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The logicians school-master: or, A comment upon Ramus logick.: By Mr. Alexander Richardson,
sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are added, his prelections on Ramus his
grammer; Taleus his rhetorick; also his notes on physicks, ethicks, astronomy, medicine, and opticks.
Never before published.
Richardson, Alexander, of Queen's College, Cambridge., Thomson, Samuel, fl. 1657-1666.
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THE LOGICIANS School-Master:

OR, A COMMENT UPON RAMUS  → Logick.

By Mr. Alexander Richardson, some∣time of Queenes Colledge in CAMBRIDGE.

Whereunto are added, His Prelections on Ramus  → his Grammer; Taleus his
Rhetorick; Also his Notes on Physicks, Ethicks, Astronomy, Medi∣cine, and Opticks.

Never before Published.

LONDON: Printed by Gartrude Dawson, and are to be sold by Sam. Thomson at the
White-Horse in Paul's Church-yard. 1657.

Page  [unnumbered]

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The Book-seller to the Reader.

Courteous Reader,

T He Author hereof, Mr. Alex∣ander Richardson, was a man of transcendent

parts, and most sublimate intellectu∣als, whereby he attained unto such a perfection
in all Arts and Sciences, that there is nothing almost of liberal and ingenuous
literature, which he had not in-sight into; and that such as to be able to lay down a
systeme of it in most exact and methodical Pre∣cepts: and had his Abilities been
drawn forth to the full advantage, doubtless the Arts had received a considerable
improvement beyond what the world hath yet been acquainted with∣al. But so it is,
that what by his want of Health, and what by the singular modesty of his Disposition
(known unto them that knew him) the Common-wealth of Learning hath

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been deprived of so great a felicity. Neither yet did he envy others the Fruits of his
own A∣bilities, but was alwayes most ready to impart and communicate what he
knew; which those of his time (divers of whom are still surviving) knew very well
how to make good use of: For though he was but Master of Arts, (and not Fellow) of
Queens Colledge, yet did divers Graduates from several Colledges flock unto his
Lectures, and what he freely discoursed unto them in several Sciences, they as
eagerly took from his mouth in writing, and then communi∣cated unto others; which
found such general acceptance, that happy was he who could make himself Master
of Richardson's Notes, which they refused not to purchase at any pains in
transcribing. For indeed they could easily perceive in him a reach beyond ordinary
men, and that his words carried further; he dived deep, even unto the bottom of
Entity, while o∣thers did but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and lick the Glass. But among
many other Notes of his those of his Commentary on Ramus  → Logick were most

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generally prized and made use of by young Students: whereof (though long since
printed) there are many Copies in Manuscript still in being; and indeed it was his
Logick whereby, as by a Key, he opened the secrets of all other Arts and Sciences, to
the admiration of all that heard him. I have therfore adventured upon this Second
Impression, and have added to it his Prelections on Ramus  → his Grammer, Taleus
his Rhetorick; also his Notes on Physicks, Ethicks, Astronomy, Medi∣cine, and
Opticks, which I doubt not but they will meet with thy Acceptance proportionable to
their worth, whereby I may be Encouraged to offer to thy view such other of his
Works, as I can meet withal, which do yet sleep (as these have done hitherto) in the
hands of Pri∣vate men.

Sam. Thomson.

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ERRATA in the Logick.

Page 2, line 18, for impossibile, read possibile: p. 10. l. 12, 22, 31. f. 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 r. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, p. 11. l. 1. r. concrescens: p, 27, l, 8, r, is it.
31, l, 10, & 25, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 37, l, 4, r, congruens. 58 l. 24, r, his proper.
80. l. antepenult, r, Ergo they are. 86. l, 8, No, r, Now. 106, l, 6 r. materiare. 111, l,
14, There, r, Therefore. l, 24, ret, r, res. 115, l, 8, r, of it. Ergo. 143, l, 9, honorum, r,
bonorum. 167, l, 26, serum, r, servum. 179. l, 25, painted, r, pointed 187, l, 27,
formalae, r formulae. 220, l, 16, motum, 1, mutum. 251, l, 16, r, from this effect.
256, l, 22, r, homo non est. 323, l, 4, obtigit, r, contigit. 326, l, 10, f, 20, r, two. 330,
l, 24, r, before we can. 334, l, 21, r, things mediately. 338, l, 2, r, otherwise if. 34•, l,
7, ano, 1, ovo. l, 8, twenty, r, two.

In Grammatical Notes, &c.

Page 2. line 16. r. Courtier in Boots. p. 7 l, 25. yet, r, yea. 9, l, penult, r, to make is.
10, l, 21, aggredi. 11, l, 27, for another genus, r, another bene. 13. l. 25, r, ratsa•s.
15, l, 15, quae, r, duae. 21, l, 1, which, r, with. 25, l. 13. f, •, r, a. 27, l, 8, r, Grecians
have. l, 12, r, ow, as owe. 30, l, 7, r jurisprudentia. 31. l, 1, dele under. 37, l, 23, r,
Dictio. 41, l, 15, f, et, r, est. 44, l, 3, r, adjunct's inesse. 45, l, 5, dele that. 53, l, 11, f,
lecher, r, lecherie. 56, l, 13, r, them one, 61, l, 21 rueri, r, tuorum. 75, l, 26, r, misti
autem ediss. 76, l, 22, of four, r, of fewer. 82, l, 1, Licinius, r, Lucilianus. l, 3, r, with
worms. 85, l, 6, least, r, last. 88, l, 11, f, no, r, too special. 93, l, 6, forme spinning, r,
fine spinning, 101, l, 1, r, meer potentia. 108. l. 3. is r. est. l. 29. f. 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉, r. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 111. l. 24. f.—, r, car∣bone. 113. l. antepenult,
r, is most hot and dry. penult, r, is most moist and hot. 126. l. 20. martor, r, marcor.
128. l. 27. this act, r, this art. 129. l. 15, acts have, r, arts have. 131. l, 1. Now, r, No.
132, l, 7, r, Aristotle. 134, l, 22, r, there for the comely aspect, one. 139, l, 9, est qua;
r, est quae. 143, l, 7, r, both these affections. 144, l, 2, r, Perscrutatio. 145, l, last, f,
plurimum, r, plurium. 146, l, 4, r, Circumvecta. l, 11, r, plurium motuum. l, 16, r,
Sphaera nona. 148, l, 17, r, motu nonae. 149, l, 16, for 9. r, 6. 150, l, 4, plurimum, r,
plurium. 151, l, antepenult, r, per se, quia. 135, l, 10, radius,•, radians unum. l. ult. r.
propius.

Page  1

The PREFACE or En∣trance into the BOOK.

I Suppose I am to dispute with a man, and be about to lay down every thing to
his reason: if he grant that he have reason, I need no further proof of Ens: for if a
man have an eye to see things, there must be an Ens, which must be the subject of it;
for else it should be in vain: and as our outward eye were in vain, if there were not
some things to be seen thereby; so were our inward eye of reason to no purpose, if
there were not an ens to be seen. Now I will stand more upon ens, be∣cause I will
ground my Rules of Art upon it, but that Reason is the proper adjunct of ens, we
shall see more plainly hereafter. Yet let us know in the mean time, that if there be
reason, it must either see something or nothing; now it cannot see nothing but per
accidens, because it properly seeth ens, as I see a man not to be in such a place,
because I see him not. True it is, that Ens is the subject of all Arts, but more
specially of Logick, Grammer and Rheto∣rick, as they are general: for indeed Reason
first seeth both it self, and the other Arts.

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Ens est quod est.

Now having found that ens is, it is requisite that we should know what it is; and I
say ens est quod est. If we shall look at the Grammatical notation of ens, it is a
participle of the present tense, and therefore is as much as quod est, even as
legens and qui, or quae legit are the same: or as in Greek 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
verberans, or qui verberat are all one, and that the very particle doth shew. For if
it be of the pre∣sent tense, it is the same with the verb of the present tense, so that
ens and quod est are the same. Again, if there be ens, as we have already proved,
then vel est quod est, vel non quod est, vel quod non est at neque, non quod est,
nec quod non est, ergo quod est. For when I say non quod est, then I put ens
fictum impossi∣bile, ergo this can no way be ens, no not in our phan∣tasie; when I
say quod non est, then I put ens fictum impossibile, and to that I give a quod but
non est, so that in the end I say, ens est, quod est, that is, neither ens fictum
possibile, or ens fictum impossibile; and there∣fore if we will define ens fictum
impossibile, it is non quod est, if we define ens fictum possibile, it is quod non est.
Now if neither ens fictum possibile, nor ens fictum impossibile be entia, then ens
est quod est. And again, when I deny non quod est, I deny est, and when I deny
quod non est, I deny est, ergo, ens est quod est. Again, ens and bonum are all one,
therefore non ens and malum are all gone, therefore siens non sit, then it is bonum
and malum: ergoens est quod est.

Ens est primum vel a primo.

If ens be, it must be either first absolutely which

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is not from another, or it must be from a first; that is from another, which is not
from another: again, contradiction sheweth it, for it is as if I should say, ens is non
aliunde or aliunde; that is, it is of it self, or not of it self; and this is contradiction.

But objection may be made, that in the continual generation of things, one thing is
before another, as my father begot me, and another begot my father, and so in
infinitum, ergo it is not necessary that ens should be absolutely first or from a first.

Answ. This is nothing, for am I from my father. This then he was before I was, and
I am after him, ergo here is prius and posterius, therefore here cannot be eternity,
ergo this ens is not eternal. Again, is not my fathers case as well as mine to be
from ano∣ther, and so all men till they come to ens primum; Yes, ergo all men are
from others, till we come to this first absolute being, which is not from any other:
for then he should not be primum: ergo ens est pri∣mum, vel a primo.

Ens absolute primum est quod est seipso.

First, if there be ens primum or a primo, there must be ens primum of necessity,
for if there be ens pri∣mum, ye grant it me, if there be ens a primo, ye must also
grant ens primum, therefore ens primum〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉pri∣mum, and
maxime intelligibile, therefore Atheists are here to be confuted, for they may
sooner doubt whe∣ther they themselves be, then whether God be, for if they be
entia a primo, they must first know him, that is primum, before they can know
themselves, for the cause is before the effect, Quod est seipso, it must be being
either seipso or aliunde, if aliunde, ne primum, for that from which it is, is prius
unto it, ergo est seipso.

Page  4
Object. Bellarmine saith that God is not seipso, neither any creature whatsoever,
for then he saith, the same thing would be the cause of it self, and the effect.

Resp. It is a meer sophisme, or rather an Am∣phibolia of the phrase. For when we

say God is seipso, we do not mean that he hath causes, but we mean privatively
that he is not aliunde, and est seipso, and est〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 are the
same, it is quod est, and so est seipso.

Ens primum est〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

If he be seipso, then he is without causes, that that is absolutely first must have no
causes, for then it is not absolutely first, ergo there can be no scientia of him 〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉, for tunc scire dicimur cum causas scimus. Again, first if he
have no causes, he hath no end, ergo he is not made for an end, ergo there can be
no art of him to guide him to an end. So that we find in this respect that ens
primum cannot be the subject of Art; Every Art is to guide the thing whereof it is
an Art to it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Again, every Art doth lay forth the causes,
effects, subjects and the proper adjuncts of a thing, for if it have no causes it can
have no qualities, and God hath none of these, ergo he is not the subject of Art.
Hence again, as this ens is beyond our reason, so he is beyond our speech, either
Grammar or Rhetorick, so that con∣cerning this ens primum, whatsoever we think
or speak it is imperfect. Now bring it to our Logick after another sort, and we
shall see this ens to be be∣yond Art. Our Logick bringeth us first to a first efficient,
and in the resolution of any thing we go so

Page  5

far, as in the end we find a first efficient. Now this first efficient hath nothing
before it, ergo that is be∣yond our reason, therefore what that is we cannot tell,
and therefore if we shall make him an effect to look out his causes, we shall not
make him first, ergo he is beyond all Art: Then again, there is no Art but is an
eternal rule in the Idea of God, as a pre∣cept of that thing whereof it is an Art, to
guide it to its Eupraxie, therefore if there should be an Art of him, there must be a
former ens which must have the Idea of it, to shew how this ens primum was
made, and whereby it must be governed: so that he is not the subject of our
reason; so that whereas I said be∣fore, that ens was the subject of our reason; here
I recal it, and say, that primum ens is be∣yond out Logick: and therefore he being
beyond all art, we will go them over more briefly, till we come to ens a primo.
First then, he is without effi∣cient, for he is without causes, ergo he is uncreated:
for the first matter, though it were without matter and form, yet it had an efficient,
and an end, ergo was created: then again, he is seipso, ergo he must be uncreated,
hence also he cannot be annihilated, nei∣ther generated, nor corrupted: again,
hence he is independe aliunde, and therefore supremum: again, hence he is
without matter: Now if he be without matter, therefore he is without genus, ergo is
not a species either subalterna, or specialissima. Again if he be without form as
without genus, then he can∣not be defined, ergo he must be without limitation of
essence, ergo without limitation of quantity, ergo without limitation of place, and
because he is with∣out beginning from any other thing, therefore he is without any
duration, and because he is without any

Page  6
matter, ergo he is truly spiritual, for so we account things spiritual, according to
the subtleness of their matter, but he hath no matter at all: Again he be∣ing without
matter and form, ergo can be no mem∣brum, because every member containeth a
portion of matter and form, neither can he be an integrum, because that consisteth
of members, which contain part of matter and form. Now in that he is abso∣lutely
first, therefore he can be but unum, for else there should be more: again if there
should be more than one, then the one would say as well as the other, I am as
forward as thee, and so none could be absolutely first. Again he is no genus, for
that is an universal, or Synopsis of many together, whereas he is but one: so that
now he is not properly an ens, but an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and above our
Logick: again, in that he is absolutely first he must needs be without accidents (to
use their term) without adjuncts, for they are second things arising from their
sub∣stances, and in absolute primo ente there must be no∣thing, but that which is
absolute primum: so that here we see his most simple being, and that he is beyond
our Logick. Now if he be without all poten∣tia, both essentialis, and accidentalis,
he is pure act; so that this act now of his must needs be his esse, be∣cause he is
pure act, for if he be agere, then his esse and agere are the same: so that if any
one doth any thing. as every ens a primo doth by potentia, it is not pure act: some
say the Angels do agere per essentiam, but it is false, unless they mean that they
act first by potentia: now indeed there is nothing, but it doth act per faoultatem
essentiae. First the form, that is the beginner of act, and when it acts upon matter
in∣ternal, that is habitual, or a faculty, when it acts by

Page  7

the matter upon some external object, that is an act; for first there is the essence,
the matter and the form, then the faculty, the forms act upon the matter internally;
lastly, the act, which is of the form, by the matter externally: now these are not in
God, but are his very essence. Now we find then, that this primum ens must be
actus, and purus actus, be∣cause there is no potentia in him at all, ergo it must
needs be, that he is primus actus, ergo optimus actus. for primus actus, and
optimus actus are all one: A∣gain hence it must needs follow, that if there be any
act of other things, it must needs be from him, and therefore if there be any thing
actu it must be from him: so then thus we have found him absolute in every thing.

Ens a primo.

Now to return to the first Syllogism. If there be reason, there must be an

adaequatum subjectum of it, ergo ens a primo, for we have heard, that ens
primum is beyond our reason, so that there must be ens a pri∣mo, which is
adequatum subjectum rationi, and that now is liable to all our Logick, for it hath
causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, &c. and thus we will go on, and see all the
subjects of the Arts in the concre∣tion of ens a primo, which the Philosophers say,
can∣not be demonstrated.

That we might dig deep, and lay our foundation of Arts sure, I have shewed that
there is a being, and that it is double, the one from whom Art is, the other in
whom it shines, now we heard that ens est quod est, which is nothing but the true
notation of ens resolved by Grammer quod est. Now for the con∣tinual succession
of things which some dream of,

Page  8
this it is, if all things be effects, there must be so ma∣ny causes, ergo in the end we
shall come to a first cause, that is not effectum: Further we heard that ens primum,
was quod est seipso, that is without any other: so that in propriety be is neither
essentia nor ens, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Hence he neither hath causes,
nei∣ther is any argument that doth arise from causes, er ∣go is an individuum, but
not a species: he is without end, ergo he is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: hence he
therefore was never made, ergo he made all things: he is without definition,
distribution, and properties, because he is without causes, ergo there can be no art
of him, but he must be the Author of art, as we shall hear here∣after. He is merus
Actus, because he is without all po∣tentia, both substantialis, and accidentalis;
again, he is primus actus, ergo optimus actus, ergo whatsoever is well done of any
thing is first from him: again, he is infinitus actus, ergo able to do any finite thing,
yea, and infinite.

E•s a primo est, quod ut est a primo, sie est ex nihilo proter primum.

First we proved before, that there is ens a primo, for proprium, & adaequatum
subjectum rationis est, at ens a primo est proprium & adaequatum objectum,
ra∣ther than subjectum rationis, ergo, Est a primo, that we heard before, for it
cannot be of it self, for then it should be absolutely first, ergo not the subject of
our reason, ergo it is aliunde, ergo it is in the end for him that is not aliunde,
Propter primum, every ens a primo is made, ergo for an end, ergo at last propter
primum, as propter finem: Again, optimus actus must do nothing in vain. It is a
rule of Nature in schools, that God and Nature nihil agunt frustra, which in∣deed

Page  9

is a general rule of Logick applied to two spe∣cial Arts, natural Philosophy and
Divinity. Now then at last we shall find every thing to be made, for that which
was never made, ergo propter primus ens.

Object. But some things might be made for things that are made.

Answ. I suppose mediately, yet when all things are effects, ergo made for an end,
at length we shall come to an end, that is not an effect, as all creatures are made
for man, and man also being made, is therefore for an end, ergo for God: Hence
there∣fore we see that ens a prima is propter primum, ergo every ens a primo hath
his vigour, or impulsus from his first efficient, whereby it is set forth to his end, so
that the Lord hath shot out every ens a primo, as it were an arrow out of his bow,
to act his end: so that the vigour and impulsus of every ens a primo, which it
receives from God, is that it may shoot at it end, ex nihilo, because there was
onely a first efficient before it, for if it were ex aliquo, then there should be more
firsts.

Object. But how can something be made of no∣thing?

Answ. God is infinite, both a parte ante, and a parte post, ergo he can make things
of nothing, which have an infinite distance a parte ante, though not a parte post,
for so every creature is infinite.

Ens a primo est concretuns.

Ens a primo must be both like, and unlike primum: so the world is one, ergo like
God, it is made of ma∣ny simples, ergo unlike him: so every thing is one, ergo like
God, but is concretum, ergo is unlike him:

Page  10

so that every creature must take a blow of God, as Jacob when he wrestled with
the Angel took a blow on the hip, though he over∣came, whereby he was made
lame. Again, our Lo∣gick tels us first of simples, and then of the disposing of
them, therefore ens a primo must be concretum of simples, because it must be
liable to our reason; so that as before there was ens, because there was rea∣son, so
here this ens, which is the subject of our rea∣son must be concretum, because I
must see it with my eye of Logick. This concretum is of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the reason of it is this, this ens though it be for God,
yet it is mediately for man, as we may see through all the creatures of God, ergo
we thus con∣clude, that every thing was made for man, and man for God; for we
know that every thing consists of matter and form, and the end of the matter and
form of a thing is to make up the effect, and thus we say, every thing is it own
end. Now then in every ente a primo, there must be an actus to carry it to man,
and an actum, that is, that that is carried, that that is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is
actus, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is the actum, or that which is carried. So we
know that Logick carries from the thing to man, and speech from man to man,
that which he hath seen with his Logick. By actus I mean that which doth make
the thing actually to be carried to mine eye: so that it cannot come to me, but actu,
by act, and it must bring the actum: now this actus is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; for
as colour acts the external thing to my external eye, and is about the thing, so this
actus doth to my reason, and is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, about every
thing, and is an object of my eye of reason, though it ariseth from the thing, and
flieth about it. Now this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 doth concrescere both with

Page  11

it self, and with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: so that Logick is concrescus with

Logick, and with Grammar, and Rhetorick, &c. And hence it is called commune,
because it is concrescens with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and with every concretion
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, So that it is concrescens cum seipso, & cum omnibus
aliis concrescentibus. Now that that is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is the Logismos
of the thing, or the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of it, and these are the actus of the
thing: for I see every thing by my Logick, and that sees nothing but arguments,
axioms, syllogismes and method; ergo, I can see nothing but that that it doth thus
dictate to my reason; ergo, Logick doth act the actum, or that which is 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉 to my reason. Now then there must be reason in every thing,
because I am to see every thing by my Logick, which is the rule of rea∣son, ergo
all things must be liable to it, ergo it must apprehend the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
in every thing. Again, there must be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in every thing,
because though all things at the beginning were made for one man, yet by reason
of sin since his fall, one cannot see all things, therefore there must be a carrier
from one man to another, that which one man sees with his eye of Logick, he may
utter it to another: so that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is actus rei ad hominem, and 〈
in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is actu rei ab homine ad hominem.
Now this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is either loquentia or eloquentia: the reason of
this distribution is this, we heard be∣fore that speech was a carrier from man to
man: and because things that are reported, are not so easily re∣ceived, as those
which are seen by our eye of Logick, ergo it was requisite that there should not
onely be an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, whereby things might be uttered, but al∣so a
fine suggering of them with Rhetorick, for the more easie receiving of them.

Page  12

Eloquentia is either more fine or more grave, that is, soluta, or ligata: the reason
is this, argumentum is artificiale, or inartificiale: now because speech is an
artificial argument, and so not easily received, the re∣fore Rhetorick serves to
deliver the matter more soberly and gravely; and Poetry yet makes it more fine,
where all things must be done by measure and sweet sounds.

So that now we see how these general Arts are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: and that
they are not of so great necessity in respect of the thing, as in regard of us for our
good: for, so as every thing is made for man, so he must see them for his good, by
that rule that they are crea∣ted.

These now though they be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 because they are

circumstantial, yet they are ab ente primo, because there are causes, effects,
subjects, adjuncts, &c. and speech in ente a primo.

Now the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is either quantity or quality, the reason is this,
every ens a primo is finite, ergo must needs have limits of quantity, if he have
limits of es∣sence.

Quantity is either discreet, or continued, for if every thing be finite, then it must
be discreet, or di∣stinct from any other. Again, as it is discreet, so it is continued,
so farre as the form extendeth the mat∣ter, whereby we may see how farre it
reacheth, and where it reacheth not. Now as there is quantity, so also there must
be quality in every thing, for there is no ens a primo that is pure act, ergo it hath a
form acting upon a matter, and thence proceed all quan∣tities. Again, it being
made for an end, must there fore act unto its end.

Page  13

Qualitas est natura, & bonitas, every thing hath nature, because it hath a matter
and a form, ergo there is nature in every thing. And therefore Ramus  → saith,
Forma est praecipua rerum natura: and the Philoso∣phers call forma principium
actionis, and materia principium passionis.

Now this ens being of this scantling for quantity, and of this nature for act, must
be good for Gods glory: so that every thing hath a goodness in it. Again, were all
things made for man, and must he see them with his reason? Yes: ergo they are
good for him: ergo he must have a will to imbrace them as bona, as well as an eye
of reason to see them as vera, and so man also is made for God, as his will acts
goodness.
Now for the order of these, actus is before actum, for the one is actio, the other is
passio, and actio is before passio, and is more excellent then it. Again, actus doth
concrescere with it self, and with the actum that is in the thing: ergo, actus is
more general; ergo is before actum.

Again, because we do not give names to things but with reason from some
argument of Logick in the thing: and again, because there must be an actus from
the thing to man, before there can be an actus from man to man, therefore the
Logismos in the thing must be before the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in it; ergo
Lo∣gick is the most general, and first in order of all Arts.

Of those things that are acta, quantity is first, be∣cause it ariseth nexly from the
matter and form of a thing: for first of all the matter and form limit the thing,
when they are put together, before they act any thing, and afterward they act one
upon the o∣ther.

Page  14

Now quality, that is the act of the form upon the matter; ergo, it is after quantity,
but before goodness, because that is the end of Natures act. For seeing quantity
ariseth immediately from the matter and form of a thing, and Nature from the act
of the form upon the matter: therefore goodness must be the last, as being the end
of all the former: and thus did the Lord make all things, first making the causes
effects of things, then imposing speech on them, then number, then measuring
them by Geo∣metry, how farre their magnitude should reach, and where it should
not reach, before it should act. Now this act of Nature was to go no further upon
exter∣nal objects, but onely be acted by the form upon the matter; whereas the
moral act of goodness was to go further, for that is for God. Again, Nature is the
next in most thing to quantity, and Goodness is last. And thus have we seen all
that is in ente a primo, which is the ground of all Arts.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉est, qua omnes artes comprehenduntur pro subordinatione finium.

Now we are come to Arts, and first we are to be∣gin with Encuclopaidia, and the
definition of it. First for the name, it is Orbis ille, & Circulus Artium. The reason
of it indeed is as much as Arts quite through, as we use to say when there are
many poor folk to be served, though they stand in a long row, Have you served
them round? But there is a further reason of it, A circle we know is a round line,
whose beginning and end meet together in a common point; therefore this
learning in a Circle must be shewed to have a common point, and that we shall
easily find. The proper subject of Art is Ens a pri∣mo,

Page  15

because we heard, that was made for an end. Now then from whence Ens a primo
had his beginning, from thence must Ars have his beginning: But from Ens
primum it had his beginning, ergo. Again, as Ens a primo hath for his beginning
Ens primum, so it must have Ens primum for his last end, because Ens primum is
not made for any end, but is the last end of all things it self, ergo he must also be
the last end of Art: Then here we find, as Ens primum is the be∣ginning of Art, so
also he is the end of Art; be∣cause he is the beginning and end of those things that
are the subjects of Arts; therefore there is one common point wherein they begin
and end: ergo having the same beginning and end, here is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet
〉. Now howsoever the phrase may seem otherwise, as we heard before, yet here
we see the wisdom of God in this name, though the Grae∣cians did not know the
reason of it when they gave it. Now the Scripture seemeth to witness this truth.
For the Lord saith, I am the beginning and the end: that is, of things, and again, I
am Alpha and Omega: these belong to Grammar, ergo to Art, ergo he is both the
beginning and end of things, and the Alpha and Omega of the Arts.

That this wisdom is round, we may also see in regard of the subject; for the World
is round, and that is the subject of Art: ergo Art is so, for Art is an adjunct to it,
and every adjunct takes figure of his subject. Again, if we will take Art for
Know∣ledge, Knowledge is in a mans head, and that is round, so Encuclopaidia is
every way in circulo: and thus we see the reason, why this name should be given
to a Chain, whose links are the Arts. Now if Ens primum be the cause of entia a
primo, then he

Page  16

hath the Idea of them in him: for he made them by counsel, and not by necessity;
for then he should have needed them, and they have a parelion of that wisdom
that is in his Idea. Again, it must needs be that this wisdom is his, because he
governs them by the rules of Art, for so every rule of Art is a Statute-law of God,
by which he made the things, and whereby he governs the things, whose Art it is.
Now seeing it is so, therefore this Law hath God for the Author, and look what
Idea was in the making of the thing, the same Idea is in the governing of it: for if
the Lord should make it by one rule, and go∣vern it by another, it would not serve
the turn to guide the thing to the eupraxie, whereunto it was made. So that hence
it follows, that every rule of Art is eternal. Again, our rule of Logick tels us, that
every rule of Art is most true, and therefore is from God. For so every rule is true,
as it answers to that Idea that is in him: and is most just, most wise; ergo is from
God, who is most true, most just, and most wise. Now it is in God as in the
foun∣tain, and it is in the creature too, but there it is by a refraction: for this
wisdom coming to the creature, according as the creature is, such is the Arts order
and course. So that if ens a primo be divided into parts, this wisdom also will be
divided into parts: and as in a Looking-glass that is broken, look how many peices
it is broken into, so many images shall you see: So for the Arts, look into how
many parts the thing is divided, into so many parts will the Art be distributed.

Q. What is the next subject of Ars in the thing?

Page  17

Answ. The Frame, as the tearm shews: for so 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in Greek
signifieth fabrica of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, be∣cause it is seen in the frame of
the thing: so that the frame of the thing is taught in the Art. So when I say,
Dial•ctica est ars bene disserendi, I do not define Logick, but I define the frame
of reason: so that the parelion is the frame of the thing, and thence are the Arts
written, and by the Art we see the frame: so then Encuclopaidia is the wisdom of
God in the thing, er ∣go the subject of Encuclopaidia is Ars, that is the Frame of
things,
Qua comprehenduntur, or, continentur.

The Chain Encuclopaidia is not a genus to Ars, no more than a Chain is a genus
to the Links, but an in∣tegrum: for as a Chain is an integrum, and the Links
membra; so Encuclopaidia is an integrum, and the Arts are the members that
make up the whole. Now as the links must be linked together, before there be a
Chain: so the Arts must be holden together, before there be Encuclopaidia: so that
every Art is a link, and they must be linked together to make up the whole.
Therefore I say, qua continentur, as parts, conti∣nentur a toto.

For Arts may be holden together; for there is that community among the Arts, for
Ars in genere is genus to them all: Therefore as Tully saith, they have a certain
commonkinred, as being species of one genus: but this holding together is after
ano∣ther manner then links in a Chain: namely, pro sub∣ordinatione finium:
Therefore they are not holden together confusedly, and as they come to hand, but
every one must have his rank according to the gene∣rality of the end thereof. So
that if we link Gram∣mar on the Chain before Logick, we do not right:

Page  18

and so in like sort for the other Arts.

I say, qua omnes artes, because as a Chain that hath not all his links, is not
perfect, because it wants some parts: so the Chain of Arts will not be perfect, if
there be any wanting; the rule of Logick teacheth us so much: for Encuclopaidia
is a totum, ergo if any member be wanting, there will not be a totum made up.
And thus we have heard the definition of En∣cuclopaidia, Now the subject of it is
Ars, as the no∣tation of it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sheweth: and this wisdom of
God is one in him, but is made various in the thing.

Ars est quae constat praecaeptis prime verissimique scientificis rei suae ad 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 continuatis.

First for the word Ars. For the Latine term divers have diversly sought for the
notation of it. Some say it cometh of arctus a Sinew: some of arx a Tower. Now
those that say it comes of arctus a Sinew, give this reason, Because the sinew is
the strongest part in a man: for though the bones be stronger in some respect, yet
because they will break, whereas the sinew will bend, ergo the sinews are
stronger, so the arts in a thing serve to strengthen it for its Eupraxie. If it come of
arx a Tower, we know that it is impregnable for the matter and building, and for
the form also it is excellent, and so the stron∣gest thing in the world: so the Arts
are for matter invincible, for form most goodly,

Ars in Greek is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which signifieth Fa ∣brica, of 〈 in

non-Latin alphabet 〉Fabrico, because it is seen in the frame of the thing. But, as
we heard, the frame of the thing is the subject of Art: and when I say, Logica est
ars bene disserendi, I doe not define Logick, but the frame of reason, as it hath
framed man: so when I

Page  19
say Grammatica est ars bene loquendi, I describe speech as it is to be framed.
And therefore when we call it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, it is a Metonimie of the
Subject for the Ad∣junct. So that here we may see, that Art is the wis∣dom of God,
but yet as it is en•rgetick in the thing, so it is called Ars, So that mark this, that Art
is the Law of God, whereunto he created things, whereby the governeth them, and
whereunto they yeild obedi∣ence: for by their obedience we come to see this
frame; therefore this Art is Gods wisdom, as it is resplendent in the things, which
is but as a drop of water to the whole Ocean sea, in respect of the infi∣nite wisdom
that is in him. Mark this well, for the Schooles run into many absurdities, whilest
they have thought that Art is in a mans head, and not in the thing.

Quae constat.

I make no genus of it, for it is genus summum in its kind, as Ens also is.

Ob. But the Schooles say Art is an intellectual ver∣tue, ergo hath virtus for his
genus.

Answ. It is no genus of Art, neither is Ars qua ∣tenus it is Art in the thing a vertue;
but as it is sci∣entia in mans head, so indeed it belongs to the E∣thicks: for if virtue
were a genus to Ars, vertue be∣longs to Ethicks: and so by this reason. Ethicks
should be the most general Art, and also by that rea∣son Ethicks should be under
Ethicks: for virtus in∣tellectualis is but a little part of them, therefore this is
fallacia accidentis, as they call it.

Again, to call it an habit as Aristotle saith it is, and as the Schooles make it, that
conceit is very simple, for habitus or quantitas habitualis belongeth to Lo∣gick,
and is nothing but a special kind of adjunct:

Page  20

therefore Aristotle doth define homo to be genus ra ∣tionale, whereas we know

genus is but an adjunct to animal, which is the genus of homo: so that it is not Art
in the thing, but the knowledge he hath of it, which is adjoyned to man. Now we
have heard, that Art is the wisdom of God, in ente a primo, and the frame of the
creature is in the antitype of this wisdom, and is a subject of Art. I say, Ars est
quae constat, though it be the frame of the thing. Now con∣stare is to stand
together in parts.

Quest. How come Arts to have parts, being but that one wisdom in God?

Answ. Not in regard of God, but in respect of the frame of the thing where we see
it. For even as Gods Mercy and Justice are one, but various in re∣spect of the
object: It is Mercy to him that comes before him in Christ; It is Justice to him that
ap∣peares before him without Christ: So Art is one in God, but is various in
respect of the various work it hath wrought in the creation of things, and that it
acteth in their government to their end. Again, those parts must constare, for in
the frame of the thing the subjects of the Arts do constare, ergo this wisdom
fol∣lowing them must constare in his parts: and as one thing hath his frame, and
another his, differing from the other; hence the precepts of Arts must be vari∣ous,
and must constare one with another; hence it follows, that in Art we must have no
rules but those that will constare, and are essential to it. So that if we bring a rule
of Grammar into Logick, or econtra: or if we leave out of Logick some essential
rule to it, it will not constare: again, if the rules of Art be dis∣ordered, they will
not stand together: therefore when I say constare, I say two things, first that every

Page  21

Art must have all the rules that are essential to it, and no more: and secondly, that
every precept must be placed in his due order, and rank. For as a Painter that
makes the picture of a man would make it very deformed, if he should set the
head where the feet should be, or contra: so were it as absurd for an Artist to
disorder his Art.

Constant praeceptis.

Every thing hath his special acts before it can work that main act, for which it was
made, as reason must have two parts, it must see the simple causes, effects,
subjects, adjuncts, &c. and Axiomes, Syllogismes and Method, that it may bene
disserere, therefore there are many petty acts of reason to be performed, which
though they all conspire in one main act, yet are they not one another: and here
we see, that as Arts did arise from the frame of the thing; so the pre∣cepts of Art
are from the Acts of things: so that thus Arts constant praeceptis or regulis, all is
one, both are good, and regere is as large as regula, and praecep∣tum as
praecipere. But my reason why I rather chuse praeceptum is this, because regula
is tropical, for it is often taken for a Square or Ruler, whereby we rule any thing,
and this is a grand Synecdoche. And a∣gain, because the Lord hath created, and
governeth his creatures by the precepts of Arts, as by so many Statutes, or
Commandements of the things act for his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as at the
Creation, when the Lord said, Let there be light, by this rule, as by a Precept, did
the Lord create light, and also governs it. It is a Law as God governs reason,
speech, quantity, &c. by the rule of Logick, Grammar, Mathematicks; and even as
a King governeth his Dominions by his Laws: so the Lord governeth his Creatures
by the rules of

Page  22

Arts: and because the Creation began with Com∣mandements, therefore we will
still hold it, and they may be called Laws, Statutes or Commandements, &c. even
as the Lord calleth his Laws for man Com∣mandements. Again, I rather call the
rules of Arts praecepta than regulae, because they being shortly deli∣vered are as
so many short directions for the guiding of the thing to the end thereof.

Prime verissimeque scientificis.

Every Precept of Art must be scientificum, that is making knowledge: scientia

(saith our Logick) is the judgement of a necessary Axiome, and therefore must be
so true, so just and so wise, as nothing can be more true, more just, more wise.
Why? so are the Precepts of Art both in God, and in the Creature, for as for
deductions the Lord hath shut them up in a brief rule of Art; for look how many
uses there may be of a rule of Art in the thing whose rule it is, so many deductions
will there arise from that rule. Now man not being able to take this wisdom from
God, which is most simple, therefore it hath pleased the Lord to place it in the
things, and as flowers do send out a scent, or odor that doth affect our sense of
smelling, so every precept of Art doth spirare a sweet science to our glass of
Understanding, which is in∣deed that irradiation, which we heard of in Divinity in
the Creation of things: but it is called scientia by a Trope, for as the scent of a
flower is not properly odor, but that that doth affect the sense; and as when we see
a strange thing, we say, look what a sight is yonder, whereas sight is properly of
the eye: so we call Art a scientia, or sweet savour in respect of our knowledge of
it, which is a metonimy of the adjunct for the Subject.

Page  23

Quest. Now how do they scientificare? how are they 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Answ. We have heard how they are in the things, and from thence they do come
by an irradiation, to the Glass of our understanding, and as the Sun beams coming
through a red or blew glass, &c. will bring the colour of the glass with them to our
sense: so doth the irradiation of Art from the thing bring the colour of the thing
with it to our understanding, I mean that this irradiation doth bring the frame of
the thing with it, according to which we see it. Now then first it is called the
wisdom of God, as it is one in him, then is it called ars, as it is in the thing, and
when it is brought by an irradiation to our under∣standing, the first Act of it is to
see the simples in the things, and this is called our intelligentia, for it is that
perspicacie whereby we look at the invention that is in the thing: so that it is the
first Act of our intel∣lectus. As it is received in an axiome, we call it sci∣entia. It is
our sapientia as we can discourse with it syllogistically: and as we apply it rightly
in time and place, so it is prudentia. And it is Ars as we can ex∣ecute, it, and
practise it in Analysi or Genesi, as Ars is rightly an intellectual vertue, as we teach
it to another it is doctrina, and his learning is disciplina; lastly, as we set it down
in writing or printing, it is liber.

And every rule of Art is true, as when I say, R•sa est flos, Socrates est homo,
though there be never a Rose or Socrates in the world, because the rule is eternal,
for it is in the eternal Idea of God, though the thing be not. Now some Meta-
Physitians, not distinguishing aright hereof, say the thing is eternal, that is (say
they) the thing was in Gods etern••

Page  24

Idea; nay the Idea of God is eternal, but not the thing. I but Kickerman saith, the
thing is eternal quoad essentiam, not quoad existentiam, but that is false, for
existere belongs to effectum in Logick, and every effect must have all the causes,
ergo matter and form, and these are not eternal.

Prime.

For there is no rule of Art, but is a necessary Axi∣ome in its own place, and so is
firstly true. Now deductions are true but at the first, second, third or fourth hand,
according as they are drawn from the first rule, at the second, third or fourth hand,
and are so far forth true, as the first rule is true, therefore when we dispute with
any Adversaries, we bring our controversie to a rule of Art, and if they deny that,
we say contra negantem principia, non est disputandum, though there is no rule
of Art but may be demonstra∣ted, and is first because it delivereth the first causes
of the things.

Verissimeque.

Every rule of Art as it is prima scientia, so it is verissima: but for deductions, as

they are secunde, or tertiae scientiae, according as they arise from the first rule, so
they are secundo, or tertio true, to wit, so farre forth as the first is true.

Concinnatis rei.

Here is the subject of Ars, and as praecepta were the matter, and primo
verissimeque scientificis were the qualities before: I do not say fabricae, for that is
but one thing, whereas the rules of Arts are many. Again, Art is the rule of the
government of the thing, as well as of the frame of it, therefore here is ens, or res
in general: I do not say concinnatis to any one thing, because as Ars in genere is
to all the

Page  25

special Arts; so is ens in genere to all the special entia. Now if you ask me what
res is, I told you before in the definition of ens, so that it was defined before, but
here I take it as a subject of Art.

Concinnatis.

I had not a better word, and therefore was fain to take this, though it doth not fit
my purpose, as I would, for the thing indeed is made to the rule, and not the rule
to the thing, though we first see the thing, and by the Act thereof observe the rule,
Concinnatis to fit together, or to sing in parts, so that every thing must be placed
in order, and fitted each to other, for no∣thing can be wisely done, if the precepts
of Art be broken.

Ad〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

For every thing is made, and governed to an end, and Art is the rule of the making
and governing of things to their end, therefore 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is of every
Art, and is not to be taught in any particular Art.

Artis est praxis & prattomenon.

We have heard what encuclopaidia is, qua Artes comprehenduntur, pro

subordinatione finiam, and what Ars is. Now we come to the common affections
be∣longing to Art, and they are praxis, and prattomenon. That Art hath his praxis
and prattomenon, I thus prove it: if the end of things be an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet
〉, then as there is that actio, or motus: so there must be a res motu facta the
prattomenon. But the end of every thing is an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: therefore I
prove it is an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, be∣cause laus rei est actione, and if there
should be any thing made, that had not an end, it were in vain. A∣gain, every thing
is Gods work, and he is pure Act,

Page  26
therefore every thing must agree to him, and so agere. And if there be a praxis
and a prattomenon of the thing, there must needs be a praxis and prattomenon of
Art, because the thing is fitted to the rule of Art, and not Art to the thing. Now the
reason why some have dreamed that every Art hath not his praxis and
prattomenon is, that false distinction of Arts into theoretical and practick, they
call them theoretical which they do onely contemplate; practick when we can by
art agere: But there is no Art but is both theoretical and practick, for as we heard
before, that we might both scire sapere, and intelligere, &c. so we may
contemplate, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ergo this distribution is fallacia
accidentis, for they do not distinguish Art as it is in the thing, but from their own
knowledge of it.

Object. But we cannot guide Astronomy, neither can we 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

with natural Philosophy, but onely contemplate them?

Answ. It is Ars as it is in fabrica rei, not as it is in homine, but there is praxis and
prattomenon in every thing, as in the Sun we may see, his motion is Praxis, his
course that he makes is Prattomenon: again, man doth not contemplate onely, but
also work by the rule of Astronomy, and by Nature, as in the sowing of corn, and
planting of trees, &c. Now for practick they say they are such as do onely
practive, and leave no work behind them: or they are also poietick, and leave a
work behind them. Of the first sort they make Ethicks, Oeconomicks, Politicks,
Musick, Op∣ticks and others, Why? doth not the Ethician work a good moral
action, or vertue, by his rule of Ethicks? and hath not the good husbandman in
working by the rule of Oeconomicks his Prattomenon

Page  27

as well, as his praxis? and so of the rest. Is not the Common-wealth the
Prattomenon of a good Politi∣cian to be governed by him according to the rule of
the Politicks? so for Musick, is there not a song sung as well as the singing of it?
and when they set their song we see it plain, that there is an opus as well as a
motus. Now they had these from Aristotle, but they are false, and it is not
commendable in the Crea∣tor, that every thing should have his praxis and
prat∣tomenon. Again, it doth not resemble the Creator, who is purus actus, unless
there be a motus in it, and a res motu facta, as the rule of Logick teacheth in the
doctrine of effectum, and not onely Logick, but also Grammar teacheth so much,
for there is scriptio and scriptum; so in Arithmetick there is a numbring, and a
thing numbred. So for Geometry there is a mea∣suring, and a thing measured: and
so for all other Arts. And it cannot be otherwise by the rule of Grammar, for every
verb is a transitive, and that is either active or neuter, and both of them govern an
accusative case, which is the subject into which they pass over, as amo patrem,
Pater is the subject unto which amo passeth over: and sero a verb neuter hath his
subject in himself, as when I say, I sow, it is as if I should say, I sow seed,
therefore there is a prattome∣non of every Art, as well as a praxis. For if a man
smels, he smels something, and when he sees, he sees something, and drinking, he
drinks drink.

Praxis est artis in agendo motus.

There is nothing that can act sine motu, but onely God: and hence it is that motus
is general to every effect, and therefore is an effect by our rule of Lo∣gick.
 Page  28

Praxis is Genesis, and Analysis.

These two belong to art in like sort, because they belong to the thing where Art is,
for if you grant a motus of every thing, it must either be from principles to the
making up of a thing, or to the resolving of it. Now if Art make up a thing, it can
also undo it, for the way is the same, onely there is a progress and re∣gress: so if I
by my rule of Grammar joyn a nomi∣native case and a verb together, I can also by
the same rule undo them again, and see whether it be true; and this we call
construing of Latine, which indeed is distruing, for it is Analysis, for we pull that
asunder, which Tully hath laid together, and indeed none can well undo a thing,
but he that hath made it, or one that knows how to make it: and therefore we do
not send for a Joyner to pull down a house, but for a Carpenter, ergo if every thing
have his Ge∣nesis and Analysis, Art must also have them, which follow the thing.

Genesis est progressus artis a simplicibus ad composita.

This Art hath his Genesis, which is a progress, for Genesis begins at the simples,
and so goes to the com∣posites, therefore must needs be a progress, now every
thing but God is composed of simples, therefore there must needs be a Genesis of
every Art which still follows the thing. So Logick first looks at the invention of
things, then at the axioms, syllogismes and method. So Grammar first begins with
letters, then with syllables, then with words, then with sen∣tences: and
Arithmetick first considereth simple number, then comparative, &c. So Geometry
first looks at lines, then at superficies, then at corpus: so na∣tural Philosophy first
begins with simple natures, then with composites, first with those that are without

Page  29

life, then those that live, first a simple life, secondly those that live a composite
life.

Analysis est regressus a compositis ad simplicia.

Analysis is an unwinding of a bottom of thred, which we wound up before: so we

analyse that which was genised before, so that it is a regressio, &c, for that way
that you took in genesi, the same way you take in analysi, onely you begin at
divers ends. So in Logick we take an axiome, and resolve it into arguments, and
so in Grammar we take a sentence, and resolve it into words, and so when I ask
what a word signifies, he that telleth me the signification of it doth analyse it, and
so for the other Arts as we heard before in the doctrine of Genesis. Now the
Schooles thought that genesis and analysis belong to Method in Logick, which
happily they might have from Aristo∣tle, who intituleth his books Analyticks, and
thence they make method to be double 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉, but they belong to every Art, therefore must be taught 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉: and again, there is genesis and analysis of one and the same
axiom, as when I seek for a cause, or any other argument to make an axiome, or
when I resolve it into a cause, &c. so that when I ask, what is Latine for such a
word, I genise it, and englishing it I analyse it, so that they belong not to method,
which is a disposition, for they may be of one word; again, they may be as well of
any other rule as of method. Now because they did observe the analysis and
genesis in method more usually, than of art in general, therefore they thought
them to be∣long onely to it; now indeed if I take any rule of art from other rules of
art, I practise method, there∣fore they may be special practises of method, for as
[said before, they may be in any other rule of Art, as

Page  30

well as in it. And method is not double because of them, no more than any rule of
Art is double, because of the double use of it, and these are the life of Art,
therefore those that will be expert for practise of any Art, let them practise these.
Now for the general Arts, I think none will doubt, but that they belong to them,
but for the special Arts there may be some doubt. If you draw any deduction from
any first rule of any special Art, it is genesis; or if you draw deduction unto a first
rule from it, it is analysis, &c. So when you examine the Suns course by the rule
of Astronomy, it is genesis, analysis contra. This analysis if it be imitated (for so
it pleaseth the Lord to let us resolve his creatures) that we may work alike, that is
called imitatio: so that those that have writ so much of imitatio, are to bring it
hither, and imita ∣tio is general, as we imitate some analysis of some thing that is
genised. And indeed all our practice is nothing but genesis imitative of 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉: so a child when he writes a copy by his Masters example doth
imitate him, for first he looks at the line then at the sentences, then at the words,
and lastly at the letters. So an apprentise when he works according as his master
reacheth him, doth imitate his example: and thus as we see Gods wisdom making
up the thing, so we see mans work in imitating God.

Ʋbi genesis desinit, ibi incipit analysis.

For if genesis be progressus a simplicibus ad compo∣sita and analysis regressus a

compositis ad simplicia, then genesis definit ubi incipit analysis: at, ergo; again it
follows that analysis conjuncta is vere hermineutica, or interpretativa, for when I
have an example, and do resolve the prattomenon, giving to every Art his own, I
tell you all that is to be seen in the thing, as in

Page  31

this example, homo est bulla, but this later conse∣cution will come in better in the
doctrine of pratto∣menon.

Prattomenon est res motu artis facta.

Prattomenon is that that the Art hath done by his praxis, for actio must go before
passio, and praxis is before prattomenon, and there is nothing, but it is made for
man, and therefore must have a Prattome∣non, for else the motion of it would be
little worth: now to prattomenon there belongs two things, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet
〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for when Art hath acted, and acted a work, it
resteth not there, for it is for an use, there∣fore there must go with prattomenon, an
use thereof. Now this use may be confused with the prattomena of other Arts; so
that this rule is here to be taught, that the Arts for their precepts are distinct, but
not for the use of their prattomena: for use holds the prattomena of Arts together,
as in this example, all flesh is grass, if it be examined. For in this there is the
prattomenon of Logick, Grammar, Rhetorick, na∣tural Philosophy, and lastly the
prattomenon of Divi∣nity. Hence we say the use of Arts is general, but we mean
the use of the prattomenon of Arts, for the precepts of Art are not onely distinct,
but the praxis to, and the prattomenon also till we come to the 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 of it: as we may see in a Shipwright, his rule of Art is distinct, his
motus is distinct, and his prattomenon is distinct, till you come to look at the
manifold use of his prattomenon. So first the Shepherd hath his prat∣tomenon,
then the Grasier he useth the prattomenon of the shepherd, the Butcher useth the
prattomenon of the Grasier, and the Cook useth the prattomenon of the Butcher,
and they that eat the meat the Cook hath dressed use his Prattomenon. So that if
the Philoso∣pher

Page  32

will dispute as we say, he disputes as a Logician making axiomes, or syllogismes,

and so takes the prattomenon of Logick, and useth it in natural Philo∣sophy. So
the Taylor takes cloath made to his hand, and he useth it to this, or that end, to
make such, or such a garment with it. There is also that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,
for as the prattomenon of every Art may be joyned with the prattomenon of other
Arts: so it must be provided that they be not so confused together, but that they
may be severed again. So I can take mag∣nitude from a body by the rule of
Geometry, for whilst I take the prattomenon of any thing, and carry it to the Art to
which it belongeth, that is aphares•s, it hath been taught in Schooles to be
peculiar onely to Geometry, but it doth not take magnitude from the thing, but
seeth is there distinct, and puls it from ano∣ther, and gives that prattomenon its
proper use, and so looks at it by that Art whose prattomenon it is, and so doth
every Art whatsoever, ergo it is general to them all.

Posterior ars prioris utitur opere.

This is from the use, so we may see in manual Arts, the Shepherd hath his
prattomenon, and the Grasier he takes and useth it, and then the Butcher useth the
Grasiers prattomenon, and the Cook he useth the Butchers, &c. and thus we have
heard of Art in ge∣neral.

Ars est generalis, aut specialis.

I shewed you before, that in ente aprimo there were certain concrescentia, and
they were either 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: now these
that are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 are more general than the other, for they do
concrescere with themselves, and with the rest. As Logick, Gram∣mar, and
Rhetorick do concrescere between them∣selves,

Page  33

and cumomnibus aliis concrescentibus in the thing, ergo accordingly must the
Arts of them, name∣ly, Logick, Grammar and Rhetorick be general: and because
the other do not concrescere with the rest, but onely in part, ergo they are more
special, for though number and magnitude may concrescere with nature, but not
with all other Arts, as Logick, &c. therefore they are not so general. Now things
are more gene∣ral or special in use, ergo the Art which still runs on with the thing
must be distributed accordingly, not that I here distribute Art into genus and
species, for in that sense they are all alike, yea the most special Art is as general,
as that which is most general, there∣fore take heed of that, for I do not mean so,
but I mean that some Arts are more general in respect of the general use of their
prattomenon, and some are more special in regard of the special use of it, as one
Art may be without another, and by nature is before it, as one is before two, for so
Logick needeth not a∣ny other Art, but all the rest have need of it.

Ars generalis est, quae est 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, circaens.

This general Art hath for his subject every thing, ergo I thus define it; It is the
splendor or light that brings the thing to man from man: now in that it is of
general use, it must needs be ubique. But is ens in genere the subject of the
general Art? yes, but at the second hand, it is firstly the subject of ars in genere.
Now there are general to ens in genere these two ad∣juncts, 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, therefore the Arts of them must be
general, and in every thing: so that if you look at ens quatenus ens, it belongs to
ars, quatenus ars, if you look at the reason or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the
thing, it belongs to Logick, Grammar, or Rhetorick, so that look at ens, as the
Meta-physitians teach it, and you

Page  34

shall find all their doctrine to be here, or in Logick, or in Divinity, about the
efficiency of God. Now I say it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉non ens by consequence, but non ens is more special, and belongs to
contraria ne∣gantia in Logick, but ens fictum is more general. I say 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉, or circa, not but that it is in the thing, for the Logicum artificium of
God is in every thing: but it is in the outside of it, and flies out of it, and acts
out∣wardly to me, and in that respect I call it circa, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: I
say 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 also, for there can be no Art of non ens; for non ens
is no creature, and Art is the wisdom of God and therefore is of that that is
something. Now the Poets fall into many figments, but they mean thereby things,
and so they belong to some special Arts: and all Esops Fables and other fables are
but Allegories belonging to natural Phylosophy, or to moral Philosophy, though
there may be fables of any art, for fabula belongs to rhetorick which is a general
art.

Ars generalis est rati nis, or orationis.

This general art running according to the general thing, that is, which is of general
use, is either the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: now the 〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉 is more general, because the thing must first be carried to
me, before I can deliver it to another. Again, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is of
absolute necessity in every thing, and therefore must needs be there, whereas the 〈
in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is therefore gene∣ral because it may be every where, but is
not; For it is impossible for us to see any thing without there be reason in it, ergo
Logick the art that made it is most general, and omnium〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
and therefore by nature is first, for other arts cannot be without it, that may be
without them: and thus now we are come to Logick.

Page  35
THE LOGICIANS SCHOOL-MASTER.

The first Book.

CHAP. I.

Dialectica est ars bene disserendi.

W E have heard what Encuclopai∣dia is, and of Ars, and that the subject
of it is Res, that hath an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: We have heard more∣over the
affections of Arts, and the Species of them, that they are general of the thing
acting, or special of the thing acted. Now then the first thing in nature is reason,
and here remember what we heard before, that we

Page  36

may see as God governed things in general by Arts: so in special reason by

Logick; and it is most gene∣ral, because it is of most general use, not in regard
of his Precepts, for so it is as special as any, but for use, because there can be
nothing without Logick, yet Logick may be without speech, quantity, &c. ergo,
this is most general. Now true it is, that this, as also the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet
〉 proceed from the thing in nature; yet Lo∣gick is more general than any of the
rest in regard of his use, for it is in it self in speech, in quantity, &c. so that look
where any art is, there Logick is: but it doth not follow, that where Logick is,
there Arith∣metick, Geometry, &c. should be. Again, it pleased the Lord to
make man his Steward under him over all the Creatures, ergo in this respect it
is necessary he should behold all the creatures, to the imployment of the use of
the principal Lord, therefore he must first see them, therefore must be prepared
with such a fa∣culty, that he may see all things by it. Now this is omnium〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉. That there is such an Art, I shew it thus.

If there be reason, then there is an art of it, because reason is ens a primo, and it
is for an end, therefore there must be that art, that is of reasons act. For the
proposition I proved it before, for reason was for an end; for the Assumption
none will deny, but that there is reason, if they will acknowledge themselves to
be but men. Our Author cals this art Dialectica, which comes of 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, signifying secer ∣no, separo, seligo; as
for example, if there were many things together, I would sever them, and this
name fitteth reasons act very well; for Logick is like a fire among the Chimists,
for as fire will congregare homo∣genia, and segregare heterogenia: so Logick is
the fire

Page  37

of all Arts, severing in the same act that fire doth, Logick from Grammar, and
Rhetorick from both, &c. and then it congregates to Logick that which is
congreans to it, to Grammar that which is homogenie to it, &c. so that when it
invents, it picks out homoge∣nies, it disposeth them, and layes them in several
pla∣ces, therefore this name Dialectica is very fitly given to this art, that works
this wonderful effect. Won∣derful I may call it, for the Chimists can do great
ef∣fects, but the Logicians can do greater, for they can see Gods Logick in the
things, and had not man faln, he might have come to have seen all the wisdom
of God in the Creatures. Now if Logick doth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is,
congregare homogenia, and segregare hete∣rogenia by the same effect, it may
fitly be so called: now this art is so called, saith Diog enes Laertius, first by
Plato, if he were the Author, he was more ancient than Aristotle, and antiquity
should have honour with good reason, if we have any reason: nay, Geo∣metry is
so called from its subject rather, not metiri from antiquity; but Zenophon in his
fourth book of remembrances saith, that Socrates was Platoes School-master,
and he never writ any thing, but Plato alwayes: so that Socrates might read it,
and Zeno∣phon hear it, for he was his Schollar, for Zenophon & Plato fuere
aequales, and Diogenes Laertius might read it in Plato, as he had noted it from
Socrates: and the Oracle witnesseth that Socrates was the wi∣sest man in his
time, and he was more wise than Ari∣stotle; for Plato that was Socrates
Schollar, was his Master; so that for this name we see how fitly it a∣grees to this
art, and also the confirmation of it from antiquity. Now Aristotle cals it Logick,
I do not deny but the name is good, but it is later, as Laer ∣tius

Page  38

witnesseth that Aristotle gave it first, but it is from the subject •eason, as the
names of most arts are. Arithmetick of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, numerus;
Geometry of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, terra, &c. but it doth not so lively name
this art as Dialectica doth, which names the life, and delivers the quintessence
of Logick: so that Logica, as it is conjugate of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, names
it well, but doth not set it out with that vigour that Dialectica doth: So thus we
see the reason of the name.

Est Ars.

What art is we have heard before, this it is, every thing hath an 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉, which is accomplished by many petty 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,
which causes the precepts of art to be answerable thereunto; so that Logicks
main end is bene disserere: bene invenire, and bene judicare are the petty acts
of it. Now if Logica, and Diale∣ctica shew the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and
frame of mans reason, and di∣rect it to the chief end, its happiness, where the 〈
in non-Latin alphabet 〉 esteth, then it is ars: at, ergo.

Est ars bene disserendi.

First disserendi, for the explanation of the word, dissero comes of dis and sero,
sero signifies first to sow and dis a sunder, or dissero, that makes disserui▪ to
sow asunder; whether it be so used I find not, I for my part ever read it in this
Logical signification, and that which I told you of concerning dialectica, is true
〈◊〉 his, that as there was things to be sown, and a sa ∣ti• secernendorum, and a
sowing them asunder: so there are first semina, which are arguments in
inven∣tion: Secondly, a satio of them, that is, a disposing of them
Axiomatically, and syllogistically; and lastly, a disserio, that is, a disposing of
them according to true method and order; so that in this disserere we have the
nature of reason quite through, as we had in Dia ∣lectica.

Page  39
So that this name delivers also to us very fitly the very soul of Logick; for as in
mans body there is a soul or a form per quam res est, id quod est, & a caeteris
rebus distinguitur; so there is of this art, or rather of the subject of it, reason:
and as in other things the Lord hath wrought so cunningly, that we cannot see
their forms, but onely the next acts to the formes: so here our Author desireth to
give to us the form of reason; which because he cannot do, therefore he delivers
it by the final cause, the next act to the form: so that when he saith dialectica
est ars bene disserendi, he means it is such an art that hath such a form that
doth bene disserere, therefore I conclude thus: if this be the happiness, the act,
and soul of reason, then it is defined fitly Ars bene disserendi, at. ergo.

Bene.

Here it is an adverb, for Grammar here doth de∣clare some controversie, and an
adverb is a part of speech joyned to the verb to shew his signification, therefore
bene is here added to make perfect the act of this disserere, ergo, bene disserere
is not two things, but one thing, and this is a commendation in defining arts, to
break the forms of them, as little as we can, be∣cause the form is but one
argument; and if we put two or more words into the form, we break it into so
many peices. Now for the reason of bene in a Art, this it is, Art is the rule of the
frame of Ens a primo: so Logick is the rule of reason, as it is Gods creature,
ergo, as it is good, ergo, bene is here put in well to shew the Act of the
goodness of this reason. Now since the fall of man, his reason is weakned, &
darkned, & so there is a bona ratio, and a mala ratio▪ though mala ratio is not
ratio indeed, but the errour of rario, and

Page  40

this act is to guide reason, as it doth bene disserere, not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet
〉disserere, ergo, it is well put in to sever them. For if Dialectica be ars rationis
bene agentis, then it is ars bene disserendi onely, and not male disserendi, at,
ergo. So Grammar is the Art onely bene loquendi, though it discrie male loqui:
now here among the Logicians are many questions, and controversies against
our Author. As some except against the name dialecti∣ca, and makes it more
special than here Ramus  → takes it, and they distribute reason into three parts,
Dia ∣lectica, Sophistica, and Apodictica, which was the di∣stribution of the
Aristotelians, not of Aristotle him∣self; but Simplicius that chief fellow, was the
first man that brought it up, and afterward it was gene∣rally received in
Schooles from him. By Dialectica they understand all probable reason, and
probality in Schools is taken in two significations, sometime it is taken for a
contingent true axiome, ergo it belongs to one little particle of the doctrine of
axioma. Some∣times it is taken for axioma dubium, or quaestio, and then it
belongs to the doctrine of Syllogismes; so that we shall find probability in these
two places; but to make Dialectica so special, is to make a Camel go through
the eye of a needle; is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 no more general then so? doth it
not go through all judge∣ment, yea and invention too?

Again, for Apodictica, which is de necessariis, that belongs to a necessary

axiome, for no syllogismes are necessary, but the axiomes which they consist
of; but the syllogistical judgement is the same both of neces∣sary and
contingent axiomes, and a syllogisme of con∣tingent propositions is necessary
as well as that, which is of necessary axioms. Now for Sophistica, that is shut
out, for if I see the truth, what need I look far∣ther:

Page  41

and whereas they alledge that it is of the ap∣parency of truth, what care I for
that? yet it is counterfeit: so that they would have all Logick to consist in a
necessary and a contingent axiome, for no syllogismes are so: and that is the
reason, that ← Ramus  → denies that demonstration; for their neces∣sary that
they speak of, is in axiom, not in syllogisme. Again, Sophistica is general to all
arts, and not special to Logick, for all arts have their errors. Now the Schools
distribute Logick into Dialectica, Gramma ∣tica, and Rhetorica, which savours
of a notorious equi∣vocation. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 indeed signifies ratio,
and oratio, but this is onely a distributing of the name, not of the thing, as if
they should say Logica signifies ratio, or speech: many also there are that find
fault with Ra ∣mus, for the reason of this name, some say it comes of 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉, colloquor; but that is not because of their collocutio; but
because of their reasoning in their speech together: but again, what hath Logick
to do with words, and to name Logick from speech hath no rea∣son at all, for it
may be without it. There is also a great question, whether Dialectica be Ars, as
Scali∣ger will have it; because saith he opus post se reliquit; or if it be facultas,
as Craelius holds, or whether it be scientia, as others say. These are bables, we
have heard that the wisdom of God is Ars in the thing, it is called scientia by a
metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, which is properly the judgement of a
rule of art: so that here is a double trope, first a metonimy of the adjunct for the
subject, the know∣ledge of the art for the art it self: then a Synechdo∣che of the
part for the whole, the rule for the whole art, for facultas, that is the subject
ratio: ergo, Crae∣lius speaks by metonimy of the subject for the ad∣junct;

Page  42

for the faculty is reason it self; so that dia ∣lectica est ars: as for their
distribution in Schooles, that ars doth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and scientia
onely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or contemplare, it is a bable, we see scientia is
the know∣ledge of the Art, and ars is rei, as A•ithmetick is of number,
Geometry of magnitude, &c. and Logick of reason, so that the scientia or
Theory of Art is fallacia accidentis, to take it for the art it self, and is as if we
should say, a painted man is a true man, ergo, when we say a man is a good
Logician, we mean a man hath that knowledge of reason, and so for o∣ther arts;
so that our knowledge of an art is no more of the essence of it, then my
knowledge of a man is of the essence of the man. Again, when I say the
knowledge of an Art, I say two things, know∣ledge, and art, which are subject
and adjunct, ergo, knowledge is but accidental to the art. For bene disserendi
there are many adversaries, and one grand enemy, some say it is rather ars bene
utendi ratione, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is an adjunct to art, and it is 〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉 not artis, as for example, we cannot say, the Merchant, or
Marriner useth the Shipwrights art, but his work, but this is the chief absurdity
that it breaks the form into peices.
Kickerman cries out against ← Ramus  → for this defi∣nition, and sayes it is a
trope, ergo, ought not to be in art, he forgets his rules, for Rhetorick is a general
art, ergo, it may be every where, but saith he, is it not bet∣ter to teach with
proper words, then with tropical, they are fit for simple men, not for judicious?
I will confess it, and ← Ramus  → too, for Grammar is before Rhetorick, ergo,
should be preferred: yet Tropes may be as plain, and as significant as other
words some∣times; but I make no doubt, but that disserere is ever

Page  43

used in other sense then this Logical signification: but if it be, let him give me a
better word; but he cannot, because he doth not but sayes, logica est ars
dirigendi mentem in cognitione rerum▪ and so breaks all in peices. Again, what
doth dirigere here? It be∣longs to art in general, for dirigere is as large as
rege∣re, and regere as regula, and regula as praeceptum; so that here he cannot
be content to horse me up to art in general, for the genus onely, but for the form
too. Again for mens, he cannot abide Tropes; but what means he by mens?〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifieth properly the divine part of the soul of man, and
sometimes it is taken for the faculties of the soul, but here he must take it for
reason, ergo, here are two Tropes, first a metonimy of the subject for the
adjunct, the faculties for the soul it self. Secondly, a Synecdoche of the part for
the whole, reason for the soul. For cognitio it comes of con and notio, to see
things laid together, and it is the judgement of an axiome, and belongs to it,
which is but a little particle of Logick.

Lastly, for res, that is as general as ens, which is as general as ars, ergo, thus he
hoists me up, and down, first to ars in general; then down again to natural
Philosophy, for mens belongs thither, then to one peice of Logick: then again up
to ars; and thus much for the explanation of the rule: the practise of it stands in
this: God hath made all things for man, therefore he must have an eye to see
them, and all of them must be liable to it, ergo, this rule tels us, first, if we
would look at any thing we must take it with us, for it is ars bene disserendi,
and so we shall see it: so that if we would do any thing with reason this puls us
by the ear and sayes it is the art to reason well: so that here we may see the
commendation of this

Page  44

art not onely in respect of the general use of it, but in that it teacheth us how to
work by it, as God hath done before us: so that it first teacheth us Gods will and
pleasure in things; and then what he would have us to do in the managing and
governing of them: and here we may see, that all things at the first were made
for one man.

Eodemque sensu Logica dicta est.

We have heard what Dialectica is, and have seen the reason of every word
therein. Now ← Ramus  → doth commorari upon this rule, and tels us that
eodem sensu Logica dicta est: the reason of it is, because here he tels us of a
controversie betwixt him and Aristotle, which I prevented before, when I spake
of their di∣stribution of Logick into Dialectica, Apodictica, and Sophistica.
Now ← Ramus  → onely sets down the rule according to truth, for thus it
stands, if Dialectica delivers the Art of reason, then Logick and it are all one,
but this is the Art that appertains to reason, and that is but one, ergo, so then if
Logica signifie the same that Dialectica doth, therefore there is the same
definition of them both, for they are one in indivi∣duo, as the Schools speak,
ergo in form, ergo but two names signifying the same thing.

Dicta est.

Meaning that that name of Aristotles is the same with that Socrates gave; and
whilst Plato doth in∣terpret Logica to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and Aristotle
saith it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: they grant it to be the same with Dialectica,
and for the distinction of Logick in∣to those three, they must needs hold that
those parts contain as much as the whole, but they do not by their own
confession; so that this distribution was made by Simplicius, which did not
understand Ari∣stole,

Page  45

or at leastwise Logick, otherwise let them tell me any thing in Logick, that is
not in Dialectica, ac∣cording to our Authors definition of it. For Ra ∣mus will not
deny but Dialectica and Logica are ta∣ken specially in Aristotle, as ratio is
sometimes used for argumentum, but that is by a Synecdoche, for he wanting
special names cals things by general words: as an exhalation he cals a fume,
whereas a vapour is also a fume, and often he useth it in his Politicks,
Eodemque sensu, &c. that is, Logick is so defined, ars bene disserendi, even as
Dialectica is, and whatso∣ever other conceits men have had concerning
Dia ∣lectica, they are out of the way, for if they will say there is a necessary, a
probable, and a sophistical ar∣gument, as many do speak, that belongs to an
axiome, not to an argument, and whereas they say syllogismus is necessarius,
that is Apodicticus, contingens and so∣phisticus, if we look at a necessary
syllogisme in Bar ∣bara, why there may be a contingent syllogisme, that is a
syllogisme consisting of contingent axioms, for so they mean, nay I will make a
false syllogisme in Barbara, that shall be true and good, as omnis homo est
lapis, omnis afinus est homo, ergo omnis asinus est lapis: and a demonstrative
syllogisme, as omne animal ratio∣nale est visible, omnis homo est animal
rationale, ergo omnis homo est visibilis: so that these lie not in the syllogisme,
for then a dialectical syllogisme would not be an apodictical, or sophistical, aut
contra, but these lie in the axiome: for why? whatsoever is ne∣cessary is true,
and a contingent axiome doth pro∣nunciare aliquid esse verum, though it may
be false, ergo whither truth belongs, thither they belong; now truth and
falsehood follow upon affirmation, and negation, and they arise from an axiom,
neither doth

Page  46

a man say aliquid esse, aut non esse, when he means an argument alone, till
there be a disposition, ergo those that make a distribution of syllogismes by
their matter deceive us: so that here we see it is true that our Author tels us, that
eodem sensu Logica dicta est.
CHAP. II.

Dialecticae partes duae sunt, inventio, & dispositio.

NOw we come to the second rule, having heard that Dialectica est ars bene
disserendi; this rule needs nothing to make it plain, but that which went before
scilicet ars in general, to shew this to be an Art, and the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet
〉 of every ens a primo, to shew that this Arts end is bene differere, both which
we heard of in the doctrine of Art, therefore this rule shewing what is pictured
in this book needs no more expla∣nation, therefore it is the first rule of all, for it
gives light to all the rules following, and takes light of none: therefore doth this
second rule give light to the former? no, it rather obscures it, for I must first
know what Dialectica is before I hear it divided, for how can I divide I know
not what? therefore this rule will give no light to the first, therefore never a rule
following, and the first rule is a comment to this. Dialectica, that is, that which
was ars bene disse∣rendi, hath two parts, bene invenire argumenta, and bene
disponere argumenta: why? because they are portions of this Art tending ad
bene disserendi partes. Can Dialectica, this Art be parted? If it be that wisdom
of God that is one most simple being, how

Page  47

comes it to be divided into branches? I have shewed howsoever it is one in

God, yet he hath made reason twisted in the thing, so that before it can bene
dissere∣re, it must bene invenire, and bene judicare: so that now reason as it is
the subject of Logick, namely as it doth act, and is for an 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 and reason according to his frame hath these two operations, invenire
and judicare, therefore the Art being the Idea of this frame, that hath two parts,
must have two parts, for Logick behold reason, not as it is a faculty belong∣ing
to natural Philosophy, but as it acts. Now thus I argue. If reasons frame run into
two heads, or actions, that it may 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, then the Art must do
so, now that reason is framed to run into these two heads, thus I shewed it, All
things were made for man, therefore he must have an eye to see them: now all
things that God hath made are considered in themselves, or with others, for the
world is one consi∣sting of many parts, and they are considered alone or with
others, therefore mans reason must run accord∣ingly. God onely is entire in
himself having no re∣spect to any other thing, he is simple, and hath no parts,
therefore he is not liable to Logick: all other things are composed, that it might
appear, that he is simple, so that every thing else is composed, or dispo∣sed with
others, yet first it must be in it self, in use: for if I say a brick-wall, there must
needs first be bricks, and what use have we of words alone in Grammar, but in
Syntax, and first we must see the Etimologie of them: nay in every Art except
Rhe∣torick there is no use of the first part without the se∣cond, neither is
invention ever without judgement, therefore when every thing hath his double
conside∣ration, there must be two parts of reason, for as

Page  48

things are, so must reasons act be, for every thing must be so administred as
that it be liable to reason, and be considered alone before it be disposed:
there∣fore invention is first, so that any man that hath rea∣son will acknowledge
the necessity of this distribu∣tion: now these two parts are called Invention and
Disposition. First for the reason of the name Inven∣tion, man was to see all
Gods creatures, and so to see his order in them: now how should man see
them? were they written in his understanding? no more than Pauls steeple is in
my eye, for man came furnish∣ed into the world onely with Logick, Grammar,
Rhetorick and Divinity, neither with the knowledge of these Arts, but with the
faculties of them, and therefore the Arts must needs be there, for we read the
Arts in the things: so that for Arithmetick, Ge∣ometry and nature, man was to
learn them by the creatures, as he was also to learn the knowledge of Logick,
Grammar, Rhetorick and Divinity. The reason is this, the Genesis of every thing
is Gods, and man must see the rules of Art, therefore man must see them from
singulars, by analysis: now then if man must learn these, and know them by his
senses obser∣vation, induction and experience, then he must seek, and find out
these, for they are not written in him: again, whereas every thing is in
disposition, it is re∣quisite that man find them out, and see them several∣ly,
therefore in this respect is this Art of reason cal∣led Invention, namely as he is
sent by God to find out these things in his creatures; now if man must find them
out with this act of his eye of reason, then is it fitly called invention, at, ergo.
And this teach∣eth man thus much, that he is to seek out, and find this wisdom
of God in the world, and not to be idle; for

Page  49

the world, and the creatures therein are like a book wherein Gods wisdom is
written, and there must we seek it out. Why is not this first Art called
Dispo∣sition, because that is more familiar, and easie to us, for all things are
disposed; but we are by this Art to sever them, and to look at them simply, so
that this name teacheth man what he is to do in this act of his reason, namely,
invenire argumenta, as in mists to look at the elements, &c. Now Kickerman
cannot away with this distribution, and yet sayes nothing to this purpose against
it, for I suppose Invention to be an ambiguous name, and have equivocation
with it, as I do not deny, but it is taken sometimes for judgement, but that is
tropically, yet while my Au∣thor tels me what it is, that is sufficient to know his
meaning how here it is taken.

Object. But Invention is never without judgement saith he, no inventions use is
ever without judgements use: so he may say Etimologie is never without
Syntax, I but, saith he, you cannot invent without judgement, therefore they are
no parts of Logick? as for example, a chest is made of wood, by this rule
materia est causae ex qua res est, therefore here is syllogistical judgement,
which is concluded a defini∣tione, and this is Aristotles demonstration, as if you
should make a syllogisme thus, That whereof the thing is, that is materia, But
wood is that ex quo the Chest is, ergo. But here is onely Logicks practise, and
not any rule of Art taught us. The question be∣twixt ← Ramus  → and him is,
whether any rule of inventi∣on belongs to judgement. This it is, the rules of
in∣vention give precepts of nothing at all concerning judgement, aut contra:
therefore these are the true parts of Logick: and whilst he argues from the
pre∣cept

Page  50
to the rule, it is fallacia accidentis, as if he should reason: Socrates est animal,
animal est genus, ergo Socrates est genus; whereas we know the thing ani∣mal
is not that Logical notion, neither Socrates, for they belong to natural
Philosophy, but genus is no adjunct attributed unto them, so this invention is
onely of simple arguments, and of the simple consi∣deration of them, and
therefore our Art runs along according to Gods order, and though we cannot
pra∣ctice any rule of invention, but by judgement, yet it doth not therefore
follow that they are the same, for it is as if he should say this, homo, quae pars
orationis? Nomen, here is the practise of Syntax, ergo Etimolo∣gy, and Syntax,
are all one.

Inventio est prima pars Dialecticae de inveniendis argumentis,

We have heard of the reason of the name Inven∣tion, why it is given to the first
part, and that with great reason, for we must find by much seeking be∣fore we
can see things. Again, Logick being the first help to see Gods wisdom in his
creatures, and this use of invention being to be found in the thing, it is hard to
find, therefore it is fitly called invention from the act of it: So again in dispute,
a man is fain to seek a third argument to prove his question. Judgement the
second part is properly the act of our understanding, when it looks at arguments
disposed, therefore here it is a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, when it
is put for dispositio: and again it is properly the disposing of arguments
together, which is of Axiomes and Syllogismes.

Method doth not look at the disposing of argu∣ments, but at the placing of
axioms: so that if I would distribute Dilectica thus, Dalecticae partes duae

Page  51

sunt, inventio, & dispositio: dispositio is judicum, or Methodus, judicium est

axiomatic•m, or syllogisticum: my reasons are these: the arts of reason are
perfor∣med by the internal senses, the best phansie invents best, and that is
performed by a hot brain: cogita∣tion serves judgement axiomatical, and
syllogistical, and that is dry, and the best memory is an ayrie moist brain: ergo,
whilst I see from this reason in natural Philosophy, that axiomatical and
syllogistical judge∣ment are thus combined, and the other severed, I think this
art should be thus divided according to their instruments, as nature hath severed
them. A∣gain, our Author distributeth the second part into axioma, and
discursus, and under discursus he placeth syllogismus and Methodus: now
these two cannot be joyned together: for why? what hath method to do with
syllogismus? Method doth not dispose syl∣logismes, but axiomes. Again, the
use of a syllo∣gisme is to make clear that that is obscu•e, and to manifest truth;
and the rule of truth belongs to axi∣omatical judgement if it be clear; if not, then
to syl∣logistical judgement: but we bring our question af∣ter again to an axiome
to see the truth of it, ergo, these two work about one thing, namely about truth,
therefore they should be combined together. So that syllogistical judgement is
to make clear that, which axiomatical judgement could not, yet the doctrine of
axioma is before, and syllogistical judge∣ment hath for his subject axioma
dubium. The ex∣ceptions against this rule are these: first, Kickerman saith,
There is no invention, but there is judgement withal, that is confessed to be true
in use, as in Gram∣mar the use of Etimologie is never without Syntax, but the
use is one thing, and the rule another: there
 Page  52

is no precept of invention, that belongs to judge∣ment aut contra: then he saith,

Who can invent, but he must also judge? for (saith he) must not a man judge a
cause before he find it? this is also a fallace of use: we cannot find a rule, but
we use both in∣vention and judgement, but by his argument, there should be no
judgement, but syllogistical: then again he saith, invention was used for a third
argument, and not as ← Ramus  → taketh it.

True it is, the Schools thought it onely to belong to syllogismes, and that there
was but the use of an argument, not the doctrine of it, but thus I argue: Is
invention of a third argument, ergo, it is of an ar∣gument, ergo, then it belongs
not to judgement: for the doctrine of a simple conceit, as he calls it, is di∣stinct
from the doctrine of judgement. Again, if it be a third Argument, there w•s two
before, ergo, there are Arguments disposed. Again, when a third Argument is
found out, do we not dispose pars con∣sequen• quaestionis in propositione, and
antecedens in as∣sumptione. and so make the proposition an axiome, and
likewise the assumption: ergo, an argument is placed in an axiom as well as in
a syllogisme by their own confession: therefore we see evidently here, that the
use of an Argument is common both to syl∣logistical and axiomatical
judgement. And I would ask, whether causa est cujus vi res est, when it is
dispo∣sed with the effect, be the same, and have the same de∣finition in an
axiome, that it hath in a syllogisme? If they say it is the same, ergo, common to
both, ergo, the doctrine of causa, and effectum, &c. must go be∣fore the
doctrine of an axiome, and a syllogisme, and Method, and must be distinct
from them all: for as method is distinct from ax•omatical, and syllogisti∣cal

Page  53

judgement, and is before them, because an axiom may be without them, not
contra: So is the doctrine of arguments before the doctrine of axiomes for the
same reason: and Kickerman confess•th as much, whilst he distributes Logick
into terminus simplex, complexus, and discursus: he saith Authors of Arts are
called Inventors, as Hypocrates of Medicina, Aristotle of Logick, but did they
not all judge them? yes, but doth it therefore follow, that invention and
judgement are not divers things, so that this distribu∣tion stands firm and sure,
and as for his conceit to have invention taught in a syllogisme, we shall hear of
it when we come there, for it is very silly. Now for his distribution into three
parts, it comes to one with ours, for his first part terminus simplex, so much of
it as is Logick belongs to invention, so terminus complexus belongs to
axiomatical judgement, and discursus to syllogismes, and he would have it
belong to method too. But first the absurdities are these, he does not follow
reasons 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which Logick deli∣vers, for conceptus simplex
is properly the judgement of a thing, when we see the truth thereof: so that this
is not so proper as invention. Now when I say in∣ventio, I say that part that
directs my reason to seek out things secretly wrapt up in nature; again whi∣lest
he makes a distribution of the precepts of Lo∣gick, by these precepts we must
understand the syste∣ma of Logick by a Metonimie of the material cause, and
when he sayes a systema of precepts, that is a far fetched trope: again we never
have more parts than two in a distribution, but there is some thing left out, for
to admit of his distribution: but is there not a community betwixt his terminus
complexus, and discursus, namely dispositio? ergo, here he wants the rul•

Page  54

of dispositio, and so makes his Art imperfect. Now he P•eads for the antiquity
of it, which we are not to admit of, but of truth: why? his Logick was not in
ancient time, is it therefore nought now?

The use of this rule is this, as we heard before, Lo∣gick took my reason, and
told me the marks to shoot at, so here it tels me that I must first invent, and so I
shall go orderly to work, and then dispose, for the Brick-layer must first have
bricks before he can make a brick-wall, and the Grammarian must have words
before he can make a sentence, and (as before) arguments are more general
than axiomes, axiomes than syllogismes, &c. for the one may be without the
other, not contra, as one is more general than two, two than three, &c. because
one may be without two, or three, &c. not contra: so first we must inve∣nire and
then judicare, that we may bene disserere, for there is nothing betwixt them,
but when we have stones then we may build, and whilst we find in the creatures
of God things considered, as they are in themselves, and then in respect of
others, therefore so must reason be distributed into his two acts, and now we
come to invention, which is prima pars Dialecticae de inveniendis argumentis,
first we have heard the reason of the name inventio betokening actively: the
reason inventing or finding out, and howsoever we may find it taken for the
whole act of Logick, yet it is a Synecdoche, and though we cannot but use
judgement in it, yet it is but inventio, ergo, est pars. He rather keeps this word
than membrum, though it be more general, because it is more in use: and again,
because in Schools membrum hath been usually taken for the members of a
man, as head, armes, legs, or the like: so that not having told us

Page  55

what membrum or pars is, he chooseth the more usual Dialectica; we heard
concerning Dialectica before, therefore to hear it again were superfluous, it is
Dia ∣lecticae, ergo, it is the integrum to it, as inventio is the membrum. Now
indeed the Rhetoricians have ta∣ken invention to be a part of Rhetorick, and so
judge∣ment, but when they come to explain them, they teach Logick: and their
dissertus is not onely Rhe∣torician, but the Grammarian, and Logician, their
Orator is omnium horarum homo, a man for every turn, so that he is a man in
whom there is a confusion of all Arts: neither is Orator belonging to Rhetorick,
but he is a general man, that hath all the Arts, and chiefly he is a Logician: now
the Rhetoricians did imagine, because they used invention, and judgement,
therefore they belonged to Rhetorick: so they might say of Law, Arithmetick,
Geometry, natural Phi∣losophy, or any other Art: now then those are the two
parts of Dialectica onely; and whereas men say commonly ← Ramus  →
Logick serves for Rhetorick, not for natural Philosophy, as some do, they speak
sim∣ply, for what use of Logick hath a Rhetorician in any other Art, as in
Politicks, is it not to prove some The∣sis? therefore if he dispute here as a
Politican by the rule of Logick, so may a natural Philosopher do, so causa,
effectum, subjectum, adjunctum, and all other arguments are the same in all
Arts, ergo, to make a special invention to Rhetorick, and another to na∣ture, or
any other Art, is simple. Now it is pars Dia ∣lecticae, we do not mean to make
pars a genus of in∣vention here, for it is a Logical notion, and belongs to
Logick: but the reason of this definition is to bring in Dialectica, so that when
we will analyse this definition, we must not say pars is genus, but Dialecti∣ca
est integrum.

