely the position can be measured, but no
Conjugate
wavelength is infinitely short, and so there will
Variables
always be a minute degree of uncertainty. With
that in mind, it's difficult to imagine under what
conditions superposition states would ever
decohere into the classic states predicted by
Newtonian mechanics. One might say that nothing is ever in a perfectly classical state.
We see, then, that all simultaneous positions or states that constitute

superposition are entailed by previous positions or states also in
superposition. In terms of our math equation, if a ranges from 0.5 to
1.5 and b ranges from 2.5 to 3.5, then these values do entail a range
of 1.25 to 5.25 for c. Every value within c is entailed by some
corresponding value in a and another in b. In terms of the electron in
the double-slit experiment, all final positions of the electron are
entailed by all of its initial positions. If the electron started out
veering just slightly to the left, its final position will be significantly
Entailment
to the left. If, on the other hand, it started out veering just slightly to
the right, its final position will be significantly to the right. If it
started out veering in both directions, its final position will be
amplified in both directions. So long as decoherence is postponed,
all initial states determine all final states.
But we are still confused as to what it means for a particle to be in a state of superposition. If we are still
assuming that such states denote law violations (because they are mutually exclusive), then with respect to
the meaning in the corresponding experience, the problem of necessity is still with us. However, now that we
have reduced superposition states to experiences with a range of values - that is, a range of meaning - that
have no trouble entailing further mean en masse, the problem of necessity has been narrowed down to the
clarity of meaning rather than its capacity to entail. That is, the problem lies with a not meaning 0.5
necessarily, nor 1.5 necessarily, nor 1 necessarily, and so on. Likewise with b. The variables a and b have a
range of meaning, no one in particular being necessary (if it was necessary, then it would make all other
meanings within the range impossible, and thus there couldn't be a range at all). So although the problem
remains, at least it has been narrowed down, and it has been narrowed to a point where we can bring in a
full solution.
The Clarity of Meaning

Necessity is the key to understanding what sustains experiences. It is what allows for them to maintain an
independent existence as real things - that is, it maintains their "realness". If they are not necessary, then they
cannot be real. But is it really as black and white as this? Take a range of meaning that an experience might
Real Things have, such as a = {0.5,...,1.5}. Although no one
value is absolutely necessary, there must remain
some degree of necessity for each value within
the range as there are certain values that a simply
cannot have, such as 0, 2, or anything outside the
Essence of range. Likewise, in the double-slit experiment,
21 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
although the electron may exist anywhere within

the region of space swept by its corresponding
wave, it will never be found behind the electron
gun or beyond the electron sensitive screen. So
the electron is necessarily confined within that
region. To be perfectly truthful, the most accurate
way of putting this is that the probability of
finding the electron in a particular location is not
evenly distributed across all of space. There is a
much higher probability of finding it within the
Realness region swept by its corresponding wave than
outside this region. Therefore, it could be said
that there is greater necessity for the electron to
be located in regions of greater probability.
Similarly with a given experience, there is
greater necessity for it to mean something within a particular range of meaning than outside that range, and
there is no clear boundary marking out this range - the necessity of its meaning tapers off as we deviate from
the center of this range. So if it's not as black and white as we might think, what does this say about its
"realness"? The most intuitive thing it says is that an experience's realness can vary from fully real to fully
unreal. That is, the essence of realness, just like necessity, can vary. The more necessary it is, the more real.
For example, if we were to look at an orange, we would see its color fairly definitely - that is, as orange.
But it would only be this definite at a macroscopic level. If we were to decipher the meaning of this
experience ever so precisely, as precisely as we measure the
properties of subatomic particles, we would find that "orange"
doesn't quite depict the meaning of this experience exactly. We
would find a range of, say, {slightly-red,...,orange,...,slightly-
yellow}. The color of the orange wouldn't be orange precisely - it
wouldn't be any particular color precisely. It would be almost
orange - it would be somewhat slightly-red and somewhat slightly-
yellow as well. It would even be a tiny bit almost-red and a tiny bit
almost-yellow (hardly noticeable, of course ). Now, these words
("somewhat", "slightly", "almost", etc.) are not meant to convey its
color being close to slightly-red or slightly-yellow; rather, they're
meant to convey its color actually being slightly-red and slightly-
yellow - both at the same time - but not quite fully real as such. That
is, "somewhat" is a description of its realness, not where it falls on
the color spectrum. The color of the orange actually is at all these spots on the color spectrum - all at the
same time - but with each spot harboring only part of the realness of the overall color.
By the standards of our conventional way of thinking, for an object to have a particular color, it can only
have one such color - it can't be both red and yellow at the same time, for example - but this way of thinking
attributes full realness to the color. It really is such-and-such color, we assume. What we are considering
here is what could be said of such a situation if its realness was somewhat faded. Could an object's
properties then take on seemingly contradictory values to the degree that it was unreal? Could an object then
be both red and yellow at the same time? It seems that perhaps it can. Consider two opposing propositions P
and not-P, for example. Normally, one would assume that if P is true, then not-P must be false. But if the
realness of things can be "somewhat" real - or, in the case of propositions, "somewhat" true - then it wouldn't
be right to say either that P or not-P is true or false. Instead, we would have to say that both P and not-P are
"somewhat true". That is, the truth of P and not-P can be simultaneously upheld if they shared equally in that
truth, each one acquiring, consequently, only a partial truth. So it would be wrong to say that not-P must be
false because P is true since P really isn't true - it is only somewhat true. Consequently, not-P can also be
true - somewhat.
We can even depict this idea graphically, as in figures 3a through 3d below. In figure 3a, we have a curve
that shoots up sharply at the value of orange. This depicts, more or less, what we were saying about the color
of the orange viewed from a macroscopic level of precision - that we see it as definitely orange. That is, the
color orange upon the fruit is most definitely real, and any other color, no matter how minor the deviation
from orange, is most definitely not the color of the fruit. Therefore, the curve starts at the left-hand side at the
lowest plateau possible, and only when it hits orange does it spike. The low points represent low levels of
realness whereas the higher points represent high levels of realness. The lowest points possible represent a
complete lack of realness, whereas the highest points possible represent full realness. Now, let's suppose
that the color of the orange went into a much more pronounced state of superposition. What we would begin
22 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
to see is more variability in its color. This variability is represented in figure 3b by the widening of the
spike, taking on more of a bell shaped curve. This means to convey that the realness of other colors local to
orange gain in realness - they aren't quite as real as orange, of course, but they aren't quite zero anymore
either. We also see that the realness of orange itself has fallen slightly. It sits at roughly 80% real. When we
compare the two figures, we can extract a rule that seems to be this: the area under the curve is conserved
(This is probably not true of the graph itself - I didn't take care to measure it - but you get the idea ). In
other words, the total amount of realness distributed across all possible values must always remain the same.
Therefore, if a property's realness is to be concentrated into one narrowly defined value, the graphical
representation will be a spike, whereas if its realness is to be distributed more evenly, the graphical
representation will be more of a bell curve whose peek is somewhat lower.
Figure 3a: Color vs. realness (classical depiction) Figure 3b: Color vs. realness (superposition depiction)
Figure 3d: Position vs. realness (superposition

Figure 3c: Position vs. realness (classical depiction)
depiction)
Figures 3c and 3d represent exactly the same concept as it is applied to a particle's position. In figure 3c, we
have a particle's position plotted against the realness of that position. It takes a sharp spike at 5, meaning that
the particle is definitely 5 units away from the origin and definitely not at any other position. Figure 3d, on
the other hand, represents what would become of the particle's position if it went into a more noticeable
superposition state. Its position would still be localized at around 5 but it would simultaneously take on other
positions. The closer those positions to 5, the more real they will be, but they won't be more real than the
position of 5 itself, whose realness has also changed - to less real. Overall, in going from figure 3c through
to 3d, the area under the graph has been conserved. So figures 3a through 3d show us that this concept can be
imagined for both experiences and physical things in the outer world.
23 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
This is indeed a strange notion. Does it even make sense to think of something as "somewhat real"? One
would think that realness cannot grade itself this way. Something is either real or not real, we'd assert. Well,
it is this kind of thinking that gives us so much trouble in the field of quantum mechanics. We are so use to
thinking that the properties of physical entities are either in one particular and definite state or not in that
state. A particle is either at location (x,y,z) or it is not. If it is not, it must be in another, equally precise,
location (x',y',z'). What is this mode of thinking that jars so irritatingly with the "fuzziness" of quantum
theory? It is the tendency of the human mind to categorize. It is one of the oldest and most reliable (hitherto,
anyway) mechanisms of the human mind whose function is to organize our experiences and knowledge of the
world into neat and orderly pigeonholes. This makes information easy to process and put into its most
effective use. We categorize things, and the more black and white we make things in our minds, the more
easily they fit this algorithm. Things are either hard or soft, bright or dark, good or bad, friendly, malevolent,
or neutral, red, orange, yellow, green... and so on. Of course, we can break free from this rigid method, and
at times it proves more useful to do so, such as when things are better thought of as falling on a spectrum or
gradient (like temperature or weight). But unless it does prove useful to do so, we feel more comfortable
with our black and white categorization scheme.
We've never had a use for breaking out of this scheme when it comes to the question of realness. Being the
macroscopic creatures that we are, we experience things on too large a scale to notice the finely grained
variability in the realness of things. Things and their states and properties seem either real or not real.
Sometimes these states and properties fall into convenient categories while at other times they fall
somewhere on a spectrum, but in either case, we perceive them as exactly what they are. That is, even though
these states and properties may vary, their being real doesn't. This has been the way we've experienced our
world since the dawning of our species. But in the technologically and scientifically advanced age of today,
we have extended the reach of our minds into a world where this categorization scheme doesn't work. For
the first time, we are seeing phenomena for which a gradation scheme must be brought into use, a gradation
scheme whereby their realness takes a middle position between the two extremes. It is a scheme whereby we
can talk about things taking on more than one position at the same time, or more than one value for
momentum, or any state or property at all. I propose that the concept of "realness" itself be adapted to this
gradation scheme and the old categorization scheme be abandoned. As the realness of an entity's properties
approaches the fully unreal end, the more the values of these properties vary in a superposition-like manner.
The difficulty we have in imagining this is the same difficulty we have in imagining states of superposition
and the strangeness of all other quantum phenomena. It is the tenacious clinging to an out-dated and soon to
be archaic mode of thinking - namely, categorizing. It is the insistence that realness fit into either of the "real"
or "unreal" categories. If we are to pass beyond these intellectual limitations, we have to accept that our
world simply doesn't work this way - not all the time, at least. We have to accept the possibility that the
reality of a given object, its properties, or anything for that matter, can vary.
Perhaps the best way to understand how realness can vary is to understand it in terms of experiences. It does
make more sense when one considers it from the subjective perspective, as our theory would have it, rather
than from the perspective of external or material objects like planets, tables and chairs, or subatomic
particles. From the latter perspective, although the idea can be entertained, we really don't know how to
image an external or material object as being "somewhat real" - half faded? But when we consider what it's
like for the meaning in an experience to be unclear, it is not as difficult. We've all had trouble, at times,
trying to apprehend or articulate exactly what it is that we're experiencing - emotions can be this way, as can
vague memories or complicated concepts that we know we understand but just can't express. Of course, this
is usually more a reflection of the frail connections between our experiences and our epistemic awareness of
Projection
them, but at least it helps us to appreciate what unclarity feels like. The only difference between these more
common experiences of unclarity and that corresponding to true superposition states is that, in the latter case,
the lack of clarity is inherent in the experience itself, not in our failure to translate it into words. So when we
imagine it this way - as having an inherently unclear meaning - we find that what the experience is about is
equally unclear. In other words, what the experience projects itself to be is inherently "fuzzy" - that is, it is
Realness as
not anything in particular. To be something particular, an experience must mean something definite and
Substance
certain. The more focused this certainty, the more definitely it is the particular thing it feels like it is. That's
the essential nature of projection. Thus, with no clear definition for itself, an experience can't actually "be"
anything - at least, not fully. It can somewhat "be" something, and what that something is can be gathered
from what its ambiguous meaning seems to focus around, but so long as it doesn't sharpen its focus with
infinite precision, it will never quite "be" anything - approximate being is all it has.
Now, even if MM-Theory is the best context within which to understand this idea, we don't even need to
appeal to it in order to make sense of partial realness. Consider what it means for a particle's position to
have no particular value, but a range of potential values instead. It means that one cannot say that it has a
definite position. Its position, as we understand it in the classical or Newtonian sense, doesn't exist - it is not
real. But, of course, there are certain values for its position that have a higher probability of turning up when
24 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
measured than other values. Therefore, for one to say that its position is completely unreal is not quite right
either. What other option is there? The only other option is to consider a level of realness somewhere
between fully real and fully unreal, a level equal in degree to the uncertainty inherent in its superposition
state. We must say that its position is "somewhat real".
Principle: Reconciliation Between Non-Determinism

and Necessity
The necessity of meaning can be reconciled with the
non-determinism of quantum mechanics as follows:
1) The more non-deterministic the outcome of any
event, the less clear the meaning in the
corresponding experience.
2) The less clear the meaning in the corresponding
experience, the less it necessarily is anything it
would otherwise project itself as.
3) The less it necessarily is anything it would
otherwise project itself as, the less it is anything
definite and precise - that is, anything fully real.
4) Therefore, the more non-deterministic the outcome
of the event in question, the less of the essence of
realness contained in the corresponding
experience, and thus the less real it is.
So it seems that the problem of the necessity of meaning can be resolved in this manner. The problem arose
because we had not taken into consideration the variability of realness. Without a clear meaning, we
assumed, an experience cannot be fully necessary, and therefore cannot be real. It was out of the question to
consider an experience to be fully unreal because its physical counterpart - namely, quantum phenomena like
Resurrecting A
particles in superposition states - was still real. But when we introduced the idea of different grades of
realness, we found this to be the perfect descriptor for what was happening, not only to the experience, but
Principle: The
also to its physical counterpart. Absolute necessity is not a must in this case - meaning can be somewhat
Unassailability
necessary in which case the experience will be somewhat real. With this minor shift in how we understand
of Science
MM-Theory, it once again makes sense.
Random Fluctuations in Realness

