RCHER DECEMBER

One Dollar

INSIDE * A GUIDED TOUR OF AMERICAN

DEEP FREEZE OPEN BOOK OR OPEN
DOOR?

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* THE NIXON GUAM DOCTRINE

NEW ZEALAND ALONE?
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, I . , Also
'", COPE Weapons
" System. A Review *'dentifying Nuclear Weapons on the
I. Invincible Task Force.
 OPERATION DEEP FREEZE
- An open book? Or an open door to V.S. military escalation?
BY BOB LEONARD

In August of this year a guided tour of the American

military facilities at Christchurch's Harewood Airport
was permitted. Invited were city councillors,
representatives of the news media and members of
the Christchurch coalition of peace groups, Citizens
for the Demilitarisation of Harewood (CDH).

Since 1960 Christ church International Airport has

been the American headquarters for Operation Deep
Freeze, the military I civilian Antarctic programme 01
the United States. The U.S. military Detachment, a
part of the massive, nuclear-armed Pacific Fleet, is
deeply entrenched at our airport. A tour of the U.S.
base is not likely to reveal very much to visitors
unless they have studied the subject and are
prepared to ask probing questions of their mllitary
guides. Even then they are likely to be frustrated by
evasion and public relations double-talk. Our purpose
in this brief article is to look behind the public image
of Deep Freeze and describe serious concerns about
the V.S. military occupation of our civH airport.

THE VISIBLE SIDE OF DEEP FREEZE

There are two separate centres of Deep Freeze activity near the airport terminal building: the
barracks / headquarters and the hangar J cargo handling areas. The total area is about 16 acres leased
from the Christchurch City Council for about $70,000 per year. The housing facilities will accommodate
several hundred personnel in barracks. In addition there are officers quarters, a post office (with its own
U.S. lip code), a lecture hall, small medical and dental units, a jail, and a post exchange supplying
familiar American goods, duty free. A large warehouse is subdivided for the separate equipping of
military and ci\filian personnel for work on the ice.
To the north opposite the roundabout is the cargo and aircraft staging area including a large U.S.
Naval hangar and several U.S. Air Force Military Airlift Command storage buildings. U.S. military aircraft,
usuaUy C-141 Starlifters and C· 130 Hercules, may be seen on the tarmac several days of each week,
more frequently during spring and summer. Many boxes, large containers, and items of equipment are
usually in temporary storage out in the open.
A question about communications with the Antarctic will elicit a brief description of the Naval
Communications facility and a gesture in a westerly direction across the runways toward the distant
blockhouse and receiving antennas. It takes a few km of driving around the airport perimeter to see the
NavComU sitting beside a golf course.
Having seen this much, a visitor might ask "Is that all there is?" It is not. But don't expect the
American military willingly to divulge the darker side of Deep Freeze.

THE INVISIBLE SIDE OF DEEP FREEZE

The U.S. military presence at Christchurch Airport has strictly military purposes that have remained
strangely invisible to New Zealanders over the years. A detailed account of American military activities in
New Zealand was published by Owen Wilkes in 1973 in a booklet titled 'Protest· A recent update has
been written as a thesis at the University of Canterbury by Grant Tweddle. An overview of the material
relating to Christchurch and some recent revelations is given below.
MIU'I'ARISA 'I"ON OF OPERA'I"ON DEEP FREEZE
The U.S. military role at the airport extends far beyond support of civilian research. The Harewood�
Weedons base complex supports all U.S. military and diplomatic requirements in the region including
those of past and present facilities at Woodbourne, Mt John and Black Birch. Military research under
Projects 'PRESS' and 'MAGNET' has been aided by the Christchurch base. This research applies
directly to nuclear missile guidance.
The Commander, U.S. Naval Support Force Antarctica. has authority over about 2000 military
personnel from the Navy, Army, Air Force, Coast Guard. Military Sealift Command, and the RNZ Army and
Air Force. The U.S. Antarctic programme has the highest proportion of military personnel (70% on the ice
in 1981) of any country conducting polar research.