Page  56

Prima pars.

Est prima pars, because it is more general than judgement, for it may be where
judgement is not, for simple arguments are before the composition of
ar∣guments both in nature and working. The Carpen∣ter must have his timber in
several peices to square them before he can joyn them together. Quod prece∣dit
natura in Dialectica, id prima pars est Dialec. at in∣ventio: ergo,

De inveniendis argumentis.

As if he should say, inventio, that act of reason doth invenire argumenta, de

inveniendis, why? he means the precepts of this act, for in this part de
inveniendis argumentis is the subject, but these precepts of inven∣tion are first
concerning a seeking: but to find what? it teacheth me first to hunt, and then to
find a Hare, as if he should say, take the rule of causa, that Hound, and hunt,
and you shall find a cause: as if he should say, would you seek a cause? first
seek the artificia∣lity, then the primative, then how it is simplex and consent
aneum &c. and so come to causa, so that inven∣tion is not taken for judgement
here, but for the seek∣ing, and finding out of arguments.

Argumentis.

De argumentis inveniendis: Arguments to be sought out: why? because the

Lord hath so commanded man to seek out his reason in his creatures, so that we
must seek an argument, which is a term in latine be∣longing to Law, as the
Rhetoricians thought, but it is more general to Logick: but because they used 〈
in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which in Greek is to plead like an Orator, and so
arg•e•e in Latine, therefore they thought them pro∣per to th•m, yet argumentum
here signifies any thing of arguere, that can charge another thing, and so

Page  57

doth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in Greek: so here we see what inven∣tion seeks

out, argumentum, and by it the thing, but at the second hand, quatenus there is
Logismos in it: so that invention takes not the thing immediately, but by
argumentum, so that argumentum is here as the Schools speak, concretum, that
is, it is argumentum, as it doth arguere: so that when we hear argumentum, we
must consider two things, first ens the subject of Art, and then the 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉, and so by that the thing: as I see a Post with my outward eye
by the colour, so that invention sees the thing mediante argumento: then
observe again that argumentum is the subject of invention: now the Schools
make a simple conceit, and so make a great ado about vox, as Kickerman and
Schaliger do to bring it into Logick, they say vox quatenus it consisteth of
letters, belongs to Grammar, but quatenus it signifies a thing, it belongs to
Logick: but as for example, homo, what arguments are homo, and the thing it
signifies? subjectum, and adjunctum, why? but these are but examples there∣of,
shall these come into Logick, because Logicks use is here? So the wall is white,
is subjectum, and ad∣junctum, doth that axiom therefore belong to Lo∣gick? but
let them but go to the definition of vox, and they shall see it belongs to
Grammar, quatenus it signifies a thing: but they may see it in the general rule of
ars generalis: for as ens is the subject of Lo∣gick at the second hand, so also of
Grammar. Now he prosecutes vox, and sayes it is to be lookt at ad modum
significationis, or jure significata, or the like: ad modum significationis is
categorematica, or suncate∣gorematica, as homo: because, saith he, it signifies
that thing, which may be an argument: why homo doth not signifie an
argument, it belongs to natural Philo∣sophy,

Page  58

and the argument is but an affection to the thing that homo signifies, but what
reason is there that homo should come into Logick, because it names the thing
that is categorematica? it is fallacia accidentis: that meat you bought on
Saturday, you did eat on Sunday; but it was raw meat you bought on Satur∣day,
ergo. But for vox therefore it comes not into Logick, onely there are conjugata
and notatio, which belong to Logick, not because they signifie things, for there
is not in them any respect of the thing, and the name, but in conjugates how one
name is deri∣ved from another, and in notation the reason of the name from
some argument. Then he sayes vox ca ∣tegorematica is primae, or secundae
intentionis, which he knows not how to utter but by certain comparisons, as of
a dyal, the stile is prima intentionis, and the sha∣dow secundae: but this vox
primae intentionis is the word that names the thing, vox secundae is the word of
Art. Now true it is this distribution is an old said saw, but there is no such thing,
it is the same fallace ab accidente. Homo and genus do not signifie the same
thing, homo is primae intentionis at the first hand, genus of the second, but
genus doth not signifie the same that homo doth: again genus hath his
significati∣on, as well as homo, that appears thus, because it hath a distinct
definition from homo, therefore they are di∣stinct re: so that genus is primae
intentionis, to the thing it names, as homo is primae to that thing it names.
Again, are there not termes of Art as well in Gram∣mar, &c. as in Logick? why
then doth he bring it in here? as homo est nomen, here nomen is the name of the
thing, not the thing it self, ergo, homo, and nomen, are not voces primae &
secundae intentionis, for they are divers things: so argumentum is concretum,
that

Page  59

is, it is evermore with the thing, not that it is the thing, as homo is argumentum,
and it doth arguere, which is an adjunct to the thing, for so every Logical
notion is an adjunct to the thing it self, but here it is, because we cannot sever
the Logical notion from the thing, because it is never but in re, that is the
rea∣son why argumentum is alwayes in the concrete, whereas 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 may be severed from the thing, but this rule bids us onely find, but
tels us not what as yet: so that it runs most orderly.
We have heard the first part of Logick to be cal∣led Invention, in respect we are
set to seek out the simples in the work of God. De inveniendis argu∣mentis,
because there is never a rule here, but it is a blood-hound to find a Deer: Again,
we heard it was an argument that was to be hunted, not the thing but the
argument, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the thing, for the thing doth not
belong to Logick, but to every Art, and Logick doth look at the thing, by the
logismos, as the outward eye beholds bodies, by light and co∣lour: and this is
called argumentum, a concrete, be∣cause Logick is never severed from the
thing, nor the thing from Logick, for we cannot see the thing but by reason,
therefore because these are inseparably to∣gether, for that cause the subject of
invention is ar ∣gumentum: so that in argumentum we are to consi∣der two
things, first the thing as it is the subject of Art in genere, and of the general
Arts: and then that same bird-lime, that is, in the thing, whereby it may cleave
to another thing, which bird-lime is the Lo∣gical notion; as when I say a chest is
made of wood: in Greek they have two names for it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is
the arguing, the abstract as it were, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the argu∣ment: but
our Author rather keeps the concrete, be∣cause

Page  60

it is alwayes with the thing, and cannot be severed from it: then the subject of
invention is ens at the first hand, but argumentum at the second. The tearm
argumentum (as we heard) is from Law, as the Greek names also be, 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉 is concione concio∣nare, and thus we see how farre Logicks
rule reacheth, & this same argumentum was used at the first, for that which we
call praedicatum a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a barbarous word made first by
Boetius, but it is more general, as we may see by the third argument in a
syllogisme, which may be an antecedent in the proposition, or assumption, as
well as the consequent.

Kickerman saith vox is the subject of this first part, and he hath many
distinctions of it, as it is ab∣stracta, or concreta; this is nothing but a
distributi∣on of nomen into substantivum, and adjectivum, qua ∣tenus voces, and
therefore the old Grammarians did so teach it: if they look at the thing, they
belong to conjugates in Logick, and there we shall see them to signifie the same
thing; one absolutely the other as it hath respect to another, and they are there,
not quatenus they are words, nor quatenus they signifie, if we go no farther, but
quatenus they contain, sym∣bolize the nature of first arguments. Again, he saith,
vox is univoca, or aequivoca: alas there is vox univo∣ca in the world, as homo
his example is vox aequivoca: if we call a painted man a man, as we may call
tropi∣cally, but this belongs to a distribution, and is but an example thereof, not
a rule: as canus is sidus, or a ∣nimal terrestre, or m•rinum, is a distribution, ex
ad∣junctis: so that to make a precept of an example is great confusion: and the
definition of a thing will take away the ambiguity of the word. More
di∣stinctions he hath, which all are nothing, but several

Page  61

sorts of aequivocation, as if he should say, there may be aequivocation of

Grammar, and there may be aequivocation in Rhetorick, &c. he tels us further;
that a word must be certa, absoluta, &c. what hath Logick to do with this? let
Grammar look to that, for it breaks the definition of vox est nota qua, &c. if it
name not the thing fitly; as if vox should say, vox est vota qua unumquodque
vocatur; will you call a man a spade, then he brings in predicament, and
praedicables. The world of Logicians doth imagine, that Architas Tarentinus
was the first inventor of them, and taught them to his Scholler Pythagoras, now
the reason that brought them in was this, that they might be furnished with
matter to work about Logick. So that they were store-houses for them to lay up
things one way or other, either analogice or a latere.

Kickerman approves that purpose of them, for saith he, things do not belong to
Logick, now the Lo∣gick in a predicament is this, the order of things be∣ing
placed one before another, and so he saith the predicaments are of great use, for
the finding of sim∣ples: Secondly they conduce for terminus complexus,
because we see what may be a subject, and a predicate in a proposition: then
another use of them (he sayes) is for discursus, for when we know what is
above, and below, we may quickly know what is in the middest; and they are
also of use for method.

For the first Invention of them, they are not store-houses, for there is nothing
but hath an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, therefore belongs to some Art: so that the
Arts are the true store-houses of things: so that his table of substantia is nothing
but a draught of natural Philo∣sophy,

Page  62

but I must tell you untowardly, and that of quantity nothing but a draught of the
Mathema∣ticks, that of quality nothing but a draught of natu∣ral and moral
Philosophy. Other things he brings in, which are not so as he makes, ubi to be a
genus of intus and foras: ad aliquid comes under relates. Quando belongs to
adjunctum, &c. but because Lo∣gicks use is there, they think they belong to
Logick, by the same argument let them bring all Arts in Lo∣gick: but saith he,
the things themselves belong to the special Arts, but for the series they belong
to Logick, that is, as if he should say, for their Logical notion they belong
thither, but when he sayes series, he is presently in method: for his series is
nothing but methods work; and if he reason that Arithme∣tick, Geometry,
Nature, &c. belong to Logick, be∣cause methods use is there, that is fallacia
accidentis, now the doctrine is one, and the use is another, the doctrine is
distinct, the use confused: then again, whereas he sayes here you have genus
summum, and subalternum, why we heard of them in the distribu∣tion ex
effectis: but because substantia is corporea, or incorporea, here is a distribution
as a genus into his species: therefore, saith he, this belongs to Logick: so let
him bring in the daubers Art too; for Logicks use is there. Thus do they make a
confusion, not seeing things distinct. Again, whereas they help to find out a
subject, and predicate, they have shut out some, namely incompleta, as a mans
hand, which may be a subject or a predicate, and when I say the world is made
of the first matter, is not the first matter here a predicate? so they shut out
transcendentia, as ens: but is not homo ens, therefore a predicate? Again, is not
a predicate an argument, ergo, artificiale, aut in∣artificiale?

Page  63
if artificiale, then fetched out of some Art, therefore let me carry my subject to
the Art whereunto it belongs, and there will I find any pre∣dicate: again for the
help of a medium, is every me∣dium a genus subalternum? Suppose we shall
fetch a medium, that is genus summum, or an individuum, but let me go to the
Art of my subject, and if I will take that which is above it, or below it, there I
shall have it done to my hand. Again, he sayes the doctrine of the predicaments
serve for definitions, and differen∣ces, &c. Why let me go to the Art, and there I
shall see every thing taught to my hand, so that the do∣ctrine of predicaments
quatenus they are adumbrati∣ons of the Arts, are to be seen in their Arts. But to
reason, that because Logicks use is there, therefore they belong to Logick, is
very absurd. Again, if there be this predicament, to shew the summum and
subalternum genus, and species subalterna, and infi∣ma, why is there not a
predicament to know causa? for by the same reason, there should be a
predicament to find out causas, and let them say what they can of the
predicaments, we shall find all in the doctrine of distribution, and definition, as
substantia is corporea, aut incorporea is a distribution, and belongs to natu∣ral
Philosophy; and so the next distribution of sub∣stantia corporea, &c. so if we
take quantity, we shall see we are in some special Arithmetick, or Geome∣try,
&c. for the predicables, genus, species, differentiae, proprium, accidens, these
we know are special argu∣ments, the two first belong to distributio ex effectis:
differentia belongs to forma, for it is called forma, in respect of the thing
formed; and differentia, as it di∣stinguisheth the thing from all other things. If
they shall say, I, but here is distributio per formam, that is

Page  64

accidental to forma, and belongs to distributio, so that forma is the better word
taken from the nature of it, for proprium is nothing but propriam adjunctum,
and there it is taught as it hath respect to his subject, not as it is an act, and
accidens is also a special kind of ad∣junct.

Now the laws of Art require, that every precept deliver the principia thereof,
and therefore be either definitions, distributions, or properties, which they after
a sort seeing, made these to be helps to the pre∣dicaments; now for substantia
quoad res it belongs to natural Philosophy, quoad serim or ordinem to me∣thod:
for quantity it belongs to Mathematicks? quality to moral Philosophy, yea, and
to natural too: for relates, they belong to Logick; but there can be no series or
order of them, for they are but examples of relates, as causa and effectum are
relates; but onely examples, ergo, infimae species: for actio it is nothing but
motus; quando is nothing but the ad∣junct of time, passio a subject, ubi a
special kind of subject also of place, situs belongs to Geometry, otherwise it is
an adjunct, and habitus is a special kind of adjunct, therefore there can be
nothing beneath these, but examples: so that do but look at his table, and you
shall see him presently go out, as he sayes qualitas is naturalis, and moralis:
this is false, for na ∣turalis, aut moralis are two examples of that adjunct
qualitas, and justice is no more a quality because it is a vertue, then Socrates
est genus, because animal is genus: so that argumentum is the true subject of
Invention, and not the predicables, and predicaments, any further than they are
arguments.

Page  65
Argumentum est quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est.

Now we come to the definition of argumentum; we heard that Dialectica is a

general Art, and is con∣versant about every thing, and about non ens gratia
entis, now then argumentum must be in every thing, therefore it is quod, any
thing whatsoever, and thus it is demonstrated, because Logick is a general Art;
so thus here we see argumentum est quod, which is as large as aliquid, quod
affectum est: we know this is a borrowed word, affection is a disposition
natural, as the eye is affected to see: but that we may see it the better, we will
dig deeper, there is an efficient work∣ing, then his working, which is eff•ctio,
which as it is about it, so it is affectum, ad effectum: as if my hand be wounded
with a sword, there is first an efficient, then there is wounding which is effectio,
then there is a wound which is effectum, then my hand is the af∣fectum to be
wounded, so that affectus is nothing but a nature in that thing, by which nature
can perform that action: so argumentum is affectum, as if he should say, that
that is made, or factus ad, or effected to ano∣ther thing, or which hath this 〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉 in it to work with another thing.

Why affectum? It is a property of an argument as homo est risibilis, when he

doth not ridere: so that he defines argumentum in invention, from that power or
faculty: for as a man may have an affection to that thing he never doth: so an
argument may have an affection to argue, when it acteth not: so that he teacheth
from that disposition of it to act, so that he delivereth it not from his act, for
that is but the use of it, but from its true nature; as the common Logi∣cians call
it praedicabile, that which may predicate, and

Page  66

sayes it is not an argument, till it be disposed, but this is accidental to

argumentum; then in an axiom they call it praedicatum actu, which also is
accidental to an axiome, for it may be subjectum as well, and both are
accidental ad arguendum. Why ad arguendum? be∣cause the end of an
argument is to argue, to play the argument, as the eye to see: ad arguendum,
because evermore when we fetch an argument to shew any thing, that is the
arguens, and doth agere, the aliquid is also an argument, but it doth pati: so
that as quod was general, that is arguens, or does argue, so it tels me that any
thing may be argued: so h•mo est aliquid, here homo is the aliquid, and is
argued by his genus, which chargeth homo, therefore there is nothing in the
world, but is an argument, and may argue, or be argu∣ed: but remember that
both quod, and the aliquid, that is both the arguens, and argutum do arguere,
but the one firstly, the other secondly; the one doth age∣re, the other doth pati,
and so reagere. The aliquid tels me it is the first, and then quod comes, and
argues it: now would you argue, then evermore look first, and that carefully,
whether your quod will argue your aliquid: as will you build an house with
sand? that will not serve the turn, for it is not affectum to it, nei∣ther hath it that
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in it: so that by any meanes let us keep close to our
rule, and we shall not doe wrong. The fallacian of the common Logicians of
Coxismus, or petitio principii, or Cuculi cantus, for they are all one. As the
Cuckow cries Cuckow, the Cuckow is Cuckow, ergo the Cuckow cries
Cuckow, for here is no third argument; and this is common∣ly the womans
reason, because it hath so little reason in it, as they will say it is so, because it is
so. So that simplex conversio among Logicians is a breach of this
 Page  67

rule: as omnis homo est animal, ergo aliquod animal est homo: other Logicians
as Polanus, cals argumentum Thema, which is too special, for thema is taken
among Schools for a question to be judged by way of orati∣on: again, every
argument is not taken as thema, then he sayes thema est simplex, which is
argumentum, or compositum, which is quaestio; and thus we see how our
Logick goes most orderly, and that it looks at ens as it is simmonted with
another thing.

Quales sunt singulae rationes solae, & per se consideratae.

We have heard what argumentum is, and the first thing that we are to look at in
simples is this, the glue to be affectioned: as if we should look for a cause, see
whether it be affected to be so: we have heard the fallacians in part before; as
first, where there is no argument, but petitio principii, and that either where
there is no petitio principii, and that either where there is no petitio at all, or
where the same thing is uttered in a synonymie, or to the same purpose. Again,
it is a breach of this rule, when that is brought for an argument, which is no
argument, as baculus stat in angulo; or when the third Argument is more
obscure and doubtful, then the arguments of the que∣stion, these and all other
petitiones principii are breaches of this rule in general, and not of any special
ones. Again, it is a breach of the definition of an argument, when we mistake
the aliquid, though the argument be good, and so that Heterozetesis is a fal∣lace
of argumentum in genere; as when I talk of Chalk, he talks of Cheese. Now we
come to the commoration after argumentum, quales sunt fingula rationes solae,
&c. He hath defined argumentum from that affection that is continually in it;
for the act is accidental, and may be wanting, for potentia (as we

Page  68

hear in nature) ariseth from the act of the form up∣on the matter. Now he saith
singulae, that is, argu∣ment by argument, the cause alone, the effect alone, and
so all the arguments from the beginning to the end. He saith rationes rather
than argumenta, first because there is an equivocation in that word, many have
thought it to belong to a syllogisme onely; and so when we say, I deny your
reason, there it is taken for an axiome. Now it is taken sometimes for the
faculty of reason, sometimes for the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in things. Here he
shews that it is taken for the same with argu∣mentum. Solae, that is as they are
to be considered in invention without judgement, and that he explains further
per se, that is, they are in their definitions not respected with some thing
externally, these are tales, that is such as I have defined unto you: so that he
doth here commorari, because of difference with Ari∣stotle, or rather with the
Aristotelians, even as he stayed before upon the definition of Dialectica, for
they thought there was no argument but in judge∣ment, and therefore have
question with ← Ramus  → whe∣ther an argument be to be taught before we
come to a syllogisme. ← Ramus  → here propounds it, and deter∣mines it for
his own part, that it may be without judgement, and look at others, and you
shall see them define all arguments, from their use in a syllogisme, as we may
see in all topick places of Aristotle, so that it is not so strait as they take it, and
← Ramus  → would teach us here, that to argue is accidental to an argument
and disposition to: so that their mistaking makes him here to demurre and stay
upon it: Now indeed there must of necessity be a simple considera∣tion of
argumentum, for though things in nature are disposed together, yet they were
severed at the first;

Page  69

and again we are to consider them so still, though they be together▪

Consideratae, he useth this word, because thought, invention and judgement
are joyned together in nature, yet he would here tell us, that we are to sever
them by our consideration, as thus, I can see heat without fire, cold without
water, &c. So that singulae ratione• are solae, & per se consideratae non in
usu, for so they cannot be: but they are solae, & per se consideratae, in
consideration, for so they be, he saith quales, because argumentum was
defined, from his qua∣lity, or property of affection, and properties are qua∣lities.

Argumentum est artificiale, aut inartificiale.

This affection, or glue is artificiale, or inartificiale, as if he should say

argum•ntum hath this affection ex sese, and it is in artificio rei, or it is not ex
sese, but from some other thing: so that every argument is affected, but two
wayes, one as an artificial argument, the other as an inartificial: now the reason
of this distribution is this:

God hath made all things for man, and at the be∣ginning for one man, and they
are to conduce to one, but all things cannot come under one mans eye of
reason: therefore that he may be better furnish∣ed herein, God hath provided
these two: the one whereby he may see by himself, the other whereby he may
see by another mans eye. Again, that which we are to see is either in artificio
rei, or not in artificio rei: so that all things are seeable, but not to be seen with
one mans eye, but by many. This word artifi∣ciale teacheth us these things: first
there is no artifi∣cial argument, but you shall see it in fabrica rei, therefore
belongs to some Art, because Art delivers the frame of the thing, therefore
there is no axiom

Page  70

that consisteth of artificial arguments, but it belongs to some Art. Now though
we hear no arguments in Arts, but the causes, and properties, yet
notwith∣standing we have all arguments indeed; for there is no quality, but is
proton in some general thing, as heat in fire, cold in water: now this gives us
great light, yet effects must be there if they be proper: and the effect belongs to
that rule where the property is taught, and dissentanies belong to Art too; as
na∣ture is constans, or inconstans, argumentum est artifi∣ciale, aut inartificiale:
so that there are no axioms af∣firmed, or denyed, true, or false, but we shall find
them in some Art, either as a first rule, or a deduct by consequence necessary:
so that hence is the greatest light that can be to a Scholler, to analyse his
example, and bring every thing to his Art, where he shall see it in causa: so that
if one would make a common place book, let him make the Rules of Arts his
heads, and let him take any example, and see whether argument is more special,
and so carry the axiom to that Art, and to that rule of the Art whether it
belongs. As homo est justus, homo belongs to nature, justitia to mo∣ral
Philosophy, ergo this axiom belongs to the do∣ctrine of justice: so that moral
Philosophy bo•rows man from nature to deliver it self.

The use of this is unspeakable, I cannot deliver it unto you, the use it self will
better testifie it; for thus may a man try every thing whatsoever, yea though it
be a contingent axiom; as audentes fortuna juvat: audacia belongs to Ethicks,
fortuna to Logick; and in audacia we shall find this, for it is that which
thrusteth a man desperately: and here we may see what a true predicament is,
not the predicaments but the Arts are the store-houses; for whatsoever is in

Page  71

artificio rei, we may see there, not onely genus, species, &c. but all other
arguments, for they are too nar∣row, and false too; for that distribution,
substantia est creata, or increata, will not fail in any Art, and the three first
predicaments (as we heard before) are nothing but practises of method. Now if
it be objected, we must not have those things before we see them: no, we must
first see them, that we may lay them up in store. We have our eye first, and then
things appointed for us to see.

Artificiale est quod ex sese arguit.

Now here is that affection, that is in this kind of arguments, that glue that was
before, is here quod ex se: so that this makes that more special, which before
was more general: so that we shall still see what our eye of reason sees: we
heard before that we see the thing, as it is an argument; here we see it, as it is
af∣fectioned to argue ex se. Ex se, what is that? as if he should say, look into the
artificium of the thing, there shall you see his artificial arguing, ex se, that is it
argues natura, or it is causa natura of its arguing: so that these arguments
concurre for the being of the thing. So wood is affected to argue a chest ex se,
that is, it is in the artificio of wood to argue a chest made of wood ex se: so then
this artificial argument ariseth from nature, from a vis ingenita, that is, in
ar ∣tificio rei: so the efficient argues ex se, as if I should say, if there were not
that cunning in the efficient of a chest to make it, it would not be one. So that it
is thus defined, quodex sese arguit. Argumentum was the next genus, and he
doth not express it, but under∣stand it here, because we heard of it so lately
before: then again he hath it here, but after another manner, because he could
not deliver the form of it, without

Page  72

the genus: for arguit is not here taken for act, but for potentia: as we say
animal vidit, though he doth not actually see, but have the faculty of it: so we
say, Does he eat or drink: meaning, can he eat or drink. For if it were taken for
the act of arguing, then it should not be no where but in judgement: so that
quod arguit, is as much as argumentum, and ex se is the form: if he had said
artificiale est argumentum ex sese, he had said the same that ex sese arguit: but
it had not been so plain to a young Schollar, and he had also newly done with
argumentum before: so that this is the second thing that our eye of reason is to
look at, namely, an artificial argument, which can ex sese arguere. Now fallaces
may be in every rule. In the first, as if any abuse it to deceive and abuse reason:
for the second, if any go about to judge be∣fore he see the invention, it is a
fallace, and a prepo∣sterous course. So argumentum is artificiale, or
in∣artificiale; they break this rule that will give testi∣mony of a thing, whose
artificial arguments they have not seen: so do the Papists in their implicite faith,
when they beleive as the Church beleives, not know∣ing what the Church
beleiveth. So Schollers that take any thing that their Authors deliver them,
with∣out any examination at all of the things they read. Kiekerman saith, an
inartificial argument may be re∣ceived before an artificial. I do not deny it, but
yet you must examine it afterward: Gods testimonies onely are undeniable,
because he cannot lye; but no mans.
Artificiale est primum aut ortum.

We are farther to look at this glue, whereby a thing is put to another thing in
artificio rei, it is there firstly, or secondly: this affection or going to the act

Page  73

is there at the first hand, or at the second hand: now it is the same still, but is
looked at, as it is originally, or as it is arising from the first: as to make up me,
there goes a soul and a body, and of the formes of the four elements is the form
of my body made, and of their matter the matter of my body made: now the
elements are firstly there, as making my body, and se∣condly my body is in me,
as a part in me: so a man is first consisting of body and soul, and then is animal:
now this wisdom of God is wonderful to consider, how he makes things first of
causes, effects, &c. and then ranketh them under a general head. And if we go
to the Creation, we shall see them evidently: first he made a first matter, then
the first forms, and then mists that had their complements, and did differ one
from another, then they might be compared to∣gether, then they had names, and
were ranked under general heads, as a part to a whole, &c. and then they might
be defined, and their limits shewed how farre they reach; for here our Author
leads us to see every thing there, and to see how it is there, the reason of this
distribution we shall see in every thing whatsoever: as in an ink-horn, there
must be the matter of it, then it self, and it must have his adjuncts, &c. and then
will it hold your ink; then when it is this, it is not a tree, or a stone, though it
may be com∣pared, and be equal, or unequal, like, or unlike: so that first we see
what is in it firstly, then we may call it round, deep, made of horn, then range it
under a head, then lay it out in its limits, and then give testimony of it.

Primum quod est suae originis.

This definition doth somewhat stick in my teeth before it come out, for it is a
far fetched trope, and

Page  74

onely one is suae originis▪ namely God: but he means this clamminess or glue
that is suae originis, is first there, the ortum is not: as the son hath the nature of
his father, but is another thing than his father: but first argumentum est quod
affectum est ad arguendum, then artificiale est affectum ex sese; so primum is
ar ∣gumentum artificiale primitus: so that we must look at the argument, as it
doth argue, not as it is suae ori∣ginis, but quod originaliter arguit: he meanes
that is there first, as we shall see by the nature of the thing: as homo justus; here
justitia is firstly in homine, as an adjunct, for he must first have that vertue
before he can be denominated justus; then secondly, it is in him as he is
denoninated from it: so a chest is made of wood; here is the cause and effect,
and this is first∣ly; then from hence I may say a woodden chest, and this is
secondly, arising from the first.

Quod est suae originis.

As if he should have said, that hath this affection to argue ex se primitus: now
then we may go won∣derful deep, if we will go by these degrees, what may we
not see? if we would make a breef: Argumen∣tum est quod ad aliquid
arguendum affectum est: arti∣ficiale ex se, primum primitus. The fallacians are
many, as they that think they are conjugates that are in name: as he hath vertue,
ergo, he is studiosus: so homo dormit, quia somnit: here is nothing but causes,
and effects, and so synonimies; for conjugata are no∣mina: so again when orta
are taken for prima, or taught before, aut contra: so do the common Logi∣cians
in the predicables, when they teach genus, spe∣cies, differentia, proprium,
accidens: First see the orta contain the prima, whence they arise symbolice, as
it were in a cognizance. Here we learn this, we must first

Page  75

look at the affection of an argument, then we must be ex sese, then primitus:

now ortum contains the same nature that primum doth; and some say the effect
ariseth from the causes, and the subject and adjunct from the effect. But doth
the effect argue with the affection of causa? it doth not: or doth the subject or
adjunct argue with the affection of an effect? No.

Estque simplex aut comparatum.

We have heard what the end of Logick is, and all shoots at this mark, to reason
well, that is, that we may handle our reason well; now that we may doe thus,
we must have invention first, afterward judge∣ment. Invention teacheth us to
find out simples, Judgement teacheth us how to lay them together, we may
compare invention or arguments, to the hook and nails in a thing; judgement to
the fasten∣ing of them together. Now invention beholds argu∣ments.
Argumentum in Logick is a concrete, as the Schools call it, signifying the thing,
together with the affection that is in it to argue another thing: as a Taylor is a
Taylor quatenus, he hath that affection in him to make a garment: so that
invention intends immediately the affection, and mediately the thing: for ens
quatenus ens, is general to ars quatenus ars, but ens quatenus it is affected ad
arguendum, so it belongs to Logick alone, and thus we go by degrees; for the
Lord doth not let us see any thing immediately: now the very name invention
tels us what we must doe, namely, seek out, it tels us the Lord hath hid things
secret in nature, and we must labour for the simples, and so find them: now we
seek argumentum, which we heard to be of two sorts, artificiale, or
inartificia ∣le: artificiale is that which is in artificio rei; where∣as

Page  76
the inartificiale doth but cary to us what other men have seen by the artificials;
and because none can testifie of a thing before he have seen it himself, ergo,
artificiale is before inartificiale: and also because he that seeth inartificialiter,
can but testifie so far forth as he sees the thing, which is not at all, ergo, they
that give testimony of that thing, whose artificial argu∣ments they have not
seen, are sophisters, and break this rule: and this is a sophisme of the Papists in
their implicite faith, which do beleive as the Church be∣leiveth, neither
knowing the artificial arguments of the thing, nor the thing it self that they
beleive. Now the artificial arguments are in the artificio of the thing, ergo, we
must of necessity know all the artifici∣al arguments in things, if we will know
the things themselves wholly. And here by the way artificiale tels me, that
every thing must be in some predicament, that is, in some Art, quod ex sese
arguit: this affecti∣on is in the thing, and it is ex se, drawn out of the thing as it
were: so that this hook whereby it layes hold on another thing, is natural to it,
for so he means. Artificiale est primo, or secundo in artificio rei, as if the thing
had a second kind of making, na∣ture, or being: so a thing is made of matter and
form, primitus: but when we consider how first singular parts are made of that
matter, then organically are made of the singulars, and the whole made of the
organical: here is the second invention, and here the matter is considered
immediately in the parts, me∣diately in the whole. This is something subtle, but
yet evident and plain: as first, imagine that thing justice in a man; here is
subjectum, and adjunctum: and this is the first invention: then from that quali∣ty
in him, I can denominate him a just man, and this

Page  77

is the second invention: so I look at a thing whose matter is made of wood, and
can conjugate a name to it wooden: as a wooden chest, &c. so when I say a
man is made ab humo, here is the material cause, and effect: but at the second
hand, when I consider how man is made ab humo, and from thence
denomi∣nate him homo, there it is that second Logick. So that the first invention
onely looks at the thing, without consideration of the names; the second
invention looks both at the thing, and at the names. So when I denominate
homo from that thing justice in him, to be justus, I mean not the name; nor the
thing, but the name and the thing together: for orta a primis per ∣inde sunt ad id
quod arguunt, sicut prima unde oriuntur, ergo, there must be both the nature of
the first argu∣ments in them, and that affectio also. So in a distri∣bution, if we
shall speak of distributio ex effect is, as in navi, alii malos scandunt, alii per
fores cursitant &c. here malos scandere, per fores cursitare, sentinam
ex∣haurire, are causes and effects firstly; but as these nautae are distributed by
their effects, here is the orta categoria, the arising, arguing. So in a distribution
ex causis of integrum into membra, the first invention is matter, and form, the
second invention is them two together in the members making up the integrum.
So in a distribution of the genus into the species; as in animali, there is essentia
corporea plena vitae, & sensus, which are the causes of homo, and brutum:
then there is a symbolum of them when we jumble them toge∣ther: so in a
distribution ex adjunctis, homo is aeger, homo is sanus, here is both subjectum,
and adjunctum: but when I make a distribution, and say, homo est aeger, aut
sanus, this is the second Logick: and this is no∣thing but the consideration of
the community of a
 Page  78

cause, an effect, a subject, an adjunct, for that causeth these distributions: so in

a definition there is firstly genus, which ariseth from matter and form; then the
second invention of them is the heaping of them together: so as they make but
one argument, name∣ly, definitio: so in a distribution, though there may be more
arguments, yet are they also heaped together to make one argument, namely,
descriptio, quod est suae originis: this is true in respect of ortum, which made
← Ramus  → so define it: but I had rather respect the de∣finition of
argumentum, quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est, and to say artificiale ex
se, primum pri∣mitus: and so we shall deliver it as it acteth, which is best.

Primum est simplex, seu absolutum, aut compara ∣tum: I rather say absolutum,
because absolutum and simplex are more opposed, and so, 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 are opposed, now these simple
arguments do look at those that are in artificio rei, as they are in their own
nature; for that is his meaning: as when I say the wall is white, here I look at
the wall as it is simple and absolute in its own nature: and in like sort at
white∣ness as it is simple and absolute in its own nature: so that the absolute
argument looks evermore at the things as they are absolute in themselves: as
when I say a chest is made of wood, I look at both of them, as they are simple
in their own nature: now the com∣parate doth not consider the thing absolutely,
but with another. So in a chest if I consider the quan∣tity of it, here the chest
and its quantity are simple arguments: but when I say it is greater than a lesse
Chest, or contra, then they are comparates: so that the comparison lyeth as it is
respected with some o∣ther thing: so that the comparative quantity, or qua∣lity

Page  79

is another thing, the absolute greatness or little∣ness, likeness, or unlikeness, for

that which is abso∣lue greatness may be comparative littleness, aut con∣tra.

Absolutum est consentaneum, aut dissentaneum.

Object. But how are disagreers in artificio rei.

Answ. True it is, that the one part of disagreers is not, but the other is: so that
the absolute conside∣ration hath respect either to the thing wherewith it agreeth,
aut contra, as ratio in respect of it self, so it is argumentum simplex, seu
absolutum, in respect of ho∣mo it is consentaneum, and goes to his constitution,
consider it with irrationale, and there it tels me, it will not be that: so that
which makes fire not to be wa∣ter is in the artificio of fire: so that which causeth
dissention is in the artificio of that thing that is dissen∣taneum: so that the same
thing is consentaneum, and dissentaneum; consentaneum if we look at the thing
wherein it is, dissentaneum if we look at another thing, that it is not: so in
black, and white, there is that in black which makes it to be black; and there is
moreover that in black which makes it not to be white: so that the same thing in
divers respects is consentanie, and dissentanie: so that white or black
considered with the wall may be consentanie, consi∣der it with that which
dissents from it, so it is dissen∣taneum, and all these must we see if we will see
any thing throughly: First we must see the affectio in artificio rei, then primitus,
then absolute, then consen∣tanie; then absolute, quod consentit cum re,
therefore this is clearly in artificio rei, and so is dissentaneum too; that
consentit, hence we see consideration to be gene∣ral between things, and they
are made so, for else they

Page  80

would never make up one whole, as all creatures make up the world, for it is
concordia discors, and dis∣cordia concors, that makes all things. Now as there
is consention in all things, so also there is dissention, for else all things should
be one: thus the Lord made all things to shew forth his wisdom, and mighty
pow∣er, that all things should consent together, and yet be many.

Consentaneum est absolute aut modo quodam.

For some things agree absolutely, others but after a sort, absolutum is
absolutely required for the being of the thing, the other is but complemental: so
that here he tels us if we would see any thing, first look what is in artificio rei,
then look what is primitus there, then what is absolute, then what is
consentanie, then what is simply required to the being of the thing. Absolute,
that is, so agreeing to the thing, that if the one be not there, the other will not be
there & contra, as if any one cause be wanting, there will be no effect, if there
be a concurring of all the causes, then an effect, if no cause no effect, & contra,
if an effect then all the causes, if no effect no concur∣rence of causes: so that
this absolute agreement doth put a necessity of each others being: now
absolute, and modo quodam are definitions of themselves, for he wanted words,
and therefore delivered the definitum, by the definitio: so that to ask a definition
of absolute, or modo quodam, is as if one should ask a definition of animal
ratione.

Absolute ut causa & effectum.

The causes give esse to the effect, therefore with∣out these esses the thing
cannot existere, ergo, there are absolutely required. In like sort in the existere of
the effect you may see the concurrence of all the esses,

Page  81

of all the causes, therefore these are absolute consenta ∣nea: Hence we learn,
that all the causes must go to the making up of the effect. And again, if any
ef∣fect, then there must be all the causes; so then we see how the ones being
depends necessarily upon the other, ut causa & effectum, therefore the cause
must first be looked at, as if I would look at ens, or any thing whatsoever,
therefore our Author taking this course takes the very way of God in his
creatures. Can any man see any thing throughly, and not see the causes first? he
cannot: and is there any thing to be seen in a thing before the causes? there is
not: therefore that is alwayes first in nature, and therefore first also in reason.
Now here are falla∣cians, as to think an effect may be from some causes, and to
think the causes may be removed from the ef∣fect, which is a common fallace.

Aristotles organon, Tullies offices, &c. here is Aristotles and Tullies casuality
still, though they be dead. Now we see how orderly we go to work, if we had
 not done so, we could not have come to cau∣sa, all the arguing of them before,
as of artificiale, primum, absolutum, consentaneum, simplex, are here in causa
and effectum So that there are many clasp• as it were, as the cause is in artificio
of the effect, it is also there primitus, and absolute, and consentanie, and
simpliciter: so that this discent doth very much clear truth, we have our flesh,
bloud, bones from causa, then afterward we have our complements from modo
quodam consentanea, then we may see we are not this, or that. See an
imperfect gar∣ment at the Taylors, and you may ask what it is, but let the Taylor
make it up compleat with all its cuts, and jagges, then you may see it your self,

Page  82

and need not ask what it is for further knowledge of it.

De efficiente, procreante, & conservante.

CHAP. I.

Causa est cujus vires est.

REmember the purpose of Logick is to direct man to see the wisdom of God,
which that reason may do well it acts doubly, first by taking at simples, then by
laying them together: that which we take with the first eye is argumentum, that
is any thing so farre as it hath the affection to argue, first as it is in artificio rei,
which therefore is in an Art, now it is first∣ly there or secondly: first it is there
absolute by way of consention, respecting the thing wherein it is, or dissenting
from the thing wherein it is not, those that consent are absolutely consenting, or
modo quo∣dam, absolute as the causes, and effect, that proceeds from the
causes; here we must begin, because the first thing that cometh to mans reason
is the cause, so if we take the world, or any part thereof, let us re∣solve it, and in
the end we shall come to the first cau∣ses, a first efficient, &c. So God is the
first cause of all things, and himself without all causes, ergo, the cause is first of
all things, then the first matter is first in his kind, the first form in his kind, and
the first end in his kind.

So Aristotle saith, God is primum intelligibile: so then if we will see the

wisdom of God in the crea∣tures, we shall see the cause, the beginner: then
again

Page  83

Aristotle doth confess, that causa is primum motus. Again, what is the initium
of every thing, but his be∣ing, and that is from the causes, therefore they are
first; again, the next cause is the farthest thing we can go unto, as if we work
any thing, now if we take causes, and look into them, then we make them
ef∣fects not causes, as if I look at the causes of a garment, I find the Taylor to be
the cause, but if I look at his cause, I make him an effect, yet I cannot make the
first efficient an effect, &c.

The Greeks call causa〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of 〈

in non-Latin alphabet 〉peto, because it is that which is first granted or requi∣red,
as the Geometricians require a petitum, or as our Author should say there can
be no demonstration of the first cause. Est argumentum absolute
consentane∣um, &c. causa est: if a cause be absolutely required for the effect,
then there is a cause: then again Lo∣gick serves us to behold the wisdom of
God, and himself also through the creature: now all things but God are made,
and are composed, ergo, they must have causes, est absolute consentaneum,
because they are essential to the effect. No shipwright no ship, no wood no
ship, no form no effect, no end, no effect; and all these together an effect, &
contra.

Cujus vires est.

First here he tels us of a vis, then he sayes it is vis essendi, then vis essendi rei:
so that as there are four words, so four things, causa is here a concrete
signify∣ing the thing causing, as argumentum was before sig∣nifying the thing
arguing, for our Logick that brings us to the first cause, doth but shew him as
he argueth, not as he is in his being, causa is the thing arguing, cujus, that is,
est res causans, cujus vi, this vis and vertue

Page  84

is of the thing, but Logick looks at it as it is in the thing, and then at the thing:
for if the thing had not vim esseficandi an effect, it could not be a cause, as
wood will not make a gown: so that it is here se∣condly required, that the thing
causans have vim causandi: and against this word is that common fal∣lacian of
non causa pro causa, as he that will lay to the charge of a childe that which a
man can onely doe: so when we ascribe to Nature that it cannot doe, as the
making of a World, which is peculiar to God, est.

Est.

Esse is a general term, and may signifie the essence of a thing, or the tying of
some thing to some thing that is not of the essence, as first when I say vir est,
secondly, vir est doctus, where I do not respect homo from his causes, but as he
hath this adjunct doctrina, and the reason why est is so general, is because this
esse is from the causes, which are most general, for nothing can be said to be
this, or that, before it be, which is from the causes: by this vis we must
under∣stand, that power, and faculty in the thing, that cau∣seth another thing, as
if he should say, the cause is affected to argue the effect forcibly, for vis is here
the same that affectio is in argumentum. Esse indeed is general to all the causes,
and existere is from them all, which appears by this, we say mundus est a Deo,
est ex nihilo, est formata, &c. so that est is nothing but the act of the cause, to
make the effect: so we shall see in a knife, there are all the four causes, to be in
it, and the three former for the end, and therefore if we will not be deceived,
here see that whatsoever is de esse of a thing that is a cause, res not effectum:
for we have heard what res est, that is the subject of Art,

Page  85

but if we had said effectum it had bene a posteriore, for we have not the effect
wrought: Again, we are but yet in causa in general: by res he meanes res
effici∣enda, not yet effecta. Now another fallacie is of non causa pro causa,
when we take that to be the cause, which hath the potentia efficiendi, but doth
not effice∣re, but is causa, quatenus it hath an hand in that effect: so that if one
bring a cause, that is not a cause, though it have vim efficiendi, yet is it not
causa.
Itaque primus hic locus fons est omnis scientiae.

This is a deduction out of the first rule, following this, if the thing be causae vi,
then this is primus locus inventionis, for it is first in the cause, before it be in
the effect: then again it is primus locus in respect it is the first argument we
must look at. Locus, here ← Ramus  → tels us closely, that the Aristotelians
topick places are these arguments, the first whereof is causa.

Fons.

We know the fountain is the first place where wa∣ters spring, so all things
spring from the causes, yea subjects, adjuncts, &c.
Fons scientiae.

For if we know the causes, then we know the effects because they arise from
them, and subjects, &c. and again that is the principal part of know∣ledge.

Scirique demum creditur, &c.

For till we know the causes we know but the out∣side of a thing, and that which
may be removed from the thing without destroying the thing, but knowing the
causes of a thing, we know it as it is, the things being arising from the causes,
and thus knowing the

Page  86

thing, we know it intus, and in cute. Here ← Ramus  → doth commorare

telling us what Aristotle meant by these words: And again too tels us that
Aristotles demonstration is nothing but the scientia of an axi∣ome consisting of
causa, and effectum, and he teacheth it to every cause in general efficient,
matter, form, and end.

No Aristotle saith, that a demonstration concludes the property of a subject by

the definition, because that layes forth the essence of a thing, but it doth not tell
us all the esse, ergo, not all the scientia, for the esses of the efficient and end do
not go into a defini∣tion.

Ʋt merito dicatur a Poeta, &c.

Here he prefers the Poets authority before Aristo∣tle, for Aristotle being more
imployed in this doctrine might speak of it as a private man, but the Poet as a
publike man, foelix meaning a contemplative happi∣ness, not a practick.

Causa est efficiens, & materia, aut forma, & finis.

Every cause yeelds an esse, but all together make the effect, now it is of two
sorts efficiens, & materia, aut forma, & finis, for he cannot give it to us in two
words, but makes a distinct axiom, and couples the parts with a conjunction
copulative, by reason where∣of they have a community, but where lyes it, this it
is I may call the two first potential causes, the other two acting causes: this the
Schools tels us, when they call materia potentia, and the form actus, and this is
← Ramus  → meaning, as we shall see in many examples, as when a Taylor
sets buttons on a doublet with thread, they are not done till all the causes are
there: so a house is not an house so soon as it hath an efficient, and mat∣ter,

Page  87

but when it hath also a form, and end. Now our Author would not use potentia,
and actus; first be∣cause they are barbarous words, secondly, they are improper,
because they cannot be called potentia, and actus, but potentiating, and acting:
then again, the form and end are potentia, as well as efficiens and ma ∣teria, &
contra: therefore he makes two couple of causes, for so we see the efficient is
the first mover, moving quite through with the matter singly, and the form and
end move them inseparably together, therefore they are thus distinguished,
efficiens est mo∣tus a quo in a line, the matter ex qua, and form per quem, finis
ad quem: but because there is a scope at matter, therefore there is a distinction.
For as the ef∣ficient, and end terminate the thing, so the form and matter
mediate the thing running quite through the same. So God made a matter, and
gave it a form, and so an end, ergo, reason must see them thus. The same order
there is also in Gods providence: so man also doth imitate God, when he doth
any thing or∣derly; the first care is for a workman, then a matter, then a form,
and then an end: though we may have cloth before a Taylor, yet it is not a
matter till it be∣gin with the Taylor to bring an effect to pass. So then the
efficient is in nature before the matter, and the matter before the form, for the
form is an ad∣junct to the matter, and the form before the end, the end being an
adjunct to the form; and again a thing must be formed before it can have an
end. The first efficient had the first matter and forms effect to him, the second
forms are adjuncts to the matter. Now the first efficient is absolutely first, for it
hath nothing before it: the first matter is not res prima, nor causa prima, but
first for matter, ergo, it is from the first effi∣cient

Page  88

onely, ergo, never hath any existency in the world, but is ens incompletum: so
the first form is from the first efficient, not of the first matter, but onely in it,
ergo it is ens also completum: hence our soules are not our forms, for then our
forms should be res in∣compl•tae. Now the end is last, and the first end is the
last end; it is first because it is most general, last be∣cause it is not made for
another end, ergo it followeth of necessity that the last end is not made: so that
the end as it is last, as the thing is acted: so it is first as it is most general, for all
the former causes work to effect the end. As we say in Schools, finis est primus
in intentione, posterius in executione: so God made all things for his glory;
here his glory is first in inten∣tion of him that works by counsel, but is acted last
of all by all things that he made. And here Aristotles bonum quo communius eo
melius, is true of the last end of all things, which is God: for he is as we may
say, finis communissimus, ergo, optimus.

Efficiens est causa a qua res est.

We have heard of causa, and of his kinds, and that they are disjoyned, by which
means there is made two couple of causes, the two first working joyntly, even
as the other do. Efficiens, & materia, here is a se∣cond distribution, and here the
efficient is first; for it is first eujus vi res est: again, by the rule of method it is
first in nature, because it giveth light to that which followeth; and that the
efficient moves first we see it in every thing; he layes hold on the matter, which
in respect of the efficient is moved, and by a natu∣ral appetite moves, and runs
to make an effect of it self; and doth effect the effect, as well as the ef∣fi••ent,
and that from the natural appetite it hath to the effect: but the mover or efficient
is

Page  89

before the thing moved, and before the effect also.

Efficiens.

Efficiens, quasi exfaciens, moving quite through: for besides his first moving,
as being the first cause, he moveth also together with the matter, form and end;
and his working with the rest is the cause of his name.

Est.

Every cause is required to the effect, efficiens est causa, ergo: again, first there
must needs be a mover to move the matter, before there can be a table wrought:
this appears plainly by the creation of the world: and because every thing is an
effect, there∣fore the efficient is the first cause: for take any thing, and you shall
see the vis of the efficient to run quite through the same; so look into the world,
and every part thereof, and you shall see Gods finger in every thing, without
which they could not be: so that ef∣ficiens est causa, and because an effect
cannot be with∣out its esse, ergo it is of the esse of it, a qua, from whom it is: as
if he should say, it is terminus a quo, &c. so as the world began with God: so in
every thing in nature, the beginning of motion is first from the next cause: so
that efficiens est causa a qua, telling us that this is the first being the effect
hath.
Res.

Here res is general as before to all the Arts, and it is the subject of the general
Arts. ← Ramus  → doth not here break the rule of method not defining what
res is. Again, if he had said a qua est, we should have had reference to res:
again, if he had named effectum, it had been a posteriore, not having learned
what effectum est. Res est, this is general to every cause,

Page  90

ergo it is taught in the definition of causa in general: but that he may not be so
obscure, he borroweth some thing that went before, for else the perfect
de∣finition had been efficiens est a qua. Now this teach∣eth us to look first at the
efficient in every thing: for Logick tels us not onely of an esse in general, but of
four several esses from which existere doth arise; as efficiens est causa a qua,
materia ex qua, forma per quam, finis cujus gratia: why doth he not say, causa
est cujus vi res sit? because something may be a cause, and yet is not; but if it
do causare then it is a cause. So if I say will do a thing, and yet do it not, yet
am I an efficient; for est doth here com∣mend to us the adsignification of time,
but the essence that so soon as it beginneth to move, so soon it is an efficient,
though the effect be not till the matter, form, and end be there.

Cujus et si vera genera, &c.

Here ← Ramus  → doth commorari, telling us that those many species which
the Aristotelians make, are not species, but modi efficientis, because more of
them may be in one and the same efficient: as one man may be causa precreans
and conservans, sola, and cum aliis, per se, & per accidens, because they may
be in the same efficient. Even as actio and passio do not distinguish the thing,
but are divers modi of the same thing. Here ← Ramus  → will find no species
of efficiens, neither are there any of the other three; for the matter that is lowest,
ergo it hath nothing under it, but examples: and so is the efficient: ergo he
needed not say, Cujus etsi vera genera, &c. for how could rhat appear to him,
that is not? we know the effect is single, ergo as the single matter, form and
end, make that, so the thing efficient makes it, neither hath it any species.

Page  91

Ʋbertas tamen per magna, &c.

There is great and plentiful use of the efficient, and as it is first of all, so is it
most general of all, for mat∣ter cannot be a matter, till the efficient move it, and
so of all other arguments: now these make cause the efficient to be commended,
or discommended, and according to these modi is the effect more or less
ar∣gued: as if a child kill his father, it is parricide: so if it be a good thing that is
wrought by one alone, he is more to be commended than if he had done it, cum
aliis, aut contra. Again, if a thing be done well na ∣tura, it is better than if it had
been done necessitate; and more commendable when a thing is done by
counsel than fortuna: now because these modi doe urge and press the effect
more or less, ergo there is reason in them, and therefore they belong to Logick:
modi, that is, adjuncts not making these effects species, but onely distinguished
by accidents: that fallaci∣an, non causa pro causa, is general to causa: and it is
also particular to efficiens, making that causa efficiens which is not: as the
Hereticks in Divinity were deceived, which said that the Angels did make the
world.

Primo quod procreat, qut tueatur.

These are first because they are more general than the rest, and also they are
more in use: for we shall have this first modus in use twenty times for one to
the other modi: so we respect God as causa procre∣ans, and tueans, before we
respect him alone: then again this procreant cause brings the thing first to his
esse, and the preserving cause is the Keeper of the thing in his esse. Now in
reason he that is the pro∣creating cause, should also be the preserving cause: as
God is not onely causa procreans of the World, but

Page  92
also causa conservans, and so should parents, as they procreant children, so
should they in like sort preserve them. The procreant cause is first, because
things must needs have a being, before they can be preser∣ved: now they are
distinguished, because when a thing is procreated, it is not preserved, aut
contra: and the modi are joyned with the cause, not with the effect, because
they are first in the efficient, as essen∣tial, for actio is before passio: so that here
mark that next after we see the efficient we are to look at these modi. As we are
saved by faith alone; here is effi∣ciens sola. Our Author brings in an example of
O∣vids, the 4. remedii: and Kickerman hath a fling at ← Ramus  → for his
examples, and would have him bring his examples out of Divinity. But first
Logick being a general Art, it is therefore best to fetch his examples out of the
most common and general Writers, as out of Poets, and Historians, which the
Gentiles and Turks may receive, these being more generally known to the
world, than are the Scriptures: and again, Di∣vinity is the most special Art of
all. And so Ramns findeth fault (but justly) with Aristotle, for fetch∣ing his
examples out of Geometry, which is too ob∣scure: for it is a fallace to fetch
examples to prove any thing, if the examples be not as well or better known to
them to whom we demonstrate any thing as to our selves. As they say in
Geometry, A is not B, &c. for so they say in Geometry, angulus A, and angulus
B. &c. Now Logick is a general Art, ergo it is best to fetch examples out of
Poetry, &c. which belongs to Rhetorick a general Art, the example is this; first
proper, otia are proper and conserving causes of love: then tropical, causa est
procreans, cibus the cherisher.

Page  93

Otia si tollas, &c.

Thus •e reasons, otia are the causes of love; for take them away, and love is
gone: hence it appeares they were of the essence of love; so that because causa
is of the essence of the effect, ergo put idleness, and you must put love, aut
contra: for the essence will be wanting, and we have a rule sublata causa,
tollitur effectum, and it is general to all causes, for they are all necessary to the
esseficating of the effect: all the rules of causa in common Logicians you shall
have here, as posita causa ponitur effectum, yet not one cause but all the causes
must concurre: many other rules they have, all which are inwrapt in the
definition of causa: now it holds contingently in every cause; for if we put one
cause, we put all the causes, and so it holds in the special causes, that posita
causa ponitur effectum, & contra: as take away otium from Egi∣stus, and you
take away love: so that sublata causa a tertio tollitur effectum: so in judgement
it is also true; as give otium to Egistus, and you may give him love, which
argues from the efficient.

Sic pater & mater procreant, nutrix tuetur.

Before he shewed us an example out of an Author, he wils us to look for the

use of them out of Authors. The matter of the first belongs to Ethicks, the
mat∣ter of the second to History. Logick is a general Art, ergo his examples are
best out of Poetry, and Oratory, wherein the use of all Art is. Now the aliquid
before is love, which we should have heard of, against which Ovid makes a
medicine. In this example Dido is the aliquid, for here the aliquid is the causa.
Dardanus had two sons, Assaracus and An∣chises, and of him came Aeneas:
now here she takes away the true causes, and sayes Caucasus begot thee:
 Page  94

so there Caucasus in duris cantibus is causa procreans, and Hyrcanae tigres

are preserving causes: but this is false, for here is non causa pro causa.

Object. But doth he well to bring fallaces?

Answ. Yes out of Poets, for here non ens, or ens fictum, hath the nature of ens in
it: neither are all fables lyes, but by continued allegories they teach us notable
truths: now she challengeth Aeneas with this for his manners, because he
forsook her.

Sic Romulus conditor Romanae urbis, &c.

He makes examples of his own, and there is genesis, teaching us that though
genesis be before analysis, yet genesis imitativa is nothing but the imitating of
a for∣mer analysis. Again, our Author makes choice of such examples as may
be paradigmaes, and whereunto any other example may be brought, as in the
first he makes an accident to be the cause of an accident, in the se∣cond he
makes a substantial effect to be from substan∣tial causes naturally, but fainedly:
in the last he brings substantial causes working substantial effects ordina∣rily in
artificial things: and here we may see who first shot the arrow, before we can
see where it lights, or through what it flew, or whence.

CHAP. IV.

Secundo causa efficiens sola efficit, aut cum aliis.

VVE are still in the efficient: the first thing that we can see in the artificio of
any thing, is the efficient, and the modi of it: rhe most general modi was
procreans and conservans before, now we come

Page  95

to the second modi, sola, aut cum aliis, which are more general than per se, and
per accidens in use, but not so generall as the first. Secundo sola, &c. this is
next, ergo next after the first: sola, that is where this mo∣dus efficiendi is
considered, and the force and vertue of this argument from the efficient cause
stands in this modus sola: for so we are to consider always when any efficient
is brought to argue any thing: see which modus is brought with it, as in the
example before; the effect is pressed with the modus of procreans, and with the
modus of conservans: as you would take away love, take away idleness, for it
is the procreant and conserving cause of love. Now as God is the pro∣creant and
conserving cause of all things, so he is cau∣sa sola first, ergo that is before
causa •um aliis, after∣ward he is causa cum aliis, working together with the
creatures, and we finding this in the first efficient, we may also find it in the
first, in the second, and in every one; because all things are simulacra of the
first. Now these belong to Logick, for there is reason in them, and any thing
deserveth more or less, praise, or dispraise, as he doth good or evil sola, aut
cum aliis.

Earumque omnium, saepe alia principalis, alia adjuvans, & ministra.

That is, earum omnium, quae cum aliis efficiunt, saepe alia principalis, alia
adjuvans, & ministra, for so saepe here is part of the axiom, and thus often it
fals out, that one among the rest in doing of things is principal, and (as we say)
ring-leader to the rest, though sometimes likewise all be hail fellows. So that as
the Lord did at the first, work all things alone, and then with others: so likewise
do the creatures in nature, and here again as the Lord is princi∣pal

Page  96

when he worketh with others, so also when creatures work together, one for the
most part is prin∣cipal.

Alia adjuvans, & ministra.

That is, as it were a minister, and an instrument, Here we are to understand

there is the principal cause, which is holpen, and doth not help: causa adjuvans
is principally of living things, ministra is commonly of instruments, which have
not life, though both of them may be of either. Virgil 9. of his Aeneidos. Nisus
avocat ab Euriolo, &c. Me me adsum qui feci, &c. Nisus alone did the deed,
mea fraus om∣nis, there lies the argument, therefore he was sola causa, ergo, in
me convertite ferrum, O Rutuli. Eu∣riolus was taken, Nisus escaped, and he
reasons not from the doing of it, for so both might have de∣served punishment,
but from the manner of doing it, mea fraus omnis; and for Euriolus thus he
saith, nihil iste nec ausus nec potuit. The syllogisme is this.

He that hath done this murder, is to be punish∣ed.

But I alone have done it.

Ergo, I alone am to be punished.

The Assumption is thus proved by denying auda ∣cia to Euriolus, whereby he

might have done it, and potentia whereby he might have accomplished it.
Slaughter is to punishment a subject.

Solitaria causa cum plerisque, & principalibus & sociis pro Marcellio varie adhibetur.

In the former example we see sola causa delivered in a strange phrase, this is
causa cum aliis, and here dux is causa principalis, militum virtus, locorum
opor ∣tunitas, &c. are the helping causes: and fortune is

Page  95

another principal cause, quae mavimam partem sibi vindicat, he reasons thus,
thou art a valiant fellow Cae∣sar, but thou hast helping causes, of which fortune
is the cheif. At vero hujus gloriae Caesar, &c. here Caesar hath no companion:
so that Caesar in pardo∣ning Marcellus is solacausa. Nihil centurio, nihil
praefectus, &c. here he removes the species of efficiens that should be cum
aliis, and he removes also fortune, which is a cheif help in war; this example
belongs to Polemica.

Instrumenta etiam in catsis adjuvantibus connumerantur.

 That is whether they be cattle that have life, which are instruments for
husbandry, or whether they be things without life, they are counted among
helping causes: so a man writing with his pen, is principal, and his pen
instrumental: but here we are to know, that we must alwayes analyse, as our
Author layes that down, which is to be analysed, as when I say he did this
alone, though he had an instrument: here he is causa sola in respect he had not
another man to help him, he is causa cum aliis as he hath an in∣strument.

Quo argumento impius Epicurus, &c.

The Epicure reasons thus, if God had no instru∣ments to help him in making the
world, then he made it not, but he had no instruments, &c. therefore this we
know to be false, by a rule of Divinity, for to make the world was an infinite
work, ergo nothing being finite could help him. Now many times there are
fallaces from all these, as when causae non procreans is put for causa
procreans, non conservans pro conser ∣vans, non sola pro sola, non cum aliis
pro cum aliis: all which we are to determine by this rule.

Page  96

CHAP. V.

Tertio causa efficiens per se efficit, aut per accidens.

THe modi are of most special use, and indeed Ra ∣mus was long in determining
about the doctrine of them, but this was his last determination. Now the former
are more general than these, because these are more special in use: and again
the other belong to these, these may be where the other are, but the other
include these: these modi per se, and per acci∣dens are more particular than the
other, for their reach. Now natura belongs to natural Philosophy, as it were,
consilium to moral as it were. Tertio cau∣sa efficiens, &c. these we have heard
before, efficit per se sua facultate, that is, not onely having it own na∣ture in it
self, whereby it worketh, but the beginning of its motion from it self, causa per
accidens hath it from another.

Sua facultate.

By facultas here we are to understand the same, that vis was generally in the
definition of causa, but he means here, that which hath his principium of motus
of it self: if one do a thing per accidens, he doth it vi, but not sua: so sua
facultate, that is, whose motus whereby it worketh is determinated in it self, ut
quae natura vel confilio faciunt: these two names should seem to belong to
natural and moral Philosophy, but we are to understand by Nature that thing
whose na∣ture is to work such an effect: yea any thing be it na∣tural, or artificial,
which hath that principium of motus in it self to work any thing.

Page  97

Ʋt quae natura vel consilio faciunt.

Counsel is that which doth a thing by deliberation willingly, and wittingly, as

God, Angels, and men onely work by counsel: causa natura is as a knife
cutteth sua natura, so all things are subject to nature: and when I find that a
thing worketh propria vi, and that beginning of motus is with the nature of it
taught, not from it nature, that is causa natura, as when another man crouds
me, and so I croud ano∣ther, and fling him down, I do it with my nature, not
from it. So in a Clock the lead goes down by a rule in nature, because it is
heavy, and that puls the rope, and the rope puls the wheeles, &c. all these move
with their natures, though not from them.

Ventorum naturalis efficientia est.

In this example:

Ʋna Eurus{que} Notus{que} ruunt, creber{que} procellis

Affricus: & vastos tollunt ad littora fluctus.

Here these three Eurus, Notus, and Affricus, are natural causes of tempests on
the Seas, they are also causae cum aliis, and each of them is as principal as the
other.

Consilii exemplum est illa Ciceronis de se confessio.

Suscepto bello Caesar gesto etiam magna ex parte, &c. those things that fall
under Logick, them doth he de∣fine, as causa per se he defines to be quae sua
facultate efficit, but if he should define what nature & counsel are, he should
run into natural & moral Philosophy, for counsel belongs to Pollicy, yet for the
modus of it in working an effect, it belongs to Logick, for a man may take
counsel of himself, without Counsellers, as Kings have. Suscepto bello Caesar,
&c. judicio meo, as voluntate: in these words lies the modus, which he

Page  98

proves a disparatis nulla vi coactus, &c. Fallaces here are very common, as
when we take that for causa per se, which is causa per accidens, & contra:
Now the reason why he gives these modi to the efficient, and not to the effect
is, because they are modi movendi, and do not belong to the thing moved.
Per accidens efficit causa, quae externa facultate efficit: ut in his quae fiunt necessitate, vel fortuna.

Causa per accidens is that which worketh an effect, but non sua facultate, but
is moved by some other thing, and yet notwithstanding it works after a sort sua
facultate, but not sua facultate if we respect the effect, as fire drieth a cloth by
removing the moi∣sture, and so leaves the cloath dry, which drought is in the
cloth.
Ʋt in his quae fiunt necessitate vel fortuna.

Necessitate cum efficiens vi cogitur ad effectum. Here we see a necessity in

invention, which is all one with coaction.

By fortuna we are to understand the special provi∣dence of God, or ignorance

of the next cause, for ignorance of the providence of God in all things, and of
the next cause, hath caused that men say what fortune had I, when they are
crossed in play, or such like.
Now necessity answereth to nature, cum efficiens cogitur: so that this necessity
here is a coaction, and yet is it efficiens though vi cogitur, cogitur when as the
work of it per se is rather of some other thing: now the same thing in one
respect may be causa per se, and in another respect causa per accidens, for
they are but modi, vi externa ad effectum, so that it doth it not na ∣tura, or
consilio.

Object. Why saith he effectum rather than res?

Page  99

Answ. All comes to one, for he means res, neither doth he define effectum here.
Here he means violence, not that vis in causa; this vis doth not work the ef∣fect,
but works upon the cause, and is that facultas whereof he spake before.

Qualis est Pompeianorum excusatio.

At mihi quidem (ait Orator) si proprium & verum nomen &c. Before he said he
was causa consilio of go∣ing with Pompey against Caesar, he saith he was
com∣pelled fatali necessitate, and hither belongs fatum in Schools,

Fortuna est causa per accidens quando praeter, &c.

Our Author before did tell us of fortuna in the ab∣lative case, here he puts it in
the nominative, because fortune is a principal cause of that effect that another
doth per accidens: the arguing we ascribe it to fortune, and say fortune did it:
so that our Author would have us consider, first that it was fortune did it,
secondly, that it takes away the title of doing it from him that did it.
Per accidens.

That is working externa facultate, now where∣as he saith he doth it per

accidens, he meanes for∣tune as it is commonly taken, when we make her blind
not seeing what she doth, for hence it doth arise, when we doe not a thing by
counsel, but •ab nab as they say, that causeth us to make fortune blind.

Quando aliquid accidit.

That is, happeneth, for here it is principal, the im∣providence as it were, he

neither sees himself a cause, neither doth he see who is the cause, and
there∣fore he saith accidit, not efficit, for he saith I did it not; so again, ask him
who did it, and •e will say, I

Page  100

know not: so that accidere is the special efficere of this modus.

Praeter scopium efficientis.

Fortune may seem to be opposed to counsel, which evermore hath a scope

whereat it levels, now when any thing happeneth praeter scopum, it is for ∣tuna
we say. Now things in nature may have a scope, which is beyond their nature,
and then it is fortuna: so that praeter scopum is as much as if he should have
said, praeter scopum fortunae, if it be causa fortuna: or praeter scopum
naturae, if it be causa natura.

Sic Pheraeo Jasoni profuit hostis, &c. here his enemy going about to kill him,
healed him.

In hoc genere causarnm imprudentia connume∣rari solet.

Imprudentia is one modus of fortune, as here.
Cur aliquid vidi, cur noxia lumina feci?
Cur imprudenti cognita culpa mihi est, &c.

I unawares have seen that, which hath done me harm. Then Ovid was causa per
accidens of work∣ing that effect he should not. So Acteon was causa inscius of
seeing Diana washing her self: and here Ovid reasons a simile, as Acteon was
torn in peices of his dogs for seeing Diana unawares, so am I banished for
seeing that I would.

Scilicet in superis etiam fortuna luenda est, &c. He means Augustus.

So if a man go forth, and a tile fall from an house, and break his head, this is
causa fortuna, it is natura as it break his head, being harder than his head, and
fortuna as it hit him, and consilio it breaks his head if it be flung, for it hath a
scope: true it is nothing but counsel hath his end in its intendment, yet

Page  101

there is no cause but hath his end of the effect it wor∣keth.

Hinc sumitur deprecatio, &c.

For our Author said before accidit, therefore we are causes, ergo, it ought to be
pardoned, deprecatio is from this manner of working fortuna: so they will say
he is a proper man, but hath no luck.

Fortunae autem nomen ignorantia causarum confinxit, &c.

Here ← Ramus  → doth commorari in the name, lest he should be mistaken, it

is an unchristian word, it is ignorance not onely as it is opposed to counsel, but
as it is unknown to the thing that worketh by for∣tune. Many other modi there
are among other Lo∣gicians, all which may be brought hither, as causa〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉 is either causa necessitate, or efficiens in ge∣nere,〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 is causa per se, if he shall say, anger did it, then there is a trope in it,
as when I say, he writes, I mean his pen writes: if I say he writes with his pen,
then I make him causa cum aliis: if I say he writes, he is efficiens. Now for the
order of causes, one effi∣cient may be cause of another efficient, &c. and so
causa causae be causa causati, but this will fail, as when I look at a child, and
commend him from his grand∣father, not respecting the mean causes, there is
not causa causae, but causa causati So when I say he came of Scipio, &c.
Hactenus de efficiente, and this we must alwayes look at first in artificio rei:
moreover ob∣serve here in every thing the manner of working: for so God is
said to do some thing necessitate, as when we say he doth that he would not,
though he would it in another sense, and fortuna, as mans fall was praeter
sc•pum Legis.
 Page  102

CHAP. VI.

De Materia. Materia est causa ex qua res est.

VVE have heard of the efficient cause, and his manner of moving in that work
of his: now these are essential to Logick, because in the very man∣ner, there
lyeth the force of the argument, and what∣soever hath reason belongeth to
Logick, many distin∣ctions there are among the Logicians, all which may be
brought to these, that of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
they say is that efficient cause that worketh internally; the Physitians call it
causa evi∣dens, and meat, and drink, is causa〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of a
dis∣ease: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is that cause that worketh exter∣nally; the
Physitians call it causa continens: but here is no distinction of cause, neither
have these quatenus causae〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 any force to argue the effect, but onely quatenus efficiens, whereas
we hear in every special modus of ← Ramus  → that they did press the effect
strongly: as didst thou kill thy fa∣ther? or didst thou it alone? &c. so also in
causa per se, and per accidens, there is great difference in ar∣guing a
conclusion; if he did it natura, there is no rebuking of that, for it was from his
nature: if he sin∣ned by counsel, the punishment is so much the grea∣ter: if he
did it well consilio, he deserves the more praise. Fortuna indeed is such a
cause, as it is not a cause by ← Ramus  → definition, for fortune is but Gods
providence unknown: now if there be any other re∣spect of 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, it will fall to the same with causa cum
aliis.

Page  103

Now we come to materia, that (as we have heard) had a community with the
efficient, which commu∣nity was to move with it a great while before the form
and end come: so soon as the efficient moves, presently the matter moves, but
the form and end move not a good while after. Now because this dif∣ference
(which causeth the distribution of causa) appears in greater things, ergo it is
also in less things: but our Logick tels us, that the efficient must go be∣fore the
matter, and how agreeable doth our Logick go to Gods work in the creatures? if
we shall take a thing and resolve it into his causes, and make them effects, and
look at their causes, (for so when we look at their causes, we make them
effects: so that absurd is that definition of causa, to be either going before, or
concomitans to the effect) at last we shall come to a first efficient that hath nihil
prius to him, ergo he was not made, ergo he ever was, ergo all other things
once were not, for they were made, ergo they now being were from the first,
ergo the first matter was not eter∣nal, as Aristotle dreamed; but indeed he would
cross Plato in what he could; yet one may confute him by his own rules, for he
grants there is a primus motor, ergo he is movens, but not moved, for then he
should have some thing to move him, and so not be first, ergo it is easie to
make Aristotle beleive he is immoveable, because he is first, ergo he must
move others onely, for he is infinite, ergo without limits of place, ergo in eve∣ry
place, ergo nusquam inclusus, or exclusus, ergo un∣moveable.
Now the first matter is first in his kind, namely, the first matter, but not the first
thing: and we may conclude from this, that the first efficient was before the first
matter: for if both were first, neither were

Page  104

first: for if the one should say he were first, the o∣ther would say nay, I am as
forward as thee, and so there would be none absolutely first: and again, one is
before two, ergo he that is absolutely first, can be but one.

Materia.

For his name, as efficiens was extrafaciens, moving all the rest, and not moved
of them, but as it were pater; so materia is quasi mater, out of which the thing
springs, as out of a mother: so that we may see the name to be given a simili,
but yet with very good reason; as the child is not a patre, but of the mother; so
the effect is from the efficient, but springs out of the matter. Now that there is
such a matter thus it may appear; there is nothing composed, but its es∣sence,
and it self a distinct; for to make essentia and ens to be the same, is peculiar to
God. Again, what∣soever is finite, that may be limited in his essence; now God
onely is infinite, and every other thing fi∣nite, ergo may be defined, ergo it self
and its essence are distinct, ergo it must have a matter. Again, if every thing
have not essence, as they speak of Angels, why are not they finite? ergo they
may be defined, ergo their essence and themselves are distinct: again, if they
have not a matter, what have they? nothing but an efficient, and an end? then
they should be imper∣fect, and be either the first matter, or the first form: again,
if they have a form, and no matter, then this form must be another thing from
them, and how is that possible? for if the form and they be all one, then the
cause and effect will be the same. But Logick is a general Art, and because
every thing hath a matter, ergo materia belongs hither, and the first matter had
not a matter, for then it should not have been first, but was incomplete.

Page  105

Materia est.

For it gives esse, and as the force of the efficient was requisite for the
esseficating of the thing, so the mat∣ter much more, for not onely its esse, but its
nature and self couches in the effect, and makes a bulk: and if the vis of the
efficient were essential, because there could be no essefication of the effect
without it, much more must the matter be essential; for if we take a∣way the
matter, we take away both the force and the thing it self. Now we must
understand that ens and non ens are the subject of Logick: and as argumen∣tum
was concretum, and also causa, so when I say mate∣ria, I mean a thing that was
made of a matter.

Ex qua.

That is, out of which it is raised, it is the mother of every thing, as we often
speak of the earth: because every thing indeed is made of the four elements, but
more especially nourished of the earth. Now the matter doth not onely by his
vertue cause the effect, but is interessed in it, and the effect riseth out of it, as if
it were a child springing out of the mo∣ther, onely it goes further in that its
essence goes to the making up of the effect: now though the essence be from
•atter and form, yet the ens it self is from all the causes.

Res est.

That effect as we shall hear hereafter; for in this doctrine of causa, effectum is
the aliquid, which we must call res, till we come to it.

Est.

Every cause gives an esse to the effect, and this esse is the bulk of it, and from
whence ariseth the great∣ness or littleness of the effect by the form; now it is a
great question in Schools, whether the matter doth

Page  106

any thing? indeed in respect of the efficient it is pa ∣tiens, but in respect of the
effect it doth causare, and so doth agere. For if it be an effect in respect of
every cause, then every cause is after a sort the effi∣cient of that effect: and if
you ask me what his acti∣on is, I answer, it doth materia, or substantiare the
ef∣fect, as the efficient did efficere the effect: It is also passive in regard of the
form, but both together co∣work to make the effect; though forma be
principi∣um motus in the thing by the matter. Now this is the next thing to be
inquired, after we see who made it, then whereof it was made: both which we
see in e∣very thing, and see them as they are done.

Now the common Logicians bring in distinctions of Materia: As Kickerman

saith, it is proxima, or remota: but he may say so of every argument, as well as
of materia: he saith man is made of the first mat∣ter, then of the elements,
which are more remote, but ex semine, that is nearer: alas we do not here
consi∣der priority, or posteriority, neither do these any more press the effect;
here is no Logick still, but materia est causa, ex qua, ergo this will not fall in
Lo∣gick: and if you mark it, presently when he comes to materia prima, and to
the elements, he is in natural Philosophy, ergo here is no distinction of materia
in Logick, but of the particular thing, that belongs to a particular Art.

Hoc argumento ficto apud Ovid. 2. Metam. Solis domus, auro, pyropo, ebore, argento componitur.
Regia Solis erat sublimibus alta columnis,
Clara micante auro; flammas{que} imitante pyro∣po, &c.

Here ← Ramus  → brings an example out of Ovid, which

Page  107

is a common School book, and here a fained cause ar∣gues a fained effect: ens
and non ens are the subject of Logick, but non ens gratia entis, for so Logick
looks at them first, and gives entity to ens fictum, and there∣fore Grammar and
Rhetorick must follow it, for they are attendants on it. The Regia Solis is here
distri∣buted into his parts, and they are argued by their mat∣ter: it had his pillars
of gold for their matter, and pyropus another matter of the columnes, the
 co∣vering or seeling of Ivory: the leaves of the doors made of silver. Observe
how these causae cum aliis in the matter do not force the effect any thing at all,
ergo he doth not teach them here; for whether they be made of one matter, or of
more matters, all is one, ergo there is no Logick in that, ergo it doth not belong
to Logick.

Caesar 1. belli civilis. Imperat militibus Caesar ut, &c.

Here milites are the efficient causes of the ships; then he distributes the ship
into his parts, keels, ribs. Carinae primum, and statumina ex leui materia, the
rest was viminibus contextum, lined within with leather: so that here is
distributio integri in membra, and every part is argued by the material cause.

CHAP. VII.

Causae primum genus est inefficiente & materia secundum sequitur.

VVE have heard of the efficient, and of the matter, and this is the conclusion of
it: now we come to the second which is in forma, & fine: so

Page  108

that whilest he saith, Causae primum genus ejusmodi est, &c. he tels me it was
a distribution before, where the genus is subsistent in speciebus efficientis, &
materiae, for so genus is totum partibus essentiale, and is never but in
speciebus: so that the genus of them is compre∣hended in the doctrine of them
two parts.

Secundum sequitur in forma, & fine: he doth not say, Secundus est forma &
fine: now as the efficient and matter were combined together, as moving
to∣gether a while without the form and end: so the form and end, though the
form be before, yet the end comes presently after, and is as it were the
pedissequa to the form: and indeed where we cannot find the form of a thing,
we put the end, as being next to it, and best expressing it. So bene disserere, the
end of Logick, is put for the form of Logick; now as this distinction of the
motion of the causes is seen in grea∣ter matters, so is it also in less: for there is
a co-ope∣ration of the efficient and end together first, then of the form, and end
together also, though not without the efficient and matter. In forma & fine, for
the form is before the final cause; for before the form be induced, or
ingenerated in the matter, it cannot be good for his end, and the end is causa in
respect of the effect, not of the efficient. So we say a coat hath a form before it
have an end, for it may be a coat, and yet not fit to serve me: now then as the
efficient be∣gan the motion, and the motion redounded out of the matter, so it
runs per formam, & finem.

Forma est causa.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is the same that forma is in Latine, there is but a

transposition of the letters, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 properly sig∣nifies the
face; and fas and facies in Latine comes of facio, because when it is made it
hath the face of a

Page  109
thing: so a thing when it hath its form, it hath a face, it will seem something: so
that the efficients esse is not facies rei, nor the matters esse, for they might be
otherwhere, ergo the efficient and matter are com∣mon causes: this is a
particular one, which is one reason why the efficient and matter go before,
being more general: so that when once he hath the face of a man, then is he a
man; this word forma both in La∣tine and Greek is taken abusive for the
outward fi∣gure of a thing; it is a metonimy of the subject for the adjunct; for
figuration is not forma; as we may see in water put in a round glass, or in a
square glass, the same water having the same form will have a round figure, or
square figure, according to the glass where∣in it is: now because the figure is
adjoyned to the form, ergo they say it is forma, and in Schooles they call it
forma accidentalis: now the figure follows the form, but it is not so essential,
but it may be changed, and yet the water is the same, because the water is
va∣riable into divers figures, as we heard before in water. The Schooles say, that
no artificial thing hath any o∣ther form, ergo ask them in what predicament any
ar∣tificial thing is, and they will answer in quality: but thus they will make
Geometry to give the formes of things. Figura is a quality, ergo to make quality
a form is very absurd: again, as before one and the same thing had divers
figures, and onely one form that makes the thing one: again, is the figure of a
table the form of it? then the table belongs to Geo∣metry, not to the Joyners Art:
again, whether doth the matter of the table belong to substantia? ergo the form
too, or else it is in divers predicaments: again, figura is an accident, but forma
is a cause, and gives essence to the thing.

Page  110

Est causa.

We heard before that causa was cujus vi res est, now forma therefore gives vim
esseficandi, it agrees with the matter in that their two essences constitute the
effect; then again by how much the form yeelds his esse in a more special
manner, then the matter, so much more the form is causa, the matter yeelds a
por∣tion of it self, but all the form is there, for the matter is common to both
species, ergo must give matter to them both, ergo forma is a more inward cause
than the matter: again, forma is principium actus, and therefore it is called
actus, ergo est causa.
Per quam.

Through which, or by which the efficient was from the which, and the matter of
the which, the form by which: so here we may see what the form doth; and if
res be per formam, it must needs follow that the forms force is there in general,
as the efficients, there is no more per quam, but all the form is there, ergo
forma tota est in toto, and it is in qualibet parte partly: not wholly, and this is
plain; as for example, by ano∣ther rule of Logick, the members we know are
essen∣tial to the whole, that is, containing a portion of the matter, and of the
form of the whole, ergo, every mem∣ber contains a part of the esse of the thing,
ergo, it cannot contain the whole, ergo those that make ani∣ma rationalis,
sensitiva, and vegitativa, forms of men, beasts and plants, and make it tota in
toto, and tota in qualibet parte, break this rule directly; for then they must be
divided: but the truth is this, they are not forms, for if they be, whereof are they
forms? viven∣tis: what is the matter of them? as in animali: is corpus the matter
of them? that cannot be, for it is forma animalis, not corporis; why then what is
he

Page  111

but composed of them, ergo they are not the matter, and form, if there rise a
third thing from them, then the thing hath another thing then either of them,
er ∣go they are not the form, but contain a portion of the matter and form. Again,
the body hath a form it self, for it hath his particular members, ergo they
contain a portion of the matter, and of the form of the body, ergo, it is
composed of a form besides the form of the whole, so that this it is, per quam,
mean∣ing it is quite through that portion of matter that makes that effect: so that
there is not onely matter, but also forma in every thing, & contra.

Res est, quod est.

There it essefies the thing, as well as the efficient, and the matter, id quost est:
so that this esse from the form doth not onely make it to be, but makes it to be
that which it is: so that hereby we shall know the form, and as for the efficient
and matter, for them a chest might have been a stool, or a table, but the form
onely makes it that which it is, and no other thing; again a body is the genus to
a man, ergo not the matter, because he is corpus.

Now we hear what the form is, such a thing as is rei superstrata materiae, the
matter is substrata, and the form is laid upon it. Now question might be made
what a thing forma is. The efficient, and matter we see what they are, the
chestity, or tability, or these do deliver the form as well as they can, but the end
deli∣vers it better, The way to know this is onely by the other rules of Logick,
every member (as we heard before) contains a portion of the matter, and the
form of the whole; how can that be? it is true, be∣cause membrum is essential to
the whole. Indeed the doctrine of forma hath troubled the Schools very

Page  112

much, and how to name it I cannot tell, onely it is causa per quam res est, this
it is. The first efficient in time made the first matter, then he did superstruere a
form upon it, so that the matter is the foundation of the form, whereby it is
retained. Now in the ele∣ments both the matter and form are uniform, and
therefore their parts are singular not making a mix∣ture, but taking hold one of
another, for so the matter is principium passionis, and the form actionis, and
then again they both conspire to make up the whole. The next things are
mingled of the elements, where all the elements are in every part; by this means
there is a matter made of the matter of the four elements, and a form made of
the forms of the four elements, and this is the best way to see the forms of any
thing: a mans arm contains a portion of the matter and form of the whole: and
again, it is made of singular parts which still contain a portion both of the
matter, and of the form of it: so that in the end the forms of things arise from
the elements by mistion; and this is that which Galen and Hippocrates mean
when they call forma crasis: so for artificial things their forms arise from the
forms of their parts: so that to know the forms of things this is the right, forma
est causa per quam, &c. Now if we take this course to see the forms of things
we shall easily see the truth: look how many members there are in a body, so
many por∣tions of matter and form there are, ergo, vita vegita ∣tiva, and
sensitiva, are not the forms, but that is it that ariseth from the union of the
elements forms: now by this means neither do we teach that the forms of things
perish, and are annihilated, as the Philosophers say, neither are their forms
divers, but conspire toge∣ther to make one; neither is life a form, so that a

Page  113

bone is a bone, and hath the form of a bone when life is gone.
Id quod est.

