July13, 2009

Barrack Obama, President

United States of America
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC. 20500

The Justice League investigations Unit

Bobby Worthy, Founder
C/O P O Box 152
Blackshear GA 31557
Email: justiceleagueunited@yahoo.com

RE: U.S. vs. John Bacon Case Number: 09-CR-30101-MJR-03

Dear President Obama: I am writing you in regards with the above listed case, on behalf of One
John Bacon; Julius Jackson; and Joseph Addison, I would like to have criminal charges brought
against individual below for “Treason” and Violation of their Oath of Office;

COMPLAINT OF JUDICAL MISCONDUCT & CONSPIRACY

Charge of Treason and

Misprision of Treason By
Federal Judges Clifford J. Proud;
Donald G. Wilkerson and
Michael J. Reagan
Southern District of Illinois

On 6th day of July 2009 Judge Clifford J. Proud alone with Carole Schmitt, USDA officer;
Jennifer Hudson; conspired to illegally imprison one John Bacon; Julius Jackson; William Berry;
Derrick Courtland; and Joseph Addison in Conspiracy under U S Title 18, § 371, please explain
to me how is dog fighting conspiracy or defrauding the United States? The United States vs.
Lopez case decide where congress delegated jurisdiction to the federal Government; also the 10th
amendment clearly establishes their jurisdiction, thus making it a crime when they act without
authority. On August 14th 2009 Judge Donald G. Wilkerson presided over the indictment where
he lack exclusive jurisdiction. On September 10th 2009 Judge Reagan Denied John Bacons
“Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Territorial Jurisdiction, on the Grounds that he had a Attorney
without any consideration on the merits of the Motion, Judge Reagan stated he has jurisdiction
everywhere, this is not in accordance with the supreme law of the land. Also John Bacon had
fired his Attorney on August 26th 2009, thus making Bacons Motion legal and in the bounds of
the law. Judge Reagan is acting without authority and out of his jurisdiction, thus making it a
Federal crime. On September 29th 2009 Judge Reagan tried to give , one John Bacon 21 one
more days to see if he could work things out with my lawyer. He then granted Mr. Bacons
Lawyers motion to withdraw as counsel, first of all how can he grant this Motion for Mr. Bacon
Attorney, when he was already fired. Also Judge Reagan state that Mr. Bacon was firing a Good
Lawyer, that he use to be his boss, that he use to work for him, that’s he was the one that taught
him everything he knows, thus making this a conflict of interest. Also Judge Reagan state that
Mr. Bacon must not have herd of Michael Vick, that he has more money than Mr. Bacon do, so
what makes Mr. Bacon think he can beat these charges, when he could not. Also he told Mr.
Bacon about this guy that tried to represent himself in his court room and he gave him 20 years.
Mr. Bacon take that as a treat and fear for his well being, these Judges have become above the
law and can due and say what they want and get away with it, that’s not fair, the law is suppose
to be equal and fair for all, the constitution is suppose to be the governing law of the land, Justice
has become blind and the laws only apply to certain people. The Constitution was written to
protect the people from the Government, but it’s the opposite, it protects the Government. These
judges along with others have committed numerous crimes against Mr. Bacon and other as well
as treason to this country. Also the Court illegally put each one of us on probation as a condition
of our a bond, thus making this illegal as well, the government has no jurisdiction over Mr.
Bacon until he has been convicted, Mr. Bacon is innocent until proven guilty. Unless the
Government is above and better then the supreme law of the land. See supporting facts below:

I am filing this communication addressed to the President of the United States pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. 2382 to report the treasonous acts, neglect of his legal and statutory duty,
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of Federal Judge Michael J. Reagan,
who has violated the U.S. Constitution and its Amendments, and who has conspired with
others to violate the U.S. Constitution. Further, Judge Reagan has engaged in acts of
corruption and has engaged in the crime of defrauding the United States government.

In Congress, July 4, 1776 A Declaration, by the Representatives of the United States of

America, "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by the Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among are Life,
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness---That to secure these Rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed that
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of
the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government----.
 BACKGROUND

Title 18 Section 2382, Misprision of treason, states that:

“Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having knowledge of
the commission of any treason against them, conceals and does not, as
soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to the President or to
some judge of the United States, or to the governor or to some judge or
justice of a particular State, is guilty of misprision of treason and shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both.”

For over one hundred and fifty years the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly and
consistently held that judges who act without jurisdiction are engaged in treason.

"We [Judges] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which
is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would
be treason to the Constitution." [clarification added]”. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S.
200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 W heat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821).
As recently as April 23, 2001, a panel of judges of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
which included Federal Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, stated that:

“Napoleon at his coronation took the imperial crown out of the hands of the
Pope and crowned himself. Federal judges do not have a similar prerogative. A court
that does not have jurisdiction cannot assume it, however worthy the cause.” Case No. 00-4267,
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of: William Mack Price,
et al.

Yet, in spite of repeated decisions by courts, judges when they have no jurisdiction,
have no authority to hear or rule in a matter and that such an act violates the U.S.
Constitution, judges continue to engage in acts which are treason to the Constitution.

Judge Reagan is one of these judges.

Under Illinois law, the Illinois Supreme Court has held in Brown v. VanKeuren, 340 Ill.
118, 122 (1930), and repeatedly in other cases citing this case, that:

"The petition required to put the court in motion and give it jurisdiction must
be in conformity with the statute granting the right and must show all the
facts necessary to authorize it to act, -i.e., it must contain all the statements
which the statute says the petition shall state, - and if the petition fails to
contain all of these essential elements the court is without jurisdiction."