NEW ZEALAND SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. MILITARY

The V.S, Embassy has declared that the V.S. base at Harewood is sovereign U.S. Territory and not
subject to NZ law. The Christchurch Deep Freeze facilities are literally a multipurpose U.S. military base
beyond NZ control and in breach of NZ sovereignty. The NZ government is represented at the airport by
the Ministries of Transport, Agriculture and Fisheries and Customs, none of which has any jurisdiction
over the American military, The Civil Aviation Division Regulations state that: "Nothing in these
regulations shall apply to military aircraft."
New Zealanders in the employ of the U.S. military at Operation Deep Freeze have for 16 years been
denied the option of belonging to a trade union in their own country. The U.S. government has persisently
invoked the sovereignty of its "Deep Freeze territory" in refusing to yield to union and worker complaints.
Customs and agriculture officials may not set foot on any American military aircraft as each is deemed
sovereign U.S. territory under international law.
During the October 1973 Middle East crisis the U.S. base at Christchurch was put on alert status along
with other U.S. bases in Australia and around the globe. Neither the NZ nor the Australian government
was informed of this fac1 until after the alert. This unilateral U.S. action could occur again at any time with
grave implications under the provisions of the 1982 Logistic Support agreement (see below).

THE MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND

The M.A.C. is an arm of the U.S. Air Force that is not covered by the NZI US Deep Freeze Agreement.
Using the excuse that every StarLifter flight has something related to the Antarctic, The M.A.C. operates
with annual blanket diplomatic clearance. M.A.C . cargo aircra1t are often contracted for flights to the
Antarctic, but the majority of M.A.C. flights each year at Christchurch Airport carry unmonitored cargoes
between Hawaii and Australia.
The M.A.C. has the slogan "Lifeline to Freedom." It is a 'lifeline' that routinely carries the basic
ingredients of annihilation - nuclear weapons - through a global network of domestic and foreign
airfields numbering in the hundreds. Is our airport a link in that network? When the American government
is asked whether the M.A.C. cargo planes are carrying nuclear weapons through our airport the response
is neither to confirm nor deny the presence of those weapons. Aviation Week magazine recently
described the M.A.C. transports as "basically wartime contingency assets."
StarLifters today. 8-52s tomorrow? The 1982 ANZUS Memorandum of Understanding on Logistic
Support between NZ and the U.S. provides for 'refit and maintenance' of U.S. warships and aircraft in NZ
'during periods of international tension.' Defence Minister David Thomson confirmed on national television
that those ships and aircraft could be nuclear-armed and that the normal 30-day approval time required
by NZ could be cut to just OK. Mr Thomson also has stated that both Christchurch Airport and Lyttelton
Harbour would be involved in these open-ended visits by nuclear-armed combat equipment The
Christchurch area would become a nuclear target if U.S. military escalation occurred as allowed in the
1982 agreement.

NAilAt. COMMUNICATIONS UNIT" WEEDONS TRANSMITTERS

The NavComU is housed in an isolated concrete-block building amid arrays of antennas. In the 1970s
the facility contained secret code-handling devices secured within three ferro-concrete vaults. Although
the vaults are currently empty and sta11 say they handle only Antarctic research-related messages, the
powerful radio equipment still runs 24 hours a day with a complete staff of over 20 naval personnel, even
in mid-winter when McMurdo Station is barely active. The unit continues to be a part of the U.S.
Department of Oefense Global Communication Network,
The NavComU had the capability to provide high frequency radio backup for the primary station at
North West Cape in Western Australia. The huge base at the Cape is an acknowledged prime nuclear
target. If the Christchurch unit were quickly upgraded to its former status, it would be a nuclear target as
well.
The directional antenna at Weedons (a few km south of Christchurch) can be motor·rotated to face
Canberra or Hawaii rather than McMurdo. There is evidence from U.S. military and congressional sources
that the NavComU will soon reinstall an AutomatiC Digital Network (AUTODIN) teleprinter, a secure
communications device that formerly occupied one of the concrete vaults.

OPEN BOOK O R OPEN DOOR?