This is peculiar to the form, for let forma be done away from a thing, and
presently it is another thing: id quod est, namely that whereby it comes to be
ran∣ged under a general head is from the form.

Ideoque hinc a caeteris rebus distinguitur.

Because forma est causa, &c. it is not distinguish∣ed by the efficient, or matter,
because all the force of them is not in the thing, as the forms force is: ideo∣que,
&c. then we see evidently, that so farre forth as the form runs with the matter,
so farre forth the thing is, id quod est; and so far forth also is it distinguished
from all other things, now this is a necessary conse∣quution from the first rule.

Object. How can it be a first rule arising from a first rule?

Answ. It is not simply and absolutely first, but first in his kind. So Dialecticae
partes duae sunt, is not the first rule of Logick, because the definition is before,
yet notwithstanding it is first in his kind; now the reason of it is thi•, every
consectary that makes a rule 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 must be a rule of Art, for
it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and is a first property in his kind, though there be
more of them together: now it is here proton, and agrees to the parts afterwards,
as risus first agrees to homo, and to Richard, William and John. &c. It is 〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it agrees 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉; so that all real distinction is from the form: and here is the
doctrine of differentia with other Lo∣gicians, it is nothing but a property: and is
here ide∣oque hinc a caeteris rebus distinguitur: so that that which is differentia
constitutiva in regard of the effect,

Page  114

is differentia divisiva as it makes it differ from other things.

Et forma simul cum reipsa ingeneratur.

Again, here is another property, he saith, forma si∣mul▪ &c. here are two things
adjoyned to forma, as properties, the first is that forma ingeneratur, the se∣cond
is that simul cum reipsa ingeneratur. For the first there is much question how
the forms come to things, the Philosophers say it is an heavenly nature, and
comes by influence of the Sun, Moon and Stars, as if it were a quinta essentia
from the elements, and must be extrinsice. Now these influences they know not
what they are, if they be qualities of the Sun, Moon and Stars, then they cannot
be forms, for the forms give essence, ergo, is no quality: if they be not
qualities, then they are substances, what substance are they? If they be of their
substance, then they are cor∣ruptible, shall it be from their matter? then it
should be celestial, for they are not made of the elements, neither can matter
make a form: and again, it can∣not be of their matter, for then they should be
dimi∣nished, neither can it be of their forms alone, for one thing cannot make a
third distinct from it, ergo, it is not from them, but the Sun, Moon and Stars
send down fire, which makes a mistion with the other ele∣ments, and so from
their forms ariseth the forms of mists, for so mistio is alteratorum unio, ergo, it
is made one, and it is evident that the forms of the four ele∣ments are all
operative, that is, their qualities are in e∣very thing. But they hold as it were a
meeting of ma∣ny Stars together at the conception of things, but as for their
work, it is not so to be respected, for we see Esau and Jacob born at the same
time, and yet of di∣vers manners.

Page  115

Ingeneratur.

Some are of opinion, that the form is in the thing before the thing be, but now it
is educted, and brought out; true it is, it was before in the parts, but they were
not membra: so that after that sort it was before, cum reipsa; how can this be
whereas the end comes be∣tween the form, and the effect?

Answ. This is a propriety, and every propriety is an adjunct to the thing, and the
adjunct is after the subject, so that this comes after the form.

Cum re.

As if he should tell us the form lies in the matter after an hidden manner, but
this property is before the end; ingenerari is another thing, then the form, ergo,
forma is before it, but it is together with the thing.

We have made an entrance into the formal cause, and have heard how that it is
after the efficient, and the matter: again whereas every cause gave an esse, the
form did that, and more too, the efficient gave a bare being, the matter gave a
being and part of his essence, and the form gives his whole essence, and make
it that which it is, and that reason of that makes it differ from all other things,
and this the common Logicians did consider, when they made differentia to be
divisiva, or constitutiva. Now here was their mistaking, that they called it
differentia, which doth not arise from the essence of it, but from this proper∣ty,
that forma simul cum reipso ingeneratur.

The Theory of the form is hardest of all humane learning, for it cannot be seen
with our senses, but onely by the effects of it we come to grope at it, be∣cause it
is principium agens of every thing strengthen∣ed by the matter; but the
contemplation of that be∣longs

Page  116
to natural Philosophy; and thus we may seek the formes of things. When I
know that membrum is essentiale toti, and that the matter and form consti∣tute
the effect, it must needs be, that so many portions of matter, so many portions
there are of forma, ergo, the Schools are deceived, which think the form may
not be divided, for it may, because it is portionated from the members.

The organical parts of a thing are made of simu∣lar parts, and the simular parts
are made of the ele∣ments, both for matter and form, the elements of the first
forms; now if you ask me further what they are, I can onely say they are the
works of the first effici∣ent incomplete in themselves; so that if you will penitus
introspicere, this is the way, and look what ele∣ment is most predominant in the
mist, so much more the neerer you shall come to see the form ingenera∣ted: if
we speak of the forms of the elements, they were extrinsice, and were
ing•nerated in the mat∣ter, again, if we shall speak of the soul of man, this is
extrinsice infused, but the forms of other things are within, and are educed out
of the matter, but there is nothing new in this, for the matter is so too.

Ingeneratur. True thus farre as the form is not made but by composition of the
elements, when the forms are not made, but in nature there is that mi∣sture, or
in Art that composition, that there is a new form: as in a stone by the misture is
made one form arising from the forms of the four elements, by their action and
passion. So in artificial things, the form is a compound form made of the forms
of the parts, and because that thing is now that which it was not, ergo this form
must needs be that now, which it was not, ergo, ingeneratum: and the whole
work of the

Page  117

efficient whilst he doth dolare, or hew a thing, is no∣thing but his preparing of it
together with the rest of the matter to make a new thing. Forma is diversly
ingenerated, if it be by composition, then it is com∣posed, if it be of simples,
then it is made by shaving or cutting it.

Now whilst he saith simul at once, it may seem by this that the form and effect
are together; he means not together in nature, for the form must be before the
effect, because it constitutes the effect, and the constituter is before the thing
constituted, therefore how are they simul? he means forma simul ingene∣rat:
thus, I suppose two go together, and yet one of them goeth before the other,
here is a priority, and simul too, he that is before goeth first, the other
fol∣loweth, yet both move together: and as two hands laid together do move
together, and yet one before the other, so is it with the formal cause and effect,
the formal cause moves, and the effect also, but the effect follows it in every
step, and the final cause follows the form, as the shadow follows the body, and
the effect comes last: again, this is a property, ergo, an adjunct, ergo, is after the
subject, for the form is an ef∣fect before it be a subject: so that the efficient doth
as it were make the form, and the effect still follows as we may see in artificial
things, so that so far forth as the form is ingenerated, so farre forth the effect is
accomplished.

Anima rationalis est forma hominis, &c.

Here our Author doth commorari, and stay upon the doctrine of forma, for it is
so deep, and subtil, as that it can hardly be perceived. This example is not true,
because anima rationalis may subsist from the bo∣dy; now as there can be no
matter without a form, so

Page  118

there can be no form without a matter, therefore this example will not serve his
turn, yet he brings that he could get; many in Schools have stumbled at this,
and have gone about to mend it, but indeed they have marred it.

Some say ratio belongs to Angels, ergo, it is not the proper form of homo, and
therefore they have added mortale, and say homo is animal rationale mortale.
Now if they joyn mortale to ratio, it is not mortalis. Again, animal ratione
mortale doth detract from man, unless we speak of his body.

Et distinguitur a caeteris omnibus naturis.

That is not so, for the Angels though they be ani∣mae, and so have not animam
rationalem, yet they have rationem; again, doth not the body of man
distinguish him from other thing? so I suppose we admit of the Pythagorians
metam,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. A mans soul in a bird will not make it a man.

Geometricarum figurarum in triangulis, quadrangulis sua forma est.

He brings such examples as he could find, and those whereof greatest question
might be made; it hath been a question among Logicians, that this forma is
peculiar to substances, not accidents; and hence have made a distinction of
forma to be substantialis, or accidentalis: but they are deceived, for Logick is a
general Art, and every thing that is made hath cau∣ses, ergo, may be defined,
ergo, hath matter and form; for otherwise we could not have a perfect definition
in Grammar, Rhetorick and Arithmetick, or in any other Arts that have
accidents for their subjects: ergo, accidents behold a form as well as an
efficient, ergo, he saith in Geometry, take a triangle, it consists of three lines
with three angles, which by their unition

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in their angles, make up one form, as well as one matter.

Phisicarum rerum, coeli, terrae, arborum, piscium sua forma est.

He doth commorari here long for two causes: first, in respect the form is deep,
and needs illustration. Secondly to confute other Logicians, that say acci∣dents
have no forms, unde praecipua rerum ut natura est, &c. if it be causa per quam
res est id quod est, then it is praecipua rerum natura. Nature proper is res nata,
that is, that springeth principiis, that is matter and form: so that the whole
nature consisteth of them, and this is the proper signification of it, afterward it
comes to signifie the principia themselves; hence is materia and forma called
natu•ae: so that in natural Philosophy, when you read of nature, they tell you
commonly some tale of materia or forma: then a∣gain by a metonimy of the
adjunct for the subject, it signifieth the qualities natural in things: all this shews
forma to be praecipua rei natura. Praecipua, first because it makes the thing to
be id quod est, so doth not the matter: again, forma, why it is principi∣um actus,
from whence the qualities principally arise: for as the Philosophers teach,
though not truly in e∣very point, materia is principium passionis: for ∣ma
actionis, and actio is better than passio, ergo the form more excellent than the
matter, but both matter and form do agere, for they are causa; yet the forms
be∣gin, and the matter is but the sustentation of it, and the forms act is the
stronger by the matter, not onely as it acts internally, but when it acts upon
external things by resistance by the way. Now as it hath chief interest in
esseficating the effect, so it is praecipua rei natura, so also there is of it
praecipua rei explicatio, si possit inveniri.

Page  120

Si possist inveniri.

He saith it neither can be found out, nor that it cannot be found out. Si possit
inveniri: sure it is findable; I prove it thus, it is lyable to Logick, if it be
objected to the eye, then the eye may see it; it may but hardly be found,
because it doth not descry it self to the outward senses by qualities, as bodies
do: a∣gain, the form in nature is so subtil that we can hard∣ly find it, but see as it
were the shadow of it, ergo di∣vers have thought the forms of things to be
divine. Some have gone so farre as to think them to be influ∣ences: but subtile it
is indeed, and harder to find out, then either the efficient, or matter, ergo we
com∣monly call that the matter, which contains the form too, because it is rather
seen as it hath a material cause, than as it hath a formal.
Ʋt in artificiofis rebus facilius occurrit.

That is the reason why he that makes natures is more cunning than any man can
trace his wisdom: as we may see in the elements, ergo no man can make a thing
in nature; man may further nature, but he cannot make any thing: again, the
parts are so fine in the mixture of things, as it is beyond the acies of mans eye
to see them.

In artificiosis rebus facilius occurrit.

Why? because artificial things are the works of men, and one man may trace
another, though every man cannot.

Caesar. 7. Muri autem omnes Gallici, &c.

As for example, in artificial things this very de∣scription will declare how hard
a thing it is to find out the form, but we use to point at it by the matter, and by
the position of it. There stood great beams all along, two foot asunder, put into
the earth, & the

Page  121

distances between them were stuffed with great stones: when these were so
fastned, then there was a new or∣der begun, where they laid the beams against
those stones that were laid before, and filled likewise the distances with stones
which were against the first lay of beams: but what hath he told us now? why
saith he, I am a French-man, and I will tell you the form of a French wall,
 where if you do but look at the forms of every part, and of them, you shall see a
composed form: so that the Logician doth not look at the outward face of a
thing, but at the inward es∣sence: here he is fain to deliver the form by many
other arguments, and indeed it is a description of forma.

Est in secessu longo locus: ensula portum, &c.

Here he hath by the position of the parts of the haven, told us the form of it.

CHAP. VIII.

De fine.

Finis est causa cujus gratia res est.

VVE have gone through the esse of a thing, we have but heard of three, when
the fourth comes, that makes up the perfection of the thing, namely finis.

Finis, for the name, it is borrowed from Geome∣try; for that that is terminus
there, is here called fi∣nis, and it is brought hither to signifie that final cause that
serveth to make up the effect: so that it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, if we keep
the proportion of the esses, but it is not

Page  122

the last part and member thereof, as they make 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the last
member of some whole, as Method is the last member of Logick. Finis is the 〈
in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the esse of a thing, not of the members of it. Now it
is called finis, because it limits the thing for his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and
for his essence, and it is the last thing that limits it, er ∣go it is called finis.

Est causa.

Because with force thereof the thing is, and the end though it do not enter into
the essence of the ef∣fect, by it own essence yet by it vertue it doth efficere, as
doth the efficient.
Cujus gratia.

Therefore the final cause is that that graceth the effect, and thence hath the
thing his commendation, cujus gratia, for whose grace; for gratia here
signifi∣eth not onely for whose sake, but for whose grace, as if the final cause
were that which doth grace the ef∣fect, and so indeed it doth. For as bonum quo
commu∣nius, eo melius, so communior finis hath more grace than finis
specialio•: for that cause, that which is next the chiefest end is more noble and
excellent, then that which is more remote. Hence man is more ex∣cellent than
any other creature, because he is made immediately for God. So then the end
graceth it evermore: and the more excellent the end is, the more excellent is
that effect. This then is the esse that the final cause doth give to the effect,
namely, that which is good for that effect: so that the good∣ness of a thing is
that vis in the effect, that it hath from the end: As in a knife, the efficient may
be a slave, the matter likewise naught, the form though that be something, yet
were it not for the end, nei∣ther the efficient, matter or form would move, ergo
 Page  123

the final cause is said to be the happiness of the thing: so that a thing is not to
be accounted happy till it be serviceable to that end for which it was made. A
garment well made as touching the skill of the ef∣ficient, and of good stuffe for
the matter, and fit for a garment, and so of a good form, yet not fitting him for
whom it was made, it wanteth his end, or happi∣ness, and so is not perfect:
Again, this shews the dif∣ference between the formal cause and the end, for the
form may be as we see, and not the end. Again, we know there are many things
that have not their per∣fection but by growth, and yet have all the causes, yet
notwithstanding the end presently follows after the form: so man was made by
God; here God is the efficient, earth the matter, reason the form; yet here is not
his end, namely, fitness to serve God. And thus we have heard the doctrine of
the causes, which are the foundations whereon the effect is builded.

Physicis rebus finis homo propositas est; homini Deus.

Of natural things man is the end: the grace of man is God, and God makes him
good, not as an efficient, but as an end.

Omnium artium est aliquod summom bonum & finis extremus.

That is that end which they reach unto, but that is not the summum bonum of all
things: for Logicks end is bene disserere, Grammars bene loqui, &c. these are
the furthest ends of Logick and Grammar, but not the furthest end of all: they
are indeed the proper end of them, but not the summum bonum: so that he
means by summum bonum the outmost or farthest end of them, and the end of
Logick lies in the precepts of it, as they act bene disserere. This is the
difference

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between the end and the effect. A house is made to dwell in, though it never be
dwelt in: so for a gar∣ment, to be worn is one thing, and to be fit to wear
another. So if I go forth to speak with one, and he be gone, yet I obtain my end:
they commonly say he was frustrate of his end, but not frustrate of finis,
qua ∣tenus finis, but quatenus effectum.

Juno primo Aeneidos connubii finem assumit, cum Aeolo Deiopeiam pollicetur, solatii scilicet prolisque
gratia.

Sunt mihi his septem praestanti corpore Nymphae, &c.

Here Juno perswades Eolus to let his wind out, and she would give him one of
her Nymphs, which she presseth upon him by final causes: first, that she may
spend all her years with him: and second∣ly, that she may make him the father
of a fair off∣spring.

In defensione Ligarii Cicero Tuberonem accusa∣torem urget, &c.

Et certe (ait) contra ipsum Caesarem est congres∣sus armatus, &c. As if he

should say, Tubero thou hadst thy sword drawn at the battle of Pharsalio, thou
didst strike his side: mark the variety of the phrases, and so of the ends. What
 meant thy sword? what was thy mind? here was the propositum. What meantst
thou to have done? even to have killed Cae∣sar. So that the final cause is not
accidental to the thing, but even substantial; and therefore we have it so often in
the definition of Arts used for the form, and that for this reason: because it is
the next ar∣gument to it, and presupposeth the form: so that this is the use of the
final cause in the definition of Arts.

As Dialectica est ars bene disserendi, here bene disse∣rere

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is the end, and it is as if he should say, Dialectica hath such a soul, as that it is
able to perform and exe∣cute this or that thing, for which it was made. So 〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉 is the end of all Arts: I but what 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
in general, why, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is the
effect of all Arts?

Answ. But as every thing is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so 〈 in non-Latin alphabet

〉 is the end of it ergo, if a man will do any Logicum o∣pus, he must 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉: and thus we have heard the doctrine of the causes.

CHAP. IX.

De effectis. Effectum est, quod e causis existit, siveigitur gignatur, sive, &c.

NOw we come to see a thing made up: it is worth the consideration, to see how
we begin at the farthest thing, and at the first. There are four esses distinct,
which we must look at distinctly and order∣ly, if we •ill see things a•ight. First
the efficients, then the matters, &c. now then let us see effectum. Effectum: for
the name it seems to be nominated onely from the efficient; for it comes of
efficior, which comes o•efficio, whence efficiens comes: and howbeit it might be
denominated materiatum, for ∣matum, or finitum, yet he rather names it of the
effi∣cient; but we are to understand, that it hath re∣ference to all the causes, even
materiatum, formatum, finitum.

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Object. Why should there not be as many several kinds of effects, as there are
of causes?

Answ. Because no one cause alone can make an effect, for it is existent from
them all: the causes are distinct in nature, and their forces are their own, ergo
their doctrine must be distinct: but because essectum must be made of the
composition of the four esses, er ∣go it can be but one: so that I cannot say,
effectum efficientis, effectum materiae, effectum formae, or effectum finis, ergo
we must see effectum alone in one lump, as it is in nature. Now because it hath
all the esses of the causes, ergo good reason that the efficient that is 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉, and worketh generally quite through with every other cause,
matter, form and end, should have the effect denominated from it, so that this
child brought forth by the four causes is denominated from the efficient.

Est.
All things are effects, but God alone, ergo, effectum est: therefore whereas all
things are made lyable to our eye of reason, it is requisite that as we see the
causes that make up the thing, so the effect, which is a quinta essentia arising
from them.

Quod.

He means argumentum absolute consentancum: now we see plainly how the

causes are absolutely agree∣ing to the effect, but how is the effect absolutely a-
agreeing to them? yes, for if the effect be from them, it will vouchsafe to
acknowledge it self to be from them: and we see in nature, that if an effect be,
then all the causes are, & contra: again, that we may see it plainly, if we take
away the efficient, the effect will be imperfect: so put the effect, and we put the
matter and form substantially, and the esses of the other: so

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take away the effect, and you take away them. Now if the efficient be rotten,
yet it is an effect, as this Lo∣gick is ← Ramus  → his effect, though he be dead
and rot∣ten: for here we respect not time, but the esse. Again, he puts efficiens
generally a qua, materia ex qua, for ∣ma per quam, finis cujus gratia, and here
effectum quod: the reason why he used quod so often, is, be∣cause he would tell
us that Logick is general to every thing.

Existit.

Esse is of any one cause; existere is a compound of them all, not that existere
hath respect of time and place, as some teach: true it is, time and place attend
every thing, when it doth existere, but they are not of the esse of the thing, but
are onely complemental; est is a causa qualibet, existere ex omnibus,
subsi∣stere ex modo quodam consentaneis. Existere comes of ex and sto, now it
doth stand upon its feet, and doth estare out from all the causes, being a fift
thing from them.

Ecausis.

Here e is as much as a, ex per, and gratia: ecausis, that is, ab efficiente, ex

materi, per formam, gratia finis. Causis not causa, and therefore it is that all
four cau∣ses must absolutely concurre, or else the thing cannot existere, as the
first matter did not: ergo, if Angels do existere, they must have all the causes:
so the soules of men after they be out of the body, they can∣not per se existere
without they have all the causes, for if any one cause be wanting, they will be
incom∣plete.

Sive igitur gignatur, sive corrumpatur.

← Ramus  → doth here commorari upon this doctrine of effectum, because the
common Aristotelians referre

Page  128
the doctrine of motus not to Logick but to natural Philosophy: but
← Ramus  → teacheth it here in Logick in the doctrine of effectum, sive igitur
gignatur, sive corrumpatur, &c, whether it be made or corrupted, sive modo
quodam moveatur, quidlibet, that is, whether it be augmented, or diminished,
&c. generatio, and corruptio are substantial motus, augmentatio, and dimi∣nutio
quantitatis, alteratio, and loci mutatio qualitatis: and all these are effects: then
again, whereas the Ari∣stotelians teach, that distruens causa, is not causa,
Ra ∣mus teacheth that it is, for whether a man doth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈
in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by the same rule he doth both, ergo, both of them are
motus of his act to the opus, ergo, causa di∣struens is a motus, and a cause, as
well as opus destru∣ctum is an effect, and privations though they be pri∣vations
in respect of their habits, yet they are effects in respect of their causes, ergo,
they are causes both alike: they teach as if a man had done nothing when he did
sin, whereas he spoiles the Image of God in him: ergo, whilst they are more
nice than wise they become foolish. If the Lord should bring to nothing that
which he hath done, it would be his effect, at least the corruption of nothing.
Now the effect is double, motus, and res motu facta, every thing is made motu,
God onely is sine motu, and doth not move when he works, for else he should
not be primus movens, but motus: but if we resolve all things, it must needs
bring us in the end to that which is immoveable: for so Aristotle found out most
things by motus: now again, there are those that sever motus, and res motu
facta, as the Aristotelians, which makes ← Ramus  → to commorari; they say,
somethings rest motu onely without a res motu facta, but that is not so, for there
is nothing that God hath made, which doth movere, but

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there is a res motu facta of that motus: they conceit that some Arts motion hath
no opus post se relictum, as when one playes on the Virginals, they say there is
nothing left behind.

Answ. What care I for that, Logick looks not to that, but as there is playing, so
there is something playd, which is res motu facta: and as there is wri∣ting, so
there is something written. These, namely motus, and res motu facta, are never
distinct asunder one without another, but onely in that the one is not the other.

Hujus loci sunt laudes, & vituperationes.

As if ← Ramus  → should say, if you would commend a thing indeed, let it be

from the effect, we may com∣mend one from his fair building, but that is
beggerly, as Tully saith, or a woman for her beauty, but this is childish, for the
true commendation is from the effect: so man is here to be dispraysed from his
sin: so the Lord is to be praised from his effects.
Quarum pleni sunt libri sacri, & prophani.

Why in Scripture? because Divinity stands in acti∣on, not in Theorie, and

therefore we have them so of∣ten commended that have done well, & contra.

Aenei. 6. facta variorum populorum, &c. Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera, &c.

The Romans are commended from their effects; first, regere imperio populos:
again parcere subjectis, &c. these are compared with the acts of other peo∣ple,
 and they are made minora to the effects of the Ro∣mans. Excudent alii
spirantia, &c. As the Corin∣thians will carve you any thing. Orabant causas
meli∣us, as the Orators among the Athenians, Coelique meatus, &c. as the
Caldeans and Egyptians will do.

Page  130

Huc dicta scriptaque referenda sunt.

That is, dicta and scripta in respect of Authors, but if we look at the things
written, or spoken, so they are testimonies. So Pericles and Hortensius are
famous for speaking well. Demosthenes and Tully for both.
Ad hunc locum referuntur consilia, & delibe∣rationes, &c.

Counsels and deliberations are effects of them that consult, and deliberate,
etiam si omnio ad exitum per ∣ductae non fuerint. And this appears evidently in
that Parmenio and Philotas were put to death, being suspected of conspiracie
against Alexander. So also were Lentulus, and Cethegus, and other companions
of Cataline.

Sunt etiam effecta virtutum & vitiorum. Quid non ebrietas designat? operta recludit, &c.

Now it is a common conceit that nothing is an ef∣fect, but that which is

substantial, but accidental cau∣ses as I may call them, may have accidental
effects. As drunkenness first operta recludit, secondly, in praelia trudit
inermem, it makes a man go to warre leaving his weapons behind him, it will
make a man think himself as good as my Lord Maior. Faecundae calices, here
are cups for drink, and drink for drunkenness, quem non fecere desertum, that is
a dizard, he meanes a Logician, contracta quem non, &c. it makes a man in
poverty a brave minded fellow.

Page  131

CHAP. X.

De subjecto. Argumentum modo quodam consentaneum succedit ut subjectum & adjunctum, &c.

VVE have heard of the essential parts of a thing, and so have seen the thing in
his essence, and we see how Logick doth direct the eye of our reason, to see the
most inmost thing in it. Now we come to see the complemental things, that
belong to a thing, not belonging or concurring to the existere of it: so that the
causes were as it were the simular parts, these are as it were the blood in the
sinews, &c. to make them full, and complemental: Modo quo∣dam
consentaneum, as if he should say, the causes were required ad esse rei, these
are but required ad bene esse rei: so that the causes looked at the inside of the
thing, and now we come to look at the outside of it.

Argumentum modo quodam, &c.

This is an imperfect transition containing onely the proposition of that which

follows, modo quodam: as if he should say, if they be there it is well,
notwith∣standing if they be wanting it is no prejudice to the essence of the
thing, for they are but circumstances, whereas argumenta absolute consentanea
are penetralia; again, argumenta modo quodam consentanea come after the
being of the thing, for accidens inseparabilis, as ho∣mini risus aequo hinnitus,
are but acts of the soul work∣ing in the bodies of their subjects,

Page  132

Succedit.

Why? because they are after those that agree ab∣solutely: we have heard that
the effect ariseth from all the causes, and cannot existere without them, ergo, it
must be a thing of necessity before it be subject, or adjunct, or before it can
have a subject, or adjunct, for that which hath adjuncts is a subject, & contra.

Ʋt subjectum, & adjunctum.

A subject is by nature before an adjunct, and a thing is first a subject before it

be an adjunct, and there must be a thing subjected to an adjunct before a thing
can be adjoyned to a subject: again the sub∣ject is more general than the
adjunct, not that there are more subjects to one adjunct, for it is quite con∣trary,
for there may be twenty adjuncts to one sub∣ject, but I mean it is more in use,
and argues more strongly than the adjunct doth, As when I say the King is
there, ergo, the Guard is there, is stronger than to say the Guard is there,
therefore the King, and here we see as before, priority and posteriority. Now
our reason is to behold things according to the course of God, for whatsoever
we see it was first in God, and when he hath made a thing then it is a subject,
and it is capable of adjuncts before it have them, ergo, sub∣jectum is before
adjunctum in the practise of God, and also of man. Now subjectum as it is first,
so must it be taught first. The name subjectum tels me it is a thing laid
undermost in regard of the adjunct, and it doth support it, and yet it is not of the
essence of it, but onely laid under it, and adjunctum is to ride on it as a pack-
horse: now as the efficient was most inmost, then the other three, or the ef∣fect,
so is subjectum here, ergo it is by nature before adjunctum.

Page  133

Subjectum est cui aliquid adjungitur.

He omits the genus, and the reason why he doth not teach the genus namely
argumentum modo quodam consentaneum is because it is a definition it self, as
absolute consentaneum was, for there is no definition of a definition, but if he
had defined it, he had brought a definition to a definition, he wanted a word to
name the thing, and therefore gives me a description instead thereof, cui
aliquid, this aliquid is that ens we heard of in Art; so that this aliquid is any
thing, not simply, but quatenus it hath an affection to be joyned. A thing being
an effect, is fit to receive outward things; and subjectum is defined by his relate
ad∣junctum, for it is cui aliquid adjungitur, and what∣soever is subjected to
another thing is his ad∣junct, as whiteness is an adjunct to a wall that is white.

Adjungitur.
Adjungitur, so that subjectum is the argument, and adjunctum the aliquid,
adjungitur, so that here he tels us that the adjunct is adjoyned to the subject, th
at which is must needs be after the thing to which it is tyed, ergo, subjectum is
before adjunctum, he saith it is but adjunctio, not entring into the essence of it,
but that it may be taken away: so that as subjectum doth intimate a thing laid
underneath, so the adjunct doth intimate a thing laid upon it: so that the ad∣junct
doth depend, and hang upon the subject as up∣on a hook; or as one thing tyed to
another: thus have we heard the subjects argument to be so, as if his adjunct be
removed from him, or he from his ad∣junct, yet he stands firm in his causes.
Now for the manners.

Page  134

Anima est subjectum scientiae, ignore antiae, virtutis, vitii, quia haec praeter essentiam accedunt.

Anima is a spiritual thing, so are these adjuncts, sci∣entia, ignorantia, &c. of the
same kind too, now these take hold one of another quodam modo, ergo, if they
be removed, yet the soul remains intire, ergo, it is but sub∣jectum of them,
scientia, &c. Now are but adjoyned to it, the anima his esse is not of their esse,
aut contra. Some are of opinion (as Scaliger) that the Angels and mens souls
esse, and agere, are the same, but then their actus should be perpetual: again
then they have no adjuncts, then no causes, then God, ergo, they have their
qualities. Again, it is a most sound, and sure argument that they are creatures,
not God, be∣cause they are finite, ergo, have causes, ergo, are effects, ergo,
have adjuncts.

Object. But how are these joyned to the soul? it hath two faculties; reason and
will, now the facul∣ties of the understanding are the intellectual vertues, when it
can promptly, and readily perform its act, as when it is prompt and ready in
inventing, then it is inteligentia, when it is prompt in seeking out truths, then it
is sci•ntia, when it is ready in discoursing, then it is sapientia, &c. so that these
intellectual vertues are habits of the faculty of reason, and lye in the
promptness of its act: so by vertues he meanes moral ve•tue, not intellectual,
and that is of the will. For when the will can promptly perform the act of
boun∣tifulness, or justice, then it is in like sort liberality, or justice, and so for
the rest, and the contrary makes 〈◊〉ergo, these are but adjuncts, quia praeter
essentiam accident, that is, these come over, and above the es∣s••ce. The soul is
tanquam tabula abrasa, and these vertues come afterward.

Page  135

Corpus sanitatis, morbi, roboris, infirmitatis; pul∣chritudinis, deformitatis.

The soul had his spiritual adjuncts, the body hath his proper adjuncts also, and
this definition of his teacheth us to look at the proper adjuncts of things. So
sanitas is a proper adjunct to the body, for there ariseth an 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 and a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and thence comes sanitas, and
morbus: robur ariseth principally from the bones and sinews, beauty ariseth
from the fresh∣ness of blood, and the analogie, and proportion of the parts, for
if there be comely visage, and not blood, it is not beauty, we call it good favour,
but not fair, but here it is opposed to deformity, and contains not onely well
favour, which stands in the symmetry of the parts one to another, which
belongs to Physick, but colour which belongs to blood.

Homo, subjectum est divitiarum, paupertatis, honoris, infamiae, vestitus, comitatus.

Here homo hath his adjuncts general both to soul, and body; now here we see
that subjects and ad∣juncts are not as the common Schools take them namely,
onely substances to be subjects, and acci∣dents adjuncts: for accidents may be
subjects, & contra, ergo, that distribution of ens into substantia, and accidens,
will not follow in any Art, but here, and they a•e special kinds of subjects and
ad∣juncts.

Locus est subjectum rei locatae.

Locus is a modus of subjectum, the Schools both ancient and of latter time have
maintained locus to belong to natural Philosophy, because (say they) it ariseth
from every thing in nature. Now first true it is, that there is nothing, but it is res
naturalis, even reason, speech, quantity, &c. are res naturales,

Page  136

and it doth not therefore follow because it is res na ∣turalis, ergo it belongs to
nature, for it is a meer af∣fection, and it is taken away, if we take away the
lo∣catum: and as causa may be no causa, effectum no effectum; so may locus be
no locus. Again, cannot things in Art be in place, as well as things in nature?
are not Angels finite and terminated? and locus, if we take it properly, is
nothing but subjectum rei loca ∣tae: as in causa there was the thing causa, as it
cau∣seth: so there is locus as there is the thing receiving: as when I say such a
one is in my chamber: here I consider my chamber not as it is in his building,
but as it is receiving him. Again, if it should not be in Logick, it should rather
be in Geometry than in Na∣ture, for limitation of place is next and immediately
from the limitation of quantity, and there we hear of locus, as there is repletio
loci: locus here is put for the space of that place, by a metonimy of subject for
the adjunct.

Est subjectum.

Here that which we heard of in adjuncts is res loca ∣ta: because it doth apply
that special kind of ad∣junct that answers to this subject locus. Now it is not
essential to the thing, ergo is but complemental: again, that which is now in one
place may remove to another place, ergo is not absolutely consenting to the
thing: and thus we see it must needs belong to Lo∣gick, as being but in respect:
they say onely corpus is in loco descriptive, and not spirits, they are but in ubi,
or in loco designatione: but what is this but a rule of Geometry? where we hear
of completio loci by corpus: and therefore Aristotle brings locus to quantity.
Then again they question whether the space that contains a thing be locus or no.

Page  137

Answ. Space belongs to nature, and is nothing but the measure that doth fill the
place, and is nothing but that quadrangula sex complent locum, or a pint will
receive a pint: and therefore to receive is to measure the space. I confess you
may name it in Na∣ture, but not define it.

Sic Philosophi divinis entibus, licet parte, & magnitu∣dine carentibus attribuunt locum.

So the Philosophers give place to the intelligences, whereas he making them to

move the heavens, saith they are on the superficies of them.

Licet parte, & magnitudine carentibus.

Here he speaks according to the common conceits in Schools, but I marvel how
he or any other can say so. Scaliger saith, they are in divine predicament of
quantity, but not in this gross predicament of quan∣tity, and they have a figure.
In what figure were Angels first created? An. In what figure was water first
made? they can take any figure as water can; but I think they were first made in
the figure of roundness. So Aristotle saith they were made as puncta. So is fire
round, for that is figura capacissima, ergo, perfectissima. I have thought also
that the Ark was made for all the world like a man, and there was the
proportion of length proportionable to a mans breadth, and the heighth
proportionable to a mans thickness. Now for the wanting of parts it is not so;
for Angels may be divided, though their parts be si∣mular: so are the elements
parts; and as some write, the wicked spirits may be struck, and so the Sun light;
but it will too quickly return into it self: and as the light may be divided, so
may they. And whereas they say, anima is tota in toto, and tota in qualibet
par ∣te, they wrong God, and the creature, for what is the

Page  138

reason? God can have no parts, ergo no causes; other things whatsoever must
needs have causes, ergo must have membra, ergo we cannot say they are all in
every part. Yes, the reasonable soul is in my little finger? Content, but is that
very portion of it that is in my head also in my little finger? There is a
dis∣continuance, and the same thing should be here, and not there, which is flat
contradiction: but God is not in this or that finger, but also between them. The
Papists absurdity appears notably in this, in that they will have Christs body to
be really in the Sacrament in the bread, and in heaven also, and yet not in the
air, but make a discontinuance: ergo it is in the bread, and not in the bread; in
heaven, and not in heaven; for if it is in heaven, there it is shut up, and so in the
bread.

Sic Geometrae locum, locique differentias in rebus geometricis.

That is, above, and below, angle, and base, &c.
At prius ignotum ferro quum scindimus aequor, &c.

Here he appoints several places to several things, and here locus is but
subjectum, and they adjuncta.

Sensilia sensuum, & res virtutibus, ac vitiis propo∣sitae, subjecta vitiorum, & virtutum hoc modo
nominantur.

Here are objecta, as the common Schools teach, because the sense is cast upon
them: so vertues and vices; though they have their subjects themselves in one
kind, yet here they are adjuncts, rebus virtutibus ac vitiis propositae. Now it is
a fallace of non subje∣ctum, when we give that to subjectum which is not
 subjectum. As Tully jested with Piso his little son, and said, who hath hanged
my son to yonder sword?

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Ejusmodi subjecto Cicero 2. Agrar. disputat, inter Campanos nullam contentionem esse, qui nullus sit
honor.

Non gloriae cupiditate (ait) afferebantur, &c.

Honour is the subject of ambition; the Campani had no honour among them,
ergo no ambition: where there is no honour there is no ambition, but inter
Campanos there is no honour, ergo no ambition. Here the proposition contains
the subject, and adjunct, and by removing the subject, he removes the ad∣junct.

Eodem argumento a Propertio dictum est.

Navita de ventis, de tauris narrat Arator, &c.

The Mariner he tels of the winds whereabout he is occupied, and vulnera are
adjuncts to Souldi∣ers; yet here as he talks of them he is adjunctum: and thus
have we heard of the first complement of a thing, namely, to be a subject, or to
have a subject.

CHAP. XI.

De adjuncto.

Adjunctum est, cui aliquid subjicitur: quod argu∣mentum etsi subjecto est
levius, attamen est copio∣sius & frequentius.

NOw we come to adjuncts, which are after sub∣jectum, and because subjectum
and adjunctum have divers natures, ergo they must be taught distinct∣ly, and in
distinct Chapters; now therefore we come to adjunctum, which is the outmost
thing, and it is

Page  140

called adjunctum, because it is adjoyned to the thing, and it is put to another

thing after it hath its being. Now there is nothing in the world, but may be a
cause, an effect, a subject or adjunct; and therefore Logick is general of 〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉: but in that he tels us, that it is but adjoyned, he tels us that
it doth agree but quodam modo, that is, conditionally; but many ad∣juncts be
removed from their subjects, sith their cau∣ses are in them.

Answ. Sure there may be an alteration of them by the hinderance of the act of
the form upon the matter, or the act externally. So the Adamant stone if we put
but the juyce of garlick upon it, it will not draw iron unto it. Again, the causes
may be altered in the subject, ergo the adjunct may be removed, ergo it is but
argumentum modo quodam consentaneum, and not absolute requisitum.
Cui.
Because any thing whatsoever may have the respect of an adjunct, as any thing
may be a cause.

Aliquid.

That is, that that is propounded, or that which we are to argue, or that that is
argued, so that that which the adjunct is adjoyned to, is subjectum.

subjicitur.

Adjunctum doth presently tell me, that there is some thing cui aliquid
adjungitur: he rather sayes subjicitur than adjungitur, because adjunctum hath
re∣ference to subjectum, and it is better to define them from the relation
between them, then a comparatis; because relats are mutual causes one of
another. Now here he shews that the adjunct is that that is builded upon the
subject: and as the subject did presuppose a thing already made, but must
support another thing;

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so adjunctum tels me it is a thing already made, but must lye upon the subject:
subjectum signifies a sup∣porter, or a suppository as it were: adjunctum, that is
more common than subjectum, and subjectum lyes alway under; but adjunctum
it may either lye over, or under, or be tacked to either side, yet it will fall off,
unless it be nailed, or adjoyned to the subject. Now that which tacks it to the
subject is that affection which it hath to subjectum, every thing will not be an
adjunct to every thing, nor every thing a subject to every thing. Salomon saith,
if we bray a fool in a morter, as wheat is brayed, he will not be wise: the reason
is, for that his spirits are so dry, dull and earthy. Now wisdom hath so fine a
hand, as that she cannot take hold of such hard things, but they will hurt it, so
that it cannot be subjectum or adjunctum to any thing: and this shews that
Logick is in the things in nature, and not in mans brain onely. So this rule wils
us to look how subjectum is able to support the adjunct, and when he sees how
God hath done them for him, to use them to his turn. Again, this rule is of great
use to see how things are tacked together in nature, so as the one being taken
away the other will remain entire: then again, though the adjunct in nature
can∣not be severed from the subject, yet by my eye of Lo∣gick I can sever them.

Quod argumento etsi sub: est levius, attamen est copio∣sius, & frequentius.

Our Author doth commorari, and tels us with very good reason, that the adjunct
is more light to press the subject than contra.

Object. But this might have been before, if it be copiosius and frequentius; now
he teacheth argu∣ments according to their more strong manner of ar∣guing;

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and subjectus is fortius, for because the cau∣ses of the adjuncts are in the
subject, you may not therefore easily remove the subject, but you will de∣stroy
the adjunct, nor contra: yet some adjuncts may be taken away; and yet take
away any adjunct, and there will be some imperfection in the thing: so that
adjunctum will be levius, if we weigh them in a pair of ballance: which appears
many wayes: as if Mr. Fanshaw be at London, his servants are there: this is
more strong arguing than to say contra. Sub∣jectum est fortius, because it is by
nature before, and the adjunct is eatenus adjunctum, as it lies on the subject.

Attamen est copiosius, & frequentius.

For one adjunct can have but possibly one sub∣ject, but one subject may have
an hundred adjuncts: now such a kind of copiousness or frequentity, doth not
make the adjunct more general than the subject, in respect the subject is of
more strength for the su∣stentation of the adjunct, than contra: and as it is more
copius, so frequentius, that is, more often in com∣mon use, because it is of all
arguments most familiar to men, even men unlearned: for the inmost thing is
the efficient, then the matter, then the form, then the end, then the effect, then
the subject, and lastly the adjunct, ergo because it is so plain as that a plain man
may see, ergo it is frequentius.

Itaque de ejusmodi signis ait Ovidius 2. de remedio.

He illustrates this by Ovids testimony, which said as much, Forsitan haec

aliquis, &c. meaning of signes: Sunt parva, because these are common
qualities, which may be in divers things: so that one will not argue so strongly:
multa juvant, that is where there is a concourse of many together,

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there is as it were a description, which argues strong∣ly.

Animi corporis que & totius hominis bona, & mala, quae dicuntur adjuncta sunt animi; corporis,
hominis.

As he hath shewed before, anima, &c. to be sub∣jects, so here he shews virtus,

vitium, &c. to be ad∣juncts: now he takes them bona & mala, because there are
tria genera honorum, namely, of the soul, of the body, and of man, so contra,
tria genera ma ∣lorum.

Denique quic quam ulli subjecto extrinsecus accidit adjunctum ejus est.

Again, here is another modus of adjunctum quic∣quid extrinsecus accidit, that

is, comes unto it not as causes, effects, or subjects, but as it were adjoyned to it
accidentally, ergo he saith extrinsecus: for it was not our Authors mind that
qualities were from with∣in, though of necessity they must be.

Ʋt •utem locus est in subjectis, sic tempus est in adjunctis.

That locus we heard of before was subjectum, and because it was a general
affection, ergo it belongeth to Logick, and it was nothing but the application of
a continet, to a contained: so time is nothing but the application of one thing to
another thing; as when I say he came on munday, or at three of the clock, that is
not time, but the adjunct of time: and here is the application of the course of
primum mobile, or of the Clock to his act: it is duratio, the meting of a thing.
Time may well be compared to a line; and as fluxus punctum is linea, so fluxus
nunc is tempus: he went in the turning of a hand, that is, whilest one might
have turned his hand: so that I measure it by the du∣rance,
 Page  144

not by his length, or Geometry.

Rei.

For Logick is rei: and as causa is res, so tempus est res, or duratiorei, that is of
the subject praesens, praete∣rita, & futura: here he doth distribute this time, to
shew that this distribution of time belongeth to Logick, and not to any other
Art. Much descanting there is about time among other Logicians, which teach
that it hath a double respect, one to the thing measured, and so it is properly
time, another to the thing measuring, and that is not time, but as one is
measuring it: now for the logical notion of time it is all one whether it be active
or passive, and it is one and the same thing diversly respected, and be∣cause
active and passive go alwayes together, ergo, the time must needs be general to
both; praeterita, praesens and futura. So for things that are subject to our
Logick are divided into past, present and to come, for onely God is not subject
to time, because he is eternal, ergo is omne non esse ante post, neither can we
say be is now if we respect time, for what should measure him, should primum
mobile, or day and night? no, so that though he be at all times according to our
Logick, yet he is with out respect of time at all times, for time is not eternal,
ergo not omne non esse ante post. And Grammar, which is the garment of
Logick, doth speak by the verb of time past, present, and to come; now we give
it in Grammar to verbs, not but that it may be given to every thing, as well as to
actions, and passions, but that we deliver it actively or pas∣sively.

Again, primum mobile which God hath made a com∣mon globe to all the world,
and is measured accord∣ing to praeterita, praesens, and futura, ergo, time is in

Page  145

every thing, and Angels, and mens souls are without respect of primum mobile,
and day and night: be∣cause they are beyond them, but they are not with∣out
duration passive, because they were made crea∣tures by God: so that though
their tempus be called avum, yet is it this tempus.

Object. May praeteritum being past be said to be? no, if we respect pr•sens, for
they are as we see here distinct things, but if we respect the thing, it is, yet not
in time, but in its essence: how in it essence? not as it doth existere in rerum
natura, but as it is in a rule, that is external: so that though Socrates now be
not, yet this axiome Socrates est homo is now, and will be to the worlds end: so
praeteritum, praesens, and futurum all of them are, for we do not respect the
adsignification of time, but look at the argument as it is a being: so that time
future is a true thing, though the time be not yet come: and that duratio past,
present, and to come are, because the thing still is: so that time is an adjunct.
But here as lo∣cus must be a thing with that affection of recei∣ving, so time must
be a thing with this affection of measuring,

Omninoque qualitates subjectis praeter causas adiunctae, &c.

Again, another modus of adiunctum is called qua ∣litates, which is adjoyned to

this, or that, not being causes, here comes in their predicament of qualitas, and
qualitas is no genus of any thing, ergo, that di∣stinction of qualitas to be
naturalis, or moralis is not at all, but a special use of a thing that is taught in a
general Art, for qualitas is but a logical term, and as adiunctum is genus to
them, so is qualitas. Every ex∣ample is infima species in Logick: so that calor is

Page  146

an adjunct to fire, and when I have said so, I have con∣sidered the logical
respect, and no more.
Praeter causas.

We have heard that there can be nothing but must have causes: and so the
existere of a thing is from the esses that the causes give, and then the adjuncts
come over, and above the thing. Now qualities are of two sorts, proper and
common, these are but speci∣al modi of these qualities: they may be proper,
be∣cause they argue at proper, common because they ar∣gue at common, or at
random, as we say. Now what∣soever hath affection to argue, that belongs to
Lo∣gick, ergo, these, because they have affection to argue, rather as modi, that
as adiuncts; as modi efficientis before. So therefore they are distingushed thus
So risus doth argue homo, not so much in regard of his adiunctity as of its
property. Now qualitates propriae have these properties with them, conveniunt
they come together with the subiect, and are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 with the
whole, and afterward with the parts, ergo, he sa•th well conveniunt.

Omni.

This is somewhat hard, for omni non dicitur de uno, aut de duobus, but tria
simul omnia, that is, three will make an omne; and our Author teacheth in
iudge∣ment, that a special axiom is quando consequens non om∣ni, and there it
may be of one or two: but here it must be taken more general for one or two,
&c. but because the Schools thought properties convenire om∣ni speciei onely,
and thought that individua had no properties, as they also thought that forma
was onely speciebus, and individua were distinguished accidenti∣bus. But our
Logick teacheth that every thing hath a form, and therefore hath properties, for
commonly

Page  147

properties arise from the form, ergo, he saith, con∣veniunt omni, whether it be
omni speciei, omni indi∣viduo.

Soli.

Soli shuts out all others, else it is not a property.

Semper.

So that if they agree omni, and non soli, or soli and non omni, or omni and soli,
sed non semper, semper sed non omni & soli, they are no properties, ergo, a
proper∣ty doth argue with this vertue, that it argues omni, so∣li, and semper; and
so it is meet, because they will come into Art, and will make a rule 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉, for this it is, every Art ought to deliver the causes, qua∣lities,
and act of a thing; for so there is in nature first the thing, then the qualities, or
faculties, then the act which points out the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: so that if
one would make an Art of homo that part of natural Philosophy, he must speak
of risus, because he doth some thing in nature by vertue of that quality: so heat,
and cold, first agree to elementum calidum and frigidum, and af∣terwards to the
species, not by the immediate acts of their forms upon their matter, but by the
common acts of fire, and agree to produce heat, and water and earth to produce
cold.

Ʋt homini risus aequo hinnitus, cani latratus, &c.

He meanes the faculty, not the act: so neighing to a Horse: every beast hath his
peculiar voyce though we cannot discern it so well. Common adiuncts are such
as agree to that which is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but is first in the parts,
and then in the general, as learning first agrees to Socrates, Plato, &c. and then
to man, and this is the difference between proper and common adiuncts, the
proper adiuncts agree first to the generals, and then to the singulars. The
com∣mon

Page  148

agree first to the singulars, and then to the gene∣rals.

Hoc genere argumenti Faunium Chaeriam, Cicero pro Roscio Comaedo cavillatur. Nonne ipsum
caput, & supercilia illa penitus abrasa, &c.

He had not an hair, for he shaved them off, ergo, he reasons from thence, that
he was a knave, and it may be true, because they are hot headed that are bald,
this is a new modus, and he reasons from signes, which are common qualities,
they do not agree omni, soli, and semper, and yet a knave doth omni soli, and
semper commonly.
Sic Martialis 2. lib. Zoilum ludit. Crine ruber, niger ore, brevis pede, lumine luscus, &c.

The cause of these not making a good man is this, the cause of a red head is
colour, ergo, there is much heat, and where there is much heat there will be
much fancy, and where there is much fancy, there will be much iuggling. Niger
ore that comes from melan∣choly, that lies in the muscles about the mouth;
bre∣vis pede, that may have some reason with it, for such a one will go apace;
lumine luseus, for when a man thinks he looks on him then he looks asquint,
and when one would think he looks asquint, then he looks on him.

Siv vestitus, & comitatus res adiunctae sunt, quo circumstantiae genere Dido, &c.

Oecan•m intera surgens aurorarelinquit &c.

So that not onely accidents, but substances may be adiuncts; a man may be an
adiunct as he is a servant. So Dido going a hunting is argued first from the time
a•rora, then the attendance of young men, then their hunting instruments, &c.

Page  149
 Est vero adi•nctorum ad subiecta quibus occu∣pantur usus item magnus.

There is another kind of adiunct, which are occu∣pantia, as we heard before of

subicta occupata. So Plato proves that those Cities are m•serable, which want
Physitians, and Judges, quia multa quoque & int•mperantiam, & iniustitiam in
ea civitate versari necesse est.
Sed consentaneorum categoria sic est, unde quidvis alteri consentane•m vel id•m, vel un•m di•i possit.

We have now seen both what goes to the esse, and bene esse of a thing; now he
cals it categoria the ar∣guing, categeria signifies to plead against, and they that
gave it that name first to argue, did discern truth by the contrary, which is
borrowed from the Law∣yers: and we know when we would see a thing, that if
we take the contrary, it will make it mag is illucesce∣re: afterward it came to
signifie not that gain-saying one of another, but one mans pleading alone for his
client, then it came to signifie the arguments that he used in his speech for his
client: and lastly, it came to signifie any argument, and thence comes
argumen∣tum, the predicaments are called so, namely categoria, and so
← Ramus  → would have us consider every argu∣ment to be a predicament.

Id•m vel unum.

Moreover he doth commorari a while telling us that id m and unum, as the

Aristotelians teach are nothing but these consentanie arguments: so id m genere
doth arise from idem causa: so gemelli are idem tempore, that is adiuncto: so
all modi of theirs arise from hence tanqu•m a primis, & simplicibus fontibus.
We shall hear of idem genere, and idem specie, and idem i•divid•o, as if he
should say, but all of them,

Page  150

huc sunt tanquam ad primos, & simplices fontes refe∣rendi.

CHAP. XII.

De diversis. Argumentum primum consentaneum expo∣situm est, &c.

VVE have heard of consentaneum, and why he should put in primum rather
than simplex I see not, for if he meant to have repeated them, he should have
put in all, ergo primum would be put out, now the use of a transition is to hang
things toge∣ther, when the one part is newly gone before, as it were half
forgotten, then we must have an imperfect tran∣sition, otherwise a perfect one:
this method obser∣ved for memories sake: now it remains that we con∣sider
what the thing is not, and thus we go orderly to work. Before, we saw what
went to a thing, for the making of it up: now we cannot well see what a thing is
not, till we see what it is, for nonens is seen gratiaentis: now this respect
ariseth not by way of argument: but by seeing what it was.

Dissentaneum sequitur.

This is opposite to consentaneum: sentio is general to them both, seutire is

taken for intelligere, consentire is said of things that have the same iudgement,
mind and reason; dissentanies are of them that have not the same judgement,
ergo, seem to have no reason in them in respect of consentanies, ergo, Aristotle
deny∣ed diss•ntanie arguments and made them fol∣low.

Page  151

Sequitur, ergo, it is by nature after, second∣ly, it is next to consentanies because

they are simple arguments.

Quod a re dissentis.

That differs from the thing it argues, are still ge∣neral: so that because the
creatures of God are dis∣creet, and many, ergo, there is dissention, and because
reason was made to behold the creatures of God, er ∣go, it was necessary that
they should be handled in Logick.

Sunt autem dissentanea.

Here he cals them dissentanea in the plural number, for that which was res
before, is become dissentaneum, as it hath a dissentany to argue it, secondly,
because here dissention agrees to them both as they are com∣pared together.

Aeque manifesta

Here dissentanies are made paria, arguing equally for manifestation, qua aequa
manifesta, ergo, this pro∣perty contains thus much, that one dissentanie is not
before another, for the manifesting of it, as causa was before effectum, &c. Is
not invention before judgment, and they are opposite? Ans. True for doctrine,
but in∣vention doth not clear judgement more, nor contra.

Alterumque ab altero aequaliter arguitur.

As there was not a priority, and posteriority, so they have equal force to argue,
contrary to consenta∣nies; so that manifestation is for the clearing of them, and
arguing because they have the same doctrine, but then what use of them.

Tame• si sua dissensione, clarius elucescant.

Here it is, why they come principally into Logick, as black is not so black till it
be set by white, &c. ma ∣gis carendo quam fruendo, we see things, for when we

Page  152

have a thing, and see not the privation of it, we make not much reckoning of it,
sua dissentione, this is a dis∣cretion from the other prop•rties: so then we see
why a contrary makes a contrary most clear, namely this, ergo, when we would
shew a thing that is obscure, we shew it by a contrary, quia sua dissentione
clarius elucescant.

Hitherto of the properties, which would not be in consentanies, for one was
more manifest, ergo, before another, and more strongly arguing. Dissentanea in
the plural number, because one argument serves for them both, ergo, one name,
and because they a•e e∣qually manifest: again, to set one before another is to
say it is stronger than the other. Again, they would not be aeque manifesta.
Sunt diversa, vel opp•sita.

We are to look at the dissention of things, now there is a more weak and a more
strong dissention, the one turn but a little aside, others turn clean back, and are
foes, ergo, accordingly doth he divide these: now remember it is ens, as ens
that Logick considers, and many times it fals out, that one thing might be taken
for another, but for diversity, and commonly our di∣stinctions are diversa.
Diversa is a more light dis∣sention, and opposites contain them: so that diversa
will give great light to opposita, but not contra, ergo, diversa are before.
Diversa a divertendo, of turning a side, because they agree one with another
common∣ly in dissention, onely they divert a little the one from the other, and
this is it that the name commends unto us: they may agree in nature, but are
made to divert ratione, ratio we know belongs to Logick, and it is the same
with argumentum: so that he means they differ but only in some logical respect:
they are the subtlest

Page  153

of all arguments, because of their little dissention. Sola ratione, ergo, they do
not of necessity make a de∣nyed axiom:

Quo de genere sunt illa frequentissima. Non hoc sed illud: quanquam, tamen.

This is not a rule of Art but a commoration, as if he should say, these arguments
have not been in Schools before, but I have observed them by my ex∣perience,
and then again they are subtil, ergo, I will help you, when you find, ergo, these
notes commonly commend unto you diversa: so forma, and facundia are made
to disagree in their adjunctive nature in respect of Ʋlisses: so that they differ
not in their nature, but onely in logical respect, as if he should say they may
both be adjuncts to one subject, but yet dif∣fer in Ʋlysses.

Priamus was ready to perish, and yet with-held not his hands, a man perishing
should hold his hands, but Priamus did not: so that causa, and effectum which
might consent are here diversa, not in respect of Pria ∣mus, but of themselves.

Paula secus in Eunucho.

He means there is a difference of modus. Suppose I be worthy of this reproach,

yet thou shouldest not tell me of it, here is subjectum and adjunctum, the
di∣versity is in respect of the cause, they are diversa in respect of him that
offered it.

Item alia aliusmodi.

Scelus tu illud vocas Tubero. Here is a little dif∣ference too, this fact was called
scelus by Tubero, Tully tels him, others gave it other names, alii enim errorem
appellant, alii timorem, &c. but no man besides thee call it scelus. Here these
names are made divers in respect of him that called it scelus: as if he should

Page  154
 say, call it any of the rest, but call it not scelus, and thus we have heard diversa.
If I say though he be rich or poor, yet he is honest here is a diversity, for so a
discreet axiom may be affirmed: they are divers, because riches commonly
make unhonest, and also poverty: so we may make diversity between the cause
and effect, or in giving many causes to one ef∣fect, aut contra, or one subject to
an adjunct, aut con∣tra, or many subjects to one adjunct, aut contra, and
according to these wayes also, there may be several modi thereof.

CHAP. XIII.

De disperatis. Opposita sunt dissentanea, que ratione, & re dissentiunt.

IN looking at things we first see the causes that give esse, then the
complements, that give bene esse to the thing, then we see what it is not, and
easily do by seeing them arguments that give esse: and first we are to see the
diversity, which though they be con∣formable, yet they do divert somewhat one
from ano∣ther, and they are first, because they give light to all the rest that
follow. Now we come to see their opposition, that is, those things which have
their causes, effects, subjects and adjuncts, are not onely dissenting in a logical
respect, but are distinct reals. Opposita, gain sets, it cometh of ob and pono, as
it were set against: ob is as it were a bolt to bar one thing from another: so that
their nature is to be barred,

Page  155

not onely ratione, but it is principally in their realty, and herein do diversa
differ from opposites. Diversa are made to disagree in that wherein they might
a∣gree, whereas opposites dissent in their nature.

Sunt dissentanea.

We heard they were called dissentanea by reason of their disagreeing, they do

not sentire idem, but quot capita, tot sensus sunt among them, whereas
consentanies are of the same judgement, and these names do well fit arguments,
because they are as it were the senses of things. Dissentanea that is, such as
think asunder, are severed, and distract our thoughts.

Que ratione, & re dissentiunt.

Ratione, that is, as diversa did, because they do not onely disagree quatenus
argumenta, that is, as they have logical respect in them, but quatenus they are
res, as black is not white, they are opposites, and there is a barre that black
cannot be white, & con∣tra, which opposition is in their dissention, be∣ing clean
of another judgement: so that there is dis∣sention betwixt them in sensu nostro
in beholding of them.
Re.

As if we say black is not white, we say not one∣ly, that black is not the cause,
not the effect, sub∣ject, or adjunct of white, but that they are divers things in
nature, ergo, this must be observed, that the bar is not onely the bar of rational
respect, but of reality.

Itaque eidem attribui secundum idem, & ad idem, &c.

Surely if they be bar'd from coming one at ano∣ther, and that in nature, then non
possunt eidem attri∣bui.

Page  156

As first when I say blackness is not whiteness: and again when as I say
blackness and whiteness can∣not be given to the same subject: here the one
dissen∣tion is in essence, the other is in accident, ergo this idem must be
understood of the essence it self, and likewise the subject. Non possunt takes
away all pos∣sibility of joyning in one, ergo, whatsoever make• them consent,
breaks this rule, for whereas this rule saith, sunt dissentanea, they make them
consentanea, and again, whereas this rule saith, non possunt eidem attribui,
they say, they may.

Attribui.

The attribute is alwayes the consequent part of the axiom: so that if we give
them to subjects, they cannot be given to one and the same subject: they may
be the consequent, but not the antecedent part: so that contraries must be
attributed, for when I say homo est animal, aut brutum, I give them both to
ani∣mal, but not eidem. Now antecedent contraries will have contrary
consequents, est enim par ratio, now they do dissentire ratione, & re, ergo,
cannot any wayes be consentanies, ergo, cannot be made by any means to
agree.

Secundum idem.

According to the same, divers think this is put in in respect of relates, because
of the example that fol∣lows, pater & filius ejusdem: but it hath a more ge∣neral
respect of opposites in their whole nature: else it should have been taught more
specially in the do∣ctrine of relates. Now two contraries may be given eidem,
but not secundum idem, & adidem, & eodem tempore: eidem, that is, eidem
genere, not eidem specie, as a man may be well, and a man may be sick, but not
the same man: so that secundum idem hath respect

Page  157

to the same individuality as it were, or species: so homo may be aeger and

sanus, but not secundum idem, for that identity cannot be: now ratio is given
homi∣ni secundum idem, for herein omnis homo est idem, & ad idem, still there
is idem, for if we consider them not about idem, they are not opposites: then
again there must be the same respect: and also ad idem, that is the very same
point, for whiteness in the wall, and white∣ness in my hand, are neither
attributed eidem, nor secundum idem; eodem tempore; for if they be diver ∣sis
temporibus, then they may both agree eidem, as ho∣mo nunc sedens potest
deinceps ambulare: so all these respects came from being dissentanea ratione,
& re: so that all these must be respected: so that black and white in general are
not opposites, but as they are considered in their dissenting and opposite nature:
so that this is the true nature of opposites. If ex indocto fit doctus, here is a
difference of time, and by this rule we may answer almost all the fallations that
are made: that fallation a divisione is from hence, therefore this is a
consequution from the definition going before, and principally from the word
re. Sic Socrates albus & ater eadem parte esse non potest.

Itaque ex altero affirmato alterum negatur, & e contra.

Et e contra follows from hence, for ← Ramus  → left it in his edition, and if
econtra be not put in, the rule is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for if we have an
example where ex altero negato alterum affirmatur, that hath otherwise no rule
here, ergo we must say & e contra, for they that leave it out, as most have done
since ← Ramus  → , here is their mistaking, because they think it is not a
neces∣sary consequution, but contingent. Now ← Ramus  →

Page  158

doth not teach us consequution that belongs to syllo∣gisms, but arguments use,
& if it be but contingently true, yet it may belong to Logick, as well, as if it
were necessary: and it is very common in speech to say, it is not this, or that,
but another thing: again the mea∣ning of these two is this, ex altero affirmato
alterum negatur, that is, they both cannot be affirmed, for he teacheth invention
here, and not judgement, & e con∣tra, that is, they cannot be both denied. They
may be both denied, as a stone is not vertuous or vitious, are these opposites?
yes by our rule, if & e contra be left out, but here they are neither of them
attributed: so that I do not mean negation in an axiom, but the not giving of
them to a thing, if both arguments be denied, they may be paria, as when I say,
if it be not Thomas, it is not William, as if I should say, it is as much reason it
should not be Thomas, as not William: so also if both be affirmed they may be
paria, as when I say it may be Thomas as well as William, for all is one for that,
and thus we must look at all these con∣sectaries, because most fallaces are from
hence, and they are very subtle.

Opposita sunt disparata, aut contraia.

They are of two sorts, that are barred disparates, that is unmatchable, or
contraries such as are directly set one against the other, now the disparates are
when the sides are not matching one another, for there is more against one, ne
Hercules quidem con∣tra duos, ergo, here the fight is not so violent, but the
duellio is more strong, so that according to this opposition of things in nature
must our Logick proceed.

Disparata sunt opposita.

Disparata are first because they will give light to

Page  159

the stronger dissention, as being contained in it: these destroy one another, but
not with that violence and force that contraries do, they are called disparata,
because here is impar congressus, and they are un∣matchable: but contraries are
well matched striking down right blows, whereas disparates steal one be∣hind
another. Sunt opposita, that is, dissenting re & ratione.

Quorum unum mult is pariter opponitur.

Here first unum opponitur multis, and then par oppo∣nitur to every one of them,
and not unum uni: now that we may see it more throughly, this it is, whereas a
thing is said not to be another thing, with the same reason that it may be said
not to be a third, or a fourth, &c. that is, unum multis, and again opposed
toge∣ther, and that we may see this more particularly, here is the reason
disparates are alwayes under some more remote genus, whereas contraries will
come un∣der one next head, be it genus or what it will be, and that is the reason
why they are unum multis, and pariter.

Object. Why doth he say unum mult is rather than multa multis? for sometimes
there are multa mul∣tis.

Answ. First, because when there are multa mul∣tis, there is one more especially
opposed to all the rest, then any of the other, ergo, he saith unum multis:
se∣condly, because where there are multa multis, there is unum multis: thirdly,
because in use we find unum opposed multis more frequent than multa multis.
Homo is opposed to brutum as unum uni, but to Leo, and equus, as unum
multis; again, he is opposed to brutum as Leo, and equus, as unum multis, but
not pa ∣riter, Pariter alike, that is, there is not another kind of

Page  160

argument, when homo is opposed to Leo, then when he is opposed to equus,

and here we may see that if opposites be onely of two branches, then are they
not disparates: then again, if they be of two sides onely then are they contraries,
ergo, if there be any di∣stribution in Art where the parts are not opposed one to
one, there will be a genus lost.

Ʋnum multis.

He doth not mean alwayes in use, as if one dispa∣rate might not argue another,
but he meanes as they are in nature, ut viridum, cinereum, rubrum, &c. are
disparates.

Quae singula extremis, & inter se disparata sunt.

For colour is simplex, aut mistus, simplex is white and black, mistus the other
colours, so that these come not under the next genus, sic liberalitas, & avaritia
inter se disparantur: because prodigality may be where these are not, habit is
vertue, or vice, vertue is this, or that, or liberality: vice is avaritia, or
pro∣digalitas, so that these are unum multis, that is, not having one next genus,
but a more remote genus of opposites, and avaritia, and prodigalitas are
opposite in vice to liberality, and here is many to one, and a like.

Virgilius 1. Aeneidos. O quam te memorem virgo: namque haud tibi vul∣tus, &c.

She is a Goddess, or a Virgin, she might have been a third, but he lookes not at
that. Not a wo∣man, for she had not the countenance of a woman: again not a
woman, for nec vox hominem sonat: ergo, Dea, and thus we see how one thing
is not another.

Page  161
CHAP. XIV.

De relatis. Contraria sunt opposita, quorum unum uni tan∣tum opponitur.

VVE have heard of a thing in his essence, and in his complements, and so also
we have seen it is not, for that if it be declining but in a respect, it is a divers; if
it decline re, then it is an opposite: a divers when it is considered with another
thing in a∣greement, yet still severed in respect: and again when one thing is not
another, by common opposition, that it makes with another, that is a disparate:
then again it is a contrary by some peculiar nature in him direct∣ly against some
other thing: so in a man we consi∣der his causes, flesh, nerves, sinews, bones,
&c. then his complements, then we respect him as one divert∣ing, or turning a
side from another thing: then we look at his common nature whereby he is
opposed to many things at once in the same nature, and so he is a disparate: a
divers he is, as when I say, though a man was there, yet his horse was there
also: again there is that whereunto he is opposed directly, as he is not brutum:
and so he is a contrary. Now though there was not in one thing any thing to
make it more plain, yet set them together, and the one will make the other more
manifest, therefore this opposition is either where one fighteth against many;
and these are disparates, or where the fight is more strong, and those are called
contraries.

Contraria, by reason here is but one to one, ergo

Page  162

these stand contra, that is face to face, when one did fight with many, some
stood aside, some behind, but these face one another, so that if the one turn
away, the other will turn to him again. Sunt opposita, that is, they have bars in
their nature, namely ratio and res.

Quorum unum uni tantum opponitur.

So that this battle is a duellio, a battle of one against one, and so they fight, that
the one things force is benr onely against the force of the other thing. Ʋnum uni
tantum, for disparates may be unum uni, but not tantum, unum uni because they
come to communi∣cate in one next nature, as homo and brutum in ani∣mal; or
else the one so denies the other, that it takes away the entity of the thing
affirmed. Ʋni; but we shall hear afterward that contraria negantia are no∣thing
in themselves.

Answ. They are something gratia entis, and our reason gives something to it,
and apprehends it as some thing in respect of the contrary, and here we may see
the force of our reason that can make of no∣thing something. Now something is
made of no∣thing divers wayes, first by our reason, secondly, by our fancie, or
by the hallusination of the eye. Lo∣gick makes onely two kinds of nothings, the
contra∣dicent, and the privant. Homo is a contrary to bru∣tum, but to Leo and
equus he is a disparate, because 〈◊〉 is opposed to equus in the same nature that
he is op∣posed to Leo.

Contraria sunt affirmantia, vel negantia.

This distribution of contraries runs on, as the for∣mer did, for as the least
dissention began first: so we still proceed to the greater: now by affirmantia and
negantia, he means things positive, or privative, for

Page  163

there is either a thing opposed to a thing, or a thing opposed to nothing, and the
fight between something and nothing is stronger than the former: for when one
thing fights with another thing, then let them fight as long as they will, or can,
yet they leave some∣thing behind them, but the other leaves nothing at all: so
that contraries are where both are things in na∣ture, or where the one is nothing,
and are called ne∣gantia of the later part: as the other are called of both parts
affirmantio.

Affirmantia, as if he should say, they are things in nature, or things positive, as a

Father, a child, &c.

Affirmantia quorum utrumque affirmat, &c.

He doth not say affirmatur, but affirmat, be∣cause he would willingly describe
them from their act, for he would deliver the nature of the arguments, ut relata
& adversa. There is likewise among these a difference of contrariety, for there
are some affir ∣mantia that may be reconciled, and •••e to agree, there be some
also that will 〈…〉•gree, but perpetuo adversantur. The 〈◊〉 if you set them face
to face will be 〈…〉•riends, but set them back to back, and 〈…〉 be foes: but set
them adversa how you 〈◊〉, and they will be foes: so then relates have not so
strong a fight betwixt them as adversa. Now they are called relates by reason of
a certain reference they have one to another continually, yea indeed they are by
reason of their reference, for the causes of the one relate are in his correlate, for
the cause of the fa∣thers relation is not in him, but he receives his whole relative
being from the correlate: so that in Divinity we know there is nothing added to
the Godhead by giving to it the persons mutually. Sunt contra, here is

Page  164

one to one, for though a father have many children, yet the relation is but one,
namely, betwixt father-hood, and son-hood; and though many stand on the one
side, yet there is but one relation: so in the high mystery of the Trinity, there is
a double relation, first between the Father, and the Son; secondly be∣tween the
Father and the Son on the one side, and the holy Ghost on the other side. So
when I say Aristotle est discipulus Platonis, these are relates, yet when I say
Aristotle est discipulus, this is subjectum and adjunctum: so cousen and cousen
are relates, if we respect the relative quality, and not the men. Now that term of
relates is used confusedly, as we say he is his father, meaning his procreant
cause, quo∣rum alterum constat.

Quorum alterum constat e mutua, &c.

Constare is to stand together of causes, e mutua alterius affectione, so that

these relates have not their causes from the thing in whom they are, but from
their correlates: as when I define a husband to be him that hath a wife, or a wife
to be her that hath a husband; these are definitions e relatis, and so e cau∣sis.
But what causes do relates contain? all the causes, both efficient, matter, form
and end. E mutua, e is a sign of the effect, quod e causis existit: so that this is
their nature.
Atque inde nominande sunt relata.

They are called relates in regard of the reference they have one to another: so
that we may here see what relates are, and how they belong hither: they that
think all arguments are relates, why they are so, as the cause, and effect, &c.
but so I cannot call them species of argumentum consentaneum, for here they
are examples, ergo, lowest of all. Again, if I say argu∣mentum

Page  165

est artificiale aut inartificiale, and so go on, thinking that all these are genera to
causa and effectum, I deceive my self as they are relates; but if all arguments
should be relates, as the argu∣ments are taught in Logick, then all the examples
of all arguments should be relates, as God, and the world: but when I make
them relates, I analyse Lo∣gick even as I make the definition of Dialectica an
ex∣ample of definitio, so that (as I say) if relation were a common affection to
all arguments, all examples also should be relates, which they are not; again, if
cau∣sa and effectum were relates, then they must be toge∣ther, for relates must
be simul natura, ergo, this is fal∣lacia accidentis, they thought the words of Art
(as they call them) were relates, ergo, the doctrine of relates must go generally
with all arguments. We know again that the causes, efficient, matter, form, and
end, and the effect are distinct things, and do not constare e mutua alterius
affectione, ergo, are not re∣lates: again, causa est cujus vi res est, and the effect
quod e causis existit. Now each relate contains the effi∣cient, matter, form and
end of his fellow, ergo, if they should be taught generally, then in the efficient
alone, in the matter alone, in the form alone, and in the end alone there should
be all the causes. Some would have relates taught as consentanie arguments,
because they do agree; it is true, but they do disagree also, and if they should be
taught in consentanies, their dissentio also should be taught there, or else they
should make a double doctrine of one thing, and this kind of teaching had been
a posteriore; again, where should they have been taught? they are mutual
cau∣ses, ergo, not causa and effectum, but both causes and effects: again, the
doctrine of causa efficiens, materia,

Page  166

forma, and finis are distinct: here they are confoun∣ded together in one. Now
the Aristotelians have a predicament of relates, and have also their series, but
their gradus of them will not stand, for relates have no species, but are lowest
save onely examples: and they go clean out, and say relates are of this nature,
or that nature, as if they should say relates whose species are in this Art, or in
that Art. As in Oecono∣mie in a family they are free, or bound, free husband,
and wife, bound children, and servants, &c. but now the husband and wife are
not relates, because the bound, and free are relates: all these are special
ex∣amples of relates containing nothing under them, so that relates cannot
possibly be a predicament accor∣ding to their own doctrine, no more than causa
and effectum, and by that course that they take, I can prove that Socrates est
genus in going backward, and saying he is substantia, he is genus, &c. Now
because the whole relation stands in their mutual causation, for that cause they
are called relates.

Ʋt pater qui filium habet, &c.

So we say, is he such a mans son? here is a metonimy of the adjunct for the
subject, son put for man; when I say Paul is a servant of Christ, here I mean
Pauls cal∣ling: servant hath a double respect in it, one as it is in Oeconomy,
another as it hath logical relation, which we may see thus, for if he be Christs
servant, then Christ is his master.

Relata dicuntur simul esse natura.

The reason stands in this, the whole being of the one relate is contained in the
other, ergo, they are si∣mul, for if they be mutual causes, they must be mutual
effects, ergo, as one is the cause, so the other is the ef∣fect, & contra, ergo, they
must be simul.

Page  167

Natura.

Because their nature springs from them mutually, for nature is arising from
causes, here we may see in the Trinity, that one person is not before another,
there is no respect of priority, or posteriority in the rest of contraries, because
there is no force of argu∣ing from thence, we heard before that all of them were
aeque manifesta, that is, aeque intelligibi•ia, and not as consentanies, where the
cause cleareth the effect more, then contra, because the causes are more simple
and single: so likewise the subject is not beholding to the adjunct, but contra;
again, the •ause and sub∣ject did more argue the effect, and adjunct, than
con∣tra Again, from hence it is, that qui alterum perfecte norit, norit &
reliquum, for they are mutual causes, and our scientia est e causis.

Pro Marcello.

Ex quo profecto intelligis, quanta in dato beneficio sit laus, cum in accepto
tanta sit gloria. Dare and acci∣pere are relates, as if he should say, if it be
glorious to receive, then it is much more glorious to give; now his principal
dri•t of arguing is a minore, but yet the arguments are relates: so that a thing is
not given till it be received; and again he that knows the one knows the other.

Tum serum sis t• genitum, blandeque fateris,

Cum dicis dominum, Sosibiane, patrem.

Sosibian is a servant to his father, because he is his master.

Sic portorum Rhodiis locare honestum est, & Her ma∣creonti conducere.

If it be honest to let out, then it is honest to hire, for they are mutual causes, and
in usury I think both taking on usury, and letting out to usury are unlawful,

Page  168
 by reason of this relation, as Jeremy speaks. So disce∣re and docere are relates,

Jamilla (inquit) matura uxor generi, noverca, filii, filiae, pellex.

Here he playeth with the names: and indeed all names of kinreds are relates.

Ovidius 1. Metamorphosios.
—Non hospes ab hospite tutus.
Non socer a gener•, fratrum quoque gratia rara est, &c.
Atque argumentum talis relationis contrarium ni∣hil habet, &c.

Indeed here is no contrariety in these examples, neither consention in that

respect, but they are paria: happily he could find no example of them in their
disagreeing nature, and so would here commend un∣to us their use to be more
often in the consentany affection, then in their dissentany nature, as when we
say, how could that be, why he was his son.

CHAP. XV.

De adversis.

Adversa sunt contraria affirmantia, quae inter se vel•∣ti e regione perpetuo

adversantur.

VVE have heard what a thing is, that is, what goes to the being, and what to the
well∣being of it: and how thereby it dissenteth from o∣ther things by a diversity,
or opposition: divers might consent between themselves, but they are made to
di∣vert one from another. Again, for opposition it is

Page  169

re & ratione dissenting either by a disparate nature, or by a contrary nature.

Contraries are either of one thing to another thing, or of one thing to nothing,
the former kind also is of things that might agree, or of them that will never be
at peace: now therefore we come to adversa, and these have their name of
turning not aside as diversa, or as one to many as disparates, neither as relates,
wch have a double aspect, a conjunct aspect being set face to face, and an
opposite aspect being set back to back. But adversa are in an oppsite aspect;
hence a line drawn from the point of the one aspect through the center, to the
point of the other aspect will be a right line: so that here is no peace, they are
overthwart neighbours continually. Sunt contraria, contraries were opposed one
to one, so that a thing is not an adverse, but as it is opposed to some other thing.
Sunt affirmantia.

That is, they are things positive, whereof the one thing is not nothing, but both
are something.

Contraria quorum utrum{que} affirmat sunt affirman∣tia, id est vere entia:

At haec contraria hujusmodi sunt,
Ergo, adversa sunt contraria affirmantia.
Adversantur.
That is, according to their nature set one against another, by a right line.

Perpetuo.

2. Relates might be friends, though they would be foes, but adversa can never
be reconciled: this dissention of adversa doth arise from a particular form; for
homo is adverse to brutum, as brutum is animale irrationale, and as man is
animale rationale,

Page  170

and these can never be reconciled, and every thing hath his contrary, though we
cannot see by reason of the forms subtilty; for contrarieties arise from the
forms.

Inter se.

This sheweth that contraries are not opposite but when they are set one against
another, as black∣ness in a shooe is not opposite to whiteness in a band.

Veluti e regione.

As if he should say, if one stand here or there, the other will face him, and if the
one remove, the other also will remove: so that they are two overthwart
neighbours directly opposed one to another conti∣nually. Disparates were
behind one another, or on the one side one of another, never before one another.
Relates also might be friends, but these will alwayes be foes. In that he saith
veluti e regione, he sheweth that they differ from disparates, and perpetuo
sheweth that they differ from relates.

Virgilius Aeneidos 11.

Nulla salus bello: pacem te poscimus omnes.
Salus and bellum are adversa.

Sic albor & niger, calidum & frigidum, virtus & vitium opponuntur. Indeed we
make them things, though their original be defects, for vice is sin, and we
consider it as it acteth, and so it is ens.

Paradox 2. contra Epicureos.

Illud tamen arcte tenent, accurate que defendunt, vo∣luptatem esse summum
bonum, &c.

Here he reasons that pleasure cannot be the good∣ness of a man, because it is

the goodness of a beast; and man and beast are contraries.

Page  171

Sic libertas & servetus, apud Tibullum 2. lib. Sic mihi servitium video: dominamque paratam:

Tu mihi libertas illa.

Now I see bondage shall befall me, ergo, fare well liberty.
 Pro Marcello.

Nunquam enim temeritas cum sapientia commisce∣tur, nec ad consilium casus

addmittitur.

He makes temeritas and sapientia, adversa; consili∣um and casus contraries,

but indeed they are dispe∣rates, for temeritas is a special kind of modus
efficiendi, namely necessitate, aut fortuna, and consilium belongs to causa
natura, aut consilio, so that they are not under one next genus.

CHAP. VI.

De contradicentibus.

Contraria negantia sunt, quorum alterum ait, alterum negat idem, eaque sunt
contradicentia, aut privantia: contradicentia sunt contraria negantia, quorum
alte∣rum negat ubique, &c.

WE have heard what a thing is, we have also heard that a thing is not this or
that, as a di∣vers, or as an opposite: as an opposite either by a general nature,
which are disparates, or by a more par∣ticular nature, which are contraries: we
have heard that one thing is opposed to one thing, or one thing is opposed to
nothing; one thing is opposed to one thing, either as a relate, or in adversa: now
we come to shew how a thing being from his causes, is not a nothing.

Page  172

Contraria.

Where there was a fight of one to one.

Negantia.

Here one of them is nothing, ergo, it cannot proper∣ly be said that here is one to
one; yet our Logick here makes nothing something, per oppositum ens, and in
very deed it is requisite that ens being from his causes, that it should not be
another thing, so it should not be nothing. Negantia, not that he speaks here of
the negation, that we shall hear of afterward in an axiom, but he meanes a not
being. ← Ramus  → had not a better word, ergo, he keeps this delivering it in
the active voice, desiring to commend to us the act, or arguing, or the faculty
whereby arguments do act. Now nothing gives name to contradicentia, of
contra, and dicens, because the affirmer: that that is a thing we have heard of
before, it is common to affirmantia, ergo, because that is it which is onely
special: here he means them by the negative part.

Sunt.

For as there is a something so there must be a no∣thing; because every thing

that is, (except ens pri∣mum) as it was not once, so may it not be again.

Quorum alterum ait, alterum negat idem.

That is, the one is a thing in rerum natura: alterum negat, that is, the other is
not a thing in rerum natura. He hath not better words to utter them to the act of
our understanding, ergo, borrows these words, ait, ne∣gat, which are a
metonimy of the adjunct for the sub∣ject; but remove the Rhetorick, and you
shall see what he means.

Idem.

For it is by oppositum ens, that non ens is ens: and it is by reason of nothings
contradicent, that nothing

Page  173

is an argument. Here we see the force of reason, that maketh non ens to be ens,
but it is by oppositum ens on∣ly: so that if there were not an idem, they were not
contraries, no not opposites.

Object. But might it not have been left out, being taught generally before?

Answ. No: there must be a denial of the same thing, for the whole entity that we
give to a ne∣gant, is per oppositum ens, ergo, it must have reference to idem.

Sunt contradicentia, aut privantia.

As the consentanies proceeded from causes to ef∣fects, and so to subjects and

adjuncts: so do dissen∣tanies disagree less or more. The less dissenting
ar∣guments must go before, because they are common to the other, and are
contained in them: now oppo∣sites are not this or that, by a lesser or a more
earnest opposition; contraries are of one thing to another, or of one thing to
nothing; and here is a sharper con∣tention: and again, among these the
contradicent, though it take away the same thing ubique, yet it leaves
something in room of it. Sunt contraria negantia, which we heard before.

Quorum alterum negat ubique.

Quorum alterum, namely the denyed; negat ubique, that is in every subject, and
puts another thing in room thereof, as visus, non visus, non visus denyes visus
in my eye, hand and foot, and in every part of my body, yet it doth not take
away every thing, but there may be some thing that should be there.

Page  174

Negat Ʋbique.