Of course, the above principle doesn't explain why non-determinism results from a lack of full realness or
full necessity - it merely shows how non-determinism is not a threat to MM-Theory. So non-determinism
remains to be explained. What we know from the preceding section is that these non-deterministic states
don't violate the necessary connection between succeeding experiences - that is, between those
corresponding to a superposition state and those corresponding to a collapsed state. Whatever the state
decoherence results in, that state follows from a subset of the classical or Newtonian states that make up part
of the preceding superposition state. For example, in the double-slit experiment, if we put an electron
detection device in one of the slits, there would be two possible outcomes: it would either detect the electron
passing through that slit or it would not. If the device did
detect the electron, this result could be traced back to the
fact that one of the simultaneous trajectory paths that the
electron took was, in fact, headed directly towards that
slit. If it was not detected at that slit, this result could be
traced back to the equally valid fact that all other
simultaneous trajectory paths were not headed directly
25 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
towards that slit. In other words, there is always a

component of the superposition state to account for the
collapsed state in accordance with what classical
mechanics would predict. This translates into our theory as
there being a subset of values within the range of meaning
corresponding to the superposition state that entail all
values in the range of meaning corresponding to the
collapsed state. In order to account for the apparent
non-determinism, the question we need to ask is: what
determines the subset whose range of meaning will go on
to entail further meaning, leaving the remainder of the range to somehow vanish?
This vanishing act need not be understood as a violation of necessity either. What happens first and foremost
is that the smooth distribution of realness permeating the entire superposition state is spontaneously
accumulated by a much more narrow subset of values within the superposition state, leaving what's left to be
fully depleted of realness. This depletion obliterates the necessity therein as well, and so the "vanishing act"
is a result of a loss of necessity, not a violation of it. Without necessity, there can be no entailment. It would
be a violation for there not to be a vanishing act. As for the prior experiences that would have entailed the
ones that vanish, they were never absolutely necessary anyway, and therefore such a vanishing act does not
violate the necessity of their entailment either.
To make this more clear, let's once more take the double-slit experiment as an example. As the electron
passes through both slits, the realness of its position is equally shared by both instances of the electron (or
sets of electrons - each slit is big enough to house more than one instance). That means that each electron
instance, or set of instances, carries 50 percent of the total realness. Now suppose we put our electron
detection device in one of the slits. Out of all trials where the electron goes through the slits (sometimes it
just hits the wall), it will detect an electron for some of them, and for all remaining trials it won't. In either
case, our detection device has collapsed the wave function. In the former case, it has collapsed to the subset
of positions within the slit being monitored by our device. In the latter case, it has collapsed to the subset
within the other slit. In the former case, wherein the electron is detected, its position has amassed all the
realness of the previous superposition state. That is, whereas before it was detected, this subset carried only
a very small portion of the total realness, and once it is detected, this subset "collects" all realness from
everything outside the subset. When it does this, the necessity of its position being in that slit also increases -
in fact, it becomes totally necessary. In the latter case, wherein the electron is not detected, the exact reverse
occurs. The subset consisting of those electron instances that pass through the other slit amasses all the
realness, leaving no realness for any instances which would have otherwise passed through the slit being
monitored. With no necessity, its path is at an end. It entails no further trajectory beyond the slit. Likewise,
its corresponding experience, depleted of necessity, entails no further experience. It entails no further
experience, not due to a violation of necessity, but to a lack thereof.
The apparent non-determinism we see is not non-determinism of entailment, it is non-determinism of what

acquires realness. For some reason, the experience corresponding to the subset of electron instances in one
Revisiting The
slit consumes all the realness while the other is depleted. Why the one subset over the other is the mystery.
Alternate
But we now see that this anomaly is not a problem for the coherency of our theory. Necessity is never
violated. Nothing is more real or less real than necessary. We don't know why a specific subset of the range
Interpretation:
of meaning in an experience spontaneously inherits all the realness from the entire range, but as we see, this
Superposition
is another matter - it is a question for another theory to answer.
As A Law of
Nature
Or it may never be answered. After all, it makes no sense to inquire as to the reasons why the bulk of
realness in an otherwise unclear experience is reallocated as it often is, if the consensus among quantum
physicists is that this is a genuinely non-deterministic process. If it is truly non-deterministic, there is no
reason. It is just difficult for us to accept because, like we said in the introduction to this paper, we have a
powerful need to understand, and understanding comes only with explanations or reasons. The consensus
among quantum physicists is that the world just is this way - non-determinism is not something in need of
explanation. I suggest we take the same attitude with respect to the non-determinism in our theory. There may
be no need for explanation when it comes to the non-deterministic selection of those experiences that acquire
the most realness since, as we saw above, that's exactly what non-determinism is - a defiance of explanation.
Even though there may be no reason for the non-determinism of this "realness hording", we can give a reason
for this lack of reason. In other words, we can say why there is no reason. If no particular state is fully
necessary in cases of superposition, then why should we expect that any one subsequent state, even if that
state does become necessary (or more necessary) in virtue of having acquired more realness, will itself be
26 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
fully necessary before it is entailed? If nothing is necessary, then no outcome is necessary either. One
particular state can amass all the realness spontaneously and for no reason. Perhaps what is going on in the
double-slit experiment is that, upon interacting with the electro-sensitive plate, the electron enters a
condition under which it is forced to take on a more definite state, but it is not necessary that whatever state
it settles upon be one or another in particular. This lack of necessity coupled with the burden of having to
settle upon a more definite state may be enough grounds for randomness to result. Perhaps the interaction
between the electron and the electro-sensitive plate corresponds to two experiences - the one corresponding
to the electron's superposition state, the other corresponding to the electro-sensitive plate - and the former,
having morphed throughout the growth of its lack of clarity, enters a particular state, a range of particular
qualities, which, when put together with the particular quality of the experience corresponding to the electro-
sensitive plate, is logically determined to take on a much more definite meaning. What that meaning turns out
to be, however, is not logically determined, except that it must be taken from the range of meaning it had
hitherto harbored. It would be much like a detective who, out of a range of suspects, knows that, logically,
the culprit can only be one in particular, and must pick one at random were he forced to guess. This lack of
necessity coupled with the burden of having to settle upon a more definite meaning may be enough grounds
for randomness to result.
On the other hand, many have made the connection between this apparent randomness and that displayed by
free-will. To name a few, Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff have their theory of Quantum Consciousness
wherein quantum events that go on in microtubules, tiny structures inside neurons, may be responsible for the
non-deterministic manifestations of free-will. This may be the case, but it should be noted that the
non-determinism of quantum mechanics is not explained by substituting it with the non-determinism of
free-will, nor visa-versa. This maneuver is simply a reduction in complexity. That is, instead of two
unexplained enigmas (quantum non-determinism and that of free-will), Penrose and Hameroff have reduced it
to one unexplained enigma - but unexplained it still is. We could go with this, exploring the implications of
equating quantum non-determinism with free-will, particularly within microtubules, and we will do this in
The the next section. Right now, however, let's conclude this section by remarking that, although we have rescued
Uprovability of our theory from the non-determinism of quantum mechanics by proposing that realness be conceived as
Randomness varying across different grades, the principle of the unprovability of randomness should always be kept in
mind. It can never be confirmed beyond a scintilla of doubt that what appears to be random happenings at the
quantum level is indeed random - even if Bell's Theorem denies us the right to posit hidden local variables,
we as metaphysicists do hold the right to posit non-local variables (in fact, it will be shown, in the paper
The Universe and "God", how our theory can account for such non-local mechanisms). Our current objective
Bell's Theorem
is not to advocate such a non-local, deterministic account, however, and so after mending our theory in just
the right way such that the failure of necessity to uphold realness is not a failure in our theory, we will honor
the thesis of non-determinism that quantum physicists promote by offering the same role for non-determinism
in our model of the universe.
Quantum Consciousness
All eukaryotic cells, like neurons, have a cytoskeletal
structure within them called "microtubules". For the most
part, cytoskeletal structures hold the cell together and
maintain its shape - they are the cell's "skeleton", so to
speak - but they often serve many other purposes. When it
comes to microtubules, for instance, they also process
Microtubules information like a computer or the brain. The studies
conducted by Stuart Homeroff point towards a quantum
computational method for such information processing.
That is, the protein molecules that make up microtubules,
known as tubulin, are believed to undergo superposition
Tubulin states for a very short period of time after which they
collapse into either of two states. Figure 4a illustrates this process. Tubulin molecules assume a bean-like
shape, and the two states that constitute the superposition state are, as figure 4a shows, a contracted state and
an expanded state. Through the enabling power of quantum entanglement, the states in which each tubulin
molecule collapses determine the collapsed states of all other tubulin molecules. This results in the
Quantum
manifestation of definite patterns along the lengths of microtubule strands as shown in figure 4b. These
Entanglement
patterns constitute the computational output of the quantum processes that each tubulin molecule undergoes.
Different patterns have different consequences on the overall neuron. Some patterns result in firing while
others inhibit firing. In either case, the resulting pattern cannot be determined by appeal to the initial states of
the tubulin molecules since these states are superposition states, and as we know, the collapse of
27 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
superposition states is, as far as we can tell, non-deterministic.
Figure 4a: Tubulin molecules Figure 4b: Patterns of tubulin collapse
This non-determinism is the perfect entryway for Penrose and Hameroff to usher in free-will. Both free-will
and the collapse of the wavefunction are non-deterministic phenomena, and therefore the two can
conceivably be reduced to one non-deterministic phenomenon. In other words, the kind of quantum
computing that microtubules undergo correspond to a decision making process. When microtubules are in a
superposition state, this reflects something akin to a thinking process whereby the neuron is considering
whether or not to fire, weighing the pros and cons so to speak, and the final pattern that results from collapse
reflects a decision being made - the neuron has decided whether or not to fire. On a much more macroscopic
level, this decision making process, when experienced across all individual neurons, amounts to the kinds of
decision making processes that are commonplace among us on a day-to-day basis. Our free-will is accounted
for by the non-deterministic quantum computations that go on in each of our nerve cells. This is the theory of
Quantum Consciousness (or QC) in a nutshell.
There is obviously a discrepancy between the account given by QC for what causes neurons to fire and that
given by standard neurological treatments (such as our paper Preliminary Concepts). As far as the latter is
concerned, neurons fire when neighboring neurons release excitatory neurotransmitters that bind to
receptors on the neuron in question. QC, on the other hand, says that neurons fire when its microtubules
collapse into key patterns. In order to clarify how these two accounts fit together, QC says that the binding of
neurotransmitters onto the recipient neuron has an effect on the likelihood of the neuron's firing. That is,
supposing the neurotransmitter was excitatory, when it binds to the recipient neuron's receptors, the chances
Neurotransmitters
that the neuron will fire become very high, unlike before the neurotransmitters bind when the chances are
quite low. Inhibitory neurotransmitters have a similar effect on the probability of a neuron's firing, but in the
opposite way from excitatory ones. In other words, although the patterns that microtubules collapse into are
non-deterministic, the probability of certain patterns turning up is greatly affected by the binding of
neurotransmitters from neighboring neurons.
Neurons, then, are much like individuals. Hameroff likens microtubule strands to quantum computers, and
thus to brains of a quantum sort. That is, QC models microtubules as the "brains" of the neuron, brains that
operate according to the principles of quantum mechanics rather than classical mechanics. Therefore, we can
understand the relation between the effects that microtubules have on its host neuron's firing and those that
neurotransmitters have by analogously thinking of neurons as individuals. The brain, then, is much like a
corporation and each neuron is an individual worker, each with its own unique function and set of skills. It is
always assumed that when one particular worker is given instructions, he/she will carry out those
instructions. That is his/her job, after all. This is like the assumption that classical neurological theories
make with respect to the effect of excitatory neurotransmitters binding to the recipient neuron - namely, that
the neuron will indeed fire. But a worker is not a cog in a wheel. He/she can make his/her own decisions on
whether or not to follow the instructions. It is true that, for the most part, a worker will follow instructions
when given to him/her from a proper authoritative figure, but we cannot dismiss the possibility that he/she
may choose to do otherwise. For example, he/she may request to put it off for one day because of a doctor's
28 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
appointment. He/she may even choose to make executive decisions when no instructions were given, such as
when an urgent matter needs attention but the boss is not around to authorize any course of action. We
wouldn't say that the worker in these cases is disregarding the job he/she has been hired to do, but we do
have to take into consideration the fact that strict obedience to instructions at all times is just an ideal model
of how workers function in a job setting. The reality is that there is always the possibility that such workers
will deviate from this model and make choices on their own accord in response to instructions. Just the
same, the mechanical model given by standard theories in neurology are just an ideal. The reality, according
to QC, is that neurons are like workers in that, although they may be given chemically transmitted instructions
to fire or inhibit firing, they always have the choice to thwart those instructions and instead do the opposite.
Some Criticisms
QC hasn't been without its criticisms. The most common criticism comes from the unlikelihood that such
large structures like neurons would ever display quantum-like effects such as superposition or
non-deterministic firing. The strange anomalies that are the focus of quantum mechanics are very rarely
observed at scales greater than a few nanometers, especially when the environment they are assumed to
occur in is sufficiently complex and highly dynamic. The brain, or even a single neuron, is such an
environment. There is too much going on therein by way of chemical reactions, biological processes, electric
signal processing, and a whole myriad of other events, for quantum events to occur at the level of neurons. In
essence, the brain is too hot an environment for quantum states like superposition to last for as long as they
need to in order to account for the non-deterministic processing of information at the level of neurons (it is
purported that these states need to last for at least 25 ms).
Hameroff responds to this with two points. First is the proposal that microtubules are coated in a heat
resistant actin gelation that provides just the right kind of cool and secluded environment for the needed
quantum states to persist for the necessary 25 ms or longer. This is an evolutionary adaptation, Hameroff
argues, that should be expected if we are to assume that consciousness and free-will are imperative to our
survival. Our genes would have mutated in such a way that this actin gelation is a natural consequence of
how our brains develop, thereby providing the basis for a much greater degree of freedom to choose our
actions when an otherwise mechanically driven biology would have led us unavoidably to our own demise.
Hameroff's second response is the fact that not all quantum states like superposition fail to persist in a highly
complex and dynamic environment. Some evidence suggests that certain quantum phenomena are actually
enhanced by raising heat levels. Although this is not the norm, it could be that the states that tubulin
molecules exist in are such quantum phenomena.
The second most common criticism leveled against QC is that it doesn't account for qualia, more or less
equivalent to what we call experiences, that well. Homeroff defends his theory on this front by appeal to
Penrose's interpretation of quantum mechanics. As we noted in the paper Quantum Mechanics, the anomalies
that quantum mechanics studies have been interpreted in many different ways. Penrose's interpretation is
Qualia known as the Orch OR model (for Orchestrated Objective Reduction). The Orch OR model posits an
"objective threshold" that sets an upper limit on quantum states like superposition such that they collapse
upon reaching this limit. That is to say that any physical property that might exist in a state of superposition
can only be so uncertain prior to measurement (i.e. the probability of what such measurements turn out to be
can only be so low). So, for example, taking our ever-so-useful double-slit experiment once again, if we
Experience removed the electron sensitive plate such that the electron could continue to travel indefinitely, the Orch OR
model predicts that the electron would only travel so far before collapsing into a more definite state. This
objective threshold, Penrose proposes, is a universal constant much like the speed of light or the charge of an
electron, and is built into the fabric of spacetime itself. But in order to understand how this accounts for the
The Orch OR presence of qualia in our minds, we need to look at Penrose's model of the spacetime fabric to see, not only
Model how the objective threshold is pictured, but also where qualia resides in relation to it.
Indeed, Penrose literally has a place for qualia such that we can say "where" it resides. He makes a place for
it by opening up little "blisters" in the fabric of spacetime. Let's elaborate on this point. Penrose borrows the
concept from Einstein's Theory of General Relativity whereby spacetime can be curved, bent, warped, and
distorted in many other ways. Einstein postulated
General
that this plasticity of space and time could
Relativity
account for gravity. He said that when we see
objects fall towards massive bodies like stars,
planets, and large asteroids, what we are actually
seeing is Newton's first law of motion - that all
Geodesics bodies in motion stay in motion - as it manifests
in a curved spacetime medium. That is, if the
29 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
space through which an object moves is curved,