U.S. Embassy staff say that Operation Deep Freeze is an open book. But government officials have
declined requests for further research visits to the Christchurch base. There are many unanswered
questions about the militarisation of Deep Freeze and the Antarctic. An Embassy attache stated that we
must submit our questions in writing. We submitted an initial list on 31 August and have received no
answers as of mid-November. If the Embassy book on Deep Freeze is open, many pages are blank. Some
of the pages we've managed to rBad revea! an alarming potentia! for U.S. military escalation with
possibly disastrous consequences for New Zealand.
IQENllFYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOARD THE
1�"III!;II1II.E TASK FORCE
, "� NeW Ze'sl'a'nd' officials invited on board any of the nuclear�capable vessels making up the Invincible
Ta��,f'orpe;may b�ve the opportunity to confirm the presence of nuclear weapons.
Acc_�sat_i()l)s, :J:�c.a 'coverMup' during the Falklands crisis over the emergency removal of nuclear ar­
rnarO en ! �'i If:orn .:trie.' damaged Sheffield by the British support ship Fort Austin has led to speculation o n
the visibility 'of nuclear weapons.
A concrete-filled 'drill round' containing a nuclear depth charge was seen by a Royal Navy Lieutenant
in the helicopter hangar of the Fort Austin. Lieutenant David Tinker, who was killed when an Exocet mis­
sUs._nit,
�;lJxjli,i!!'IY:,Fi?rt A,:,stJn and found a nuclear bomb there. I was rather surprised and wondered whether it was
�ort,h' s,feeping hi the hangar anymore.'

•
� HMS INVINCIBLE

Nuclear �,epth charges, confirmed by British defence sources as standard equipment for warships on
operational patrol faraway from supply bases, have been for years the West's main antidote to deep
water submarines. The British frigates carry Lynx and Wasp helicopters which can drop the depth
charges into an area where the precise position of an enemy submarine is unknown.

DELlIIERY.
While Defence Secretary Sir John Nott furiously denied in the 1982 debate that the Fort Austin was
acting 85 a retriever of nuclear depth charges thought to be too dangerous in a 'shooting war,' he
praised the nuclear capability of the British Navy in an open article written for the NATO REVIEW, ap�
pearing in the April '81 issue. The article states that in all the United Kingdom has several hundred strike
aircraft and helicopters capable of delivering United Kingdom nuclear weapons. 'We also provide,' Sir
John Nott writes, 'five squadron of Sea King helicopters, two flights of Wessez, 25 flights of Wasps and
16 fiights of Lynx, all of which are capable of operating from warships at sea and delivering British nu�
clear depth bombs.' These numbers of aircraft and helicopters represent the total owned by the United
Kingdom Navy. This indicates that helicopters aboard the Invincible Task Force are certainly nuclear
capable.
(The Frigate HMS Rothesay carries a Wasp helicopter, the Frigate HMS Aurora a lynx, the ammunition
ship HMS Regent and fleet tanker HMS Olmeda carry four Sea King helicopters each).
Sir John Nott also concedes that there will be 'two squadrons of Sea Harrier aircraft operating in the
near future from anti�submarine warfare carriers ... capable of delivering nuclear weapons.' Sea Harriers
will be aboard,the Invincible.

REASSIGNED
Jane's Fighting Ships indicates that when the aircraft carrier Ark Royal was scrapped helicopters
were reassigned to all large fleet auxiliaries. Remarkably, this means that even the fleet tanker HMS
Olmeda in the task force will have nuclear weapons aboard for its 'defence' since it normally carries four
Sea King helicopters,
"REAT'If INFRINGED
The spirit, if not the latter, of the South American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (the Treaty of Tlatelolco)
was infringed when the British took nuclear weapons to the Falklands. Contracting parties to the treaty
agree to prohibit in their territories 'the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any other form of
possession' of nuclear weapons.
Britain is not a party to the main treaty, but has signed two additional protocols under which non�latin
American countries agree to abide by it.
territories in the treaty zone (this includes the Falklands islands): the other is for states already in
possession of nuclear weapons. However, arms control experts point out that the legal interpretation of
the treaty is extreme,ly complfcated. It does not specifically ban the transport of nuclear weapons for
example."t is difficult to deny though that the spirit of the treaty, meant to confine horizontal proliferation
of nuclear weapons, has been infringed. In the same way, the desire expressed by South Pacific nations
to establish a nuclear weapon fre.e
British task force.
_ Keith Burgess.