Good reason, for when it pursues the contrary in e∣very part, it cannot be so
strong a fight, as where the contrary fights with the other in the same subject; ut
justus non justus, for the use of them, we seldom find them directly opposed,
but in an axiom we chiefly find them: as when I say, it is so, it is not so: or we
shall find them often by way of mocking, as when we cry at a thing, and say, If
it be not, it is not: here is the antecedent negative, and the antecedent
affir∣mative.

Sic in defensicne Murenae, &c,

Nihil ignoveris, saith the Stoick, imo aliquid, non om∣nia. Here be contradicent
axioms, making one axiom to consist of contradicent arguments. So that by this
 example we may see where they are used. They are called contradientia,
because the contrariety is in the denyal of the word affirmed, quasi contrarietas
in dictione, but it is in re indeed: so that this is contra∣diction, when two talk
together, and the one denies that which the other said, as Dives, non Dives,
bella, non bella, puella, non puella.

So Cicero counts Atticus an Epicure by professi∣on, that mortui non sunt miseri,
because non sunt: now when we find contradiction in a speech, we shew it by
the rule; we find many arguments among the Pa∣pists to be of this kind, and
also among our own men, The fallaces are general to opposites, and there are
non-contradicents, for contradicents when men con∣tend about nothing.

Page  175

CHAP. 17.

De privantibus. Privantia sunt contraria negantia, quorum alterum ne∣gat•in eo tantum subjecto, in
quo affirmatum suapte natura inest.

NOw we come to see a thing in his being and with his complements, may not
be that absence of a thing where it should be for privans is nothing else;
privans will neither let the habit of the thing it de∣nieth be there, nor any other
thing but it selfe, ergo, there is the greatest contention that can be, and be∣tween
somthing and nothing in the same place, there is the greatest distance: and
nothing pulls out some∣thing, as it were by the roots, and makes that some∣thing
to be an absolute nothing.

Privantia.

They are so called, because of the privant that pulls the habit out of his house,
as it were.

In eo tantum subjecto.

He doth not mean that privantia are alwayes ad∣juncts to some subject, for they
may be of the same thing: as when I say, sight is not blindness: but this he
means, that the habit is denyed, and the denyer takes away the very same thing
without leaving any deputy thereof: as cecity denies the very entity of visus,
where it should be, and plucks up as it were the first causes of it.

Suapte natura inest.

He doth not understand by nature, as if it were a thing considered in naturall

Philosophy, but in that

Page  176

thing where unto it might be consentany, ergo, by nature is to be considered

that, that any way, or by any Rule of Art should agree to the thing. so that
simplex natura is as much as consentaneum, or that which is confentanie, as a
cause, effect, &c. to the thing.

At que hic affirmatum, dicitur habitus negatum au∣tem privatio.

 He keeps the common terms, it is called habitus, be∣cause it should be habituall
to the thing whereunto it is given,

Negatum autem privatio, because it pulls out the habit by the roots.

Sic motus & quies, sic ebrius & et sobrius.

Our Author brings such examples as are received in Schools, otherwise

ebrietas is a vice: and indeed all vices are privantia. So sin is a habit, as it
causeth the subject to act imperfectly; so non es ebrius quia so∣brius: he takes
away the privant by putting the ha∣bit.

Sic cecum esse, et videre.

Existat igitur ex hac familia aliquis, ac potissimum caecus ille.

Let blind Appius come, because whilest he cannot see, he will take the lesse
grief at her.

So pauper, and dives, mors, and vita, and indeed this shews what sin is, that
brought death, a privant cause, a privant effect,

Item tacere, et loqui: so mortalitas is the privation of immortality, though it

seem to make it a privant.

Sed dissentaneorum categoria sic est, &c.

Our Author told us before, that there was a cate∣gorie of consentanies, shewing
us where Aristotles ten categories are: and here are categoremata of
dis∣sentanie

Page  177

also, and a categoria of them. Now because we cannot see categoria, or arguing
without we first see the arguments, ergo we are here first taught the
categoremata for the categorias sake.

Ʋnde quidvis ab altero differre quolibet modo potest.

Ʋnde quidvis, that is, any thing, as if he should say there is nothing, that is, not
another thing, or no∣thing, but it is some of these wayes.

CHAP. 18.

De paribus.

Argumenta simplicia it a fuerunt in consentaneis et disentaneis: comparata

sunt, quae inter se comparan∣tur &c.

VVE have heard of a thing as it is in it self com∣pleat, and as it is first in the

causes, and after∣ward with his complements: and seeing it thus, we see how it
is not another thing. Notwithstanding we come now to see that there may be a
comparison betwixt it and another thing, happily to match it, or to be unequall,
like or unlike: now whilest we see things thus we see the inside & outside of
them. The arguments are called comparates, for this afection in them resteth as
it were to argue so soon as they are sundred; as for example, lay one thing to
another, it may be greater, though less to another, &c. so that these doe not look
at things as they are absolute, but as they are laid together. The reason of these
argu∣ments in nature is this, there are more things in na∣ture than there are
degrees of quantity or resem∣blance

Page  178

of similitude, ergo, some of them must be matches, some greater some lesse,
and as the reason of that question one being asked, whether there were any two
men in the world that had a like number of hairs upon their head? He said yes,
because there were more men in the world than any man had hairs on his head:
so it is here, there are more things in nature, than there are degrees of quantity,
and they are finite, ergo some have the same quantity, and some have not: and
again, because some things are like others, and some unlike, ergo, there must
be a looking at that.

Argumenta simplicia, &c.

Here is a transition containing the doctrine of that which went before, and this
is the conclusion.

Comparata sunt, &c.

Therefore it is imperfect wanting the proposition, the name comes of con and
paro, to bring together, or lay together: so that howbeit the denomination of
Comparates may seem to rise principally from pari∣tie, yet we must take them
more generally, because imparia, similia, and dissimilia, are also compared, but
are unmatches, for as our English word Matches may be taken for equall
matches, or unequall, so may the Latine word comparata be taken for paria, or
imparia, &c.

Quae compar antur.

So that this word delivereth the reference that one thing not being another, hath
to it by way of reference.

Inter se.

That is, the one being compared with the other, and the other with that, and
both comparates, the cause was of the effect, the subject of the adjunct,

Page  179

et contra: dissentanies had one denomination too, but comparates though they
have the same denomi∣nation, yet we doe not consider them absolut ely as
dissentanies are, but as they are laid one to another, and the other to it.

Quae tamet si ipsa comparationis natura aeque nota sunt, attamen alterum altero, &c.

Here he tells us that comparats are like unto dis∣sentanies in this, that they are
aeque nota natura, as dissentanies are aeque manifestae, but though they be so,
yet herein they dissent from dissentanies, that the one in respect of one man
may be more known and more notable than the other: so that though they be
aeque nota natura, yet quoad nos, the one may be better known to a man than
the other, ergo, here we must alwayes take heed, that when we make
comparisons (which do not conclude, but illustrate as they say) that we take our
comparison from a thing, as well or better known to him to whom it is made,
than the thing we go about to prove, otherwise we teach so∣phistically, and
break this Rule.

Saepeque notis brevius judicantur, aliquande partibus plenius distinguntur,

Again, this is generall to all comparats, judicantur, that is declared, shewed,

painted, ergo, he saith ra∣ther judicantur, than demonstrantur.

Notis.

He means this, comparats use is double, they are either shorter either with
notes, or made full with parts.

Quae propositio, redditioque nominantur.

The parts of a full comparison are these, where the proposition is the argument
arguing, and the redditio the aliquid.

Page  180

Atque omnino comparata etiam ficta arguunt, fidemque faciunt.

Whereas a fained cause cannot argue a true effect, aut contra, a faigned subject
a true adjunct, and so in dissentanies, why in comparats we may faign one, and
will argue another true one, and here is the ground of all Fables, which are full
comparisons, similia, hence we say comparates doe magis illustrare, than
concludere: so that these are the three properties be∣longing to comparates in
generall.

Comparatio est in quantitate, vel qualitate.

He doth not sa•comparata, are quanta, or qualia, but comparatio est in

quantitate, vel qualitate, looking at the categoria, or arguing; now it is not
quantitas or qualitas, but in quantitate or qualitate, as if he should say, things
that are compared, are laid toge∣ther in their quantity, or quality, for we are not
to understand any Arithmetical or Geometrical quanti∣ty or quality here, which
is alwayes the same, but it is Logical quantity and quality, that is, that quantity
and quality which we consider in one thing with a∣nother: so that if you would
know what this Loi∣gicall quantity is, it is nothing but equality or in∣equality,

In quantitate

That is, when things are compared in their equa∣lity or inequality, for parity and
imparity, simili∣tude or dissimilitude belong to Logick; now compa ∣ratio in
quantitate is first because quantity is by na∣ture before quality, for this parity
and imparity must needs be considered in the thing arising from the na∣ture
thereof, before we consider the quality in nature arising from the quantity; as
for example, I must first consider the greatness of a wall, then I shall see that
 Page  181

quality whiteness to be extended according to the greatness of the wall.

Qua res comparatae, quantae dicuntur.

Qua, that is, it is that aff•ction of things that are laid together, for that he means
when he saith qua,

Res comparatae, &c.

Quantity is an affection Logicall to res: now in that he thus defines them, he

doth not mean quantae in respect of the word, but in respect of the nature of the
thing: for this it is, we know every thing hath this logismos, or Logicall
affection, whereby it may be called quanta; so qualities may be compared
toge∣ther, and be made greater or lesse, by reason of the finite nature of them.

Est que parium vel imparium.

Now because there are more things than degrees of quantity, for that cause it
comes to pass, that some things are equally matched, and some unequally: so
then, when we compare things together, and they be matches, those are paria:
this parity is of those things which chance to be equall.

Pari sunt quorum est una quantitas.

First he calls them paria, as if he should say matches or fellows, or as we call

them paires, as a pair of gloves or garters, &c. else it may be they are imparia
or dissimilia, for so somtimes that word imparia is used for dissimilia, quorum
quantitas est una. He doth not mean that the things are one, but their quantity is
parity, ergo, he saith, quorum quan∣titas est una: here he doth not mean that
their quan∣tity is one, but it is called parity.

Page  182

Argumentum igitur paris est, cum par explicatur a pari.

This follows from the definition: by explicatur he means arguitur, but he saith
explicatur, because it is the nature of those to unfold one another.

E••sque notae sunt par, aequaie, aequore, &c.

Because others have not taught these kinds of ar∣guments before, ergo, he
pleaseth to stay a while up∣on them, and would teach us to judge of them by the
phrase, as it were, but we must look at the matter.

Par levibus ventis.

Here Crusa, Aeneas first wife, is compared to the winds

Et nunc aequali, &c.

Here the age of one is compared with the age of a∣nother.

Again, the Empire of Rome shall be equall to the whole earth, and their courage
to the height of heaven.

Cujus res gestae at que virtutes es, &c,

Now follows full comparisons, his gallant deeds are compared with the whole
course of the Sun, the proposition is here with what limits the earth is con∣fined,
with them is the earth limited.

Littora quot conchas, quot amaena rosaria flores, &c.

Here are many propositions to one reddition, as many shels as are on the sea
shore, &c, so many are mine adversities: quae si comprendere coner, &c. again
his repeating of them would be as if he should tell the drops of the Icarian sea.

Hujus vero loci sunt consectaria illa è contrariis quidem orta, &c.

These kindes of arguments though they seem

Page  183

to have in them contraries, yet by laying them toge∣ther, and seeing their
contrary consequence they come to be comparates. As Sosibian is a servant to
his father because his fat•er is his master.

Ex adversis sunt frequentiora.

For the fo•mer examples were onely true in relates, and privants, but ex
adversis sunt fre∣quentiora.

If one accuse him whom I defend, then I may ac∣cuse him, whom he defends.

Quod cum fateantur satis magnam, &c, If vice make miserable: shall not vertue
make happy.

Contraria enim c•ntrariorum sunt conse∣quentia, &c.

This rule holds not when it is genus, but when it follows from it, then it will be
true, as I cannot say the father is good, ergo, the son is evil, because good∣ness
and evilness do not follow from fatherhood, and sonhood, for consequentia is
here as arising from contrary causes, or from causes in the thing, or as adjuncts.

Dic quibus in terris (& eris mihi magnus Apollo) &c.

This is a common argument among the common sort. One propounds a riddle,
and the other not being able to answer, propounds another, and this also is
common when one sayes give me this, and I will give you that.
Paria vero ficta sunt illa, &c.

Now we come to ficta paria. As Zenophons wife would not rather have her
neighbours husband than her own: so she should not rather desire his gar∣ment,
or gold, &c. and as Zenophon would not rather have his neighbours wife than
his own, so he should
 Page  184

not rather desire his neighbours horse, or ground, rather than his own: and here
we see the use of the third property.

CHAP. XIX.

De majoribus. Imparia sunt, quorum quantitas non est una. Impar est majus aut minus. Majus est,
cujus quantitas ex∣cedit.

VVE have heard how things may be compared with things, and this comparison
was either in quantity or quality, which quantity was a logical quantity, not a
geometrical quantity, for it was of things where Geometry cannot be
considered. A∣gain, this is general to every thing, not special to Geo∣metry: and
the reason hereof we heard to be, because there are more things in nature, than
there are de∣grees in quantity; it was parium, or imparium. Pa ∣ria were pairs,
matches and equals, and imparia are such as agree not in any one of these
three: but the aliquid here as it is greater to one, so is it less to ano∣ther. Imparia
therefore are such as are not pairs, but the one is greater than the other.

Quorum quantitas non est una.

We have heard concerning quantity, that paria were quorum una est quantitas,
imparia sunt quo∣rum non est una quantitas, that is, as parity was the quantity
of paria, so imparity is the quantity of im∣paria.

Page  185

Non est una.

Because the ones quantity is called majus, and the others minus: so that as
paria had but one quantity, so imparia have two, one majus and another minus.

Impar est majus, aut minus.

Having shewed what imparia are, here he distribu∣teth them into majus and
minus, as if he should say, imparity is either in majority or minority, and here is
all logical quantity, and they that will make a predi∣cament of quantity should
indeed bring in this quan∣tity, and not the table of Arithmetick and Geome∣try:
the reason why this quantity is general, is be∣cause all things whatsoever are
finite in essence, ergo, in quantity. Majus goes before minus, because it
containeth in it the quantity of the minus, and exceed∣eth: so that the majus
gives light to the minus, not contra. Majus is so called, because it is evermore
con∣sidered in comparison of one thing to another: and therefore is not called
magnum aut parvum, maximum aut minimum.

Majus est, cujus quantitas excedit.

Here majority is the quantity of majus, and this majority exceedeth, because
that the majus is active in comparison of the minus, for the stronger acts up∣on
the weaker, rather than contra.

Propriae notae sunt, &c.

 Our Author doth commorari upon this doctrine, because others have taught
them confusedly, there∣fore to keep us in order, that we may not be mistaken,
he pleaseth to set down these notes, for our further help.

Tostitur emedio, &c.

Verbosa simulatio prudentiae, which is the third ar∣gument

Page  186

is argued a majori, domina illa sapientiae.

There is not onely contempt of the babbling Orator, (which is the aliquid) but
of the good Orator.

Hinc sumitur Logica quaedam gradatio, &c.

That is, as a modus belonging nither is that logical gradation, &c. as the people
and the Senate are com∣pared, the Senate and the publique garrisons, and they
and the Generals, &c so that here is a climbing up the majus, in one respect,
being made the minus in ano∣ther respect.

It is better to be the son of Thirsites, and an A∣chilles, then contra: the majus is
before, the reason is this, that that is of his progenitors is not his own, but that
which he hath of himself,

Aeneas perswades his fellows to stay and bear these, because they have born
greater.

Thou openest thy fountain to thy enemies, give us leave to open our little
springs to our friends.

She gave thee great thanks, yea as big as great mountains. Now the majus is,
quam abs te esse da ∣tum.

Ficta vero majora etiam plurimum valent.

As we heard before generally, that ficta comparata, might argue vera: so here
ficta majora may argue ficta minora.

If a Duke should love her, he could not keep her much less canst thou.

If Jupiter should do it, I could not hope to do it, much less if Aeneas should bid
me.

Page  187

CHAP. XX.

De minoribus Minus est, cujus quantitas exceditur.

MInus is a logical quantity that may be in every thing, as I have said before of
majus: and mino∣rity is the quantity of minus, ergo, it is exceeded by the majus,
because the majus contains the minus, and much more, double, treble, &c.

Minus autem sepa indicatur, &c.

As majority hath been abused by Authors, so hath minority, ergo, he would

help us by notes, lest we should be deceived. Saepe, not alwayes, as we shall
hear afterward.

Nemo non modo Romae, &c.

Rome is compared with every corner of Italy, and the argument is drawn a
minore. Catilin had sought out all the rascals in Rome, and all in every corner
of Italy, which is the minus.

Catalin would fain have been Consul to trou∣ble the State, here Consul is the
majus, and exul the minus.

Ovid. 1. Reme. amoris.

Here the body and soul are compared, the body is minus, the soul majus. If thou
wilt labour for the good of the body, much more for the good of the soul.
At que hujus ejusdem speciei sunt hae formalae, quae fi∣unt negatione parium.

Hither we refer those manner of speeches, which are made by denials of equals.

Page  188

Omnes ex omni aetate, &c.

If all the Lawyers of the Common-wealth were here, they are not comparable to
Servitius Sulpitius: who is the majus.

Aliquando not a nulla est.

He was so far from finishing his work, which is the majus, that he had not laid
so much as the foundation; which is the minus.

We ought to be moved with the voice of Poets: why? stones, woods and wild
beasts will be ordered by musick, the minus.

Gradatio illa est a minoribus.

As in majoribus there was a climbing up from the lesser to the greater: so here
there is a falling down from the lesser to the greater.

Facinus est, vincere civem Romanum, is less than ver ∣berare, and verberare
less than necare, and necare less in crucem tollere.

Finguntur etiam minora.

As we heard before of majora that were fained: so here we hear of fained

minora.
Ante leves ergo pascentur in aethere cervi, &c.
 The remembrance of kindness is compared with these fained comparisons.

O horrible thing, &c. that is the majus: to spew in thy own house at supper is a
beastly thing, that is the minus: in caetu vero populi Romani, &c. that is the
majus.

Page  189

CHAP. XXI.

De similibus.

Adhuc compaeratio in quantitate fuit, sequitur compara ∣tio in qualitate, qua res
comparatae quales dicuntur: nempe similes aut dissimiles.

THis is not that quality in an adjunct which was absolutely considered: sequitur
comparatio in qualitate, before he told us of comparata in quantita ∣te, here he
saith comparatio in qualitate, because all is one: but the categoria is that that
Logick looks at rather, then the categorema, ergo, he saith here compa ∣ratio.
By comparata in qualitate, we are to consider the things compared; by
comparatio in qualitate we are to understand the arguing or categoria of them,
and categorema is more in use than categoria, because Logick is evermore
concreat with the thing, ergo com∣paratio in qualitate is all one as if he had
said compa ∣rata in qualitate.

Sequitur comparatio in qualitate.

Or as I may say, comparativa qualitas, qua res com∣paratae quales dicuntur, as

if he should say, by which res comparatae are comparata: so that whilst he
saith res, he tels us we consider Logick together with the thing.

Quales dicuntur.

Because he doth define by conjugates, ergo he saith dicuntur, for conjugata are
nomina, and so dictiones are nomina: quales, that is, similes or dissimiles: so
that by quales we do not consider any absolute quality in any thing, but that
which hath reference to some o∣ther thing.

Page  190

Nempe similes, aut dissimiles.

As before we heard the ratio of comparata quanti∣tate, so here we shall see the
reason of similes, aut dissi∣miles in qualitate, which is because there are more
things than qualities; and hence it comes to pass that some things are like to
others, because they have the like quality: and some again are unlike, because
they have not the like quality. Again, similia must go before dissimilia, as
quantity went before quality, because it did arise immediately from the limits of
the essence: now qualities are the acts of the form upon the matter, and there is
no act till the essence be li∣mited, ergo, till the thing hath quantity, ergo,
quantity is first. Now similia are first, as the names shew; for when we see
unlikes, we know them to be dissimilia, by seeing them not to be similia: again,
the dissimile is as it were the denyal of simile.
Similia sunt, quorum est eadem qualitas.

Here we may see whither similitude belongs, name∣ly, to Logick, and they are
fitly called similia, because they stand in comparison with a thing.

Quorum est eadem qualitas.

From quality he doth define these qualia, and he saith eadem, not una as in
quantity, which was quorum quantitas est una, yet the quantity of these is one,
and the same: but he saith here eadem, because as we know una belongs to
quantity, and eadem to qua∣lity.

Similitudo proportio dicitur, &c.

Here he doth commorari, because the Schools have abused this property,
teaching that it doth belong to quantity: so we also abuse it in our common
speech, as when we say he is a well proportioned man, when we mean that his
members are correspon∣dent,

Page  191

or like one to another. Ʋt similia proportionalia: this also follows, which also
shews that proportio be∣longs hither.

Notae similitudinis, &c.

There are no Topick places of Logick wherein the Schools have been so
mistaken as in these, therefore he sets down the notes to help us the better.

Servius Sulpitius and his son are compared as si∣milia.

Augustus cure of Ovid is compared with Achilles cure of them onely whom he
wounded.

The day of Tullies return to Rome from banish∣ment was like immortality.

He was made Verres, my Lord bore-pig (this shews that their orignial was from
a base beginning, in that they gave themselves such names) as it were by
drinking of Circes cup, which turned Ʋlisses com∣pany into swine,

They behold Pompey as a man come from heaven: non ex hac urbe, &c. there
is also a dissimilitude, the commandement and doing are similia.

Similitudinis partes deinceps explicantur.

Hitherto we have heard short and contract com∣parisons; now we shall hear
them at the full, either where the parts are disjoyned, or where they are lin∣ked
one in another.

Di juncta quando termini quatuor, &c.

He cals them termini, because they make as it were two axioms, in both which
there is a consequent, and an antecedent part: two termini go to the Protasis,
and two to the Antapadosis.
Here the sick man, and his meat, and the wicked man, and his tasting of praise
are made similia.

Page  192

Nocte pluit tota rediunt spectacula mane

Divisum imperium cum Jove Caesar habet.

These are the first verses that Virgil shewed him∣self by, and set them on the
gates where Augustus was to come out to be made Emperour, and verses then
were rare, onely one Ennius (as Tully witnes∣seth) had made some, which were
no good ones, yet they were read for their matter: Virgil was at this time poor,
and had not been thereabout long, being as it were a groom in Caesars stable,
and Augustus see∣ing them, demanded who made them, and none would
challenge them, but one Batillus a simple fellow, praemium que magnumerat
adeptus. On the next mor∣ning Virgil seeing that, sets on the gates again. Hos
ego versiculos feci, &c. and Sic vos non vobis, four times, then Augustus called
Batillus to perfect them, and he could not, then Augustus promised a great
re∣ward to him that could: so Virgil perfected them, and hereby mocked
Battillus: the quatuor termini are these, first Virgils labour, and the reward that
was gi∣ven Batillus, the other two the oxes plowing, and others reaping the
corn, &c.

Aliquando nulla prorsus est nota.

As we have heard before in minoribus, so here sometimes there are no notes at

all, but they are un∣derstood: as when we use allegories. As white Dazies are
not esteemed, and black Violets gather∣ed: so a white boy sometimes may not
be esteem∣ed of, and a black boy regarded. Remember that alwayes in those full
comparisons that the pro∣position is the third argument, and the reddition is the
aliquid.

Continua est quando, est primus terminus, &c.

This onely it hath special, first it hath onely three

Page  193

terms, then onely one of them, namely, the middle∣most is used twice, ergo, this
is more composite the disjuncta similitudo, for there was but one reference of
two terms to two, but here is a reference of three terms, where the middlemost
hath a double re∣ference.

Ficta similitudo.

As we heard before in general, that ficta compara ∣ta might argue true ones, so it
is true especially, for indeed all fables for their matter are nothing but be∣long
to Logick, and are full comparisons.

If Horace be asked why he used to play on the fid∣dle in galeries, and why he
came not into the City, he will answer by a faigned similitude of the Lyon being
sick, and the Foxes excuse of not coming to him.
CHAP. XXII.

De Dissimilibus.

Dissimilia sunt comparata, quorum qualitas est di∣versa.

THese have their names of dis, and similia, because there is a dissimilitude
with them, but a little dif∣ference, dissent, or rather a diversity; and as
dissen∣tanea of dis, and sentio, contain diversa which might be consentanies,
but for their little difference in lo∣gicall respect: so dissimilia contain similia,
but with a diversity.

Sunt Comparata.

He should say comparatae in qualitate, for other∣wise

Page  194

comparata is not their next genus, ergo, that should be put in.

Quorum qualitas est diversa.

Therefore it cannot be said to be the same, now he saith it is but diversa, not
opposite: shew wing that similia are very diversa, but by way of comparison:
so that we shall find dissimilia to differ onely ratione, but handled
comparatione.

Dissimilitudinis propriae notae sunt.

He still telleth us how to distinguish them.

Heu domus antiqua, &c.

The house and the master might be subjectum and adjunctum, but here they are
dissimilia: dispar here is not impar, but dissimile, but they that gave it to
dis∣similia at first mistook the matter: and use hath changed it.

The three Countries of France were unlike in speech, in order and in laws.

It was all his labour to look with one countenance, to sound with another
voyce, to go with another pace, &c. these are effects handled with a diversity,
and made comparates.

Neoptolinus, and Achilles, father and son, causa and effectum are made divers,
and are handled with a comparison.

Wit and age adjuncts are handled by a dissimili∣tude.

A day for sacrifice and a day for counsel are Dis∣similia.

I thought, O Meliebus, that Rome had been like Mantua: here is an example of
similia, if we look at both: but Virgil meant not so.

Nota plerumque nulla est.

And yet there is a ful comparison. Brutus the first

 Page  195

Consul of Rome put his son to death for betraying Tarquinius. Manilius put his
son to death for kil∣ing one who challenged him to fight.

CHAP. XXIII.

De conjugatis. Hactenus prima argumenta sunt exposita, sequuntur or∣ta de primis, quae perinde sunt
ad id quod arguunt, sicut prima unde oriuntur.

HItherto we have heard of that that goeth to the being of a thing, and to the well
being of the same, and how many wayes it may not be another thing, and yet it
may be compared with it, to see whe∣ther it be a greater, or less, like, or unlike,
&c. and having seen things thus, now we come to consider how they may be
named, and likewise how they may be ranged under some general head, and
then be li∣mited in their essence, and accordingly as we see good, may we give
restimony thereof. And hither∣to we have heard of those arguments that are
firstly in the thing: now we come to consider how these first may argue,
secondly by reason of the first.

Hactenus prima argumenta sunt exposita, &c.

This is an imperfect transition containing the con∣clusion of that which went

before, and the proposi∣tion of that which followeth, this course that our Author
keeps is most natural, for when we see a thing in all the arguments before, then
it is requisite that we give it a name.

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Sequantur orta de primis.

They are called orta because we shall see in the particulars every one to have a
being from the first.

Quae perinde sunt ad id quod arguunt, sicut prima unde oriuntur.

And for their arguing they carry themselves ad id quod arguunt, that is, to the
aliquid, sicut prima unde oriuntur: so that this is their definition, so that look
with what affection the first argue, with the same af∣fection also do these argue:
so that the difference of the first, and orta argumenta is not so much in the
force of the arguments: as in that these argue after a new manner. These orta
are of two sorts, either such as arise more simply, or such as arise more
composite∣ly: more simply as conjugata and notatio, for they arise but from
one argument alone: more compo∣sitely as distributio, and definitio, for they
arise from more arguments at once, therefore conjugata and no∣tatio go before
distribution and definition, for a di∣stribution doth arise from consentanies, and
dissenta∣nies: a definition may arise from orta which are after consentanea and
dissentanea. The first kind of orta are conjugata and notatio.

Conjugata, sunt nomina, &c.

So that these lie principally in the name for their arguing, ergo, they have this
in particular: as to spring simply from the first, so to denominate things.
Conjugata are before notatio, because they arise onely from consentanies,
notatio from both con∣sentanies, and dissentanies: now for conjugata, they are
yoked words, sunt nomina, so that these lye in the name.

Varie deducta.

Varie, not so much in respect of their ending, as in respect of their use.

Page  197

Ab eodem principio.

That is, proceeding from one and the same begin∣ning, principium is the thing
signified, as the thing ju∣stice, &c. as if he should say, conjugates are nomina
varie deducta, that is pulled in sunder, but have the same signification:
signifying the same abstract as justitia, the concret as justus, the act as juste: so
that he doth not mean varie d•ducta, as if they were deri∣vatives, but in respect
of the thing: so that here we may see how nomina belong to Logick, namely, as
they are things.

In conjugatis symbolum est consentaneorum argumentorum.

By conjugates he means a casting together: as if he should say you have

consentanies onely in conju∣gatis: so that in them is the symbolum, badge and
to∣ken of consentanies onely, and good reason, be∣cause these are
denominations from one and the same thing continually, ergo, cannot be
possibly from dissentanies, for then they should be from divers principia.

Libertas quoniam nulli jam rest at amanti, &c.

Liberty is not to him that is in love, ergo, a lover cannot be free, here the thing
libertas is not the cause of liber, but curtu sis liber, looking at the effect
to∣gether with liber. Now conjugates arise onely from agreeing arguments,
ergo, there is nothing that goes to the casuality, effectity, subjunctity, or
adjunctity of a thing (as we may say) but we may denominate from it. As I may
call a chest made of wood, a woodden chest: for indeed the reason of the name
conjugata is from yoaking the thing unto the man, or unto the act.

Page  198

C•cero 3. de natura Deorum cum Dionysio tyranno lo∣quitur. J am mensas argenteas de omnibus delubris
jussit auferri, &c.

Dionysius coming into Greece, robbed their Tem∣ples, they used to have fine
things in their Temples dedicated to their Gods, which they called 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉, thence came 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 accursed, because they
dedicated them to their Idols: now he took these things, and there was engraven
in them, bona Deorum, ergo, he said, he would be so bold as uti eorum
bonitate.

I will not use him as a Consul, because he used me not as a consular, that is, as
one that hath been a Consul.
 The cause was consularis, and senatoria, ergo he needed the help of the
Consul, and the Senate, res consularis, and senatoria are the adjuncts to consul,
and to senatus.

CHAP. XXIV.

De Notatione. Notatio est nominis interpretatio: nomina siquidem sunt nota rerum, &c.

NOw we come to notatio, conjugata did nominate the thing from some thing
that was in it, but did not name it properly, but so as it might agree to ano∣ther
thing that had the same consentany argument in it, from which that name was
fetched, but notatio is the name of a thing, that is proper to it, he called the first
conjugata; for as we were taught by them to give the thing a name which may
be common to

Page  199

some other thing: so here notatio teacheth us to give the thing a name arising
from some property in it: so that it be not common to other things; neither is the
name and the thing the same, as we heard in conju∣gates, justitia, justus, and
juste, were the same, onely they were delivered diversly.
Est nominis interpretatio.

That is, not the laying out of the name, but the reason of the name: so that the
arguments arguing are nomen, and notatio nominis. Notatio is after con∣jugata,
because it ariseth from dissentanies also, and comparats, whereas conjugates
arise onely from con∣sentanies.

Nomina siquidem sunt nota rerum.

So saith our Grammar, vox est nota, qua unumquod∣que vocatur. Now as there
are nomina, so ratio reddi potest, si vera notatione fiant. The denomination
comes from something, as homo ab humo, for as humus signi∣fieth the earth, so
homo names not man earthy, but it is a new name drawn from humus.

So terra is called vesta a vi stando.

And fire is called focus a fovendo.
Cicero 4. in Verrem. O Verrea plaeclara! Quo enim accessisti, quo non attule∣ris tecum istum diem!
Etenim quam tu domum, quam urbem adiisti, quod favum denique, quod non eversum, atqu• extersum
reliquiris? &c.

They made a holy day in Sicily for the honour of my Lord Boar-pig: now he
was a sweep-stake, ergo, his holy day was named of his manners, Verres a
ve∣rendo, because he swept all where he came.

Ovid 1. F astorum.

Prima dies tibi Carna datur, dea cardinis hac est, &c. Carna was so called,
quasi dea cardinis, because

Page  200
 she was conversant about doores and hinges.

Tu conjugis, bonae foeminae, locupletis quidem cert• Bambalio quidem pater,

&c. As Bambalio was so called, because he used to stammer and stutter in his
speech.

Ex dissentaneis autem est notatio.

Ʋt Lucus, quia umbra opacus, parum luceat, & ludus,
qui est longissime à lusu, & Dis, quia minime dives.
Et comparatio autem est notatio▪
Ʋt Pyropus quod flammam ignis imittitur.
Est vero ut notationi ad suum nomen, sic nomini ad no∣tationem sua affectio.

← Ramus  → doth commorari here, and shews how the name may argue the
notation, as well as the notation may the name, though that be not so common
as ani∣mi plenus, ergo animosus, et contra. And thus we have heard how
nomina belong to Logick.

CHAP. XXV.

De Distributione. Reliquum est ex ortis aliunde argumentis, argumentum distributionis & definitionis.

NOw we come to second orta, which arise mani∣foldly from more arguments:
and this he desi∣red to deliver unto us, when he said distributio and definitio.
Now distributio must come after conjugata, & notatio, in respect of his double
arising: then again it is requisite, that after we have seen the first argu∣ments in
things, that we next name them from some thing in them, and then that we see a
thing as it is common with another: and again, when we see the distribution of
it into his parts, we may soon see the limits of it, and how far it reacheth, and so
give

Page  201

testimony thereof. Now a distribution doth arise from any consentany

arguments, or common, be∣cause that a cause may be common to more effects,
& contra: and a subject to more adjuncts, & contra: Hence it comes to passe,
that a thing may be distributed, a common cause into speciall effects, aut
contra, a common subject into special ad∣juncts, & contra. And this we see to
be very true in nature by many examples: so that distributio is no∣thing but
taking a common cause, or subject, & di∣viding it into special effects, or
adjuncts, aut contra.

Reliquum est, &c,

This is an imperfect transition, and indeed contai∣neth a distribution: as if he

should say, ortum is re∣liquum or primum A distribution is from com∣mon
causes, and a speciall cause, and that is per∣fect: or from some conflux of other
Argu∣ments, which the Schools call properties, and that is descriptio.

In qua utraque pars affectio reciprocationis est.

That is, this is a property to them. Now he saith affectio, because argumentum
est quod affectum est ad arguendum. As if he should say, these arguments are
affected to argue with a mutuall receiving of them∣selves, as the whole contains
just as much as the parts, et contra, the definition, as the definite, et con∣tra. So
that this reciprocation for all the world is like unto two Juglers pots, where the
one will hold just as much water as the other, and neither more nor less: so then
the whole is not the parts, nor the definitum the d•finitio, onely there is this
mutuall af∣fection of reciprocation betwixt them; that is, they have that
affection as that the parts simul sumptae will reach no further than the totum,
aut contra; the de∣finition

Page  202

than the definite, aut contra: as when I say, a man is sick, or well, here the parts
may agree to other things than to man, Answer. True, but we must understand it
as if it were said, homo is either homo aeger, or homo sanus: now this
reciprocation in a distribution, is of all the parts together with the whole.

Distributio est cum totum in partes distribuitur.

Having shewed the generall affection, he now comes to tell what distribution is:
it is called distri∣bution in the active signification in respect of the parts; now
distribution is the categoria, and the parts and the whole are the categoremata.

Cum totum in partes distribuitur.

Here is first a totum, which shewes that it is alwayes some common thing, and
the parts are speciall things contained in the whole: so that that which is new
here, common, as a common cause, a common effect, subject, or adjunct, &c.
and here this comon is called a totum, as it contains the parts, then again, this
distri∣bution is as it were a pulling the parts in pieces, and not a joyning or
gathering of them together, though iuductio be an inversa distributio: but he
rather useth this word distributio, because it is more generall, and more in use,
and the arguing from the whole to the parts is more in use, than contra.

Totum est quod continet partes.

It is that which holdeth together the parts: conti∣net, because all the parts are in
the whole, as in one, as being the common head wherein they are.

Pars est quae continetur à toto.

For the container is the totum, and the parts the contained: so that the doctrine
of distributio is but to teach us how to range and carry every thing to his

Page  203

home: It is a great question among the Physici∣ans, whether a wen be a part of a

mans body, or no. Answer. It is morbus, ergo, no part: it is in toto, but not
contained à toto, for the whole contains the mem∣bers by reason of its form, if
we speak of integrum, but the form reacheth not to this.

Atque ut distinctio totius in partes, distributio: sic col∣lectio partium, &c.

 Many Logicians have made this to belong to argu∣mentatio, but they are
deceived, for they belong hi∣ther, and it is the same to doe and undoe, to divide
the whole into parts, and to colligere the parts to make up the whole.

Distributio sumitur ex argumentis toti quidem consen∣taneis, inter se autem dissentaneis,

Here he sheweth from whence distribution ariseth, namely from consentanies,

in respect of the parts with the whole, and also from dissentanies, either
disparates or contraries, in respect of the parts be∣tween themselves.

Itaque tanto accuratior erit, quanto partium, &c.

This is a deduction from that that went before; for if the former be true, then
this also: now the greatest dissention is of contraries, and the greatest of all is
between something and nothing, ergo, to distribute into tricotomies, and
quadricotomies, &c. is to skip over something that should be taught. And thus
much for distribution in generall.

Page  204

CHAP. XVI.

De distributione ex causis. Distributio prima est ex absolute consentaneis, causis nempe, & effectis.

COncerning this doctrine of distributio, we have heard the generalitie: the

ground from whence a distribution doth arise, is, for that the first argu∣ments
are common: as a common cause may be di∣stributed by the effects, in like sort
a common effect may be distributed into speciall causes: and so for the subject
and adjunct: so that beside that commu∣nity, there is nothing new in this second
invention. In a distribution we observed a whole and a part: the whole contains
the parts, and the parts are contai∣ned of the whole, ergo, if either the whole
contain not all the parts, or all the parts be not contained of the whole, there
will be no distribution. Now these arguments did arise from consentanies, in
respect of the whole, but from dissentanies inter se. Itaque tanto accuratior
erit, &c. ergo, a distribution into a dicotomy, which is of contraries is the best;
yet if it cannot be had, we must be fain to make a trico∣tomy. Now we come to
the species of Distribu∣tion.

Distributio prima est ex absolute consentaneis, causis nempe, effectis.

A distribution is a derivative argument from cause, or from modo quodam

consentaneorum ut subjectorum, et adjunctorum. Now the use of distribution is
this, that we may range every thing in his own order and

Page  205

place, for when we have seen a thing in his esse, and bene esse, and then that it
is not this or that; and have also compared it with other things, to see whe∣ther
it be equall or unequall, like or unlike, and like∣wise have given it a name; in
the next place it is re∣quisite, that we set it in his rank, for so the Lord hath
ranged every thing in the world, as man under his genus animal, for the Lord
hath made all things liable to our Logick, ergo, they must be ranged under
some head, that we may see how they agree, and how they disagree.

Distributio prima est, &c.

Distributio is double (as I said before) ex absolute consentaneis, et modo

quodam consentaneis: so that he calls that distribution which ariseth from a
generall cause, and a generall effect. Distributio prima: It is prima in a double
respect; first, because causa and effectum are prima: secondly, as they are
before sub∣jectum and adjunctum. He takes distributio here in the active
signification, and according thereunto must the species be prosecuted, for he
doth define them from the parts dividing. For the notation of the word (which
gives great light) it comes of tribuo and dis, as if it signified that distribution
that justice gives: it is a term belonging to Law, as many of our Logicall terms
doe: and here it signifieth a severing of the parts, and a giving to every part his
due, as when a common cause is distributed, and then to eve∣ry speciall effect
his own cause is given: so that here is nothing in this new invention, but this
distributi∣on, the rest is the first invention: as when I say, a man is sick, and a
man is well, here are two subjects, and two adjuncts: but when I say of men,
some are sick and some are well, here is a distribution. Now the

Page  206

reason why he joyneth both causa and effectum toge∣ther, saying, ex absolute
consentaneis, causis nempe, & effectis, is because that in a distribution as there
are parts, so there is a whole; distributio being both active and passive, though
it be principally denomi∣nated from the parts: so that where the cause is the
whole, there the effects must be parts.

Distributio ex causis est, quando partes sunt causae totius.

So that here the effect is the whole, and the causes are the parts: now he
prosecutes the doctrine of di∣stribution by the parts, because he goes according
to the act of things, and the parts here constitute the whole: again, a whole, the
very name doth deny a distribution; for if it be whole it is not distributed: but
the parts shew a whole, ergo, we must apply di∣stribution to the parts; hence
distributio ex causis is not when the cause is a whole, but when the causes are
parts. Hence a Distributio ex integro is before a Distributio ex genere, because
there the parts are effects.

Distributio ex causis is here the first invention, in that he saith ex causis, the
second invention in that he saith Distributio. Again, there is the first inven∣tion,
when he saith, quando partes sunt causae; the se∣cond invention, when he
saith, quando partes sunt cau∣sae totius; so that take the common effect, and
make it a whole; the causes, and make them parts, and this is the second
invention.

Hic distributio integri in sua membra praecipuè laudatur.

This now is a speciall modus of distributio ex causis, there may be a

distribution of the effect, by the effi∣cients, by the materials, by the formals, and
from the
 Page  207

end: but he doth not stay upon them, but presently comes to the distributio
integri in membrae, because it is of greater use, and of more practice.

Hic.

That is, in the distributio ex causis: so that membra are parts, but all parts are
not membra: and integrum is totum, but every totum is not integrum.

Praecipuè laudatur.

Why? because it is of so great use: secondly, be∣cause it is more secret, the

other more familiar.

Integrum est totum, cuipartes sunt essentiales.

The integrum, the entire as we call it, is totum, that is, quod continet partes,
ergo, the membra must be con∣tained of the integrum, giving therunto both
portion of matter, and portion of form: Hence nails and hairs are not membra of
a mans body, because they give not a portion of matter and form to it.

Cui partes sunt essentiales

So then if the members be essentiall to the whole, they give essence to it, that
is, they afford causa: now essentia stands principally in the matter and form,
ergo, he means these parts give matter and form to the whole.

Membrum est pars integri.

Therefore it is contained of the whole, ergo, gives essence, but how gives it
essence? thus, which few Logicians shew, as for example, in a mans body,
every member hath his own matter and form, and all the members together
make up a common matter, and a common form of the whole, so that a man is
made of a soul and a body, then the soul is made of matter & form: the body
also is made of Organicall parts, and they give matter & form to it: then the
simular parts

Page  208

contain the matter and form of the organicall, and the simular parts are made of
a portion of the matter and of the forms of the elements: so that we may see the
form of mans body ariseth from a manifold com∣parison, now the integrum is 〈
in non-Latin alphabet 〉, hoc aliquid, yet is it totum, though it be alwayes
singular.

Why is integrum before membrum, seeing it gives essence to it?

Answ. Integrum is made of the parts, and is a to∣tum, ergo, must go before.
Again, it is here before in this new invention, because it doth here continere
partes, ergo, is the agent: again, when we consider distributio, because the
whole doth distribute, and the parts are distributed, ergo, it is requisite, that we
first see the whole; hence it is rather called distributio, then inductio, because it
is more frequent to dispute from the whole to the parts, than from the parts to
the whole. Now if integrum be cui partis sunt essen∣tiales, and membrum be
pars integri, then whatsoever is true of a part, is true of the whole, not contra,
be∣cause membrum is essentiale toto, non contra. And by this rule it stands that
Christs sufferings are to be gi∣ven to him as he is whole Christ, both God and
Man: then again, by this Rule we see, that that which he hath felt being head,
the whole hath felt: which if we consider well, we may see how Christs
righteous∣ness is made ours, because he is the head, and that which the head
suffers the whole suffers, ergo, that is the wholes that the head hath done.

Sic Grammatica in etymologiam & syntaxin. &c,

For why? Grammatica is the whole Art, Etymolo∣gy and Syntax are the parts
there of. Dialectica in in∣ventionem, & judicium dividitur.

Kickerman cannot away with this example, for

Page  209

(saith he) Dialectica is the habit, invention and judgement are Arts: now the
parts must be of the same nature with the whole, because they constitute the
whole. Alas poor man, this it is, the rule of Logick is the rule of mans reason,
ergo, the rule must run along, not according to the nature of reason, for that
belongs to natural Philosophy, but according to the act of it. Now by invention
and judgement I do not mean the act, but the rule of the act that teach∣eth me
invenire: invenire is the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of this part of invention: now
Dialectica is the whole, ergo, in∣vention and judgement must consist of
precepts con∣taining the matter and form of the whole. Bene disserere is the end
of Logick, ergo, these two parts must shoot at this mark; then again the form of
Diale∣ctica bene disserere ariseth from the parts, so that as our Author teacheth
them they contain a portion of the matter, and a portion of the form of Logick.
This it is, Logick looks at the motus of reason, and inventi∣on and judgment
contain the motus, ergo, they are the parts.

Haec distributio principalis est, cum rei longioris ex∣plicatio suscipuur.

You have heard what is required in a perfect defi∣nition of the integrum into the
members: and here are many, yea, most fallaces of any arguments, as if we
leave out any part in a distribution; again, in di∣stributione ex integro, if the
parts do not contain a portion of the matter, and form of the whole: again, when
we distribute in Grammar, vox est literaaut syllaba, it is not a perfect
distribution, because these parts are not dissentany inter se, for a letter contains
portion of the matter, and form of a syllable, and so is essential to it. Had
distributio principalis est, si rei

Page  210

longioris, &c. if you mean to make any long discourse of any thing, divide it,
for it gives great light, and help to your own memory, and to the people, hence
distributions are the chief things in Art; hence many call their books partitions.
Kickerman cals his sy∣stema, which belongs to distributio: and the respect of a
distribution is but from a part of the Art, ergo, his name is to strait: ergo,
 remember this rule by any means, for it is of great use, both for the good of the
teacher, and of the learner.

Virgilius 1. Georg.

Quid faciat laetas segetes: quo fidere terram Vertere (Maecenas) ulnusque
adjungere vites, &c.

Here Virgil distributes his whole work; this is a distribution of the integrum into
the members, not of the subject into his adjuncts (as some will have it) for it is
a distribution of his book. First he will teach how to plow, then how to set
vines, then how to order cattle, then how to order Bees.

Cicero pro Mureno.

Intelligio (judices) ires accusationis partes fuisse: & earum unam in

reprehensione vitae, &c.

His oration was divided into three parts, first the reproving of Murenus for his
life; Secondly, his seeking of honour; Lastly, the accusing of him of ambition:
so Preachers divide their speech, not their text.

Quin etiam aliter tractatur hoc argumenti genus, vel a partibus ad totum, vel a toto ad
partes. Catullus.
Quintia formosa est multis: mihi candida, longa, Recta est: haec ego sic singula
confiteor, &c.

Again, he shews another modus, when we bring in an induction of the parts to

make up the whole, or when we argue from the whole to prove all the parts.

Page  211

As Quintia was fair to many, here is the totum, to me she is candida, longe &
recta, but there other things wanting in her to make her beautiful, namely,
venu∣stas, & mica salis: wit to make merry jests without offence, and good
carriage: so here we see how he by withdrawing a part, denies the whole.

Lesbia formosa est: quae cum pulcherrima tota est, Tum omnibus una om•es
surripuit Veneres.

Here now contrary to the other example, he ga∣thers all the parts of beauty in
one, and so concludes the whole.

CHAP. XXVII.

De distributione ex effectis, ubi de genere & specie. Distributio ex effectis, est quando partes sunt
effecta.

THe original of a distribution is from firsts argu∣ments coming to have a

generality, because they are common to many, distributio ex effectis est, &c.
that is, when special causes may be given to one com∣mon effect, for as
integrum though it be singular, yet is it totum, because it is made of the portions
of the matter and form of the members: so here the effects are made of their
genus.
Now he sayes distributio ex effectis, because it ari∣seth ex effectis, for there are
the causes distributing, and the parts distributed: so that here we may see why
these arguments are rightly called orta: quando partes sunt effecta: so as the
whole doth symbolice contain the causes, so the parts do symbolice contain the
effect: as if he should say, effecta we heard of in

Page  212

the first invention, but effecta here sunt partes, this is the second invention.
God as he made all things, so hath he ranged and ordered them one under
ano∣ther: so that in this definition, this is all, the parts are the effects, and the
cause is the whole. Marriners are general causes, but they have special effects,
for some climbe the shroud, some run up and down, some pump, &c. here are
the effects of the efficient cause: so we may distribute from the matter, as of
wood is made a wooden chest, or table, or stool, &c. so from the form as we
may from the genus, but this alwayes consider in general, that the parts be part
of the whole, and that they be homogenie parts, for if we shall divide a whole
into parts, and particles, there will be no distribution, as if a mans body be
anato∣mized; because the particles will agree with the parts.

Distributio generis in species hic excellit.

He doth here hasten to genus, as being the princi∣pal thing in this place: and it
is as if he should say, that distribution which we usually hear of, and which we
have so often in Schools of genus and species, they are but modi of a
distribution ex effectis: and it is true, and whilst the common Log•cians see not
this, they know not the truth of them, nor their original▪ and this makes them to
begin with genus and species in their Logick: so they know them not in their
cause, but onely in their second nature.

Hic excellit.

As if he should say, this is the chiefest modus in this distribution.

Genus.

Genus signifieth firstly a stock or kinred, now be∣cause all the species come
from one root, as a family

Page  213

cometh from one stock, ergo, it is called genus, or as the parents are causes of
their children, so is genus cause of the species: so the Hiraclides are they that
come of Hiracles

Species.

This signifieth in the original the countenance of a thing, n•w we come to see
nothing but singulars, ergo, individua, and species infimae are properly species,
it comes of an old verb specio, or spicio; species it is that which is looked on:
excellit that is of principal use, and this is the reason thereof, the Lord hath
ran∣ged all things under his own general, but this kind of ranging is more
general than the rest, and the genus giving essence to the species, it draweth the
species with it wheresoever it goeth; hence it is that where∣soever the genus of
any thing is taught, there a so must the species be taught, and this was the
father of pre∣dicaments, so that there is nothing, but is under a ge∣nus, but genus
generalissimum
Genus est, totum partibus essentiale.

Totum est quod continet partes, for the parts we heard were holden together in
the whole, for before whilst the members did contribute every one a por∣tion of
matter and form, they made up the whole, now genus is totum, but contrary to
integrum, for there the integrum had his whole matter and form, from the
members: but the genus comprehends the species in a common matter, and in a
common form.

Totum essentiale.

By this we are to understand that which gives es∣sence, that is, matter and form:
so that integrum did contain all that the members had, but the genus doth not
contain all that the species have: so that though

Page  214

all the essence of the genus be in the species, yet the whole essence of the
species is not in the genus: when I say totum essentiale, I say two things, first,
that genus is a totum: secondly, that there is nothing in the ge∣nus, but is also in
the species.

Object. But how can it be said that genus gives es∣sence to the species, whereas
they have more in them than the genus.

Answ. To contain is to hold together, now be∣cause the species agree in one
common matter, and a common form, as in uno puncto, ergo genus doth
con∣tain them: so that reciprocation here is to be un∣derstood so far forth, as by
their hypostatical union the specius are made one in their genus; hence it is that
whatsoever is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, with the genus must agree with the
species: therefore if any in distribu∣ting shall make any part as large as the
genus, as Lo∣gicians distribute genus into perfectum, and imperfe∣ctum, they
make species totum and not genus: so ens is substantia, or accidens will not
come into any Art, for the parts are consentanies inter se being subje∣ctum and
adjunctum.

Partibus.

Pars est quae continetur non in toto, sed a toto, t•t•m est quod continet, as
being the common punctum where∣in the parts meet together, he saith also
partibus non parti.

Species est pars generis.

Pars we heard before: generis: so that as mem∣brum was pars integri, not
generis, so species est pars generis, not integri: so that they which divide parts
into integral, or simular, understand not Logick, for a part simular is nothing
but species, which is pars ge∣neris, as a pan of water, & a drop of water is
genus &

Page  215

species: a bone and a part of a bone is also genus and species; now they call it
simular because they have the same denomination. Why so? genus doth
predi∣care re et nomine, as they say pars generis: here observe, that species
hath reference onely to genus, and so ge∣nus to species; even as causa is effecti
causa, and sub∣jectum adjuncti subjectum, for they are relates, ergo, can repeat
no other thing, but one another. So a∣gain, genus is totum, not speciei, but
specierum, ergo, when we give a double face to him, we make him like Janus
with a double fore-head, for they make the same species to be species to two
things: species there∣fore is generis species, as one son is but son of one father.

Now this is their trouble, that they cannot distri∣bute a species into individua,
because (say they) indi∣vidua do but differre numero: what is that? Differre
numero is properly to reckon up, or make an indu∣ction of the individua to
make up the species: again, when we distribute that species into all his
individua, there is a distribution, for there is a totum, and parts distributed.

Objection. But in a distribution we should have but two species.

Answer. Why, is it not requisite that there should always be a decotomie, for
indeed if we could find it out, every thing is decotomised, but the Lord hath not
revealed it unto men, but hath kept it secret to himself.

Objection. Singulars have no differences, but are distinct onely by a conflux of

common accidents.

Answer. Then singulars should not differ in es∣sence, ergo, I should be the same
with you, and you with me; the first matter indeed was imperfect, but

Page  216

every thing else is an effect, ergo, hath all the causes, ergo, the form, If they
ask me what it is, I answer them, that my soul is my form as they hold: or else
thus, as my members are not another mans members; so my form arising from
the parts of my body, is not another mans form, but is really distinct from it.

Objection. But (say they) the reasonable soul is ge∣nerall to all men.

Answer. There indeed may be some scruple, but when we consider that the
forms of the body and the soul make up the form of a man, we shall see every
man to have a distinct form, by which we shal know them each from other.

Sic animal genus hominis & bestiae dicimus.

He means that genus is a generall totum, and comprehendeth the species under
it: for as a Hen co∣vereth her chickens with her wings, so genus cove∣reth the
species with his essence: then again, make an axiome, as homo est animal, and
you shall see the spe∣cies to be the subject more often than the genus, ergo, he
saith subjecta.

Genus est generalissimum, aut subalternum.

Here he distributes genus unto us, shewing us that there are two kinds thereof:
the one is generalissi∣mum, for so indeed every genus is general, and hath his
subsistencie onely in singularibus: and because all genera do subsist in
singularibus, ergo, all but singula ∣ria are genera: hence it is that they say in
Schooles, ens and unum confunduntur.

Species sub alterna, aut specialissima.

Genus generalissimum, cujus nullum est genus.

Generalissimum is so called, because it is most genus, because that can be

nothing but genus.

Page  217

Subalternum genus is genus, but not onely genus, nor alwayes genus.

Cujus nullum est genus.

There must needs be an end: for as there is a low∣est whereat we must begin, so
there must be an high∣est above which we cannot go, for there cannot be an
infinitus motus in creatures: so the Lord hath in great wisdom ranged things in
their order. So the common Logicians have made ten predicaments, or genera
generalissima: but the first four have Logicks use in them, the rest are
arguments, but if we would know the genera generalissima, every Art will tell
us them best: now we may ascend to ens too: so that ens is the definitum
indeed.

God is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so in Logick argumentum is genus

generalissimum; vox in Grammar, &c. and all these are species of ens.

Nullum genus.

Here he denies any genus to stay our reason, that so we may not go too far: for
since genus ariseth from the matter, we shall at last come to that which is no
genus, but a matter onely, ergo, we must distribute this into his matter, and
form.

Subalternum genus, ut subalternaitem species, quod spe∣cies hujus, illius autem genus est.

Subalternum genus, may also be subalterna species: so that these being one
and the same, onely differing in respect, therefore one definition may serve for
them both.

Species specialissima, quae est individua in species alias, ut materia & forma singulares.

Species (as before) signifies firstly a singular thing, and other species are called
species at the second hand, but individua are properly cald species quae
speciuntur.
 Page  218

Now he saith specialissima, that is indeed, and pro∣perly, as generalissimum

had no genus above it, so spe∣cies specialissima hath no species under it:
individua is here an adjunct to species specialissima: now he saith individua,
because he speaks of division, ergo, here he tels us, that we can go no further,
to find any inferiour species, we may onely divide it into mem∣bers, if we will.

Genus vero, & species notae sunt causarum & effectorum.

He doth commorari here, because the Schools have not commonly received,
that genus contains the mat∣ter and common form of the species: but we know a
perfect definition layes out the quiddity of a thing, that is, the matter and the
form: now the form is there, but where is the matter? why, the genus con∣tains
the quiddity, the essence, the causes, ergo it is an argument unswerable that the
genus contains the matter.

Hinc universale est insigne, ac praestabile, quia causam declarat.

The common Logicians never lookt after any di∣stribution, but of the integrum
into the members, and of the genus into the species: now integrum is
com∣monly a singular, ergo, in opposition to it they called genus an universal:
then again the integrum is made of the matter and form of the members, now
they are singulars, ergo, there can arise nothing from them, but that which is
singular. Now the genus is common to the species, therefore by reason thereof
it comes to be universal, and we must apprehend it in our minds.

Object. It is a great question whether universalia be realia, or onely

intentionalia.

Page  219

Answ. True it is, that every universal is subsistent in singularibus, so that there
is truly animal: but we must look for him in individuis, for genus is totum
par ∣tibus essentiale: but if we make an abstraction of it from the singulars, then
it is not real: but here is a fallace, for the universal still remains a thing, though
I thus consider it in my mind: for I would dispute with them thus, If it be but a
phantasme, then can it give no essence. Again, when we define, do we not lay
out the thing? ergo, if genus were onely mental, it could not give essence: so
causa, effectum, and all other arguments are things real in nature, howsoever
my Logick takes hold of them.

Insigne.

True it is, that every whole is general, because it is totum, but genus is
universale insigne, ac praestabile, and so it appears: for because it gives esse
not onely in a distribution, but also in a definition, ergo, it is of great use even
set in the fore-front of the Ari∣stotelians, quia causam declarat, and our
knowledge is e causis.

Distributio generis in species valde quidem excellit, sed difficilis est & rara inventu.
 Valde excellit, that is in use, sed difficilis est, & rara inventu, the reason is this,
the genus is totum univer ∣sale, and gives matter and form to the species: now
the form is hard to be found: so that in common Au∣thors we find this definition
seldom, but in Arts it is more often: yet if we should examine it strictly, we
might cavil; as when I say animal is homo, or brutum, here animal and homo
have the same form, onely homo and brutum do differ in form.

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Ovidius 1. Metamor.
Neu regio foret ulla suis animalibus orba,
Astra tenent coeleste solum formae que deorum, &c.

Here animal is the genus; astra, pisces, bestiae, & vo∣lucres, are the species,
being argued by their several subject of places, and man is argued a
comparatis, and from his adjunct authority.

Cic. 1. Officiorum, virtutem dividit in species quatuor.

So Tully distributes vertue into four parts, and gives the definitions of the
species for the species themselves.

Distributio generis in formas specierum eadem est, &c.

The reason follows: ut animalium aliud loque••• a ∣liud motum: We may see our
Author could not tell what to make the form of homo, for one while he saith
animal is rationale aut irrationale, here he saith lo∣quens, aut mutum.

Object. But how can this distribution of generis in formas be true, when as the
forms of the species are not in genere?

Answ. Because the genus contains the matter and form of the species, and the
special form is a membrum of the species, ergo, the genus being in individuis,
and giving esse to them, may be said to contain their spe∣cial form, even as I
may be truly said to hold a stool in my hand, when as I have but a part of it in
my hand.

Genus & species non solum tractantur hac simplici di∣visionis formula, sedetiam separatim alterum ex
al∣tero.

You have not genus and species alwayes used after this simple manner, but one
to argue another: for
 Page  221

when I say homo est animal, there is a distribution, though there be but one
species.

Pro Archia.

Ac ne quis a nobis hoc it a dici forte miretur, &c.

Because he was a Rhetorician, therefore he should speak for Poetry, for they
are both Arts: here he reasons a genere ad species; for ars is the genus, and
eloquentia and Poetica are species.

Contra genus tractatur per species.

Ovid. 4. Tristium.
Materiamque tuis tristem virtutibus imple:
Ardua per praeceps gloria vadit iter, &c.

Glory goes through an headlong journey: why? if Troy had not been the cause
of Hectors glory, he had not been glorious: so that the art of War, of a Pilot at
Sea, of Physick, &c. had not been known but by adversity.

Exempla igitur specialia suo generi accomodata, sunt hujus loci.

That is, when examples are applied to their genera sunt hujus loci, that is, they
are species: now the very name commends a similitude to us, neither is there an
example, but there is a similitude: as when one sets a child a copy to write by, it
is a simile for him to make a simile by; and when one example is brought to
argue an example, it is a simile, but when it is brought to argue a genus, then it
is a species.

Ad Atticum 7. Ʋrbem tu relinquas? &c.

The question is, whether the City is to be left: it is lawful, Themistocles did so:
it is not lawful, for out people did not forsake Rome, neither did Pericles
for∣sake the City.

Page  222

CHAP. XXVIII.

De distributione e subjectis. Reliqua distributio est quodam modo consentaneorum, ut subjectorum &
adjunctorum. Distributio e subjectis est, cum partes sunt subjecta.

DIstributio hath his denomination from the parts, because it is active in respect
of them, and passive in regard of the whole: then again, because of the
consention of the whole with the parts, ergo it is ex consentaneis: now there
may be a common subject to more adjuncts, & contra, ergo, he saith, Reliqua
distri∣butio est quodam modo consentaneorum: and to use any more particular
description of them is to no purpose, seeing we have heard what subjectum and
adjunctum are.

Distributio e subjectis est, cum partes sunt subjectae.

 So that if we shall but sever them, we shall see no∣thing but subjectum and
adjunctum: if we keep them together, we shall see the arising affection.

Ʋt apud Catullum. Virginitas non tota tua est, ex parte parentum est, &c.

The maids virginity is divided into three subjects; not as integrum into
members, but three were owners of it, as three men may be owners of one ship.

Sic Cicero 5. Tusculanorum. Sunt enim tria genera a bonorum, ut jam a laqueis Stoi∣corum, &c.

So bonum: the totum is shewed by his subiects: it is corporis the subject, or of

external things belonging to the whole man, or animi.

Page  223

Some, as Kickerman and Doctor Downham, would have this distribution ex

subjectis, and the next, to be imperfect, even as definitio is perfecta, aut
imperfecta: but they are much deceived, for when a perfect defi∣nition may be
had, we use no description, ergo, it serves onely where a perfect definition
cannot be had: it is not so here; for if we have a perfect de∣finition, either
integri in membra, or generis in species, we must not therefore leave out these,
if they be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, aut contra; as we see axioma is
affirma ∣tum, and negatum must come into Logick, though it have his species
afterward. Again, these distributions cannot be reduced to the perfect ones,
either of inte∣grum or genus.

CHAP. XXIX.

De distributione ex adjunctis. DIstributio ex adjunctis est, quando partes sunt ad∣juncta: ergo, the whole
is subjectum.

Ʋt hominum alii sani alii aegri, &c. This distribu∣tion will not be distributed
(as I said before) into genus and species.

Sic Virgilius 1. Georg. Quinque tenent coelum zonae, quarum una corusco, &c.

The heaven is distributed by his adjuncts: it is temperate or intemperate, to

dicotomize it, intempe∣rate is hot, or cold: hot is the middle zone, cold are them
between the Tropicks: temperate are the other two.

Page  224

Caesar. 1. belli Gallic.

Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres, &c.

Caesar divides the Country of France into three parts, according to the
inhabitants thereof.

CHAP. XXX.

De definitione.

Definitio est, cum explicatur quid res sit, eaque vicissim definitio argui potest.
HItherto we have heard of a distribution; now we come to a definition: for
having heard what a thing is, and how it differs from others, notwith∣standing it
may be compared with them, and be equal or unequal, like or unlike, and then
be named: lastly, be ranged under some head: having I say seen all these things
clapt close together in the thing, now it remains that we should lay out the
limitation of it, and circumscribe it. This is the last of all, because it may arise
from any of the arguments going before, and also from orta which follow.

Definitio est cum explicatur quidres sit.

We heard that the arguments arising manifoldly were distribution and

definition: now definition a∣riseth as it shall fall out, either from agreers, or
disa∣greers, comparates, or orta, ergo, it arising from more arguments than any
of the rest, it is requisite that it should be after all the rest: though in laying
down an Art it will have the first place, because if it be a perfect definition it
layes out the essence of a thing immediately: if it be a description it layes down
the

Page  225

quantity, &c. A definition is as it were a box, that layes up all the rules
following in the Art, even as the body doth the members.

Definitio.

For the name, we know finis is terminus, and be∣longs to Geometry: we heard it
borrowed from thence into Logick to signifie a cause, here it signifies the 〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉 so that definire is to set down the extreme, or utmost
points of a thing, ergo, it must be recipro∣cal with the thing defined, else can it
not define it: for if the definitum be larger than the definitio, then it out-reacheth
the limits of the thing: if it be less, then it layeth not out the essence fully.

Cum explicatur.

So that definitio doth lay abroad: explicatio is a laying abroad the quiddity of a
thing. In that he saith definitio doth explicare, he means all the argu∣ments
before were clapt together in the thing con∣fusedly, but the definition doth lay
them abroad: as in this word Dialectica there is a Synopsis of all Lo∣gick, but
when I say, it is ars bene disserendi, here the definition layes out all more at
large: the definite is like a Pedlers pack, wherein his points, pins, knives, &c.
are shut up altogether, and the definitio is like the laying of them out, or
shewing of them, to the end that he may sell them. The one may likewise be
com∣pared to a garment folded up, the other to a garment spread abroad at
large.

Quid.

That is, the essence: for as in a perfect definition we may gather the other
arguments of a thing, from the causes: so in a description we may gather the
causes from other arguments: this entity there∣fore or essence, the definition
alwayes looks at: ano∣ther

Page  226
difference of the definitum and the definitio is, that the definitum is ens, and the
definitio is es∣sentia.

Res.

That is the ens the subject of the general Arts, that is aliquid in the definition of
argumentum.

Eaque vicissim definitio argui potest.

As the definite called before res may be argued a definitione, so contra: though
the definitio be more of∣ten brought to argue the definite, than contra: ergo, it
hath the name definition, not from definitum, but from the definitio.

Object. Kickerman saith, ← Ramus  → will have definitio both an argument

and an axiom.

Answ. No, we make it an argument when we speak properly, we make it an

axiom when we speak Synec∣dochichos.

Definitio est perfecta, aut imperfecta.

This distribution is now to good purpose, for the Schools have not agreed at
any time of any perfect definition, as they say homo est animal rationale, this is
not a perfect definition, ergo, some do add mortale, some capax disciplinae,
some both; so that indeed we cannot give a perfect definition of any thing, ergo,
because it is so hard to find the special form, it is re∣quisite to have an imperfect
one to grope out the form thereby, else we should be undone, if we could no
way look at the essence of things, and here by the way we see the quiddity laid
out perfectly by a per∣fect definition, and imperfectly by an imperfect
defi∣nition.

Illa, proprie definitio; haec, descriptio dicitur.

Where we may see that perfecta definitio is pro∣perly the species of this
definition, and that the defi∣nition

Page  227

before was synecdochichal; now that explio catio of the thing is perfect or
imperfect: the one cal∣led definitio, the other descriptio; the one containing the
limitation of the essence, the other the limitation of the quantity: so that
whatsoever hath an essence distinct from it self must be limited, ergo, may be
de∣fined: ergo, have their perfect definition, though we cannot see what their
form is.

Definitio perfecta est definitio constance solis causis essentiam constituentibus.

The reason is, because it stands of more parts, namely the genus, and form,
laying out the composi∣tion of the thing.

Ecausis.

As if he should say, they do give existere to the de∣finite.

Solis.

Because no other arguments come in a perfect de∣finition.

Essentiam constituentibus.

That is, materia and forma, but materia is included in genere: so that definitio
is ortum doubly, now there are four causes which give esse, but two of them
onely give essence, so that the effect hath his sub∣stance from the matter and
form, not from the other causes.

Quales causa genere, & forma comprehenduntur.

← Ramus  → doth commorari upon this doctrine, shewing that a perfect

definition doth lay out the substantial quiddity of a thing: now the reason why
he saith genere, and not materia simply, but materia as it is in genere, is this,
because the genus containeth not onely the matter, but also a portion of the
form, the general form: ergo, it must be the next genus that we must

Page  228

bring in a perfect definition, for if the genus be more remote, then the form of
the next genus must be left out: but if we take the next genus, then we bring in
all above it.

Et forma comprehenduntur.

That is the special form: the reason in nature is this, we find that the totum is
not subsistent but in sin∣gularibus: now we find moreover that singulars have
that whereby they are singulars beside, for else one singular could not be
destinct from another, er ∣go, every singular must have his peculiar form, and
also his matter, not as it is a first argument, but as it is symbolice in genere.

Ʋt in aenimali, & pars formae.

He means of the general form, for anima vegetati∣va, and sensitiva are the
forms of vivens, and so of a ∣nimal.

Totam formam hominis.

As if the form of man did consist of these as of parts: but it is not so, the truth is
this, there is in some things a simple life, in some things more lives, as anima
vegetativa is firstly in planta: now animal hath that, and somewhat more,
namely, sensitiva; and man hath both them and also reason, so that one of the
species hath nothing but that which the genus hath, namely, vivens and planta,
for planta is vivens, quae vivit vitam tantum vegetativam, and so is vivens,
onely tantum makes the difference from others. Now from this discourse he
gathers, that a definition is universale symbolum, not that singulars cannot be
perfectly defined, as well as universals, but he meanes it is a symbolum
containing universally the causes con∣stituting the essence: so that the
individuum hath the matter and form of every genus above him, ergo, it is

Page  229
 universale in this respect, having his peculiar form ad∣ded to them.

Naturam.

Here we may see what nature is in things proper∣ly: some make the form onely
to be nature, some the matter onely, and some both form and matter: here we
see the essence and nature are all one: in the first signification natura signifies
res nata: secondly, it signifies res underes nata est, that is, the causes: so that
here know that the causes being put, all things attend∣ing them follow, for so
natura is taken for the pro∣perties of a thing. E qui dat formam, dat formam
consequentiam: so that a perfect definition doth deliver whatsoever comes
within the mame of na∣ture.

Tales definitiones sunt artium.

No not tales if we should exactly try them by this rule, but they are the best
examples. Now ars is not the next genus to Grammar, neither is bene loqui the
form, but the end of Grammar, but he tels us hereby, that there is a soul of
Grammar, which is in every rule, which is as it were the simular parts of the
Art, tending to this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, bene loqui.

CHAP. XXXI.

De Descriptiono.

Descriptio est definitio ex alliis etiam argumentis rem definiens.

THis we heard to be generally called definitio: so that it doth quodam modo

definire: but as definitio

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in general before was a trope, so descriptio is not a de∣finition, but as it doth

explicate quid res sit, not defi∣niendo from the essence, but describendo from
the quan∣tity: so that the definitio layes out the flesh, bones &c. and descriptio
layes out the complements. The de∣finition was internal, the description is but
external, limiting the thing as it were with chalk. The de∣scription may be
compared to the Carpenters chalk∣ing, the definition to the thing chalked; and
by how much the thing it self layes out the quiddity of it bet∣ter than the
chalking doth, by so much is a perfect definition more excellent than a
description: so that here remember that howbeit a description cannot see the
arguments laying out the essence of the thing, yet the intendment of it is to do
it.

Est definitio.

That is, rem definiens, that is, quidditatem rei expli∣cans.

Ex aliis etiam argumentis.

That is, others beside the causis: so that a descrip∣tion must have a genus with
it, if it be not a genus ge∣neralissimum, that hath no genus: again he saith, ex
aliis, not telling us which, because any of the argu∣ments a foregoing may go
into it, even a distribution, yea a testimonony also, as we may see in the
 descrpti∣on of fama: so that it may arise from in artificials, yet must it not be
taught after them, because artifici∣als must have nothing to do with inartificials.

Atque haec succincta brevitas non est in hac specie perpe∣tua, sed saepe illustriorem, &
magnificentiorem expli∣cationem desiderat.

Our Author doth commorari upon the use of a de∣scription, shewing that it is
not alwayes so brief as before▪ but sometime we shall lay it out in all the
sim∣ples in the thing.

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Sed saepè illustriorem, & magnificentiorem, &c.

That is, when we deliver things that are magis il∣lustriora, et magnificentiora, it
is requisite we should lay them out more at large than those that are of less
moment.

Sic gloria describitur in Miloniaena.

Sed tamen ex omnibus praemiis virtutis si esset habenda ratio praemiorum,

amplissimum esse praemium, gloriam, &c.

Glory is argued from his genus praemium: praemium from his subject virtus,
then à comparatis amplissi∣mum; Lastly, ab effectis.

Sic 4. Aeneid. fama discribitur.

Extemplo Libyae magnas ut fama per urbes,
Fama malum, quod non aliud velocius ullum, &c.

Fama is the aliquid argued by her effect of going, then the subject of place,
urbes, and magnas an ad∣junct to urbes, urbes Libya the integrum, extemplo an
adjunct of time: malum a genus, and malum is argued by an adjunct, swiftness,
à minore. Monstrum another genus, horrendum an adjunct, mirabile dictu a
testimony, nec dulci declinat somno a disparate.

Tales sunt descriptiones plantarum, animalium in Phy∣sicis; item fluminum, &c.

That is, when we lay out their whole quidditie at large: and thus have we seen
all the artificiall argu∣ments that are in any thing: and so have seen the thing
both within and without. Lastly, we shal hear that, having seen all in a thing
that we have heard before, then may we safely give testimony of it as we see
occasion, and not before.

Page  232

CHAP. XXXII,

De testimonio Divino.

Exposito artificiali argumento, sequitur inartificiale. Argumentum inartificiale

est, quod non suae natura, sed assumpta artificialis alicujus argumenti vi
ar ∣guit.
VVE have heard of artificiall arguments, and there can be nothing that shall be
in the artificio of any thing, but we have heard it: so that if we look at any of
the creatures of God to see the root, the causes of it, and then the whole
circum∣ference and limitation thereof, we may by these ar∣guments taught
before, see it throughly. Now where∣as one man cannot see all things, though at
the first all things were made for one man, the Lord hath in wisdom ordained
that we should receive somethings by reports from others; for as the world was
to in∣crease both in men and other creatures, it was impos∣sible that one man
should see all things intus & in¦cute: so that whereas at the beginning all things
be∣ing made for one man, and he afterwards could not see them, yet still it is so
far forth true whilest all men see all things. It is called inartificiale for the
contrary reason that artificiale was so called, namely of being in the thing,
whereas this is not in the na∣ture of the thing, but externè altogether: so that we
may see his force by this, having no farther to doe with the thing, then onely by
witnessing of it.

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Exposito artificiali argumento, &c.

This transition contains the conclusion of all that went before, and the
proposition of that which fol∣lows: and here again we may see how artificiall
ar∣guments go before inartificials, because inartifici∣all arguments have no
ground but as they are backt with artificials. And this doctrine we may see to be
true by the practise of common people; for if a man give testimony of that he
knowes not, others will say he doth he knowes not what: For as no man can
give testimony of that he knowes not; so no man ought to receive a testimony,
but as it is backt with artificials, otherwise he knowes not the thing suffi∣ciently
as he should; and if he first hear a testimo∣ny of a thing, and afterward come to
see the thing, he will then say he knowes it, not because one testi∣fied so much,
but because himself saw it to be so. It is called Argumentum inartificiale,
because it never comes into Art to make up a Rule, though it may come in as a
commoration to prove a rule syllogisti∣cally; but method is the disposition of
axioms, not of syllogismes: now a testimony of a thing belongs to that Art to
which the thing witnessed doth be∣long: as Aristotles authority against the
creation of the world belongs to Divinity, there to be confuted in the doctrine of
the creation.

Argumentum inartificiale sequitur.

It is an Argument, for it is effected ad arguen∣dum, but after a new manner, for

it is externè: but as it is grounded upon the Artificials, so it is effected to argue.

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Argumentum inartificiale est, quod non sua natura, sed assumpta alicujus artificialis, argumenti vi
arguit.

It is of power to argue, as we heard before, but not vi sua: For when a man
beareth witness of a thing, we receive it, presuming that he is familiarly
ac∣quainted with the thing that he witnesseth: so that arguit, but not sua natura:
for alas, what harmony is there between the witnesser considered in his own
nature, and the thing witnessed, considered in its own nature? None at all: so
that we must look at either of these for their natures.

Sed assumpta, &c.

So that by the force of some artificiall Argument taken unto it, it doth argue,
ergo, this teacheth us not easily to receive every testimony hand over head, but
first to look whether the testis be well acquain∣ted with the thing witnessed,
otherwise as it may be an error in him to give testimony of a thing he knows
not, so may it be no lesse error in us that re∣ceive such a testimony. This we see
reproved in com∣mon matters among men, and it teacheth us to re∣ceive the
testimony of a man, not so much because ipse dixit; but because we are sure he
knowes the thing throughly.

Vi assumpta.

Nor that it is ortum argumentum, for orta did ar∣gue with the same force that
the first did, from whence they did arise, but a testimony doth not ar∣gue with
the force of an artificiall, be it primum or ortum, though it be backed with
artificiall. The cause, effect should be in the witnesser, but they are not in the
witness: if the testis have seen any one argument, we are so far to receive his
testimony, and no farther: if he have seen more arguments, or all

Page  235

of them, then are we much more to receive his witnesse.

Ita{que} cum exquisita rerum veritas subtilius exquiri∣tur, per exiguam vim probationis habet.

This being the nature of an inartificial, it hath little force to argue of it selfe: for
all his strength is aliunde.
Veritas.

Truth belongs to an axiome, here he means, if we would see it to be ens, or the

entity of it, surely this argument can stand us in no great stead: the testi∣mony
onely swims in our brain, but we doe not see the thing in its subtile parts: as if
he should say, the artificial arguments do argue subtilly, the inartificiall more
grosly.

In civilibus autem et humanis rebus plerum{que} hoc argu∣mentum praecipuam fidem è moribus
arguentis efficit, si prudentia virtus, et benevolentia adfuerint.

He staies upon the use of an inartificiall argument. In the matters of the

Common-wealth, or in matters concerning private men, this argument hath his
spe∣ciall credit; because in this kind they are most recei∣ved, we know all the
matters in our Courts pass by writings or testimonies of men; and in these civill
matters we look more after the men, then after the thing: there are Artificials
here in these matters, but we look not at them; still we are to understand that
the witnesses know the artificials: the reason is, be∣cause they are things done
in time long before, which therefore cannot be decided but by writings or mens
testimonies.

Praecipuam fidem habet.

That is, it doth urge most in respect of the subject, whereto it is used.

Page  236

E moribus arguentis, efficit, si prudentia virtus, et bene∣volentia adfuerint.

This inartificiall Argument hath not praecipuam fi∣dem from it self, but as it
proceedeth from him that is prudent, vertuous and benevolent. Prudentia is that
skill a man hath to bring his Rule, or any deduct from his Rule to practice, that
is, if he be not simple, and silly, to tattle and prattle he knows not what, then
praecipuam fidem habet: so that prudentia doth require discretion, and
judgement to know and de∣liver a truth. That commandement, Thou shalt not
bear false witness, is here taught.

Again, if he have not vertue joyned with his pru∣dentia, that is, if he make not
conscience of witnes∣sing the truth when he knoweth it, we ought not to receive
it: so that as he must be able to judge of the truth, so must he have conscience
to utter it.

Lastly, because notwithstanding though he may be judicious and vertuous, yet

it may be that even the best man may be carried with an affection either of love
or anger, ergo, he must have good will to speak the truth howsoever, ergo, it is
left to a malefactor, that if any of the Iury seem not to have these things, he
may except against him.

Id uno nomine testimonium dicitur.

Of the second part: for testis and testimonium are the arguments arguing; it is so
called in respect of the thing witnessed, because that is neerest. Now some
Logicians, as Kickerman, place testimonium in judgement, not in invention, for
(saith he) it is an axiome, but he is decived, for the testis and the te∣stimonie are
arguments, and make but one axiome: why, one argument may be an axiome, as
a wise man

Page  237

is worthy respect: here a wise man is an axiome; but when it is a testimony it is

not an axiome: True it is, that the testis speaks rem testatam axiomatically most
commonly, and that is the reason our Author speaks so often of veritas here in
this chapter; but as it is a testimony, it is no axiome.

Est divinum vel humanum.

Here is a distinction of testimonies, I dare not call it a distribution, for these

parts belong not to a testi∣mony, but as divers modi, we know that divinum
te∣stimonium is given from him from whom nothing is hid, but that he sees all
things, the humane is not so: so that testimonium comes to be respected these
two wayes. Now if question be made, that divinum te∣stimonium is beyond all
controversie; surely if God say it we are to receive it: for God is good, and
knowes all, and no evill dwells with him, neither doth he wish evill to his. Man
may say with the A∣cademicks, hoc tantum s•io, me nihil scire, ergo, if a
di∣vine and humane testimony be compared together, the humane is to give
place to the divine: neither is there any divine testimony, but if we look after it,
we shall see it in the thing: so that a divine testimony is most absolute, not
quatenus testimonium, but in re∣pect of of testis: hence doe we plead so for the
truth of the Scriptures, We say that we believe that which the Church
delivereth, because God sayes it to our hearts by his holy Spirit, this is divinum:
The Church of Rome sayes we are to believe it because the Church saith it, but
that is but humanum, ergo, not so excellent. Again, they are not content to
make the Church a witnesse of the Scriptures, but most absurdly the cause of
them. But God, as he is the Author of them, so he is the witnesser by his Spirit:

Page  238

and it is one thing to consider God as the cause of them, and another to
consider him as the testis thereof.

In divinis testimoniis numerantur non solum deorum ora∣culi, sed etiam responsa vatum & fatidiorum.

Our Author brings divellish examples, not divine: and he might have done
much better if he had brought testimony out of Scripture; but the reason why he
doth not is this, we know Logick is a generall Art of all things whatsoever,
ergo, the Scriptures not being received among all people, and he regarding that
which was more common in use, as the Poets Fables, and such like, and that
which was more gene∣rally received, ergo, he omits the Scripture. Now here in
the examples following we shall see that these oracula were oracula
diabolorum, and responsa vatum were of lyers. So that we must understand by
divinum testimonium, that which is divinum in truth, and not onely in name: for
as there are many called Gods, and yet but one true God; so there are many
di∣vine testimonies, and yet but one true divine te∣stimony.

Cicero 3. Catilin, Nam ut illa omittam (ait Orator) visas nocturno tem∣pore ab occidente faces,
ardoremque coeli, ut flumi∣num jactus, &c.

Strange signes were seen about the time of Catilins conspiracy, burning heat,
flashings appearing in the heaven, so that the gods did by them witness these
things. So when God doth at any time shew forth his justice, as he did in
Jerusalem by the sword hanging over it, and by the strange bringing forth of
the lamb by an heifer standing at the Altar to be sacrificed, or by comets, &
such like, they are testimonies of some judgment to come.

Page  239

Deinde paulo post.

Quo quidem tempore cum Aruspices ex tota Hetruria convenissent, &c.

Here Tully makes many divine testimonies of Ca ∣tilins conspiracy, and of the
state of Rome.

Tandem cum dixisset, ut ex Aruspicum responsis ludi facti, & Jovis signum
majus factum conversumque ad orientem, tum ait:
 Nonne illud vero ita praesens erat, ut nutu Jovis optimi maximi factum esse
videatur?

Tully makes this among the rest a sign of Catalins conspiracy: they had made
Jupiters image a very little one, and therefore they took it down, and made it
bigger, and it was set upon the stool looking toward the Senate, even at that
time when these fellows of Catalin went through the Town, and thereby it did
as it were command the Senators to look after these wretched fellows.

Brevis est illud Tibulli.

Quod si vera canunt sacris oracula templis,
Haec illi nostro nomine dicta refer:
Hoc tibi conjugium pr•mittit Delius ipse
Faelix, ac alium desine velle virum.

