Visit to Gaza

June 20-21, 2010

David H. Shinn

“One If by Land, Two If by Sea”

My entry into Gaza through the modern and highly secure Israeli
facility at Erez on Gaza’s northern border with Israel was uneventful as
compared to Paul Revere’s midnight ride in 1775 when two lanterns in the
steeple of the Old North Church in Boston signaled that the British were
arriving by sea. Nor did it have the drama surrounding the five vessel flotilla
destined for Gaza preceding my border crossing by land. Revere’s ride,
immortalized by poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, does, however, remind
us of troubled times in widely separated parts of the world during different
eras. This was my first visit to Gaza. As a result, the account that follows
certainly contains errors of omission and perhaps unwittingly some of co-
mission.

The Gaza Strip

The Gaza Strip is a narrow band of land about 45 kilometers long, 6

kilometers wide at its narrowest point and 13 kilometers wide at the widest
point. It constitutes 165 square kilometers, which makes it about the size of
Singapore or the tiny Sea of Galilee in northern Israel. Gaza is surrounded on
the north and east by Israel, on the southwest by Egypt and on the west by
the Mediterranean Sea. You can drive the length of Gaza in 45 minutes.
More than 1.5 million people live in this densely populated land. Until 1948,
Gaza was the administrative capital of a strip of land stretching from the
Palestinian border with Egypt to Ashdod in present day Israel. As Israel
expanded its territory in 1948, it stopped at the borders of Gaza which
became a sanctuary for some 200,000 to 250,000 Palestinian refugees
expelled from land that became part of Israel. In 1949, Egypt and Israel
signed an armistice establishing the current boundaries for Gaza. The
territory holds no religious significance for the Jewish people.

The Governance Situation

Hamas firmly controls Gaza while the party of Fatah, led by Palestinian
Authority (PA) president, Mahmoud Abbas, governs in the West Bank. Hamas
is an acronym for an organization that translates as the Islamic Resistance
Movement. Hamas developed in 1987 from the Muslim Brotherhood, a
 2

religious and political organization founded in Egypt. The senior Hamas

figure in Gaza today is Ismail Haniyeh, while its overall leader, Khaled Meshal,
resides in exile in Syria. In 2006, Hamas surprisingly won the Palestinian
general legislative elections, defeating Fatah and setting the stage for a
power struggle. In 2007, Hamas militarily routed remaining Fatah supporters
in Gaza, killing many and forcing others to flee to the West Bank. This led to
a de facto division of Gaza, led by Hamas, and the West Bank, led by the PA
with its headquarters in Ramallah.

Hamas combines Palestinian nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism.

Its founding charter commits Hamas to the destruction of Israel and the
replacement of the PA with an Islamist state on the West Bank and Gaza.
Hamas refuses to recognize the state of Israel, which precludes it from taking
part in any peace talks. Israel, the United States and the European Union
classify Hamas as a terrorist organization. But Hamas is also a powerful
political and social organization that has a reputation for eschewing
corruption, and it has proved that it can mobilize support in free elections.
Hamas funds schools, orphanages, mosques, clinics and sports leagues
throughout Gaza.

Recent Gaza-Israel Relations

Israel imposed sanctions against Gaza after Hamas won the 2006
Palestinian legislative elections and after Hamas subsequently captured an
Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, who presumably remains under Hamas control
although he has not been seen publicly. After Hamas defeated Fatah and
took complete control of Gaza in 2007, Israel then implemented an even
stricter embargo, with Egyptian support. Beginning early in its
administration, Hamas allowed (probably encouraged) the firing of poorly
targeted rockets into Israel. Other organizations also engaged in these
homemade rocket attacks. There was a six-month cease fire in 2008, but
Hamas called off the truce near the end of the year and resumed firing
rockets into Israel. Tel Aviv responded in late December with a massive
attack on Gaza by air and ground that lasted for three weeks, killed many
Palestinians and inflicted considerable damage. Rocket attacks from Gaza
into Israel have largely ended.

The tightened Israeli blockade has made it almost impossible to rebuild

the structures destroyed by Israel during its invasion in late 2008 and early
2009. For example, Israel destroyed Gaza’s main power plant and sewage
treatment plant. Power has been partially restored, but there are still
frequent outages. The sewage treatment plant has not been repaired and
raw sewage is spilling into Gaza’s northern shore, polluting an area where I
saw many Palestinians swimming. In an ambiguous announcement on 17
 3

June 2010, Israel said it would adjust its blockade policy and allow more
goods to enter Gaza.