(5.."'''...., NATO REVIEW Vol. 211, Ap,lI '111 No. 2. THE GUARDIAN 2nd, 17th Mo".....".." 'lIlI.
LOMDON SUNDAY '1'1111115, 7th M."'.....b.... 'SlI• .lANE'S FIGHTING SIIIPS.)

USELF-ACTIVATION OF THE WORLD

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEM,."
BY BERNARD BEREANU. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH,
VOL. 20, No. 1, pp 49-57, 1983.

REVIEWED BY BOB LEONARD

Former U.S. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy said in 1981: "The Pershingw2 missiles can
reach the Soviet Union from West Germany in' five minutes, thus producing a new possibility of a super­
sudden first strike -even on Moscow itsell. This is loo last." Who could disagree?
Probably no person who has read widely and thought deeply about nuclear weapons proliferation has
failed to conclude that eventually the whole ghastly inventory would seifMdestruct. It is intuitively obvious
that everMincreasing missile speed and accuracy and ever-decreasing delivery times will eventually
exceed the capacity of human minds to control them. Thus computers must take over the business of
watching for nuclear aggression, interpreting radar warning data, and making the ultimate fateful
'decision' on nuclear weapons use.
Bernard Bereanu has developed a mathematical model of the world nuclear weapons system which
confirms our fears of computerized armageddon. Whether or not one can read the mode! itself and
evaluate its validity it is chilling!y instructive to consider the assumptions and essential technical
considerations of the model. They are emphasised along with the implications of the model in this paper,
the simplest of three by Bereanu on the subject of nuclear war by accident.
An initial and entirely reeHsfic assumption of the model is that decisionumakers controlling two
antagonistic nuclear arsenals will retaliate if they conclude they are under nuclear attack. This
assumption is critical because, according to Bereanu, it leads directly to the conclusion that the two
arsenals are really just a singl,
purely random events. He develops this aspect of the model by focussing on two major technical facts:
(1) The arms race is producing ever more accurate warhead delivery systems with delivery times
dropping into the range of just a few minutes, and (2) The computer systems that must take over the
nuclear warning and response systems are prone to random errors in software (programmes written by
humans) and hardware (electronic components primarily).
If a warning alarm cannot be verified as true or false within the time required for retaliation, the
retaliatory launch must proceed if the missiles are not to be destroyed on their pads. Bereanu calls the
time needed to verify the accuracy of an attack warning "Efficient Checking Time,' or ECT. As the
nuclear arms race continues, EeT steadily decreases. Pershing-2 deploymen1 is considered by Bereanu
to be a typical case of drastic reduction of the EeT. Any false nuclear alarm whose duration exceeds the
EeT will automatically activate the world nuclear weapon system.
The author appends a number of detailed notes to his paper in which he relates the abstractions of
mathematics to the realities of intermediate-range missiles, reduced flight times of submarine launched
ballistic missiles. and documented false a.iarms in the Early Warning Systems of the United States. The
false alarms will continue at a rate of hundreds per year (there are at least five nuclear powers).
Therefore, Bereanu concludes: "The old adage that 'mankind will have to live wi1h nuclear weapons'
while continuing the armament race, Is contradictory. Unfortunately the limitation concerning computers
mentioned above, only too familiar 10 those working with computers, and its consequences on the nuclear
weapons race, are largely unknown to the public and generally ignored in the literature on nuclear
weapons systems."
Any mathematical mode! will fail to reflect the complexities of the real world. But Bereanu's model will
serve a vital purpose if it helps us to confront the fallacy of nuclear deterrence and the necessity of
nuclear disarmament.
"Self-Activation of the World Nuclear Weapons System" ( 9 pg) by 8ernard Bereanu is available from
the NZNF Zone Committee. Refer resource list.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NIXON GUAM DOCTRINE.
- Keith Burgess.

", , , 88 faf 8S the problems of internal security are

concerned - except for the threat of a major power
involving nuclear weapons - the United States is
going to encourage, and has a right to expect, that
this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the
responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations
themselves ...
RICHARD NIXON, Guam, July 1969.