He would perswade her to marry, because A∣pollo had foretold that it should be
fortunate with them.

CHAP. XXXIII.

De testimonio humano legis & sententiae.

Testimonium humanum est commune, aut proprium.

KNowing that a humane testimony doth rest upon the artificial arguments, it
cannot be so strong as

Page  240

divinum is: yet it may be true. Est commune, aut pro∣prium, because the more
witnesses it hath, the stronger it is: that which is testified by one man alone is
wea∣ker, because one man may sooner be deceived than many: he may see
onely one artificial argument, they may see more, yea all: so that as a divine
testimony is to be preferred before an humane, so a humane that is common, is
to be preferred and received before an humane that is proper.

Commune ut lex, & illustris sententia.

Lex a law, a rule which is received either by the whole world, as the law of
Nations; or of some pe∣culiar Countries, as the laws of a private state: and this
hath less force in it than the former, ergo, if the witnesses stand of more
together, and of one alone still holding all of them prudent, vertuous and
bene∣volent, we are to receive that which is witnessed by more men, sooner
than the other. Now then where the Church of Rome reasons with us, it is not
better to go to the Church, than to a private man? yes, but they must be prudent,
vertuous and benevolent: a∣gain, they must see the artificial arguments of that
witness, for else if one man shall bring testimony from the word of God, we are
rather to receive his: else we prefer an humane testimony before a divine.
A∣gain, if it be an humane testimony, and a humane te∣stimony that we compare
together, let not a private man stand up to stir with his meer testimony against a
whole assembly.

The reason of the Creed being generally received in all Churches, is this,
because it hath a divine testi∣mony, ergo, next to the testimony of the Church,
we are to prefer the common testimony, and then the private, as it doth not jarr
with the common one.

Page  241

Illustris sententia.

For though it be not a law, yet is it generally re∣ceived, as notable for truth: now
he cals it illustris, opposing it to obscura, which though it may have truth in it,
yet is it not so famous to be received. We say vox populi is vox Dei, because all
truth comes from him.
Legis autem & non scriptae, & scriptae, testimonium est. Pro Milone.

Est enim (judices) non scripta, sed nata lex; quam non didicimus, accepimus,
legimus; verum ex natura ipsa arripuimus, &c.

For there are some laws that are customs, and they are not written: indeed in
civil affairs, it so comes to pass that we cannot see all, but are fain to leave
some things to custom: yet there may be some laws written in our hearts, which
we call natural.

This is witnessed, that it is lawful for a man to de∣fend himself by the law of
Nature.

Et ibidem.

Quod si duodecem tabulae nocturnem furem quoquo mo∣do, diurnum autem si

se telo defender it interfici impu∣ne voluerunt, &c▪

Why a man may slay his adversary by the Law of the twelve tables, which in
the night time al∣lows it.

Sententiae illustres sunt proverbia.

That is, old sayes, as they call them, because they are generally received, are
called proverbs: ut pares cum paribus facillime congregantur: birds of a feather
will flye together.

Sparctam nactus es, you have an office look to it. This was occasioned thus,
when they had chosen their King at Sparta, they used this proverb to him,
Spar ∣tam

Page  242

nactus es, hanc exorna. Illustres sententiae are genus to proverbia, and dicta
sapientum.

Sunt item dicta sapientum.

These were private testimonies at their original, came to be general afterwards

because of the com∣mon receit of them. Nosce teipsum. Socrates was counted
the wisest man that lived in his time: and whereas the Mathematicks and
natural Philosophy then flourished, he was the first that taught civility: and the
subject thereof is the knowledge of a mans self, ergo, he taught his Schollers
this lesson. Nosce te∣ipsum. He means to know Moral Philosophy, E∣thicks,
Oeconomicks, Politicks, &c. Ne quid nimis: too much of any thing is good for
nothing.

Proprium testimonium est, ut Platonis illud, 1. ad Quintum fratrem.

Atque ille quidem princeps ingenii, & doctrinae, Pla ∣to, &c.

That State is happy where Philosophers are Prin∣ces, or where Princes are
Philosophers: Plato saith it, that is testimonium proprium.

Talia sunt in Poetis. 6. Aeneid.

Discite justitiam moniti, & ne temnite divos.
Sic Homerico illo versu.
Ajax autem ex Salamine duxit duodecim naves.

The Athenians and the Megarenses had fought so long, that there was a law
made at Athens, that none should speak of Salamis. Now Solon put a rope about
his neck, and ran through the City, saying this verse, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,
&c. by this means the Athe∣nians rising together got Salamis from the
Megaren∣ses, and it was belonging to Athens, because of the King thereof.

Page  243

Vivorum testimonia non sunt non tantum cum quaeritur de fundo, aut caede, &c.

He doth not make a distinction of testimonies to be dead or alive, but he means

by mortuorum those when they were alive, that are now dead: he makes many
kinds of private testimonies, as obligations, confessiones, insiurandi, &c.

Obligationis exemplum est, 5. Philip. Audebo etiam oblig are fidem meam (P. C.) vebis popu ∣loque
Romano, &c.

Augustus Caesar was yet a young youth, who went to school when his father
Caesar was slain, and Anto∣ny made great stirs, thinking he should be in
Caesars place. Now the Romans offer the Souldiers this Au∣gustus to be their
Captain, that they might set him up against Antony, telling them that he would
both overcome their enemies, and also that he would be a good Governour.

Pignus autem obligatio quaedam est, ut apud Virg. Elog. 1.

Vis ergo inter nos quid possit uterque vicissim
Experiamur? ego hanc vitulam, ne forte recuses, &c.

So a pledge or a pawn is a special kind of obligati∣on: they that put out money
to usury can tell that a pawn is an obligation.

Confessio est libera, vel expressa tormentis, quae proprie quaestio dicitur. Tale fuit argumentum
contra Mi∣lonem quod a Cicerone deridetur.

Age vero, quae er at aut qualis quaestio?

 Confessio is when a man is a witness against himself, and it is either voluntary,
or expressa tormentis, quae proprie quaestio dicitur, that is a Commission.
How did the Commission go out? where is Ruscio and Casca? did Clodius lay
waite for Milo? he did. Then

Page  244

when it was answered that they should be hanged for saying so, they answered
again, that Clodius did not lie in wait for Milo, hoping for liberty.

Hunc etiam referri potest argumentum, quo utimur, cum affirmationis nostrae approbationem, &
experientiam proponimus.

That is, this may be added to confession, when by experience we tell a thing.
Would any body lend Volcatius twenty shillings, let him trie, tecto recipiet
nemo, no man will so much as receive him to house. If you were in my case,
you would find it.

J usiur andum etiam testimonium est, 6. Aeneid. Per superos, & si qua fides tellure sub ima est, Invitus,
regina, tuo de littere cessi.

This is the last, and is humanum, because it is his wit∣ness that swears it.

Ob. But is not that Divinum, when God swears by himself.

An. No, because it is in respect of our weakness. 2ly, because we here consider
God as if he were man. If there be any faith under the earth: now there is none.

Reciprocatio hic obscurior est, ut quia testatum verum sit, testis sic etiam verax.

Here is a reciprocation in a testimony, but it is more obscure, than that which

we heard of before in the doctrine of a distribution, & definition, ut quia
testa ∣tum, &c. the reason is here because that whatsoever the witnesser shall be,
such shall the witness be: if he be prudent, vertuous and benevolent, his witness
will be prudent, vertuous & benevolent, that is as if he should say, if the testis
be true, then will the witness be true.

Obscurior est.

Because a man may bear false witness when he speaks the truth, and likewise
because the simple man may sometimes speak the truth as well as the prudent
man.

Page  145

THE LOGICIANS SCHOOL-MASTER.

The Second Book. De J udicio.

CHAP. I.

Quid Judicium. Adhuc prima Dialecticae artis pars fuit, in Inventione; pars altera sequitur in Judicio.
VVE have hitherto heard of simples, which simples may be composites, but yet
we re∣spect them as one joyned to another, as man is made of many arguments,
but may be considered as a sim∣ple: now we come to consider how one thing is
joy∣ned with another thing. The glue which we heard of before, was that
affection of one argument to ano∣ther, which the common Logicians call
categoria: but when they are put together in disposition, they belong to
judgement: so that here we shall hear of nothing but laying of simples together,
that is, of arguments with arguments; and that is either of two sides, of one
argument to one, as in a simple axiom: or of

Page  246

three sides together, as in a syllogisme: or lastly of axioms one after another for
the help of memory, which is method: so that when we have seen this, we may
see the reach of our reason, and the rule of it.

Adhuc prima Dialecticae artis pars fuit, &c.

This is a perfect transition, for it is long since we heard this distribution: our
Author saith in inven∣tione, and then sequitur Judicium: so that he teacheth us
that the first part of Logick is conversant a∣bout the invention of arguments, and
shews us that the first part of Logick came to be called invention by a
metonimie of the subject for the adjunct: so ju∣dicium came to name the second
part of Logick by a metonimie of the subject for the adjunct: or if you will,
Invention and Judgement came to be the parts of Logick by a metonimie of the
effect for the cause, for so invenire and judicare are acts performed by the first
and second part of Logick, which if Kickerman had well considered he would
not have reproved Ra ∣mus for this distribution.

Sequitur judicium.

Judicium is properly the act of our understanding, as it doth discern and

determine truth and falshood: for it comes of judex a judge: and when an axiom
is made, our judgement comes to judge it: so that the name will in the end
hardly be found large enough for this part of Logick. I would rather distribute it
thus, Dialecticae partes duae sunt, Inventio, & Dispositio, and then Dispositio
est judicium, aut methodus: and judicium est axiomaticum, aut syllogisticum.
My rea∣sons are these, first because in method I see no more judgement than in
invention, but it is properly of the order of axioms. Again, judgement is for
truth, and falshood, and that is the drift of axiomatical and

Page  247

syllogistical judgement, ergo, they two are to be cou∣pled together. Again, I

observe this in nature, that there are three internal senses, fancie, cogitation and
memory, for the common sense is all one with fancie. Now these serve reason,
as the two affections love and hatred serve will; for as there is the affection of
love to embrace that which will willeth, and the af∣fection of hatred to hate that
which will nilleth: so there is to serve reason, first a fancy that serves
inven∣tion; cogitation and memory that serve disposition. Now these three are
distinct in nature, because their organs and instruments by which they work are
di∣stinct, for the organ or instrument of fancy is heat, the instrument of
cogitation is drith, and moisture of memory. Now the opposite to heat is cold,
therefore cogitation and memory communicate in cold: then cold is a dry or
moist cold, the dry cold is the instru∣ment of cogitation, the moist cold is the
organ of memory, but this cold must be but in a degree, for if it be too cold all
is mard. Now then cogitation and memory communicating together in cold,
there must be a genus, wherein judgement and method must also communicate,
and that is dispositio: so that as these organs are by nature severed in man, so
nature must sever our reason into invention and disposition, and disposition
into judicium and methodus: and that these are distinct in nature many reasons
do shew, for when a man is first born, then is his invention best, his judgement
is best when he is past juvenis, he re∣members best when he is a child, and then
best for in∣vention, because his head is then hottest; afterward best for
judgement, because then his brain is dryest: first of all best for memory,
because his head then is moystest: again, man in the morning remembers best,

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because then his brain is moyst by reason of the fumes that ascend to the brain,
when he sleepeth; at noon he is fittest for cogitation, because his brain is then
dryest; at night he invents best, because then his brain is cold: and as in the
Su•• course, her heat is moystest in the morning, dryest at noon, and cold∣est at
night: so is it with mans reason: so that the inter∣nal senses are thus divided: yet
here do we rather ad∣mit of a dicotomie, because else we should leave out a
genus, namely dispositio. Again, because the ends of in∣vention and judgment
are various: now it may seem strange, that Logick teacheth these parts thus
divi∣ded: for if it be true, that a child hath his memory first best, then his
cogitation, and then his fancy, why should not method be taught first, then
judgement, and lastly invention? The reason is this indeed, if a child should
have use of his disposition first, it would hinder his growth, for a child hath
least use of his reasonable soul for a long time, because it is an hin∣drance of
the acts of the vegetative and sensitive soul, by reason hereof if he should be
moystest, he could not grow to that stature which is fitting: or if he should be
dry, it would not extend his moysture again afterward; that his fancie is
moystest, it is for the bene esse of the body, for moisture is most praedo∣minant
in him, till he come to the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of his age, and then his
moysture cannot extend it self by reason of his heat, and then he becomes most
judicious: so that these are contrary to the order of method, for the good of
man. Again, a child hath his faculty of memory principal, that then he may
gather things in∣to a store-house, and afterward he must come to judge them:
ergo, it is necessary that he should have the best memory first, not so much for
the act of his rea∣son,

Page  249

as for the growth of his body (he is for anima vegetativa a plant: for sensitiva
an animal) and yet there is no one act of any of these faculties above, but a•l act
together: yet so as one is predominant: ergo, we say old age brings wisdom.
Now wisdom is sa ∣pientia, that is syllogistical judgement; or prudentia, that is,
the application thereof upon every occasion. Again, syllogistical judgement is
for axiomatical judgement, for when an axiom is doubtful, we use the light of a
third argument, and so going back to the rule of true and false axioms, we judge
it to be true, or false: again, axiomatical and syllogistical judge∣ment
communicate in the disposition of arguments, whereas method disposeth
axioms immediately, ar∣guments mediately; again, method hath nothing to do
with syllogistical judgement no more than with axiomatical judgment, ergo, we
hear how these should be distributed from the organs of them in natural
Phi∣losophy, and from the very act of reason. Now for Kickerman who makes a
tricotomy, he desiring to make a perfect Art leaves out a genus.

Dispositio, est secunda pars Logicae de disponendis ar∣gumentis ad bene judicandum.

This term dispositio commendeth to us the whole drift of the second part of
Logick, that is, a disposing, severing, or putting arguments asunder, it is pars
Lo∣gicae, taking it for the doctrine of Logick, it contains a portion thereof,
which hath nothing to do with in∣vention, I mean for precept, but onely for use,
for in∣vention and judgement are as opposite as white and black.

Pars Logicae.

For indeed it belongs to no other Art, no not to Rhetorick for doctrine, but
onely for use, for as for

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their order of exordium, narratio, &c. it is nothing but method: ergo, it doth not
follow, that because the Rhetorician useth disposition, ergo, it belongs to
Rhe∣torick. The Orator, the Grammarian, &c. are gene∣ral men, yet their Arts
are distinct.

Logicae.

Because Logick is the rule of reasons act, and there is also this second act of
reason to let us see how God hath disposed all things in nature: for so all things
but God are composite, yet there are simples too; yes, but not in use subsistent
in them∣selves, but ever with others: ergo, Gods simplicity is a property that
cannot be communicated to any o∣ther thing.

Secunda.

For there cannot be a disposition, till there be things to be put together, as a

Brick-layer cannot lay bricks together, except he have bricks. Again, we know
Grammar hath two parts, first Etymologie of a word alone, and Syntax of more
words together: so here there must be of things, first a simple considera∣tion of
arguments asunder, and then a disposing of them together.

De disponendis.

Our Author saith de disponendis: so that this it is, the whole of these rules
following is to dispose things with things: or seeing God practise first in this
rule, we imitate him: for if man be Gods steward over his creatures, it is
requisite he should know them, that he may take them to his comfort.

argumentis.
 Surely it doth dispose arguments but mediately, not immediately, first it
disposeth axioms, then argu∣ments under axioms, for else I do not see how
method

Page  251

will come under this definition, ergo, we are to under∣stand it thus, de

disponendis argumentis, that is, of di∣sposing axioms immediately, arguments
mediately, as they make up the axioms.
Ad bene judicandum.

This should be left out, for it belongs not to me∣thod, for it is ad memoriam
recolendum rather, ergo, we may leave this out, yet he stayes upon it, and gives
the reason thereof, certa enim dispositionis regula unum∣quodque judicatur, this
is true, but I deny that every rule of disposition tendeth ad bene judicandum,
there∣fore Aristotle in his Problems saith, that a man of great judgement hath no
great good memory, and the reason is this, because their instruments are
con∣trary; so that certa, but not omni dispositionis regula unum quodque
judicatur. Now from this Judicium, & dispositio pro eodem dicitur: yea but not
rightly, and as I take it, here ← Ramus  → was mistaken: they that made this
distribution of Logick first, as Tully, Ari∣stotle, Plato, they knew not method,
but shut it out of Logick, otherwise they would not have called this part
judgement, And that they knew not method it is plain, because they never spake
of method.

CHAP. II.

De axiomatis affirmatione, & negatione. Judicium, est axiomaticum vel dianoeticum.

DIsposition hath two parts, judicium and metho∣dus, this is the true disposition:
these do com∣municate in a disposition: for why? here in judge∣ment we
dispose arguments with arguments, in me∣thod

Page  252

we dispose axioms with axioms, ergo, both of them dispose. Again, their
instruments are consent∣ing in cold, ergo, both of them are contrary to hear, for
that will sever things. Drith and moisture clea∣ving together, ergo, these are the
parts judicium of disposing arguments to judge them, method of pla∣cing
axioms to remember them. Judicium is first, because method disposeth onely
that which judge∣ment frames, even as invention is before disposition: and this
is wonderful to consider, for there can no∣thing be well and soundly
remembred, but that which is first judged, and nothing soundly remembred, but
that wch is throughly invented And it is true with me, if I understand a thing
rightly, I never forget it, else I never remember it: so that if a man forget any
thing, he hath not judged it well, because he hath not in∣vented it well: to see a
thing in the cause, that is, the argument, for there causa is general, that is, our
intel∣ligentia, to make axioms is our scientia, to discourse is our sapientia, to
apply every thing in time and place is our prudentia, to work the like our Art,
these are the things that make a man a scholler, and a wise man, ergo, a man
that shall take this course in his studies shall be an exquisite man every way,
ergo, in the stu∣dy of any Art this must be the way for him that de∣sireth to be a
scholler, first to see the rule of his Art, then the arguments, then the sapientia,
then the pru∣dentia, and so he shall remember it for ever.

What Disposition is we have heard, and how there are two kinds of it; now
judicium est dispositio ad bene judicandum; so that the use of this second part
is of great use for the perfecting of judgement, for if we read things without
judging them, we shall many times swallow that for truth, which we shall in the
end find to be sophistry.

Page  253

Axioma est dispositio argumenti cum argumento, qua esse aliquid, aut non esse judicatur.

Axioma, The word in his proper signification is, worthiness, or dignity, and by a
metonimie of the adjunct for the subject, it signifieth such a truth as is worthy
the receiving, or believing: now axioma du∣bium is not worthy this worthy
name Axioma, be∣cause it is not per se manifestum, but we are fain to de∣mur
upon it, so that some axioms are not so plain as others: others also there are
which are so plain, as he that cannot see them, or doubteth of them, deser∣veth
the whip, Now because this first part of dispo∣sition is of a clear truth, ergo, he
calls it axioma, as if he should say an honorable truth: putting us in mind
thereby, that though this name be common to all axi∣oms, yet it is principally to
them which are per se manifesta. Again, he rather takes this name, because
others will not so well fit his purpose. Again, the other names enunciatum,
enunciatio, &c. belong ra∣ther to a syllogisme.

Axioma est dispositio.

That is acknowledged, that there is such an axiome, as is plain, palpable and

manifest: yet are there o∣thers also laid together with such a subtile hand, as we
cannot easily see them, the thred is so fine as that we cannot see it without a
candle or torch. To see the cause in nature why Iron goeth to a Load-stone, is
hard: and axioma dubium, and subtillitas, in their tropical signification are all
one: such are those argutiae arguing in a fine manner.

Objection. If man had stood, should he not have needed syllogistical

judgement, had there been no use of that?

Answ. Yes, for he should have first invented be∣fore

Page  254

he had judged, and though his reason should have been so clear, as that he
should have seen many things in nature, yet not all: For these Rules are
eternall.

Again, some things lye upward, which are plain, some also lye downward,
which are not easily per∣ceived: Again, if we will acknowledge that in Art
many deductions 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 may be drawn from a first Rule, and
that we may apply a first Rule a thou∣sand wayes, why then we must
acknowledge syllo∣gisticall judgement. Before he told us that dispositio was
pars Logicae de disponendis argumentis: here he saith Judicium is dispositio
argumenti cum argumento, here there is dispositio argumenti cum argumento,
be∣cause Judicium is dispositio, but to dispose one argu∣ment with another is
peculiar to an axiome.

Here question may be made, whether it may not be dispositio argumentorum

cum argumentis, or argumenti cum argumentis, or argumentorum cum
argumento? Yes, but if it be argumentorum it is argumenti, ergo, this is more
generall: so that he saith argumenti cum argumento, as in a simple axiome: or
argumentorum cum argumentis, aut contra, as in a composite axiom: so here is
the playing at two-hand ruffe, for here are but to sides in an axiome, ergo, in
this respect he saith, argumenti cum argumento, argumenti in ge∣nerall, because
all the kinds of arguments may be di∣sposed in an axiome.

Qua esse aliquid aut non esse judicatur.

So that the drift of judicium is to look at an ali∣quid, so doth invention; but yet
it goes further, and judges it esse aut non esse. Now aliquid, a thing, that is ens
in genere, being an aliquid, is judged to be this or that: so that here we may see
that what the com∣mon

Page  255

Logicians teach, that in an axiome there is a subject and a predicate; and the
predicate is so cal∣led because it is foretold in the subject, & contra: as when I
say, homo est animal, animal tells me some∣what of homo, and homo tells me
somewhat of animal: and the aliquid, which is the subj•ct, is she ed esse, aut
non esse: hence it is, that an axiome shewes ali∣quid esse, aut non esse, because
every thing that is, is composite, and the simples are imperfect: he doth not say,
aliquid esse verum, aut falsum; for if I say, homo est lapis, I say a thing to be,
though it be false; and when I say, homo est animal, I say a thing to be, and it is
true.

Now divers bring in here quaestio, and they say it is simplex, which is the same
with an Argument; or Composite, which is the same with an Axiome: as if
there were no use of an Axiome, but by way of question: but we know that a
question belongs to a Syllogisme, and to make it as generall as Axioma, will not
be either 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Latinè enunciatum Enunciatio, Pronunciatum, Pro∣nunciatio, effatum dicitur.

Our Author s•ays upon the naming of Axioma, because few Logicians besides
himself have received this name, therefore lest his Schollars should think it
strange whereabout he goes, and whether he had forgotten himself, he tells
them, that he means by axioma that which others call Enunciatum, &c.
Pro∣positio properly belongs to a Syllogisme, and is the thesis, and the
assumptio is the apothesis. Why saith he Latinè, because axioma is graecè: as
if he should say, I use this word as best sitting my turn, for no La∣tine term
utters this thing so well. Again, the rea∣son is (as if he should say) I had rather
use this term,
 Page  256

because the Latines fetching the tongue from the Greeks, have not names so
fitting the things as they, because enunciatum, enunciatio, &c. have an
adheren∣cie of words, and they doe name Logick by Gram∣mar, whereas we
know an Axiome may be when it is not uttered.

Enunciatum, enunciatio, &c,

Enunciatum signifies the thing concrete, and enun∣ciatio signifies the

axiomation (as we may say) of it, the disposition of it, and so of the rest.

Axioma est affirmatum, aut negatum: affirmatum, quando vinculum ejus affirmatur: negatum quando
negatur.

We have heard that there are but two sides of an axiome, and to this end qua
judicatur aliquid esse, aut non esse. Now this axiome is distributed first into his
adjuncts, therefore affirmatum and negatum at∣tend upon the esse and non esse,
which the axiome doth deliver. Homo est animal, here aliquid esse dicitur, and
it is affirmatum: homo non est animal, here aliquid non esse dicitur, and it is
negatum: so homo est lapis, here aliquid dicitur esse, & affirmatur: homo est
lapis, here aliquid dicitur non esse, & negatur: so that the affirma∣tion and
negation of an axiome is not of the esse and non esse of it. If he said
affirmatum, qua esse aliquid, here he doth not mean esse, but esse, that is
affirma ∣tum: as when I say, homo est lapis, Esse, and non esse are other things
then affirmatum and negatum: but when a thing is so, it ought to be affirmed,
and when it is not so, it ought to be denied. Here I say, he di∣stributes an
axiome into his proper adjuncts, ergo, this distribution is not imperfect, as we
said before; because then the species which follow should be left out, for some
there are which say a distribution is

Page  257

perfect or imperfect, even as a definition is perfect, or descriptio; but that is

false: for we use not a de∣scription, when we can have a perfect definition, but
we use a distribution ex adjunctis, when we also have a distribution generis in
species. Again, it is not im∣perfect, because it cannot be a distribution of genus
into the species, or of integrum into the members im∣perfectly; for then
affirmatum would signifie a sim∣ple axiome, and negatum a composite axiome.
A∣gain, if this distribution were left out, there would want a rule of Art, which
is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Now before we heard of Arguments that were af∣firmantia and negantia, here
he saith, axioma est af∣firmatum aut negatum, for the band is it that denies or
affi•ms the arguments one of another, er ∣go, the axiome is denyed, aut contra:
yea when there are Arguments affirmantia and negantia disposed in an axiome,
it is affirmatum aut negatum: as when I say, darness is not light, the band
denies light of darkness.

Affirmatum quando vinculum ejus affirmatur.

Why have we not yet heard of vinculum? If here be his first place, why doth he
not describe it?
Answer. Because we heard that Dispositio was pars Logicae de disponendis
argumentis, and that judicium was dispositio argumenti cum argumento qua
esse ali∣quid aut non esse judicatur: and in disposition we have this band, for
though there be a positio of argu∣ments, dis that is a sunder: yet there is a
composition too: so that we have it both in the generall defini∣tion of
disposition, and in the speciall description of Judicium.

Vinculum.

Now indeed vinculum is vox aequivoca, for it is the band of an axiom, of a

syllogism, and of method:

Page  258

the band of method is called transitio, which ties two several doctrines
together, as two banks that have water running between them are tied together
by a bridge, ergo, in this case it cannot be defined.

Vinculum affirmatur.

Then we see that the affirmation of the axiom is from the band, and not from
the arguments: and when we say homo est lapis, and homo non est lapis, we
have a vinculum in both: though indeed where the arguments agree, there
should be an est, and where they disagree, there should be a non est.

Negatum quando negatur.

For if it be •ffi•matum, quando vinculum ejus affir ∣matur, so negatum contra: so

that here evermore look to the vinculum: now this distribution doth not re∣quire
that we should alwayes affirm and deny too the same axiom and so look at it,
neither shall we alwayes find it so, though it may be so; because these are but
adjuncts to an axiom, and where the same axiom is affirmed or denyed.

Hinc nascitur axiomaticum contradictio, quando idem axi•ma affirmatur, & negatur.

So that in contradiction there is this peculiar, that the same •xiom must be
affirmed and denyed: so that the true place of contradiction is here: he saith,
Hinc nascitur: whence? from the affirmation and nega∣tion of the same axiom.
Now the reason why the same axiom may be affirmed and denyed, is because
these are not essential to an axiom, and the axiom is the same whether it be
affirmed or denied: the same it is also for esse, and non esse, but not for
affirmation and negation: it is the same man that was in the morning cold, and
warm at noon. Now here in dis∣putation we are carefully to observe, that there
be a

Page  259

contradiction, where we make one.

Idem axioma.

That is, the same arguments must be both affirmed and denied, one of another:
and this we must care∣fully look unto, else may we contend de lana caprina.
 Again, he said idem.

Object Homo est doctus, and homo non est doctus, are these the same
arguments? yes, and the same axiom, but differing onely in quality; they are
subjectum and adjunctum: but when I say homo est doctus, and un∣derstand it
of homo, which is not doctus,•s Thirsites, it is still the same argument, but the
arguments are dis∣parates.

CHAP. III.

De vero, & falso.

Axioma deinde est verum, aut falsum: verum quando pronunci•t utires est;
falsum contra.

IƲdicium was either axiomaticum or syllogisticum: the axiomaticum was that

which shewed a thing to be, or not to be, and it was first distributed into
affirmatum and negatum: now again, an axiom is di∣stributed secondly into
verum and falsum, which is by nature after the other, because an axiom is not
true, or false, till it be affirmed or denied: as when I say homo and animal, I do
not say that any thing is true or false, till I affirm that homo est animal, or deny
him to be animal: so that truth and falshood do arise from affirmation and
negation: therefore verum and falsum are but adjuncts to an axiome, because
they

Page  260

arise from adjuncts, and therefore secondly they are after affirmatum and
negatum, because they arise from them. Now we are in our rule of judgement,
which must guide our reason: to what end? to see the truth and falshood of
things, ergo, axioma is verum or fal∣sum: and after our reason sees a thing to be
verum, then may our will as bonum imbrace it; for ens ve∣rum and bonum are
all one, and here we may see whi∣ther verum belongs properly: sometimes
indeed it is taken tropically for a like, as when I say this i• a true picture; but I
mean that this picture is like such an one; here a similia: but the axiom is this,
that this is the picture of such a one, it is true, so that in the end it will come to
be proper: another signification we find of verum, as when it is opposed to
fictum, but this is not proper, and the meaning is, that ens est is a true axiom: so
that every signification at the last will fall out to be the same with this that is
here taught. Aut falsum. If there be verum, it must have his contrary, which is
falsum. Now though there is not falsum in nature, yet because God so created
the things so vera, as they might be otherwise, ergo, there is falsum. The same
axiom might be true and false, as we shall see in contingents, ergo, there is both
ve∣rum and falsum.

Object. Why may there not be the doctrine of a false syllogisme, as well as of a
false axiom?

Answ. The axiom is not a false axiom, quatenus an axiom in Logick, but
quatenus we look at the mat∣ter of it, for its truth or falshood in natural
Philoso∣phy: so for a syllogisme, if it break the rule of a syl∣logism for form,
then it breaks the rule of Logick: but if it do peccare for his matter, then it
breaks some rule of some other Art: so that Kickerman is much
 Page  261

deceived, for a false syllogism is a false syllogism as it breaks the rule of a

syllogisme, but the doctrine of a false axiom doth not break the rule of an
axiom, ergo, this is fallacia accidentis, and there is an equivocation in the word
axiom, and in the word syllogism.

Verum quando pronunciat utires est.

Because verum and falsum are but adjuncts, why we handle them together with
their subjects, and we define them also by their subjects: so that truth in∣deed
belongs hither ergo, it is not the end of Logick, as some would have it, for then
all the parts o• Lo∣gick should conspire in this: neither is it the 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 of Logick, for that is method. Now in a true axiom there is required
first a pronunciatio, that is, an ax•oma∣tical disposition: secondly, it must be
utires est. Pro∣nunciatio properly signifies an uttering or shewing forth in
words, but here he takes it for the same that axi ma is, as he told us before:
ergo, he means by pro∣nunciat, quando axiomatur, or axiomat: so that we must
not dream that he meaneth, as if an axiom could not be if it be uttered.

Ʋtires est.

Here mark that the truth ariseth from res radically: now he tels us, verum
axioma est quando dispositio fit uti res est: so that this refers us to the reality or
es∣sence of the thing. What difference is there between •he res and the axiom?
Much, for axiom is an adjunct to the thing; truth is first in God, then secondly,
all things are so far forth true, as they answer to the idaea in God, for so God
created all things, and so they were very good, that is, they answered to his
idaea of them in himself: so that res is true at the se∣cond hand; and because
Logick is concrete ever∣more

Page  262

with the thing, therefore he refers us to the res: so that here we may see what
truth is properly, when the axioms do pronounce as the things are; so that first
look at the truth in things, which hath it from God, then at the truth of the
axiom which hath it from the thing: he saith quando pronunciat, because the
same axiom may pronounce one way, and another way, but when it
pronounceth utires est, then is it verum. Scaliger thinks he hath found out a
great subtilty, who saith there is verit as in oratione, and that is when it answers
not to the Idea in God, but to the apprehension in man: now truth lyes not in the
speech, but in the thing: he makes this comparis•n, there is Cardan, and his
picture made in wax by a sig∣net: he saith the picture is so far forth true, as it
an∣swers to the signet, so speech is so far forth true, as it answers mans
apprehension. Now the picture is not true, for we must look at truth, as it is in
Logick, which doth pronunciat uti res est. But wher•as he sayes speech is true
as it answers the thought, that is to say, they are similia: but the axiom here is,
whether this picture be like Cardan, neither are we to look at mans thought, but
at the thing indeed, speech is the very image of the thing, & so when I say the
thing is as a man speaks it, I mean they are fimilia.

Falsa contra.
Why did he not say falsum quando pronunciat non uti res est. He shall not
need, for it had been a vain repetition of the words going before, because
falsum is contrary to verum, and contraria contrariorum sunt consequentia: so
that falsum being contrary, what∣soever we hear of afterward affirmed of
verum, we must understand the contrary of falsum, therefore whilst some ask
why ← Ramus  → did distribute verum into

Page  263

contingens, and necessarium, whereas falsum is also so: it is sufficient that he

saith falsum contra. Again, he prosecutes it no farther: because when we find
an axiom false, we are not to look at it any farther, but there let our reason rest,
ergo, he goes according to the act of our reason: but for verum our reason goes
further, to see wh•ther it be contingens, or necessarium, so far as our reason is
to look after it

Axioma verum est contingens aut necessarium.

These follow upon truth, not upon the thing im∣mediately: and good reason, for
as verum and fal∣sum hanged upon affirmation and negation, so do these hang
upon verum, so that it is contingens verum, and necessarium verum, and not
contingens or necessa ∣rium axioma next and immediately, and such axioms
there are in nature, for the Lord hath so joyned some things together in nature,
as they may be severed, others he hath so coupled, as that they cannot be
dis∣joyned.

Contingens.

It is therefore called contingens, because the truth thereof is but tactu, the
arguments do but attingere one another, not fasten one in another, as subjectum,
and adjunctum are but touching one another.

Contingens quando sic verum est, ut aliquando falsum esse possit.

This shews that truth and falshood are but adjuncts to an axiom, because they
do but contingere to it; so that a contingent axiom is of such a thing as may be
true at one time, that is, pronunciare uti res est, and at another time falsum, that
is, pronunciare utires non est. We find in common Logicians the term
probabile, which they often use for axioma contingens, but it hath equivocation
with it, for sometimes it is taken

Page  264

for a doubtful axiom, which may be general both to contingens and

necessarium, and there it is properly, ergo, when they use it for a contingent
axiom, it is a hard metaphor, for who would go about to prove that I sit here,
which is contingens, so that probabile belongs to a syllogism: therefore how
simply do some define Logick, Ars probabiliter disserendi: by probabiliter
disserendi, they mean thema probabile, that is, axioma dubium, and so they
joyn probabile with a syllogism, which properly belongs to the question.
Quando sic verum est, &c.
Here mark how contingens is defined by time: we heard of time before in the
doctrine of adjunctum, ergo, it hath nothing to do here, ergo, aliquando hath
not so much to do with time, as it looks after contin∣gens, which may be verum
and falsum at several times: for when a thing is once true, it cannot also be
false, but diversis temporibus. Again, when we hear of con∣tingens falsum,
there let us leave it; and now falsum is contra, but because every thing is first
true before it be false, ergo contingens must be defined quando sic, first verum
est, and falsum afterward.

Ʋt aliquando.

He saith falsum esse possit, non est: for when it is true, it must not of necessity
afterward be false, yet he gives the potentia, and sayes falsum esse possit,
though it never be false. As audentes fortuna juvat: the arguments are causa
per accidens and the effect.

Fac enim id hodie esse verum; eras falsum esse po∣terit.

He stayes upon the doctrine of a contingent axi∣om, because it is a question in

Aristotle, whether fu∣turum contingens be true or false? this we shall

Page  265

answer by and by: onely take this, that he doth not tie us to the present time, but
it may be future, or to come: it will rain to morrow, this is a contin∣gent axiom.

Itaque veritatis hujus contingentis judicium, opinio dicitur.

Truth was an adjunct to the thing, and judgement was the subject to truth:
contingency is an adjunct to the truth: and the judgement of the truth of a
contingent axiom is but opinio: so that opinio is the judgement of that axiom
that is contingent: that I sit here is but opinio, for I may not sit here, so that if
one tell it to another, he may be deceived of it. So that if a man teach
contingent true axiomes in any Art, he shall be deceived: such are many of
Aristotles rules, and of the Aristotelians, as when they say genus is
praedicabile, why it may be subjici∣bile too.

Que praeteritorum, & praesentium homini certa es∣se potest, futurorum per naturam non admodum
potest.

See here that the opinio, and judgement of this axiom praeteritorum, &
praesentium may be certa: here we learn what our opinio may be of things
past, present and to come; so that opinio is here distributed into certa and
incerta: certa is duplex, praesentium and prae∣teritorum. Incerta onely
futurorum

Quamvis Deo tempora omnia praesentia sunt.

It is altogether certa to him: so that in a word we may see all Aristotles dispute,
that all truth is certa, but not to all; and here we see, that notwithstanding the
certainty of a thing, yet it may be contingent, and not necessary, so Gods decree
of mans fall was certa, but not necessary, either by the necessity in an

Page  266
axiom, or by coaction in invention. Quamvis Deo tempora omnia praesentia
sunt, here this would be put in, & cui ipse revelavit: for the opinio of truth
belongs hither, and not to Divinity.

Itaque Martialis Priscum merito cavillatur.

Saepe rogare soles, qualis sim, Prisce, futurus,
Si fiam locuples, simque repente potens:
Quenquam posse putas mores narrare futuros?
Dic mihi, si fias tu Leo, qualis eris.

Priscus would often ask of Martial, what he would do if he were made rich and
mighty suddenly. And Martial would ask him, what a one he would be, if he
were a Lion: he cannot tell.

Necessariū, quando semper verum est, nec falsum esse po∣test: & illud affirmatum appellatur 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉 de omni.

We have done with verum contingens, verum as it should happen: now we

come to necessarium; ne∣cessarium in Logick hath many significations: we
heard of it before in Invention, where it signified violence, force, coation: but
here it is more proper, and it is not opposed to nature as that before, but is that
which concurs with nature, and commonly is true by nature.

Necessarium quando semper verum est, nec falsum po∣test esse.

Here we observe first the axioma necessarium is verum: secondly, it is semper

verum: thirdly, it is without all possibility of being falsum: now con∣tingens and
necessarium arise firstly from the argu∣ments, which when they are but modo
quodam ne∣cessarium, are so joyned together as they may be severed, they
make but a contingent axiom: but when they are absolutely agreeing, and so as
they cannot be severed in nature, then they make a necessary axiom.

Page  267

Quando semper est, erit, aut fuit.

For by est we are to consider not so much the ad∣signification, but the
connexion of the arguments: again, here is a perpetuity of truth required, so that
it must be without all possibility of falshood, a contin∣gent axiom, though it
never be false, yet it may be, but a necessary cannot be; so that by potentia we
are to understand the habit, not the act. Now this po∣tentia is in the arguments,
as it cannot be that homo should not be animal, it is not in potentia naturae,
that this should be false: so that a necessary axiom requi∣ring a potentia, and
that potentia is in the things, we must be careful to discern it.

It is a common opinion, that whatsoever God de∣creed is necessary.

Answ. Though it be true that Gods decree shall most surely come to pass, yet
doth it not put a necessi∣ty, for then this necessity must lie in the things, not in
the Author of the things: so when we say his decree must come to pass, we
mean it must be of necessity, that is, by coaction, and this also is false, for the
Lord doth all things by counsel: so that here we are to look at the potentia in
the arguments, and not to any external potentia. The not discerning of this
neces∣sity ex hypothesi, as they call it, and certainty, makes them take many
things for necessary, which are not. So that to imagine such a thing, is to say,
that God doth not things consilio: again, to say so, is to make the Stoicks
faetum, for their fa ∣tum was this, because Jupiter said so: so that if they say it
cannot be otherwise, it is the Stoicks fatum directly.

Et illud affirmatum appellatur 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 de omni.

Aristotle doth in his demonstration labour much

Page  268

to shew that the rules of Art must be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉, first, saith he, they must be concluded from the prima and
proxima causa, so that he did dream of a demonstration in a syllogism, as when
we conclude a property of a subject by the de∣finition: his meaning was that the
rules of Art should be most true, and arising from their immediate causes, but
there is no syllogistical Art for demonstra∣tions, but as we may dispose many
arguments, cause and effect, subject and adjunct, &c, in a simple axi∣om,
having one and the same doctrine: so we may dispose a syllogism, either of
contingent axioms, or of necessary axioms in Barbara, as he would have, and
yet the doctrine of an explicate is the same: ergo, the doctrine of demonstration
is vain. Again, he saith, we conclude from the cause 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,
whereas in∣deed all our concluding is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Object. But it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in respect of the third argument.

Answ. True, so also I will conclude 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 from any other
arguments as well as the cause: so that all the doctrine of Aristotles
demonstrations is here in a necessary axiom, and in 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Now an axiom is necessary here, not that there is
any necessity in respect of the rule of Logick, but in respect of the matter of it.

Object. A contingent axiom may deceive, ergo, his doctrine should not be in
Art; as also an inartificial argument is not in Art.

Answ. The doctrine of them is belonging to Art, as well as any other rules, for
they are eternal: so that an axiom is contingent, or necessary in respect of the
matter of it, ergo, we shall not need to speak of them in a syllogism; ergo, to
distribute a syllogism accord∣ing

Page  269

to the matter, or form of it (as Kickerman doth) is very absurd. Syllogismus

dialecticus is nothing but a syllogisme of contingent axioms: syllogismus
apo∣dicticus is nothing but a syllogisme consisting of ne∣cessary axioms: and
syllogismus sophisticus is so cal∣led from the form of it; and here observe
evermore, that if the sophistry lye in any of the arguments alone that are
disposed syllogistically, then it is a fallace of the arguments in invention, as non
causa pro causa, non effectum pro effecto, &c. If the so phistry lie in form of
the syllogism disposed, then it breaks some rule in the doctrine of syllogisms: 〈
in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is a necessary axiom affirmed: so that this is the
difference in ge∣neral of a necessary axiom, and an axiom 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉, that the axiom 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is alwayes affirmed: so that
an axiom necessary 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 hath three things in it, first, it must
be semper verum, secondly, it must be without all potentiae of being false,
which are general both to contingens, and necessarium: Lastly, it must be
affirmatum which is peculiar to it self. He cals it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,
because it is omnino verum: and de, which includes not onely a necessary truth,
but also affirma∣tion: for if we praedicate an adjunct upon his sub∣ject
negatively, it will not be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
signifies omnino,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies affirmed: so that it doth not
require that an axiom should be general, for a proper axiom may be 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉, as if he would define the Sun, Moon, and Stars, so that 〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉 requires that it be verum, that is verum necessarium, and
that it be de, that is, affirmatum.

Impossibile contra, quod de nullo unquam verum esse potest.

This axiom is opposed to necessarium, and also to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉:

and it is contrary to that quod de nullo, &c.

Page  270

so that because he saith de, therefore it is opposed to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

neither is it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 are contrary.

Impossibile.

Impossibile is a false axiom, and here we may see how falsum still runs along
with verum Possibile and impossibile are not species of falsum axioma, for both
contingens and necessarium are possibilia, and it is general to them both: so
that this is quod verum esse potest unquam, & de nullo: not that this axiom is
al∣wayes denyed as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is affirmed, but it is contra∣ry to an
axiom 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because that is alwayes af∣firmed; and contrary
to it, mark the contrariety, it is nunquam verum, opposed to semper verum:
again, nunquam verum esse potest, is opposed to nec falsum esse potest, here it
is contrary to a necessary one: last∣ly, it is de nullo opposed to 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉de omni, here it is contrary to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Now
affirmatum, and negatum, verum, falsum, contingens, necessarium, possibile,
and impossibile, &c. are (as they call them) words of Art, for indeed they
belong to Logick: but these when any thing is brought as an example to them, it
is no∣thing but an application of the species to the genus: now they call these
modals, because the modus is the genus, and the axiom is the axiom. When I
say homo est animal, est necessarium: why here are two axioms, which they
are not aware of; and in this syllogism, Qui dicit te esse animal, dicit verum,
qui dicit te esse asi∣num dicit te esse animal: ergo, &c. both the proposi∣tion
and assumption may be denied, for in the pro∣position he disputes from a
species to the genus: in the assumption he will prove hic homo est asinus,
because that homo est animal, verum est: here again the assumption is false, for
he disputes â specie ad ge∣nus.
 Page  271

Axioma artium sic 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 esse debent, sed praeterea homogenia, & catholica.

Here he makes a special application of homogenic and catholike axioms, unto

the axioms of Art, as if they did belong onely to them: and it is true, for though
the doctrine of axioms be general to every thing, as Logick is, yet these laws
are peculiar to the axioms of Art: and they are general, because they belong to
all axioms of Art: and there is no rule of Art, but it must be 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & contra: if it be all of these, then is it
a very rule of Art; if it be onely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉, then it is in a rule of Art, & is but a piece of axioma ∣ta artium,
therefore every rule of Art must first be true, because 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
is the rule of truth, ergo, a con∣tingent axiom cannot be a rule of Art, for it may
de∣ceive us, as often as teach truth: and it must be affir∣med, because it must
teach, for a negative axiom tels us onely what a thing is not: for though this
axiom, lapis non est animal, will never fail, yet not teaching me what lapis is, I
may take it for a stick, or any other thing.

Axioma homogenium est, quando partes sunt essentiales inter se; ut forma formato, subjectum proprio
ad∣juncto, genus speciei.

Axioma a rule of Art, which must be worthy credit above all other rules:
homogenium, that is, belonging to that Art, yea, and to that particular part of
that Art, and to that particular point of that Art; as in∣vention is not homogeny
to judgement, ergo, homo∣geny here must be considered, not as it is in the same
Art, but as it is in the same rule.

Quando partes sunt essentiales inter se.

That is, when the arguments are essential inter se:

Page  272

so that here is required an essentiality, as the causes are essential to the effect:
what all of them? no, onely the material and the formal; so that integrum and
membra, genus and species, the subject and proper adjunct, because the causes
of it are to be found in the causes of the subject: why these? because they arise
from matter and form, are essential, both as it is active, namely, as the causes
give essence to the effect, and also as it is passive, namely, as the effect is
essen∣tiated of the causes.

Ʋt forma formato, subjectum proprio adjuncto, genus speciei.

He saith, forma formato, not materia materiato, be∣cause though the matter
give his essence, yet the form is but one, which makes the thing one, whereas
there may be many matters, Genus speciei: mark how that the genus and form
make a definition, ergo, the defi∣nitio and definitum are essential inter se ergo,
that makes a rule of Art; here he leaves out integrum and membra, which I
much marvel at, for had he put in them, then we had had all the arguments that
could makes these rules of Art.

Id appellatur 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, per se.

The rule of justice that we give to every thing, that which is per se true, and
homogeny, as longitude is in the superficies, but not per se, but per aliud, for so
per se here is not opposed to per accidens, but to per aliud.

Axioma catholicum est, quando consequens semper ve∣rum est de antecedente, non solum omni & per
se, sed etiam reciproce: ut homo est animal rationale.

A catholick axiom: this name is somewhat im∣proper, for it doth not contain all
that is in a catholick axiom, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 doth; 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 is primum,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

Page  273

de toto: so that this is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 first true of the whole, and
afterward of the parts. Kickerman saith, that Aristotle takes 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for the same: but he neither saith so,
nor meanes so.

Quando consequens semper verum est, &c.

By consequens he means an argument; now can an argument be true? here he

takes verum in a more large sense than before: he means when the parts do so
truly predicate one of another, as that they make a true axiom 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉.

Non solum omni & perse sed etiam reciproce.

That is, when one part contains the other: so that one would think reciprocation
might be an affection of subjectum, and proprium adjunctum in invention: it is
true, that one contains as much as the other, but the subject and proper adjunct
are not the same thing, as the definitio and definitum are. For homo and ri∣sus
are not all one, but here reciprocation is between subjectum and adjunctum,
because notwithstanding they be divers things, yet the one contain as much as
the other: so that this reciprocation is more general than that before: so that the
rules of Art are these three, namely, definitions, distributions and proper∣ties:
and every rule of Art must be most true, most just and most wise, because the
axiom must stay up the thing to guide it to his end.

Tres hae sunt leges documentorum artis propriorum: prima 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, lex veritas;
secunda 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, lex justitiae; tertia 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, lex •apientiae dica∣tur.

So that these three properties are required in every rule of Art.

Page  274

Atque ejusmodi axiomatum ita catholicorum judicium verissima & prima scientia est.

So that the judgement of such catholick axioms, is prima verissimaque scientia,

and all others are but se∣cond or third truths, as they are deducted from the first,
second or third, and are per se so far forth true, as their first rule is true: hence
whatsoever we read, we shall find it, if we mark it, to be either a rule of Art, or
some deduct: so that the heads of Arts should be the heads of common place
books, and so might we bring all that we read unto them, and try them.
 Now some say, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 contains 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ergo, they might be left out.

Answ. It doth not follow, for these three are di∣stinct things, for as it is
reciprocum, it is not in the same respect 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. Again,
an axiom may be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and yet not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet
〉, &c. so also an axiom may break the rule 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and yet not
break the rule 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. so that if they were left out, we
should have no rule to shew such axiomes to be false.

CHAP. IV.

De axiomate simplici.

Atque haec de communibus axiomatis affectionibus, spe∣cies sequuntur.

VVE have hitherto heard of whatsoever is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to an axiom

in general: for though 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
belong

Page  275

onely to the rules of Art, yet because they may be sim∣ple or composite axioms,
ergo, they are generally to be taught to them both: the judgment moreover of
such axioms was prima verissimaque scientia. Prima, because that was first,
and per se true, and most true, because all other deducts do so far forth approve
themselves true, as they agree to the first, and these first rules are few, therefore
they come nearest to God who is but one, and are next to his wisdom: o∣thers,
which are deducts, may be many, and they come next to the first rules: we have
among us a distin∣ction of doctrine and use, doctrina is properly the first rule of
Art, and use is the application thereof, or the special deducts gathered from the
first. Others I find take doctrina for the first part of Divinity, and Use for the
special practice of a rule of Art, but they are deceived, and speak improperly:
and all the rules that Kickerman saith are wanting in ← Ramus  → , are
no∣thing but the practice of a rule, that is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and they are
infinite. As posita causa ponitur effectum, this ariseth from the definition of
causa, and it is onely true, where the cause is brought as a third ar∣gument in a
syllogism, and otherwise we have no use of it, and having handled all that is
general to an axiom, now we come to the species, Atque haec de com∣munibus,
&c. This is a transition not from one part of an axiom to another, for those
things that we heard of before touching an axiom, are but adjuncts to an axiom,
therefore must not be severed from their subject: but because these have taken
up two Chap∣ters, and so continued the doctrine of axioma long, why we may
have forgotten our selves, thinking we have heard of the species already? no,
saith ← Ramus  → , we come but now to the species.

Page  276

Axioma est simplex, aut compositum.

Disposition we heard did dispose arguments ei∣ther firstly, or at the second
hand, in an axiom they are disposed either one with one, or one with more, or
more with more; if one be disposed with one, so that there be but two sides, as
it were playing at two hand ruffe, then it is a simple axiom: and from this
simple disposition of the arguments, it is called sim∣plex, compositum contra:
so that this double disposi∣tion of arguments makes this distribution, whereas
affirmatum, negatum, and the other adjuncts before, rather looked at the band,
then at the disposition of the arguments: so that axiomatica dispositio is
simplex in respect of the simple disposition of the arguments that are disposed
therein.

Simplex quod verbi vinculo continetur.

Simplex is first, because there cannot be a compo∣site axiom, but there will be a
simple axiom, and the composite is as it were a manifold simple.

Verbi vinculo.

He defines it from the band, not that it ariseth from thence, but because a verb
fals out to tie an axi∣om to one.

Continetur.

For Invention did handle arguments severally, but in axioms they are laid
together with a cyment or verb.

Object. Why doth he call it a verb? we have not heard of Grammar yet, doth he
mean that verb which is taught there?

Answ. No: but his meaning is, that the parts of this axiom are tied together by
that which if it be ut∣tered is a verb: so that verbum here is a metonimy of the
adjunct from the subject, verb being put for

Page  277

that whose name will be a verb. If a man would lay bricks with bricks, to have
them hold together, he must have morter; and if he would fasten two peices of
wood together, he must have a nail, or a pin of wood: for as the morter is to the
bricks, and the nail or pin to the wood, such is this vinculum here spoken of to
the arguments.

Vinculo.

He cals it vinculum, because the vinculum holdeth the arguments together in a

kind of composition: imitating God therein, who hath tied things in nature with
an affection: and indeed to speak the truth, it springs from the affection that is
between the two ar∣guments disposed.

Itaque affirmato vel negato verbo, affirmatur, vel ne∣gatur.

Before we heard in an axiom, that affirmatum was Quando vinculum ejus

affirmatur, negatum contra: why then a simple axiom having the band affirmed
must be affirmed & contra: so that this is nothing but a spe∣cial application to
this kind of axiom, of that which was before taught generally to all axioms: and
that which is special here is, that it is the verbum that is denied or affirmed,
which was vinculum before: and this commendation indeed is chiefly for
contradicti∣on: for if there be contradiction here, the verb must be affirmed, and
denyed: ut ignis urit: ignis est antece∣d•ns, urit consequens: here he cals the
argument go∣ing before the verb antecedens, and the argument fol∣lowing the
verb, consequens: others call them sub∣jectum, and praedicatum, but he is not
pleased with their names, because subjectum is properly an argu∣ment in
invention, therefore if it should be used here, it would breed confusion: and not
onely subjects

Page  278

and predicates are disposed here, but all other argu∣ments, therefore he rather
keepeth the general terms shewing so much: again, they are fitter, because here
we are in disposition, ergo, there must be an argument to go before the
vinculum, and another to so low. Now we use these terms also in a composite
axiom, but they are more proper here. The Aristotelians used their terms
subjectum and praedicatum onely in a sim∣ple axiom, for they had no
composite axioms, but a connex, as we shall hear afterward.

Atque hic prima est inventarum rerum dispositio causae cum effecto, ut in primo exemplo, &c.

Prima by nature, not otherwise, because we can∣not make a composite axiom of

more arguments with more, but there will be more lines: here in a sim∣ple
axiom there is but one line, and in a syllogisme there will be a triangle, the
demonstration may be this.

[illustration]
A simple axiom. [illustration]
A composite of one to more [illustration]
A composite of more to more. [illustration]
A Syllogisme.

Quomodo argumentum quodlibet enunciari potest (exceptis plenis comparationibus &

distributioni∣bus) consentanea quidem affirmando, dissenta∣nea negando.

← Ramus  → doth commorari in telling us the use of a simple axiom, and he

tels us all arguments may be disposed therein, but plenae comparationes, and

Page  279

Plenae distributiones, for so he means, else homo est animal is a distribution,

and yet a simple axiom: but otherwise these will evermore be a composite
axiom.

Consentanea quidem affirmando, dissentanea ne∣gando.

Not but that consentanea may be denied, and dissen∣tanea affirmed, for we
heard before that the same axi∣om might be affirmed and denied, but thus they
ought to be disposed, consentanea affirmando, dissentanea ne∣gando: now here
by consentanea he doth not mean onely causa, effectum, subjectum and
adjunctum, but also those that do arise from them, even all that may any way
agree: as in like sort by dissentanea he means also all them that do arise from
them, or that do any way disagree: but here we are to know, that this is not any
rule of Art, but onely a commoration, ap∣plying that here in special, which he
taught before. Now this disposition is easie: but here sometime the band, and
the consequent part grammatically uttered will be the same, as ignis urit: now
we come to the affections of a simple axiom, which belong not to a composite.

Axioma simplex est generale, aut speciale.

This is a distribution of the subject into the ad∣juncts, and though a composite
axiom may be gene∣ral, or special, yet there we do not look after it: so that
composite axiomes in a syllogisme may make a simple syllogism, being
considered not as composite, but as the arguments are simply disposed.

Generale.

This term comes of genus, not that this axiom con∣sists alwayes of those
arguments genus and species; but he means that commune which we hear of in

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Grammar, and yet notwithstanding the antecedent part may be common, and
the axiom may be proper, ergo, he rather keeps that term generale, then
commune, though it be a hard trope. Now in a general axiom we are to observe
these three things, first an antece∣dent that is common, secondly, a common
consequent, thirdly, a general attribution of them, for else it might be a special
axiom: so that generality and speciality belong to an axiom, and are not to be
sought for in the doctrine of arguments.

Atque hic contradictio non semper dividit verum & fal∣sum, sed contingentium utraque pars falsa
potest esse.

He is careful to teach us contradiction, because there is a mean matter, because

there is no dispute where there is no contradiction, ergo, he teacheth us the
contradiction of a simple axiom, and now of a ge∣neral axiom which will not
alwayes divide truth and falshood, sed contingentium utraque pars, &c. that is,
when we contradict a general by a general.

Item non contingentium.

Why saith he non contingentium? because these non contingentia are such as
fall out, peradventure impossibilia, as in this example. Omne animal est
ra ∣tionale, nullum animal est rationalia, he could not well call them necessaria,
nor possibilia, because they may be denied, whereas an impossible axiom
should be affirmed.

Axioma speciale est, quando consequens non omni ante∣cedenti attribuitur: & hie contradictio semper
divi∣dit verum a falso.

It is called axioma speciale, not in respect it hath a species alwayes disposed in

it with a genus, but in re∣spect it is more special than the general quando
conse∣quens, &c. Consequens indeed is the chiefest part in

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an axiom, and is commonly the argument that is brought to argue: not the
antecedent, he doth not say consequens commune: because it may be either
common, or proper, it is no matter whether of them it be.

Non omni antecedenti.

Omni and non omni are contradictory, now omnis dicitur de tribus ad minimum,
saith the Schools, ergo, if omnis be given generally to all in a general axiom,
then non omnis may be given to one, as it is a special axiom: omnis indeed is
the sign of a general axiom, but where it cannot be had, there the axiom is
special: non omni, that is to the antecedent that cannot have omnis put before it.

Attribuitur.

Attribuitur, in an affirmed axiom, it may seem that there is attributio: but in a

denied axiom rather ab∣negation: but attribuitur both here and in a general
axiom must be taken more generally for the same that disponitur is, whether it
be by way of affirmation or negation.

Et hic contradictio semper dividit verum a falso.

So that if our contradiction with any body be a special axiom, then we may be
assured, that the one part is false, and that there is contradiction in it.

Speciale est particulare, aut proprium.

Particulare doth intimate a common, for nothing can be parted but a common,
and it is so called, be∣cause though the antecedent be common, yet it takes but
part of it.

Particulare quando consequens communi antecedenti particulariter attribuitur.

Here is a fault in the print, for if it should be com∣muni, because the consequent
(as we heard before)

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may be common or proper: but the antecedent must be common; but here is a
particularis attributio. Now a general axiom is before a special, because it is
more large. Homo est doctus is a particular axiom, for antecedens is common,
now it differs from a gene∣ral, first in that a general must have a common
con∣sequens, this may have a common or proper; second∣ly, a general must
have a general attribution, this is a particular one.

Huic autem axiomati generaliter contradicitur.

Therefore in like sort generali axiomati specialiter contradicitur, and then

dividit verum a falso, for con∣tradict a general by a particular, and it will divide
truth and falshood; so that a general axiom hath a double contradiction, one
when we contradict a ge∣neral by a general, and another when we contradict a
general by a particular.

Axioma proprium est, quando consequens antecedenti pro∣prio attribuitur.

 This axiom doth require first a consequent be it proper or common: secondly a
proper antecedent: thirdly an attributio. Now he means by proprium, not that
the antecedent should always be a proper name, for an axiom of genus and
species may make a proper axiom.

CHAP. V.

De axiomate copulato. Axioma compositum est, quod vinculo conjunctionis con∣tinetur.

AXiomatical disposition was where there were two sides arguing, and they
were either one ar∣gument

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to one, or more to one, & contra: but we have already heard of a simple axiom:
now we come to a disposition, where there is one to more, aut con∣tra, and it is
called a composite axiom of this compo∣site disposition. Axioma compositum
est, quod vin∣culo conjunctionis continetur. This axiom contains more simples
in it, though we consider but one side with one.

Quod vinculo, &c.

That is, whose parts are tied together with a con∣junction, so that the tryal of the
axiom lies in the conjunction, not that it ties the arguments firstly, yet it doth tie
them too, as when I say a man is just, and true, for the principal tying lies not in
Is, but in And: so that though there be a verb, yet that is not here considered as
the band. Now if a simple syllogism stand of composite axioms, then Is is the
band.
Vinculo conjuctionis continetur.

So that the parts are held together by this vincu∣lum, yet here he doth not mean
a grammatical con∣junction, but the thing that is signified by the con∣junction:
vox est nota in Grammar: so that meto∣nimically he means that thing whereof
the conjuncti∣on is a note, for he hath not a fitter word, and there∣fore though
Grammar be after Logick, yet because it is commonly taught in Schools first,
therefore Ra ∣mus borroweth from that. Now then by vinculum conjunctionis we
are to understand, that which the con∣junction signifies, and that is nothing but
the glue, or affection that knits things together.
Itaque e conjunctione affirmata vel negata, affirmatur vel negatur.

Here he doth deduct this consecution holpen

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from a former rule: affirmation and negation were, where the band was
affirmed or denied, ergo, if a con∣junction be the copula of a composite axiom,
then that being affirmed makes the axiom affirmed, & contra: this he staid
upon to teach us to discern of contradi∣ction, which is of use especially in
common talk, for if there be no contradiction in controversies, there will be no
dispute.
Contradictionisque pars vera, pars falsa.

Here evermore contradiction divides truth from falshood: so that if one part be
true, the other will alwayes be false, & contra.

Enunciatum compositum est pro sua conjunctione congre∣gativum, aut segregativum.

The axiom stands upon the band, for we have heard of the arguments before,
and that which is here new is the disposing or banding them together. Now
ac∣cording to the nature of a conjunction that ties two sides together, are axioms
to be divided, for there are some conjunctions that belong to a syllogisme tying
three sides together.

Congregativum, that is, where the parts are gathered together to argue one side:
segregativum, that is, where the parts that make one side are severed, to ar∣gue
the other side. Now the reason of this is plain, for some things there are that
may agree in nature, and some things that must be severed, ergo, as God hath
ordered his creatures, so must our Logick be∣hold them.

Congregativum enunciat omnia consentanea affirmando, omnia etiam dissentanea negando.

Enunciat, that is, it doth dispose omnia consentanea affirmando, he means by

consentanea, not onely causa and effectum, subjectum and adjunctum, but
paria, or

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comparata, or orta, otherwise it should enunciare none but consentanea and

dissentanea, dissentanea negando, by dissentanea he means all argument
wherein there may seem to be any dissention.

Est vero copulatum aut connexum.

Things disposed together, where there is two sides, are either disposed, that is,
yoked together, as Oxen go together one by another, or as Horses are tied tail to
tail one following another in a team. So that if the arguments be disposed, that
is, yoked together as Oxen, then it is a copulate axiom, and if one argument go
before another, and the later follow upon the former, then it is a connex: so that
as one thing in nature is disposed together with another, or as one thing
followeth upon another, so must our reason see them. A copulate is first,
because there is not such a precedency and consequency of the arguments as in
a connex, but both go together, ergo, a copulate is next to a simple, and thence
it is that a copulate axiom is so often in a simple syllogisme.

Copulatum, cujus conjunctio est copulativa.

The axiom is delivered altogether passively, the arguments were active, because
the vinculum is affir∣med or denied, and doth not affirm or deny, cujus
con∣junctio est copulativa, whose vinculum is a conjunction if it be uttered:
copulativa, that is, coupling the argu∣ments together, as,

Ʋna Eurusque Notusque ruunt, creberque procellis Affricus—

Hic igitur negatio erit & contradictio.
 Non una Eurusque Notusque ruunt, creber{que} procellis Affricus. Non doth
not here deny that Eurns did blow, or that Notus did not blow, or that Affricus
did not blow; but that all of them did not blow; for

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if one or two of them had blown, and not the third also, it had been false.

Verum enunciati copulati judicium pendet ex om∣nium partium veritate: falsum, saltem ex una parte
falsa.

That we may therefore judge aright whether a copulate axiom be true or false,
why, that it may be true, it must have all the parts true together: falsum may be
of one part false: hence in bonds and obli∣gations, where there are many
conditions, if we break one we break all.

Huic generi affine est enunciatum relatae qualitatis, cujus conjunctio est ipsa relatio.

Here ← Ramus  → doth commorari, for he could not well tell what to say, for
whereas he told us before that a conjunction was the band, here he saith, what
shall we do with those axioms where there is no conjun∣ction, but relata
qualitas. Why, saith he, you must understand here that there is a conjunction:
so that a species of a copulate is that axiom where there is a relation of quality,
for though there be not a con∣junction, yet here is the same in effect with a
conjun∣ction: as if it were thus; sopor est fessis gratus: sic tuum carmen est
nobis gratum.

Relatae qualitatis: he means also relatae quantitatis for so there are examples:
as, how many fishes are in the sea? so many, saith Ovid, are my miseries: Now
I have marvelled that he left out quantitatis, I had ra∣ther have said enunciatum
relationis: not relatae com∣parationis, for dissentanea come not in here.
Relatae qualitatis, where there are similia: he doth not mean that relation in
arguments, but a pronoune.

Page  287

CHAP. VI.

De Axiomate connexo.

Axioma connexum, est congregativum, cujus conjunctio est connexiva.

AXioma connexum, is where the parts are knit one to the tail of another, as in a
t•ace of Horses: and that there is such an axiom, it appears because of the
tacking of one thing to follow another in na∣ture.

Est congregativum: As gathering things one upon the tail of another.

Cu•us conjunctio est connexiva.

Not that it is alwayes so, but relation of time may be here also: as misery draws
a lie, and vanity and falshood follow after, cujus negatio non si, saying the
consequent doth not follow upon the antecedent.
Conjunctio etiam haec interdum negatur apertius negan∣do consequentiam.

Our Author doth commorari in these composite axioms, because other

Logicians have either taught nothing at all of them, or very little: this
conjuncti∣on is sometime denied more openly, negando conse∣quentiam, that is,
not by denying the consequent part, but by denying the consequent part to
follow upon the antecedent, as si est homo, non est brutum, this is not a connex:
so that we must look alwayes that the con∣sequent follow upon the antecedent,
as si est miser, non est ideo vanus, this is a conne.

Page  288

Pro Amer.

Non continuo si me in sicariorum greg•m contuli sica ∣rius sum.

I am not presently a cutter, if I betake my self into the company of cutters: here
the connex must be, non ideo sicarius sum, for he must have some time to learn
to be a cutter.
De Fato.

Nec si omne enunciatum verum est aut falsum, sequi∣tur illico causas esse
immutabiles.

So that the denial is non sequitur illico causas esse immutabiles: the reason
follows:

Affirmatio enim significat si sit antecedens non ideo consequens esse.

That is, it followeth from the antecedent, as if he be a man he hath reason, for
the consequent is affirm∣ed, because the band is affi•med.

Negatio itaque & contradictio statuit, si sit antecedens non ideo consequens esse. Quare cum, &c.

It may be a true axiom, though never a part be true. As, si homo est Leo, est
etiam quadrupes, that is a necessary true connex: but it is neither true that homo
est Leo, nor that he is quadrupes, and so neither part is true: so that the truth of
the consequent part of a connex axiom hangeth on the antecedent
condi∣tionaliter.

At si connexio sit contingens, & pro sua tantum probabilitate ponatur, judicium ejus tantum opi∣nio
fuerit.

So that he doth declare unto us how to judge of necessity and contingency,

which lie in the necessary or contingent following of the consequent upon the
antecedent. Ʋt Pamphile, si id facis, hodie postremum me vides.

Page  289

C•nnexo axiomati affinis est ista consequentiae relatio.

 A cousen connex, or a cousen to connex axiom, is that axiom which is uttered
by cum, etiam, or tum, &c. so that these have the reference of the former: as
ap∣peareth in the example ut,

Cum Tullius sit Orator, est etiam p•ritus bene dicendi.

CHAP. VII.

De axiomate discreto.

Axioma s•gregativum, est cujus conjunctio est segrega ∣tiva: id•oque argumenta
dissentanea enunciat.

A Composite axiom was so called because it had a joyner to his b•nd, that is, a
conjunction: now the band may joyn the words, not the matter, ergo, a
conjunction in a copulate axiom may couple the words, though it sever the
matter, and if the band be not uttered, then that thing that the word doth noti∣fie
is the logical b•nd. Now as axioma was congre∣gativum, which gathered the
parts, either yoaking them like Oxen, as in a copulate, or tying them as Horses
one after another, as in a connex: so segre∣gativum doth sever and sunder the
parts of the axi∣om, and therefore his conjunction is segregativa: so that where
things are severed in nature, there must our Logick see them distinct.

Ideoque argumenta dissentanea enunciat.

Axioma segregativum cannot enunciare consenta ∣nea, but dissentanea: here he

means all arguments where there is consention and dissention; for dissi∣milia
may be disposed in a discrete axiom, though

Page  290

they be not dissentanies: so again, though it doth enunciare dissentanea, yet it

doth not follow, but that it may enunciare consentanea, as animal est homo, aut
brutum: so that they are dissentanea quatenus, the parts disjoyned do dissentire
inter se, and they are consenta ∣nea quatenus, the parts together argue the
whole: so that the parts are not disjoyned from the whole, but inter se.

Enunciatum segregativum, est discretum aut dis∣junctum.

This segregation of things is either a more easie discerning of them, whereas

they might otherwise agree, which may appear to our eye, though it be not so
palpable in the things: or it is disjunct where the parts are severed re & ratione,
so that these axioms do serve for the deliverance of diversa and opposita.

Discretum, cujus conjunctio est discretiva.

Discretum of discerno: so that when things are so severed in nature, as we may

see them disjunct with our eye, though not so plainly in the things them∣selves,
they make a discreet axiom.

Itaque è dissentaneis praecipuè diversa enunciat.

This axiom doth enunciare dissimilia too, there∣fore if he had said dissimilia,
he had included diversa: as though there be matters which might be judged by
 the outward senses, yet are they to be referred to the mind too.

Cujus negatio, & contradictio est.

So that the denial doth take away that discretion which was laid down before.

Discretum enunciatum judicatur esse verum & legiti∣mum, si partes non solum verae, sed etiam
discretae sint; falsum vel ridiculum contra.

Now for the judgement of this axiom, it is verum

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& legitimum: so that two things are required in judging a discreet axiom: first
that the parts be true, else it will be a false axiom; secondly, that they be lawful,
else they will be ridiculous, because the parts will not be divers. As to say,
though he be a man, yet he is a living creature: here both parts are true, but here
is no discretion & therefore it is ridiculous.

CHAP. VIII.

De axiomate disjuncto.

Axioma disjunctum, est axioma segregativum, cujus conjunctio est disjuncta.

THe discreet and disjunct sever things, but the for∣mer doth it onely ratione:
now the disjunct looks at an opposition between the things disjoyn∣ed: it is
called a disjunct axiom, as disjoyning or pulling the parts out of joynt: so then
the former may be compared to the laying of two things that are distinct, but
not pulled out of joynt.

Est segregativum.

Therefore severing the matter, for the parts are so divided, that they cannot
agree, or be united, because they are opposite sine ullo medio.

Cujus conjunctio est disjunctiva.

Disjoyning or pulling in pieces the things dispo∣sed, as there is either day or

night, these are privantia, ergo, contraries, ergo, opposites.

De Fato.

Omnis enunciatio est vera, aut falsa.

This is a disjunct in like sort, where veritas and

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falsitas are disjoyned: now for the judgement of this axiom, here one part onely
is true, and not both, which ariseth from the nature of opposites. Itaque eidem
attribui, &c. but if we consider the affection between the whole and the parts,
there both will be true: as argumentum est artificiale, aut inartificiale, but
because the whole with the form make up the spe∣cies, therefore we say in
 effect, argumentum est artifi∣ciale, aut inartificiale: and if there composite
axioms be disposed in a simple syllogisme, then the verb will be the band: for
we have nothing to do with the dissention of the parts, but to see how the parts
of the question are disposed with the third argu∣ment.

H•c significatur è disjunctis uni um verum esse.

In a distinct axiom one part onely is true, because they are dissentanea: as
homo est bonus aut non bonus, these pa•ts are but contingent separated, bu• the
dis∣junction is necessary.

Cujus negatio

Non omnis enunciatio est vera, a•t falsa.

So that the denial taketh away the contradiction.

Et contradictione significatur, non necess•rio alterum verum esse.

So that though the parts may be contingently true, yet the axiom may be
necssary.

Veruntamen quamvis absolute vera disjunctio necessar a quoque sit: tamen nihil necesse est partes
separatim necessarias esse.

Therefore est is not the band, for it doth tie but contingent truth, but the
conjunction is it, because it ties necessary truth.

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Itaque si disjunctio sit contingens non est absolute vera, & tantum opiniabilis est: qualis est frequenter
in hominum usu.

So that this disjunct contingent is not usual in common speech, ut si quaeratur,

&c. whereas both, or neither of them might come.

Tantum opinabilis.

Because opinio is the judgement of a contingent axiom: and thus we have heard
all the kinds of dis∣position on two sides.

CHAP. IX.

De Syllogismo, & ejus partibus.

Atque ejusmod• judicium est axiomaticum, axiomatis perse manifesti sequitur

dianoeticum.

NOw we come to a disposition, where there are three sides, so that they play as
it were at three hand ruffe: Now mark the reason of this distributi∣on of
dispositio into axioma and syllogismus: some things there are that are laid
together in nature with∣out a mean, ergo, we may see them at the first hand uno
intuiti: some things also have a mean, which we must use before we can see
them, ergo, according to the things in nature, and according to the act of our
reason in beholding these things, so must our Logick proceed, and as the
medium shall either combine or sever them, so we may conclude them
affirmatively or negatively, and herein stands the force of those rules, though
they be not alwayes true, quae conveni∣unt in aliquo tertio conveniunt inter se,
& contra, be∣cause

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that medium is the holder of them two toge∣ther, aut contra: for there the
medium will be a bar to sever them; as otiosus est amator, Egistus est otiosus,
ergo, est amatur, because otium is as glue to pull on amor, for it argues love as
causa, and it puls on Egstus as an adjunct. So this rule sublata ••usa tollitur
ef∣fectum, & contra: and all these rules of consecution are because the effect
brings the cause with it: and any other argument as well as causa may be a
mean whereby two things may be glued together: for this third argument is not
so much a medium in regard of the other two disposed with it, but in respect of
our seeing them, and we may see as well by any other ar∣guments as by causa.

Atque ejusmodi judicium est axiomaticum, &c.

An axiom is such a thing as appears to be true at the first sight, or at the second
hand: now our reason is to be so glued, as that it may be able to see any truth,
ergo, if the truth appear at the first sight, an axiom will serve us, else we must
have a candle to make it clear: so that here we may see, the purpose of
syllogistical judgement is not to make things more true, or more false in
themselves, but to make the truth, or falshood more manifest unto us: so that
clear per se belongs to an axiom; but perspicuity in regard of us belongs to a
syllogism: and here we may also see, that axioma probabile, as they call it, and
axioma subtile belong hi∣ther: so that all third arguments are not used to make
the things more true in themselves, but to make the truth more manifest to us,
ergo, Cardan, whilst he argued against Scaliger, that he that disputed of
sub∣tilty, might dispute of all things, was in the right, but when he would go
about to prove, that all things were to be taught in subtilty, there he was out, for

Page  295

after we have discoursed a point syllogistically, we are fain to go back again to

the rule of an axiom to judge the truth, or falshood thereof, ergo, here we may
see that axioms and syllogisms are confederate, and not syllogism and method.
Now the same axiom may be manifest to one man, but dark to another, ergo,
syllogistical judgement waits upon man, and if the truth or falshood be nice or
fine, that it cannot be seen with one act of our eye, then we must use a third
ar∣gument: and subtil, if we define it aright, is axioma non adeo manifestum.

Sequitur dianoeticum.

Dianoia signifies reasons discourse, the laying a∣bout by our 〈 in non-Latin

alphabet 〉, for when at first she doth not see a truth, then she commands
cogitation to coagitare, that is, to look after it: so that dianoia is nothing, but
the running about of our reason for the finding out of truth. Some Logicians
have compared axiomatical judgement to a calm sea, for there our reason is
qui∣et, being satisfied with the truth, and syllogistical judgement to a troubled
sea, that is, full of storms, winds and tempests, for there our reason beats every
corner to conclude that which is doubtful, and from this act it is called dianoia;
and the judgement of reason in such an Art is called dianoeticum, it running
after this, or that: but our Author divides it after∣ward into syllogismus and
methodus, which how it should be true I see not, namely, how method should
be dianoia: for the three internal senses in nature are distinct, ergo, these parts
ought to be distinct accord∣ing to them, as we heard before. Now method makes
all things one, and so we remember all things as one, and the things be judged
before I come here, here I onely lay things together to remember them.

Page  296

Dianoia est, cum aliud axioma ex alio deducitur estque syllogismus, aut methodus.

This very definition tels me, that dianoia is nothing but syllogismus, and they
are both one: so that here are deductions of axioms out of axioms, which surely
belong to syllogistical judgement onely, for I do not mean that it is ordering of
one axiom before ano∣ther, but a drawing of deductions from their first rules:
true it is, that a former axiom gives light to that which follows, but that light is
by vertue of syl∣logistical judgement, so that method placing axioms, doth
indeed need axiomatical judgement, as that also needs invention before it can
place them, but it doth not therefore follow, that the doctrine of axioms should
be in method.

Syllogismus est dianoia; qua questio cum argumento ita disponitur, ut posito antecedente, necessario
con∣cludatur.

Syllogismus signifies properly the sum of an ac∣count in the species of

numeration, especially in Ad∣dition: and summa and syllogismus are the same;
and the Logicians have borrowed it of the Arithmetici∣ans, because though
Logick be the first Art in order, and nature, yet Arithmetick was observed by
men be∣fore Logick, ergo, Plato set over his Academy 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
for it was taught among them as Grammar is now taught among us: for as for
Logick, Gram∣mar and Rhetorick, they had them by nature, ergo, they studied
the Mathematicks first, ergo, they called them Mathematicks, for the word is
general to all Arts, and indeed that was the reason that Aristotle in his Logick
brings demonstrations out of the Mathe∣maticks: so that this metaphor
syllogismus was a pri∣ore to them. This syllogismus est dianoia, qua questio

Page  297

cum argumento, &c. it is indeed a contract of larger discourse, and here in this
rule observe first a questi∣on, secondly, an argument, thirdly, a disposing of
them together, fourthly, a set or constant position of the arguments and the
question: Lastly, a necessary conclusion from them, first if it be a clear truth
that ought not to be a question, else it should.

Qu• quaestio.

What question? shall he go ask any body? yes, a third argument if he will; but
quaestio here is a law term signifying a commission: so that if he doubted he
might see at the Law for the truth: so that this judgement is a Courtly kind of
seeking out truth with two arguments before the judgement seat of a third
argument and it is not quaestio which is made with an interrogation, which
whilst some Logicians did not consider they fell so in love with quaestio, as
that they made it the subject of Logick, and divided it into simplex which is the
same with argumentum, and com∣positum which is the same with axioma. Then
there must be an argument, he doth not call it tertium ar ∣gumentum here, as he
doth afteward, but onely argu∣mentum: though there are alwayes three
arguments, because here he considers it in respect of the whole question, not
looking at the parts of the question as they are in Invention: and argumentum
must be brought indeed as an evidence, or witness, rather than as a Judge, for I
my self am the Judge thereof.
Cum argumento.

Therefore here, saith Kickerman, must argumen∣tum come in: yea, here indeed
it must come in, but it must, ergo, be taught before, for it must be before it can
come in, ergo, to say it must be here taught, be∣cause it comes in here, is
fallacia accidentis, so that an

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argument belongs to judgement, as it may be dispo∣sed, not as it may be in it

self. But saith Kickerman fur∣ther here is a question before an argument, ergo,
the doctrine of a question must go before the doctrine of an argument, indeed it
so fals out here, but yet the parts of a question are not before an argument
without he will make Pigs fly with their tails for∣ward.

Disponitur.

He would have further rules of consecution from the third argument, that he
might know how to use them; but indeed the rule of syllogismus is the rule of
consecution, ergo, those maxims, as they call them, are consecutions from the
rules of invention, and are prosyllogisms. Now here is a disposition whereof
Kickerman was not aware, whilst he would distribute Logick into a simple
conceit, a double conceit, and into discursus: for if disposition be general both
to his double conceit, and to his discursus, then he leaves out two rules, the
definition and distribution of di∣sposition, ergo, let us hold the right. Ita
disponitur, because in a simple syllogism there is the disposition of the part of
the question with the third argument, consequens in propositione, antecedens in
assumptione, and in a composite syllogism there is the whole question placed
with the third argument alone in the propo∣sition, ergo, the question as the
better man must have the third argument for his companion, for he is the
Gentleman, ergo, he saith, quaestio cum argumento, and ••t argumentum cum
quaestione. Again, the third ar∣gument is for the questions sake, ergo, it is he
that is the more lofty, but this is not quaevis quaestio, but that quaestio quae ita
disponitur, ut posito antecedente necessa ∣rio concludatur. He cals it an
antecedent, ergo, a syl∣logism

Page  299

consisteth of two parts, an antecedent and a consequent. An antecedent is so

called, because it goes before, and a consequent because it comes after: again,
an antecedent and a consequent are not yoked together as two Oxen, as in a
copulate axiom, but one before another as Horses trace, as in a connex hang∣ing
upon the former by a necessity of consequence. Now this question is so posita
cum argumento, as that the question doth follow on them two, for the third
argument never comes into the consequent part. Here positum is as it were put
case, as put case there be an antecedent, tum necessarium concludatur.

Object. Doth every syllogism conclude necessary truth? Yes, not but that it may
be contingent, but he means necessario, that is, that this consequent will follow
necessarily upon the antecedent, for the Art or rule of a syllogism: as otiosus
est amator is contin∣gent, Egistus est otiosus, is contingent, ergo, est amator,
this consequent doth necessarily follow upon the antecedent: so that necessario
goes not with the conclusion, but with the inference of the conclu∣sion.

Nam cum axioma dubium sit, quaestio efficitur, & ad ejus fidem tertio argumento opus est cum
questione collocato.

That is, when a matter is to be demurred, and staid upon, quaestio efficitur, as
before, & ad ejus fidem, &c. what is that? that is, ad ejus fiat dictum, that is,
that you may build upon this truth tertio argumento opus est: so that fides
properly belongs to the will, and to the resolution of the will, which is the
extremity of reason, so that fides is in the will, ergo, belongs to Di∣vinity; for
when the Lord assures man by his Spirit, that he is reconciled unto him, his will
saith present∣ly

Page  300

fiat dictum; so that the third argument must give testimony of the honesty of the
parts of the question, which two parts entring into the band, the contro∣versie is
ended. Collocato: here he tels us in general of the placing of the argument, but
when it is to be placed, and where, we shall hear hereafter.

Syllogismi antecedens partes duas habet propositionem, & assumptionem.

He doth not define antecedence and consequence, for there is antecedence and
consequence in an argu∣ment, as the cause is before the effect, &c. and in an
axiom, and also here, ergo, they are voces ambiguae, ergo, are not to be defined
here.

Propositio, & assumptio.

Propositio is oftentimes used generally for axioma, but it names an axiom

onely as it is used in a syllo∣gism: and to use it more generally, is to abuse it, or
at least to use a catathristical synecdoche: assumptio belongs hither onely.

Propositio est prima pars antecedentis qua questionis faltem consequens cum argumento disponitur.