as it is near massive bodies, the object whose
nature it is to continue along the path it travels
(Newton's first law) will also curve. Objects at
rest begin to move (as when you release an apple
from your grip) because they are traveling
forward in time, and time, like space, also curves towards massive bodies (like the Earth). What Penrose
adds to this is that spacetime is not only malleable, but also fissionable. That is, the lines (or geodesics) that
make up space and time, whether straight or curved, can fork into several paths. He hypothesizes that
"blisters" can form, as in figure 5, whereby a straight path in space splits off in various directions,
effectively forming a cone shaped pocket that looks like a blister.
Figure 5: Penrose's space blister
Just as a particle would follow the lines of space whether straight or curved, a particle following a line of
space that hits one of these blisters forks itself into several copies or instances. It would be in several places
at once, essentially accounting for quantum superposition. The objective threshold predicted by the Orch OR
model puts a limit on the size of these blisters such that all space paths that branch off from each other are
eventually forced to collapse upon each other, one in particular being selected for all others to converge
towards (the non-determinism of decoherence).
And inside these space blisters, Penrose presents us with the monad - the elementary unit of the Platonic
Truths! Essentially, Penrose is suggesting that conscious experiences, or qualia, reside here, inside the space
blister. They serve as the matter around which a conscious decision is being contemplated, and which
collapse marks the settling of. Penrose specifically emphasized Platonic Truths as characterizing their
essential quality - that they are ideas or thoughts - and quite literally took them to be external entities existing
in space among all matter and energy. It was Hameroff who took the ball from there and extended this idea to
all other forms of qualia. Joy, sorrow, pain, pleasure, colors, sounds, smells, tastes, tickles, itches, and all
the qualitative diversity that make up the experiences we know of come from within the space blisters inside
Monads
our brains - the blisters responsible for the superposition states that microtubules enter in and out of.
Hameroff likes to think of qualia, therefore, as an essential ingredient in the fabric of spacetime, making it a
fundamental building block for reality.
Reconciling The Theories

Our concern is with this last criticism. We have our own theory of qualia that blatantly clashes with
Penrose's. In this section, we will show how monads, or fundamental units of mind, cannot exist in space
blisters. This will be an objection mainly aimed at Penrose's model, but not so much to Hameroff's - at least,
not if Hameroff is willing to stand by his position that qualia are the fundamental building blocks of reality.
He won't get far with this claim by heeding to Penrose's model, but we will see that with our model, he fairs
30 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
quite well.
It's not terribly difficult to denounce the validity of Penrose's model as it finds its roots in a ancient
philosophy that has seen its day. That philosophy is Platonism and most contemporary philosophers take it to
be rather naive at best, and rubbish all together at worst. Why is this so? The essential tenet behind Plato's
philosophy is that there exists a metaphysical realm in which all absolute Truths reside, Truths like "all
circles are round", "all men are mortal", "space is infinite", "the squares of the sides of a right triangle sum
to the square of the hypotenuse", and so on. Plato believed the mind was like a sense organ whose target
objects for sensing were these absolute Truths - it saw into the metaphysical realm, he thought. Just as we
don't need to learn about tangible objects in order to sense them, the mind doesn't need to learn absolute
Truths - it knows them a priori. Today, we understand the neurology behind why the mind perceives these
absolute Truths. When neurons from the cognitive centers are stimulated, we will experience thoughts, many
of which are just these absolute Truths.
We also know from more than two thousand years of experience that pursuing one's own apprehensions of
absolute Truths, or what appears to be such, leads to confusion and grave mistakes more often than
enlightenment. The lessons learnt from these, by most philosophers anyway, is that Platonic Truths are best
understood as fabrications of the mind. This is not to say that no Platonic Truth is valid - a circle is still
round and men will always be mortal - but it is generally understood that these are not "things" that exist
outside of ourselves like material objects. They don't have an independent metaphysical existence
somewhere "out there". The truth of these principles is inherent in their mental character.
MM-Theory concurs with this by separating our perceptions of reality into different domains - three to be
exact, when it comes to human beings. These domains, or categories of experience, were outlined in the
Basic Theory as the cognitive, emotional, and sensory experiences. The confusion that often arises from
Platonic philosophy is no doubt a consequence of the objectification process, which aims to mimic the
externality, or thing-like character, of objects in the physical world when constructing the forms that abstract
The concepts take in our minds. In other words, it takes experiences from the cognitive domain and infuses them,
Objectification to a degree, with attributes from the sensory domain. We ultimately make mistakes when we forget not to take
Process these borrowed attributes too literally, a very common example being the positing of these abstract concepts
as things belonging to the world of our sensory experiences. That is, we invest too much faith in the
thing-like qualities of our objectified concepts, and thereby assume that they must have some kind of
existence in the world "out there", even if that existence must take a metaphysical form. But we fail to realize
that "out there" is itself an exclusive character of sensory experiences only. That is, thoughts don't ever
Projection project themselves "out there" in any sense - they are "true" or "false" instead. In short, Platonic philosophy
is grounded on a profound, but common, error - namely, the objectification process gone awry.
Penrose's model of spacetime is even worse. Not only does he posit the existence of metaphysical principles
"out there", but he actually gives them a place. He invents these space "blisters" to house them. If you want to
know where "all circles are round" is, look for a particle in a superposition state, he says, and there it will
be. It would be one thing to say that these space blisters correspond to platonic principles, as we say about
MODs, but his theory hinges on the fact that these principles actually reside therein. He wants to propose that
the collapse of particles in superposition states are affected by something local to them, something that will
"reach out" and decide the final state of the particle. He wants to say that it is in virtue of the particle being
"in contact" with the consciousness that is the space blister that its fate can be decided by that very
consciousness. This will never do, however, since it defies the very essence of a principle - that is, of a
thought - to place it somewhere in space. Even Plato knew that metaphysical entities can't be placed
somewhere, and this is why he invented the realm of metaphysical forms - a realm that, although paralleling
our physical world, is not characterized by space or physical extension. To have a specific location implies
The that it is in space, which means that, although it may not be visible or solid, it takes a physical form (material
Correspondence forms, on the other hand, do require a certain degree of solidity as the word "material" derives from the root
Rule word "matter"). No - platonic principles, or any kind of experience, is absolutely placeless (unless we're
talking about the perception of physical objects, of course ). They don't take physical forms; they are not
"extended", as Descartes would put it. Without extension, there is no particular location in space where they
could be. If we are to associate them with anything in the physical world, it must be through some kind of
correspondence (as the correspondence rule points out). That is, experiences are non-local, metaphysical
things that correspond to local things in the physical domain of reality. There may still be space blisters, and
they may account for superposition states, but there can be nothing inside but a void.
Now, this is Penrose's idea, and although Hameroff champions it wholeheartedly, his contribution to QC
branches off from it. Penrose's model was the springboard from which Hameroff proposed his version of
QC, and so, as it stands, he is somewhat dependent on the validity of the "space blister" model of qualia.
However, the only reason for this dependence is that there are no feasible alternatives. What I intend to show
31 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
now is that our theory is perfectly compatible with Hameroff's given that he severs his dependence on the
blister theory and substitute it with our model of qualia. In other words, QC is still an excellent theory of
free-will, but it leaves something to be desired when the question of qualia is raised. Our theory, on the
contrary, is built to explain qualia, but it fails to address free-will as adequately as QC. Why the two
theories should not work together is a question with no sound answer. Therefore, let's see what comes from
an attempt to meld the two together.
Consider a neuron from the cognitive centers of the brain. According to MM-Theory, when this neuron is
stimulated by excitatory neurotransmitters, a thought is experienced corresponding to its firing. All that needs
to be accounted for is that brief moment before it actually fires when its microtubules are in a superposition
state. We know the physics behind this, but what is the experience like? The experience is that of freedom -
more specifically, the freedom to control our thoughts. When the neighboring neuron stimulates the one in
question, our theory accounts for the corresponding experiences with the concept of flow. We say that one
thought flows into, or entails, the other. Within a stringently deterministic paradigm, we assume that this
entailment is absolutely necessary. In effect, we would account for the freedom we feel we have over our
thoughts as totally illusory. Despite what it seems, we can't help that the next thought that enters our minds
Entailment
will be such-and-such. But by incorporating QC into our theory, we add that non-deterministic touch, in
which case we need to account for the lack of absolute necessity when it comes to one thought entailing
another. The necessity breaks at the moment of the neuron's superposition state. At this moment, the neuron is
not entirely firing but not entirely at rest either. The corresponding experience is not entirely a full-fledged
thought, but not entirely the absence of such either. Its realness is only partially there. This moment is when
Flow
we make our decision whether to allow such a thought to enter our minds or not. The thought is necessary to
the degree that the superposition state of the microtubules are likely to collapse into patterns conducive to the
firing of the neuron. If it is highly likely, or even highly unlikely, our will is weak with respect to thought
control. But when the chances are close to 50/50, the strength of our will is at its peak, and we feel the full
force of control over our thoughts.
Some Implications
Now, if this is the manner in which our theory melds with QC, there are some implications worth examining.
First of all, it is doubtful that the same things we said above about thoughts - namely, that our control over
them corresponds to the superposition states of neurons - can be said about other experiences from the human
mind. For example, we'd be hard pressed to argue that we have any control over our visual experiences.
When I look at a fruit sitting on my table, I can't help but to see only
those properties that it actually bears. I can't choose to see a banana,
say, when it's really a pear. Therefore, we should only see neurons
exhibiting superposition states at a sufficiently frequent rate in those
MODs corresponding to the kinds of experiences we have a
significant degree of control over. Cognitions would be at the top of
my list, followed by, perhaps, emotions. Sensations would take a
rather low position, as they seem the hardest of all experiences to
control. Neurons in the visual cortex, for example, would probably
exhibit superposition states very rarely, if at all. And if we were to
include the motor cortex, which seems to correspond not so much to
an experience but to the very quintessence of "willing", perhaps that
would go to the very top of the list, surpassing by far cognition and
exhibiting extremely high amounts of superposition in terms of its
neural firings. This correlation between the superposition states of neurons and the degree of control we
have over the corresponding experiences or actions certainly makes for a very testable hypothesis.
Another interesting note to make on this point is that, as we go from those experiences over which we have a
high degree of control to those over which we have very little control, it seems that the "opacity" of qualia
(for lack of a better word) grows thicker. That is to say, the low-control experiences, like hearing, seeing,
touch, and so on, seem very rich in their qualitative character. The diversity in quality is high as is the
vividness (or "opacity"). High-control experiences, on the other hand, seem rather thin in qualitative opacity.
Our thoughts seem quite "airy-fairy". Our fantasies seem "dreamy". It's hard to pinpoint one particular
thought or to see every minute detail in our memories of an event or scene. It's almost as if they were only
"half there" (and, in fact, this is what we would say, in terms of their realness, when it comes to quantum
states like superposition). Our emotions seem to harbor a bit more opacity as we find a much wider array of
affects and more intense pleasures and pains, but still not quite as much as sensations. The degree of control
we have over our emotions is, likewise, somewhere between that of our thoughts and that of our sensations
(although not all may feel this way). It seems rather befitting, therefore, that our theory cooperates with QC in
32 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
this manner. More precisely, it seems that where quantum states are next to lacking in the brain, qualia are at
their peak, and therefore MM-Theory offers the better account. QC, on the other hand, offers the better
account, at least insofar as it posits free-will, where quantum states are most pronounced in the brain. To me,
this seems like a very nice compromise.
An Interview As Hameroff put it, "qualia... are actually irreducible, fundamental components of the universe" (see link
With Stuart ). In this, he was referring to Penrose's model of spacetime geometry, of course. We abandoned this model
Hameroff for the reasons mentioned above, and so in this sense Hameroff was wrong. But in the context of
MM-Theory, he is more right than he might realize. Qualia really are the basic components of the structure of
reality. Our theory assigns them exactly that role, and it goes on to explain why. The qualitative diversity of
our phenomenological world is made up from all our experiences. They carry the essence of realness and
Qualitative with it, they paint reality as an artist paints a mural, but unlike the images in the mural, the reality they paint
Diversity is fully real, and thus it is the very fabric of the universe that Hameroff posits. In this sense, he is correct in
asserting that qualia are true reflections of reality in its raw, naked form.
Essence of
Realness
Before celebrating QC, however, we ought to examine another implication that falls out of our hybrid theory.
We already touched on one - namely, the inverse relation between control over our experiences and their
opacity - and this seemed to go over well. There is another, however, which might veer us more towards
skepticism. Let's examine the implications this has for the predictions we can make in a laboratory setting
wherein electrodes and voltage meters are hooked to live brains.
What would happen if we connected an electrode to one end of a single neuron from the cognitive centers (or
any center over which we have a high degree of control), a voltage meter to the other end, and we let a weak
current pass through? According to classical theories, we should see the voltage meter jump every time.
There should be a one-to-one correlation between
activating the electrode and reading the presence of an
electric current. But when QC is considered, this
correlation should not be one-to-one. There would have to
be a certain probability that the voltage meter reads
nothing even though we stimulated the neuron with our
electrode. There may even be a chance that a current will
indeed be detected without discharging a current from our
electrode. This is a testable prediction involving
macroscopic observations. Of course, it assumes that
microtubules will behave exactly as Hameroff theorizes
even in such a laboratory setting, a setting in which the
surgery required seems rather invasive and it is doubtful
that tampering with the brain using cold metallic
instruments will avoid disturbances of the neuron's normal
environment. Nevertheless, if care is taken and the setup is
sufficiently thought through, results of experiments like this
could lend powerful support to QC if all went according to
our predictions. If our predictions weren't met, however, it wouldn't bode well for QC, and our theory would
have to revert back to a more deterministic view of the brain whereby free-will is more illusory than we
thought (although the non-determinism of quantum mechanics in general would have to be upheld).
But how plausible are these predictions? Remember, we would be witnesses to quantum non-determinism on
a macroscopic scale - at least, insofar as our interpretations of the readings on our voltage meter go. In
effect, the implication of this would be that, in our moments of freedom, when we make conscious choices of
what thought to think or what action to take, we would be partaking in the violation of natural laws. We
would be defying what all classical theories would predict with respect to how brain processes play out.
Take the neuron we chose to connect our electrode and voltage meter to, for instance. Imagine that it's a
rather long neuron that stretches from one end of the brain to the other. By all the laws of physics we know
Action Potential
of, stimulating this neuron with our electrode would, at this scale, undeniably trigger an action potential that
would travel down the neuron's axon and meet up with the voltage meter, at which point, we should see a
sudden spike. This is what we would expect according the laws of biology, of chemistry, of
electrodynamics, and all other fields of science involved. Unless QC is correct, quantum non-determinism
33 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
doesn't play into these things at the scale under consideration. Therefore, to observe the kinds of
probabilistic results QC predicts, where the voltage meter would spike only part of the time, we would be
witness to the violation of these laws. Are we sure enough to make such a bold prediction?
Keep in mind, however, that to call such an outcome a "violation" may be a bit harsh. We did question
earlier whether the so-called "laws of nature" are more relics of an absolutist way of thinking, and that
nature really doesn't deal in such immutable rules - or at least, that nature plays by her own rules and is not
concerned with equipping us with the right kinds of intellectual faculties to understand what those rules are.
Nonetheless, the prediction is very risky. It is unlike most predictions that follow from quantum theory since
it sets the arena in which they can be tested on a macroscopic level. But then again, this is not unheard of.
The double-slit experiment, for example, demonstrates quantum effects on a level for all to see with the
naked eye (the interference pattern). So this prediction is far from unorthodox - it's just extremely bold.
And what if QC doesn't turn out to be true? What if, after conducting a battery of experiments like the ones
mentioned above, we find very little support for the theory? Would we then have to revert back to a
deterministic view of the brain? Of course, we couldn't revert back too far down the scale of size before we
hit the wall of quantum mechanics. We may not see neurons in superposition states, but we can always count
on subatomic particles existing in superposition states, particles that make up those very neurons, which in
turn make up the brain. In short, there is always some stirrings of quantum phenomena deep in the bowls of
the brain. Therefore, the question becomes: can we still salvage free-will by appeal to these quantum
phenomena, regardless of how infinitesimal?
The trouble with this is that any attempt to equate free-will with the non-determinism at nanoscopic scales
could never account for the kind of freedom we attribute to the overt behavior of macroscopic animals like
ourselves. We attribute the will to choices that can be so potent in overcoming the odds that it amounts to
nothing other than a violation of the laws of nature as they would otherwise assert themselves in our brains.
For example, a volunteer fire fighter who, in virtue of his own human nature, fears death as profoundly as
anyone else musters the courage and the will to risk his life in order to save a helpless child trapped inside a
burning building. If we are attributing such acts of bravery, or any act of defiance against our more natural
impulses and propensities, to free-will, then what we are saying, in effect, is that we are going against what
the brain, in virtue of the electrical, chemical, and other mechanical forces active therein, would naturally
drive us to do. In other words, we are defying the laws of nature at the level of neurons. QC could account
for this easily by supposing that these neurons exist in superposition states, but we are considering, at the
moment, whether an account for free-will could still be given should neurons never display superposition
states. The only things displaying superposition in this scenario are entities no greater in size than the
subatomic particles of the brain. It doesn't seem plausible at all to suppose that the states in which these
things collapse could have any noticeable effect on things the size of neurons, nor, in turn, on human
behavior. This is why I consider the hypothetical voltage meter experiment described above to be the key
test for advancing or discrediting Hameroff's theory.
Quantum Consciousness and Classical Neurology