When the ANZUS Council met in Washington earlier

this year, Australia offered a sub11e challenge to the
substance of the pact. The Australian government had
observed the Reagan administration's formal
adoption of a foreign policy, the so·called Nixon
Guam doctrine. which says that America's allies are
alone except in the event of nuclear war.
At a press coference in Washington Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr 8i11 Hayden, said that the
Guam statement 'seemed to declale that countries of the region (Asia, Pacific) would be required to look
after their own security problems short of those conflicts involving nuclear weapons and a major super­
Power.'
'It would seem,' Mr Hayden continued, 'that Judge Clark (President Reagan's Nationa! Security Adviser
till just last month) about twelve months ago confirmed this principle, so we want to sort that out .'
The predictable content of this year' 5 ANZUS Council communique was yet another endorsement of the
ANZUS Treaty as it stands. But what lay behind the Australian government's concern?
On Ju!y 25th, 1969 President Nixon sojourned for a night on the island of Guam at the outset of an
Asian tour. A press conference was summoned in which Nixon outlined to accompanying newspeople in a
background briefing in the Navy's Officers club the elements of what was called the Guam doctrine. H e
later spoke o f his policy outline as the Nixon doctrine and expanded its application to the entire world.
.
The Guam press conference was one of the rare occasions when a major presidential policy was
stated extemporaneously. However, it had evidently been carefully thought out and its essence had been
outlined to newspeople at the White House in a previous lengthy and official briefing before Nixon left
Washington for the Pacific.
President Nixon's policy emphasised an intention for the United States to simultaneously remain a
Pacific power and 'lower i1s profile' and hence its commitment to the defence of Asia, and by extension
the Pacific.
The most significant statement made by Nixon at the press conference in Guam was in response to a
hypothetical question concerning Asian countries' interpretation of the withdraw I of troops by the United
States from Vietnam.
President Nixon said, ". . I believe the time has come when the United States, in our relations with our
Asian friends, should be quite emphatiC on two points; One, that we will keep our treaty commitments
(the ANZUS Treaty commits 1he parties to consultation only) , . . and two, that as far as the problems of
internal security are concerned - except for the threat 01 a major power involving nuclear weapons -
the United States is going to encourage, and has a right to expect, that this problem will be increasingly
handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves."
President Reagan's formal adoption of this policy came in a speeach made by Judge William P. Clark
to the Centre for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University in May of 1982.
OuWned i n the speech were the main points of a secret eight-page Nationa! Security Memorandum
which sets out the broad geographical guide·lines for military and strategic planning. The key point was
that the United States would not, and in fact could not, engage Soviet forces on all fronts sjmultaneously
if a war were to break out.
This represents a significant shift from the 'global conflict' concept previously enunciated by Casper
Weinberger, the Defence Secretary. Mr Clark said that although any conflict with the Soviet Union could
extend to global dimensions "this does not mean that we must have the capability to successfully
engage the Soviet forces on al! fronts. What it does mean 1s that we must procure balanced forces and
establish priorities for sequential operations to ensure that military power would be applied in the most
effective ways."
Clark also made direct reference to the administration's determination to go ahead with the
modernisa.tion of its strategic nuclear triad. This has been interpreted by political analysts as a clear
signal to America's allies that they must expect to carry the brunt of defence against attacks from
enemies other than the Soviet Union.
 One of the hard�earned wisdoms of the Vietnam war is that it is politically inexpedient for America to
wage a protracted war far away from home. There is no assured swift victory and domestically, the
political consequence are dire.
What is more, the United States is no longer able to economically support such a commitment.
Prospects for soaring Federal deficits has led the American administration to cut military spending for
the next three years. Projected budgets have been pared to the bare minimum the administration thought
necessary to rebuild the military.
In the past month, for example, substantial proportions of the budget have been awarded to major
nuclear projects at the expense of conventional force development. Financial injections have recently
been given the stand-in 81 bomber, the MX missile, the Trident ballistic missile fleet and the naval cruise
missile.
The Australian Government had come to its own conclusion in 1982 in a report by the Joint committee
on Foreign Affairs entitled 'Threats to Australia's Security: It concluded, 'If United States Forces were
fully occupied in a major confrontation with the Soviet Union, then Australia would have to be prepared to
fend off any threats from other powers with only incidental help from its American ally.'
How realistic, and honest, is New Zealand's assessment? In the Ministry of Defence annual report for
1982, ANZUS is still regarded as 'an ultimate guarantee of security in the region.'
Yet the Nixon Guam doctrine, which says that America's allies cannot expect direct military assistance
in any contingency other than in an attack by the Soviet Union involving nuclear weapons, remains in
effect.
I1s significance represents an undermining of the ANZUS Treaty itself. Far from providing an ultimate
guarantee of security, the treaty has become a written endorsement for United States use of nuclear
weapons in the region.