We have heard of a question, and an argument, which is a third in respect of the

two in the question; but he cals it not a third before, because in a compo∣site it
is disposed with the whole question, not with the parts, then the dispositio of
the argument cum quaestione is not at random, but so as there will be an
antecedent and a consequent, which antecedent be∣ing put, the consequent will
follow of necessity; that is, the inference of the conclusion will follow of
ne∣cessity, so that necessity here follows upon the infe∣rence of the conclusion,
not upon the conclusion. Now the parts of the antecedent are the proposition
and assumption, for so it is requisite, that every syl∣logism

Page  301

stand of three parts, because they play at three hands: and there must be two
parts of the antece∣dent, because the argument being but one can play but twice,
namely, with the two parts of the question, and therefore if it should play the
third time, it must play with it self, and thence it is, that it never comes into the
conclusion: now in a composite syllogism there is silently contained the
antecedent part of the question in the assumption, though it be not exprest. Now
the common Logicians call the proposition the major propositio, and the
assumption the minor proposi∣tio, and the reason of it is this, because the majus
ex∣tremum, namely, the consequent part of the question was put in proposition,
and the minus extremum in the assumption: for as touching a composite
syllo∣gism, Aristotle did not teach one word of it. Now ← Ramus  → keeps
these terms propositio, and assumptio, and he had reason, for use hath taken up
these words in good Authors for these things, as in Tully, Cornelius Agricola,
and other Logicians that follow the more pure latine, and there is reason for it,
for that which they call propositio there, is a thing propounded to him with
whom we dispute, and then the former being granted, I do assume as it were
out of the bowels of the proposition, the assumption: so the Greeks call
propositio, Prothesis, and assumptio, Hypothesis: though I find some of them
that call the proposition thesis, whereas the question is the thesis. Now
propositio is that which is propounded, and carrieth a shew of truth with it,
ergo, we seldom deny the proposition, but rather the assumption, or else
distinguish of it, ergo, our chiefest care must be of the assumption, to discern
truth and falshood in that.

Page  302

Est prima pars antecedentis.

As if he should say, that the disposition of the que∣stion with the argument,
must have a proposition, and that must be placed first: so that that which we
shall hear of more particularly hereafter, here we hear it more generally,
namely, that it must be prima pars.

Qua questionis saltem consequens, &c.

In this proposition there is a disposition of the question with the argument,

saltem consequens, he speaks this, because whether our syllogism be simple or
composite, the consequent part of the question is in the proposition. He saith
saltem, because the whole question is in the proposition of a composite
syllogism: ergo, the consequent part, therefore ob∣serve this generally in every
proposition, there is the consequens quaestionis disposed with the antecedent;
therefore whereas we heard before that a syllogism was qua quaestio cum
argumento, &c. here we hear that propositio est qua quaestionis saltem
consequens cum ar ∣gumento disponitur.

Assumptio est secunda pars antecedentis, quae assumitur e propositione.

Assumptio, the second part of the antecedent part is called assumptio, because
adsumitur, it is taken to the proposition, for the proposition being setled, we
take the assumption out of it being more general: I was wont to compare the
proposition to a Cow, and the assumption to her Calf, that is taken out of of her,
and goeth by her side.
Est secunda pars antecedentis.

Propositio is before, for in the question the conse∣quent part is more general, or
at least equal to the an∣tecedent, quatenus it is an axiom, by reason whereof

Page  303

the proposition that contains the consequent part of the question with the third
argument, is more general than the assumption: and it is the principal, namely,
the third argument: as, si Socrates est animal, est sub∣stantia: at si Socrates est
homo est animal, ergo: a∣gain, here lies another reason, qua assumitur è
propo∣sitione, ergo, the proposition must be more capacious, or at least equal,
as where the proposition and assump∣tion shall be reciprocal, for we cannot
take two out of one.
Assumitur.

Because when the proposition shall be granted, then I will take my assumption
out of it: so that this is generally to be observed, that the assumption is ta∣ken
out of the proposition; this is the dianoia of it, qua aliud axioma ex alio
deducitur: it is as a case of boxes where one is taken out of another: now if the
assumption be not taken out of the proposition, then it is not ad idem, ergo,
baculus stat in angulo.

Syllogismi autem pars consequens est, quae complectitur partes quaestionis, eamqueconcludit: unde
complexio & conclusio dicitur.

So that we must take heed that we have not more in the conclusion than the
parts of the question: for as it was a fallace if the assumption were not taken out
of the proposition: so is it also here, if any thing come into the conclusion
beside the question. If there should be any other thing, it would be either an
heterozetesis, when the question is not concluded, as the Schools say, it is not
adrem; or else apoluzetesis, i. concluding many questions in one, ergo, an
hetero∣zetesis, and apoluzetesis erre against this rule.

Eamque concludit.

The third argument can never come into the con∣clusion:

Page  304

in a simple sillogism the third argument is brought as a candle, to see how it

playes with the consequent part of the question in the proposition, and with the
antecedent in the assumption, and then the question is concluded: in a
composite syllogism we repeat the third argument in the assumption, as if he
should say, mark this, this is it that shews the truth of the question. Concludit:
that is, shuts them together in the axiom: but if they dissent it severs things.

Ʋnde complexio, & conclusio dicitur.

These are logical terms, which he brings to shew us how the same thing may
have divers names: and hitherto we have heard generally de Syllogismus & ejus
partibus. Now there are certain properties that belong to a syllogism, which are
called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, hi∣dings, for many times in our dispute we hide
some parts; now the reason of that is indeed the distracti∣on of our
understanding, for many times we hasten to be at the conclusion without any
reason; some∣times we touch the reason without the conclusion: and again,
many times we touch all the parts, but dis∣orderly, therefore this being in use
we must have a doctrine thereof.
Si qua pars syllogismi defuerit, enthymema dicitur.

This by the common Logicians is made a special kind of argumentation, but

they mistake it, for it is nothing but a syllogism wanting a leg, as if a man
wanting a leg were not a man, so is this a syllogism, though it be lame. Again,
in Grammar we say, quod subintelligitur non d•est: ergo, here though a part be
not expressed, yet is it, not wanting: & the very name tels me as much. It comes
of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in mente, be∣cause I keep a part of it in my mind:
and even as in

Page  305

Arithmetick syllogismus is the totum; so enthume∣ma is the reservation, or

keeping of one in my mind, and setting down a cypher: so that that re∣tention 〈
in non-Latin alphabet 〉, doth not make a distinct species of argumentatio.

Si quid praeter illas tres partes accesserit prosyllo∣gismus.

Many times we shall see the proposition backt, the assumption backt, and the
conclusion backt with a third argument, then it is prosyllogismus: so that
some∣times as we are too strait, so here we are too large: divers Ramists have
also thought there should be pro∣axioma; as Tully that famous Orator of Rome
de∣claimed against Verres: here they say, that famous Orator of Rome is a
proaxioma, and it is so; for if any thing be added in an axiom beside the
antecedent and consequent part, it is but for illustration of that part whereunto it
is joyned: but in a prosyllogism there is a third argument that proves something
backing either the assumption or the conclusion: as Paul an Apostle writes to
the Romans: for here Apostle is part of the axiom, and from that name he is
enjoyned to write: that they call Sorites is nothing but many prosyllogisms one
backing another, and one backing the principal.
Partium etiam ordo saepe confunditur.

Whereas the parts should be in order, the propo∣sition first, then the assumption,
and lastly the conclu∣sion; sometimes we shall have the assumption first, then
the proposition, then the conclusion, & contra, & alternè, & inverse: as
Socrates est homo quia ani∣mal, &c. As for dilemma it is nothing but
 syllogismus disjunctus, and inductio is nothing but a collectio, or a reasoning
from the parts to the whole.

Page  306

Attamen, si qua dubitatio propterea fuerit, explenda, quae desunt: amputanda, quae supersunt: &
pars quae libet in locum redigenda est.

If any parts be wanting, so that some scruple may arise thereof, set it down; if
there be more than needs, take them away for the time; if any parts be
disor∣dered, set them at rights, first the proposition, then the assumption, and
lastly the conclusion.

CHAP. X.

De syllogismo simplici contracto. Syllogismus est simplex aut compositus.

VVE have heard of a syllogism, and what it serves for, namely, to manifest a
doubtful axiom: now we come to the species of a syllogism, est simplex, aut
compositus.〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: we have heard the reason of the name,
that it is a brief of that which is more largely delivered: now for this cause the
Stoicks called it a fist, for it is not generally of Logick, but belongs to a
syllogism. These names simplex and compositum we have heard of more often
in Logick; we have heard of argumentum simplex, aut comparatum: and we
have heard that axioma est simplex, aut compositum, and now that syllogismus
est simplex, aut compositus: but it is the community of name, not the
community of the thing: and for want of fit names, we may borrow the same
often, if so be the definitions shew the difference of them: in a simple axiom
there is one argument simply dis∣posed with one; in a simple syllogism there is
also a

Page  307

simple disposition, but of the consequent part of the question in the proposition,
of the antecedent in the assumption, ergo, from the breaking of this question
thus, as there is a simple disposition, it is called simple, but in a composite
syllogism the whole question, and the third argument are disposed together,
ergo, accor∣ding to these two kinds of disposition there are these parts of a
syllogism; now the reason why there is this disposition in nature is this, the
third argument which is well called so here, because here the parts of the
question are broken, the truth must either be such, as is so doubtful, as we must
be fain to pull the parts of the question in sunder to see it, and then we make a
simple syllogism: or if the question be not so doubtful but that we may soon
perceive it, then we make but a composite syllogism: hence it is, that the
common Logicians never dreamed of a composite syllogism, but onely of a
simple, desiring to make all things more clear, but there are often more fallaces
lie lurking under a composite syllogism, then under a simple one: hence in
Schools we say, dispute ca ∣tagorice, for in a composite the third argument
be∣ing disposed with the whole question, doth not so clear it, as in a simple it
doth; yet none is to except against it, the composite syllogism clears the whole
question, the simple clears both the parts of the que∣stion.
Simplex, ubi pars consequens quaestionis disponitur in propositione: pars antecedens in assumptione.

This then is particular first in a simple syllogism, that the consequent part of the
question is disposed with the third argument in the proposition, now whe∣ther
before or after, we shall hear hereafter, for that is more particular; before in the
definition of a syl∣logism

Page  308

it was quaestio cum argumento, then quaestion is saltem consequens, here it is

pars consequens in propo∣sitione, pars antecedens in assumptione: and whether
this be before or after, we shall hear hereafter: so that is general to every simple
syllogism. Conse∣quens in propositione, because that evermore is the more
general part of the question, as we heard be∣fore, and the continent should hold
more than the contentum, and the assumption assumitur è propositione, ergo,
the consequent must be there, and the antecedent, therefore in the assumption
he doth not say, conse∣quens disponitur cum argumento, for that is general
before in the definition of a syllogisme.

Estque affirmatus è partibus omnibus •ffi•matis.

← Ramus  → now teacheth us the common properties of a simple syllogism,

which agree not to a composite, but quatenus the proposition thereof may be a
sim∣ple: affirmation and negation we heard of in an axi∣om, but here the
syllogism is not so nominated from the band as before, but from the
propositions affi•m∣ed, or denyed, general, special, or proper; so that
affirmation is here when every part, proposition, as∣sumption and conclusion
are affirmed.

Negatus, e negata antecedentium partium altera cum complexione.

Now we are here to observe, that in these general properties come in all those
modi, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, &c. for they are nothing but generalis
affir ∣matus, negatus, &c. so that if we observe but these rules, we shall swallow
up many rules, and such words or modi, as would make a man afraid to read
them, lest there should be some charming in them.

Negatus e negata, &c. for ex omnibus negativis nihil concluditur: for if the
third argument disagree

Page  309

from both parts, it will never glue them together; but here in general this is a
certain truth, that the conclusion will follow the worse part, particularity cannot
indeed hold in a contract, but for negation it will: now followeth another
property.

Generalis, e propositione & assumptione generalibus.

This is not as the generality of an axiom, quando commune consequens

attribuitur generaliter communi antecedenti: but here it is when the proposition
and assumption are general.
Specialis, ex altera tantum generali.

Because the other part may be either particular or proper; if he had said, ex
altera tantum speciale, it had not been so convenient: again, whilst he saith, ex
altera tantum generali, he tels us there cannot be a concluding ex meris
particularibus, because the con∣clusion would not follow, for in the particular
axiom there may be a separation, as aliquis homo est doctus, aliquis homo non
est doctus: here would be four ter ∣mini.

Proprius, ex utraque propria.

Here mark, that as in the special syllogism, so in the proper, he makes no

mention of the conclusion, be∣cause howsoever the parts be general, &c. the
con∣clusion will be particular: now by the rules follow∣ing I will presently
know in what mood any syllo, gism will be concluded.

Simplex syllogismus, est contractus partibus vel ex∣plicatus.

Our Author brings in a distribution here, that hath not any warrantry from any
other but himself, he hought long how he might make a dicotomy, which he
might have done thus: a simple syllogism is more single, or more composite,
this he thought of, but if he

Page  310

should have brought it in, then there would have been confusion, for then he
bad severed the expli∣cates: because there the third argument follows twice:
whereas there are certain properties agree∣ing to them both, which have nothing
to do with a contract. Again, I have seen in some of his additi∣ons a tricotomy
into contractus, explicatus, primus and secundus: but this also would breed
confusion; for by this means those properties that are general to both the
explicates would be left out: but in the end he settled in this, though
Machelmeneus a French man, who saith he was his Master, reports that
← Ramus  → desired him to mend this distribution: and I am sure, though he
were his Master, the Scholler was better than the Master. ← Ramus  → saith it
is contractus, or ex∣plicatus: which we are to justifie thus: he follows use, and
use contracts this kind of Syllogism more often than it explicates it: not that it
is alwayes con∣tracted, but sometime it is explicated, as ← Ramus  → tels us:
yet this is alwayes true, that when it is explicated it may be contracted. Paul
contracts it, hath God forsaken all Israel? God forbid, I am an Israelite: this is
it: Paul is not forsaken, Paul is an Israelite, ergo, all Israel is not forsaken: so
that contractus is a species of syllogismus, because use doth most com∣monly
contract this kind of syllogism: therefore be∣cause it is true more often, then it
is false, therefore let the truth be taught generally, and the exception come more
afterward, because that is more special in use, the explicate is never contracted,
ergo, this opposition of them may seem to make them oppo∣site species.

Page  311

Contractus, quando argumentum pro exemplo ita subji∣citur particulari quaestioni, &c.
 Here these things are to be considered: for the argument is brought as an
example alwayes, then secondly, the question is particular, thirdly, it is
sub∣jected to the particular question as an example there∣of, and here lies the
contradiction, here the third ar∣gument is brought as an instance as we call it.

Subjicitur.

That is subjected as inferiour to both the parts of the question: it must be

subjectum of the consequent part of the question in the proposition, and
sub∣jectum of the antecedent part of the question in the assumption, if we
explicate it: so that remember that before in the definition of spllogismus
symplex, and apply it unto this: so that that which is here re∣quired is first a
particular question then a third argu∣ment as a question is subjected, and this is
when it is contracted.

Ʋt utramque partem antecedens, & assumptione affir∣matum intelligatur.

For that is understood, intelligatur, that is, even when it is contracted: so that
here is the reason why this syllogism is first. Aristotle and all his sect that
follow him make this figure last: but a syllogism is a disposition, and according
to the disposition of the third argument, such is the syllogism, if therefore it go
before in both the parts of the antecedent, why to go before is before to go
behind, ergo, this must be the first. Kickerman saith Aristotles order is best,
be∣cause the last figure is most general for use, he hath reason for it, for it is
more large for his reach, but not so simple for disposition, and how can we
conclude, till we know where to place the third argument.

Page  312

Hic enim argumentum quaestionis, &c. ← Ramus  → doth here commorari.

Nec aliter explicatur.

← Ramus  → was here deceived, for sometime it is expli∣cated, yet for one
that is explicated, we shall have it contracted.

CHAP. XI.

De prima specie syllogismi simplicis explicati.

In syllogismo explicati propofitio est generalis, aut pro∣pria, & conclusio

similis antecedenti, aut partide∣biliori.

VVE have heard that a simple syllogisme did break the question, and the third
argument was laid to each part, that is, to the consequent part in the
proposition, and looked into that by the light of the third argument, and to the
antecedent in the assumptions. Now simplex was by use contracted, or laid out
more at large. Use is artium magister, saith the Schools, and because it was
more often in use con∣tracted than explicated, ergo, it was requisite that he
should teach us the use of contracting it. This is in nature first, if we shall look
at placing the third argu∣ment, for to come before is before to come behind, and
to come behind is before to come before and be∣hind. Now in a contract the
question is alwayes particular, and the antecedent part of the question in like
sort doth alwayes agree with the third argu∣ment, because the assumption must
alwayes be affirm∣ed, so that do but consider those two things, and

Page  313

you shall presently know any contract syllogisme, and thus much of a contract,
now we come to an ex∣plicate.

In syllogismo explicato propositio est generalis, aut pro∣pria, & conclusio similis antecedenti, aut parti
de∣biliori.

The things here to be considered are first in the proposition, then in the
conclusion: the proposition must be general, or proper, not particular, for then it
is a breach of this rule, and this fallace is very com∣mon even in common talk,
as for example.

I hat that ties us unto Christ is the act of our faith.

The imputation of Christs righteousness is not our act of faith saith one.

Therefore it doth not tie us unto Christ.

Here the proposition is not general, for we are made righteous, not for our saith
alone, but for that we are in Christ by faith: faith ties us as an instru∣ment, but
we must take heed that we give not that to the instrument which is due to the
principal cause, for even as my arm is tied not to my sinews, or nerves, but is
tied to the whole body, and is a member of the whole, being tied unto them by
the whole: so we are as members of Christs body tied to his Church, and are
part of the matter and form of the whole, the matter is quatenus, we are
spiritually made of the se∣men of the word: the form is the union of the Spi∣rit
holding all the members in semine, in that word unto Christ, now there is no
fallace more common than this, for if we have a reason we bring it, never
looking after the conclusion how it will follow, ergo, let us now well consider
it, that we be no more de∣ceived, for thus one saith.

Page  314

We are adopted to be the Sons of God by the act of faith without Christ.

But the imputation of Christs righteousness doth not make us to be adopted

Sons of God.

Therefore this is as if I should say, that where by I am nourished or live is my

hands, ergo, this is true, but yet I do not live onely by my hands, for then I
should feed on them; and so if we look at the in∣vention we make that causa
sola, which is causa cum aliis.

Et conclusio similis antece denti aut parti debiliori.

That is, if that be strong, that is general, it will be like it, ant parti debiliori, that
is particular, negative or proper. Now for negation we heard of that gene∣rally
before, that is, ex meris negativis nihil concludi∣tur: so that it is generally true,
that if the syllogism be negative, the conclusion thereof must be negative: but
particularity and property are here to be under∣stood: so that whether in a
contract, or explicate, negation is general, and by pars debilior we are to
understand both negation, particularity and proper∣ty, but more especially
particularity and property; particularity is debilior, then generality, because
there we cannot so fully determine of a thing. Now nega∣tion is more weak than
affirmation, because it is more general, as when I say a man is not a stone, for
here I go far from the point of telling you what a man is, for yet he may be any
thing but a stone.
Species duae sunt: prima ubi argumentum semper se∣quitur, negatum in altera parte.

For whilst a syllogism stands in the disposition of the question with a third
argument; and a simple syllogism is from breaking the parts of the question,
disposing the consequent in the proposition, the ante∣cedent

Page  315

in the assumption, ergo, the species must be by reason of the disposition of the
third argument going before onely, or going behind onely, or going both before
and behind, ergo, they are very species of dis∣position. Now there are species
duae, for there are no more places for the third argument: it cannot go after, and
come before, as it may come before, and go after, the reason is this, the
consequent part of the question is the majus extremum, ergo, if that should be
in the assumption, then how could the as∣sumption be taken out of the
proposition, whereas the minus extremum was there, for so the assumption
would be bigger than the proposition; and by this means the third argument in
the proposition should be greater if it came after, then the majus extremum that
should there go before it, whereas we heard be∣fore that the consequent part of
the question is either more general, or at least equal to the third argument: and
again, it should go before in the assumption, though it be greater than the minus
extremum: so that there are no more places, it must either go before both, and
so be less than both the parts of the questi∣on: or follow both, and so be greater
than both: or else it must be a mean betwixt both.
Prima ubi argumentum semper sequitur, &c,

For here is a more simple disposition than in the second explicate, secondly, it
is denied in altera parte, meaning in the one part of the antecedent part, either
proposition or assumption: they must never both be denied, nor both affirmed.
The rule of negatus told us that one of the antecedent, and the conclusion must
be denied but not all.

Semper sequitur.

That is, the consequent in the proposition, and

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the antecedent in the assumption: so that if the questi∣on be negative we may

conclude it here, or in all the rest: but particulars where the third argument
agrees with the antecedent may be onely concluded in a contract, as,
Turbatus non bene utitur rati•ne.

Turbatus is a man addicted to his affections, and the Stoicks held that sapiens
and turbatus were dispa∣rates, and the reason is, because sapientia is not
tur ∣batio. Sapientia is properly the readiness or prompt∣ness in syllogistical
judgement: now where will rules without reason, that is not good; for the
af∣fections that attend upon will do trouble the reason, as love heats fancy, and
hatred cools, both which are enemies to reason. Ʋsus rationis, the third
ar∣gument is a genus of sapientia, for it is general of all Logick: and the
intellectual vertues are the hab∣tual promptnesses of reasons act: and this
syllogism may also be concluded in the second kind of an ex∣plicate.

Qui bene utitur ratione non est turbatus.

Sapiens bene utitur ratione.
Sapiens igitur non est turbatus.
Hoc judicium ita fit a Cic. 3. Tus.

Quemadmodum (ait) oculus conturbatus non est probe affectus ad suum munus
fungendum, &c.

The proposition is here adorned with a prosyllo∣gisme a simili: & sapientis

animus it a semper affectus est, ut ratione optime utatur: there is the
assumption: nunquam igitur est perturbatus, there is the conclusi∣on: and this is
called a general of the first kind, be∣cause here are onely negative syllogims,
and there∣fore the conclusion is alwayes negative, ergo, that is the first kind of
generals, when the conclusion is like

Page  317

to the proposition, for here general is an affection of simplex syllogismus

explicatus: but when I say gene∣ralis est primus, aut secundus, here is a
distribution of the genus into the species: now it is general, because the third
argument is given to the parts of the questi∣on generally.

Res mortalis est composita.

This is a general of the second sort, because here the assumption is denied: here
composita agrees to res mortalis as a cause, ergo, the proposition is affirm∣med:
and because it will not agree with the antece∣dent anima, ergo, the assumption
is denied.

Cicero 1. Tusc. In animi autem cognitione (inquit.)

Here the assumption is first, being backed with a prosyllogism, a testimonio

nisi enim in Physicis plum∣bei sumus, and here Tullies eloquence is shewed in
the variety of words signifying the same thing, and this belongs to natural
Philosophy, where we hear that el•mentum is composed ex elementis Quod cum
ita sit, &c. here is the conclusion. Est enim interius, &c. that is, res mortalis
here is the proposition, and these are both general, for here compositio is
gene∣ral to the consequent part, and the conclusion is so too. Now we come to
the species of specialis prima, aut secunda.
Lividus non est magnanimus.
This is special, because the proposition onely is general; it is primus because it
is negative in the pro∣position like unto the conclusion, the question is, whether
maximus be a snake or a slow worm, for a snake is very slow: and lividus is
properly that which is black, and blew, and metaphorically it sig∣nifies poyson:
it signifies also one that will not

Page  318

do good himself, and yet envieth at others that do well: magnanimus, that is,
couragious: these are disparates. Maximus Ovids friend is magnanimus: so that
lividus non est magnanimus belongs to natural Philosophy.
Ovid. 3. de pont. Eleg. 3.

Livors iners vitium, mores non exit in altos, &c.

Here is the proposition utque latens ima, &c. there is a prosyllogism to it, a
simili. Mens tua sub∣limis, here is the assumption, and here are prosyllo∣gisms
to that; Maximi were so called first of Fa ∣bius Maximus who was more than
Alexander Magnus, supra genus eminet ipsum a comparatis: in∣genium for
magnanimity, a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, then a minore. Ergo
alii noceant mi∣seris, here is a dissimilitude. Ac tua supplicibus, &c. here are
prosyllogisms for the conclusion which is wanting.

Specialis secundus.
Saltator est luxuriosus.

Specialis because one onely part is general, secundus, because the assumption
is denied, as the conclusion is. The question is, whether Murae∣na be a dancer.

Cicero pro Muraena.

Nemo enim fere salta sobrius, nisi forte insanit, &c.

Here the proposition is first with a prosyllogism, neque insolitudine, &c. here is
a distinction into the specials: intempestivi convivii, &c to mihi, &c. here is the
assumption, and there is a distribution of the integrum into the members: lastly,
the conclusion, & cum ea non reperiantur, here is again a repetition of the
assumption with the conclusion.

Page  319

Ovid 1. Trist. Eleg. 2.

Carmina proveniunt animo deducta sereno.

Ovid excuses his verses tripliciter, my verses cannot be good: why? from the
cause, carmina proveni∣unt, &c. nubila sunt su•••is, here is a prosyllogism of
the proposition ab adversis: secondly, carmina s•cessum &c. the proposition,
the assumption is me mare, &c. Again, all fear should be removed from good
verses: the assumption followeth enwrapt with a contrary, ego perditus ensem,
 &c. haec quo∣que quae facio, &c. here is a deprecatio instead of the
conclusion, which is general to all the three syl∣logisms.

Proprius primus.

Agesilaus non est pictus ab Appelle, &c.

Here the third argument disagrees with the conse∣quent part, for Apelles lived
not in Agesilaus time.

Proprius secundus,

Caesar oppressit patriam.

Here we see our Author doth not bring examples of proper syllogisms out of
Authors, because Authors commonly slide away in generals; but yet he might
have brought some out of History, for there com∣monly we have proper
syllogisms.

CHAP. XII.

De secunda specie syllogismi simplicis explicati.

Secunda species, explicati syllogis est quando argumen∣tum antecedit

propositione, sequitur affirmatum in as∣sumptione.

VVE have heard the reason of the disposition of a simple syllogism, and the
reason why

Page  320

the contract must go first, because it placeth the third argument and that before,
whereas the first explicate is the second, because it placeth the third argument
both before and after, ergo, here is a more composite disposition than before,
ergo, ← Ramus  → placeth this last, whereas Kickerman would have it first,
because it is more general for use, but quatenus it is a syllogism it is more
special: but he meant it was more gene∣ral, because it concludeth more
questions, but that is no reason, for so adjunctum in Invention should be taught
before subjectum, for adjunctum est frequenti∣us, & copiosus: but we cannot
know what to place before and after, till first we know what it is to place
before, and what it is to place after.
Secunda species syllogismi explicati est, &c.

There are two things to be considered in this de∣finition: first, that the argument
doth antecedere in propositione: secondly, that it be affirmed in the
as∣sumption: for the placing of the third argument, we must know, that the place
of it is double: first, it must be the antecedent in the proposition; secondly, it
must be the consequent in the assumption, and it had his name medium from
this syllogism principally, for in a contract it was placed before the parts of the
question, in the first explicate after them: here it comes between them both, and
because this kind was most common, and a figure best known in Schools, ergo,
hence came the third argument to be called medium: Secondly, the assumption
must be affirmed, and herein it agreeth with a contract; and here we see what
syllogism may be concluded in an explicate: first, an affirmed of all sorts,
whether generalis, parti∣cularis, or proprius: secondly, a denyed of all sorts but
not every denied; for if the antecedent part dis∣agree

Page  321

with the third argument, then it will be con∣cluded in the first kind of an
explicate, and therefore argumentum antecedit the consequent part of the
que∣stion, sequitur affirmatum, the antecedent in the as∣sumption, as we heard
generally in a simple syllo∣gism; as for example, the question is, whether profit
attend honesty, the third argument is justum: for the proposition, if it be not
well gotten it will not thrive: for the assumption, the truth of that ap∣pears,
because justitia generalis, or virtus and honesta• are all one.

Affirmatum generale Omne justum est utile.

Cicero 2. officiorum, it a concludit.
Summa quidem authoritas Philosophy, &c.

Here the proposition is first, being backt with a prosyllogism a testimonio; then
the assumption, and then the conclusion: and this is generalis, quia est ex
propositione, & assumptione generalibus quia ex omnibus partibu▪ affirmatis,
and the rest following are so for the reason out of their definitions.
Neg. gene.
Timidus non est liber.
Hoc ita concluditur, & judicatur ab Horatio 1. Epist.
Quo melior servo, quo liberior sit avarus, &c.

The question is, whether a covetous man be free: no, for he will make himself a
slave for a farthing: the proposition is argued in the example with a
prosyllo∣gism, and that is argued by another prosyllogism from his effects, nam
qui cupit, &c. there is the assumption•porro qui metuens vivit, &c: there is the
conclusion backt with a prosyllogism.

Consslii expers, consilio reginon potest.

Page  322

Terentius in Eunucho.
Here, quares in se neque consilium neque modum
Habet ullum—

Love cannot be governed by counsel: why? be∣cause it is expers consilii: any

affection whatsoever if it be in excess it will hear no reason, love espe∣cially,
for it is hot, and that intoxicates the head, and sets fancy on work, and will hear
no judgement: the proposition is first, here quae res. In amore haec omnia
insunt vitia, here instead of the assumption the causes of love are reckoned up.
Incerta hac situ, &c. there is the conclusion backt with a prosyllo∣gism a
contrario.
Affir. spec.
Consules virtute facti, studiose rempub. tueri de∣bent

The question is, whether Cicero was to be causa quae •ueatur Rempublicam:
yes, because he is made Consul for his vertue.
Sic Orator diligentiam suam, &c.

The proposition is first, being argued with a pro∣syllogism a minore, qui non in
incunabilis, that is, not by being born of them who have been Consuls; sed in
campo, that is when they go to the fields, not to their progenitors, and that he
shews by a contrary to him∣self; then the assumption, nulli populo, and with a
prosyllogism the conclusion, me ipsum, &c. he doth commorari upon the
assumption by a digression: and upon the occasion of the prosyllogism he
repeats a∣gain the conclusion.

Quod optatum redierit, gratum est.

The question is, whether Lesbia be welcome to Catullus: yes, because she is
the subject of his desire, it is a connex axiom; but we are to

Page  323

look at it as it is a simple axiom, as the verb is the band that ties it.

Ca•ullus sic concludit.

Si quicquam cupidoque optanti obtigit unquam.

The proposition is first, then the assumptio argued a minore carius auro: lastly,
he doth commorari upon the conclusion, Lesbi animi cupido: where there is
also a comparison added a minore.
Neg. spec.
Deceptor amantis puellae non est laudandus.
Phillis apud Ovidium.
Fallere credentem non est operosa puellam.

Now followeth a negative special, Demophoon non est laudandus, from his
effects the proposition is first, fallere with a prosyllogism, simplicitas, &c. then
the assumption, sum decepta, then the conclusion with an execration by a
testimony of the gods: and now in these kinds of simple syllogisms, the
question is made much more clear and evident then in composite syl∣logisms,
because here we sever the question into his parts, and lay the third argument
with each part, to see the truth thereof: whereas in a composite syllo∣gism we
dispose the third argument with the whole question, and do not sever it at all.
Now then, that we may know readily where any question may be concluded, it
is but this, look at the question, whether it be affirmed, or denied, general,
special, or proper: if it be a general affirmed, it can be concluded onely in the
second kind of an explicate, not in the first ex∣plicate, not in a contract: if it be a
general denied it may onely be concluded in the first explicate, and also in the
second explicate, if the third argument agree with the antecedent part of the
question: if it be a particular affirmed it may be concluded in a con∣tract,
 Page  324

not in the first explicate, but in the second ex∣plicate, if the third argument
agree with the antece∣dent: if it be a particular denied it may be conclu∣ded in a
contract, and in the first explicate, if the third argument disagree with the
antecedent part of the question, and in the second explicate: so that this is the
most general: if it be a proper affirmed, it can onely be concluded in the second
explicate, not in the first explicate, nor in a contract: if it be a pro∣per denied,
then it can be concluded onely in the first explicate, or in the second explicate,
if the third argument doth agree with the antedent part of the question, not in a
contract.

CHAP. XIII.

De Syllogismo connexo primo. Adhuc syllogismus simplex fuit: syllogismus compositus, est syllogismus
ubi tota quaestio est pars al•era propo∣sitionis affirmatae, & compositae: argumentum est pars reliqua.

VVE have heard of a simple syllogisme, and how it came to be simple: now it
is called a com∣posite, by reason the whole question is placed in the proposition
with the third argument, now which goes first, and which goes last, we shall
hear in the specials. Again, this proposition must be affirmed, meaning the parts
affirmed, and also composite, the assumption and conclusion are alwayes, or at
least may alway be simple, and it is called composite, not so much in respect of
the proposition, but of the dis∣posing

Page  325

of the whole question with the third argument. Here we must not bring any part
of the question into the assumption, for if we bring in one part, we wrong the
other part: and if we bring in the whole questi∣on, we commit a tautology,
making the proposition and assumption the same; but the third argument must
come into the assumption, because it is the light to clear the question, ergo, it is
first placed in the pro∣position with the whole question, then alone in the
assumption: as if I should say, this is it that is two foot long, do you mark it: or
as if I should shew you corn, and a bushel together in the proposition, and then
afterward shew you a bushel alone, and tell you that it is a lawful one.

Tollere autem in composito syllogismo, est specialem con∣tradictionem ponere.

That is, wheresoever we sh•ll hear of this term of art, tollere, we mean to put a
special contradiction: why doth he say, specialem contradictionem? because
that if the third argument be a general in the propo∣sition, we must put the
special contradiction to it in the assumption.
Syllo: compositus, est connexus, aut disjunctus.

That is a composite either where the proposition is a connex axiom, or where

the third argument and the question are disjunct. Our copulate axiom will come
into a simple syllogism, but not into a compo∣site, our discreet axiom making
but a discretion be∣tween the arguments, comes seldom into a syllogism, so that
these onely conclude, because in a connex ax∣iom the arguments hang one upon
another, follow∣ing one the other: so that there we look at the two arguments
simply agreeing: so in a disjunct the parts there argue as contraries, and one
contrary will con∣clude

Page  326

another, because there the band severs the ar∣guments contrary to a copulate
axiom: now connex∣us is first, because a connex axiom comes before a disjunct,

Syllogismus connexus, est syllogismus compositus proposi∣tionis connexae,

So that here is nothing to be considered, but one∣ly the proposition, that it be a

connex.
Est que duorum modorum

Because here are 20. places, the third argument may go before the question, or
it may go after the question.
Primus modus syllogismi connexi est, qui assumit ante∣cedens, & consequens concludit.

Here we may conclude affirmed questions in the first modus as in a contract the
third argument was placed before, ergo, it was set first: so here in a con∣nex that
must be first where the argument goes be∣fore. As,

Si dii sunt, divinatio est.

Cicero 3. Officiorum.
Atque si etiam hoc natu a praescribit, ut homo homi∣ni, &c.

If a man must wish well to a man quia homo, he must seek the profit of a man,
but prius, ergo, the propositi∣on is obscured with a prosyllogism.

Sic Aencidos 4. Dido judicat Aeneae remanen ∣dum esse.

Mene fugis? per ego has lacrymas dextramque tu∣am te.

If I have well deserved of thee, go not from me: first the proposition is backt
with a prosyllogism: te propter, &c. the assumption: cui me, &c. the
con∣clusion.

Page  327

F requenter hic non assumitur idem, sed majus ut 1. Catil.

Si te par•ntes timerent, at que odissent tui, &c.

You shall often have in this kind of syllogism the assumption omitted, and a
prosyllogism in room of it. If Catilius parents could not away with him, he
should go from them: at nunc te patria, &c. a majore.

Concludendi modus hic idem est, quando propositio est lata temporis: quo genere
nympha, &c.
Cum Paris Oenone poterit spirare relicta.
 We heard before that such axioms, where there is cum, and tum, that is his
meaning by relation of time, that it is a connex axiom: and so here a connex
syl∣logism.

When Paris hath left Oenone, then let Zantlous run back to his spring, at, ergo.
Here the proposition is first, then the assumption, then the conclusion.

CHAP. XIV.

De syllogismo connexo secundo.

Secundus modus connexitollit consequens, ut tollat antecedens.

HEre is a connex, and here the third argument must come after, and the
question must go be∣fore, ergo, it is secundus, and here we see there is a
dou∣ble taking away, tollit antecedens, ut tollat consequens.

Si ulli rei sapiens assentietur usquam; aliquandi etians opinabitur, &c.

Nunquam autem opinabitur;
Nulli igitur rei assentietur:

Page  328

The Academicks thought that a man should not have an opinion of any thing,
and therefore should not assent to any thing, and from them came the
Scepticks. Nunquam epinabitur, is a general negative, and aliquando
opinibatur, is a special affirmed.
Ovidius 2. Trist.

Si saperem, doctas odissem jure sorores, &c.

There is the proposition with a prosyllogism from their effects. At nunc (tanta
meo comes est insania morbo, &c.) there is the assumption, the conclusion is
wanting. As the first kind of a connex did con∣clude affirmative questions; so
this second kind con∣cludes denied questions.

Hae duae syllogismi species sunt omnium usitatissimae.

That is, these two kinds of syllogisms are so plain, that every fool, as we say,
may make them.

CHAP. XV.

De syllogismo disjuncto primo.

Syllogismus disjunctus est syllogismus compositus propo∣sitionis disjunctae.
Modi duo sunt; primus tollit unum, & reliquum con∣cludit.

VVE have heard that a simple syllogism is bet∣ter for the clearing of a doubtful
axiom than a composite, because there the question is bro∣ken in pieces, and the
third argument, which is the candle or light, is laid to each part. In a composite
the third argument is laid to the whole question: so that there the question
cannot be so clear: and there
 Page  329

in the proposition we say in effect, this is the third argument, and then repeat it
again in the assumption, and say this is it, mark it well Now it is connexus aut
disjunctus; and connexus we heard of before, and now it remaineth that we
speak of syllogismus dis∣junctus.

Syllogismus disjunctus, &c.

We have heard the reason of the name syllogis∣mus, it is an Arithmetical term

signifying the sum in Addition, because we gather in it as in a sum, that which
hath been more fully delivered, it is called dis∣junctus, even as a disjunct axiom
was so called, be∣cause the matter was severed, though the words of Grammar
were not: so a disjunct syllogism is where the third argument is a thing
disjoyned from the question. It is composite because the proposition is
composite, yet not every composite proposition ma∣keth a disjunct syllogism,
but where there is disjun∣ction between the question, and the third argument,
ergo, in these kinds of syllogisms we evermore con∣clude from opposites, as in
a connex we conclude com∣monly from consentanies.

Modi duo sunt; primus tollit unum, & reliquum con∣cludit.

In a disjunct syllogism it skilleth not where we place our question, whether

before or after the third argument, secondly, observe in this first modus of a
disjunct syllogism, that we take away the third argu∣ment in the assumption,
and conclude the rest, third∣ly, that in this first kind we conclude affirmatively,
and lastly, that here we conclude simple questions, ut, Aut dies est, aut nox est,
&c.

Ciceronis pro Cluentio judicium tale est;

Sed cum esset haec illi proposit a conditio, &c.

Page  330

Sic idem 2. Philip ratiocinatur.

Nunquam ne intelliges tibi sta•u•ndum esse utrum illi, qui istam rem g•sserunt, homicidae sint, an
vindives libertatis? &c.

The question is this, either Brutus and Caius were freers of the Country, or
traitors to the Country, the proposition is first with a prosyllogism. Atten∣dite
enim paulisper, &c. first be thine own judge, for Antonie would be drunk;
again, there is another prosyllogism to the proposition, plusquam homicidae,
&c. and that he proves with another prosyllogism, they killed Caesar a father
of the Country. Tu homo sapiens & considerate, quid dicis? this is the
assumpti∣on, being backt with a prosyllogism, non homi•idae, which he proves
from a testimony, from the effects of Antonie The conclusion is last. Sequitur ut
liberatores tuo judicio sint quandoquidem tertium nibil esse potest. So that all
the parts are here laid down orderly, one∣ly they are obscured with
prosyllogisms.

Si partes d••junctae propositionis sint duabus plures, ju∣dicandi, concludendique ars erit eadem.
 That is, it may so fall out that there may be more third arguments brought to
conclude the question: as in disparates before can conclude truth, we must
bring all the disparates together, and we must take away all but our question.

Sic Cicero judicat, Rabirium cum consulibus esse opor∣tere.

Atque vidimus (ait) hac in rerum natura triasuisse, &c.

The question is, whether Rabiriue was to be with the Consuls, the proposition
is first: the assumption follows with a prosyllogism. Latere with a
prosyl∣logism a simili cum Saturnio esse, &c. with a prosyllo∣gism

Page  331

also: then the conclusion backt with a prosyl∣logism, virtus, & honestus, &c.

CHAP. XVI.

De syllogismo disjuncto secundo.

Disjunctus secundus e proposi•ione partibus omnibus af∣firmata assumit unum,

& reliquum tollit.

THe second disjunct is called secundus in respect that it concludes negatively,

as the first conclu∣ded affi•matively, and as before the third argument was first
taken away, and the rest concluded: so here contra we assume the third
argument, and take away the rest: and further we are to consider, that the
proposition must be affirmed partibus omnibus, yet we may say it is, or it is not
arguing from a contra∣dicent.

Sic J uno cum J ove de Turno concludit 10. Aenei. Quid si qu•d voce gravaris,

Mente dares, at que d•c Turno rata vita maneret;

O husband that you would grant but in mind that Turnus might not be slain:
either he must die, or I am deceived. The proposition is in those words, quod ut
O potius, &c. the assumption taking away the Irony. Et in melius tua, quod
potes, orsa reflectas, there is the conclusion.

Ejus modi syllogismus efficiture propositione copulata ne∣gata, quae negata complexio dicitur:
quaeque dis∣junctionis affirmatae vim obtinet.

A syllogism whose proposition shall be a copulate axiom denied, because it is

the same with a disjunct

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affirmed in value, ergo, it may make a disjunct syllo∣gism, this is seldom found
in use, but because other Logicians teach it, ergo, our Author would not leave
out any thing, that belongs to the Art of reason, as,

Non & dies est, & nox est;

At dies est:
Nonigitur nox est.
 Here non denies the one, and puts the other, for in a copulate axiom we heard,
that non denied the cou∣pling of the parts, and this is called negata complexio,
because here the proposition may be denied, where∣as before he said generally
e propositione partibus om∣nibus affirmata.

Complexio dicitur.

By complexio he means the whole Syllogism, by a Senecdoche of the part for

the whole, and now we have heard of the kinds of disposing arguments
im∣mediately: so far as the act of reason reacheth: now we come to method
which is but one rule, yet indeed it is the golden rule of all Arts,

CHAP. XVII.

De Methodo secundum Aristotelem.

Methodus est dianoia variorum axiomatum homogenio∣rum pro naturae suae

claritate praepositorum.

MEthodus, for the name it signifies with the way, or order, when any thing is
done the right way, order, or manner, then it is with the way: so that it doth by
name commend unto us the nearest and right way of performing any thing,
ergo, it is fitly so called,

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for a right line is but one, and it is most short, inter eosdem terminos.
Est dianoia.

That is, a discourse of the mind, for axiomatical judgment is said to be of the
mind quiet, and calm, and dianoia is said to be of the mind troubled, for there is
an agitation of the brain to and fro•, that we may come to see the truth more
plainly. Now I do not see in method how aliud axioma ex alio deducitur, if he
mean that one axiom is here more general, and another more special; there may
be a fallace in that, for the more general doth not contain in it the more special.
In a mans body of all the members the head is first, yet none will say that it
contains the rest of the members in it: notwithstanding there is some∣thing in
this I must confess, for the former rule in an Art gives some light to the rule
following, as Diale∣ctica est ars bene disserendi, gives light to the second rule
of Logick, for I must first know the whole, be∣fore I can distribute it into its
parts, but how this is any discourse I do not see: Again, I have shewed that
among ancient Logicians dianoia is onely given to syllogisms, and not to
method, and in truth I hold dianoia and syllogismus to be all one. Again,
method is for memory, not for the judging of things: and that argument before
concerning the distinct organs of the parts of Logick, is instar omnium to prove
it. It may be said fitly, that it is dispositio axiomatum, for in axiomatical and
syllogistical judgment there were ar∣guments disposed, by which indeed axioms
did arise, but method doth not dispose any arguments, but ax∣ioms, ergo, this in
like sort is a mean argument to shew that axiomatical and syllogistical,
judgment should go together, disposing arguments immediate∣ly,

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and method should be above, for it meddles not with arguments, but with
axioms immediately.

Axiomatum.

Axioma signifies properly such a truth as is wor∣thy credit without any

discourse, ergo, it agrees to that which is per se manifestum, and therefore
axioma du∣bium is not worthy that name axioma: but method is dispositio
axiomatum: first of them that are clear without any light of a third argument:
and doubt∣ful axioms are not disposed by method, but as they are cleared before
the tribunal seat of a third argument: and indeed method is principally a
disposition of the axioms of Arts. Axiomatum not of things:

Object. Is there not order in things?

Answ. True it is, that method as the rest of Lo∣gick is an adjunct of the things,
yet it disposeth them gratia axiomatum, for as invention is immediately of
arguments, and they are of things: and as judgment is of axioms, and
syllogisms, and they likewise are of things: so method is of axioms
immediately, and of things immediately: so that we must lay up no∣thing by the
rule of method but axioms, and this must be our care in reading any thing to
take the ax∣ioms, and to carry them to their places in Arts.

Object. Are not syllogisms to be remembred, ergo, is there not method of

them?

Answ. Yes, but we take the parts asunder, and make them axioms first, for the
proposition, assumpti∣on, and conclusion are axioms, and belong to some Art,
therefore look whither the more special argu∣ment in the axiom belongeth, and
thither the axiom belongeth: and if we would remember the reason why such a
thing is so, or not so, see where your rule is, and look at the former axioms, and
you shall find

Page  335

arguments for the proof of any thing, and may so keep them: as for example:
otiosus est amator, Egi∣stus est otiosus, ergo Egistus est amator. The
propo∣sition belongs to moral Philosophy, for vitium is a vice, love is
concupiscence the sin, and it is the affe∣ction of love disordered, ergo, this
breaks the seventh Commandement, ergo, this axiom belongs hither, for love is
the more special. Egistus est otiosus: this indeed belongs to the history of
Egistus: but because we have it not, therefore we may carry it to otium: so the
conclusion belongs to moral Philosophy, to concupiscence. Again, syllogisms
serve but for the clearing of the truth of axioms, and then afterward we return
again to the rule of an axiom to judge whether it be true or false, and this is all
that is requi∣red for disposing arguments, ergo, method is dispositio axiomatum
onely. Again, we never remember any thing, but we make an axiom of it.

Object. But we remember words.

Answ. Though it be true that some remember words very strangely, yet they
remember them as axioms, for the word, and the thing signified by the word
make an axiom.
Object. But I suppose they know not the meaning of the words.

Answ. Yet the sound oreecho of the word in his head, which is an adjunct unto
the word, and the word it self makes an axiom still: so that method is onely of
axioms: and commonly they that so re∣member words have little judgement,
and if all the axioms of all things were laid down methodically, we should
remember all things methodically.
Variorum.

For method is not in one axiom, therefore here

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take heed that we be not deceived, taking that to break the rule of method,
which is a breach of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: as if this term invention be made
a part of Rhe∣torick, it is against 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: but if the doctrine of
this rule Inventio est prima paus Dialecticae, &c. be taught in Rhetorick, that is
a breach of method: con∣tra, the definition of Logick placed in Grammar or
Rhetorick, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but a breach of method A∣gain, he saith
they are various, not such as shall be contrary one to another, for the difference
of the ax∣oms of Art is but in a diversity, as it were, not in op∣position, because
in respect of the object they all tend to one thing.

Homogeniorum.

That is of the same kindred: this homogenia is not that in an axiom, for that is
between the arguments in an axiom, this is between the axioms themselves: so
that let us beware that we put not heterogeny axi∣oms in an Art: for they that
have done so may be compared to ignorant Painters, that paint a horses head
upon a mans body. Again, when we are to make a speech of any thing, we must
be careful to speak within our compass, and not to bring in things that are
heterogeny to the subject we speak of,
Pro naturae suae claritate praepositorum.

For method is the rule of order, ergo, there must be a praepositio & a
postpositio of axioms here: ergo, if we wil draw any Art out according to his
true feature, we must set every thing in his own place, nature observes this
course in every thing, as we see whilst the earth would rather ascend then there
should be vacuum: and whilst the spirit of God his mighty power that governs
all things, doth place every thing in order, we see he doth it by the rule of
method continually: as he placeth the fire in the highest place above the

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other elements, then the air, &c. dulcenatale solum, &c. to every man, and to
every thing, because by the rule of method that is his place: and if things be
displaced, they will sooner perish. The reason in nature why the load stone
desires to stand North and South, is because of the rule of method, it being
most agreeable to the nature thereof so to stand: so that every thing desires by
this rule, not onely its proper place, but its proper situs also in that place.
Pro naturae suae claritate: this proposition must be guided by this rule,
namely, the clearness of their na∣ture and good reason for the former axiom
doth di∣sery some light to the following. Again he saith, pro naturae suae, so
that clarius natura must go first, not that which is simply clarius, because that
that is by nature clarius, is clarius, and notius then any other: and whereas we
have a distinction of notius natura, and notias nobis, they are the same Notius
natura is in Genest, notius nobis is in Analysi: for howbeit in analysi we begin
at the lowest, which is notius nobis, yet in the end we come to notius natura,
and then that which is notius natura, is notius nobis: and we know in genere
before we know in specie, as we know homo before we know Thomas, or
William, &c. Hence it is that many of our great Doctors know the rules of Art,
but know not how to practise them: so that indeed they know them not. Again,
because prius natura commonly containeth something in it that we must know
before we can understand the next rule; so Arts teach us: as Logick first
teacheth In∣vention, then Judgment. In Invention it first teach∣eth an argument
in general, then in specie: now if we would know which is natura prius in
every thing, that we may do thus, if one rule give light to ano∣ther

Page  338

or if one rule may be without the other to clear the truth of it, then that is first:
otherwise it needs the help of another, it must come after that other: as one is
before two, for I cannot know two before I know one: secondly, two cannot be
but there must be one, whereas one may be without two.
Ʋnde omnium inter se convenientia judicantur, memo∣riaque comprehendentur.

Here he tels us a double fruit or end that ariseth thereof: for the first end, unde
omnium inter se con∣venientia judic antur, true it is thus far, if an Art be set in
order, we do there judge of the parts, but this is by axiomatical judgment, not
by methodical, for I make but one axiom of two, as if I judge the definition of
Logick to be before the distribution, here the distri∣bution is an adjunct to the
definition, and here I make of these two one axiom of a subject, and an adjunct,
and judge them by the rule of axiomaaical judge∣ment. The second end
memoria comprehenditur, is true: so then the judgement of all the parts of an
Art for their conveniency, is nothing but the seeing of their consention: for one
axiom laid to another is subjectum and adjunctum, and so we make but one
axiom of them: now method makes all things one, and we remember all things
as one: and therefore it is that the world is one, namely, by method; and the
reason why we forget any thing, is because we make one thing more things, for
every sense is of one thing indeed. The reason why we remember a man whom
we have seen before, is because we remember the disposition of the parts of his
body, nose, mouth, eyes, &c. and so turning the glass of our understand∣ing
unto him again, we know him; and if we would remember any thing for our
own present use, let us

Page  339

carry them home to their places, and we shall not forget them: and here we may
see that we do not remember by taking the species of things into our brain, and
there lay them up as in a chest, or let them hang as birds in a lime twig, and are
received by fancy first, as if it did fashion them, then cogitation considers of
them, and memory keeps them.

Answ. There is no reason to shew that these should be true, for these outward
species that come to my external eye, vanish away quickly, for the species of
the understanding they being made of the animal spirit must also soon vanish:
but by the rule of me∣thod we place the things in their order, as God hath done,
and when our eye hath seen them once in their place, she knows where to go to
find them again: so that as my outward eye being once turned from the thing it
beheld before, doth not receive any spe∣cies from it: so my eye of reason hath
not any spe∣cies of any thing any longer than it looks at it, so that I may fitly
compare our inward eye of reason, to our outward eye, or to a glass.

Atque ut spectatur in axiomate veritas, & falsitas, in syllogismo consequentia, & inconsequentia: sic in
methodo consideratur, ut per se clarius praecidat, ob∣scurius sequatur; omninoque ordo & confusio
judi∣catur.

← Ramus  → doth commorari upon this rule, and shews it by comparing it

with other rules, for as the drift of an axiom is truth and falshood, and of a
syllogism consequence and inconsequence: so that syllogisti∣cal judgment is
but to clear things to us, and we must go to axiomatical judgment, to see the
truth and falshood: so that rules of consequution are here, and maxims as they
call them, rules of consequents, as

Page  340

sublata causa tollitur effectum, &c. these are but uses of the arguments of
invention, and they follow by syllogistical judgment, we making the first rule to
be the third argument: as here, if causa be cujus vires est, then sublata causa
tollitur effectum. At. Ergo. Sic in methodo, &c.
Omninoque ordo & confusio judicatur.

By judgment here we are to understand axiomati∣cal judgment, as I said before:

but order is here, which we judge by the application of the rule of method to
any thing, and so we syllogize.
Sic disponitur ex homogeniis axiomatis primo loco abso∣luta notione primum, secundo secundum,
tertio terti∣um, & ita deinceps.

According to this rule of method shall be dispo∣sed homogeny axioms, first that
which is absolute, that is, that which takes not light from any other: then of
them that take light from others, secundo, secundum, tertio tertium: so that the
definitions of things in Arts are absolute prima: but in truth there is not any
definition of any Art absolutely first, but that of Encyclopadia: there are also
magis and minus nota compared with others, which are in the second and third
places.

Ideoque methodus ab universalibus ad singularia perpe∣tuo progreditur.

So that here we must know that that which was before natura prius, is here
universalius, not genus, species, or any such thing, but he means that method
proceeds a natura notioribus ad natura ignotiora, and this is the genesis of
method. Now Kickerman not seeing this well, and seeing Aristotle say in his
 Ethicks that he must proceed a generalioribus ad specialiora, did imagine that
every Art must have his praecognita:

Page  341

but Aristotle means, that having spoken de summo bono, which was the most
general end, he was to speak of things more special tending to that end; and
alas what is absolute primum in an Art, but the first rule? ergo, can there be any
thing to be praecognitum? Again his praecognita are either the Art it self
confusedly taught, or the exposition of some special rules there∣of, and for
postcognita, why the examples are infimae species, ergo, lowest, ergo, we
cannot go further than examples for postcognita.
Hac •nim sola, & unica via proceditur ab antecedenti∣bus omnino, & absolute notioribus ad
consequentia ignota declarandum, eamque solam methodum Aristo∣teles docuit.

So that things are to go before or after by their nature: and this Aristotle and
every one doth con∣sider, for when a man cloatheth himself, first he is to cover
his head, then to put on his doublet, hose, &c. and it is preposterous if a man
should first put on his shooes, then his stockins, or breeches; and in making
himself unready he must analyse, that is, first put off his shooes, then his
stockins, &c.

CHAP. XVIII.

De prima methodi illustratione per exempla artium.

Sed methodi unitatem exempla doctrinarum, & artium praecipue demonstant,

praecipueque vindicant.

OUr Author stayes long upon method, his rea∣sons are, because all Logicians
are very silent in the doctrine of method: and they that have spo∣ken

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of it are mistaken therein, for they make method to be nothing but genesis and
analysis, whereas they are the practice of a rule, or of as many rules as are in
the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of a thing, ergo, they are not method, though there
may be a genesis and an analysis of the rules of method, as well as of any other
rules of Lo∣gick, or other Arts. Now whilst other Logicians knew not this, they
have run into many questions about the multiplicity of method, whereas it is
but one: as may easily be shewed by reason. For if all things are made one by
the rule of method, though there are many things in the world, then there
can∣not be more methods, for then there should be more worlds.

Exempla doctrinarum, & artium praecipue demon∣strant, praecipueque vindicant.

← Ramus  → saith, that method (as it is true) is not bet∣ter seen to be one, then
in the rules of A•ts, for as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet
〉 are onely belong∣ing to rules of Art: so method is almost, and princi∣pally of
the rules of Arts, though their order m•y be in many other things.
Quibus quamvis omnes regulae generales sint & uni∣versales, &c.
In the rules of Art all are universals, not that there may not be proper axioms in
an Art, but he means such as are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉: o∣therwise if he should not mean thus, this generality would be
onely true of the rules of the general Arts, not of the special Arts: but though all
be general, carum tamen gradus distinguntur, as they are compa∣red one with
another, as the definition of Logick is before the distribution, being more
general than it. and so the distribution is more general than the next, and so for
the rest.

Page  343

Again, the most general rule in disposition is more special than the last rule of
invention, because inven∣tions use is more general than judgments, though the
rule of disposition may contain more in it, than the rule of invention containeth
in it.
Quantoque unaqu•que genelarior erit, tanto magis prae∣cedet.

That is, as it is pro naturae suae claritate praeponen∣dum, so must it be placed.

Generalissima loco, & ordine prima erit, quia lumine & notitia prima est.

This being the course of nature to proceed from the highest to the lowest, for so
we must place things: the reason followeth: now indeed ← Ramus  → himself
took no great pain about Art in general, and there∣fore imagined that every
definition in Art was abso∣lutely first, whereas in very truth none of them are
absolutely first, but onely that rule of Encyclopaedia.
Subalternae consequentiae sequentur, quia claritate sunt proximae: atque ex his natura notiores
preponentur, minus notae substituentur, ▪tandemque specialissimae constituentur.

Among subalterns some are more general, and some are more special,
← Ramus  → here speaks Allegori∣cally, alluding to genus and species
subalternae, and spe∣cialissimae in Invention: and here special rules are all one
with others in themselves, though not in com∣parison with them:

Definitio itaque generalissima prima erit.

← Ramus  → means the definitio, and the definitum, not d•finitio the argument:
now this must be first, why? one would think it should rather be last; because a
perfect definition intendeth to lay down the whole essence of a thing: and
before a man can know a peice

Page  344

of a thing, he must know it in the whole as it is com∣prised in a brief, from the

neerest causes thereof.

Distributio sequitur: quae si multiplex fuerit, &c.

For so we heard that a definition was manifold in∣tegri in membra, generis in

species, &c. because as the definition laid out the whole in one lump at once
from the causes, which are the utmost things: so in a distribution there is the
 whole, but laid out distribu∣tively in his parts: so that this is the difference of
them: and the following rules do prosecute every part according to their place.

Praecedit in partes integras partitio, &c.

The reason of this is, because the membra make up the whole, and are causes
thereof, as the definition was of the thing defined. Again, the distributio of
generis in species is from the effects, and they are af∣ter the causes, ergo,
distributio ex causis must go before them; again, a distribution of the integrum
into the members in an Art is common to a distributi•n of the genus into the
species: as for example, in Gram∣mar vox is divided as integrum into litera, and
syllaba, and both letters and syllables are general to vox nu∣meri, and sine
numero, which are the species of vox.

Sequitur divisio in species, &c.

But if there be a distribution of the subject into the adjuncts, they must go
before distributio generis in species, as affirmatum, and negatum axioma, must
go before simplex and compositum, because the adjuncts are 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 with an axiom in general. Again, if we set a distribution of the genus
into the species be∣fore a distribution ex adjunctis, we must handle the species
distinctly, ergo, there would be no room for distributio ex adjunctis to come in:
but we must know that we seldom have these distributions of the

Page  345

same Art, for where there is distributio integri in mem∣bra, there is seldom
distributio generis in species, though there may be either of these, and likewise
a distribu∣tion ex adjunctis.

Et transitionum vinculis, si longior inter eas intersit ex∣plicatio, colligandae sunt, &c.

He gives us here a note by the way, that if the di∣stribution went long before,
that then we should use a transition from one part to another: so that here we
see the use of a transition, and that it belongs to method, and it is as it were a
bridge to go from one thing to another: and it serveth auditorem reficere, ac
recreare.

Omnes definitiones, distributiones, regulae Grammaticae repertae sint, atque unaquaeque sigillatim
judicata, &c.

← Ramus  → supposeth every rule of Art already inven∣ted, and judged, how
shall we dispose them? not by any rules before, but onely by method which is
be∣hind, for we speak of order: as first the definition of Grammar, then the
distribution, because partes si∣mul sumpta are equivolent to the whole: and let
an Art be laid down thus, and we shall see every thing plainly and evidently.

Page  346

CHAP. XIX.

De secunda methodi illustratione per exempla Poetarum, Oratorum, Historicorum.

Atqui methodus, non solum in materia artium & do∣ctrinarum adhibetur; sed in
omnibus rebus, quas fa ∣cile & perspicue doc ere volumus, &c.

AS Aristotle saith in the first of his Ethick 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. so

every thing may orderly be laid down, quas facile, &c. therefore Poets, Orators,
&c. observe this rule, howbeit they do not usque quaque ingredi, and insistere
as Art requireth.

Virgilius in Georgicus, &c.

Hactenus avorum cultus & sidera coeli,
Nunc te, Bacche canam:

Poetry is a general Art, ergo, a Poet is a general Author, therefore

← Ramus  → brings examples out of Po∣etry to shew this general Art of
Logick, Virgil for ex∣ample handles Georgicks, that is, husbandry, and di∣vides
it into four parts, in his first book he handles that which is 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 with husbandry: but his distribution is not so good as it should be if
it were an Art; for Virgil doth as Kickerman useth to do, namely, divides it into
its common properties, and into its special properties: common as Astrologia,
Meteorologia, then he comes by a transition to trees: then by a more imperfect
transition in the beginning of his third book de bobus, &c. for a transition is
per∣fect or imperfect; a perfect one consists of a con∣clusion of that which went
before, and of a proposi∣tion of that that followeth: an imperfect transition

Page  347

consisteth of either of these severally and alone.

Sic igitur Poeta generalissimum primo loco, &c.

That is, this must be our care when we do any thing especially if it be of
importance, that we miss not this method: but that we place every thing in his
due order and method according to nature.

Sic Ovidius in Fastis, &c.

So Ovid in his Kalender first sets down the gene∣ral definition of his works, and
then he distributes it into twelve parts, according to the twelve months of the
year: reprehending Romulus for making but ten months, but it should seem that
the Romans had their time divided, as well in the time of Romulus, as
afterward, ergo, he did invent all the twelve moneths, ergo, Ovid was deceived,
in thinking that Numa Pom∣pilius did make January and June: now he cals June
Janus, because that moneth was dedicated to Janus, whom some think was
Iavan, some Noe: and the first day of this moneth was his holy day.
Oratores in prooemio, &c.

So that here we may see this one method that as it is used in Arts, so is it used
in Poets, and Orators: now the exordium is nothing but a commoration: the
narration a description of that thing whereof he is to speak, the confirmation a
distribution, &c.
Sic Livius summam, &c.
 This example is for History.

Page  348

CHAP. XX.

De Crypticis methodi.

Haec igitur in variis axiomatis homogeneis, &c.

← RAmus  → hath shewed us what method is, and that it is but one: now this
exact order thereof is then, when we desire to teach any thing plainly.
At cum delectatione motuve aliquo, &c.

If a man be to deliver an Art, he must exactly ob∣serve this method in every

point: but many times it fals out in discourses that disorder must be used, not
for the doctrines sake, but because of the perversity of the hearers, for they
often go out of their way by reason of their weakness; now this way is
especial∣ly when we reject homogenies, as Orators use much to do, and draw in
heterogenies, knowing that varie∣ty doth delight.

Sed praecipue rerum ordo initio invertitur, &c.

So as we shall see a rule come in like a morris-dan∣cer, as Aristotle placeth

many out of order.
Itaque ad illam perfectae methodi, &c.

So then, as we heard in a syllogism, that there was an inversion of the parts, a

superfluity, and a defect: so here in method, haec imperfectior forma non solum
detractis rebus mutila est vel superaditis rebus redun∣dat, sed ordinis sui
quibusdam gradibus inversis praepo∣stera est.

Quod Poeta facit, &c.

This crypsis is more often in Poets than in Ora∣tors, or History, though it be

used much in History: now populum docendum sibi proponit, i. belluam
multo∣run

Page  349

capitum, but indeed he deceives them, yet it is onely for delight. This order is
very usual in Poetry, and very pleasant in a tale, or fables, because when we
read them we cannot rest quiet till we come to an end of them.

Sic (ut Homerus ait) Homerus Iliada disposuit.

Nec gemino bellum Trojanum orditur ab ano, &c.

He doth not begin the Trojan war from twenty Eggs, in one of which Eggs
Helena was, and Castor and Pollux in another: Semper ad eventum festinat, &c.
for in the first book of his Iliads one would think that he brought in the history
of the ten years, but indeed thereby he takes occasion to bring in the history of
 the years before So Virgil fetcheth Aene∣as from Sicily, which is a little from
Carthage, &c.
Sic commici Poeta, &c.

For there every thing must seem to come by chance, not of purpose. Oratores
vero, &c. they re∣fer all to victory: they are like Lawyers, and there∣fore think
they may lye at pleasure: therefore they will place their strongest arguments
first, that their Auditors may chew the cud upon them: and then they put out
their mean arguments in the middle, whilst their Auditors are meditating on the
first; and then at last by that time the Auditors have well thought of the first,
they bring out one or two strong ones more, to make their Auditors beleive that
they in the middle were like to the first and last.

FINIS.

Page  [unnumbered]

Page  1

GRAMMATICAL NOTES.

T His we are to know, That God made all things for man, and at the beginning
for one man, for there was but one: but since the Fall, because all things cannot
come under one man's eye, immediately, therefore God hath provid∣ded Speech, to
be an Hobson, or Carrier, between man and man; that thereby he might see all
things, and that so Gods Ordinance, of making all things for one man, might still
con∣tinue. Logick doth act and bring the thing to my understanding & afterwards
Speech is the carrier of

Page  2

it, therfore, it is necessary that there should be a con∣stant rule of speech, that one
man might understand another; but whereas these things, being uttered by Speech,
are therefore hard to be received, because they are inartificial Arguments: therefore
God hath provided Two arts of Speech, one of propriety of Speech, and another of
the decking and sweetning of it. So that the Lord doth here, even as Physitians use to
do with their Patients, to wit, when they have a bitter Potion to give, they use to
sugar the top of the Pot wherein it is. So that Grammer may be compared to a plain
Garment wtithout welt or gard, or it is like a grave Citizen. Rhetorick may be
com∣pared to the lace, or jags on the garment, and is like a fine Courtier: Poetry may
be compared to some fine cut, and is a Courtier—going on his feet: so that according
to the double use of Speech it is di∣vided into two parts: the first wherof is Grammer.

The name Grammatica is a Greek word, which therefore we see was first named of
the Grecians, and is derived of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a letter, of 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 a line of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which signifieth, (1) to engrave seu
insculpo, and hence cometh our English word, ingrave: (2) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
signifieth to write, because, the first writ∣ing was by Hieroglyphicks, for at the first
they used Hieroglyphicks, making the images of Birds or Beasts, as an Horse for
swiftness, a Bear or Lion for strength: a Lions head and a Ring in it they use still
over mens doors, signifying thereby watch∣fulness. For in Philosophy, we find that a
Lion sleepeth with open eyes, and this was the first kind of writing: The second was
in wax Tables, or Tables laid over with wax, where they have a stile made of steele,
(and our English word steel cometh of stilus)

Page  3

and hence also stilus signifieth a pen; Now they wrote in these, by lifting up the
wax, and so was the letter made: hence came exarare to signifie to write, i e. to plow
up, as they did the wax, and so shut up the Tables; and these, as Tully speaketh, had
every one his letter-carrier to his Friend, and hence came let∣ter-carriers, or
tabellarii, and the Friend had keyes to open the •ables, and so read the letters: The
next kind of writing was in the rind of the bark of a Beech, and there thy wrote with
ink, and rolled them up. Now this rind was like unto parchment, and thence came
liber, (which is properly that rind) to signifie a Book; and our English word Book
co∣meth of that word Beech, Buck, and to this day most of that which we call Beech,
is called Buckmast. Now concerning the invention of ink, which was here first used,
we read not of it; only this, that some call it atramentum sutorium, and therefore it
seems they learned to make it by Coblers and Dyers. The next kind of writing was in
Parchment made of Sheep skins and Goat skins, which was invented in Phrygia, at
Pergamus in Troy, and thence came Per ∣gamena, to signifie Parchment. The last
kind of writing was in Papyr, which was first invented in Egypt which was made of
a rush, called Papyros, hence came it to be named Papyrus, and Papyr in English:
hence is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of biblos that rush.

Printing was invented a great while after any of these, not past some 300 years ago;
it was invented at Gaud in Picardy, where there was a Knight that had his Seal fell
into his ink as he was writing a let∣ter, and he taking it up something nimbly for
foiling his fingers let it fall in again, and afterwards lying on the papyr, there it left
the print of the letters, and

Page  4

he seeing that, did by that means invent Printing: and thus much for 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉. From that cometh 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a line, and before Moses we
know there was no wri∣ting but only by Hierogliphicks, so that lines are not so
ancient as hieroglyphicks, except we mean such lines as we write from one side of
the papyr to the other: Now for writing by letters, Moses was the first, or rather God,
as we may well think, see∣ing he hath brought all sounds to so few letters; though
Josephus makes mention of two pillars that were before Moses, wherein were
written the prin∣ciples of the Mathematicks, and that he saw one of them, yet I think
he was either deceived, or they were after Moses, and hactenus of 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉.

Now followeth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉litera, for every letter hath lines except one,
which hath only one, and that is (jod) which signifieth a space because it leaves out a
space: And hence is Grammatica a Greek word, understand 〈 in non-Latin alphabet
〉, and it will be a literal art, or the art of letters, because their language which they
were to learn being natural unto them, they needed not to go any further than to
learn their letters and to spell them, so they called it Grammatica literaria: as if the
whole art of Grammer consisted only in the knowledge of letters. So that this name
is as much too strait for the thing, as a Childs shoo is for Her ∣cules foot; but yet we
knowing the meaning of the name, may still keep it, knowing that was the errour of
them which gave it, not of those who shall after∣wards hold it. Grammatica is too
strait, for the let∣ters are the least part of Etymologie; and truly, if we look at the
names of all Arts, we shall find that they were named before they were perfected, as
Dialectiea, coloquor: an adjunct. Rhetorica, a fluent Speech,

Page  5

Now this Art of Grammer is but one in nature, for at the beginning there was but
one Speech, (as but one man) till an hundred years after the floud. Again, Speech is
but one, in regard of the faculty, and also in regard of man; so that all the languages
in the world are but as so many idioms of the same Gram∣mer, and not divers
Grammers; for one definition of Grammer, and one distribution; one definition of
vox, and one distribution of vox, numeri & sive numero serveth to them all: And as
in Greek those several Dialects do not mak several Grammers, but only divers
idioms; so do all languages whatsoever make several idioms, not several Grammers.
Now this variety of languages came by the building of Ba ∣bel, for whereas they built
a Tower, both that might be famous for memory, and understanding that God would
destroy the World either by Fire, or Water, therefore thus in their foolish conceits,
they went a∣bout to prevent the power of God; first laying brick, and using slime for
morter to prevent fire, and a—of Reed and Palm-tree leaves, which are very broad
and like a target, which are there to be seen until this day, that they might swim upon
the—made of this Reed: And Herodotus wri∣teth that there were eight Ascents in it,
and the two lowermost were Furlonges high, so that if the rest were so, it was a mile
high; and on the top (he saith) there was a Temple built, which was dedicated to
Ju∣piter Belus, Son of Nimrod: This Tower they built, being loth to disperse
themselves abroad over the face of the earth, as they were commanded Genesis the
first, to replenish the earth: therefore it pleased God to work that Confusion of
Tongues among them to sever them, and so make diversity of Countries; for

Page  6

according to their Tongues commonly Countries are severed. Of these Tongues were
first the Mo∣ther Tongue, then the deducts from it; the mother Tongue is Hebrew,
first, in respect of its self, for it is most natural, for there is not any natural notion,
but it hath its natural word. Again, in Hebrew are the fewest words and yet signifie
the most things. A∣gain, it is plain by the Scriptures, for the History, in Genesis
sheweth, that the words are Hebrew words, as Adam HEvah: But objection, Why
might not God have given them from the Du•ch's? No, for there is no Dutch name
so effectual as the Hebrew names be; so the Lord called the Heavens Shammajim,
and there is no name in the world that signifieth so; and the Sea Jam, there is no
tongue that doth term it so from the same reason, and until the building of Babylon,
their names were Hebrew names, and the Towns which they built before Babylon,
had also Hebrew names; therefore, that Speech was the first.
We have heard the reason of this name Grammati∣ca, which is the definitum, now
followeth the defini∣tion of it: i. e. Ars generalis in sermone, and so Gram∣mer is Ars
benè loquendi. First, he calleth it Ars, for that which is, and is for an end, must have
a constant rule to guide man to that end. From this genus many questions may arise;
as, How can Speech be eternal, seeing it is proper to man? Here we are to know that
Speech is a Creature of God, and there∣fore 'twas in his eternal decree, as all other
things: and though it be true that there was but one Tongue from the beginning of
the World till the destruction of Babel, yet in Gods decree all the rest are eternal, and
so is the rule of Speech, and they were in the e∣ternal notion of God. Again, their
words do vary

Page  7

continually, therefore they were not eternal; for if one that died 500 years ago were
now alive, and should speak, we could not understand him. Answ. Though it be true
that words by reason of many sounds do daily change, yet the rule is eternal; though
they be not spoken from eternal, yet the va∣riety of Speech doth not change the rule
of Gram∣mer. as in reason, this axiome homo est animal was true before homo was,
and will be for ever: So in Grammer is the rule eternal, as likewise is the rule of
generation and corruption eternal, and ever true and the same, though men daily be
generated and corrupted; so is Grammers rule external, though, &c. and 'tis because
God would shew his mighty power and wisdom, that there are as many several
Grammers, as there are several ages, and more too; and there is nothing more
wonderful under heaven then to consider the great variety o•••ands and co∣lours, and
complexions of things, which all are from their contrary forms.

Ars.

In Latin some think the word comes from artus a s•new, others of arx a tower, ab
arcendo; and both w•ll well agree to our purpose, for artus a sinew, we know the
strength of those things that have sinews li•th in them, yet they are stronger then
the bones, for the bones by reason of their hardness will break, w•ereas sinews
will rather give back, and bend, and are more tough: So the rules of art are most
strong an• sinewy. If we derive the word from arx a tower, it my be very well so,
for as there is both great stre•gth and much beauty, both in the matter and

Page  8

form, so the rules of Grammer are most strong, and make a most sweet harmony.

Generalis.

Because though it be not everywhere, as Logick is, yet it may be; now Logick is
everywhere, because every thing was made for man; therefore he must have an
eye to see every thing, for otherwise he could not use them aright. But Grammer,
because when I see a thing by Logick, I may keep it to my self, therefore it is
general only 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉secundùm quid, therefore it is taught after
Logick. Again, wheresoever there is Grammer, there is also Logick; where there
is Logick, there is not alwayes Grammer, for Logick may be only in mente,
therefore it is more general.

Orationis.
This general art of Speech is twofold, both Gram∣mer and Rhetorick; but the
difference is this, that Grammer carrieth the matter in a budget neither too big nor
too little, like one of these Irishmen with Breeches without pockets. Rhetorica
carrieth it in a fine bag full of laces, yet not altogether full, for there are more
words then matter; therefore both Grammer, Rhetorick, and Poetry are all e∣qually
general for subject, but not for use. For Gram∣mers use is before the use of them,
and may be with∣out them even as a garment may be without a lace or jag. But
here by the way, because these are general Arts, therefore they have no proper
subject, but their use may be everywhere, and therefore Kecker ∣man, whilst he
maketh Rhetorick a special art, telleth me he never knew the right distribution of
the arts,

Page  9

for it is the art of Speech, and that may be every∣where, therefore Rhetorick is
general and may be used in any thing; therefore Tropes upon due consi∣deration
may be used in any art. Now if it be de∣manded, whether it be better to use
Grammer, or Rhetorick in teaching of Children? I Answ. Gram∣mer is better, 1.
Because it is more general than Rhetorick: 2. Because it keeps us more close to
the matter, which is a very good thing in teaching; yet not withstanding sometime
Rhetorick is better, be∣cause it delivers the proper word together with some
sweetness, for Tropes do arise from some arguments in Logick; so that we cannot
condemne Rhetorick, neither is it possible we should alwayes use Gram∣mer,
seeing there be many more things then proper names; for God making all things,
and Man being to name them, and had not names sufficient for them: therefore for
want of words, gave the same name to divers things by Tropes; and therefore
Talaeus saith necessitas tropum genuit: Yet at the beginning one thing had but one
name, but afterwards the same word came to signifie many things, as we see in
He∣brew, where one word signifieth twenty things, and but one properly and
Grammatically, and all the rest Tropically. And I find that words are used
impro∣perly these wayes: First, in respect of the Trope: Secondly, when we deliver
the same things, in di∣vers languages, there they use divers phrases, which must
be compared together, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is good in Greek, in Latin it is
to make Children, which is not usual. Now if you will know whether is better,
bring them to Logick, and there see which phrase is more special, that is to be
prefer'd: to make it ge∣neral to the efficient cause in general, to beget or

Page  10

procreate Children is proper to the first modus of the efficient, therefore it is the
better phrase. So vac∣cas agere in English is to drive Kine, though they say in
some parts, do the Kine into the field: And there is another kind of Trope, which is
caused by reason of the phrase; therefore one that teacheth young Scholars must
have a special care, That first his Scholar knwo the nature of the thing, and then
the name of it, which stands by this rule, v•x est no∣ta quâ unumquodque vocatur,
and by this means we shall teach them, first what every word signifieth in
propriety, and then the thing as it is named in other tongues, and then the phrase,
and then compare one phrase with another, and thus by the way we shall estimate
which phrase in every language standeth with best reason. As that of 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉, and in English to beget Children, where to beget is peculiar to
nature, and belongeth to those things which have only a vegetative life, and
therefore our English phrase is better: So 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is to put to the
hand, and in Latin is agreed, to put to the foot, or to go to, which is more general,
therefore the Greek phrase is better: So in English we say to go to, and to go in
hand with, which phrase neither the Greeks nor the Latins have. It is a Metaphor
fetched from the mo∣tion of the hand, which is the chief organ of motion, & is as
much as I should say, put our hands to, & this is more special; so that bring them
to Logick and •here you shall be able to judge which phrase in e∣very language is
best; and so consequently which Tongue is best. And this way I can prove our
Eng∣lish best, except the Hebrew: For those that inven∣ted the Greek Tongue, were
great Scholars, and were very good Rhetoricians, and so made their

Page  11

Speech more eloquent, whereas our inventors of English were not so.

Bene

Is here an adverb joyned to the verb to shew his signification, and is not another
word from loqui, and the reason of it is this, a man may loqui, but not bene loqui,
as bonus vinum was as good as their Wine, but not good Grammer; as a man may
dispute so∣phistically or ignorantly, and so break the rule of Logick: so likewise
he may malè loqui and break the rule of Grammer. Again, since the Fall of man as
there is a bona and a mala ratio, so there is a bene and malè loqui, and Grammer
gives not precepts of that malè loqui which was attracted by sin, but only of that
bene loqui which is a Creature of God. Object. But many have thought that this
bene is no∣thing but that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the definition of art in
general, and therefore should not be repeated in e∣very special art. Answ. But they
are to know, since the Fall, as we said before, there is a bene and malè lo∣qui, and
art gives precept only to the bene loqui, and therefore bene must be added for
distinction sake: Again, they confess themselves, That bene in the de∣finition of
ars, is the same that expeditè and that is an habit in man, whereas this bene is
essential unto Grammer as it is an art: Again, here bene is joyned with the form
not with the genus, and therefore is another genus which is more special, over and
above that which was before; for so we are to understand that the species contain
more in them than the genus doth: Now for those who to avoid bene will put more
words into the definition, let them know that into how many words they divide the
form, into so

Page  12

many parts they cut it; which ought not to be, be∣cause the form is but one
Argument. Now it is a great question among many Scholars which language was
the first (and that was indeed the Hebrew) Goropius would have the Dutch to be
the first, and he argueth for it subtily, and hath many notations of words, as fast
backwards is staf, because when we have a staff, we stand fast: so litera is of let
and er which signifieth to wander, because when we write we let our Pen wander
about.

Benè loquendi.
Here because the form is not easily found out, and when it is found out, we have
not one word to ex∣press it in, therefore we are to imagine the form to be included
in this Gerund in di: for because we have not a word to deliver the form in, hence
we are fain to take the next argument to forma, which is finis and include it in
that: and we are to know that in very deed every precept is a member of that Art
whereof it is a precept, so that every precept hath a certain vigour, or life, or soul
as it were, which soul taken up from all the precept, is the form of the Art. And
again, howsoever it may be objected that Grammer is not in every thing (for many
things have no names) and so is not a general Art, yet the work of Grammer is in
every thing: So also though man only can speak, yet Grammers work is general,
and so we are to understand it, to answer in proportion to Logick, for as I see
every thing with my eye of reason, so it is requisite that after I have received it, I
should carry every thing to ano∣ther, and that I must do by Grammer: and
Gram∣mer hath a double reference, one in regard of him

Page  13

that speaks, and another in regard of the thing he speaks of, or the matter in hand.
i e. We that here are to look out at the thing he speaks, and his mean∣ing: and in
very deed ens à primo is Gods creature, and hath every Art in it: so that though
Grammer, that is speech, is proper to man, yet Grammers work is in every thing:
the reason is this, Every thing in nature is distinct, and I apprehend them so with
my Logick; and they being so, must needs have distinct names, otherwise I cannot
carry them to others di∣stinctly and as they are. So that Grammer is general, 〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉, for so Adam by seeing into the nature of every Creature,
could see their names, though we cannot do it: so he named the fire Esh, because
of the noise it makes in green wood: so wa∣ter maiim which signifieth quid, that is
the essence, for so Thales thought that every thing was made of water: and in the
second verse of the first Chapter of Genesis, it is said, The Spirit of God moved
upon the waters, where water is put for the first matter: so we call it in Latin aqua
quasi à quâ the efficient cause: so he called darkness lajil which signifieth rest,
because it is the time of rest: So God called the day jam because of the jumbling
noise that is made in it: so the earth erets from rashat tero to ware: and there is no
name but it hath a reason of it, and that Logick tels me when it handled notatio,
for ens à primo hath that in it which is in every ge∣neral Art.

Loquendi

Loqui and dicere signifie the same thing, but come to be distinguished thus,
because that Rhetorick to which dicere doth belong, was seen most especially

Page  14

in pleading before Judges, hence they gave it that name dicere; which cometh of
dico, and dico cometh of the Greek word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which
signifieth the decision of a Controversie; and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉bifariam, or as some say 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉divido, which
may well be, because in pleading of controversies, they divide their speeches.
Loquendi, not Ars Scribendi, for if they take it for the Orthographie of a word it is
accidental; neither are the letters the same in every tongue, therefore not the same
writing of them: Again, the letters may be changed, though not well, for the
Hebrew letters are given with great reason, and the other are taken from them: if
they take writing as general as speak∣ing, it is the same with Grammer: now the
cause of it was this, Man receiveth into his understanding the notions of things,
these notions are expressed and made known from him to another man by words,
now because man was not to live alwayes, neither by reason of the distance of
place could speak unto every one, hence was the necessity of writing.

Bene.

For a man may loqui and yet not bene loqui, i. e. according to bona locutio,
whereof Grammer gives precepts: but he that speaks according to the rule of
Grammer, whether he know he doth so or no, it is no matter, he doth bene loqui, i.
e. he speaketh such a speech as is pure according to the custome of the place
where the speech is spoken: for in nature there is great variety of speech by reason
of the heat and cold in men, which is according to the place wherein they are:
hence many consonants in Dutch and our English tongue; so thar variety of
sounds is not alwayes from the party named, but the party

Page  15

naming: and he that hath more heat, intentionally is more apt to pronounce, hence
Englishmen are almost to learn any tongue.