Expectations versus Reality

I was not sure what to expect during this two day visit to Gaza,
especially in view of all the publicity following the failed flotilla episode. My
underlying expectations were that Gaza is an economic dead zone with
shortages of nearly everything and that Palestinians living in Gaza would be
overwhelmingly despondent. I also expected to encounter a heavy and
visible Hamas security presence. All three expectations were wide of the
mark.

What I found was bustling commercial activity based on trade through

the underground tunnels between Gaza’s southern border and Egypt and a
population that remains angry at its plight but is far from despondent. I
stayed in a first class hotel, the Al Deira in Gaza City, and ate in excellent
restaurants with varied menus. The Mediterranean beaches were crowded
from sunup until well after sundown with adults and children. Admittedly,
this tiny enclave where exit and entry for Palestinians is almost impossible
does not allow much else by way of recreation. I did see a few armed Hamas
security personal dressed in black fatigues. They were, however, neither
numerous nor did they seem to be engaged in any activity other than serving
on static guard duty. Hamas has reportedly made a major effort to take arms
from individual Palestinians, a development welcomed by most residents who
previously were subject to periodic celebratory shooting that resulted in the
death of innocent people. Before Hamas took power in Gaza, there was also
frequent family-based factionalism that ended in violence.

Small Gazan vessels continue to fish up to 3 miles off the coast. They
operate out of the tiny harbor at Gaza City and are easily visible off shore as
are the larger Israeli naval vessels that patrol regularly beyond the 3 mile
zone. The fishing industry has shrunk significantly because of its limited
access to the sea. If the small Gazan fishing vessels venture out more than 3
miles, the Israeli naval ships fire warning shots or, on occasion, directly at the
Gazan vessels.

Reactions to the Flotilla

Gazans were still buzzing about the flotilla during my visit. It is clear,
however, that the flotilla was largely a political stunt and not a humanitarian
aid mission. With the important exception of building materials and large
equipment, the flotilla was bringing little that is not already available in Gaza.
Israel’s mishandling of the situation was a propaganda bonanza for Gaza.
Residents of Gaza welcomed the flotilla because it focused attention on their
situation and showed that someone in the outside world cares about Gaza.
 4

There was particular appreciation for Turkey and a surge in demand for
Turkish flags, which one could see flying in Gaza.

There were several rocket attacks in May 2010 from Gaza into Israel
after the flotilla episode. They came to a quick end and Palestinians claim
that Hamas even captured and jailed the offenders. I have no way of
confirming this report. The fact that Israel did not retaliate suggests that it
understands these were renegade attacks opposed by Hamas.

The Tunnel System

A visit to the maze of tunnels along the Gaza-Egypt border was one of
the most fascinating stops. At this point, Gaza is about 13 kilometers wide
from the Mediterranean Sea to the Israeli border. Apparently the soil from
the shore of the Mediterranean for about five kilometers inland is too sandy
to build tunnels. They tend to cave in. Presumably, there is also a reluctance
to build tunnels close to the Israeli border. This would leave a band of
perhaps 5 kilometers that is a couple of hundred yards wide to build the
tunnel entrances and exits on the Gaza side. There are no obvious security
personnel in the tunnel exit/entry area and strangers can move around at
random.

In Gaza, most of the openings are covered by tents or more permanent

structures. The tunnels extend under the Egyptian wall along the border for
a distance of up to 1 kilometer before they open again on the Egyptian side.
They descend up to a depth of 20 meters. I saw one that went straight down
for 12 meters and then made a right angle turn towards the Egyptian border.
I was told there are currently about 3,000 active tunnels, although eyeballing
the small area in which they are concentrated suggests that estimate may be
too high. Perhaps each opening has multiple tunnels that increase the
number. It is also not clear what qualifies as a tunnel. Some of them
reportedly consist of nothing more than a pipe to carry fuel, which is very
cheap in Egypt and remains reasonably priced in Gaza. I was also told that
the tunnels, which are owned by individual families and operate like a crime
syndicate, are licensed by Hamas and the goods taxed by Hamas. According
to one estimate, the tunnels employ directly or indirectly some 40,000
persons. That figure seems much too high. Several Palestinians said that
one or more tunnels is/are large enough to drive a car through. It is very
dangerous to work in the tunnels. They cave in regularly and the Israelis
occasionally bomb the system.

Most of the goods in Gaza today come through the tunnels. Consumer
goods and food products are widely available. Most of them are from China
and Egypt. There are serious shortages of building products and heavy
equipment. As a result, most of the structures bombed by Israel during the
 5

brief war in 2008-2009 have not been rebuilt. On the other hand, virtually all
the rubble has been removed and there is vacant space where buildings once
stood. The tunnel system does have one huge downside. They drive up the
cost of the goods available to residents of Gaza. Consequently, poorer
Gazans, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population, can not
afford anything other than essentials.