So we wouldn't be able to credit free-will for every one of our actions, not even those for which no
conceivable causal force can be identified from a subjective point of view. But perhaps there is still a way
by which we can explain the feeling of freedom by appeal to the authentic freedom to choose our
experiences down in the quantum world. That is, if QC is wrong, but we cannot dismiss the non-determinism
of quantum phenomena as they exist at a subatomic scale in our brains, then maybe we can still posit
free-will at that level, and the experience of freedom may actually resonate to higher levels. In short, we feel
the freedom of quantum events despite the fact that we can't attribute that freedom to our actions.
To understand this a little more clearly, let's toy with an analogy.

Suppose that we had a swimming pool full of bubblegum balls.
Some are red and some are yellow. If you scoop out a handful of
these gum balls, you will definitely see distinct instances of them -
you will be able to tell, easily, which are red and which are yellow.
Now suppose you climbed to the top of a ten story building and
looked down at the pool. Would you still be able to discern the red
ones from the yellow ones? Of course not. They are too far away,
and all you will see is a blur of orange. However, the fact that it's
orange you see - not red and not yellow - means that you are, in fact,
seeing both colors. You are seeing the red ones and you are seeing
the yellow ones - you just can't distinguish between them.
34 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
In a similar way, perhaps the sense of freedom we feel comes directly from the actual freedom of the
superposition states of subatomic particles in our brains to collapse into whatever states they choose. Rather
than "seeing" this freedom, like we see the red and yellow gum balls from afar, we feel it. But like the gum
balls, we can't identify any one particular instance of freedom - we can't refer to any one quantum event as a
demonstration of the fact that we are indeed free. But the brain is fraught with these events - everything is. It
fills our brains, and all of nature, like water to a sponge. Therefore, it would make perfect sense to suppose
that the freedom of events undergoing quantum collapse is equally saturated in our brains. The degree of
freedom we feel would be proportional to the ratio between those events in our brains, at the quantum scale,
whose outcomes could be said to be relatively certain and those that are relatively probable (much like the
ratio of red gum balls to yellow ones).
This is meant to account for the feeling of freedom; not the actual having of freedom. That is, this freedom
remains at the quantum level, and at the macroscopic level of everyday life, our behavior is, for all intents
and purposes, still deterministic. We do what we do in accordance with standard neurological principles.
Neurons send signals to other neurons and chemicals mediate these signals, and the brain's overall activity is
regulated. Likewise, these same neural and chemical processes control all our muscles and other bodily
functions, keeping our behavior in line at all times. But all the while, we perpetually experience freedom
behind all these events. In a sense, it is behind these events - all these relatively deterministic events are
built on top of the quantum world - they are built on freedom.
But whatever the fate of QC - whether it is bound to survive all the tests awaiting it or doomed to fail - its
legacy will remain. That legacy is the uniting of quantum non-determinism with free-will. If QC survives,
this union can be expressed at the level of neurons. If QC perishes, however, the union still holds, but only at
the level of subatomic particles. So in either case, Hameroff and Penrose give us a conceptual alternative to
the simple randomness of collapse that occurs when superposition states decohere. Instead of speaking in
terms of randomness, we can use the lingo of free-will. We would say that as the realness in a given
experience dilutes itself throughout a range of meaning, the experience, as a conscious being, gains more
freedom to choose what it wants to be. That is, it eventually makes a decision on which of the possible
meanings it wants to ground its realness in. And when this happens, it becomes more prominently real as the
precise quale it has chosen for itself, and thus it becomes necessarily that quale.
Of course, it is a poor use of words to say that it chooses what it "wants" to be. It experiences no desire, no
preference for one specific meaning or another. Desire is another experience unto itself, and it would be
absurd to suppose that a "want" could be infused into what is already a particular experience of some other
kind. Besides, to choose according to one's desires is not as free as a choice made completely uninfluenced
by anything - that is, desire is more often than not a determining force that one usually finds hard to resist. A
choice made out of pure and utter freedom is a choice that mimics randomness. Yet, as we have seen with the
principle of The Chaos of Randomness, it cannot really be random. Hameroff himself concedes this as he
The Chaos of
argues that free-will is not determined, yet not random - it's something else. This is why we have opted for
Randomness the term "non-deterministic". The experience that chooses what it "wants" to be has some other means by
which it chooses, and this means is, for all intents and purposes, unimaginable.
Be that as it may, it does sooth the curious mind to consider free-will as an alternative to randomness. At
least free-will is familiar, and although we may not understand what it is or how it works, it does give us that
sense of rapport with whatever has it. So instead of these bizarre and mysterious seemingly random events
that go on at the quantum level, we come to perceive events that are simply choosing their own outcome. The
non-determinism is still as elusive to our understanding as ever, but it just seems so much simpler from this
point of view. Of course, the union of free-will with quantum non-determinism may be wrong all together, in
which case we'd have to reluctantly settle for virtual randomness in what inherits, from the range of meaning,
all the realness from the whole range, and as we've seen, this is not so bad for MM-Theory so long as we
view realness as varying along a gradient. Nonetheless, if ever there were a place for free-will in a theory of
the universe - whether based on physics or a subjectivist theory like ours - the quantum world would be it.
Participation in The Universal Will

Now let's depart from the world of the nanoscopic and set our sights on the cosmic. In this final section, we
make our last attempt at reconciling free-will with determinism. Once again, we return to a classical view of
determinism whereby it is free-will that must yield. However, our approach this time will permit both the
freedom of the will and the inviolability of determinism to coexist in the same model. So what yields? It is
still free-will, but it's not the freedom of the will that yields; rather, it is who, or what, has it. What we will
35 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
suggest is that free-will may very well be real in an utterly deterministic universe if it belongs to none other
than the universe itself, and although we make much use of this will, it is only in virtue of our mutual
participation in the universe that we do so. We are not detached from the universe, although we fancy
ourselves as independent, autonomous beings. We are every bit a part of the universe as all the mountains,
waters, skies, and all the planets, stars, galaxies, and every little grain of sand, molecule, and fundamental
particle. When we act, it is the universe acting. This is not the universe defying our freedom; it is our oneness
with the universe that preserves our freedom, for even our freedom is one with that belonging to the universe.
This is the idea that we will articulate in much more detail, and with much needed clarity, throughout the rest
of this section.
To begin with, we ought to accept the onus of defending the claim that a universe that is fully determined can
possess any sort of freedom to choose. After all, the notion that often conjures up in one's mind when he/she
hears of freedom is that of thwarting any sort of rules that may bear down upon the one exercising that
freedom. So if the laws of nature that play out in my brain, left to their own devices, would determine my
every action, the notion that I am free entails that I am capable of preempting these laws and imposing my
own chosen course of action in their place. Why should it be any different for the entire universe? If it had
any freedom, it should be able to suspend its own laws, and every now and then, we should be witness to
such instances. Even if we suppose that this does occur, whether or not witnesses are ever there to record it,
we will get nowhere in arguing for a clean reconciliation of free-will with determinism, since in that case,
determinism has clearly yielded. Even if it never broke its own laws, the simple fact that it can - that the
potential is there - invalidates any consistent definition of determinism. So we will not argue along that line.
We must meet the onus we carry by justifying the authenticity of free-will, as it is owned by the universe,
without touching its exhaustively deterministic character at all.
The Freedom of The Universe

The first step towards a solution is to ask what it means for something to be determined. Let's call that which
is determined d and that which determines D. So, for example, a lit match D determines the state of a puddle
of gasoline d, when it is drop into it, to be on fire. What it means for d to be determined is simply for D to
exist. More formally, D is something outside of d - or more simply, D is not d. That is to say, something is
determined when there are other forces outside of it that have the determining influence necessary to qualify
that something as determined. There are several ways in which D can be separated from d, two of which are
spatial and temporal. Spatial separation is simple: D impinges on d form the outside. A strong wind can push
me over, for example. In the temporal sense of separation, when D exists in a certain state or carries out a
certain action, that state or action can have determining effects on the future states or actions of D, which, at
that time, can be called d. That is to say, if we consider D and d to share a continuous identity through time,
where D is an earlier instance of d, then surely D can determine d. My consuming three cups of coffee in the
Mental Models present, for example, will determine my wakeful and restless night later on. Besides spatial and temporal
separation, there is also conceptual separation whereby the identities of two conceptual objects, or mental
models, are seen as distinct. In the equation a 2 + b2 = c2, for example, the variables a, b, and c are
recognized as separate entities. That is, we conceive of a or b being not the same variable as c. They are
"outside" c, as it were. Yet they coexist with c, as the sides of a right triangle coexist with its hypotenuse,
and determine c's numerical value. Conceptual separation, along with the spatial and temporal kinds, are
what permit entities to determine, and be determined by, each other. In brief, for something to be determined,
there has to be something other to do the determining, something over which the determined has no power.
Principle: The Relation Between The Determining

and The Determined
An entity or event d is determined if, and only if,
another entity or event D, which is spatially,
temporally, or conceptually separate from d,
determines d.
The universe is a place in which all particular things therein are subject to the influence of all other things.
Nothing really exists in isolation. Even in the void of empty space, there are many influences at work, such
as gravitational fields that originate from all other material bodies, or the cosmic microwave background
The Cosmic
radiation - a low-energy "bath" of microwaves that permeate all of space and are left over from the Big
Microwave
36 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
Background
Radiation Bang - or the light from distant stars that exist in every direction. Even when we consider the universe as a
network of experiences connected by entailment, we get the idea that no one experience in particular is free
from the influence of those experiences that preceded it. Therefore, the only thing that has a chance of being
free from any determining influences is that for which there is nothing else in existence - the universe itself.
But, of course, as we pointed out above, an object, even if it could be isolated from all other things, would
Experience still be under the influence of its past states and actions. The universe is no freer from its own past states and
actions than an ordinary object. Therefore, we must consider the universe, not only in its present state, but
also in all the states it was ever in and all the states it will ever go through. Only in that broad a scope can
we honestly say that the universe is free from any determining forces.
Entailment
What we are considering, then, is the form the universe
takes as it exists beyond time and space, the universe as
one timeless, spaceless thing - the only thing. Such a thing
cannot be influenced by anything exterior to it, nor can it
be influenced by itself, for any of its past states that would
otherwise determine its present state are already
incorporated into what, in the utmost essential sense, it is
that we are considering. Such a thing is free.
Principle: The Non-Deterministic Status of The