Id autem Latinis Latine.

Here is a Commoration where he cometh into the Latin Grammer, as if he should

say, in Latin after the Latin manner: for there are not so many Gram∣mers as there
are kinds of Speech, but it is as if he should say, Grammer is either the Latin,
Greek, or Hebrew Grammer; which is a distribution of the adjunct into the
subjects: for as there is but one Greek Grammer, yet many dialects: so the several
Grammers are but so many several dialects or idioms of the general Grammer.

Partes Grammaticae qua sunt Etymologia & Syntaxis.

Here is a copulative axiome, and the Arguments are Grammatica the integrum,
and Etymologia and Syntaxis the membra, which are yoaked together. There are
two parts of Grammer, first, because two of Logick: for if Grammer be the carrier
of Logick betwixtmen, then it must be answerable to Logick to carry the simples
and composit; for otherwise we shall not carry well. Again secondly, Speech is a
garment to cloath our reason, and as we would think a Taylor a fool that should
make a garment with one sleeve for him that hath two arms: so for Gram∣mer, if
we should make it with one sleeve to cover Logick that hath two arms. Et contra
as we count that Taylor an idiot, that makes many sleeves for him that hath but
two arms; so for him that makes many parts of Grammer to cloath Logick that
hath

Page  16

but two parts; though now a dayes I know not how many sleeves and hang-bys
they make. For Orthography and Prosody they are not part of Grammer, but
common adjuncts, and run through whole Grammer as blood through the whole
bo∣dy.
Etymologia.

Cometh of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉verus〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉sermo, i. e.

verilo∣qutio, and in very deed according to the notation it belongeth rather to
Logick than to Grammer, for it is nothing else but notatio, and so the
Grammari∣ans use to give examples, as lepus from the adjunct, quafi levipes, but
the Grammarians, it being before used in Logick, brought it into Grammer and so
use hath received it; even as some will have Dia ∣lectica to come of 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉colloquor, and so be∣long to Grammer.

The reason of this distribution is for that every speech consisteth of words, for
that as Syntax an∣swereth to judgment, so Etymology to invention: the occasion of
it was this, In ancient time when Grammer was first invented in Greece, it was
only observed in letters and syllables; the next observa∣tion among the Greeks,
was to look at the notation and reason of words, and so came to call that part of
Grammer Etymology, and afterwards the Grecians found out the whole Art of
Grammer before any o∣ther Nations.

Syntaxis.

Cometh of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉consuo or construo: because in the beginning

they laid the words together accor∣ding to the matter, so they did in Greek and
Hebrew

Page  17

till the Orators took that liberty to them to change: and because as Logick layes
things together; so doth Syntax utter them, if Grammer be right it must tye
nothing together but that which Logick doth tye: Hence is Logick before
Grammer in genesi, but Grammer before Logick in analysi, so is Grammer before
Rhetorick in genesi, but Rhetorick before Grammer in analysi: hence do we
remove the Rhetorick to see the Grammer and Logick in analy∣si.

Etym logia est prima pars Grammaticae, quae vocum singularum proprietates interpretatur.

This definition is not so good as if he had said est de voce, or praecipit de voce,
though praecipere be too large, for it is in Art. And Etymologie doth in∣terpretari
not only the properties of words, but also letters, and fyllables, which are the
causes of words.

Est prima pars.

Here prima and pars are Logical terms, therefore not genus to etymologia. The
word interpretari be∣longeth to analysis, and is all one with it. Etymo∣logia ergo
est prima pars Grammaticae, quae est de voce, here is a definition ab integro &
subjecto.

Etymologia est.

If there be vox, then there is etymologia, but there is vox. Ergo.

Page  18
Prima pars.

For there is a simple consideration of a thing there∣fore there must be a simple

consideration of the name of a thing, whereof etymoligia must give pre∣cept. It is
prima because I must consider a word, first simply in its own nature before I joyn
him with another.

De voce.

So that the subject of Etymology is vox (oratio, and sermo, belong properly to
Syntax) as argumen∣tum of invention, and Grammer goes no farther then vox: so
that all we shall hear of in this part of Gram∣mer is of a word alone. Hence not the
thing chest, but the name chest is a noune: for the three general Arts all take their
notions from ens, and yet ens it self may belong to Physicks. Logick takes notion
of it as it hath causes, effects, subjects, and adjuncts: Grammer as it doth notifie it
by its name to another. Physick as it consists of principles. And for that distinction
of vox to be primae or secundae intentionis, it is a toy: as animael say they, is
primae intentionis genus secundae. But I would ask them is animal & genus the
same thing? No, for they belong to divers Arts: And genus in his own Art is as
well primae intentionis as animal is, and it is a meer fallacia accidentis.

De voce.

Simplici not de vocibus. And for one word to be laied to another word is but
accidental to it, so that Syntax doth not handle vox. He saith vox, not dictio,

Page  19

though sometimes they be the same, yet it is dictio, as Rhetorick takes the notion
of it; and here we may note two things, namely that first when we look at, or
consider a thing Grammatically, we first give it a vox that is a name, for that is the
most simple consideration of a thing. Secondly, It is not only vox which is spoken,
but which is written al∣so.

Vox est nota quâ unumqu•dque vocatur.

Some call it dictio, some vocabulum, but vox is best, because it names the thing
from his special use, à vo∣cando.

Nota.

Here nota is not general to vox, for nota is a Lo∣gical term, and belongeth to
adjunct, so that this definition is from the subject and the conjugate, and he means
(as if he should say) vox is that whereby notice of the thing is given us. It is nota;
here he doth not consider vox as it is a quality in man pro∣ceeding from such
causes, but as it doth notifie the thing whereof it is vox: So our eye of reason, as it
is a part of man, and faculty of the soul, belongeth to Physicks, as vox doth: but as
it doth act for that Eupraxie, for which it was made, so it belongeth to Logick. In
that he calls it nota, we see it is another thing than the thing it self whereof it is a
note, and vox is nota, i. e. a notifying and making known the apprehension of
mans mind, even as wax having the picture of the seal is to the seal it self: and 〈◊〉
was man to name things. And here is a fallacy very use∣ful, to say this or that is a
true speech, when it is not
 Page  20

the speech in property, but the Logick clothed in the speech, that is true or false.

Ʋnumquodque.

For Grammer is a general Art. Ergo, ens is his subject more remote, so that here
he doth but spe∣cialize ens: so that vox is but the subject of Gram∣mer more
special, unumquodque more general: and as affectio is to argumentum, so is
vocatio to the thing called: so also that which was the aliquid in argu∣mentum, as
Grammer takes his notion of it, is unum∣quodque: And that definition of nomen,
of a thing that may be seen, felt, heard, or understood, is erroneous; for I can see,
feel, or understand a thing, and yet name it not. But doth res belong to Grammer?
No, but things attending ens, for o∣therwise ars in general is about ens, and words
are terms given unto things, so their doctrine must be general. So that every thing
hath its name, which notatio in Logick sheweth.

Again, Here we may see that verbs, adverbs, and conjunctions are voces; and
hence we may see the definition of a Noune to be too general, and secondly, their
errour in calling nomen not vox.

Vocatur.

Here I am told how this nota is used, which is for the calling of a thing, and the
naming of it; hence when we are asked what part of Speech such a thing is, we are
to know that the thing is no part of speech, but the name of it: so it is fallacia
divisionis, when they ask, what part of Speech a whole Speech is.

Page  21

It is a great question which Scaliger in his Book, De causts linguae Latinae,

whether words be ex thesi, or ad placitum?

But for Compound words they are ex thesi, as first words also in propriety of
speech; for we know that speech is the creature of God, yea and that words
signifie this or that thing, it is also from the providence of God: so God taught
Adam to name the Creatures: and so God wrought the Confusion of Tongues:
Now man was to name them, and God by man; because that speech was to be the
carrier betwixt man and man.

Again, Man was to be the Lords Steward over his Creatures, and therefore he
must know their names; and Adam did name things with reason, and according to
his apprehension, which we may see by men now adayes that name things so, as,
ac∣cording to their apprehension, they can give a rea∣son thereof. So that words
are given with respect to the thing named, and the reason of the things na∣med is
in the thing, so that words are not ad placi∣tum; so we give to little things little
names, so in English things that are glib have their names run much upon (l) or
other semi-vowels: if greater things, then their names run upon grosser let∣ters.

Now the Art of Speech is ars bexe sermocinandi, for that is general both to
Grammer and Rhetorick. And the wisdom of God concerning Speech is double,
pure, and ornate, and these are in the things, which Rhetorick shewes, in that there
is rea∣son in every Trope, and figura teacheth us to figu∣rate the Speech as the
thing is; and if it be great,

Page  22

we give it a great name: if little, we give it a little name.

And hence do arise the three stiles of Tully, That for a lofty thing we have a lofty
stile, for a mean thing a mean stile, for a little thing a low stile, and that with good
reason, for Speech is the garment of Reason, and therefore ought not to be too
little, or too great for it.

And for their Rules these Arts are eternal though changed by man, which is 〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉, and di∣stinguisheth things by their names, and Rhetorick is
the same to all the world.

And so for Grammer, the Rule for variation is e∣ternal, though the variation of
words be according to the variation of men, and this consists either in single
words, or in construction of more words, where alwayes note, that as the word
governed doth depend upon the word that governeth it, so do the things.

Vox constat syllabâ; syllaba constat literâ; litera est ex sono individuo.

For sonus is the material cause of it, the form is from the figuration of it with the
instruments of the mouth: For the word litera some think it cometh from
litteratura, and therefore write it with a double it, whereas it should be with a
single t; some think it comes of lineatura, and so of linea, from the matter: some
think it comes of litura a blot, which Scaliger believeth not, because it is from the
destruction of it: but this reason is more witty than sound, for man is called
mortalis of his

Page  23

death, but I think it comes of litura a blot, because when we set black upon white,
we do as it were blot the white paper: and so sometime bloting and writing are
confounded.

Linea comes of linum, linen, made of flax, (because thread was the first thing that
was con∣sidered for a line) and not of lino, which signifieth to blot out, so as
delinere is the same with delere.

Litera est vocalis aut consona.

The reason in nature is, because there are two prin∣cipal sorts of the position of
the mouth: the first is when we make a sound without any more ado: the second
is, where there is a more special kind of the use of the Organs in the mouth; which
letters either make a complete sound in themselves, or an incom∣pleat; and even
as in nature the first matter was in∣complete, yet makes things which are
complete: so the Consonants, which in themselves are incom∣plete, with vowels
make syllables, which are com∣plete.
This word vocalis signifieth vocal, i. e. sounding of himself; for he needeth no
other, though he be joyned with another. Now for vocalis, they usually define it
litera quae per se syllabam potest efficere: this is à priore but not generally true,
for in our English tongue our w, oo, ee, never make a complete sound, neither in
Hebrew, and yet there they make a com∣plete sound, though they be not without a
conso∣nant.

Now for my own part, I would define a vowel to be litera quae completum sonum
edit, or quae plenè sonat, or rather quae constat sono completo; but in

Page  24

Hebrew I am content with Mr. Junius, quâ movetur syllaba, for a vowel is in a
syllable, as the soul in a body, and as the soul moveth it self and the body also, so
doth a vowel move it self and the conso∣nants also: and the Hebrews may seem to
have held the vowels to have been some spiritual thing, and therefore did not
figure them with characters or bo∣dies, but with pricks only: and hence at the first
they wrote without pricks: and afterwards when they used pricks, they did not set
them in the letters, neither do they alwayes now, but above and under the letter,
because they would shew that the soul doth move all parts, as if they should say,
anima est tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte: and as the An∣gels by the rule of
Divinity, were made puncto tem∣poris: so the Hebricians thinking the vowels to
be spirits, figured them out punctis: also, because they thought spirits had not
quantity. Vocalis is com∣monly defined litera quae per se syllabam potest efficere.

Quae Syllabam.

This word syllaba hath been oft enough repeated before, and therefore needeth no
repetition here a∣gain. Vocalis is litera, and litera is before a syllable in nature,
therefore this is à posteriori.

Per se.

This is not general, for in ab, eb, ib, ob, ub, these do not per se syllabam efficere.
Again, this potentia is not general at all times in use; for this vowel, a, in this
syllable ab, cannot make a full sound. And again, for per se, in english our w, oo,
ee, do never per se syllabam efficere; now from the definition it followeth

Page  25

that so many syllables so many vowels; now for consonants the very name
sheweth that they cannot make a compleat and full sound, and therefore they
require a more special position of the mouth, for their prolation: and hence is our
order in writing a, b, c, d, not good; but first setting the vowels and then the
consonants, yet some have thought that some liquids make a full sound, which is
not true, for that they alwayes have a vowel going before them, as mut•s have
ever a vowel coming after them: thus for all Grammers do agree, but here is a
Question, Whether a letter or a syllable be brevis or longa? and in old time we
know they used to write a longae with a double aa, so in Greek ▪ and ω, ε and ο,
only differ in time: but to Answer to the Question, We must needs confesse that
the vowel is the motor, but yet a short vowel by reason of the consonants joyn∣ed
with it may be made long & contra, and there∣fore I think it more proper of a
syllable than of a let∣ter. For thus I reason, One letter should have but one
character, Ergo▪ yet we will speak of them here. The reason therefore of length
and shortness in speech is this, The Lord hath appointed speech to be the carrier
from man to man, therefore it must be such as will easily be received, therefore
must be or∣dered by time and tune: for as every act is ordered with time, so must
speech be: Again, little things are to have little names, therefore short names:
great things great names, ergo, long names: now for a semi-short, or the like, they
belong to Musick and not to Grammer. Now in our short time we may be as long
as we will, as men when they are angry will be as short in the long, as at other
times they are

Page  26

in the short. Brevis is simplicis temporis, longa is du∣plicis; that is, look as your
short is, your long must be twice as much.

A Vowel is either diduct or contract, diduct is with the mouth drawn wide, and
that is either with a greater rictus, as a, or with a lesser as e and i: a is first, for it
is the first in nature, and it is the first letter that we speak, though it have a greater
yawn∣ing than either e or i: Now the lesser yawning was common to both e and i,
which shewes the affinity betwixt them: hence did jed in the Hebrew stand for
both e and i, and they call them cousen vowels: so also in Latin we write
indifferently turrem or tur ∣rim. Contract is of the drawing together of the mouth,
for the form of the letter is from the form of the mouth in the pronunciation of it.
C•ntracta is either a poach-mouth, or a hens-tayl: i e. either wide or round: now in
a contract it is required first that the mouth be drawn round: secondly, that as in a
diduct the tongue was lifted up to the palate: so here contrarily it should be
pressed down; and it is o, or u, and y. The difference of these is in a more full or
lesser orbe in the pronouncing of them, and in Hebrew o and u, are usually set in
letters, namely, in vau, and this sheweth how they do co∣incidere, which is in use:
so θs in Greek is changed into us, in Latin, as papyros into papyrus: yet o is with
a more full orb, u with a more contract: and the figuration of the Latin letters is
from the Greek, and the Greek from the Hebrew: yet this is not al∣wayes, but there
are some exceptions: For e in the Hebrew seems to be from the Assyrians, so the
single θ in the Greek seems to be from the Assyrians:

Page  27

yet they might have it from the frame of the mouth, but so it would be the same
with u, and in the Greek υ is like half an o: now the o must have a full globe, and
the tongue is drawn into the solum; and this letter, if we mark, soundeth more
inwardly in the mouth, whereas u and y make as it were a whistling through the
lips, and so sound through the lips: The Grecians o short, which is the same with
camets hatuph: the Greek long ο is as two long ωω: so in English we have our
short o, with o alone; and our long o sometimes with oa, as coal: sometimes with
ow, or owe: or more seldom with ou, as ought: but it were better if we had the
Greek ω, or some other character: now for u, this hath a more contract mouth for
the prolation of it, and seems to whistle through the lips; u also hath the tongue
brought back in the mouth, and it soundeth almost in the ve∣ry opening of the
mouth: in Hebrew gibbuts soun∣deth like u, or as we do in tu and the like: Surech
 soundeth as ▪ in Greek, υ is their u short, ov is their long u, and is rather a vowel
than a dipthong; for there is but one position of the mouth in it.

Caetera desunt.

Page  [unnumbered]

Page  29

RHETORICAL NOTES.
CHAP. I.

Rhetorica.

THe name is of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉fluo, as a stream doth, but tropically it

signifieth to speak fluently: the reason of this Art is, that Speech be∣ing the
Carrier from man to man, which is but a testimony, therefore not easily
received, God hath therefore provided a kind of sugar, that thereby it might be
the more easily received: and Rhetorick is as honey to a bitter Potion, or lace to
a garment. It is

Page  30

Ars,

Because it consisteth of Precepts fitted to an Eupraxy.

Dicendi.

It cometh of Dico, which cometh of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in Greek which

signifieth a decision or determination of a Controversie, and belongeth to ju
isprud, so that dicere is properly to plead in Courts or places of Ju∣stice; and
because Rhetorick at the first was in such places of most use, therefore is this
word given unto it. which in propriety is too strait for the Art to which it is
given: but because Use hath received it, we are content with it, knowing that it
was the error of them who first gave it, not of those who after∣wards used it.

Bene.

This Bene is not the same with that in the definiti∣of ars, for that in ars is
whereby a man doth a thing expeditè, or ex habitu, and is not in Arte, but in
Ho∣mine; but now this bene dicere, or bene loqui, or the like, is a bene dicere,
or bene loqui beyond that in the definition of ars, for the species is beyond the
genus, by a form, which ← Ramus  → teacheth in the definition of forma: but
the reason why bene is put in the de∣finition of every Art, is because every
Creature of God, by reason of our sin, is made evil unto us and obscured, so
there is good or bad: so Speech is good or bad: and the Art takes hold only of
that which is good. For it is the wisdom of God, and therefore for difference
sake it is requisite that bene should
 Page  31

come under into the definition of every Art. And here it is an adverb joyned to
this verb, to shew this thing that is the good function of this action bene di∣cere.
So he doth bene dicere which useth word in tem∣pore, and he doth malè dicere,
which useth them in∣tempestivè.

Cujus virtus.

Here he doth commorari, to shew the effects of Rhetorick, and indeed so every
art hath great effects being wisely used.
Ideòque Plato.

Now Plato being an honest man in Greece, and those that were called
Sophistae, abusing this Art, and making the common people by it beleive, That
God was evil, and truth falshood: he was angry with them, and so called it The
Art of Cookery, of Flat∣tery, of Painting, of Enchanting: though indeed it was
by the fallacies of the Arguments in Logick: and thereupon that name
Sophistae, which before was a name of honour, became afterwards a name of
re∣proach. Now (as I said before) it was not Rhe∣torick, but false reason of
Logick; only the Rheto∣rick set a gloss upon it, and these names are as it Pla ∣to
should say, though this be a kind of Musick which in it self is good, yet thus it
ought not to be used, but is unneedful, and therefore he calleth it a kind of
sauce, and painting out of a thing: or as if he should say, a cup of poyson
fweetned with honey. And Aristotle following his Master Plato, said it was in a
good Common-wealth unneedful: but indeed Rhe∣torick is a kind of Musick,
which is good and need∣ful.

Page  32

The Romans of long time would not admit of Rhetorick, and among the Turks I
think that they will never receive it: and indeed rude people, yea, and all kind
of people are easily deceived by Rheto∣rick; not in regard of judgment, but of
the affecti∣on of love, which embraceth it, and voluptas is the object of
affection. Now indeed here lyeth the fal∣lacy, in that a Speech being seasoned
with Rheto∣rick, passeth by the understanding, and so the Will takes hold of it,
and whilest the Will doth hastily embrace it, the reason cannot examine it: and
so in Tropes, it is respected of Rhetoricians to bring sounding words to tickle
the ear, but the understand∣ing is not well pleased, because it doth not
under∣stand it: and Rhetorick is the art of affection as it sweetneth the speech,
for the affection of love is so greedy of it that it will not let the understanding
take it, therefore Rhetorick is said to be the art of affection, Grammer of things
to be understood; but this is nothing, for they are both of Speech and so are
Arts to entertain bonum.

Now for the Turks, I think they will never em∣brace it, for they are as God's
rods to whip his Christians withal. We have already heard what Rhetorick is:
now followeth the distribution; and that is into Elocution and Pronunciation: for
accor∣ding to rhe double act of this art must this art be di∣stributed, for we have
already heard that Speech is God's Creature given unto man to be a Carrier
from man to man; and that because one man's eye cannot see all things, which
being only a bare testimony, is not easily received, and therefore must be
sugared or sauced, that it may be more sweet and pleasant, and

Page  33

also more evident. Now Speech is adorned by speech, or by gesture, for though
Speech be consi∣dered in gesture, yet not the Speech properly, but the sound or
tenour of it: For in that Oration, where both speech and gesture are answerable
one to another, that is most plain, and takes the most effect in the hearts of the
hearers: and gesture is a kind of dicere, and therefore when they use pleading in
Courts, they use gesture, that there may be a more pleasant dicere consisting of
these two parts: so that Speech is adorned either with speech or gesture. The
First of these is called Elocutio of eloquor, which though for notation it be the
same with pronuncia ∣tio, yet in definition and in use they are distinct. This is
first because elocutio may be without pronunciatio, as are Tully's and
Demosthenes his Orations: and se∣condly, Pronunciatio may be improperly of
that which is meerly Grammatical; therefore elocutio must go before, so that
according to the double sweetning of Speech must Rhetorick have these two
parts.

Elocutio est exornatio.

Here exornatio is not a genus to elecutio, therefore I define elocutio to be prima

pars Rhetorica, de exorna ∣tione orationis.

Est exornatio.

We know that the garment is one thing, and the cut another, so that Grammer
and Rhetorick are distinct Arts; and we may easily discern between them: For I
may compare Grammer to plain deal∣ing, or to one that speaketh plainly: and
Rhetorick is one that is eloquent, or as it were one that sets

Page  34

jewels or pearls in Grammer, for the making it the more evident, to be received
more easily.
Orationis.

Oratio is properly the subject of Grammer, as ra ∣tio is of Logick. But because

Rhetorick also is the Art of Speech as well as Grammer, therefore me∣diately,
or at the second hand oratio comes to be the subject of Rhetorick: namely, as
this oratio is a∣dorned with tropes and figures. Hence it follow∣eth that
Rhetorick is a general Art, because his sub∣ject oratio is general: yea, as
general as Grammer. For howbeit in precept it be taught after it, yet for use the
one is not where the other may not be; nei∣ther is it after Grammer for subject
or common use, but only in a kind of precedency of doctrine, even as Logick is
before Grammer, only because if we use Grammer which is the latter, Logick's
use must be the former; as oratio should not be before Ratio. Now because
Rhetorick is a general Art, hence it followeth, that it may be used in any art, if
so be we have not a word without a trope, that is so usual∣ly and familiarly
known, as the tropical word is: or if it be not of so great use as the tropical
 word is: for tropes do arise from the arguments in Logick; so that they do not
only set a lustre or resplendency upon the word used, but also shew the
argument from whence it is drawn. Which thing if Kecker ∣man had well
considered, he would not have found fault with ← Ramus  → for using a trope
in that word dis∣serere, both because Rhetorick is general, and se∣condly,
because that word disserere is of a thousand times more use then any other
word.

Page  35

Object. But Rhetorick saith he, is an Art only of the Affection, and not of the
Ʋnderstanding?
Answ. So I can say of Grammer, for only Lo∣gick is that which my
understanding takes hold of: and oratio is to the eare, yet also to the
understand∣ing, as it carrieth the reason with it. Now indeed Rhetorick slips
down more speedily than Grammer doth to the affections, and is more volupe:
and vo∣luptas as it tendeth to bonum, is the object of affecti∣on. And so these
Sophistae of Greece, when they would deceive their Auditours, did so adorn
their speech, as that it would move so speedily to the af∣fections, that the
understanding could not examine it: and thence it is, that this Art hath been
most abused, of any art, and of least request. For it is of the nature of Musick,
that it steals away the af∣fections from that where about they ought to be
oc∣cupied.

Eáque perse plurimum potest.

This is a rule of propriety, for it agreeth only to this part of this art, and not any
other part what∣soever of any other art: so we know invention is not of any
force without judgement, but is seen only in judgement. So for Etymology and
Syntax in Gram∣mer; but elocutio can do much by it self without pro∣nunciatio.
Now the true reason of this propriety is this, because there may be exornatio
orationis which is written, as there is pronouncing: and scriptio orationis may
be without the pronunciatio of it: for elocutio is orationis, but pronunciatio is
oris,

Page  36

and there may be oratio where there is not os, but not contra.

Ʋt in Curione, qui.

Here he doth commorari upon the commendation of this propriety; which he

illustrateth à specie of Curio, who was a Roman, that had very pleasant, and
eloquent words, but his pronunciation was very mean, hence his elocutio was
commendable, but not his pronunciatio, for there he was maximè nudus, though
for eloqution he was orator optimis proximus numeratus.

CHAP. II.

Elocutio est Tropus aut figura.

HEre Elocutio is not a genus to Tropus and Figu∣ra, but is used tropically by a
metonymy of the subject for the adjunct. Therefore I had rather say,
Ornamentum or exornatio orationis, est Tropus aut Figura: and by that means
give them their ge∣nus. Here exornatio orationis is a definition it self, and
therefore cannot be defined, for there cannot be a definition of a definition:
therefore I do not define exornatio orationis, but only distribute it into Tropes
and Figures.

Now for the demonstration of this distribution. We have already seen that
Rhetorick is an Orna∣ment of Speech, therefore must run along answer∣ably,
with it, therefore distribute it according to it,

Page  37

therefore a Speech is either of one word alone, or more together: as if he should

say, Rhetorick must adorn Etymology and Syntax: so that as Tropus is to
Etymology, so is figura to Syntax.
Tropus est Elocutio.

I would define it thus, Tropus est ornamentum ora ∣tionis, &c. Or, Tropus est,
quo verbum, &c.

Tropus of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because words that are tropical are turned
from that which they naturally signifie, to that which they do not naturally
signifie. It is Ornamentum, because besides its lustre, it carrieth an argument
with it. Orationis, because it is only in oratione; and is in it as a jewel or jem is
in a Ring; and here the art lieth in the word.

Quà Verbum.

He useth verbum rather than nomen, because nomen properly signifieth that
part of Speech which is de∣clined with gender and case, though for notation it
cometh of novimen, of novimus, of novi, of nosco, be∣cause we know things by
their names. But verbum properly is as general as vox, and so it is here taken,
but by a synechdochy of the genus for the species is put for a verb. Again, Dicti
hath more ambiguity with it than verbum, and vox is peculiar to Gram∣mer.
Again, not only nomina but verba are also tro∣pical. Again, Verbum in a
Sentence is the chief word, for it is vinculum, so that there can be no Sentence
without it, therefore used with good reason.

Page  38

Verbum immutatur.

Here is a metonymy of the subject for the adjunct, for the word is not changed,
but only the use or signification of it.
A native significatione.

That is à Grammaticâ, or propriâ significatione: though it be not alwayes so at

the first hand: for sometimes words are changed from one tropical sig∣nification
to another tropical signification: and there they are firstly from the other
tropical signification, and à natia â significatione at the second hand.

In aliam

Not quamlibet, but such an one as shall be accor∣ding to Logick; as that which
properly signifieth a cause, may tropically signifie the effect, aut contra: and so
of the rest of the Argumens which argue one another. [In aliam,] i. e. into such
an one as use hath brought up that it may be put for.
Tropus verò Aristoteli.

Here he doth commorari about the commendation of a Trope, his Argument is

à contrario, as if he should say, If it be so pleasant when it is abused, much
more when it is rightly used.

Ideóque Platonis oratio.

Plate had two Schollers, Aristotle and Zenocrates: Aristotle was of a quick wit,
and therefore Plato

Page  39

said, He needed a bridle for him: Zenocrates was more dull, but of a greater
judgment; therefore he said, He wanted a spur for him. Now Plato left his
School to Zenocrates, which made Aristotle maligne at him, and upbraid him
with his faults: and among the rest he challengeth him with Tropes, which is a
good fault; though truth 'tis that proper words are better even in an Oration, if
they can be so conve∣niently had: though afterwards Aristotle commen∣ded
Tropes, if they were pleasant and not far fetch't from home.

Et certè Tropum.

Here he sets down the procreant and conservant cause of a Trope; and for
necessity, though Gram∣mer be as large as Logick, yea, as large as our thoughts;
yet at the first it was not: yea, they used to say, The heart cannot comprehend
her own thoughts: and again, because things at the first were so many, that they
could not readily give the proper name of every thing, hence arose Tropes:
afterwards these Tropes were sweet and pleasant, and therefore they would let
them go no more.
Nam ut vest is frigoris, &c.

Man at first needed not cloathes, but now by rea∣son of sin (the temper of his
body, and external cold together cause cold) he needeth cloaths which he useth
not only for heat, but also for ornament. So for Tropes though necessity
brought them in, yet de∣cency doth hold them.

Page  40

Delectat autem ideo, &c.

Because it is witty to let pass those things which are before our feet. Secondly,
Because our cogita∣tion is refreshed by them: for variety delighteth, as there is
in Tropes, and even as if we see Speech in his holy-day garment.
Haec igitur prima sunt.

These are the first sauses and remedies to make Speech look red and white.

Sedtamen verecund. &c.

Here is a propriety, a Trope must be bash•ul and shamefac't, not brought in by

another, or come in rushing perforce, but gentle and led by the hand, or I pray
you ceme in: Now to all kinf of Tropes there be certain general affections; and
those are either in one word alone, or in the continuance of more words
together: Those which are in one word a∣lone, are either such as are too hard
and harsh; or too bold and proud, such as are pull'd in by the ears and are more
sausy: now these are general affections of Tropes; and the reason of them is
this, We have heard what a Trope is, namely, where a word is changed from his
natural signification into another: now because that for want of words we
cannot rea∣dily give a fit word that is tropical, therefore we are forc'd to bring
them in more harshly sometimes and more proudly: now that which is more
harsh, is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, abusio tropi, which comes of 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉abutor; that is, a word which is abused more unkindly, or a
word hardly entertain'd: 'tis

Page  41

called of the Grammarians 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet

〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Tunc ego, &c.

If I might only hope for this grief: here is an harsh Trope; for Spes is expectatio
boni; and metus or ti∣m•r expectatio mali; so that here is either a synech∣dochy,
or a catachrestical Ironie. Now, for Hy∣perbole, that hath no affinity with
catachrésis, for an hyperboly is very usual and commendable, neither is there
any harshnesse in it, but it is a little too proud: but catachrésis is harsh, and not
used but of Poets only; not of Oratours, at least, very sel∣dom.

Gladium vagina, &c.

This is also harsh; for we rather say, Vagina & gladio vacua, than gladius est
vagina vacuus: Va ∣cuum here is a metaphour, h. e. (exutum.)

Hyperbole est audacia tropi.

Of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to be carried above: and this affection signifieth

that for which it was fetch't very kindly, but proudly, and so as it doth inhaunch
and encrease the matter to very good purpose: and this affection is very
commenadble and usual especially in Scripture: Meiosis, diminutio, which is
contra∣ry to hyperbole is nothing else but a synechdochy of the species for the
genus.
 The Second affection of Tropes in the continu∣ance of more words is called
Allegoria, which is con∣tinuatio troporum, yet those Tropes must be of the
same kind of Tropes; as they must be all of them

Page  42

either metonymies, metaphors, ironyes, or synech∣dochyes: not one a

metonymy, another an irony, and another a metaphor, and another a
synecdochy: it hath his notation of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉.

Sedin Allegoria tenendum.

That is, In an Allegory look from what thing we first fetch our Allegory, with
the same thing must we end. As, if I begin with a ship, I must end with a ship;
for if I begin with a ship, and end with a plow, inconsequentia foedissima
fuerit. So also we see in the Gospel, how the Allegory of Dives and Lazarus is
continued; how they were there feasted, and after∣ward how they were to feast
in another place, where Dives had such a dry feast, as he desired but the tip of
his finger to cool him withal: but how Lazarus was taken into a joyful feast,
yea, even into Abra ∣ham's bosom; where we may see even by this rule, what is
meant in this place by Abraham's bosome; namely, that Lazarus sitteth in
Hea∣ven next unto Abraham: So is the Allegory con∣tinued from the thing he
doth fetch it: And this rule is of great use in Scripture, for the understand∣ing of
the Spirit of God in many places, which o∣therwise might seem dark. Now for
him that gave his fellow a box on the eare which felled him, and yet said nisi
tetigi; what affection is this? it is a kind of hyperboly of his own
commendation, as if he could do more with a touch, then others with a great
stroke.

Page  43

CHAP. III.

Troporum genera duo sunt. Primum est metonymia & ironia.

THis distribution of the kinds of Tropes is in re∣spect of the things whence they
are borrowed, and those from the Arguments of invention. The second
distribution is from simple arguments.

Metonymia est tropus causae ad effect. subj. ad adjunct: vel contrà.

Here is definitio ex distributione, as if he should say, is absolutè vel modo

quodam consentaneorum, which is shewed by the induction of the species. But
because not every cause is put Tropically for e∣very effect, nor è contrà; neither
every subj. for every adj. nor è contrà, therefore he chuseth rather to keep
himself closely by these species, then to speak generally.
Metonymia.

Of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a change of the name,

which is true of every Trope, but because use hath received, we content our
selves with it, knowing what is meant by it: or if ye will make it a synecdochy
of the ge∣nus for the species. And this trope is first, for that the arguments
whence they are borrowed, are first; and the reason why the cause is put for the
effect, is, because it gives esse to the effect: so the reason why

Page  44

the effect is put for the cause, is, because it hath its esse from the cause. So why
the subj. is put for the adjunct, because the adjunct in esse is in the subj. et
contrà; so that this Trope is of consentany Ar∣guments.

Metonymia causae est efficieintis aut materiae.

Here also is a definition of the metonymy of the cause ex distributionne. There

is not any Trope of the other causes, neither form nor end; not of the form, for
that is the effect it self, where the form is, and therfore ← Ramus  → said,
Distributio generis in species & formas eadem est. Neither of the final cause,
for that cannot so determine, because one thing may have many ends.

Object. So the effect may have many efficients?

Answ. But then according to the several modi of the efficient, there will be
several effects: but there are no modi of the final cause.

Efficient. cùminvent. & author.

Here Inventor and Author are the two modi of the efficient. The first examples
be of the Inventor, as

Tum Cererem, &c,

Ceres is corrupted with water; here is Ceres the Inventor of Corn: put for Corn,
Cerealiáque arma.

Here Arma is a Metaphor.

Page  45

Quos amisimus Cives.

Those Citizens which we have lost.

Mars pro bello. Aut dulcis musti, &c.

Or he that doth concoct the humor of sweet Muske∣dine with Vulcane, i. e. fire:
and this is he that is cal∣led Tubalcain often in Scripture.

Sinè Cerere & Libero, &c.

Without Bread and Wine lusts wares cold. And here is an Allegory, for the
same Trope is continu∣ed: yet 'tis better to use venus than Coitus, but Li∣ber and
Ceres are more than the severity of the judg∣ment seat will bear.
 Est preterea hîc valdè usitat, &c.

Here is Author, the second modus of the efficient; and this is valdè usitatum:
yea, of much greater use, than is the Inventor: so Martial calleth the history of
Livie, Livie.

Metonymia materiae.

This is a definition it self, neither needeth it more to be added to it, for there is
not definitio definitio∣nis, yet I may say it is quando nomen materiae traduci∣tur
admateriatum significandum.

Non domus & fundus, &c.

Aes & aurum, pro aeneis & nureis nummis.

Page  46

Aes & ferrum duelli.

Brass and Iron are signes of War, not of Peace. pro armis aeneis & ferreis. So is
silver put for silver houshold-stuffe so plate for the dishes made of plate.

CHAP. IV.

Metonymia effecti, cùm ex effect, &c.

HE here makes the effect to answer only to the efficient, and in Latin it doth so;
but in He∣brew sometimes it doth not, as in Genesis, chap. 1. vers. 2. The earth
was wtthout form, and void: and sometimes it is found so in English, also in
Latin; as 'twas called Lavinium, because 'twas built either from the material
cause, or the subject of place. Now this is a common metonymy; neither doth
he lay down all the modi which belong unto it. So spes is obscura, obscura is a
metaphor, afterwards a me∣tonymy, i. e. incerta. So is caeca pro ignorante a
meta∣phour. So pale Death knocks equally at poor mens shops, and Kings
turrets: Death is said to be pale, because it makes things so.
Pallentesque habitant, &c.

Morbi efficiunt pallentes: senectus a metonymy of the adj. for the subject; for
the man that is old: it is tristis because it causeth sorrow. Here sometimes the
efficient is put for the effect without any more

Page  47

adoe; as in these examples that went before: some∣times the adjective is given
to the substantive, which noteth the vis of the efficient, and not the efficient it
self, as in this example that followeth.
Praecipitem iram.

Many modi there are of this metonymy of the effect which he omitteth: as this,
when a man carrieth a Sword in his hand, we say, this man carrieth Death in his
hand▪ here is Death put for the instrumental cause: so mors in olla.
CHAP. V.

Metonym. subj. est, &c.

WE have heard before the reason of the name of Metonymia, and that it is
distributed according to the Arguments whence it is borrowed: namely, to be of
Arguments consentanious absolutè, or modo quodam: absolutè, as the cause
and the effect: of the cause was of the efficient or matter; yet of these two
causes the matter is more usually put for the effect: as, this Chest is wood: i. e.
made of wood. Now the reason why 'tis so usual that the matter is put
commonly for the effect, is this, because the genus doth arise from the matter,
and doth predicate in quid of it.

Cùm nomen, &c.

That is, when that Noune which properly signi∣fieth

Page  48

a subj. is delivered to signifie the thing adjoyn∣ed. Here he saith nomen, not
verbum, as he did in the definition of a Trope, to shew that he liketh both of
them indifferently, and therefore useth them promiscuously. Here we are to
understand that this definition is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for every subject
is not put to signifie his adjunct; or contrà: as whit∣nesse is not put for wall, yet
this is the best definiti∣on that can be given, and is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
with his modi that follow.

Ʋt cùm ponitur Continens, &c.

Neither is this generally true, for every continens non pro quáque re contenta
ponitur, but is to be limit∣ed with his two modi that follow: The first whereof is,
when the place is put for the inhabitants thereof: and this is the first special
modus of that modus of continens pro re contenta.
Invadunt urbem, &c.

The City was not buried in sleep and Wine, but the People in the City: So urbs
pulcherrima for cives pulcherrimi. So

Quòd in me carcerem effudistis.

They cast a Prison upon me; for the Prisoners.

Testis est Italia.

Here Tully calls Italy, France, Sicily, Spain, to witnesse, for the Italians, French,
Sicilians, and Spaniards; and here is also allegoria. Now the se∣cond special
modus of that modus of continens pro re

Page  49

contenta, is, when the place is put for the things done in the place: so the
market is put for the Rhetori∣cal actions done in it: so by Academia where Plato
 taught, Lycéum where Aristotle taught, and Tus∣culane where Tully taught, is
meant the Learning made famous therein. There is yet another speciall modus
of continens pro re contenta, which I marvel that he left, as this, Reach me the
cup, for the drink in the cup: and, Give me thy purse, for the money in the
purse: here is continens pro re contenta, and yet neither of the special modi
aforegoing.

Ex hoc genere est illud.

This is not a third special modus of continens pro re contenta, but a second
from it, and here the pos∣sessor is put for the thing possed, as our neighbour
Ʋcalegon burneth, for his house: Ʋcalegon comes of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
non curo, therefore he that dwelleth near such a carelesse neighbour, had need
to be careful for fear of fire. This modus is very useful in prose, as, he is with
me, that is at my house.

Sic dicimus hominem devorari.

We say, the man is undone, or eaten up, when his Goods are taken from him,
and this is another modus: The next modus is, the Captain for his Army: The
last is, the Advocate for his Client.

Page  50

CHAP. VI.

VVE have heard the reason of this Art of Rhe∣torick, namely, that 'tis to sweeten
speech with, otherwise being inartificial it is of little force in the hearers eares.
For whereas every thing co∣ming to mind, doth first come to the outward sen∣ses,
then to the inward senses, and hence to the un∣derstanding, & so to the affections,
and last of all to the Will. Rhetorick comes to the understanding, yet presently,
before it can examine it, the affections lay hold of it, and so, tickle the Will that it
may approve it: and hence it came to be abused, 1. with sophistry to the
understanding; 2. for tickling of the Will.

We have heard also that it hath two parts, namely, for that Speech is so; either
writing, or uttering of it: hence is the double consideration of speech; the first
whereof is called elocutio, which may be in writing alone without pronunciation,
but pronunciation cannot be without elocution; hence it followeth that these are
several parts: And secondly, Elocutio is before Pronunciatio: now elocutio is
either in one word alone, adorning etymology; or in more words together
adorning Syntax: that which is in one word alone is called tropus; and the reason
of the sweetnesse of a Trope is, because it doth not only give a splendour, but
besides that it carrieth us to a∣nother Argument from whence it was drawn: for
every Trope signifieth two things to the hearer:

Page  51

First, A kind of sweetnesse with the thing it deli∣vereth: and secondly, the
argument whence it was drawn. Therefore though at the first necessity found it
out, yet afterwards variety did so delight that it would not cast them off. Now
these Tropes are not of any words as we will, but of consentanies with
consentanies, dissent. with dissent. &c. and there∣fore the distribution of the
doctrine of Tropes must run along according as the arguments are distribu∣ted: yet
we have not fit words to distribute them withal, for if we should have said that a
Trope is ei∣ther simple or comparate, then we should have left out those Tropes
which do arise from orta argumen∣ta, as, synecdoche integri, & membri, generis
& speciei. Again, not every simple argument is put for every simple one; neither
every comp. for every comp. so that in this distribution there would have been a
double errour, therefore he contents himself with the special words Metonym. and
Ironia, commending unto us a totum which we are to imagine by these specials as
they have a community one with another, which is in regard of the arguments
from whence they arise.

1. For a metonymy of the cause, that is either of the efficient or of the matter: The
reason of these two Tropes is, because these two causes in constitu∣ting the effect,
are precedent a good while before either forme or end. Now here, first the
efficient is put for the effect, for that often times giveth names to the effect: and
this metonymy hath two modi, the first when the Inventour is put for the thing
in∣vented; the second when the Authour is put for the thing effected: so, we call
← Ramus  → his Logick, ← Ramus  → :

Page  52

and the reason hereof is this, because at the first we had not readily a name for it;
for the thing being new we could not hastily give it a name, but gave the Author's
name, till we had a better for it: So, for the matter we call Money silver, because
at the first we had not readily a better name. Now there are no Tropes, of the
formal and final causes; and the reason is, because they were so confused with the
effect, that at the first we cannot readily sever them, both because forma simul
ingenita cum effecto: and secondly, because these two causes do work so near to
the effect a good while after either efficient or matter.

2. A metonymy of the effect is, when the effici∣ent is signified by his effects: here
he seemeth to make the effect only to answer to the efficient; but it doth answer
also to the matter at least, though not in Latin, yet in Hebrew and English: Luz
was cal∣led Bethel before it was Bethel. Now this metony∣my of the effect hath
two modi: The first, when the effect is given to the efficient adjectively: the
second when given to the efficient not adjectively, but ab∣stractively: as he said,
Death was in the Pot, because Colliquintida was in it. Now as the cause is put for
the effect, & contrà; so, the subj. for the adj. & con∣trà.

3. In the metonymy of the subject the modi are ei∣ther contin. pro re contenta, as
locus pro incolis, & ad res locatas; or possessor pro re possessâ; or Dux pro
exercitu; or Advocatus pro Cliente.

4. Now followeth the metonymy of the Ad∣junct.

Page  53

Cùm ex adj. res subj. signifie.

 That is, when the name of an adjunct is given to the subj. whereof 'tis an
adjunct: So we use to say, Saving your Honour: If it please your Worship:
Honour and Worship being put for the subjects there∣of: for, because the term
of the cause, effect, sub∣ject, and adj. did not at the first come readily to our
hand, therefore we were fain to put cause for effect, subj. for adj. aut contrà.
So, the names of Vertues and Vices are put for vertuous and vitious men: as
Lecher for a lecherous man; Covetousness for a co∣vetous man, &c. and this is
the first modus of this metonymy.

The second modus is, when the signe is put for the thing signed; as, pubes for
inventus; for pubes is properly the budding of the beard; when he be∣ginneth to
be adolescens.

The third modus is, when the adjunct of time is put for the subject; as time for
the unmannerly Ci∣tizens in that time: so aspera saecula for the People that
were then asperi; so is togae for Peace, and here [cedant arma togae, conced.
&c.] are two Hyper∣boly's.

Page  54

CHAP. VII.

Ironia est Tropus à contrar. ad contr.

SO that this Trope is only from those Arguments of contraries, and not of
disparates, because they are too many. This definition is too general, for Relates
are not so put one for another, because they are of more use in their agreeing
affection, than in their disagreeing, but only is special to adversa
contradicentia and privantia.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Cavillator, a wrangler: simulator, making that to be, which is not: dissimulator,

making th•t not be, which is: illusor, a mocker: irrisor, a derider: this is the
proper name of this Trope, and the use of it chiefly is ad jocandum. Now here,
because there is so little reason that one contrary should be put for a∣nother;
therefore 'tis hardly perceived, yet is to be distinguished either by word, or
gesture, or by both.

Heus bone vir.

So,

Meaning malè adversa.

Curasti probè.

That is, Non curasti, contradicentia: So integri∣tas tua, i. e. your uprightnesse,

your shame-fac't-nesse,

Page  55
 your good done deeds; and so for the adversa. The modi here are 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which are contradicentia; as let me
not speak of your calami∣ty: So may there also be of privantia, as when we say
of a rich man, This man indeed is very poor.

CHAP. VIII.

VVE have already spoken of those Tropes which do arise from simple
Arguments: now follow those that do arise from Comparates and Orta.

Tropi primum genus.

Here is a perfect transition; wherein by the spe∣cies the genus is commended

unto us. For because Rhetorick doth not trace Logick in every step, but only in
some few, hence it cannot be so exactly di∣stributed, according as the
Arguments of Logick are: hence was he fain to couple these two species
meto∣nym. and irony together, whose community is in that they both arise from
simple Arguments.

Secund. seq. in metaph. & synecd.

Here the one is from Comparates, the other from orta, which whilest
← Ramus  → doth couple them toge∣gether with this conjunction, he
commends unto us a genus, which he could not name for us. We have heard
before, Logick was compared to the

Page  56

body, Grammer to the garment, and Rhetorick to the lace laid upon it, which
because it is an orna∣ment unto it, 'tis not all over the garment, but only in some
parts, for it must be rare, for it would not be an ornament if it was all over; so
that we can∣not so fitly distribute it according to Logick. Me∣taphora of 〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to cary over, for this Trope
doth carry us from one simile to ano∣ther.

Metaph, est quando ex sim. &c.

Hence this Trope doth only arise from similia, be∣cause the quality wherein
they are compared makes them, and if that a mistaking should be, it is not
great. There is no Trope that doth arise from comparates in quantity, because
there is no propor∣tion, for it belongeth only to similia.

Itaque metaph, est ad unum verbum contr. sim.

This is a deduction fetch'd out of Logick from a contract similitude, which is in

one word.
Tropus nullus est florentior.

Here he doth commorari in the commendation of this Trope fetched from that
Argument in Logick whence it ariseth. For whereas other Arguments do prove
that which they are brought to argue, similia do only illustrate: so that a
Metaphor is more excel∣lent than any other Trope in clearing, and making
bright, and our speech more pleasant: and, indeed, a metaphor makes us see, as
it were, superficie tenus,

Page  57

if it be taken wisely and brought to the senses, espe∣cially to the eye which is
the most acute sense.
Nam & odor urbanitatis.

The sweetness of your Civility.

Mollitudo humanitatis.

The softness of your Kindnesse: These metaphors are fetched from the senses,
and are good (indeed,) but yet those that are to the eye, are more pleasant; for
they put into the mind things which we cannot see: and indeed the Will
receiveth things from the understanding, and that from the senses inward and
outward, especially the eyes.
Nihil est in rerum natura, &c.

There's nothing in nature, but a simile may be drawn from it, for Logick is
general of every thing.
Cujus ego Patrem, &c.

Whose Father I account a God, and a Parent of my Fortune, and my name, i. e.

as a God, and as a Parent.
Honos alit artes.

That is quasi alit, for alo is properly to nourish, as meat doth.

Omnesque incenduntur.

Are set on fire, this Trope here is fetch'd from fire which burns up things which
are combustible.

Page  58

Spem fronte serenat.

He makes clear his hope by his countenance; serenare is to make clear as the
day is when the Sun shineth forth bright.
Magnóque irari fluctuat aestu.

He chafeth with the great heat of his angers; from the Sea: and this is a fit
metaphor for an angry man, both for his gesture and speech, and these are to
the sense of the eyes.
Ʋt sementem seceris, ita metes.
As thou sowest, so shalt thou reap: as you begin (for so signifies sementis, the
beginning of the Har∣vest) so shall you end.

Latrant.

So, some Oratours bark, and do not speak: this is taken from Dogs, and this is
laid to the ear.
Ad illius hanc orationem adhinniit.

He laughed or gigled; from an horse: This also is especially to the ear, though
we may also see the gesture.
Hyperbole verò & Allegoria, &c.

Now in Metaphors, Hyperboles, and Allegories have most praise: and hence 'tis
that other Rheto∣ricians have made them proper only to a metaphor: and an
Hyperbolical metaphor makes a lofty stile; when we give life to things which
have not life, this

Page  59

is a special modus, and the reason of it is this, because if the grace of a

metaphor be for the making plain of a thing unto us, then much more these, for
the acts of living things are more apparent unto us, and therefore more pleasant.

Geminique minantur.

So,

Two Rocks threatned into Heaven: minari is pro∣perly from that affection of
ira.
Pontem indignatus Araxes.

The River Araxes scorneth the Bridge: This is taken for a mighty Prince.
Parietes medius fidius, &c.

The Walls of this Court, O Caesar, by my faith, me thinks do give thee thanks:
This is taken from men. There also are most excellent Allegories; as, Vertue is
fastned with deep roots: this is taken from Plants, which cannot be weakned by
force, nor be removed from their place. Here he continueth his Allegory from
the same thing wherewith he began it.

Memoriâ vestrâ, &c.

Our assayes shall be cherished by your memories, and shall grow by your talke,
and shall wax old by the monuments of writing. So also that, he is set on fire
with wickednesse, his eyes did burn, and cruelty burst out of his countenance;
this is from the nature of fire.

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 O Navis, &c.

This is spoken of the Common-wealth, taken from a ship.

Quaere Coracem, &c.

Let us suffer this Crow to bring out his young ones out of his Nest, i. e. Let us
suffer this Oratour Corax, (which was one of their Sophisters which abused
Rhetorick) let us suffer him to bring out his Sophistical Schollars into the
Court.
Neque tam fui timidus, &c.

I was not so fearful that in the Troubles of the Common-wealth I would not do
so and so: here 'tis fetched from a ship at Sea. I fear the cloud of thy fore-head,
and thy stinking breath infected (as it were) with brimstone: This is taken from
Coyns and Metals.

CHAP. IX.

Metaphora igitur ejusm. fuit.

VVE have heard of a Metaphour, now follows Synecdoche, of 〈 in non-Latin

alphabet 〉, to take up shortly, by the whole a part, or by the part a whole.

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Pars est membr. vel spec.

Here follows Logick, desiring to trimme Logick fitly.

Synecdoche membri, &c.

Not every part for every whole, nor contrà, but sometimes, as, the member
being put for the whole, and yet not every member for every whole, but only
some; and 'tis as if he should say, Pars is either that which is a member, or that
which is a species: so that here is not every distribution, sc. of the subj. or
adjunct, for they will be a metonymy of the subj. or adjunct. Synecdoche
membri, when by one member the whole is signified.

O tecta ipsa misera.

O miserable covering! of how unmeet a Master (if I may call him a Master) are
ye held? here the covering for the house, that it covered.

Haud aliter, &c.

No otherwise your Poope, Puppis is the further part of a ship.

Pubesque tueri.

Pubes here is a metonymy, as before.

Prosâ mucronem pro glad, &c.

So also prose will suffer that the point of the sword be put for the sword; but
not the poope for the ship, nor the mast for the boards. Here also is a kind of
 Allegory.

Page  62

Nullo me modo posse.

I tell thee I cannot be safe with thee in the same house, seeing I am in great
jeopardy that I am in the same City: here is parietes pro domo, maenia pro
urbe: So oculi & aures, pro oculatis & auritis homini∣bus.

CHAP. X.

A Synecdoche of the species, is, when by the species the genus is signified.
Certè, &c. parricida.

Which is properly when one killeth his Father, but is generally put for
homicida: This is the first modus.

The second modus is when infinitum numeri dici∣mus pro magno: as, a man
may bring out 6 hundred such.
Cujus ex Ludo, &c.

Out of whose School came as many Princes, as out of Trojan's Horse.

The third modus is the singular number for the plural: as, Romanus for Romani;
and in both the examples following: for what is so necessary, as to hold the
Weapons to defend Thee, for Ʋs.

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Allegoria hîc freq.

Here also is a kind of Allegory, as we may see in the examples following: as,
Catones, Philippi, Laesis pro Civibus honoratis, & pauperibus. There were two
Catoes that were wise, the third was weak: and thence the proverb was tertius è
coelo cecidit Cato. So Venus and Mars; for Vulcan took them with an iron Net
in bed together, and went and told the other Gods. So Tyhys for a Pyrate, or the
Sea: Argos was the ship that Jason sayled in to Colchis for the golden Fleece:
so, great Achilles, for any noble man: so, Troy for any other place.

Hunc Caepuae, &c.

So

When we saw this man at Capua with a stern spi∣rit: Magii, Blossii, were
Romans of stern spi∣rits.

CHAP. XI.

VVHereas before the part might briefly con∣tain the whole, so now contrary; these
do arise from the cause and effect in Rhetorick, and this is opposite to that which
went before, and is integri or generis: integri, when of the whole is sig∣nified the
member.
Pabula gustâssent.

They had tasted the pasture of Troy; for part of

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it. Bibit is a metaphor; Germania a metonymy of the subj. for the adjunct.

Res vides quomodo, &c.

You see how the case stands: Orbis pro globo, & pro parte orbis.

CHAP. XII.

SYnecd. generis is, when the word that signifies the genus is given to the species:
as, virtus pro for ∣titudine; Homo for Catiline: so, for what hope do you keep such
an animal, pro bestia: Yet we must take heed that we put not any genus for any
species; as, quadrupes pro equo: and this is the first modus.

The second modus, as Tydides for Diomedes; and Pelides for Achilles.

The third modus, Poëta pro Virgilio; Orator pro Tullio.

The fourth modus, as, the plural number for the singular; as, we have deceived the
people, and seemed Oratours unto them. Here likewise is a kind of Alle∣gory, as
in the example that followeth.

CHAP. XIII.

THus much of the Tropes; at whose excellency if you look, the metaphor is chief,
because it layeth out the thing more plainly and pleasantly

Page  65

than the rest: the next is an Irony, because dissen∣tanea suâ dissentione Clar.
elucescunt. The next a metonymy, for that ariseth from Consentanies: Last a
synecdoche, for that ariseth from Orta: for the example, 'tis plain.

CHAP. XIV.

VVE have heard that Elocutio was in one word, or in more words: in one, as a
Trope, and that was the first part of Eloc. The second follows in more words,
which therefore doth not adorn Ety∣mology, but Syntax: and this is called figura,
which is a borrowed word from Geometry, and signifieth the figuring of a Speech,
or the making of it come∣ly, so that it lyes in the shape of a Speech to please
especially the eare, or the eye: for so doth Rheto∣rick especially please these two
senses: or a figured Speech you may fitly term a well-set Speech.
Est clocutio.
That is an ornament of speech.

Quâ orationis habitus.

That is, the habit of a Speech is changed from a Grammatical to a Rhetorical.

There habitus is a word fetched out of Natural Philosophy, from a man that
hath a good habit, i. e. a comely man of person, or one well set: so that the
ornanent lyes here in the well set of the Speech which causeth this figure.

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Arecta & simplici consuet.

For whereas Grammer is the garment of Logick, and would cover every thing
as Logick layes it down, the Nominative case before the Verb, and the
Accusative after the Verb: Figura comes and sets this speech otherwise, and so
changeth the habit of it; so that I may compare Grammer to a trubkin, and
Rhetorick to a fine handsome fellow: and in Rhetorick I may compare a Trope
to one cut or jag, and a Figure to all the jags, or the whole shape there∣of: They
called figuram〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because 'tis the habit, or attiring, or
well set of the speech: this name seemeth first to have come from Players, by
reason that in Comedies and Tragedies we know the same party being in divers
habit, played divers parts: hence 'tis that some would have it a Player, or a poor
man in princely attire, or a French-man: Tully did despair in his art in his Book
called Orator, en∣creasing the number of Figures, and in his Book De Oratore
doth diminish it: and in his Tropicks he saith, 'tis no errour in a thing that is
infinite, to pass some thing; but 'tis in art an errour to omit any thing.
At hujus infinitatis, &c.

Here Taleus in effect doth confess that which Tully said before: or at the
leastwise would commend un∣to us the difficulty of this doctrine of Figures. We
have heard what Rhetorick is, and the parts of it; how that 'twas the sweetning
of speech, and had his good use at the first; till afterwards Sophisters did

Page  67

annoynt their Paradoxes with it, which made it evil, even as a bad Ditty under a
good Song: It had two parts; for that speech may be either only written, or also
spoken: now the first of these can do much of it self, & is called elocutio, which
cōmends unto us ornaments either in one word which is tropus, or in more
words which is figura.

Object. But a Trope may be in more words?

Answ. It cannot, only thus, sometimes in Latin more words may signifie one
thing, and yet in ano∣ther language it may be delivered in one word; for
otherwise tropus is but in one word, unless it be a continued Trope, and then
there is a Trope in every word. Now figura is in the fashioning of the speech,
and so is turned from his Grammatical vis and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and so
as it would make the speech more plea∣sant: Now this fashion is either
outwardly, or in∣wardly; for figura dictionis is in the outward word, but figura
sententiae is in the inward matter principal∣ly, yet in the outward also, and
therefore is meer compos. and therefore to be handled after figura dictionis:
and hence is this distribution of figura, when the words only, or also the matter
is adorned; and the reason is, that as tropus did sweeten the word and brought it
to signifie two things; so doth figura sweeten the sentence both within and
without: this care the Lord had in framing this art, that thereby the truth might
be more easily received.

Fig. dictionis est figura.

So that figura is his genus: where there is fugura∣ted a Speech resounding

sweetly in themselves: so that 'tis in the fit sounding and correspondency of

Page  68

words among themselves one upon another; so that there are these things to be
considered, 1. A figu∣ration, 2. a sound 3. between the words 4. fit, and lastly
sweet, and as it were a certain harmony of well tuned strings, and every word is
as 'twere a well tuned string, and all together consenting make a sweet
harmony.
Quo uno nihil, &c.

Yes figura sententiae is cognatior animo, but yet none is cognatior nostris
auribus quàm figura dictio∣nis.

Numero enim excitamur.

This is true of Poetry and Musick, for we know Musick, how when Alexander
the Great heard it, was thereby stirred up to Wars, and again when the found of
it was more remiss, he ceased from it; so that this figure is to make speech more
pleasant: and as 'twere makes us dance to hear it, and is as the Apothecaries
Box. Now this figura dictionis is either in the measure of sounds, or in the
repetition of them: now the measuring of sounds is, when we give every one his
true dimension, and hence Musick is therefore pleasant to the eare: and also
Bells de∣light us much if there be good proportion in the sounds of them
observed in the ringing of them: So, the Nightingale is very pleasant, both for
the varie∣ty and proportion of her sounds: But now the Cuckoe is nothing
delighting because she alwayes fings one tune, and she is like the Ass in
Aesope, that would play Musick: Now here Poetry is nothing but this
Rhetorick, which is in the measuring of

Page  69

sounds, and this is very pleasing to the eare. And here we may see in what
harmony man at the first was made; I mean in what consent with other things,
seeing that he is now so delighted with this dimension, for before the Fall this
kind of figure was without doubt much more pleasing. Now since the Fall we
know some men are not delighted at all with Poetry; which if it be from their
nature that they despise it, it argueth a distemperature of it, other∣wise 'tis
wisdom in others. Dimension is before re∣petition, because it needs dimension,
as we shall see in some figures hereafter.
CHAP. XV.

VVE have heard of figura which is outward, or both outward and inward: The
outward is alwayes in the sounds, and is either in the dimen∣sion of sounds, or in
the repetition of them. Di∣mension is as 'twere fine musick in right number and
quantity: Repetition as 'twere an eccho, or sweet tinckling; so that these are like to
musick measured by time. Now this figura dictionis is distributed by his forme,
which is dimensio sonorum, or eorum repeti∣tio; and hence 'tis that dimensio
sonorum, &c. are not defined, for they are definitions themselves: nei∣ther doth he
define dimensio, for it belongeth to Grammer for the time of it.

Page  70

Dimensio est Poëica vel orat.

So that here comes in Poetry, so that 'tis not a distinct art by it self, and therfore
not to be handled by it self, but is a branch of Rhetorick: Poetry is before,
because Oratory is borrowed from it: again Poets were long before Orators: and
the first Poets we read of were the Pythagorians; and after them was Homer
which is one most ancient, and this Poe∣try was the first measure that was in
speech, and this was invented for the rudeness of the people that it might every
way answer the eare from the one end to the other. Poetica of 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉facio, because th•y made things which were not as though they were;
as Chimaeraes monsters, and in ancient time all the truth was so delivered.

Poëtica quae perpetuis, &c.

Which is tyed with perpetual Lawes, i. e. even from the one end to the other, or
which is managed from the one end to the other with laws of certain spaces;
which is not so in Oratory: so that I may compare Poetry to neatness and
lepidity, and Oratory to gra∣vity: for to be so tyed as Poetry, is too nice, and is
such an one as he which would not let an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 lye on the
Cape of his Cloak, which is not manly but womanly. Or like to him which was
fellow-Senator with Hortensius, who putting one of the cuts of his garment out
of frame, caused him to be very angry: and Poetry may also be compared to a
fine French∣man of the French fashion, or to a Courtier: Ora∣tory to a grave
Alderman.

Page  71

Et ferè in fabul. argumentis, &c.

For the most part 'tis used in fables; and fabula is the subject of Poetry which is
ad hominum mores imi∣tandum, & exprimendum. And now the first Poetry was
those Sylvestres Musae which were called Pasto∣ral Shepherds, and this is very
ancient, as we may see in Abel which was a Keeper of Sheep, and also in
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Now this keeping of Sheep at the first was very
usual, and being an Office of no great Work, but that the shepherds had great
leasure, they fell to study and seek out the Na∣ture of things, as of their Sheep,
and plants, and the like: Others among them not so well minded fell to love,
and to play hob and tib, and so made love-songs, and Ballads: after these
shepherds there were others which made songs and Ballads of the Acts of
 Noble-men, among the rest Homer being but poor and did beg, and when his
Father died, his Mother married a School-master which taught him: He did
make songs; and rapsodia signifieth songs tyed to∣gether: Now afterwards
Homer went to Travel, and as he went on the Sea by studying got the Rheume
that he became blind, and came back again and made songs, and used to sing
them at Coblers shops: and afterwards he that was Governour in Greece caused
Homer's songs to be gathered together into one Book by Aristarchus, and those
which Aristar ∣chus said were Homer's verses were put in, and those which he
said were not, were left out: hence 'tis that when we see any one which is a
curious Judge in any thing, we call him Aristarchus.

Page  72

Hinc Tragaed. Comaed, &c.

These are branches of Poetry, if we respect the verse, but if we look at the
matter, they will belong to other arts. It is called Tragaedia, because a Goat was
given to it for a reward: Comaedia,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a cross∣way,
because it was used in compitis, for they used to play their Comedies in streets,
making their stages upon Carts, that they might go about and be seen.
In quibus〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉&〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

That is fallings out: agnitio knowing of it sudden∣ly: for Poetry worketh so

craftily, making things that are not as though they were, and so makes our
knowledge of it more sudden.
Numerus Poët. est Rythm. aut metr.

This distribution falls not out every way well; for in Rythmus, if we mark it, we
shall often find repe∣tition of sounds: for 'tis

Certâ clausulâ terminat.

So that there is of an epistrophe in it: yet this di∣stribution cannot be amended,

but only the fault noted. Rythmus of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as metrum of
mensura. Rythmus is a Poetical number containing a cer∣tain number of
syllables ending with a certain clause.

Object. But why are not the feet dactylus and spon∣daeus taught generally to
them both?

Answ. No Rythmus only looks at the arithmetick of syllables, i. e. at the number

of them; and not at

Page  73

the geometr. i. e. the quantity of them. Rythmus is before, because 'tis more
ancient.

CHAP. XVI.
VVE have heard of dimensio Poëtica in Ryth∣mus, which dimensio though it hath
been used only in fabulosis argum•ntis, yet notwithstand∣ing it being a branch of
Rhetorick which is a general art, we are to know it may be used in any thing
whatsoever. Now followeth Meeter which is very ancient, though Aristotle
denieth it, and thinketh Homor to be the first in Greece, which may be true; for
the Graecians had but little learning amongst them at the first, but what they got
from others: but in Judaea it was common, and so ancient, that Wriers do ascribe
it to Moses to be the first that wrote He∣roical verse, and they were Psalmes that
he wrote so; and some also write that he had a Daughter which was a very fine
Poet: And David also and Solomon wrote verses in Meeter, which were long
before the Graecians: And for Homer, his Father-in-law was a School-master
which taught him, and afterwards his Father bound him Apprentice to a Merchant,
and so he travelled the Seas, did see Ʋlisses his travels and wrote his History of
Troy about that: and when Homer travelled, even as he was entertained where he
came, so he did describe those people. Metrum and Rythmus are the same, and
only two names for one thing. Metrum of mensura, 'tis a metonymy of

Page  74

the adj. for the subject, the measure put for the mat∣ter measured which it
handleth. Metrum is a di∣mension Poetical containing certain feet placed in certain
places: so that there are these Three things to be considered in this difinition; 1. A
Poetical number: 2. Certain kinds of feet: 3. Those feet must be placed in certain
places. 1. I say Poetical number, for that is the genus, as we heard before: 2.
Certain kinds of feet, as in a Phaleucium, Spon∣daeus, Dactylus & Choraei tres:
in a Sapphick, Cho∣raeus, spondaeus, dactylus, & Chorei duo. 3. They must be
placed in certain places.

Now for the place, note only this, That in an Hexametre in quinto loco be dactylus
tantùm, and in sexto spondaeus; and this is all for place. Now be∣cause pes is
mentioned in the definition of metrum, hence it comes here in the next place,
being an ad∣junct unto metrum, to be defined.

Pes est dimensio.

Pes is call'd dimensio, which is general both to Rythmus and metrum, but this
dimensio is finita, i. e. limited with certain times of syllables, not with cer∣tain
syllables.
Estque bissyl. aut trissyl.

Et uterque simplex aut mistus.

As Spondaeus which is bissyllabus, because it con∣taineth but two syllables:

and simplex, because they are both of one and the same time, to wit, either both
short, or both long: Spondaeus comes of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a

Page  75

bee sted, which is a metaphour. Pyrrhichius is of a short, which comes of 〈 in

non-Latin alphabet 〉, which signifieth swift, because of the speedy running of
it. Now in∣deed this foot should have been set before spondaeus, because one
long hath as much time as two short, therefore two long have as much time as
four short; therefore the short ones are more simple dissyllables. Mistus is
Jambus, and this foot had it's name from the inventour thereof. Choreus
signifies a measure used in dancing, and comes of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
Trissyllabus simplex is molossus, of three long, which should have come after
Trochaeus: 'tis call'd Molossus from that Country so called where 'twas found
out, and where the people were much delighted with it: The same Country was
also called Epyrus of him which was their first beginning, which was Pyrrhus.
Trochaeus of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉curro to run like a Trope. Now for
dissyl∣lables simple there can be no more but those mentio∣ned; but for the rest
many more feet there are which may be observed; and yet not material, whether
they be here brought in or no. Trissyllabus mistus be∣cause of so many syllables
is more various: here 1. is dactylus, which signifies a finger, where there are
three joynts, the first is stronger, the other two be weaker. Anapaestus of 〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉, a repeated foot.

Mistia è dissimil. continuis, &c.

Creticus, so call'd of the Country Creete. Amphibrachus of 〈 in non-Latin

alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because 'tis short at both ends: Here
the parts of Meeter being decla∣red, now the common adjuncts or affections
follow, and these are two, First, if a word end with a vowel,

Page  76

or m, or both, and the word following begin with a vowel, they are taken away,
so that this property consisteth of two parts: the first is, if a vowel end a word
without m, and the next word begin with a vowel, then eliditur, as, sera nimis
vita est, The second part is where there is a vowel and also m ending a word,
and the next word beginneth with a vowel, all are taken away, as, nullum ille,
here i and m are taken away. Now the second property is this, that ultima
syllaba of a verse, habetur pro indifferenti. Now for the kinds of Meeter, they
are many, yea, and as many more as he hath set down, much like the tunes of
musick: and as in Speech there are many kinds of words, so are there many
kinds of Meeter: yet those which are ordinary in Schools, and of most use, are
simple or composite: Simple is of two feet, and is call'd Adonicum of Adonicus
the Authour; when Sappho being a fine Woman loved and made sapphick
verses, which were so called of her, and af∣ter his death, at the end of every
third verse, she in memorial of Adonicus made Carmen Adonicum: this consists
of two feet, for if it should be of four, it would be a foot, and not a verse: now
this Sappho was a very fine Musicioner, and she did excel Pindar in it. Carmen
Compositum is of more feet than two, and is either tetrametr. or polymetr. here
he is fain to make shift as he can with such words as he can get; for otherwise
tetram. is polymetr. though the schools use to say three is the least number of
multitude, and say tria sunt omnia. Tetram. is that which hath four feet, and this
is the first; for there is no verse of note that is of three feet: Polymet. is pentam.
or hexamet. Asclepiad. of Asclepiades is the name of a

Page  77
 Poet that found out this kind of verses. Pentame∣tra are Phaleucium, so called
of the Author: Sap∣phicum of Sappho, as before: or Elegum, of Eligo to chuse,
for these were a choice kind of verses. Hexa ∣metrum epicum is of 6 feet.

Verùne pentam. ab epico nun{que} separatur.

Here by pentam he means elegum, by a synecdoche: Now here are not all the
kinds of Meeter by many, yea, the common Grammers have •ambicks, which
here are not set down, though the matter be not great.

CHAP. XVII.

VVE have already heard the doctrine of Poeti∣cal number: now follows
Oratorical, which did not at the first observe measure: The first that used to write
were Poets, which wrote in verse; yet Orators used to speak in prose, but not to
write prose of a great while after the Poets.

Numerus oratorius est numerus, &c.

That is, 'tis not tyed to such a strict number of syl∣lables as Poetry is, neither to
the same feet in many sentences together: dissimilis poëtico, for it doth not
quite through observe the number of feet as Poetry doth; neither doth it use the
same feet together: dissimilis sibi ipsi, because we should not alwayes use it,
lest the people should think it to be a set Speech;

Page  78

neither should the same feet be perpetuo used, but in divers clauses divers feet.
Now this oratorical num∣ber at the first did arise from Poetry; for the Ora∣tors
seeing the Poets much to delight the people by their Poetical number, they also
did endeavour to find out a kind of oratorical number, whereby both their
matter and speech might be of more grace, and comeliness unto the people:
Now, indeed, this ora∣torical number hath a kind of deceipt in it, but 'tis bonus
dolus, and not malus dolus; even as the Phy∣sitians use a kind of deceipt,
whereas they giving to their Patient a bitter Potion do sugar it at the top, that
the bitterness of the Potion may not so sensibly be felt. Now the deceipt is this,
namely, in that because this dolus doth sweeten the matter, therefore they think
the matter is deceiptful, which is fall•cia adjuncti, and therefore they did use
number in prose, but at liberty, not Rhythme, or Number. The in∣ventor of this
oratorical number was Thrasymachus; but he tyed himself too strictly, and
came too near unto the Poets: next was Gorgias, but he was also too sweet, and
therefore did make the people mark his speech, and not the matter, and
therefore did wrong the matter: He was a notable Sophister in Arîstotle's and
Plato's time, and was Isocrates his Master: but this Gorgias by this means did
much wrong the matter; even as if we see a Gentleman in a very fine suit, we
shal so much look at the suit, that we shall not look to the properness of his
person: Now Isocrates which was Gorgias his Scholler did ex∣cel them both,
and indeed he is the sweetest of all for figura dictionis, for he is very moderate:
but Demosthenes and Aeschines were sweeter for figura

Page  79
 sententiae; for Demosthenes was strong, and there∣fore his speech was more
violent, as it were, casting out thunderbolts. Now for the grace of oratorical
number. Hyperbaton transmutatio (of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) is permitted,
that it may be lawful for the sugaring of speech to transpose their words in a
sentence into such places as they will make the best sound; for o∣therwise (as
Fabius saith) a speech will be rugged, hard, and dissolute, and yawning, if we
shall place the words as they do arise; so that in Greek and La∣tin we may for
sweeter sound use by porbaton, but yet notwithstanding in our English tongue
we must not: for use hath placed them Grammatically, and there∣fore they may
not be changed.
Differenda igitur quaedam sunt & praesumenda.

Some words therefore (saith he) are to be put back, and some to be put before:
and even as in buil∣ding of Stones, every stone must not be laid as they come
next to hand, but as they will best lye together: so nothing will make a more
sweet speech than a fit mutation of the order of words. This oratorical number
hath no rythme in it, but only in a certain re∣petition that is in epizeuxis and
epistrophe, as we shall hear hereafter, but is only in the observation of feet,
which Tully esteemed of so much worth, as that he affirmed the speeches to
exclaim, when the words fell fitly: and so our Sermons do much delight; yet in
them we must take heed we be not too curious, lest we draw the peoples minds
from the matter to the words, and so rob God; for so the speech will so delight
the eare and the affections, that the matter

Page  80

will not enter into the heart: and without question Demosthenes had never laid
his thunder-bolts so, had they not been cast from him with number: and
ther∣fore (saith Tully) as wrestlers and sword-players do shun every thing
warily, and do not strike vehement∣ly, that whatsoever is profitable unto fight,
the same may be comely unto the sight: so an Oration doth not make any deep
wound, unlesse the stroke be fit, neither doth it well enough fly the force,
except it know what is comely in the flying of it: therefore as their motion is
who are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, unskilful at that play of Olympus; so is their
Oration who do not shut up their sentences with numbers.

CHAP. XVIII.

THis is the commendation of Tully of oratorical number in feet, which ought to be

much more acceptable to us than to the Author himself, who be∣ing enwraped
with the Schools and Comments of Rhetoricians thought this act to be most hard
which is in twenty orations observed by ← Ramus  → and shewed to be most
easie; so much more excellent was the Oratours nature and use than his art. Now
here was but one rule which was generally taught before, namely, That oratorical
number be unlike both to Poetry and it self: here he doth commorari and tells us
that therefore in prose we must not use verse; yet sometimes you may for
authority or pleasure, as Tully of old did using the example of the Athenians: The

Page  81
next rule is, that we make not the beginning or end of a verse, the beginning or
end of prose; neither that we begin or end our Oration with any sentence like to
verse: though indeed in the beginning there is lesse care, because there it comes
new, and there∣fore the people are ready to pass it away, and in the middle of an
Oration there is no consideration at all, but in the end must be greatest care of all:
hence O∣ratours use to place some good Arguments in the be∣ginning, the worst in
the middle, and the best at the latter end: now the end is most to be regarded
be∣cause it doth most appear, and is best understood by the people; so that though
the beginning and middle, which peradventure they have forgot, were not good,
yet the conclusion being good, they will judge all the rest to be good also: now in
Oratory we are to observe the last six syllables of a clause quae bissyllabis tantùm
pedibus definiri potest: neither must we be too curious in observing the syllables
of every clause. Now he comes to the specials, and there he tells us that all
syllables long, make a slow and a rare clause; yet if they be all long, 'tis not amiss
in a grave matter: but all short are more rare than all long; for there 'tis too swift,
and that speech doth not be∣come the gravity of an Oratory, but long and short
together are more usual. Here note, that, as in Poetry, so also in Oratory, nihil sit,
extrema illa longa sit, an brevis.

Now this Oratorical number is learned two ways, either by taking a well set
sentence and displacing the words to see how they will sound, or to take some
sentence which is dissolved, and to place it bet∣ter. Now there must be such
variety of feet in Ora∣tory,

Page  82

as that of Licinius, that sweet words are framed as Carvers work by art, and
pavement engra∣ven with—or the like; and the oratorical num∣ber doth as well
regard the sound of the letters, namely, that one word do not end with a vowel,
and the next word begin with a vowel; neither that Rhe∣torical sentences run upon
one letter, as, O tite, tute, tate, &c. but that the consonants sound well as it doth
respect the measure of the syllables.

Sume de Graccho apud Censores.

Their Censors were two, which were to look to the manners of the people, and
had authority to cor∣rect them, and from their Office they had their name.

Causam judicii longè aliam statuo.

For Tully judged all these sounds by his eare, but indeed it is by the affections
also.
Causam afferre Tullius nullam potest.

Yes, the other were more familiar to the people, and he knew what pleased
them best; now if there be consonants ending a clause, they must not be too
stiffe; neither is it requisite that a verb should be last in a sentence, if there be
other words that will sound better: Tully's clause was esse videatur, Jam∣bus &
Chorei duo: And thus much of Poetical di∣mension.

Page  83
CHAP. XIX.

WE have heard of figura dictionis in dimensione soni, both Poëticâ and Oratoriâ,
where we are to note that Talaeus should have taught hyperba ∣ton, and that same
literarum bonitas as general affecti∣ons to all dimension, for the hyperbaton is
general to every tongue besides the French and our English tongue; and therefore
indeed most part of the Syn∣tax of our English tongue lyeth in the placing of the
word.

Figura dictionis in repetit, est similis aut dissim.

That is like, or somewhat unlike: for so we heard in Logick that dissim. sunt,
quor. qual. & diversa; so that a dissimilitude hath a dissention but only in a
diversity: so that it is somewhat unlike. Similis is either simil. soni, or dictionis,
and both of them ei∣ther continuè or disjunctè, i. e. either without any thing
coming between, or that hath something in∣terposed: Contin. is either in eadem
dictione, or di∣versâ: in eadem dictione appellatur epizeuxis of 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉, because they are so near that they are not severed but only by a
parenthesis, which is no part of the sentence.

Hic solùm numerus non vox iteratur.

It should be sonus not numerus, for that we heard

Page  84

of before: and again, he saith quae est in soni repeti∣tione, therefore it should be
sonus.
Interdum parenthesis interponitur.

Here he doth admonish us of a Caution that might fall out, and that's of a
parenthesis, which though it be in the same sentence, yet is not part of it;
there∣fore doth no harm to this figure. Now figura dictio∣nis in diversa sententia
est anadiplosis, or climax.

CHAP. XX.

ANadiplosis is when the foregoing sentence end∣eth in the same word that the
same sentence beginneth withal. It cometh of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉reduplicatio. He saith

Quando sonus idem.

Because where is the same word, there the same sound also, not contrà: though
there may be the same word, and the same sound in this figure as well as in the
rest; therefore because he had not one word to comprehend sonus and dictio he
took the more general.

CHAP. XXI.

CLimax signifieth a gradatio, or a climbing up the ladder of stairs, or the like: it is

a manifold
 Page  85

anadiplosis; so that it is not an opposite species of anadiplosis, but a property of

it, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is of Tropes: so that the difference of them is this,
That anadiplosis is in one word twice repeated, and climax is in more words often
iterated: and here in a cli∣max note that alwayes the word is not the least of the
former sentence that begins the second; I mean 'tis not alway in place, yet 'tis in
sense, as torvaleaena lupum sequitur, not sequitur lupum.

Caetera desiderantur plurimum.

Page  [unnumbered]

Page  87

NOTES OF PHYSICKS.

PHysica est ars bene naturandi.]〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is na ∣tura,〈 in non-Latin

alphabet 〉 understand 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is ars natu∣ralis, or the art pertaining
to nature; 'tis ars as appears by the definition thereof and this affection.

Bene naturandi.] i. e. to do the work of nature well, for Physica is the rule of natures
acting, so do Angels whilest they do their act; and 'tis the rule whereby God made
them. Neither is it only of con∣templative

Page  88

things, but of the practise, as may ap∣pear by the branches of it; as hortulana,
agricultura. Si natura Physica, at natura, ergo.

Natura est, quae est orta à principiis.

Natura est, quando aliquid naturâ fit. Nature is every thing, quatenus tis ortum à
principiis, as all is but God himself. Some think that corpus is Physicks object,
but if we take corpus generally for that which hath the three dimensions, it is too
large and be∣longeth to Geometry, if it be taken more special∣ly as 'tis orta à
principiis, 'tis no special: for natura est spiritualis aut corporea; but because
every thing is res nata, ergo every thing is à natura. Neither is generation and
corruption so large as natura or prin∣cipia, for they are both of the form only,
neither were the Angels generated, and so shall not corrupt, but created & so
eternal per se. Neither is nature and propagation reciprocal, but propagation and
in∣constant nature; and so what is the reason that Pa∣rents love their Children—but
because of the continuance of their progeny by their continual pro∣pagation? And
this shewes that man was made to be unchangeable.

Some Philosophers say that Sciences have their subjects, but Arts have not: but let
them look to the distribution of ars generalis; and there they shall see that Logick
hath an object, namely ratio, and Grammer, namely oratio: and nature comes of
nas∣cor, quasi res nata or orta, for nature will comprise any thing in it but God.
And so Aristotle doth en∣title his Books De ortu & interitu, which do apper∣tain to
every thing but God; and hence comes ortus.

Page  89

Kickerman would have a special art of Spirits, scilicet〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

and let him, but yet 'twill be a branch of natural Philosophy. And for the Spirits,
this is that deceiveth them, they think if we give them mat∣ter, we must make
them bodies: but this is an incon∣sequence, for accidents have their matter, and yet
are not bodies: and matter belongeth to Logick which is general, but corpus is
special to Geometry. But for the Angels, are they not many? and have they not
any community? Ergo then they have a genus. They say analogicè, if they mean
symbolicè, 'tis true. And they must have forms, for they are distinct: if they have
matter without form, then they do not exist; et contra; if they have neither matter
nor form, then they are infinite. And natura be∣ginneth where creation endeth: So
that it looks not at materia as 'twas created of nothing, for so 'twas a miracle; but
as 'tis now a nature and fit to essifi∣care other natures.

Principia sunt Materiale.

Principia sunt Formale.

