CHI MING TSOI, petitioner VS. C.A.

& GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents

January 17, 1997

FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao were married on May 22, 1988. Until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual contact between them. Hence, Gina (wife) filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. Medical examinations showed that the wife was healthy,
normal and still a virgin, while the husband was found to be capable of having sexual intercourse
since he was not impotent.

The wife claimed that her husband was impotent, and was a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis and since he was using his mother’s eyebrow pencil and cleansing cream. She
also claimed that her husband married her, a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. On
the other hand, the husband claimed that it was his wife who was psychologically incapacitated
to perform basic marital obligations. He asserts that his wife avoided him whenever he wants to
have sexual intercourse with her. He further claimed that his wife filed the case because she was
afraid that she would be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and that he might
consummate their marriage. He also insisted that their marriage would remain valid because they
are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.

The trial court declared their marriage void on account of psychological incapacity of the
husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the
procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

RULING:
Yes. The prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the procreation of
children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, the Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. The husband’s senseless
and protracted refusal to fulfill his marital obligations is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to “procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. Decision affirmed and petition denied for lack of merit.

SANTOS v. CA
-240 SCRA 20-
January 4, 1995
FACTS:
Leouel first met Julia in Iloilo City. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day
for both of them for they got married on September 20, 1986. Leouel and Julia lived
with the latter’s parents. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to
happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia’s parents into
the young spouses’ family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a
“quarrel” over a number of things like when and where the couple should start
living independently from Julia’s parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel’s spending a few days with his own parents.

On May 18, 1988, Julia finally left for the U.S. to work as a nurse despite his
husband’s pleas to so dissuade her. Seven month’s after her departure, Julia called
Leouel for the first time. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her
contract but she never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the U.S., where he
underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with Julia, but
all his efforts were of no avail.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly
show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.

RULING:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.

The use of the phrase “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Code has
not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity and like circumstances. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus, correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have
sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code, which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be “legitimate.”

The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with

expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL

OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents
February 13, 1997

FACTS:
On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a
son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a
husband and a father as he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends, depended on
his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitute psychological incapacity?

RULING:
There is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations

Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise

constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability.

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.

(3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095
of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

FERRARIS V. FERRARIS
17 July 2006
FACTS:
This is a resolution of the Supreme Court on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
petitioner regarding the dismissal of her petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to the
respondent.

ISSUE:
How shall psychological incapacity be proven?
RULING:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. 13
As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated
with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.

Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner’s evidence showed that respondent’s
alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some
deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple’s
relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so)
was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented
with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner’s own reckoning, respondent
was a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner started
doubting respondent’s fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from
women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-
called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner’s lack of trust in him and
her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to her
anger, temper and jealousy.

At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a
mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type."
In fact, Dr. Dayan’s statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is
dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of
theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan’s information that respondent had extramarital affairs
was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent’s
alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan’s answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She
replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was a
history of respondent’s parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the
supposed problematic history of respondent’s parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr.
Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling factor" on the
part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondent’s character that effectively
incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations.

We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude

whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates
than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

While petitioner’s marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void
marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the
family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. Petition dismissed
with finality.

Antonio v. Reyes
10 March 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void.
He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the
time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner
claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and
instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only
confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it
from other sources after their marriage.
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape
and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo
Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in
psychology, when she was neither.
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold
Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever
witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she
postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her
honor and even presented an invitation to that effect but petitioner discovered per
certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken
place.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those
names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting
her as the “number one moneymaker” in the commercial industry worth P2 million.
Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent
the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. He likewise
realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination
when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her
payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set
from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture
dealer. She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money
from other people on false pretexts.
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his
officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation
but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November
1991.

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr.
Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist,
who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a
normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they
observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was
abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based
on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that respondent’s extreme
jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no
actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another
woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that
respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of
health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly established.
According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made
her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning
and significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of psychological incapacity as to
render the marriage null and void

RULING:
“It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false
pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they
indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at
least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on
respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her
mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to
understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person
unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning,
and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One
unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or
emotional commitments.

“From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s
condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite
grave. But the requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be
divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical
averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was
curable or incurable.
“From the totality of the evidence, however, we are sufficiently convinced that the
incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the
petitioner.