Universe
When the universe is considered in its entirety and in
all its states throughout the whole of time, it becomes
a spaceless and timeless entity in relation to which
nothing else exists. It follows, therefore, from the
principle of The Relation Between The Determining
and The Determined that, when considered in this
state, the universe is not determined by anything - it
is non-deterministic.
Does it have free-will? After all, to be free from outside determining forces is one thing, but to actually have
a will is another. To be sure, it is a consciousness. We are still proponents of MM-Theory, and so we
attribute conscious experience to the universe at all levels and under all perspectives. We will consider
what the ultimate experience must be like for a universe that is all and everything, and which takes some
unimaginable form beyond time and space, in our paper The Universe and "God". Without elaborating on this
too extensively, we will essentially argue that the "universal experience", so to speak, is such that it entails
itself - that is, it is a self-reinforcing and self-justifying experience. And in a spaceless and timeless context -
a context in which the upholding of the universe's existence can be attributed to nothing but itself - we can
easily construe its freedom as a genuine will by appeal to the compatibilist framework outlined above,
which tells us that a will is such when its actions issue from the self. Of course, the compatibilist account
works only insofar as we wish to construe it as a will, but insofar as we wish to construe it as genuine
freedom, the account given here is quite the opposite; the freedom of compatibilism depends on a
deterministic framework - one cannot be in control unless one is controlled, we said - but the freedom
considered here is true freedom from any determining forces. So it is a will in the compatibilist sense, but it
is free in the fullest sense of the word "freedom".
But even in appealing to compatibilism, there is a problem. What would there be for it to exert its will upon?
There would be nothing, not even itself. For a being to exert its will upon itself, or anything for that matter, it
needs an expanded interval of time through which the exercising of this will can develop. In every act of
will, there is first the intention, then the act, and finally the consequence. These occur in a temporal order.
But without an expansion of time, acts of will cannot develop in this way. So even if it had a will, it seems
difficult to fathom that it could be put to any use, in which case, it seems doubtful that there is any sense in
which it could really be free.
37 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
In fact, having said this, it almost seems as though we ought to revert back to a deterministic description. The
universe, from this perspective, is one thing. There is nothing else in existence and there is nothing else
throughout the course of time. Whatever else there could be, it is this. Therefore, the universe is determined
simply to be what it is. It cannot change. Is this the state of a being we would call free?
It gets tricky at this point because it seems we are positing another condition for determinism - namely,
identity. That is, whereas earlier we concluded that for something to be determined, there must be something
beyond that thing, something other, to do the determining. Here, we are, in a sense, retracting that idea in light
of the determining power of the very identity of a thing. We are saying that a thing is determined to be exactly
what it is because it simply can't be what it's not. A thing determines itself, in other words.
The problem with this form of determinism, however, is that it doesn't actually exclude free-will. Suppose,
for example, that I chose to read a book. I chose to do this freely. The fact of the matter is, however, that
once I've chosen to do this, I am, without question, reading a book. That is, the identity of the act I am now
engaged in is none other than "reading a book". This is what it is, and it cannot be anything else. Am I to say,
then, that I am determined to read my book - that I had no choice? Obviously not. There is, of course, a sense
in which this act is determined - it necessarily is what it is - but this is not the kind of determinism that butts
heads with free-will. It is perfectly compatible. For each and every act of will, there is a determinism of
identity in both the act and the consequences of the act. In fact, the determinism of identity is very often
established by an act of will - the book reading scenario is a case in point. Through the power of our will,
we can determine the identity of things. By the same token, we can determine our own identities - that is, we
can determine the states and predispositions we put ourselves in. This, of course, still plays out through time,
where an act of will the moment before one's state or predisposition is determined is followed by that same
determination. The question, therefore, is: could a being will its own state - that is, it's own identity - in a
timeless context?
What I propose is that the timeless and spaceless form the universe takes in its entirety may actually be the
only arena in which determinism and free-will finally come to reconciliation. It is only from this vantage
point that we get a glimpse of how the two are actually different - maybe opposite - forms of the same thing.
How so? We have just seen how the determinism of identity is perfectly consistent with free-will. Why is
this? Because the identity of an act, state, consequence, entity created from an act, or anything else that comes
by way of free-will is determined by the act of will. My will to make a pizza determines my dinner to
actually be pizza. So what could determine the identity of the universe beyond space and time in its totality?
Could the universe will for itself its own identity? And in doing so, would it not then be determined to have
that identity and at the same time have chosen it freely and still be free?
This certainly sounds paradoxical - to be determined and free at the same time - but keep in mind the
timeless state we are considering here. The paradox comes about primarily because we are used to
imagining acts of will as they manifest through time. For example, when I eat the pizza I made myself for
dinner, I willingly change my state from one of hunger to one of satiation. Once satiated, however, I can do
nothing about it. I cannot choose to undo the act of eating, thereby reverting my state back to one of hunger (I
suppose I could regurgitate it all, but this would do nothing to change my past actions. Whatever is past is
carved in stone). But for the universe, in its timeless state, whatever act of will it carries out on itself has the
intended consequence, yet at the same time, the act is never done with. That is, since these acts are carried
out in a timeless context, there is no "before" to allocate the willful act, nor is there an "after" for the
consequence. They both occur "at the same time" (technically, this is a poor choice of words since the "same
time" denotes a point in time for two or more events to coincide. We should really think of the act and the
consequence simply as having no chronological order with respect to each other). Therefore, the act of will
is always present, coinciding with the consequence it brings. There is no point when it is "too late". The
universe never enters a state in which the act of will that brought it into that state is done and over with. It is
always in the midst of choosing its own identity, always choosing for itself to be what it is. Thus it is, at
once, determined by itself, and freely determining itself.
But what exactly is the identity it chooses for itself? Whatever it is, it could not be something that goes
through changes. That is, the universe could not choose for itself to be one thing at one moment, and then
something different the next. Whatever it chooses, it can only be this. The reason is obviously that we are
still speaking within the same timeless context, a context where change is impossible. So then what is this
one thing that the universe, once and for all, ultimately is? Well, let's just say it is the will to exist. Our
reasons for saying this will be more clear after reading the paper The Universe and "God" where, after
giving an account of what the experience of being the universe is like, we will see that this is the only thing
the universe can be in terms of free-will (if we want to attribute free-will to it). Understand this correctly.
The will of the universe is not so much to exist, but to be existence. And what is existence other than the
ultimate experience we will explore in The Universe and "God"? That is, what is this experience in terms of
38 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
free-will? Well, if the universe can be only one thing, then it must be its own will. That is, it wills itself to
be this very will. It is a fully effective self-reinforcing will.
Now, this idea may not be clear without reading The Universe and "God". It is not clear how a universe that
is essentially a network of experiences could culminate in a great will. Rest assured, however, that an
equivalence can be shown between such a will and the experience that the universe ultimately is, an
experience that breaks down into the more particular experiences we know of and those corresponding to
every other particular physical system in existence. We already mentioned how this equivalence holds for
the compatibilist account of free-will (almost anything can be said to have free-will according to
compatibilism, so long as it is bestowed with consciousness), and it also holds for the subjectivist
perspective we entertained above, the perspective by which causes map onto reasons and justifications. The
latter perspective requires a bit more of an in depth understanding insofar as the nature of the universe's
"justification" for its choice is concerned, a term we will define more thoroughly in The Universe and
"God". This term is more or less synonymous with the more informal terms "reason" and "justification" we
employed when describing the subjective perspective above, and for all intents and purposes we can think of
the universe's justification for willing its own existence in a similar way. The universal experience, in other
words, justifies itself. The bridge that links this experience to a universal will won't be explicitly laid out,
but so long as the reader keeps the compatibilist and subjective perspectives in mind, this bridge can be built
without much confusion.
Expanding The Universe - Again

The only question that remains is how this great will can be brought down to the level of human beings and
other sentient creatures who seem to possess some measure of freedom. In customizing a particular definition
of "equivalence" in the paper The Universe and "God", we will be able to say that certain experiences are
equivalent to others in terms of their meaning. More specifically, the meaning in one whole experience is
equivalent to the sum total of the meanings in all its component experiences. What do we mean by a
"component experience"? Take, as an example, the experience of seeing a tree. The visual beholding of the
tree is one whole experience. Its component experiences are the visual beholding of its leaves, its branches
and trunk, the color of the leaves, their swaying in the wind, and so on. In other words, whatever components
turn up when we do a reductive analysis of a given experience is what we mean by "component
experiences". We say that the meaning of the whole is equivalent to the meaning of the sum of the parts.
Meaning is much like a mathematical equation in that it has no physical parts, and it doesn't exist "out there",
but it is information and it conveys its content to a beholder. Equivalence is, therefore, like the relation
between the right and left sides of an equation. Take, for example, the following:
1 = 0.5 + 0.5 = 0.25 + 0.25 + 0.25 + 0.25 = ...
The meaning in any one full expression is equivalent to the meaning in any other - they are all 1. You can
imagine the expression '1' represents the experience of the full universe beyond space and time. The
expression '0.5 + 0.5', therefore, represents the experiences corresponding to the universe as it is broken
down into two arbitrary parts (everything to the left of the Sun and everything to the right ). It is
completely arbitrary whether or not these parts are perfectly equal (if they were not, an expression like '0.1 +
0.9' might suffice). It is also arbitrary whether or not we divide the universe into two parts as opposed to
three or four or a trillion. Whatever the case, we can be assured that however we carve up the universe, the
parts we yield will correspond to experiences of some kind, the summation of which will be equivalent to
the experience of the universe as a whole. It's no different from physical reductionism - whatever parts we
discern in a physical system are indeed there and do, in fact, make up the whole system. So we can do this
sort of reduction down to the level of human beings and other sentient creatures.
What, then, can we say about the freedom that belongs to the will of the universe? When we split the
universal experience up into its parts, what happens to free-will? The will remains in each and every part. A
cloud, for example, when it rains, wills itself to rain. In terms of its own experiences, we would say that it
wills itself to entail those experiences that correspond to the process of condensation and rain. But here we
have a problem. As soon as we split the universe into its parts, we are forced back into a deterministic
paradigm. The cloud cannot escape the laws that underlie the process of condensation. When the right
Entailment conditions for rain are met, the cloud has no choice but to condensate. So how is it free? It is free because,
although it is a component of the universe, it is still one with the universe. That is, rather than think of the
cloud as an entity separated from the rest of the universe, we should understand the more accurate view that
it is an extension of the universe, much like my hand is an extension of myself and so its actions are really my
39 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
own. Therefore, whatever act it carries out (such as condensation), this is really the universe acting. But is
this enough to say that the universe is acting freely? Could the universe have done otherwise if it so chose? If
it could, we could hardly say that the cloud's condensation is a law of nature.
At this point, we can say that whatever particular events or phenomena we consider, when taken together
with the rest of the universe throughout all of time, it constitutes a component of the universal will to exist.
Therefore, these particular events and phenomena are just what necessarily must be in order for the universe,
as a whole, to maintain its existence. In other words, the reason the cloud condenses and forms rain is
because this is what must happen in order to preserve its identity to the timeless, spaceless, static form of the
universe. The universe simply is these events and phenomena - at least partially. So what we can say about
the role that free-will plays is that the will to exist is equivalent to the will to make the cloud rain coupled
with the will to make everything else happen in the universe throughout all of time. The universe wills it all.
It doesn't will each event and phenomenon individually - as though it could decide that one such event or
phenomenon will adhere to natural laws whereas another won't. It makes one choice for everything and for
all time. The choice to exist just is the choice for there to be inviolable laws governing all particular events
and phenomena. The universe is not bound to the laws of nature. It wills the laws of nature to exist, and it is
only in virtue of our expanding the universe through time and space (i.e. the way our minds perceive it) that
we see these laws occurring uniformly throughout space and repeating throughout time. What we are seeing,
in effect, is a reminder that the universe is a place in which, under the right conditions, clouds will
condensate and rain. The universe chooses for itself to be exactly this, and so every instance of a law of
nature is a spatially and temporally expanded expression of its choice and its identity.
One could say that the laws of nature are what preserve the identity of the universe. Take a rubber ball, for
example. When thrown at a hard surface, it will bounce - a perfect example of a natural law. The reason why
it bounces is because the universe that exists at the moment one throws the ball must be linked to the same
timeless universe as that linked to the universe of the next moment, namely when the ball bounces. Although
at each instant, we are considering the universe only in that slice of time, it still maintains a necessary
connection to the universe as a whole - the universe in its timeless state. And because the universe at each
instant maintains an identity with the same whole, there are going to be necessary conditions that hold for
each instant. In this particular example, the condition is that if a rubber ball is thrown at a hard surface in one
instant, in the next instant the ball must bounce off that surface. That is, the only way the universe at each
instant can be the same universe is if this condition holds.
Again, this can be represented by an equation. Consider the following:
y = bx + c
If we want to do something to one side of the equation - anything - we would have to do the same to the other
side. For example, if we wanted to subtract c from the right side, we would have to subtract c from the left
side as well. We would get:
y - c = bx
As a representation of natural laws, what this says is that when something is done to the universe in one
instant, something equivalent must be done to the universe in the next instant. If not, it becomes "imbalanced"
so to speak. The universe in one instant would lose its identity with the universe in the next instant, like the
left side of the equation would lose its identity with the right side. If they lose their identity to each other,
they lose their identity to the whole. So when one heats a pot of water, it boils. Boiling is the event that
compensates for the imbalance caused by the change in water temperature. When a solid is thrown into a
bucket of liquid, the liquid rises. Rising is the
event that compensates for the imbalance caused
by the solid being thrown into the liquid. When
sodium and chlorine are mixed together, a
chemical reaction will be triggered, and salt will
be produced. The production of salt is the event
that compensates for the imbalance caused by
adding sodium and chlorine together. In all these
cases, the "imbalance" refers to the state of the
universe, starting at one instant in time, going
through some kind of change, and thereby altering
its identity. Since the universe's identity can't
really change, a compensating event must
40 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
coincide with the change in question such that the changed state of the universe, coupled with that
compensating event, is equivalent to the universe as it was before this change.
What can be said about the cloud can be said about human beings as well. Every one of our acts are executed
freely, and the will behind it can be ultimately traced back to the universe itself. Yet, this is not to say that
this will is not ours. It is not as though our freedom is illusory, and that it is really the universe that is free.
The freedom we feel really is the same freedom the universe indulges in, except that in our case, it coincides
with a spatially and temporally expanded existence. What ultimately is being willed, by the universe and us,
is the continued existence of everything, of reality. This is where the schism lies, however. That is, in order
for our will to be united with that of the universe, exactly the same ends must be pursued. If the end towards
which the universe channels its will is its own existence, our will must also work towards this end. But it
never feels like this, not once (not in my lifetime in any case). When I exercise my will, it might be for a
whole slew of reasons. I might be interested in repairing my car, in tending to my lawn, in going out to rent a
movie, to grab a snack, to call up a friend, or whatever my heart desires. It certainly isn't to maintain the
reality I find myself in - I assume reality takes care of that itself. So how do we mend this schism?
What we have touched on here is a disparity of objectives. That is, it is not a disparity between our
individual wills and that of the universe, but between the objectives being worked towards in the exercise of
this will. While the universe's objective is to sustain its own existence, my objective may be to, say, make a
ham and cheese sandwich. The disparity becomes evident upon expanding the timeless and spaceless form of
the universe back into its time-bound and space-bound form. When that happens, we get distinct physical
systems (or experiences) going through distinct stages of whatever activity or process they are undergoing.
One must remember that all these distinct systems and distinct stages all contribute in their own unique - and
necessary - way to the ultimate identity of the universe. In willing itself to exist, the universe wills this
identity for itself. It wills itself to be this identity. It therefore wills itself to be each and every distinct
system and distinct stage of every process, even the making of a ham and cheese sandwich by my own hands.
My objective in making this
sandwich is a necessary stage
in the happenings of the
universe as a whole, and the
sandwich is a necessary
object that adds to the full
identity of what the universe
is. In other words, my
objective is a small, but
necessary, step in meeting the
greater objective of the
universe, much like adding the
cheese is a necessary step in
making the sandwich. We only
get a glimpse of these smaller
steps when we expand the
universe into time and space.
When we expand the universe
in this way, the main objective
of the universe's will, the end
goal, is no longer a neatly encapsulated whole. It is no longer "one thing"; it is a series of steps, each
involving a number of distinct systems that must be followed through with in order to meet the grand
objective of a sustained existence. The universe is a place in which, at a specific time, in a particular house,
I will make a ham and cheese sandwich. If this is what the universe wills itself to be, even if only in part, it
must will for me to make the ham and cheese sandwich. And if it takes a specific component of itself to do
this, namely myself, then it will be this component that carries out this very particular step. The will of the
universe will be there in the act, felt by the component, and since the particular objective of making the
sandwich is a necessary step, this will actually be the focus of the component's attention. In what other way
could this step be realized? I, as the one component fit to carry out this task, must see it as my own personal
objective. In no other way could I carry out this task freely.
Obviously, I am not assigned this task. It's not as though my aim is to do my part in sustaining the existence of
the universe. I have no idea that the universe has a greater objective in mind than my trivial goal to make a
sandwich. What this reflects is more the experience that motivates my will, and the epistemic
Epistemic unconsciousness of whatever other motives precede and proceed my own actions. So I suffer from a sort of
Unconsciousness shortsightedness with respect to the universe. I see only my own goals. This doesn't prevent my goal from
being an infinitesimal step in a larger agenda, however. Although I have no epistemic awareness of any of
41 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
the universe's other goals, the universe does know about my goals in virtue of the fact that my experiences
are also the universe's experiences, and the knowledge of my own goals is also known by the universe. Once
I accomplish my goals, I leave the universe in a particular state that continues to go through flux and evolves
by the hands of something other than myself. This flux is the process by which antecedent objectives are met,
and the hands that guide it belong, not to me, but to the rest of the universe. It is the next step towards meeting
the grand objective of existence. The universe continues to experience the motives behind this endeavor, just
Epistemic
as it did the experiences guiding me towards my objective, but since these experiences are not mine, I fail to
Awareness
recognize their connection to the objective of my own personal will. I fail to see how it, along with my own
objectives, are but minute steps in a greater process.
It is almost as though part of the plan the universe has in mind for sustaining its own existence is the creation
of individuated beings - namely, humans - that can experience their own objectives as being theirs
personally. It creates these beings out of itself - that is, in terms of the material substances that make up their
bodies and the experiences that make up their minds, the universe draws these resources from itself. And
even after having created them, they continue to maintain their oneness with the universe, even though they
may feel individuated, for the universe never really severs them from itself (much like how the creation of an
idea or a thought doesn't sever that idea or thought from our minds). So it's almost as if the universe decided
to split itself up into a multitude of individuals, each with their own objectives and life agendas, such that the
fruits they bear will ultimately contribute to the universal goal. These objectives and agendas are really set
out, from the very beginning, by the universe itself, and when we carry them out as individuals, we are really
the universe carrying them out, temporarily oblivious to the fact that we are the universe and that part the
process in meeting the grand objective is to create this oblivion, an oblivion that was setup from the start to
last only until our deaths after which time the state of our minds would return to what they were before our
birth - a remembering of our oneness with the universe. At least, it is as if this was what the universe had in
mind.
Principle: Disparity of Objectives