The tunnel system could not operate without the connivance of

Egyptian officials on their side of the border. Since Egypt’s official policy is to
support the Israeli blockade, the assumption is that bribes to Egyptian
officials allows the system to function. The U.S. reportedly helped finance a
scheme to drive steel plates 30 meters deep (below this level it is very
difficult to dig a tunnel) along that part of the Gaza-Egypt border where
tunnels exist. It is proving to be an expensive failure. For about $5,000, the
Palestinians can cut through the steel plate and continue with their tunneling.
There is so much money to be made in the tunnel economy, that $5,000 is no
obstacle at all. According to one account, the United States has suspended
financing of this project.

Where Does the Money Come From to Support This Economy?

In view of the Israeli blockade, virtually no functioning industry and

very little agriculture, the question arises as to the source of funds for the
Gazan economy. Most of it seems to come from the following:

• The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian
refugees in the Near East operates the health and education sector
for many Palestinians in Gaza and employs a large number of people.
I observed UNRWA-financed outings for Palestinian children along the
unpolluted southern beach.

• The European Union continues to pay the salaries of those former

Fatah civil servants in Gaza who lost their jobs after Hamas took
power.

• Some countries have foreign aid projects in Gaza.

• Remittances from Palestinian relatives contribute to the economy.

• Iran reportedly provides some grants to Hamas.

Israeli Settlements in Gaza

In August 2005, Israel forcibly evacuated all remaining settlers living in

the Gaza Strip. At the peak there were less than 8,000 Israeli settlers in
Gaza, but they occupied some key real estate and the secure roads
 6

supporting their exit to and entry from Israel severely complicated the
movement of the 1.5 million Palestinians who shared this congested land.
The closure of the settlements has significantly improved internal mobility
and the lifestyle of the Palestinians. They no longer have to contend with
Israeli security personnel inside Gaza who were there for the purpose of
protecting the settlers. According to the Palestinians, Israel concluded that
the small number of settlers living in Gaza posed excessive security expenses
and presented an untenable long-term situation. Some Gazans argue that
the periodic rocket attacks from within Gaza into Israeli settlements in Gaza
drove them out. The truth is probably somewhere in between. Israel
bulldozed the settlements to the ground. Hamas has made use of very little
of these leveled settlement spaces. In those cases where the land was once
owned by Palestinian families, it has not yet been returned.

The Rafah Border Crossing

I was able to tour the border crossing at Rafah from Gaza into Egypt.
Egypt had recently reopened the border although it had already closed to
movement of persons at the time of my visit. The security emplacements are
simple on the Gaza side, more impressive on the Egyptian side. The actual
crossing covers a surprisingly large land area. Hamas security personnel
control the Gaza side while Egyptian troops are in charge on their side.
Because there was no movement of people at the time of my visit, the Hamas
guards were bored and pleased to take the time to show a visitor how the
crossing worked.

Gaza and the International Community

Gaza continues to struggle with its international ties. Because it is on

the terrorist list of the United States and European Union, contact with these
countries is out of the question. Nor does it have very many friends in the
Arab world. Its only neighbor other than Israel is Egypt. Because Hamas’
ideological ties are with the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, an opposition group
that is anathema to President Mubarak, relations between Egypt and Hamas
remain cool. Egypt also sees Gaza as an Israeli-created problem and is not
especially anxious to assume responsibility for an issue that was not of its
making. This is understandable as concerns the movement of Palestinians
from Gaza through Egypt. It is less clear, however, why Egypt does not want
to benefit more from commerce passing legally across the Gaza-Egypt border
rather than surreptitiously through the tunnel system. Open trade would
seem to work to the advantage of both Egypt and Gaza. It is also possible
that Egypt is keeping the border closed in response to pressure from Israel.
The Egyptian announcement following the flotilla incident that it had
reopened the Rafah border has had limited impact. The Rafah crossing is
 7

only open to a small number of people each day. No commerce is passing

through Rafah.

Hamas, comprised of Sunni Muslims, has developed close relations

with Shia Iran. Ideologically, the two entities have nothing in common; this
appears to be a marriage of convenience. Nor does Hamas have anything in
common ideologically with Wahabbi Saudi Arabia. Hamas does have good
links with Syria, Sudan, Qatar and recently Turkey.

Higher Education in Gaza

The primary purpose of my visit to Gaza was to lecture on the brain

drain and the Nile water question at Al-Azhar University in Gaza City.
Consequently, I will offer a few comments on the state of higher education in
Gaza.