(Sources: Vital Speeches 1969. Text of William Clark's speech at Georgetown. ICA Wireless
file. New York Times, May 22, 25, 1982. Report from Ministry of Defence 1982. Christchurch
Pr .... , July 21st, 111113).

EXERCISE COPE THUNDER.

New Zealand Air Forces practice 'penetration' tactics in the Philippines.
All year round units from around the Pacific deploy to Clark Airforce Base in the Philippines, for two·
week intensive COPE THUNDER exercises as if they were mobilising for actual combat
In May of 1981 eight Skyhawks of the number 75 squadron of the Roya! New Zealand Airforce took
part in exercise COPE THUNDER and in November of 1982 New Zealand Airforce McDonnel Douglas A-
4Ks participated. The New Zealand Ministry of Defence claims that such exercises prepare New Zealand
forces for combat readiness and provide excellent training opportunities in the form of simulated combat
missions in a realistic threat environment. Exercise COPE THUNDER though, held at Crow Valley five
miles from Clark Airtorce Base, is particularly aggressive in nature and the key word is 'penetration.'
New Zealand Forces practice sneak incursions here into Soviet territory jamming radar and
communication systems and simulating attacks on trains, airfields, factories and tanks
COPE THUNDER participants are organised into three separate forces. Red Forces consist of air·
borne and ground-based threats that simulate a hostile environment that must be penetrated and
attacked. Simulated air-to-air missiles and anti aircraft gun sites guard realistic tactical targets that look
like trains, airfields, factories and tanks from the air.
Blue Forces are those undergoing training and must survive attacks from ground controlled aircrafts
which follow combat patterns and techniques used by the Soviets. Red Airforce defences on the Crow
Valley range include simulated surface-ta-air missiles and anti aircraft gun sites colocated with
associated radars that emulate Soviet search and tracking radar characteristics. Radar and
communication jamming is tried by the incoming Blue Force.
The third force (the White Force) is engaged to monitor the exercise and score points in the
competition.
The scenario constructed at Crow Valley depicts an invasion of Soviet territory or else might be the
anticipated environment in a penetrating attack against North Korea.
Integrated force operations are stressed in the COPE THUNDER exercise. Later in the usually two­
week long programme comes a composite strike that integrates nearly all Red and Blue Forces. New
Zealand airmen practice fighting alongside United States forces in a simulated penetration into foreign,
hostile territory.
Military targets include an enemy airfield complete with mock aircraft in revetments, tanks and artillery.
Civilian targets include a train and factory.
Is this the kind of exercise New Zealand Forces should be engaged in or should the emphasis be
defence rather than strike? Should the New Zealand Ministry of Defence not question United States
preparedness to invade Soviet territory? Do the integrated force exercises commit New Zealand forces
to assist United States forces in a future invasion? These are questions that New Zealanders should be
addressing to the New Zealand Defence Ministry. K. Burgess.
-

(Sources� Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 1th, '83. Ministry of Defence
Annual Report, 182.)
 PEACE RltSEARCHER MONTHL Y IS A SUPPLEMENT to THE
NEW ZEALAND NUCLEAR FREE ZONE COMMITTEE
NEWSLETTER

p 0 Box 18-541 Christchurch

. .

, �,

Next Month * The UKUSA Agreement. An agreement too

secret for Prime Ministers to see. * The role of the United '.
States Air Force Military Airlift Command (MAC). \