Although we and the universe participate in the same
will, there is a disparity between our objectives. The
objective of the universe is simply to exist, whereas
our objectives could be a myriad of different things
but existence is not one of them. Whatever our
objectives, they are also the universe's objectives and
they form the necessary steps towards meeting the
objective of existence.
So although the universe partakes in our objectives, these are not the highest objectives the universe has at
stake. For the universe, the highest objective is existence. For us, the highest objectives span no longer than a
lifetime. So although our highest objectives are different, the will that sees them through is the same. Our
will to meet our objectives is the same will that the universe puts towards meeting its objective of existing.
At no matter what level of the universe we are focused on, and no matter where or when, whatever happens
there is motivated by the same will as everywhere else. It is one will that permeates everything and for all
time, and we humans participate in it. This explains a little more than the feeling of freedom; the freedom we
feel is real - it really is free-will that we have, that works behind our every action. It really does belong to us
too - the universe shares its will with everything within itself. The only difference is the objective we
foresee. Even then, the objectives are always shared between us and the universe, but we, in our limited
role, can't see passed those objectives that concern only our lives, and so for us, it is the highest objectives
we can aspire to that mark the difference between us and the universe.
Some Objections
A few objections I anticipate from some readers are: 1) This may be all well and good for reconciling strict
determinism with free-will, but the fact of the matter is the universe is not deterministic, as the section
Quantum Theory above makes clear. Determinism is required for a spatially and temporally expanded
universe to maintain an identity with its spaceless and timeless form - namely, the will to exist. How could it
Flow will its own existence if the world, at the quantum level, is non-deterministic? 2) For the most part, when we
42 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
work towards our objectives, we succeed. But this is obviously not always the case. We sometimes fail.
Wouldn't this constitute the universe failing? If our objectives are shared with the universe, then our failure
must count as the failure of the universe. And if our objectives are a crucial step towards the greater
objective of maintaining existence, then a failure on the part of the universe to accomplish any one of these
objectives would culminate in the demise of its own existence. This certainly can't be the case. 3) To have an
objective is to foresee it - that is, it is to have a plan, a goal. If we didn't know what we wanted or what we
were aiming to achieve, how could there be any objective? Yet, planning, which requires thought, memory,
knowledge, and other forms of cogitation, is a human activity. Therefore, it would be difficult for anything
that cannot think to have an objective. What is the meaning, therefore, of the universe having an objective?
Surely, the great majority of experiences therein are not human, let alone cognitive. How can the universe
have a "plan"? 4) This account of free-will may be a bit too radical. If free-will is behind each and every
act, anywhere and anytime in the universe, then each and every one of our experiences should feel free to
flow in whichever direction it chooses. But then why are some experiences, like sensations and, to an extent,
emotions, beyond our control? I can't choose to feel cold as hot, for example. But if the will of the universe
is in that sensation, driving its dynamics, then should it not come along with a sense of control? These are
fair objections, and we shall close this section by answering them all.
The first objection has a simple reply. We've already resolved the problem of quantum non-determinism in
the universe, and the solution we invested in works for this objection as well. When quantum
non-determinism arises, we know that the phenomena that exhibit this non-determinism are not fully real.
They are unreal in proportion to the extent that the phenomena in question are non-deterministic. Therefore,
any non-determinism at the quantum level may be accounted for by the same degree of imperfection in the
universe's will to exist. That is, the universe's will to exist may be immensely powerful, but it is not
necessarily absolute. It may just be that the universe's will is only 99.99% effective (or thereabouts), in
which case, it doesn't quite meet a full and absolute ontology. It is only 99.99% real. The 0.01% shortcoming
is reflected in the non-determinism of the quantum world.
The objection concerning the failure of one's objective is equally simple to confront. It is true that we often
fail in our objectives, and it is therefore the universe failing as well, but this hardly makes a dent in the
larger objectives the universe is pursuing. In fact, if we failed, it can only be due to other entities and
processes in the universe that we have come up against, entities and processes that are also driven by the
will of the universe. In other words, the universe deliberately thwarted our objectives - its own objectives.
What does this mean? It means that in light of the greatest objectives the universe has in mind, it must be
crucial that some of the lesser objectives be stifled. But why? Well, simply because it is sometimes the
pursuit of such objectives that matters, not their satisfaction. That is, it must be that the universe, in creating
us to pursue certain objectives, and in creating the situations that instigate such pursuits, has in mind only for
us to strive for those objectives, not to meet them. It must be that such striving is what matters, along with the
consequences of meeting up with the obstacles that ultimately lead us to failure. In that process, the will to
achieve our objectives is authentic with both ourselves and the universe fully meaning for headway towards
the objective to be made.
As for the third objection - that there must be a plan behind every objective - the fact of the matter is, there
are a myriad of ways to exercise one's will without crafting a plan beforehand. For example, when the phone
rings, I, out of habit, immediately pick it up without thought. Yet I am doing it freely and willfully. I could
just as easily refrain from answering the phone as I could any other simple act. Other examples include acts
of a more emotional nature, such as picking up a phone to call someone dear to me whom I miss. This doesn't
require a lot of forethought or meticulous strategizing; it is most often done in the spur of the moment. The
sole driving force behind this sort of act is a desire, a want. I do it because I want to, and I am free to carry
through with it or withdraw from it. In all these cases, there is a clear objective, an end towards which I am
moving freely and with little, if any, invested planning. Why should we assume, therefore, that the universe,
driven by its kaleidoscope of experiences, has any need for cogitation, or anything resembling it, in order to
have a will that seeks to satisfy an objective?
Although this reply meets the challenge of the third objection, let's develop it further. In so doing, we shall
gain some insight into how we might confront the fourth and final objection (that some experiences don't
seem willed at all). The examples mentioned above - impulsively picking up a ringing phone and calling a
friend out of emotion - can be difficult to resist. When we don't fight them, the experience feels willed. When
we do fight them, however, it feels as though our will belongs to the act of resistance, and that the emotions
or impulses being fought have a driving force all their own - not a will that belongs to us, but a force almost
akin to nature herself. That is to say, it is those occasions
when we try to fight against our emotional drives and
impulses that it feels as though those emotions and
impulses are actually the deterministic forces within us,
43 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
challenging the strength of our will. It is in those moments,