RP V. IYOY
21 Sept. 2005

FACTS:
After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was
"hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the
United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest
then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after
Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that
he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in
1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children,
that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In
1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu
Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because
he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused
him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of
their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child,
Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American
family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her
American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr.,
Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada
Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left
and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of
reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint
that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and
72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Should the marriage be declared void under Art. 36?

RULING:
The evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave
mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of
marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill
will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also
do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.
Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed
respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and
extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an
American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American
surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with
her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If
the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily
established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither
could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor
that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling
in Marcos v. Marcos, respondent Crasus must still have complied with the
requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina that the root
cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. No
less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.

SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO

-October 4, 2004-
FACTS:
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco and respondent Manuel were married at civil
rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on August 11 1973. After
discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to
adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy. On 25 September 1997, or after
twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the
declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner
Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over
domineering and selfish attitude towards him. In her Answer, petitioner Juanita
alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home in
Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be
free to marry his paramour. The trial court denied respondent Manuel’s petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita. The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia
finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not both Manuel and Juanita are psychologically incapacitated.

RULING:
The presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s
lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts
and her controlling nature, and her inability to endear herself to his parents are
grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these “defects” were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. In fact,
the psychiatrist reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply
with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.

The psychological report of respondent Manuel’s witness, Dr. Garcia, showed that
the root cause of petitioner Juanita’s behavior is traceable – not from the inception
of their marriage as required by law – but from her experiences during the
marriage, e.g., her in-laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the
priesthood, her husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him, and her inability
to conceive.

An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing
of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court is reinstated and given full force and effect.

RP V. HAMANO
MAY 20, 2004

FACTS:
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese
national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that in
October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They
later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and
stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.

On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of
the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their
marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two
months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but
he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that
Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.

ISSUE:
Is abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological incapacity?

RULING:
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to
be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no
need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s
case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness.
This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There
was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the
context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere
fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the
marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a
person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not
apply here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband
being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find
no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient
in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and
clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of
studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

MACARRUBO V. MACARUBBO
27 FEBRUARY 2004

FACTS:
Complainant averred that respondent, a member of the bar, started courting her in
April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted
marriage which was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J.
Bolivar, the first on December 18, 1991 in the latter's Manila office, and the second
on December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and
that although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June
16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his
previous marriage was void. Complainant further averred that respondent entered
into a third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned
complainant and their children without providing them any regular support up to
the present time, leaving them in precarious living conditions.

Respondent denied employing deception in his marriage to complainant, insisting

instead that complainant was fully aware of his prior subsisting marriage to Helen
Esparza, but that she dragged him against his will to a "sham wedding" to protect
her and her family's reputation since she was then three-months pregnant.
Respondent submitted in evidence the final and executory October 30, 2000
Decision of Branch IV of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City in Civil
Case No. 5617, "Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Florence J. Teves," declaring his
marriage to complainant void ab initio. He drew attention to the trial court's findings
on the basis of his evidence which was not controverted, that the marriage was
indeed "a sham and make believe" one, "vitiated by fraud, deceit, force and
intimidation, and further exacerbated by the existence of a legal impediment" and
want of a valid marriage license. Respondent also submitted a certification from the
National Statistics Office that complainant's name does not appear in the National
Index of Marriages for Bride; another certification from the National Statistics Office-
Office of Civil Registrar General that it has no record of the December 28, 1991
marriage of complainant and respondent; and an attestation from the Office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite that Marriage License No. Municipal Civil
Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite that Marriage License No. 772176221 which was used in
complainant and respondent's marriage is not on file in its records.

Admitting having sired complainant's two children, Juris Alexis and Gabriel Enrico,
respondent denied ever abandoning them. Respondent claimed that he left
complainant and their two children with her consent after explaining to her that the
pain and shame of living in sin and ridicule was unbearable. In both his marriages to
his first wife and to complainant, respondent claimed that he was made to enter
into the marital union against his will.

ISSUE:
Is a “sham” marriage a null and void one?

RULING:
That claim is an affront to the intelligence of the members of this Court to
distinguish fact from fiction, reality from fantasy. It is not easy to believe that a
lawyer like respondent could easily be cowered to enter into any marriage. One
incident of a "shotgun marriage" is believable, but two such in succession would tax
one's credulity. And then, there is a third marriage to Josephine T. Constantino
which is again the subject of another annulment case. It would not come as a
surprise if in that pending case, he would again put blame on his third wife in order
to send the marriage to oblivion.

