AGENT'S ACTIVIry SUMMARY control Number

oo2g-2007 -crD1 g2

TIME. DATE. AND AGENT SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

712007 08:30 OR INVESTIGATION: At 0830, 7 Dec 07, SpecialAgent

BASIS FQII

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Anti-terrorism Officer, Fort Devens reporting that he had been advised
g e'd
that a listing of 382nd MP BN equipment was listed on Wikileaks.org,
and he requested advise on who would be the appropriate Law
Enforcement agency.

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Security Manager, 655th Regional Support Group was contacted by a
unit member who reported finding a very detailed listing of 382nd MP BN
equipment on Wkileaks.org. The specific link address was identified as:
http;/ oro/wiki/HHD 382 MP BN %28WRBUAA%29
the unit Chain of Command as well as SFC
RRC Command Security Manager, who in turned
ouidance on which Law Enforcemen
Agency/Military
also reouested to know if the incident could be incorporated into-hls
OPSEC briefing.

The undersigned advisec tttrf

that I would reach out to West
Point CID with this informationJo see if the Active Duty CID as a plan for
such incidents. Advised him I do know at this moment, who should be
tracking down the website to determine who and why posted, and
specifically who would have investigative responsibility, but that it could
by 902nd Military Intelligence (Ml), he West Point CID Office, or
possibly the JTTF or a MA fusion cell. Advised that I would like to hear
what 902nd Ml Unit thinks. who were also provided the details bv Mr
I Regarding the inclusion in the oPbEC briefing, advisedMr
that I strongly support it's inclusion and I was under the
Ilffi-or-ession that such incidents and/or on similar events are part of the
annual OPSEC briefings (lE: unauthorized releases of unit
rosters/phone books, failure to shred records which identity unit strength
and types of
equipment, etc.)

Subsequently at 1245,7 Dec A7 ,

Special
Agent-in-Charge, West Point CID Office, \ 996, advised
thru a global emailthat he had briefed Mr. Washington
District Operation Officer, and it is there opinion ts an
OPSEC issue and therefore the investigative responsibility lines with
902nd Ml. He advised his office can assist should M.l. require it;
however, he did not plan on initiating any investigation on the matter as
of this time.

At 1715,7 Dec 07, the undersigned received r!:reilstring from Mr

Iwnich reflected that Mr Senior Force
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ProtecTron PRl.
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I R l, M C O IFNETTO,TM-OI o rt h E a st R e g o n
MCOI i ;

Current Operations, 57 Patch Rogd-E!-I{g11S-Virginia 23651 had

rorwarded the fottowins Lr'"iiiJ-fl ii,i.fiprr cipsrc
Analyst
HQDA DAMO-ODI (ctr), (U) 703-614-6558:

Apparently one of our assistant security managers at Ft Devens

chanced upon a British website which has placed the entire joint service
TDA & TO&E's for the lraq and Afghanistan theaters on their website:
AGENT'S ACTIVITY SUMMARY Control Number OO2g_2007 _ClD1g2

TIME, DATE, AND AGENT SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

http://www 382 MP BN %28WR8UAA%29

I feel certain someone in DoD already knows about this, but, we're not
sure nor are we sure of the validity of the documents themselves.
However, they are darn sure convincing. Hence we are reporting this to
you so you might inform the DA OPSEC POC of this information and
have them investigate.

yrlforwarded the information to the Jolnt oPSEC Support

Ce n-Ter Toi-action s deemed appropriate.

Based on above initiated TAB#13. No action is required by this office,

however I would like to follow-up with 902ND Ml before closing TAB.

Discussed this mater with England

I
12t17 t2007 13.20

0:15 |
Resident Office, 902nd Ml Group,-Ff Devens. Sl
maintained that he had attempted to follow-up by ng IF-e lists of
equipment from the unit, which was pending. His initial position is that
none of the equipment was sensitive and therefore not releasable. he
agreed that it probably should not be a website, but it is an issue that his
office will not further pursue.

Based on this discussion this TAB is closed