when we attribute the failure to tame our emotions and
impulses to their overbearing power, that we claim we
couldn't help it, that we had no choice. This isn't what it
seems, however. It is not that our emotions and other
impulses have been stripped of their will, but that there is
a clashing of wills within the same psyche. The will to do
as we please, to satisfy our emotions, is still alive and
well - in fact, evinced by the difficulty in resisting them.
But our attempts to resist them constitute a second will,
one driven more by reason and principle - or even by
another emotion. So there is no need to classify such contending mental forces as deterministic in nature, or
at least, in this case, as without the freedom of their will. Every mental force counts as a freely flowing agent
with its own objective that may or may not clash with other objectives being pursued by other mental forces.
This accounts for experiences that we feel drive what we do, such as emotions and learnt or instinctual
impulses, but a little more needs to be said in order to account for experiences like sensations. Sensations
may indeed drive us sometimes, but they don't seem willed in the least. Putting this another way, we may be
able to describe emotional struggles as one will battling against another, both belonging to one individual,
because there is a sense in which both objectives - that of our emotions and that of our counter-emotional
intentions - are ours. The objective of our counter-
emotional intentions is clearly ours because it is we who
are pitting ourselves against our emotional inclinations, yet
at the same time, it is we who want what our emotions
strive for, and we who would otherwise take what our
emotions strive for if it wasn't for our better judgment. But
in the case of sensations, this doesn't seem to work both
ways. That is, it may work in the one way - namely, in that
we can strive to alter our sensations (seldom with any
success) - but in the other way - in that we strive to
maintain our sensations as they are presented to us - it
doesn't make much sense. That is, it doesn't seem to
describe what sensations feel like to say that it is we who
are willing them to be what they present themselves to be. When I prick myself with a needle, I rarely
describe the experience as my deciding to feel pain. I am more inclined to say that I can't help but to feel
pain. In other words, sensations don't feel like a product of our will. We can certainly fight against them,
unleashing all the power of our will to alter and deform them, but very rarely do we ever succeed. This may
be enough to show that we have a will separate from that of our sensations, but the insurmountable challenge
of willing our sensations to change seems to reflect a rigid and unchangeable essence, something more
indicative of a will-less determinism. Do sensations, therefore, count as experiences without a will?
No, they don't count as experiences without a will, not under the current considerations at least (namely, the
idea that all will comes from the same universal source and is infused within all its parts). It simply means
that sensations mark the boundary between what is truly "us", or the individual, and the rest of the universe.
Another way of saying this is that sensations are the
experiences given to us by the universe in their untampered
form - untampered by us, that is. It is only when we
interpret and process the information imbedded in our
sensations that our will gains an ever stronger hold on
them, and the freedom to do as we want with them
becomes ours. What kinds of things do we do with them?
Of course, we interpret them, think about them, apply
perspectives to them, remember them, feel towards them,
react to them, talk about them, and so on. Before they are
ours, they are beyond the reach of our will, and this gives
them that characteristic inflexible feel. But this does not
mean they are without a will themselves. It just means that
they are not ours to exercise our will over. They are the universe's. The universe's will is still there, and it is
applied directly to those sensations - in fact, creating the sensations such that we can experience them. The
universe wills for us to see, hear, touch, taste, and smell all the things we do. At the precise moment that we
experience these things, the universe's will has not relinquished its hold on them yet. There is that brief
moment when we experience our sensations and at the same time feel helpless to control them. It is only after
these experiences have made their way well into our minds that they become subject to our control.
44 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
Yet, even when they have made their way partially into our minds, such as when we recognize a set of lines
and angles as a box, it still doesn't feel as though we have full control over them. The box we see, for
example, could never be seen as a ball or a pyramid. Unless I am under the influence of some seriously
powerful hallucinogenic drug, if it's in the shape of a box, then I will certainly see a box. We are talking
about experiences that correspond to higher functional areas of the brain. Seeing a box, for example, would
correspond to the mid section of the dorsal temporal lobe. It gets its information from the occipital lobe at
the back of the brain (where primary sensory data is first processed - where we see a set of lines and
angles), and pulls that information together to make possible the recognition that what's being seen is indeed
a box. Similar integrative functions occur all over the brain, and for all senses. There are MODs in the
somatosensory cortex, for example, that integrate different touch sensations characterized by the different
locations on the skin where they are detected. These MODs give rise to the sense of something moving
across the skin if the different locations are adjacent and the sequence in which they are stimulated is in the
right temporal order. Yet, this experience too is beyond our ability to change or deny. A little more needs to
be added to our argument if it is to be a tenable one. These experiences seem to have been handed off from
the universe to us long before the corresponding MODs made their presence possible. They are clearly
within the human mind at this point. How do we account for their seemingly will depleted character in this
case?
Well, if you will recall from The Advanced Theory, we outlined in great detail the "anatomy" of the self.
Most crucially, in figure 7, we pointed out the parallel connections between each stage of our sensory
experiences and the "cognitive database". In that same paper, we gave the criteria for what makes an
experience "ours". What is required is that it be acknowledged. Acknowledgement of an experience is the
means by which the experience in question is transferred to the cognitive database whereupon it is
synthesized with all other acknowledged experiences and our apprehension of "the world" emerges. The self
is thereafter conceived as the point-of-view from which the world is experienced. Thus, insofar as the world
is thought of in terms of experiences, such experiences will be attributed to the self - that is to say, the
association between the world and the self that results from this process ensures that our experiences will be
duly recognized as "ours". This matters because, as figure 6 (a variant of figure 7) shows, while all stages of
the sensory experience indeed become "ours" in virtue of their detour into the cognitive database, they
continue to flow along their original course giving rise to each successive stage in turn. The key point is that
the latter course evolves outside the cognitive database, and so it does not belong to us - at least, we don't
Acknowledgement experience ownership over it. Here, the experience feels more like the external, independent objects they
present themselves as. For example, the box we are currently considering is seen as an independent object in
the outer world, not a component of our minds. In that state, it is difficult, or even impossible, to extract any
sense that we can change its form, properties, or essence by the shear power of our will alone (reaching out
and manipulating it physically is another matter). But when these perceptions pass into the cognitive
database, we become aware that they are seen (or sensed), and thus we become aware of their perceptual
status. The perception is automatically attributed to the self, and so any further change that they go through
(cognitive change at this point) is due to the self's willing it. Thus, what we get is the seemingly paradoxical
condition of owning our sensory experiences while simultaneously having no power over the forms into
which they morph.
Figure 6: Visual processing across the cognitive database threshold.
45 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
It's very much like a homeowner who buys a house that has yet to be completed. The homeowner is the
individual, the developer is the universe, and the house is the sensory experience. It is the sole duty of the
developer to see the construction of the house through to the end, just as it is up to the universe to see our
sensory development - from points, to lines, to shapes and forms, to familiar objects, and so on - through. Yet
at any stage throughout this development, we as the owners have privileged access. The homeowner owns
the house, and he/she may come to oversee its development at his/her own discretion. He/she may thereafter
take pictures, discuss it with friends, form opinions, and so on. But the development is left strictly to the
Flow
developer. His/her executive power over the work is like the will of the universe over the flow of our
sensory experiences. As individuals, we are like the owner in that our will reigns only over our own
thoughts and impressions of the project.
There may be other objections that I've overlooked, but these are the ones that come to mind. Having
addressed them, we can conclude this final take on the problem of free-will and determinism. We are both
free and determined at the same time. We are determined in virtue of our necessary identification with the
timeless and spaceless state of the universe as a whole, but by the same token, we are free because the
universe is free. The freedom of our will comes from the fact that our choices are ultimately made by the
universe itself. We are a part of the universe, and thus our actions are its actions. If the universe can be said
to be free in virtue of having nothing outside itself, not even its past states, to impose limits on it, then this
freedom applies equally to all its parts. The reason we experience freedom in our day-to-day acts is because
it is freedom through-and-through. We are an extension of the universe exercising our freedom. We encounter
obstacles when our objectives appear to be thwarted, but this again is the will of the universe. Our
objectives differ, but the universe is never against our personal objectives. For the universe, these objectives
are a small step towards the grand objective of sustaining its existence. Sometimes our objectives need to be
hindered because this is the necessary means by which the universe sustains its existence. It means for us to
pursue those objectives and at the same time for those objectives to be crushed. All the while, it is the same
will driving it all, the same will that each and every one of us are participants in.
Conclusion
In this paper, we explored various ways to resolve the problem of free-will and determinism. We started
with the most conservative approaches and made our way to the most radical. This is also the way from the
most simple to the most complex. Before closing this paper, a brief rundown is in order.
The first few approaches were very conservative in that we tried not to redefine determinism, and
consequently compromised free-will in whatever way was deemed appropriate. We first dispensed with the
absurd notion that free-will meant random behavior, as that is an untenable position. Free-will, therefore,
had to be defined in accordance with the terms of a fully deterministic paradigm. We built a model in which
the self could remain active in its role in the universe. The self doesn't sit by and watch its behavior heeding
to the dictates of a set of rules, but neither does its actions emerge from a void - it is a link in the chain of
cause-and-effect. In this way, we can say that all one's actions are determined, but it is still the self that is
doing them.
We defined "cause" in terms of membership to a group of causes, and it isn't so much the removal of the
cause that prevents the effect from realizing, but the removal of the whole group. The removal of a single
cause may still prevent its corresponding effect, but the emphasis on the group serves to conform our
definition of "cause" to the fact that causes seldom hold "all or nothing" relations with their effects. If the
roads had been less slippery, for example, it may not have prevented my car from crashing necessarily, even
though the ice certainly contributed to the accident, and therefore counts as a cause. Remove every cause, on
the other hand, and the accident would clearly not happen.
We took these ideas and tied them into another definition: control. We first noted that to be in control in a
deterministic system, one must be controlled. Freedom, therefore, is not to act from a void, from nothingness,
but to be rid of chaos and unpredictability. We then formally defined "control" as the capacity to allow one's
desires or intentions to be a cause of the actions so desired or intended. In this way, we find that free-will is
simply a determining force that works through the self, the process of which the self is not only aware, but
desires or intends.
We then moved onto something more complicated. We examined the problem of free-will and determinism
under the light of the objectification process. We first noted the difficulty in imagining free-will as
something other than law violating randomness when the problem was objectified. We summarized this in the
The principle of The Paradox of Objectifying Free-Will. We then pointed out the means by which the
46 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
Objectification
Process
objectification process creates this difficulty. It separates the self from the self - that is, it creates a model of
the self in the objectified model of the world, a self that can be observed, and thus renders it equally
objectified and determined. The observing self, on the other hand, remains free from the objectified model of
the world in virtue of its position as a non-participant, indeed a nonentity, in that model. In this position, it
avoids subjugation to the laws of that model.
The Paradox of
Objectifying
Free-Will
Given that the only alternative to the objectified perspective is the subjective one - in which we are not
concerned with modeling our world with abstract conceptual tools, but with engaging in it, engulfed by the
more sensual experiences it has to offer - it stands to ask whether the same determinism we see in our
objectified models exists in the subjective experience. We found that although the answer may be trivially
"yes", it necessarily requires a reversion back to the objectified perspective in order to give this answer, and
that if we were to refrain from such a reversion, remaining in the subjective perspective, no "causal forces"
or "determining laws" show up in our actions. Instead we get reasons and justifications. Although reasons
Mapping of The and justifications are more or less as effective as causes and laws at predicting behavior, they don't bear a
Objectified and "forced" relation to that behavior per se. Yet, as the Mapping of The Objectified and Subjective
Subjective Perspectives principle makes clear, there is still a one-to-one mapping between the reasons and
Perspectives justifications of the subjective perspective and the causes and laws of the objectified perspective that one
cannot sever. Therefore, the move from the objectified perspective to the subjective one is not a complete
solution to the free-will versus determinism problem.
In fact, if free-will really exists in the subjective perspective, the account being the acausal relation between
behavior and the reasons and justifications preceding it, this is a paradox. It essentially means that the
problem of free-will cannot be solved. To solve it, we have to rely on the objectification process, for it is
the sole tool for crafting explanations for any phenomena. To employ the objectification process to this
problem is to make our way across the one-to-one mapping back into the objectified perspective where
free-will either disappears or succumbs to descriptions of pure randomness. We summed this up in the
principle of The Insolubility of The Free-Will Problem. The only solution to this paradox is to suppose that
The Insolubility
free-will may indeed be there in the subjective experience, but its true form is inconceivable. The
of The Free-Will objectification process may be inadequate for capturing it. What it means for the relation between behavior
Problem and the reasons and justifications behind it to be acausal may be something that our species is ill-equipped to
understand, and the best course of action, therefore, is simply to make use of our will rather than question it.
Those were the conservative approaches wherein we held determinism constant and accommodated
free-will. We then explored non-deterministic systems to see where an uncompromised free-will could fit.
We began with quantum mechanics. We first distinguished between those anomalies of quantum mechanics
that are described as superposition states, and those anomalies that are truly non-deterministic. We toyed
with the idea, for a few paragraphs, about whether superposition states ought to be considered law violations
or simply a sample of nature's laws for which she has not prepared us for understanding. We settled on the
The
more pragmatic approach - namely, that if they are genuine laws after all, our theory, in virtue of The
Unassailability
Unassailability of Science principle, holds (at least, insofar as accounting for superposition states), and so
of Science we ought to consider the implications that superposition states represent law violations.
The proposal that we brought to the table in order to understand the state of those experiences corresponding
to superposition was that as the necessity of the entailment sustaining the flow of those experiences
decreases, so does their "realness". That is to say, if the flow of a given experience doesn't seem to entail
any other particular experience, or set of experiences, by necessity, it is probably due to the fact that they are
"less real" than they could be. We went to certain lengths in order to make this idea more clear. We argued
that an experience being partially real is best understood as the meaning underlying that experience being
Entailment
only partially clear - that it has no definite meaning, but a range instead. We also argued against the notion
that the black and white categorization schemes that the human mind is used to are absolute and universal
truths about the way our world works. The realness of things may not necessarily fit into simple and
convenient pigeonholes labeled "real" and "unreal" - there may be subtle shades in between. Given that, the
problem - namely, that a non-necessary course of development for a system to undergo removes the grounds
Flow
upon which it can be real - is resolved. If we only conceive of realness as varying along a gradient, such
systems need not be fully real after all.
47 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
The next problem, that of the non-determinism of quantum collapse, was not so much resolved (as we are
refraining from deterministic accounts), but shown to be a non-issue. That is, so long as the collapsed state is
entailed, albeit not fully by necessity, by some subset of values from the prior superposition state, then there
is nothing more to account for the value of the collapsed state. What appears to be random is what that value
turns out to be - or what subset of meaning from a range acquired the bulk of the realness. This may indeed
be non-deterministic, but this bears no consequence on the relation between the value of the collapsed state
and its predecessor values in the superposition state - it can't if it really is non-deterministic. Therefore, it is
not a problem for us. In fact, it is best left unexplained, for in that case, we have a perfect role for free-will
to play.
Many theories have been put forward to unite the non-determinism of quantum collapse to that of free-will -
reducing two obscure phenomena to one. These are called Quantum Consciousness theories, or QC for short.
Penrose's and Hameroff's version is currently the most highly debated one in the field. It rests on
microtubules, tiny strands made of protein molecules inside our neurons that go in and out of superposition
states. The state in which microtubules collapse determine the state of their neuron - either firing or not
firing. Therefore, for microtubules to exist in superposition states, neurons also exist in superposition state -
both firing and not firing at the same time. Hameroff proposes that, while in these states, we are in the midst
of making a decision - either to have a particular experience or not. For the most part, these experiences
would have to be cognitive since that is one of the few experiences that seem readily under our control, and
so the neurons exhibiting superposition states would have to be from the cognitive centers.
We deemed Hameroff's theory an excellent account of free-will but a poor one of qualia, or experiences. He
relies on Penrose's model of "space blisters" that house platonic principles and, supposedly, other
qualitative features of mental life. We demonstrated the failings of this model, arguing why it could never
serve as an adequate account of qualia. What we proposed instead is that Hameroff's account of free-will
rely on our theory, for accounts of qualia is its stronghold. Together, our theory and QC make a very
convenient pairing, accounting for both qualia and free-will.
And finally, we offered one last resolution to the free-will versus determinism problem - that each and every
one of us participates in one universal will. We argued that if one considers the universe beyond space and
time, then there is nothing outside of itself to determine it. It is self-determining. But in this light, we notice
that self-determination - particularly, the determination for one's self simply to exist - is perfectly
compatible, and may be synonymous, with free-will. Therefore, it pays to consider the possibility that
perhaps the universe wills itself to exist. If this is the case, then each of its components, all the physical
systems and events whose sum constitutes the identity of the universe, partakes in this will.
We cautioned the reader that this argument partially relies on developments that will be expounded in the
paper The Universe and "God", but the argument essentially entails that the expanded form of the universe,
with all its physical components separated by vast distances in space and all its processes that unfold
through eons of time, is equivalent to its timeless and spaceless status. Therefore, every component and
every process is essential to the universe's grand objective of maintaining its existence. If this existence is
willed, then so is everything that happens in the universe, right down to the busy legs of an ant carrying food
to its colony.
But as the universe gets decomposed into its parts, so does the objective of its will. That is, the will to exist
gets decomposed into several lesser steps, each still crucial in meeting the goal of existence. The objectives
we consciously carry out in our day-to-day endeavors is a small sample of these tiny steps. We see our
objectives as the highest objectives that exist for us because this insight constitutes the highest experience
that exists for us. Just as this experience is a fragment of the greater experiences the universe is having (of
which we are epistemically unconscious), so are our highest objectives. But make no mistake - everything
we do serves the greater objective of existence. We may not have this in mind, but the universe does. And
Epistemic
because it is the will of the universe that sees this all through, it is the will of the universe that works through
Unconsciousness
us. And because we are a part of the universe, an extension of it, one with it so to speak, this will is equally
ours. This accounts for the feeling of freedom in our will - it is authentic freedom, the freedom of the
universe to simply be.
The Value of Freedom