Respondent here has exhibited the vice of entering into multiple marriages and
then leaving them behind by the mere expedient of resorting to legal remedies to
sever them. The impact of respondent's conduct is incalculable upon his ex-wives as
well as the children he had by them, their lives having been dislocated beyond
recall. Respondent's assertion that he has not failed to support his children by
complainant is not totally supported by the evidence on record. He may have
secured educational plans for them and doled out some sums of money in the past,
but it appears that he has failed to provide them regular, monthly support. In fact,
he admitted that even before he left complainant's residence in 1995, he was only
giving intermittent support to his children with her.
Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage
and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for
the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. This must be
checked if not stopped.

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such,
including that which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality

and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show
satisfactory evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that
he is supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his two children
by complainant. Let respondent's name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. CA & SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL, respondents

January 29, 2004

FACTS:
David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996 and May 20,
1967 in a civil and church wedding, respectively. They had four children. David
instituted a case for the nullity of their marriage on account of Sharon’s
psychological incapacity to perform basic marital obligations. He claimed that
Sharon had extra-marital affairs with several men including a dentist in the AFP, a
lieutenant in the Preisdential Security Command, and a Jordanian national. Despite
the treatment by a clinical psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship
with the Jordanian, whom she married and with whom she had two children. When
the Jordanian national left the country, Sharon returned to David bringing along her
two children by the Jordanian national. David accepted her back and even
considered the illegitimate children as his own. However, Sharon abandoned David
to join the Jordanian national with her two children. Since then, Sharon would only
return to the country on special occasions.

Dra. Natividad Dayan testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of

David and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who
wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best
in whatever he does. On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that Sharon was
suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of
infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse,
even bringing with her the two children of the Jordanian to live with David. Such
immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of
infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of the said disorder
amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.

The trial court declared their marriage null and void on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of Sharon to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
While the Court of Appeals set aside the trial court’s judgement and ordered the
dismissal of the petition. David’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, he
appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sharon’s infidelity is equivalent to psychologically incapacity.

RULING:
No. Sharon’s infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically incapacity.
As held in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, “psychological incapacity” should refer to no
less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which as so expressed in Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. The law intended to confine the meaning
of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.

Sharon’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves

constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality, which make the respondent completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity or sexual promiscuity.

At best, the circumstances relied upon by David are grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code not for declaring a marriage void. The grounds
for legal separation, which need not be rooted in psychological incapacity, include
physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. Decision affirmed. Petition
denied.

REPUBLIC vs. DAGDAG

351 SCRA 425
FACTS:
Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag contracted marriage on September 7, 1975. They begot two
children. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He
would from time to time, disappear and suddenly reappear for a few months. He was always
drunk and would forced his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and inflict physical injuries on
her if she refused.

On October 1993, he left his family and was never heard from him again. Erlinda was forced to
work and learned that Avelino was imprisoned and that he escaped from jail.

Erlinda filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds of psychological
incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication. Upon trial,
Erlinda presented Virginia Dagdag who attested to the psychological incapacity of Avelino. The
trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent without waiting for the prosecutor’s
manifestation. The Court of Appeals affirmed trials’ court decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated?

RULING:
The court contented that Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the
root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband.

Furthermore, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently
proven. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present
controversy evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered.

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent

April 17, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on
board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got
married on 03 March 1975. They did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college
and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a
month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in
Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally
resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could
stay together – when respondent was on vacation.

It started in 1988 that respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to

perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and
irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker,
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal. Two months later,
petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change.
But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage invoking psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the psychological incapacity is present in this case.

RULING:
The phrase “psychological incapacity,” borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision
in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept
has escaped jurisprudential attention. At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her
allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity
on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a
declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her,
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates
with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that
relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law
has not quite given up, neither should we.

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent

October 19, 2000

FACTS:
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five
children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family
and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment. Brenda filed a case for the
nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage
null and void under Article 36 which was however reversed by the CA.

ISSUES:
1. Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a
physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological
incapacity.

RULING:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however
that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a
conditio sine qua non for such declaration.

Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide

material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his
job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was
during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and
moral support, and even left the family home.

Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the
guidelines outlined in Molina.