Al-Azhar University is affiliated with Fatah. Pictures of Yasser Arafat

still hang on the wall. Established in 1991, it has an undergraduate
enrollment of 18,000 and about 300 students at the MA level. It has 12
faculties and an association with Cairo University. Most classes are taught in
Arabic, although the science faculties are often taught in English. All the
teaching staff is Palestinian from Gaza. It has a department of desalinization,
a medical institute, a pharmacy program, and a respected water research
center. It does not have a strong academic reputation. Graduates have huge
problems finding employment. One exception is the small number of
graduates in agriculture.

The Hamas-affiliated Islamic University of Gaza has the best academic

reputation in the Gaza Strip. It enrolls 19,000 undergraduates and 1,000 MA
students. It has 10 faculties at the BA and MA level: medicine, engineering,
information technology, science, nursing, commerce, education, art, sharia
and law. Education is based on religious doctrine. It has the most rigorous
academic program, the best students and the best faculty, a number of
whom are former Fulbright scholars. Because of the Islamic University links
with Hamas, the United States has no engagement with the institution.

Established in 2000, Al-Aqsa University has about 16,000

undergraduates. In 2009, it became embroiled in a power struggle involving
Fatah, Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).
The PA in Ramallah briefly closed the university. It reopened in the fall of
2009, apparently under a committee formed by the National and Islamic
Forces on the initiative of the PFLP. Al Aqsa has two campuses—one in Gaza
City and one in southern Gaza at Khan Younis City on land formerly occupied
by Israeli settlers. It has 7 faculties: arts, science, education, media, fine
arts, physical education and administration and financial studies. The quality
of education is considered to be poor.
 8

The University College of Applied Sciences has about 6,000

undergraduate students. It offers 40 majors and was started by professors
from the Islamic University. The focus is on technical education. It
reportedly has high standards.

The newest institution of higher learning is Palestine University, a

private school. It only has 400 to 500 students and is struggling to obtain
accreditation.

Al-Quds Open University offers long distance education from outside

Gaza to some 60,000 students in both Gaza and the West Bank at 24
different centers. Most of its students failed to obtain admittance to one of
the other universities.

Some of the Key Problems Facing Gaza

The fact that Gaza is in better shape than I expected, does not mean it
is doing well. The problems are enormous and include the following:

• There is a severe shortage of meaningful employment.

• Key infrastructure such as the destroyed power plant, sewage

treatment plant, parliament, government buildings, police stations and
other facilities has not been replaced.

• All fresh water in Gaza comes from an underground aquifer that is

declining in quantity and quality. It is becoming increasingly saline
and Gaza can not afford expensive desalinization equipment.

• The Israeli blockade poses daily hardships. Although Gaza is able to

import many of its needs through the tunnel system, the prices of
goods are high.

• The people of Gaza are isolated in this small strip of territory. It is

exceedingly difficult to leave or return.

• Hamas has removed most Fatah supporters from paid positions and
replaced them with individuals loyal to Hamas. This has had some
negative effects such as a loss of competency at one of the leading
hospitals.

The Future of Gaza

In spite of the terrible state of relations between Israel and Gaza, I find
it easier to be optimistic about a solution to their differences than a solution
of the West Bank situation. The existence of the ubiquitous Israeli
settlements and their security satrapy on the West Bank do not make it
 9

possible for me to envisage creation of a viable, independent Palestinian

state in the West Bank anytime in the foreseeable future.

The situation in Gaza is very different. While current political relations

between Hamas and Israel are much worse than they are in the case of the
PA and Israel, the practical issues are much more amenable to solution. Gaza
has well defined and generally accepted borders with Israel. There are no
longer any Israeli settlements in Gaza. Hamas clearly controls all the
territory in Gaza. In the West Bank, the PA only controls the cities while Israel
controls large chunks of the rest of the territory.

If Hamas could end its stated goal of the destruction of Israel, agree to
accept the existence of Israel and return the captured Israeli soldier, the way
would seem to be open for reaching an understanding with Tel Aviv. The two
entities do not have to like each other; they only need to co-exist. Israel
would have to end its blockade of Gaza, permit infrastructure such as Gaza’s
international airport (destroyed by Israel circa 2001 and then again in 2009)
to reopen and allow Gaza complete and free access along the Mediterranean
coast. A particularly difficult issue for Israel would be Gaza’s desire to build
up its military capacity. But it should be possible to resolve even this issue.

This may be naïve, wishful thinking by a specialist on Africa, not the

Middle East. But as compared to the challenges in reaching a solution for the
West Bank, Gaza looks positively soluble.
10