There is no question that we cherish freedom. Curious minds that seek to understand our world, and therefore
harbor an affinity for deterministic accounts, although they may prefer this understanding, are no less fond of
freedom. This fondness seems not to depend on the account we give for free-will, whether it yields to
determinism or it is authentically non-deterministic. As an experience, freedom feels good - it furnishes us
48 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
with a sense of security and comfort. It is this feeling that we cherish so dearly.
The last thought I'd like to close with, therefore, is not so much another insight or approach to the problem of
determinism and free-will, but an admonition. The love we have of freedom is the reason why it is attributed
such high value. Therefore, let us do our best not to devalue it by assigning blame and guilt to actions on the
grounds that they were done freely. Although this is indeed necessary at times, and our judicial system would
crumble, taking social order down with it, were it not for the assignment of guilt and blame to criminal and
reprehensibly immoral acts, if we do this too often, that which we cherish most about freedom - the joy of
having it - would soon be replaced by feelings of apprehension and reluctance at the thought of using it for
fear of inheriting such blame and guilt.
This is far from a plea for leniency towards criminals and the maliciously intended. I believe in the good
judgment of those charged with overseeing legislative and judicial matters, and the need surely exists for
effective and well communicated means of deterrence. What I find more difficult to keep faith in is the
appreciation many people have for the true value of freedom. All too often, I see the use towards which the
idea of freedom being put to be the chastisement of the criminal and the wicked. That is, far from
appreciating freedom for the blessing that it surely is, it is being used as a tool for judgment. If it can be
shown that one who commits a monstrous act did it freely, this qualifies as the green light for incrimination
and harsh sentencing. I can't count the number of times I've heard "He should be punished to the fullest extent
of the law". I can, however, count the number of times I've heard "He should receive a moderate or mild
sentence" - zero! It is as though too many don't see a greater use toward which freedom can be put. So, again,
it isn't that such a use doesn't serve society well, and it isn't that the target of such use is necessarily
undeserving, but it is a shame to see the more valuable qualities of freedom - that it gives purpose and
meaning to life, and makes it worthwhile - being taken for granted, or even unnoticed. If we aren't careful to
take notice, blame and judgment will be the only worth we see in it, and ultimately, because we will come to
despise it, the only worth it will have.
The Universe and "God"
The Problem
The Conceptual The
Cleaning Up Finding Objectifying of Free-Will -
Introduction Experience of Compatibilism Realities and Subjective
The Mess Randomness Free-will Why There Is
Freedom Their Rules Perspective
One
The Random
Quantum A Question of The Clarity of Quantum Some Reconciling Some
Challenge to Fluctuations
Theory Lawfulness Meaning Consciousness Criticisms The theories Implications
Necessity in Realness
Quantum Participation In
The Freedom of Expanding The The Value of
Consciousness and The Universal Some Objections Conclusion
The Universe Universe - Again Freedom
Classical Neurology Will
TOP
Bookmark this page now!
© Copywrite 2008, 2009 Gibran Shah.
49 of 49 4/2/2010 3:51 PM
Appendix
Effects of Quantum Entanglement
The effects seen in quantum entanglement are not like those seen in standard
mechanical phenomena. One particle entangled with another does not have
effects on that particle in the conventional sense of "effect". Probably, the most
accurate way to describe this kind of effect is to say that certain measurements
that are taken of one particle will effect the measurements taken of the other
particle thereafter. For example, we know that when a J/Ψ particle (a special kind
of meson particle) fissions into an electron and a positron, whatever the spin
value of the electron, the spin of the positron will have the opposite value. These
particles, having once been united in a common source (the J/Ψ particle), have
now become "entangled". The key to understanding any kind of quantum
phenomenon, such as quantum entanglement, is that the states or properties of
such phenomena may not have determined values necessarily - not until they are
measured. For example, whether the spin of the electron is "up" or "down" is
literally undetermined, not just epistemically but ontologically, until it is
measured. Now this entails a peculiar relation between the entangled particles. It
means that if we measured a property of one, say the spin of the electron,
whatever its value turned out to be, say "up", we know for certain that the
positron's spin must be "down". And this is, in fact, what our measurements of
the positron will yield. This is the way in which one particle of an entangled pair
has effects on the other. The electron has effects on the positron by availing itself
to measurement and thereby settling on a particular determined state, and this
forces the positron to also settle on a particular determined state whose value is
also determined.
We can rule out any sort of mechanical influence because these effects seem to
occur instantly even across vast distances of space. Einstein showed that nothing
can travel faster than light, and so if two entangled particles are separated by,
say, 10 light years, measurements taken of one particle cannot have an effect on
the other by means of sending information about the results of this measurement
through such a great distance of space. To do so would take 10 years at the least,
but we know these effects occur instantly (keeping in mind, of course, that it
would take at least 5 years for each observer taking the measurements to reunite
with the other and compare results).
Einstein was not too pleased with this finding, naturally, and in fact, he, along
with Podolsky and Rosen, set out to prove that a paradox falls out of this. They
called it the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox (or the EPR Paradox), and the
reader can learn more about it by following the link provided:
EPR Paradox
Where Are The MODs?
i
Notice that we haven't exactly articulated the experience of freedom in terms of
MODs as we did at the beginning of this section. This is okay. Our aim is simply
to find a fitting articulation for the experience of freedom in order to understand
it as an experience. Whether this experience turns out to correspond to an actual
MOD or not is beside the point. It may, but at this point, it seems more likely that
it might correspond to a lack of MODs. That is, the experience of freedom, we
are saying, is the recognition that we are in control of our actions and that they
come from ourselves, and that we recognize this in the absence of perceiving any
prior causes. So it is the absence of the MODs that would otherwise correspond
to the perception of these prior causes that makes the experience of freedom
possible. There certainly are MODs that correspond to the recognition of the
control we have, and that the self is the source of our actions, but these MODs
are most likely situated in various locations all over the brain (not just the motor
cortex ). But once one perceives the prior causes that determine one's
actions, a sense of helplessness tends to sit in, and one no longer feels
responsible for one's actions. The feeling of freedom fades. We will touch upon
this in the next section.
The Inconceivability of Superposition

The following thought experiment demonstrates how states of superposition,
when conceived of as objects existing in more than one place at a time, are
indeed impossible to imagine correctly. Imagine an electron in two places at the
same time. Keep in mind that this electron is actually one electron occupying two
places simultaneously - not two electrons that are simply identical in all their
features. Now imagine poking one with a pin such that it starts to move (like in
the animation below ). We can certainly imagine that one of them moves
whereas the other doesn't. This is proof that we are not imagining it correctly. If
we really understood what it means for the two apparent electrons to be one and
the same, it should not even be possible to imagine this. Why is this? Well, if
they are the same, everything that happens to one should necessarily happen to
the other. If you poke one with a pin and it moves, the other should move as well
in exactly the same direction with exactly the same momentum. Note that it's not
enough simply to enforce this in our thought experiment by consistently
visualizing their behavior as synchronized. Why not? Because if they really are
the same electron, we should conceive of it as necessary - that is, we should not
even be able to imagine one doing something without the other mimicking. But
the fact that we can, even if we understand this to be erroneous, shows that we
haven't got it right. We don't truly get the concept - we can't get the concept.
Thus, states of superposition really are inconceivable.
ii
Law Violations or No Laws At All
Of course, there is a third interpretation of superposition states: that there simply
are no laws of nature to restrict the states that things can exist in. When we
consider the interpretation that laws are being violated when things go into
superposition states, we don't mean to convey something incompatible with this
third interpretation. All we mean to convey is that whatever is happening to an
entity in a state of superposition, it defies any intelligible order. This may mean
there really do exist laws of nature that are being violated in those instances, or it
may mean that no such laws ever existed. Either way, we simply mean to
distinguish this case from that in which the things in superposition states are
indeed adhering to some kind of order, but one that is unintelligible to us as
humans.
Duality of Physical Entities

Strictly speaking, an experience is never associated with a fundamental particle,
but with the system that consists of the particle and whatever else the particle is
behaving relative to. This follows from the principle of Duality of Physical
Entities:
Principle: Duality of Physical Entities

1) Physical entities, such as particles, are the
expression of experience.
2) All experience must flow.
3) Therefore, all physical entities must move.
4) All motion is relative.
5) Thus, in order to move, all physical entities
iii
must coexist with at least one other physical
entity.
In the case of the double-slit experiment, for instance, for the electron to be in a
state of superposition with respect to its location, this can only be meaningful
insofar as its location is relative to other things in its environment - to the
electron gun, to our measuring instruments, to the entire universe, and so on. We
will continue to talk about the corresponding experience in terms of the particle
itself (as opposed to the particle/environment system) since whatever we say
remains valid in either case.
As it turns out, this makes sense when one considers the fact that some properties
of particles don't seem to exhibit superposition states, such as mass and charge.
All properties are measured by different means and instruments, and so the
detection of superposition by any one method of measurement is an indication of
ambiguity in the experience corresponding to the system that consists of the
particle and that measuring device. Other properties, like mass or charge, may be
measured by other devices, and the system that those devices and the particle
make up correspond to a different experience, one which may not contain the
same degree of ambiguity.
Realness As Substance
I hope this way of conceptualizing the variability of realness - by the clarity of
meaning in our experiences - helps to avoid a potential misinterpretation - that
the "realness" of things I'm proposing is a substance. This is not what I mean. I
must make it emphatic: realness is not a substance. If it were, then we'd wind up
caught in an infinite regress wherein the realness of a thing would itself be a
thing possessing its own degree of realness, and that too would be a thing, and so
on. But hopefully it has been made clear how "realness" is to be understood - as
the clarity of meaning in an experience. Because our theory equates perception
with reality, any lack of clarity in perception renders the things perceived
proportionately unreal.
Resurrecting A Principle: The Unassailability of Science

With this minor adjustment in our theory, we not only reconcile the problem of
necessity, but we also salvage the Unassailability of Science principle. That
principle, again, is as follows:
Principle: The Unassailability of Science
iv
The Advanced Theory of Mind and Matter will
always be able to assert its main tenets no
matter what the discoveries of science. It will
always posit that experiences correspond to the
phenomena of those discoveries.
So this principle is now two-fold. It says that whatever the discoveries of science,
if 1) they prove to play out deterministically, then our theory would posit a set of
definite experiences behind it whose meaning is absolutely clear, and those
experiences would entail other experiences by full necessity. But if 2) they prove
to play out non-deterministically, then our theory would still posit a set of
experiences behind it, but ones whose meanings are not definite or clear. They
would entail non-deterministically as the necessity underlying their identity
would be less than full. The formal articulation of this principle, as outlined
above, doesn't say much about whether the clarity in the meaning of these
experiences is full or not, nor does it say anything similar about their necessity.
Therefore, as it is articulated, it works with both these points, and so we will
leave it as it is.
Revisiting The Alternate Interpretation: Superposition As A Law of Nature

Notice that if we had taken the other route, the route whereby we would have
considered superposition states as fully functional laws of nature (albeit
impossible for us to image) rather than law violations, we would not be able to
overcome the challenge of non-determinism that quantum mechanics poses to
our theory. To suppose that a phenomenon adheres consistently and fully to
natural laws would entail that the underlying meaning of the corresponding
experience is absolutely necessary. But then, when the phenomenon comes up
against a non-deterministic outcome, this necessity must break. In effect, we
would have no way to justify how it could do this having committed ourselves to
the view that all its prior states evolved along a necessary course.
Ironically, then, the only option for us in our goal to salvage our theory is to
assume that the laws of nature are being violated by superposition states. This is
not a proof that laws are being violated (that would be a circular form of
argument), just a recognition of the criteria we must meet in order to rid our
theory of any inconsistencies. Nonetheless, the proposition that the realness of
certain phenomena, and properties of phenomena, can vary, thereby affecting
necessity in like manner, makes a lot of sense for both superposition states and
the non-determinism of collapse, and for both a subjectivist theory like ours and
a physicalist theory like quantum mechanics. It makes more sense than the
alternative, for in that case, we have no understanding of how superposition
states might be accounted for, nor do we understand how their outcomes can
break from a deterministic course.
v
Furthermore, due to the particular account of superposition we have given, we
can interpret such an account in terms of physical laws in a much more realistic
way. It isn't all that realistic, in other words, to posit actually existing, but
empirically elusive, laws only to suppose that they get violated all the time. A
more realistic way of putting is that such laws are not absolutely abiding, and that
as the necessity of certain physical outcomes becomes less, so does the rigidity of
the laws that would otherwise determine such outcomes. In other words, perhaps
there are no such things as the laws of nature - at least, not in the classical sense -
but, so to speak, "guidelines" of nature instead.
vi

Determinism and Free-Will

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Determinism and Free-Will

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

MM-Theory - Determinism and Free-Will http://www.mm-theory.com/detandfw/detandfw.

Bookmark this page now!

Determinism and Free-Will

Cleaning Up The Mess

Figure 1: Pixels on a computer screen.

Principle: The Unprovability of Randomness

been discovered yet.

The Experience of Freedom

As Nietzsche once put it:

question of commanding and obeying, on the basis, as already said, of a social

Figure 2a: Classic models of free-will and

And while we're at it, let's formally define "effect":

Principle: Being in Control

Principle: The Chaos of Randomness

The pattern of random outcomes is chaotic and

Principle: Accommodation of Free-Will With

In a fully deterministic system, free-will can be

Conceptual Realities and Their Rules

a thing in reality, it must be subject to the rules or nature of

Principle: The Paradox of Objectifying Free-Will

The Subjective Perspective

Principle: Mapping of The Objectified and Subjective

The Problem of Free-Will - Why There Is One

Principle: The Insolubility of The Free-Will Problem

First of all, let's make a distinction between a law violation and

gave above - namely, 4 + 5 = 10. Lawlessness, on the other hand, is

Definition: Law Violations vs. Lawlessness

Principle: Deterministic Law Violations

The Challenge to Necessity

superposition to some degree.

This is consistent with how decoherence works.

We see, then, that all simultaneous positions or states that constitute

The Clarity of Meaning

although the electron may exist anywhere within

Figure 3d: Position vs. realness (superposition

Principle: Reconciliation Between Non-Determinism

Random Fluctuations in Realness

towards that slit. In other words, there is always a

The apparent non-determinism we see is not non-determinism of entailment, it is non-determinism of what

superposition states is, as far as we can tell, non-deterministic.

Figure 4a: Tubulin molecules Figure 4b: Patterns of tubulin collapse

space through which an object moves is curved,

Figure 5: Penrose's space blister

Reconciling The Theories

Quantum Consciousness and Classical Neurology

To understand this a little more clearly, let's toy with an analogy.

Participation in The Universal Will

The Freedom of The Universe

Principle: The Relation Between The Determining

Principle: The Non-Deterministic Status of The

Expanding The Universe - Again

1 = 0.5 + 0.5 = 0.25 + 0.25 + 0.25 + 0.25 = ...

Again, this can be represented by an equation. Consider the following:

Principle: Disparity of Objectives

challenging the strength of our will. It is in those moments,

Figure 6: Visual processing across the cognitive database threshold.

The Value of Freedom

The Universe and "God"

Bookmark this page now!

© Copywrite 2008, 2009 Gibran Shah.

Where Are The MODs?

The Inconceivability of Superposition

Duality of Physical Entities

Principle: Duality of Physical Entities