These are first to be considered in Physicks: and materia and forma belong to
Logick, and are ad∣juncts to the thing that is materia and forma. Now because we
know not what to call them, we are fain to borrow these words materiale and
formale: and then I say two things, First, the thing which is mate∣riale and
formale: Secondly, That affection they have to be called materiale and formale.
Hence it follows (though it belong to Divinity) that, be∣cause every nature doth
arise ex principiis it is not

Page  90

eternal; neither are these principiae eternal, because they are from an ens primum.
And from these prin∣cipia do arise all qualities, as Aristotle is right, and yet
wrong; for he saith, that they come from the forme: but they are qualities of the
thing, and as the thing was made of matter and form, so the qualities arise from
the thing made of them both. And prin∣cipium materiale, is the thing whereof
materia in Logick is the notion; and so formale. And for ma ∣teria to be prima and
secunda in Logick, there is no∣thing such, but the thing materiale is primum aut
se∣cundum: and for materiale primum it cannot be de∣fined, for it hath nothing but
the efficient before it: only 'tis that which is primum substratum in naturâ, and
formale is that which is primum superstratum in naturâ; so that one is as 'twere
the subject, the o∣ther the adjunct. And so anima is in corpore tanquam adjunctum
in subjecto, And, (by the way) anima est tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte, is
false; for anima is finite, and if it should be tota in qualibet parte, then it should
be so by the same reason that we say God is totus in qualibet parte, and so is God:
so that 'tis but pars in parte: again it hath limits of quantity, ergo it hath some
figure, ergo partem extra partem, ergo position of parts. And primum materiale is
made of nothing, and so is next unto nothing, so that nature looks at it as it doth
constitute things. And from these we may prove Divinity, for every thing is made
of nothing, and so by the same power may be resolved into nothing: so that nature
teach∣eth nothing contrary to Divinity. And from these are all qualities: and all
qualities have their quanti∣ty according to their subject; so Learning, when I

Page  91

say, Such an one is great Schollar. But Objection, Some will say, What to be
measured with a yard? No, but if a good Logician, then so far forth as his Lo∣gick
reacheth.

Pricipium est materiale, formale.] From these principia may we conclude any
thing. And by how much more forme and less matter any thing hath; so much
more action there is. But

Quest. How then is it continued, if there be so little matter to comfort the forme?

Answ. The continuance of motion is no hurt to any thing; for 'tis but to extend the
matter, and bring it in frame: and hence 'tis that there is more action in some
things than in other things. So the Angels do most act, for they have most forme:
yet we are to think that they have the three dimensions; and many of them cannot
be together, for there should be penetratio dimensionum, ergo essentiarum. And
there in the definition of Nature, we heard of ortus, because that is general to
every nature to be orta à principiis. But interitus belongeth only to inconstans
natura. So that 'tis no good consequence to say, such a thing had ortum, ergo it
must have in∣teritum: and the reason is, because Angels and the highest Heavens
have their principla congenita, and ergo, nature cannot dissolve them. The Earth
hath less forme than Watter; for if it had the forme of Water upon it, it would
occupie more room. So that 'tis not from the matter, but from the form. And every
nature hath these two principia; the principium passionis is from the matter,
actionis from the forme. And from these come limits of essence & of quantity,
which reaches so far as the form extends the matter:

Page  92

so the matter of earth reacheth so far as the form ex∣tends it, otherwise the matter
of it might further be extended. And here is that question amongst Physiti∣ans,
Whether Hairs and Nayles be parts of man, or not? For if the forme extends it self
so far, (which it doth not) then they should be parts. Scaliger saith, the Angels
have quantity, but not praedicamental, but spiritual quantity; which is nothing but
their subtile quantity: and because they have quantity, hence they must be under
some figure, and they have their place, and that is one.

Passionis. Actionis.

By vertue of the forme there ariseth actio, by vertue of the matter passio: Yet they
arise from them both, but more especially from the one, than the other: for every
thing is effectum: ergo, it hath causes, ergo these causes do agere, ergo the effect
doth pati: so that every nature doth pati. And a∣gain, every nature hath principia,
from whence co∣meth actio. Hence are these most general, yet passio before;
because it cometh more principally from the matter, as also because every thing
doth pati in its very generation before it be perfect, And the materiale doth pati,
and the formale agere, yet the materiale doth agere also, so Aristotle saith,
materia doth appetere formam, ut foemina virum.

Crassities, Tenuitas.

Crassities comes from the contraction of the mat∣ter, as tenuitas from the
extension of the form in the matter: and one and the same thing may be crassum
and tenue: and as there is a certain limitatio of every

Page  93

thing by reason of its principia, so there is a certain limitation in regard of

extension and contraction in them.

Tenuitas vocatur & subtilitas.

Subtilitas we call slenderness: subtilitas is the forme spinning of the matter by the
forme; crassities contra. So take a Portion of the first matter, and put the forme of
fire upon it, and it will spin it finer than the forme of air will do, and so the rest.
So that the act of the form on the matter extending it, causeth subtility; crassities
is contrà. Again, every thing hath porositie in it, and so it rents: and tis re∣quisite
there should be porosity in every Element, for that there must be apposition of
elements: and that there must be, as in the earth, that it may bring forth fruit. And
that which Kickerman calls impurity in the elements, is nothing but this
apposition of them. And for the doctrine of the three Regions of the Air, it comes
in the Meteors, as not being so di∣stinguished as tis an Element. but as the
Meteors be in it.

Gravitas. Levitas.

Gravitas and Levitas do arise from the continual act of the forme: for where there
is a great deal of forme, and little matter, there is most levity. So in the highest
Heavens, because the principia were to∣gether, and there is much acting of the
forme, hence is it most light, and hath the highest place. And gravity is a privation
as it were of levity, as opacity is of light. And so the same matter may be more
light by the action of the forme, not more grave. And so the first matter was most
grave, because it was with∣out

Page  94

forme: and as it was every thing imperfectly so 'twas in loco, and was quantum
imperfectly; though limits of place and quantity be so far as matter and form
reach: and 'twas without forme, ergo imper∣fect. And for so many legions of
Spirits in a mans body, we are to imagine them to have distinct places; so when
we pull a thing, we would have it in two places, ergo it rents. And acts are either
internal, when the forme extends the matter; and hence is subtilitas and crassities,
and this is the true arising of subtilitas, some say it ariseth from heat, and rarity:
but there may be subtility where these are not, as in the highest Heavens: and this
is plain in the Ele∣ments which have one common matter, and yet by their forms
they are more or less extended: neither is heat the cause of extension, for the earth
will be more extended, if the forme of Water be in it. Again, when the form
extends the matter beyond its reach, till it rent, this is rarity: Gravitas is from
more matter, and less forme, levitas contrà: The external act is of the matter and
forme. Raritas and Densi∣tas. Rarity is the extension of the matter by the forme,
that it rents and becomes porose, and so is every thing, for if Angels can extend
themselves, then tis from their rarity and density, and ergo from porosity: and so
for Adam, and the patriarchs, and the rest, they being in the highest Heavens,
there must needs be cessio corporum, and there must be no vacuum, ergo there is
a caelestis aura that doth cedere. Scaliger saith when the air is extended tis
porosus, and yet he cannot tell what 'tis that is in the pores of it; for if it were air,
then it should still be one continu∣ed body with it: but all the Elements are
together

Page  95

by apposition; so that there are other elements in it. And raritas and densitas are
not qualities, saith Aristotle, but the distance of the parts, and as it were a kind of
ratio. And these may be of the same thing as the air may be more rare, and more
dense. And these are internal acts. The external, act the power of action and
passion: For where there is much po∣tentia actionis, there must be much potentia
passionis, and so antipathy: where if there be much action, then there must be
patientis fuga, or else it perisheth. Now where there is much action and affection
to his like as is cause, effect, subject or adjunct, this is Sympathy.

Multiplex & disconti∣nuum unum mun∣dum efficit ordine, et hinc ascensus.

descensus.

Multiplex & disconti∣nuum unum mun∣dum efficit contiguitate, & hinc nullum
da ∣tur vacuum.

The world consisteth of many parts, which are not continua, but contigua: yet we
may call the world one, as he that made it is one; scilicet in method or order, not
in continued quantity. And by reason, that all things are one by method, hence
there can be no vacuum: First, because there would be a crypsis of this method:
again, vacuum is non ens; but on∣ly ens à primo is part of the world, ergo not non
ens, for nothing cannot be a part of something. Nature is manifold, but 'tis made
one by method: as every rule of Logick are divers in themselves, but make but
one act by method, so nature being manifold in it self, is made one by method.
And here are a great many Controversies answered; as, That the world is

Page  96

not one by continuity but method, we know is the wisdom of God, according to
which God created and governs things; ergo the things do appetere their place, as
God hath placed them: hence 'tis that things ascend and descend. Some say 'tis for
their own preservation: which indeed is the final cause, but the efficient cause is
method. And as a Painter, when he paints a thing, should make a deformity, if he
should set things out of order: so nature, if things should not be rightly placed, so
that there be no crypsis of method. And here comes in the world, which is
multiplex and discontinua natura: here also by reason of this method there comes
to be conti∣guity of every thing; so that there cannot be va ∣cuum: for then the
world should not be one, and so we should make two worlds, and make nothing
something. And though Gods wisdom, Power, and other Attributes, be, and in
God, yet he would have them appear instar omnium, and to be sufficient for all
things: and so he made them many, to shew the variety of this wisdom. Now
again, as they are many in themselves, yet they must be but one, to shew that the
variety of this wisdom is but one in him. And they are in one method, and so
make one world. So we say in Logick, and 'tis sometimes true, That the cause and
the effect be like: and so is God and the world. So the world is but one: and is
round, as being the most capacious figure of all: now 'tis one, not in continuity, for
then it should but have one quantity, and so one forme, but as be∣fore in contiguity
as it were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e. an heap, but an orderly heap, and so is but
one in method. And hence every thing desireth its place and order

Page  97

by the rule of method; which commands that natu∣râ prior must praecedere: ergo
the outmost things must first be made; and ergo they must have more forme than
matter, that they may ascend: and so by order, from the highest nature, goeth
down to the lowest: And for those Philosophers which make Nature to be God, I
doubt it, and methinks 'tis like their o∣pinion which made the God-head the form
of every thing. But we must not wrong God, but acknow∣ledge the principia to be
causes of things, and give them their effects, for they say in that such qualities—
such a thing, 'tis from God: But as a man doth write with pen, so God hath made a
creature which worketh of it self, even as the Pen writeth, but is governed by God
even as the pen by the writer. So that natures work is when the two causes do
work according to Gods Logicum artificium: and Nature is the cause of natural
effects; and is to be distinguished from God. So that here we see the disposition
and order of every thing. So when I see a Tree bring forth fruit, I conclude there is
Logick; and yet neither tree nor fruit hath reason: ergo there is one greater that
hath reason: which methinks were sufficient to convert any Atheist. And from this
or∣der of things comes contiguity: for there must be no vacuum, as before, since
that would be a breach of method. So we see Water and Earth will go up even into
the element of Fire for the preservation of the unity of this world. And if there
should be a vacuum it must needs be something or nothing, then in the world or
out of the world; if out of the world, then it were not all things; if in the world,
then a part of the world, then as before in ens it should be

Page  98

ens; if in the world and not ens, then the world must be two. And from method 'tis
that the Load-stone desireth to stand North and South; and so doth every thing,
yea naturally, not guided by coun∣sel desire natale solum. And when we do
transplant trees, 'tis a monster and against nature; and so that one woman should
nurse an other womans child: And one woman may have three children, though
she have but two dugs, so that she have milk for them. And from sympathy it is,
that the iron goeth to the load-stone, for 'tis his food; ergo his preser∣ving cause;
and the stone may act through a Table. For descensus. What is the reason that fire
cometh down? Common Philosophers ascribe it to plate, which belongeth to
subjectum; but 'tis place, which is order, and belongeth to method: and that is the
next cause, though the final cause be as before, ne detur vacuum. So when I cast a
stone, that it flies, 'tis propria forma; the reason why it flies from me is that it doth
pati, and ergo doth flie his enemy. The common Philosophers ascribe it to the air,
which in very deed doth hinder it as themselves shall confess; for cast a stone
upward, and when it falleth down again, what is the reason it moveth faster when
'tis near the center, than when tis farther off, but because when tis near the center
there is less resistance of the air than there was above? So what is the reason we
take force to strike with an Ax, and that goes far∣ther, than if we set it upon a
thing and lay great weight on it? because the wood can resist the Ax well enough.
Now we lift up our hands, because all the vital spirits in the legs and other parts of
the bo∣dy come to inable that part which acteth most; and

Page  99

the higher it goeth the more forciblly it cometh, for that it is more able to resist
the air; as also there is a double motion, natural and violent: and it will come
down more easily, because it is a natural moti∣on; not upward so well because tis
violent unto it. So a thing that hangs down, that part moveth most which is
farthest from the center, for that it suffereth violence. So what's the reason, that
put salt Beef in∣to the Sea and it will be fresh; but put fresh in, and it will be salt?
because tis the nature of salt to con∣stringe; and that's the reason salt Beef
occupieth less place than fresh doth: now its pores being filled with salt, the salt
water cannot get in, but only the fine water pierceth in, and so takes away the salt:
but if it be fresh the pores be so open, that the salt water entreth in, and so it
becometh salt.

Materiale est〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉in naturâ primum substratum: and this is
fons passionis. Formale est essentia in na ∣turâ prîmum superstratum, as before:
and this is fons actionis. And from these principia many things in nature may be
made manifest. As from hence, things natural have finitness of essence, which
belongeth to every nature: and thence limits of quantity, as the Angels have; and
thence they are alwayes under some figure; thence also have they limits of place;
and so Zanchius saith, an Angel is in his own place. Again, if every natural thing
have these principia, then tis principiatum; ergo tis in tempore, and had a
beginning: hence nature must have an efficient; ergo not eternal: and this efficient
only can turn the constant nature into nothing; but they are not re∣solvable per se,
because they are proxima to nothing in their kind: otherwise if nature should
resolve

Page  100

them, it could work a miracle, which is above na∣ture, for nature found them
created, and must so leave them, for creatio and annihilatio are not effects of
nature, but above it: Hence the soul of man could not be created by nature; for
then either of something or nothing; not of nothing. For creatio is above nature, if
of something, then resolvable a∣gain. Again, if every thing in nature be of these
principia, hence is generatio ex aliquo, and corruptio in aliquid; from these
principia comes actus & poten∣tia; actus est ex acto formae in materiam; potentia
est ex actu formae per materiam: From these inward acts come (1) levity and
gravity; and there are two causes of levity, the first is a form more active; the
second is less proportion of matter: The causes of gravity are contra: again the
causes of subtility are more proportion of forme, and more active, and less
proportion of matter: again rarity and density are degrees of porosity; and every
thing is porose; so Angels do contract themselves, by retracting (as I may say)
themselves into their pores; neither need we to fear vacuum ergo, in the highest
heavens; for there is a calestis aura to prevent it: so also the highest heavens are
porose, neither is there any door to open and shut, but God doth that at his
pleasure: so also fire can extend and tontract it self, and that because of rarity and
so porosity; much more ergo the Angels. And extension and contraction comes
from porosity: which will plainly appear in the E∣lements which are together by
apposition; for one is in the pores of an other; and this is that which Kickerman
calls a misture; and indeed besides this ap∣position there is a kind of imperfect
misture in them,

Page  101

so that I may call the Earth or any of them a Meer. Potentia is ex actu formae per
materiam. I call it rather potentia than Qualitas; because the other is alwayes in
act, but this sometimes doth not work. This po∣tentia excitatur ad actionem by
passio; and this passio is either amica or inimica: amica is that sympathy which
is between consentanies; inimica that antipa∣thy between dissentanies: and these
are ex rei alicu∣jus preservationis appetitu. Now from both these comes motus
which is either naturalis, or violentus: naturalis ex amicâ passione; violentus ex
inimicâ ▪ Naturalis is flower at the beginning, and swifter at the end; because tis
nearer to that which it doth ap∣petere, and so moves faster: and this sheweth that
there is an appetitio of consentanies, and as I may call it a kind of raptus. Motus
violentus is swift at the be∣ginning, and flower at the end; for it makes haste, till it
be out of the reach of its enemy, and then it thinks it may go more slowly: and
according as agens acts, so doth patiens pati: now this patiens is ergo debilior, or
fortior: if debilior, then resistentia, and as I may say, oppugnatio: if fortior, then
also re∣sistentia and patientis fuga.

Natura est constans, aut inconstans.

God made all things for his glory; ergo he made some things constant, to shew his
immutability and constancy: and some inconstant, to shew the varie∣ty of his
wisdom, scilicet that it was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 all sufficient and infinite.
Things ergo constant, not in regard of the Creator, for he can resolve them: but
per se in respect of their own nature, and so are not subject to interitus; neither
doth it follow that if they had

Page  102

ortus, ergo interitus; for these constant natures ne∣ver have any privation, ergo no
contrariety. Ergo no interitus, so that their matter and form were simul
ingenerated, and the one never without the other. Nature is manifold, but made
one by method; and here comes in the world as a general affection of na∣ture: and
every nature is a member of the world, and so a part thereof: so that the world is
not one, as before, by continuity but contiguity: and for the preservation of this
worlds unity it is that things ascend and descend, rather than from their gravity
and levity; for as every thing doth appetere sui ipsius preservationem, so totius
conservationem also; and hence they come down and go up, for else the world
would be two, for there would be vacuity: so that gravity and levity are not
properly causes of ascent and descent: for a heavie thing though it be out of its
place and be high, yet tis not there heavie by me∣thod; and so alight thing though
it be in place of an heavie thing, yet it desireth not to ascend to prevent vacuum. It
is praeter naturam that a man swimeth on water, and sinketh not.

Constans, cujus principia congenita in ipsâ primùm.

The constant natures cannot be resolved; as the highest heavens: because they are
to be a perpetual habitation of perpetuals: And these are most strong: hence the
Devil is so strong against man if God did not restrain him. Hence they are in
Aevum; for though they had a beginning, yet no end: and these have most forme,
and least matter, and most action in them.

Page  103

Constans vel Coelum, aut intelligentia.

Coelum. It hath least matter of any thing, except Angels; hence is it so extended,
and more pure than any of the elements. The Schools call it quinta essen∣tia: and I
am content that they should call the highest heavens so: for tis not miscible as the
Ele∣ments are. The Elements are subjugated, for their essence is in every thing,
but 'tis cut and so mingled in little parts: then there is a proportion of every one of
them; then the forms take hold one of ano∣ther, and so they are united, and this is
the unio al∣teratorum; for they are but only altered, and a third thing made of
them. And this proportion is accor∣ding to arithmetick proportion. And the highest
heaven is most firm, which may be because of its so∣lidity. Coelum is constant
because it must contain all the rest, yea the inconstant: Again, it must be
con∣stant, as before, because the inhabitants are so.

Object. It hath no inhabitants?

Answ. It hath: for there are two deformities in things, first, to be without forme;
secondly, void: Ergo this must not be void; ergo the Angels are in it. Now these
highest heavens have their principia congenita in them: otherwise the matter
should be before the forme, and so there would be a privatio, and not an habit;
and then nature might resolve them, and so they should not be constant. But here
may arise Two doubts:

Object. 1. If these principia be congenita, then how were they before the effect?

Answ. That which ← Ramus  → saith of the forme, that simul ingeneratur cum
effecto, is true in them:

Page  104

now this is a property of the forme; and a property we know is an adjunct to the
thing, whereof tis a property: and the subject is before the adjunct, ergo, forma
before this property, and this property before the effect, and ergo the forme is in
them before they be effected.

Object. 2. If these principia be congenita, then why should the Material Cause in
Logick be handled before the formal, since here they are both simul?
Answ. As the forme was before the effect, so was their matter before their forme,
and every ef∣fect is motu but in God. So in the Creation of an Angel both matter
and forme moves together, yet first the matter, and then the forme: So first we
ap∣prehend the substratum, and then the superstatum: as imagine, in such a point
the matter and forme begins, and after as the matter runs on, so the forme runs
along with it: So we may see it more plainly in the generation and corruption of
the Elements: for even as the one corrupteth, so presently follows that which is
generated: So when I hold both my hands together and move them, they both
move, and yet the one moves first: so for the creation of An∣gels. So that there is a
priority, and posteriority, and yet a simul: and nature where it finds them, there it
must leave them: and it finds their principia con∣genita, ergo it cannot resolve
them; hence cannot they be divided. Again they must be most valid and strong,
that they may prevail over the inconstant natures; as also that they may do the
work of the Lord as it should be done. Yet there is resistentia and raptus betwixt
them and the inconstant natures.

Page  105

Again, they are actuosissimae, for they must prevail with the inconstant natures:
hence they have most forme and least matter: hence they are most light, and so
have the highest place: Again most subtile and rare, hence is their great extension
and little contraction: most subtile; hence their matter most pure and fine∣ly spun.
Our Divines say the matter of the highest heavens and of the elements is all one,
but I would rather call the highest heavens a quintae essentia with Aristotle, for tis
not commiscible as the Elements are.

Object. But they have one genus namely nature, ergo the same matter?

Answ. There is a community of them, but not in their next genus, ergo not in their
matter: Coelum or Intelligentiae.] As of the inconstant natures, some have life,
and some have not: so likewise of the con∣stant, some live, and some do not.
Coelum is first, for tis the others place, ergo their subject, which is before the
adjunct. This Coelum first consisteth of parts which shine most brightly, for there
is neither Sun, Moon, nor Stars, and there must not be dark∣ness: but these parts
are, as I may say, perfused with a most excellent light. Which is after a sort
resem∣bled unto us in gems and pretious stones. These parts are foris, or intus:
foris is tectum or solum: tectum est quod tegit omnia & est extimum. Neither is
our Saviour Christs body highest of any thing; for there is this tectum above it.
And this must needs be the greatest and best figured, that is, most round; and tis in
spatio tanquam in loco; yet differing from other things, because tis not externally
limitted by any other thing but only in spatio. Solum is that

Page  106

which is gone upon. Intus is aura coelestis which is most pure and most
desaecated from other things.

Intelligentiae.

In Divinity they are called Angels of their office and place: and their matter is the
fame with the highest heavens: as those creatures which live in the earth have
most earth in them, and those that are in the water, air, or fire, have most water,
air, and fire. And the Angels have least matter, and most forme of any: hence are
they most subtile: hence in their greatest condensation so fine, that we cannot see
them. And these have reason whereby they see most accutely all other things; for
they are made for God and mans use. They have Will also, for where there is
Reason, there must be Will. And thirdly, they have local motion; which is by
extension as the Sun beams. And in the good Angels there is no supe∣riority and
inferiority: but in the evil, Beelzebub is said to be the chief: which is but only the
opposing of him to Christ of Bagnal Zebub. They are most active of any thing,
having most forme and least matter of any thing: and they are cum ratione &
vo∣luntate, active, because they have the greatest charge of any creature: cum
ratione, that they may do wise∣ly; cum voluntate, that they may do it cheerful: and
so they are said to do the Will of God speedily, willingly, and wittingly. They
have least matter: hence can they so extend it; and hence they are so subtile.
Again they are most active per materiam: hence most swift in motion: which
motion is by ex∣tension, and so by this celerity contracted again. Some
Philosophers hold, That the Angels move the

Page  107

heavens; and their reason is, because their motion is so wonderful. But so they
may say, the Angels move a Plant, because it brings forth an apple which is so
wounderful. Now these Angels having so subtile matter; hence in their greatest
condensation, they are far beyond the edge of our eye to see them: hence are they
called spiritual from their subtili∣ty. And as the highest heavens are Olympus, i. e.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, most shining, so are the Angels: Olympus was a very
high hill, and there was thundering and lightning in the top of it: now they thought
it was above the clouds, and so the Sun made it so bright. Again, the Angels are
so strong: hence tis that the enemy can break down trees and houses, and cast
down steeples: so the Soul of man is swift, and is not as some think in one part
principally, but in every part of man: and according as the body encreaseth, so
doth it extend it self. Hence also an Angel being so strong, can carry a man, as he
did Philip. The Angels do understand a thing as we do mediately; else they should
do it by a miracle, for they cannot see Gods idea but when he pleaseth: and God
hath genised every thing, ergo they must analyse it, and that by the same Logick
that we do: yea, and they do labour and observe by induction of singulars as we
do. And they can see and hear; so they attend in the Church at Sermons: and so
Paul meaneth in the Corinthians, when he saith, We should use de∣cency for
offending the good Angels: for so he meaneth it: neither can do be understood of
the Ministers, for he did not need to speak it of himself. Again, did not the
Serpent speak to man and woman

Page  180

in the garden? Yes: but that was with a Serpents tongue. Yea but with that he
would not speak.

Inconstans natura is elementum elementatum.

Elementum est ex prae existente or rather praesubsistente materiâ. Hence comes

generatio & corruptio; for the constant natures have onely an ortus, but not an
in∣teritus, because their principia were congenita: but these inconstant natures
have both generation & cor∣ruption, and hence are they called inconstant. And
here because the matter was before the forme; hence it may be resolveable again:
hence tis that the con∣stant natures do prevail with the inconstant, when there is a
fight betwixt them. Generatio est novae formae acquisitio. Corruptio est veteris
formae amissio. In these inconstant natures the matter was before the forme;
hence was there in them a privatio: Yet the matter was capable of a forme hence
the form being once inge∣nerated must still continue in the matter. For altera ∣tio
qualitatum, we heard of it before; for tis also ge∣neral to the Angels. Now because
the matter was subsistent without the forme; hence it may be sepe∣rated from the
matter: Yet because simul ingeneratur cum re ipsâ; hence it cannot be separated
ex toto, but ex parte tantum. So that here the forme doth as it were rise upon the
back of the matter. And as there is never in nature a formale without a materiale,
so by consequence there is never a materiale without a for ∣male: and the matter is
put without the form as it were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as the Schools rightly
teach.

Elementum aut elementatum. I choose these terms rather than any other, because I
would shew the course & order that nature observes in her working.

Page  109

Elementum est natura inconstans, quod ex materiali principio immediate oritur:

For elementarium, or that which is made of the elements is ex materiali
princi∣pio, but mediately and at the second hand: even as method in Logick
disposeth arguments at the second hand, as they make axioms. First for the names,
Elementum, some say tis quasi alimentum, because our nourishment is from them:
and true tis, that that whereof we are made, by the same we are nou∣rished: but
here it signifieth that which is lowest and most simple next to the materiale
principium. Now tis natura because orta principiis: yet inconstans, be∣cause the
matter was before the forme. Immediatè. Because it was made immediately of the
first matter: hence no other thing was immediately of the first matter: hence all the
secundum materiale must needs be in the four Elements, otherwise it should not
be perfect: again, this was not a good definition. A∣gain, because tis immediatè:
hence there is nothing mistus, but is mistus immediatè ex elementis: so our
nourishment before it doth nourish us in the liver, is turned into the four humours,
whereof every one hath some element predominating in it, and so is tur∣ned into
the elements again. No other thing is im∣mediatè ex principio materiali, so that the
four ele∣ments must needs take it up all: hence again the ele∣ments are most
simple of inconstant natures, ergo they must have one common matter, and every
one his peculiar forme. Now from this community of matter hence they are
opposite one to another, be∣cause they may be in one subject (but natura constans
and inconstans have not one common subject) and that rule of opposites doth
evidently demonstrate

Page  110

that there is a primum materiale principium, because the elements are opposite by
reason of that common matter: for the form is in the matter as the adjunct in the
subject: hence tis that substances are as well contraries as accidents, for a quality
can but alter a quality, not a substance. Again, because 'tis im∣mediately ex
materiali principio, hence there is no misture but only a putting together of the
materialia and formalia principia: and here in the elements there is such a
proportion of matter and forme, that other qualities beside those before do arise:
even from the portion of the matter and form there is greater acti∣on and lesse
passion, or contra: hence also because we know not their forms, we are fain to
distribute them from their qualities, hence these are the prima mate∣rialia. Neither
could there be a misture without ma∣ny formalia: now the elements are most
simple: hence the elements have fewer qualities, than the elementaria have,
because their composition are most simple, and so not having so many forms to
act nei∣ther such a composite matter to pati and reagere: Hence having few
qualities they are so soon corrupt∣ed: so fire will soon corrupt the air: hence is also
the easie transmutation of the elements, which made Keckerman think the
elements were imperfecta: but they are perfecta, though they be sooner corrupted
than mista. Now in the elements themselves there is so much sooner corruption by
how many fewer qua∣lities there are betwixt them: so fire cannot turn water into it
self, but by the means of the air, that is first expelling the cold which is contrary,
and then driving out the moisture, which sheweth that there is air in it.

Page  111

Elementum est calidum aut frigidum.

This distribution into calor and frigus, takes the elements in order, and here in
there is contrariety: and these qualities are firstly in the elements; for the constant
natures are not hot nor cold; because they having such abundance of forme and so
little matter, hence the matter cannot resist and pati the forms act. Calor is when
the forme hath such a por∣tion of matter that it can actupon it, and the matter pati
and reagere, yet not so as it taketh away the forms act, but maketh it rather the
greater: and hence est calor: for because the forme of fire is more active than the
form of air, hence tis most hot. Cold is contra. So that I may say, Elementum is
when the forme acteth upon the matter: Calidum is the strong act of the forme
upon the matter: Frigidum is the weak act of the forme upon the matter: So fire is
hot and dry: hot because of the strong act of the form upon the matter; dry,
because this heat acted by the form driveth out the moisture: So we see when fire
doth heat any thing it expels the moi∣sture and so leaves it dry. So the fire causeth
heat in it self, and outwardly also when it is condensated: so in—its parts are
united and ergo it will burn which sheweth it must needs be hot: and from this
heat followeth the quality of brightness; which is chiefly in the fire for that is 〈 in
non-Latin alphabet 〉. The lowest element is most opacum; the middle elements
are indifferent, inclining to light because of the fire and to opacitie by reason of
the lowest element. Some say raritie is caused by heat, and so they say the fire
doth rarifie. But it doth as well conden∣sate.

Page  112

Indeed the fire by reason of the forms act on the matter is more subtile than the
other elements; and hence wil more easily enter into the pores of them and so
raraifie them. But put leather into the fire and it will condensate that and make it
shrink by reason of the moisture in it; and so the earth is left dry. So it rarifies the
air in getting into the pores of it, and drives away its forme, and so makes it (by
extending it) the more subtile, and carieth it with it. So in a gun, the fire's form
acting upon the matter cannot be kept in such a little room: ergo it bursts out of
the gun and breaks the air. So air is very subtile in its parts and wil enter into the
very pores of the thing and by reason of its moisture and heat wil make a thing
swel, and so rarifies it and makes it occupy a greater place. Water we say be∣ing
rare becomes air and air being dense becomes water: the form of the one getting
uper hand, then the form of the other contracts it self and so becom• condensate;
as the other form extends it self and so becomes rare, not that it becomes rare, but
that by the act of the form tis made to occupy a greater place. Heat is common to
both fire and air; but fire is first, because 'tis more formal and less mate∣rial for the
same portion of the matter takes a greater place hath a more active form and here
ergo the mat∣ter doth less reagere and the body of the fire may be bigger than the
body of the earth but not in propor∣tion, so a pottle of fire is more than a pint of
earth. Calidus is that in which there is more formale than materiale: ignis is that
which hath most materiale & least formale in constant natures: hence tis the
high∣est of al other elements and there keeps the highest

Page  113

place. Yet I cannot say tis meerly light, for the highest heavens are above it ergo
lighter than it, al∣so tis of a most equal temper and light yet so as not burning but
per accidens. Neither did Cardane need to think that the heavens should burne up,
if there was that element of fire, for it doth urere and comburere only per
accidens; as tis condensated for the higest heavens it cannot burn, for the parts
can∣not burn, for the parts cannot be seperated, because they are congenita. Again
the highest heavens are most subtile and solid ergo wil not burn: but in car ∣bone
the fire is apparent, for tis condensated, and because of its subtility tis not per se
seeable, but on∣ly in materiae crassitie. So we see in our fire that when our shins
are burnt fire comes unto them, for t•s not air, as some think for why then should
we not roast meat in the air? And yet the fire coming to our shins is not seeable
though feelable, ergo much less seeable in its own element; yet it wil ap∣pear in a
glass being held at our shins; so in a glass window being gathered together and
beames sent down by the sun and in hot countrys where the beams come down
perpendicularly they make a great heat. Some think these beams are not real but
be sent down by the sun, and beget lumen in the air, but then what becomes of
that lumen when the sun goes down: but gather the sun beams into a glass and
they will burn, ergo they are fire; again air will not burn, ergo it is not it. The fire
is that where the form doth most extend the matter of all incon∣stant natures and
so is most moist hot & dry. The air is that which is most and hot; here the form is
not al∣together so active and ergo the matter is not so ex∣tended;

Page  114

again here the act being less, hence tis not so hot as the fire, neither is the matter,
ergo so act∣ed upon, and ergo is neither so dry as the fire: a∣gain tis most moist for
the form cannot dry it be∣cause of the heat in it, and hence tis most diffuse, and
ergo most moist and most moistning; hence tis that air will so replere any thing
that there be no va ∣cuum.

Frigidum is water or earth: cold is in both these by reason their forms are not so
active, and their matter is more abundant and more—, and this appeares in divers
extending of the same matter having divers forms. So if the same matter have the
form of water it will be cold; if of air it will be moist; if of fire it will be hot: ergo
these qualities are from the greater and lesser act of the form. These elements are
cold because they have more matter or less form. So they say the Moon is cold,
because she takes up vapours and yet not able to take them up to the fire leaves
them and they become cold. so put luke-warme water to scalding water and it will
be more cold; because it dulleth the forms act of the scalding water. Now in the
ele∣ments there is one common matter to them all: now that one is more subtil and
another more dense; tis from the forms act upon the matter; nei∣ther the forms act
alone nor the mattes alone: but both together cause these qualities; which indeed
are rather acts than qualities So the fire doth act continually. Now as the form doth
act inwardly upon the matter; so we say tis habitual: as it is act∣ed by them both
outwardly and so more sensibly, so we call it an act. So the vegetative foul doth
conti∣nually

Page  115

vegetate. And in these I say there is more matter & less form: hence the form is
clogged with the matter that it cannot act, and so tis dull; as a beetle against a
wool sack. Frigidum where there is more matter than form; that is, the proportion
of the matter is greater than the proportion of the forme. Hence tis probable that
the first matter was equally devided into four elements, and that one had at the
first as much as an other, but after∣wards according as the form did extend or
contract them; so came one to be greater than the other, aut contra. But here it
may be Objected, Is the water greater than the earth? or was it as great as the
earth? Yes, the water was greater than the earth for quantity: so at Noe's flood we
read how high it was above the highest hils: again we know it o∣verflowed the
whole earth, though God now for the preservation of his creatures, wch were to
live upon the earth, hath devided the waters, and hath plac∣ed some of them above
in the firmament, and some of them below on the earth; and but for the waters in
hollow places in the earth, the diameter of the earth would be a great deal less.
And that the hils are so many cisterns to hold water tis plain, be∣cause water
comes out of hils, and the earth is full of water, so the river Niger runneth under
the earth; so the river Aesopus runneth under the me∣diterrane sea; so that though
some object, that the sea is but in some parts some 2 miles deep, yet there are
many waters under the earth. Frigidum est aqua et terra. Water first, where there
is more matter & less form, but not in proportion with the earth. Hence be∣cause
of the abundance of their matter these ele∣ments

Page  116

are seeable: the other elements being hot are not seeable, and that with great
reason, namely that we might more perfectly and more cleerly see the things that
move in them which we could not have done so well had they been seeable: as in
water we cannot so perfectly see fish. Water is most cold and moist by reason of
the forms act being more active than the form of earth. But how then is it most
cold? Because, though the form act more than the form of earth, yet the matter
doth so strongly reagere, that 'tis more sensibly cold because of the greater action
and passion; even as when a ball or a stone is cast forcibly unto me, if I meet it
with my hand it doth more sensibly agere, than if I take it gent ly in my hand. 'Tis
also moist, because it being ex∣ceedingly cold is also moist, and moisture causeth
softness; so that softness is a quality arising from moisture and is properly of the
air and secondly of the water. The earth is most dry: because the form of it is so
little active, cannot extend it ergo to make it fluid, and so it makes it dry. Fire is
more fluid than the earth but not so dry: air having heat which doth extend,
moisture makes it most moist but not dry. Again tis cold but not actually as water,
because the form doth not act so much upon it, as the form of water upon water.
Again hence the earth is most solid and least porous of any of the elements. Again
the earth is most dark and opake of all the elements; the air and water are capable
of light and opacitie: because the creatures that live in them, have a sensible life,
and should have light and darkness night and day. Thus much of the elements
simply considered as they are elements:

Page  117

now there is not only an apposition of them, but a kind of imperfect misture; for
they cannot give sapor and such other qualities as they have, but as they are
mista: Ergo we shall hear of them again in the meteors, as also of the regions of
the air, and of mare, and of other rivers which are meteors.

Elementarium.

Elementare est quod ex elementis est. Ergo for its matter 'tis made immediately of
the materiale prin∣cipium: and for the forme of it, 'tis made proximè ex formis
elementorum.

Obj. But then the forms of things should be composed?

Answ. So they are: even as the body is com∣posed of many parts, which are
composed of many similar parts, which contain both matter and form. Again,
Mistio est miscibilium alteratorum unio. Ergo 'tis mistio that makes a thing unum:
then must the forms be mista, and so composite, for that makes the thing unum.
Now for those that say the forms of things are from the influences, I would ask
them, What it is that unites the matter and form together: for in Logick we know
there is nothing betwixt the matter and the form? Some say that spirit is the
vinculum of the soul and body: yea, but the soul is not the form: and again, what
shall unite them in a stone where there is no such spirit? Object. 2. Some deny the
forms of the elements to be in the mist: But if they be not; how do they return into
the ele∣ments again: and again 'tis granted by all that the qualities are there, ergo
their forms must be there: and the elements are actu in the mist; yea, and are
agents there as we shall hear hereafter in mistione. Now the greatest objection I
find against this, is this;

Page  118

say they, How can things without life cause things to live? There may be a vivens
of them, because ani∣ma vegetiva, and sensitiva are nourished by nutri∣ment: for
spiritus vitalis is the vegetative soul, which is nourished by humidum radicale,
and hath air pre∣dominating in it; and spirit us animalis is that sensi∣tive soul
which is nourished by moisture and heat, and hath fire predominating in it: and
the common people do use to say that these do vanescere in auras: and the
spiritus animalis is made of the vital spirit, and the vital spirit is made of a natural
spirit which ariseth from the meat which we eat: ergo if these can nourish and
keep life, they can also cause life. If they shall say the vital spirit is not made of
the natu∣ral, then it must be made of nothing, and so should be eternal in nature.
Keckerman saith, the elements are corpora incompleta; which is most false, for
they should not exist but in composites; but they do in themselves, for they are
effects. I rather chuse this word elementarium than mistum, because mistum is but
an adjunct to it. Elementarium est quod est ex ele∣mentis; and so the first matter,
but at the second hand: and hence it appears that the elements go in∣to the mistum.
But the greatest Objection that ever I met with concerning this, is that, How can
things which have not life, cause life? Yes: For life is but an act, and a composite
act: Again, life is preserved and maintained by the elements, ergo may be caused
by them; so the animal spirits are made of the vital, and the vital of the elements,
not only as they are acts, but also as they are membra, for there is no o∣ther soul in
Plants and Beasts, for they are next to the reasonable soul. Now if they shall say
these

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spirits vital and animal be not made of the elements, but of some other thing, I
would ask them, Of what, of the spirits which are in the meat? Then the forms of
Plants and Beasts must be made of the forms of Herbs, and of such things as they
feed on. if they will say, they be made of the influences; they are then either
accidents, which cannot be forms, or substances: if substances, then they should
be porti∣ons of the matter and forme of the Stars, and then the stars should not
remain the same thing. Mistio, they say is alteratorum unio; so that in the framing
of the forms of things there must be an alteration and another forme distinct from
any of these forms from whence it did arise: even as in a Chest made of boards, I
cannot in propriety of speech call them boards, but a Chest made of these boards:
So in the things that are mist I cannot say, the elements forms are their forms, but
tis a mist forme composed of the elements which are incomplete in the mist. So
that true 'tis there is an alteration, but a generation also; though generation will
not serve the turn, because there is not a corruption of the elements, which make
the things: neither indeed do generation and cor∣ruption go alwayes together, for
when a chicken is made of an egg, there is not a corruption but a per∣fecting of the
egg, neither is there acquisitio novae formae, but veteris perfectio. And the
elements are members of the elementaries: but a part of fire is not a membrum of
fire, but part of the matter and form of fire. Now here is the chief question, How
these are in the mist. First of all, the elements by the mutual action and passion of
their matter and forme are holden together, and make one simple thing:

Page  120

and now these have one common matter, but distinct forms, and so are opposite,
which will ergo fight to∣gether, and one flie the other, except there be some∣thing
to hold them together: hence it appears there must be more things than one in a
mist. Now con∣traries will soon destroy one another, except they have some
stickler, as I suppose air comes to earth and makes it clammy; then the water
comes to tem∣perate earths driness, that it cannot overcome the airs moisture; then
the fire comes to water to main∣tain airs heat: so that there is a discors concordia
and a concors discordia; and then all the forms must so act as one doth not
dominare over another, as 'tis in things imperfectly mixed, which do not ergo long
continue: so that the forms act must here needs be abated. Again the matter is but
one, ergo it is na∣tures care to keep every little particle of the matter with its form
there temperately acting. And being so close and so divided, hence 'tis that they
are far beyond the acies of our eyes to see them; which is plain in natural things;
and so in artificial things, we see sometimes cloath made of wooll of so many
colours, which are so finely mingled in the cloath that we can hardly distinguish
all the colours. And these parts in the mist are so diminute, that indeed they come
next to penetratio corporum. Elementari∣um est proximè ex elementis. For we find
that they are resolved into the elements; ergo made of them: again they are
nourished by the elements, ergo made of them; both for matter and forme. Which
is thus proved, for they are both in mistis, and of the matter is not made forme,
nor of the forme matter: again, those things which have life, their life is
main∣tained

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by the elements; and if it be a good reasoning to say, the body is nourished by the
elements, ergo made of them, 'tis as good to prove the forme to be made of their
forms also: again, natural, vital, and animal spirits are the souls of Plants and
Beasts, and are made of the elements; the natural are made in the liver, the vital in
the heart, and the animal in the head; and if animal be an univocum genus to homo
and brutum, it must be all in them, and the same in them both, for univocum is
idemre and ratione.

Mistio is more than alteratio; and yet we cannot call it generatio, because there is
not corruptio which is veteris formae amissio: but both matter and form are
turned into the elements, and for the matter they have one common matter, and
they have a camposite form arising from the forms of elements an it still
remaineth in the same part of the matter that it was in the simple. Now in the mist
the forms must subigere, which is by action and passion, so that there are
contraries in every mist: and in mists there must not be a proportion of the
elements in quantity but in act. Consider ergo in every mistion 1. that there be a
proportion of the elements accor∣ding to act, 2. that these parts are so imminute
and almost indivisible that they cannot be seen; though all the parts in the mist are
not equally minute: for the more formal elements as they are more subtil in
themselves so also more minute in the mist. And good reason tis that these should
be so because these must act and subdue one another: so to earth which is the—as
it were, comes to air, and there exceding drought and exceeding moisture fight
to∣gether, and the air doth as it were rarifie the

Page  122

earth; now these two being contraries will soon destroy one another if there be not
a stickler to take up the controversie betwixt them, scilicet wa∣ter, as before, and
to it fire; and so these make a knot of good fellows. Now these parts thus fastned
one upon another, according as they hold together such shall be the continuance
of the mist. And these acts of the forms of these minute parts may be compared to
so many pins or nayls wch hold things together: as in the mist we see that fire
cannot get out because tis nailed in by water, nor air for tis pinned in by earth.
Now for that que∣stion how the forms become one since it remains in the same
matter, wherin it was before. Tis made one by the mutual act and catching hold
one part of another, and so in them makes one form. And according to the qualitys
of their acts shall the con∣tinuance of the mist be; as when we see two men of
equal strenght wrastle together, they will strugle together a great while before
either of them fall: so in the elements. from this mistion comes tempera∣ture, as
we may see in hot water being but indiffe∣rently warme is neither so cold as to
cool, nor so hot as to burn. Temperamentum is the respect or reference of these
qualities in the mist; for the forms of the elements remaining in the mist and
act∣ing there must needs have qualities to proceed from them. Yet these acts of the
elements in the mist, are not in eodem gradu in the mist that they are in the
elements: for they are restrained one by another nei∣ther all mista in that
proportion that one should an∣swer another exactly, for then there could be but
one kind of misture. Temperametū est ad pondus vel adjusti∣tiam.

Page  123

For that ad pondus there can be no such found in the world, for this would never
corrupt tempera ∣mentum where there is excess of one quality or two; of one
quality is simple, which is calidum, where the hot elements exceed the cold; or
frigidum, where the cold elements exceed the hot; of two qualities is composite,
but these 2 qualities must not be contraries, for they would destroy one another,
but they must be more remiss and from the exceed∣ing act not in extremity of
these qualities, as in pepper, ginger, &c. have the things their denomi∣nation. Now
there cannot be a temperature wherein three do exceed; for then the fourth would
be destroyed. And here we see there are nine temperatures: first that ad pondus, of
which sort in∣deed, as before, there is none to be found, yet we do imagine it for
the better understanding of the rest; then that wherin one only quality exceeds,
and that's of 4 sorts; or that wherein 2 qualities ex∣ceed wch is of 4 sorts also: Now
these temperaments have their degrees which though there be infinit of them yet
four only observed. As in grammer from the letters arise varieties of sillabls and
so words; so from the temperament in nature arise so many simi∣lars: for these
temperaments are firstly of similars, ergo the similars being many have not the
same temperature with the whole, sor first tis of the fimi∣liars, then of the
organical, and lastly of the whole. Now there is also temperature of one thing in
regard of another, as of a man with a Lyon we say the one is hot or cold in respect
of the other; for because mistum attends elementarium, according to the va∣riety
of the composition divers qualities arise. Now

Page  124

in things composed of similar parts only, as worms eels, they ergo having their
life a-like in every part, hence they live after they be cut, and they have the like
temperament: but these things that have or∣ganical parts, when they are cut in
peeces, their parts will not live; for the life hath one principal seat and is not in
every part a-like. Now in com∣paring the temperature of things together if one
ex∣ceed the other above the common rate we call it a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
otherwise 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 under 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is putri∣do
rottenness, when the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is in heat and moisture where the
heat is only able to set it up and make it rotten, and so nature is dissolved and this
is general to the elementaries, and to the air and water so far forth as they be
mingled with vapours; so we say in sickness-time the air is infected. Now
temperature ad pondus proves another reason: be∣cause in nature it would be fit
for no office, as not to cool because heat is equal to it, not to dry because moisture
will hinder it or contra. There must be in∣equal proportions of the elements, and
consequent∣ly more temperaments, because things are made to diverss ends, so
that ergo they must have elements predominating in them whereby they may be
fitted to such and such ends. secondly Temperament must be unequal, because
they must be mutable, and there must be dissolution. Ergo the temperature must
be unequal and one element too strong for an other. And these predominating
elements do so much destroy themselves to our sence as they do by our act,
though they do to our sence also, as I can tast ginger and find it hot. Where one
only doth predominate tis either heat, cold, moisture, or

Page  125

drith: for as before according to that for which the thing was made such elements
shall it have predomi∣nating in it for the attainig of that end: so we say the heart is
naturally hot, for to turn the chylus in∣to chymum, so the brain cold per se but
accidentally hot, which heat is brought from the heart to it by the vital spirits: so
that according to things ends so must they be made, as bones have drith in them
pre∣dominating, because they are the foundation of the body, even as the earth is
the foundation of the world. So again we say the four humours caused in the liver
are fluid, and ergo have air predomina∣ting in them, because tis their office to run
up and downe to nourish every part: and for the humours first our meat and
nutriment comes to our stomack and there is turned into chylus, and hence it
comes into the liver and is turned into chymum, and the humours are made of the
succus of this nutriment in the liver; and of these humors is made semen and that
part of the semen which hath most drith in it makes a bone, which is a similar
part, and so of the rest. Now in some things there are two quali∣ties predominating
in respect of a double use of the thing: and these predominting qualities must
ever∣more be disparates, not contraries, for then they would destroy one another.
Now man of all things comes neerest to the temperament ad pondus and ergo he
is most sure to mark others temperature being compared with mans temperature.
Crasis and temperamentum are all one. But now the de∣grees of temperature are
not infinite, but they di∣stinguish them into four only: and where any ele∣ment is
predominate above these degrees there is a

Page  126

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which in living creatues is called morbus, which Adam

was not subject unto, and yet had the art of medicina, ergo morbus is not the
object of me∣dicina; hence is putredo, now putredo and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
differ in that, one quantity must drive out another so as that there be a dissolution;
but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 may be without any dissolution: again the common
philo∣sophers make putredo only, where moister predomi∣nates: and thirdly
putredo is where only external qua∣lities uniting with internal do make a
dissolution, as by external heat united with internal heat do make a dissolution, as
by external heat united which inter∣nal heat water is expelled; and so in wood the
heat and the moisture that hold it together being taken a∣way by rhe fire falls into
ashes. And by reason of this putredo things come to stinke, which we call fae∣tor:
 yet where this putredo is but in any degree (for there be degrees of it) there it doth
not stink So moisture external will putrifie as wood in water, which we call
martor, for we have no proper word: so drith will cause putrefaction; so wood will
rot, which we call caries: so will cold also putrifie by quenching heat: so rust is a
kind of putrefaction, which caused by external moisture united with inter∣nal and
so makes things, as it were' sweat and be∣comes rusty. And these are the effects of
putredo, and these are general, &c. The rest is wanting.

Page  127

ETHICAL NOTES.

DIvinity is the rule to make a man happy: And this man in his life hath a double
respect: First, As he is a man alone: Secondly, As he is sociate; and soci∣ate is either
in a Family, or in a Com∣mon-wealth. Hence must the distinction of the proles of
Theologie go accordingly; and all these must tend to happiness: now these are proles
of Theolo∣gie arising from the second part thereof; namely, from the second table of
the law, which by reason

Page  128

of man's Fall is almost dasht out of him: yet there is so much left in him as is able to
shew him that he was made able to please God, and secondly, to live well. So that
this work of being a good Divine is wrought in man from several causes, for the
sancti∣fied man because be hath Faith, he keepeth the rules of Ethicks,
Oeconomicks, and Politicks by the spi∣rit of Sanctification: but the only civil man
which wanteth Faith, doth therefore fail in a Divine, and so all is spoiled; yet he
keepeth the rule of Ethicks by the spirit of restraint, which spirit keepeth him from
those enormous sins which otherwise he would have committed. For we are to
imagine every one of us by nature committing all kind of sins, in that measure as he
which is the most sinful committeth the greatest sins that he is given unto. So that no
man is at liberty in this kind to do so much as one civil act without the spirit of
restraint, and therfore much less an action of Faith.

Ethica est ars bene gerendise.

Ethica is derived from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉mos, custome or man∣ner: it is

more frequent in the plural number 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 manners; and hence
were the Gentiles called Eth∣nici, because they were otherwise mannered than the
Israelites, which were the Children of God: its ars because it consists of precepts
most true, just, wise, &c. yea, and in very deed before the Fall this act of Ethicks
was the very rule of Divinity: Bene gerendi se: so that it is the rule of the good
carriage of a mans self; and here by se I mean vir bonus. Gero properly is to carry
himself, ergo not to ride, but to go on foot: i. e. so to cary himself as no man can
justly except a∣gainst him.

Page  129

Vir bonus est qui bonis instruitur.

Because we cannot give a perfect difinition of this art, ergo we are fain to bring
the subject of the art into the definition thereof, and so need not to de∣fineit any
more: notwithstanding if we please we may thus define it from the notation; Vir
bonus est qui bonis instruitur. So that this teacheth him how he may be an honest
man, namely, if he hath this bo∣num, both internum and externum.

Bonum est quod est appetendum, Or, appetibile ad bene se gerundum.

This bonum here is that which Tully calleth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉&〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉& honestum. Quod est appeten∣dum, or appetibile: I give it no
genus because as all o∣ther acts have their genera generalissima, so here bo∣num
is the genus summum: I say appetibile because it is the nature of bonum to be
desired, for it is the sub∣ject of the Will, and ergo the affection of Love it doth
desire it. Now that this bonum must contain all both inward and outward bona, I
prove it thus: Quicquid requiritur ad bene gerendum se is here meant, but both
bona corporis & animî are required ad bene se gerendum, ergo both are
necessary.

Bonum produceth these two qualities, gràtia & authoritas.

Gratia est quâ apud homines plurimum vales.

And this is that which causeth good estimation a∣mong men.

Page  130

Authoritas est quâ apud homines plurimum potes.

For he that will be a good Ethician must not only be an honest man, but such an
one as hath those things which do attend bonum both corporis et animi: now as I
said before this gratia maketh good estimi∣mation among men; and from this
ariseth authori∣tas, whereby he can do much with men.

Bonum est viri totius aut partis.

Because as there must be internal vertues for the be∣gining of any act, so there
must be external bona for the performance thereof. So Adam at the begin∣ing had
not only all things made fit for him, but al∣so Lordship over them. Which
Lordship conteineth both favour and authority: Thus did the Philoso∣phers
account bona to be viritotius aut partis.

Bonum totius hominis est quod externè advenit, seu confert ad bene se gerendum.

And this is Libertas

And this is Facultates.

Libertas est quâ expeditè seu liberè te bene geras.

But this a servant cannot do, and ergo Aristotle re∣quireth in his Ethicks that he
that would be a good Artist in this kind should be a freeman and one that is
suijuris. And so we see in common experience that those which are not free
cannot do as they would.
Object. But cannot a servant be a good Artist in this kind?

Page  131

Answ Now indeed not as he is a servant and ergo if Adam had stood we should
not have had any ser∣vants for there had been no need of them but every man in
his own place should have performed his own duties. Again one may be a servant
to such a ma∣ster as will permit him no opertunity for good ex∣ercises, but
otherwise as this bondage came in by sin and is a slave thereof so he that is so tied
cannot bene se gerere.

Facultates sunt quibus te geras.

And of this sort are riches. Friends and the like; and these are also necessary to a
good man: because many being free from servitude yet for want of these they
cannot do their will, ergo we se Adam at the begining had not only liberty but an
help meet for him.

Object But cannot a man bene se gerere without a wife?

Answ. Not unless he have other friends insteed of a wife. And thus we se also by
experience, espe∣cially in Scholars, which notwithstanding being very desirious of
company, yet for want of books or company to confer with all or some such like
thing oftentimes come short of their desires. So that we∣see these outward things
are of a good use for the car raige of a mans self. But here Question may be made,

Are riches good, seeing the Stoicks thought them not so, and most now a-dayes
say they are indifferent and good according as they are used?

Answ. The common answer to this is that they are good according as they are
used. But I am not of

Page  132

that mind, for that they are per se and simpliciter good, as the Scripture testifies.
as also because they were made for a good end, whereas if they were indifferent
they should have been made for an evil end: again they are the gift of God and
therefore they are good per se and in their own nature, though Astriotle seemeth
to make them indifferent, arguing that if they should be simply good, then they
should make the man good. But this is a fal∣lacie, for the default that they are not
good is not in the riches but in the want of other things which should conduce ad
bene se gerendum. And it is as if he should argue thus, He that hath invention
only without judgment is not a good Logitian ergo this invention is not good,
which is an inconse∣quence.

Facultates are Divitiae. Opes.

Divitiae sunt quibus per se bene seu commodè te geras. Opes sunt quibus per alios bene te
geras.

For divitiae are a mans own proper substance; and they draw opes which are the
use of an other mans good: and this is the difference of them. Hence the Poet
saith, Aspicis, ut veniunt ad candida tecta columbae? But may not a poor man
bene se gerere?

Answ. No he cannot performe this action of morality after such a sort as he which
hath facultates. Yet that a man may bene se gerere I do not require abundance of
riches, but only so much as is requi∣site for this end. Notwithstanding a poor man
may be a good divine, because the Lord doth not exact

Page  133

at any mans hands more than that which he gave him. But Adam he had all things;
and such a man Ethicks look at. Now for Opes, for Adam was not absolute having
all the creatures til he had a wife al∣so, and ergo a mans parents brethren and
friends do conduce ad bene se gerendum, parents for his bring∣ing up and friends
to help him in his place and cal∣ling.

Bonum partis est quod inhaeret aut internè conducit ad bene te gerendmu.

And as the other was extrinsecè agens, so this is intrinsecè agens. And this also
we may see in Adam, who was indued with strength of body and comly aspect,
The heathen Philosophers have stum∣bled at these things in making felicity to
consist in riches honour and the like: yet Aristotle thought they did only conduce
unto happiness, thouhg he was deceived with the same fallacy he was be∣fore.

Partis is Corporis, aut Animi.

Because bonum is externum aut internum.

Bonum corporis est quod est innatum or connatum corpori.

For it is not acquisitum as bona animi are.

Object. But these bona corporis are natural, ergo how are they required ad bene te
gerendum?

Answ. We have them to some end and therefore to mannage the carraige of our
selves, ergo the Poet saith, Gratior est virtus veniens a corpore pulchro.

Page  134

This stands in 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

This stands in aspectu grato.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉est quâ validè te geras.

And validity lyeth in the body: and he that will performe any vertue as justice
wisdome or the like must have this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: so that if a man be
sick lame or deformed or have no constitution of body, that action, whatsoever it
be, looseth his grace, and is ridiculous in respect of him that performeth it. I
remember Socrates found fault with the games of Olympia, because there the
body was only exercised and the vertues thereof and not the vertues of the mind;
and so he said an Ox or Lyon might be practi∣sed. But he was deceived; for the
case is not equal, for the bona corporis in man are ad bene se gerendum whereas
there is no such thing meant in the strength of an Ox or Lyon.

Aspectus gratus est quo decenter te geras et 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

So that this addeth decus to the action: and we se by continual experience, that
where men are not much known, therefore the comely aspect of one man is much
preferred before another: and ergo though a man had all the bona that went before
and wanted this he would but be a mocking stock. So that as a pretious jewel
should be placed in a pretious matter and not in dust, so should vertue in a comely
man. Euexia is more general than sanitas and tells us that all the members of a
mans body do concur to th•s good action. Pulchritudo is properly that good

Page  135

colour that is of a good crasis and belongeth to a woman and ergo is more special
than aspectus gra ∣tus.

Bonum animi est bonum quod facultatem animi perfecit, eodem{que} sensu virtus diciter,

I say quod facultatem animi perfecit. perfectio and bonum are all one; for then we
say a thing is bonum when it is perfectum. God hath indued mans soul with
faculties, which when they can act readily then they are called bona and habits.
perfecit. be∣cause these faculties of understanding and will are not perfected till
they can work readily, and then they have their perfection: so that look what
facul∣ties of the soul have such readiness of act they have their perfection, and
they are called bona animi.

Aemulatio est quâ alterius exemplo excitamer ad bonum.

Virtus animi hath her stirrer up to that which is good, and in her course her spur,
and limits, and carriers. For a man that is expert in the eupraxie of any quality is
stirred up by some of these, so that this aemulatio is not a vertue of it self but is a
provoker of bunus Ethicus unto vertue. Quâ excitamur or exci∣taris. Because
every man at the beginning was made for an eupraxie for God; and in the fall
though he were no way able to perform it; yet there remain such relicks as to
leave him without excuse, and so stir him up to good by others example, and
a∣mongst the rest this is one provoker and indeed the first of them. Alterius
exemplo this is the cause that provoketh us to bonum; not envying the good
ex∣amples

Page  136

of others, but grieving that we cannot excel them. Ergo, this ariseth from a kind of
ambition: but it is good not desiring the evil, or the staying of him, but his going
on.

Calcar est quo currens excitatur ad bonum persequendum.

Now as we have heard, that there is an impetus or first setting on to begin, so there
is a spur in cursu to set him on to go lustily forward.
Calcar est mediocre aut ingens.
Mediocre est quod mediocritèr incitat.

It is from the notation: and if calcar in genere be quod incitat, then calcar
mediocre est quod mediocritèr incitat.

Mediocre est Laus.

Mediocre est Fama.

Laus est mediocre calcar à paucioribus propter mediocrem viriutem additum & subditum.

First, We do not give laus to any one till we see he do something of the act, and so
it differeth from aemulation. I say mediocre calcar; because this spur doth not gag
so deep as ingens calcar doth. Propter mediocrem virtutem. For laus is of that
vertue which is not yet come to perfection, but is a degree unto it. Apaucioribus;
because it not yet being perfect, is not known so well as that of fama is.

Page  137

Fama est calcar mediocre quod plurium ore versatur.

Now when vertue is but mean, and so not known to many, we give laus unto it: if
it be known of many, then it hath fama given unto it. And this is the difference
betwixt laus and Fama.

Calcar ingens est quando virtus venerit ad〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Calcar ingens est Honor.

Calcar ingens est Gloria.

Honor est quo virtus perfecta honoratur.

I say quo virtus perfecta honoratur: because here the act is come to its 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉 or perfection. So we see in Arts and Trades, that we do not give
honor to any Art till the man be his Trades or Arts-master. Now gloria is the
highest spur, and differeth from honour, in that it is more general than honour,
even as fama is more general than laus.

Cancelli aut carceres sunt quibus virtue intra suos limites coercetur aut
continetur.

Cancelli sunt Pudor.

Cancelli sunt Paenitentia.

So that whilest these two are in man, they are as bridles to keep us from evil, and
to do good.

Pudor est quo à transiliendis limitibus coercetur.

Now I say so because pudor is a shame-fac't-ness to

 Page  138

commit evil, and to omit good, and that alwayes be∣fore the act; whereas
verecundia is that blushing after act, and that is natural, and is but in some men,
not in all; and therefore it belongeth not to moral Philosophy: So that a man
should be shameful lest he do evil: and ergo, Aristotle faith in his Politicks, That
he is not a man that will not be shameful: and yet in his Ethicks he saith that
pudor and poenitentia are not beseeming a good man, because he must do nothing
that he must be ashamed of, or grieved for: But admit this were true, yet he
granteth that a yong man may be ashamed and often play the slip: but in∣deed
there is no man, though he be a perfect good man, but he shall need these to keep
him to good, and from committing of evil, and if he had them not, he were not vir
bonus. Now Aristotle meaneth that a good man should not have them actually
after that evil is committed, but onely poenitentia: but take them as bridles before
the act of evil to keep him from committing of evil; and so they are requisites to a
good man.

Poenitentia est quâ à virtute omittendà & vitio committendo deterremur.

Some think that poenitentia doth not belong to E∣thicks: but it doth as it is thus
taught, and thus may the more civil man have it.

Object. But a good man ought to do nothing whereof he should be ashamad?

Answ. True: but if virtus be sensim acquisita, then there are many degrees to the
perfection of it, and so may there be many slips, which we must be aware of, and
ergo, must have this to keep us from evil.

Page  139

Virtus est Intellectûs:

Voluntatîs.

If God hath endued mans soul with these two fa∣culties of Understanding and
Will, then also the bona of this soul must be distributed accordingly, and so be
bona intellectûs, or voluntatis: at; Ergo. Now when these faculties do act readily,
then we say they have their perfection.

Virtus intellectûs est quâ facultatem in∣tellectûs perficit.

Even as virtus in general was before, so is this in special described unto us.

Quâ rem agendam perspicit Intelligentia. Sapientia.

Here now beginneth the doctrine of Intellectual Virtues, the first whereof are
these:

Intelligentia est quae principia rei agendae perspicit.

It is named ab intellectu, as if it were the act of the whole intellectus, but it

beholdeth only the principiae of things, and looks between the Arguments in
them. Some Philosophers make intelligentia only of the principia of common
rules of invention in Logick, as this: The whole is bigger than the part, &c. But if
this were so, then there should be no intelligentia of other Arts, but it is the
readiness of the act of invention

Page  140

both in making Arguments, and in using them; that is, both in analysi and genesi.

Scientia est virtus intellectûs.

Whereby we readily see the truth: we call it the judgement of a necessary axiome.
But it's the act of the judgement for truth; and these are for the seeing of things.
Now these follow that we are to use after that we have seen intelligentia and
scien∣tia.

Sapientia est quae rem agendam ad usum contemplatur.

For when we see the intelligentia and scientia, then by our sapientiâ we gather an
hundred conclusions, and this is one in contemplation only, gathering these
deductions, and yet practising them.

Prudentia est quâ res agenda ad usum dirigitur.

For as before there was the readiness of the other vertues, so ars is the doing and
executing of those things that are to be applied in their right time, and fit place,
and so they may be prudent, and not good artists. Now all these are necessary for
the vertues of the Will; ergo are taught before them: for vir fortis, justus, &c. must
be intelligens, sciens, sapiens, &c. Now for the cardinal vertues, only prudentia is
here, and the rest come after; because they are vir ∣tutes voluntatis.

Page  141

Virtus voluntatis est quae facultatem voluntatatis perficit.

That a man may behave himself well, he must be bonis instructus, and they are
totius hominis, aut partis, i. e. Corporis or animi. And all these are necessary that
a man may bene se gerere; and he must have the virtues of the mind as
intelligentia &c. that he may be perfect in the practice of all arts: and whereas the
common Philosophers require only prudentiam and justiam universalem indeed
all these are requisite. Now follow the vertues of the will and these are the
cheifest of all and are only in bono: but now bonus may have gratiam,
authoritatem, bona corporis and intellectûs but he must be bonus that hath bona
voluntatis, though in infimo gradu, and ergo these vertues do most conduce ad
bene se geren∣dum. So that we see as in divinity summum bonum is the subject of
the will, so also in Ethicks will hath his object bonum. Now we are to know that
Ethicks look at such an one as Adam was before his fall, for he was indued with
all bona both interna and ex∣terna, both intellectus and voluntatis so that he is our
pattern. Now virtus voluntatis hath alwayes ad∣joyned unto it conscience, so had
Adam a conscience to accuse and excuse. But what is conescince?

Answ. It is so much of the Law as yet is in man; or it is the lecture of the

understanding reading the Law that is in the will. Now for all the distinctions in
Schools of conscience as it is good or bad &c. they are false; for conscience is
neither good nor bad: but when we do a thing and afterward know it to be evil
then we call it an evil conscience, or if there

Page  142

be no effect of vertue we call it no conscience: So that this it is, if a man do evil

and his conscience be against it, they say it is a bad conscience and yet this
conscience is good.

Si adsit, excusan∣tem & haec Voluptatem Praemii expectationem.

That is if it be according to moral vertue it brings with it delight; (not that

voluptatem which we shall heare of hereafter,) and expectation of the reward, for
the very natural man wil expect it.

Si absit, accusantem et haec Dolorum Paenae metum.

That is if vertue be absent there it will whip him; and hence is grief and fear of
punishment; which is opposed to pleasure and expectation of reward. So Adam
had his conscience when he hid him in the garden.

Prosequitur affectu, amoris, auream medio∣critatem; odii extrema.

This virtus voluntatis doth prosecute with the affection of love auream
mediocritatem; and with the affection of hate, the extreams. Now these ex∣trems
are to come into act, because they are the ob∣ject of hatred, which is an affection.

Page  143

Est in gradu infimo vel—mediocri supremo

This is a property of the virtues of the will; not that the virtues of the mind have
not their degrees, but we look not at these but at them and these of virtue have
both affection before.

Virtus voluntatis esterga Deum: Hominem.

Here still we must run on with Adam, and this act going on according to divinity.

Sanctitas est virtus voluntatis Deum immediatè respiciens.

For so all vertues do look at God, but this im∣mediatly. I say it is virtus volunatis,
because it is an act of the will.

Quae rectus de Deo sensus.

That is sanctitas consisteth in the right understand∣ing of God, or in the right

worshiping of him, as God is the subject of of our worship, not as he is the object
of our understanding.

Page  144
 Atheismus est defectus sensûs dei.
Rescrutatio gloriae est excessus seusûs dei.

Rectus cultus Dei.

This vertue is a definition it self it is that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-

Latin alphabet 〉.

Prophanatio est defectus cultûs Dei,

It is all carelesness of the worship of God.

Superstitio est excessus cultûs Dei.

Caetera desiderantur

Page  145

ASTRONOMIAE.
Caput primum.

AStronomia est ars caeli mobilis.

Caelum mobile est quod perpetuo motu fertur in gyrum.

Zodiacus norma est longitudinum et latitudinum.

Aequator declinationum in coelo.

Coelum hoc in plures sphaeras est distinctum.

Hae verò sibi invicem ita contiguae sunt, ut supe∣rior semper interiorem se
undequa{que} conclusam con∣tineat, non secus ac in ovo gallinaceo, luteum
al∣bumen & putamen, alterum alterius complexu tene∣tur, nec tamen ulla alterius
motum impedit.

Sphaera est unius motûs vel plurimum.

Page  146

Caput secundum.

SPhaera unius motûs est primum mobile.

Primum mobile est sphaera vicenis quaternis ho∣ris ab ortu per occasum ad ortum
circum verta super polos mundi.

Itaque hic motus per aequinoctialem describitur, & quindecim gradus unâ horâ
conficit, diemque na∣turalem describit.

Hujus motus dicitur 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Caput tertium.

SPhaera plurimum motuum est, quae fertur, & motu primi mobilis, & simul nisu
suo. Quo propior primo mobili, eo proprio motu fertur tardiùs. Estque duplicis,
vel multiplicis.

Caput quartum.

SPhaera duplicismotus est, sphaera nova, quae prae∣ter motum primi mobilis, suo
fertur obliqùe ab occasu ad ortum, circa polos Zodiaci. Centum annis fit ejus
progressio uno gradu.

Page  147

Caput quintum.

MOtûs multiplicis sphaera est, quae praeter motus illos priores, suum porro habet
& stellis in∣signitur.

Stellarum declinatio est ab aequin octiali.

Estque sphaera octava, vel planetaria.

Sphaera octava est quae perpetuo motu fertur polis in peripheria duorum
circulorum, quorum diame∣ter est minutarum 24 circa puncta aequinoctialia
mundi: fitque hic circulus juxta Copernici traditio∣nem annis 3434. Hoc motu
Ecliptica octavae sphae∣rae ab Eclipticâ mundi in Austrum et Boream mutat; hinc
nonnunquam ad Aequatorem punctis solstitiali∣bus accedit nonnunquam discedit:
unde eorum maxima elongatio mutatur, nec semper eadem ma∣net, nam quae
tempore Ptolomaei fuit 23 gradus 35 minuta, nostro aevo à Wernero et Copernico
depre∣hensa 23 gradus 28 minuta cum semisse; maxima itaque declinatio est 23
gradus 52 minuta, minima 23 gradus 24 minuta; est ergo maxima hujus
muta∣tionis differentia 24 minuta. Porro motu novae sphaerae fertur ab occidente
ad orientem annis centum ferè gradum. Hinc initia hujus dodecadem oriorum &
septo recesserunt ab initiis Zodiaci mundi eorun∣demque do decalem. Initia sunt
poli sphaerae octauae est autem octavae sphaerae à terrâ undequaque di∣stantia
decies millium & quadrag•nta diametrorum terrae dodrantis perpetuò: numerantur
verò pro diametro terrae 1720 milliaria Germanica. Sphaera octava est quae
proprio motu super duos circulos,

Page  148

quorum diameter est minutorum 24 & poli sunt pun∣cta aequinoctitialia quae
discribuntur ab initiis Arietis & Librae octavae sphaerae. Hic motus, vocatur
mo∣tus trepidationis, & motus accessûs & recessûs. Quidam volunt diametrum
circulorum in quibus ver∣tuntur poli octavae sphaerae esse quatuor gradus 18 min.
43 sec. Revolutionemque facere annis 7000.

Caput sextum.

In octavâ hac sphaerâ funt stellae fixae. Suntque im∣mutabilibus semper spatiis
disjunctae à se invi∣cem, veluti in paralelis provehuntur, in suo orbe, dignoscuntur
scintillatione. Stellae hae igitur proptur motum novae sphaerae progrediuntur
singulis centum annis ferè gradum, aliàs tamen tardiùs, aliàs cele∣riùs, quòd aliás
versùs Orientem, aliàs versùs Oc∣cidentem, aliás versùs Meridiam, aliàs versùs
Ar∣ctum, ex motu novae & octavae sphaerae. Soli deo stellarum numerus notus
est; Veteres autem anno∣tavere visu & effectu insignes mille viginti duas.

Caput septimum.

Stellae ob immensam distantiam minutissimae qui∣dem apparent, suâ tomen mole

terram multis partibus excedunt, suntque magnitudine sextuplices.

Primae magnitudinis sunt, quae caeteras omnes splendore vincunt, terrâque

majores sunt centies

Page  149

septies cum undecim sexagessimis quartis; est enim diametri earum ad diametrum
terrae proportio qua∣drupla super-parciens tres quartas, quae 19 ad quator. Cum
ergo per 18 proprsitionem Element: 12 sphaerae sunt inter se in triplâ ratione
suarum dimentientium, diametris cubicè multiplicatis majoreque cubo per
minorem diviso colligitur differentia seu excessus. Harum sunt 15.

Secundae magnitudinis sunt &c. (•) est enim pro∣portio diametri earum ad
diametrum terrae quadrupla super-parciens viginti quinque sexagessimis, quae est
205 ad 60. Harum numerus 45.

Tertiae magnitudinis sunt, quae terram septuagies bis cum triente ferè superant;
proportio enim dia∣metrorum quadrupla est sesque sexta, quae est 25 ad 9. Sunt
autem numero 205.

Quartae sunt terrâ majores quinquagies quater & semisse, vel paulo plus;
proportio enim diametro∣rum est tripla super-parciens quatuor quintas, quae 19 ad
5. Et sunt 477.

Quintae, quae vincunt mole suâ terram tricies se∣mel: proportio est tripla
superparciens tres tricessi∣mas octavas, quae 119 ad 38. Quarum numerus 217.

Septae, sunt minimae superantque terram paulo plus decies octies: proportio dupla
super parciens quin∣que octavas quae 21 ad •. Numerus harum stellarum est 49.—
His addiderunt 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 obscuras 9, & nebulosas 〈 in non-Latin
alphabet 〉 7.

Page  150

Caput octavum.

STellae partim in certos asterismos sunt digestae, partim sunt 〈 in non-Latin

alphabet 〉.

Asterismus est stellarum plurimum vicinarum certâ ratione ab aliis distinctarum

effigies, cujus similitu∣dine & nomen sortitur ut agnosci faciliûs possint.
 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 autem constant certo stellarum numero vel incerto: qui
certo stellarum numero vel incerto: qui certo stellarum numero constant sunt 48.
Hipparchus & Prolomaeus appellant 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Proclus 〈 in non-
Latin alphabet 〉, Plinius signa & sydera, Vulgus constellationes. Haec partitio ex
Phaeniciâ in Graeciam. Phynices autem à patribus sanctis post diluvium.

Caput nonum.

PRimus ac situ utilissimus est Ursa minor, sive Plaustrum minus; est autem
asterismus fiellis in modum ursulae formatus, quarum una in extremitate caudae
est tertiae magnitudiuis, fatis lucida, stella Polaris dicitur, quòd Polo proxima sit,
nam tan∣tum quatuor gradibus distat. Haec igitur à propin∣quitate ad Polum notu
facilis est. Dicitur Tartaris, Seles micol, ferreus clavus. Hinc paulo alia in
medietate caudae, deinde alia in initio caudae. & deinceps duae in sinistrâ
ponètibiâ & duae denique in sinistro humero.

Proximus est Vrsa major, qui est astrismus con∣stans stellis 27; quarum septem
lucidiores secundae magnitudinis versus polum. Plaustrum majus vulgò vocaur.
&c. &c. &c.

Page  151

MEDICINAE LIBER PRIMUS.

Caput primum.

MEdicina est ars bene sanandi.

Medicina est] quia sanitas est, ad fi∣nem dirigenda.

Est ars] quia sanitas ob finem.

Sanandi] qui est sanitatis.

Bene] quia sanitas bona, & bene agier à sanitate oportet.

Sanitas est affectus corporis per se ad actionem suam probè efficiendam.

Sanitas est] Quia corporis sua constitutio ad pro∣prium munus.

Affectus] qui ex corporis constitutione fit id aptum vel ineptum ad munus suum.

Corporis] quia corpus sedes est sanitatis, & non pro∣priè dicitur anima sana per
se, qui orta ex corporis constitutione.

Ad actionem suam efficiendam] quia corpus pro∣pter

Page  152

functionem aliquam, ergo 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ejus ad actio∣nem efficiendam.

Probè] quia corpus à naturâ, ideoque propter functionem optimam in suo genere.
Natura enim tendit in optimum.
 Caput secundum.

SAnitatis sunt sua signa, & suae causae.

Sua signa, quia sanitas ipsa abstrusa plerum que latet, itaque sua signa habere
debet, ex quibus eam possimus expiscari.

Et suae causae, quia immutari possint ergo suae causae sunt, quibus immutari
possint.

Signum est quo proditur sanitas.

Quo proditur, quia signo mens ad sanitatem rectâ ratione ducitur.

Signum est sanitatis praesentis vel absentis, quia sanitas vel praesens vel absens esse possit.

Signum presentis sanitatis est, quo praesens sanitas indicatur, & dicitur
demonstrativum, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quia signum est quo proditur sanitas.

Signum absentis sanitatis est, quo absens sanitas in∣dicatur, quia signum est quo
proditur sanitas.

Signum absentis sanitatis, est praeteriti vel futuri.

Quia omnis sanitas absens est praeteriti vel futuri.

Signum sanitatis praeteriti temporis, quo praeterita corporis sanitas memoriâ

repetitur; et dicitur com∣memorativum.

Signum sanitatis futuri temporis, quo futura sani∣ras praevidetur; et dicitur 〈 in

non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Signa potro sunt vel comitantia, vel assidentia;

Page  153

quia signa sanitatis sunt, vel quae perpetuò adsint, vel non adsint.

Comitantia sunt, quae sanitatem perpetuò comi∣tantur.

Perpetuò] quia comitantia sunt sanitatis comites perpetui.

Assidentia, quae etiam adesse possint, quia assi∣dentia modò adsunt, modò absunt.

Hîc excellit symptoma.

Symptoma est, signum ex sanitate profectum.&c. &c. &c.

Page  154

OPTICAE LIBER PRIMUS.

OPtica est ars bene videndi.
Res ad videndum proposita, est vi∣sibile.
Visibile est per centrum oculi per∣ceptibile.
Visibile generale prius apparet quàm speciale.
Visibile recipitur vel verè, vel hallucinanter.
Verè, quando visibile rectè ad oculum se habet.
Hallucinanter, quando aliter.
Liber secundus.
VIsibile est primarium, vel secundarium.
Primarium, quod emittit radios.
Radius est linea è quovis radiantis puncto speciem ejus unà perferens.
E•rad••s à radiante obverso in oppositum fit ra∣diosa pyramis.
Pyramis radiosa est cujus basis in radiante obverso, centrum verò punctum in opposito.
Itaque

Si radians suerit sphaericum, pyramis erit conus.

Page  135

Et

Si radians fuerit angulosum erit recti termina pyra∣mis.

Et

Pyramis fastigiatur in centro oculi, quando radi∣anti opponitur etiam ferit oculos
impressione qua∣dam.

Itaque

Omne quod videtur, sub angulo videtur.

Et

Quia una basis utriusque pyramidis, utriusque oculi radius unum conspicitur.

Radius perpendicularis caeteris est robustior.

In radiosâ autem pyramide axis est radius princi∣palis.

Axis est radius a centro basis ad verticem perpendi∣cularis.

Itaque

Fortiùs à re visâ imprimitur, valentiùs etiam acci∣pitur.

Itaque

Certissima comprehensio visibilis sit per axem.

Per alium radium tanto ce•tior, quanto axi propin∣quior fuerit.

Quovis è puncto Radiantis, Radiantis axis prove∣nit in adversum.

Itaque
Et pyramis è Radiante obverso quaqua versum in oppositum.

Radii autem immittuntur sine intermissione.

Itaque

Et pyramides.

Radiorum locus est intervallum ad quod per¦medium porriguntur radii.

Quo hoc intervallum majus est, eo pyramidis angu∣lus in opposito minor, quo
minus eo major.

Itaque

Radians quo remotius, eo apparet minus, quo pro∣prius eo majus.

Page  156

Et

Si angulus illinc minor hinc major quam pro oculi acie, visu non percipitur.

Medium est corpus perspicuum, illustratum, situm inter radians & oppositum.

Radii medii tincturam capient.

Liber tertius.
RAdii sunt simplices vel geminati.
Simplices quorum quilibet in pyramide unus.

Itaque

In eodem medio cum opposito constituti.

Liber quartus.
GEminati qui angulum rectilineum faciunt.
Suntque catoptici vel mesoptici.
Catoptici, ubi à densâ corporis superficie versùs partem unde veniunt reverberantur.
Radii catoptici angulos faciunt in superficie densi corporis, quorum alter incidentiae, alter
reflectionis appellatur.
Angulus incidentiae quem faciunt advenientes, in superficie densi corporis.
Angulus reflectionis, est, quem faciunt iidem radii inde reflexi.
Angulus reflectionis aequalis est angulo incidentiae,
Verùm oculus specularem tantùm reflectionem percipit.
Speculum est densi corporis polita superficies.
Radiùs perpendicularis à speculo in seipsum re∣flectitur.
Reflectio radiantis speciem debilitat.

Page  157

Liber quintus.
RAdii mesoptici, qui per aliud medium penetran∣tes franguntur.

Refractio fit in superficie perspicuum terminante.

Radius tamen rectus hîc è radiante corpore rectè transit, tanquam medium esset
unicum; neque quic∣quam novae soliditatis occursu patitur.

Obliqui igitur hîc tantùm refringuntur.

Radius igitur obliquus hîc angulum facit, cujus alterum crus est super alterum
intra communem me∣diorum superficiem.

Itaque

Quo obliquior est angulus, eo major est ejus in∣firmitas & debilitatio.

Perpendiculum fractionis est quod à puncto inci∣dentiae in alteram partem

educitur.

Perpendiculum est index loci, in quem radius de∣serens suam rectitudinem

refringitur.

Radius autem hic vel ad perpendiculum infra rectitudinem frangitur, vel à

perpendiculo ultra ean∣dem progreditur.

Si radius obliquus inciderit in medium densius, ver∣sus perpendiculum frangetur;

si in rarius à perpen∣diculo.

Itaque

Imago refracti visibilis, abaquâ in aerem videtur major visibili.

In aquâ tamen pauca & valde clarâ sensus falli po∣test

In obliquo conspectu mesoptico locus imaginis est perpendiculi à re visâ in

communem mediorum su∣perficiem concursus cum radio visionis recto.

Page  138

Itaque

Res visa per radios refractos extra suum locum ap∣paret.

Extra suum locum apparere est, propiùs vel remo∣tiùs, quàm absit videri; seu
superiùs vel inferiùs, dexteriùs sinistriusve.

Hinc

Fieri potest ut per fractos radios videatur quid piam quod per rectos in
conspectum venire non potest.

Hinc
Si res aliqua in vas iniiciatur, & ab oculo recedat vas quoad res in fundo posita
cerni non possit; ea¦videbitur loco ab oculo remotiore, si aquae in vas
in∣fundantur.

Et

Stella super finitorem apparebit, quae adhuc est infra,

Liber sextus.

Visibile primarium est lux & color.

Quorum alter alterius actus est ut conspiciatur. Lux quod lucendo radiat.

Itaque

Cr jus radius lucis speciem perfert.

Et
Quae per se medium suum collustrat.
Si medium ab alterâ luce majore illustretur, minor eâ obscurabitur.
Ab omni puncto concavi luminosi radii perpen∣diculares in centro confluunt.

Itaque

In concavo luminoso luminis vis maxima est circa¦centrum.

Itaque

Coelestis circa terram.

Page  139

Lux a sole universam mundi fabricam complet.

Itaque

Diametrali intervallo conspici potest.

Stellarum lux magnitudinem distantiae eam assequi potest ut evanescat.

Itaque

A nobis plurimae non cernuntur, qui ab ipsis semi∣diametro hoc est 180
milliaribus absumus.

Et

Quae cernuntur tam parvae apparent, ut lucida coeli puncta esse videantur.

Itaque

Multo minus diametrali intervallo conspiciuntur.

Liber septimus.
 RAdius perpendicularis in seipsum reflectitur.

Itaque

Reflectio unit plures radios; nempe à pluribus punctis in unum concurrunt.

Itaque

Multiplicant virtutem ejus.

Itaeque

Lux reflexa est fortior incidente.

FINIS.

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