"Where a court is exercising special statutory jurisdiction the record must

show upon its face that the case is one where the courts have authority to
act. Before a decree can have vitality the court must have jurisdiction not
only of the person but of the subject matter."
 "Whatever the rank of the court exercising a special statutory jurisdiction, it
is governed by the same rules as courts of limited jurisdiction."

and In re Gebis, 186 Ill.2d 188 (1999), the Illinois Supreme Court recently stated that:

“When the circuit court’s power to act is controlled by statute, the circuit
court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction and must proceed within
the statute’s strictures. M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 66. Any action taken by the
circuit court that exceeds its jurisdiction is void and may be attacked at any
time. In re Estate of Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1994).”

Federal Judge Reagan not only irreparably harmed litigants but also
irreparably harmed the judicial branch of the United States government and attempted
to harm the U. S. Constitution.

The Supreme Law of the Land holds that:

"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the
law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the
government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and
are bound to obey it." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894
(1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687-88
(1974); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220, 1 S .Ct. 249, 26 1 (1862);
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).

Judge Reagan has placed himself above the law in which he took a sworn oath to
uphold.

Where a judge has a duty, he has no discretion. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 412
(7th Cir. 1972), 1972), citing Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat (22 U.S.) 738,
866, 6 L. Ed 204 (1824); U.S. v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1991).

The Littleton court stated:

"Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When
they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a
discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law, and,
when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it. Judicial power
is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge;
always for the purpose of giving effect t to the will of the legislature; or, in
other words, to the will of the law." [Emphasis in Littleton decision].
 DEFRAUDING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

Under Article VI, clause 3, of the U.S. Constitution, every judge has taken an oath to
support the U.S. Constitution. Whenever any judge violates the Constitution in the course
of performing his/her duties, then that judge is acting without lawful authority, has
defrauded not only the Defendant or the Plaintiff involved, but has also defrauded the
government.

A judge is paid to support the U.S. Constitution and the U.S. Government and has taken
an oath to so do. By not supporting the Constitution, the judge is collecting monies for
work not performed.

Under the Constitution and its Amendments, a judge only has the lawful authority to
represent the government with the government’s lawful operations. A judge has no lawful
authority to represent the government when the government has no lawful authority to act.
Should a judge act without lawful authority and accept and deposit payment from the
government for his personal acts (any act performed without lawful authority), then the
judge is defrauding the government. It is a crime for a judge to accept and deposit monies
paid by the government for the judge’s personal activities.

A person who acts, not in conformance with the law, but beyond its limits, is performing a
personal act. By accepting government compensation fo r such act(s), he/she is
attempting to give color of legitimacy to such act(s). However, no person has even a color
of authority so to do. Without legitimacy, the act(s) presuming authority are fraudulent and
the compensation are an illegitimate act compounding the fraud.

Under the principal of law established in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct.
1683, 1687 (1974), when a Federal judge acts in a manner in violation of the Federal
Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he
is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his
person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The government has no power to
impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United
States.” [Emphasis in original].

There is no judicial immunity available for a judge when he engages in a criminal act.
Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962). Acting
without jurisdiction is both a criminal and a treasonous act.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT, LAW & LEGAL DEFINITION

The Interstate Commerce Act was passed by U.S. Congress in 1887; this created the
Interstate Commerce Commission. It was designed to address the concerns about the
monopoly of railroads in existence at the time. It was a law that established the right of
Congress to regulate private corporations engaged in interstate commerce. Interstate
 Commerce refers to the purchase, sale or exchange of commodities, transportation of
people, money or goods.

The Constitution does not establish the Federal government as the territorial legal authority over
us, but rather it establishes the federal government as the legal authority around us and between
us. The State governments remain as the representative of the sovereign (We the People) and
retain their territorial jurisdiction over their own citizens and own affairs. The Federal
government is given authority by the Constitution over affairs with foreign countries (around us),
and over interstate commerce (between us), but not directly over us.

The Constitution, of course, gives the federal government complete authority over all foreign
affairs and foreign persons in America. Article 1, Section 8, Clauses 3 and 4 of the Constitution
grant powers to the federal government over foreign affairs, agreements, and persons; and
Article I, Section 10, Clauses 1, 2 and 3 of the Constitution prohibit the States from enacting
agreements with foreign entities.

Additionally, the Federal government is the territorial authority in the U.S. territories and
possessions, where it is the authority over the people in those places, but not in the fifty states.

And what does the Supreme Court say about Federal jurisdiction?

"The laws of Congress in respect to those matters {outside of Constitutionally delegated powers}
do not extend into the territorial limits of the States, but have force only in the District of
Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government.
Constitutional restrictions and limitations were not applicable to the areas of land, enclaves,
territories and possession over which Congress had exclusive legislative authority" [Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 US 244]

"Special provision is made in the Constitution for the cession of jurisdiction from the States over
places where the Federal government shall establish forts or other military works. And it is in
these places, or in territories of the United States, where it can exercise a general jurisdiction."
[New Orleans v. United States, 35 US (10 Pet.) 662 (1836)]

"The federal government has nothing approaching a police power" United States v. Lopez
"Special provision is made in the Constitution for the cession of jurisdiction from the states over
places where the federal government shall establish forts or other military works. And it is only
in these places, or in territories of the United States, where it can exercise a general jurisdiction"
[New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836)]

"All legislation is prima facie territorial" [American Banana Co. v. U.S. Fruit, 213, U.S. 347 at
357-358] "There is a canon of legislative construction which teaches Congress that, unless a
contrary intent appears [legislation] is meant to apply only within territorial jurisdiction of the
United States." [U.S. v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 at 222] "the United States never held any municipal
sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in Alabama or any of the new states which were formed
... The United States has no Constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction,
sovereignty or eminent domain, within the limits of a state or elsewhere, except in the cases in
which it is expressly granted ..." [Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S.C. 212, 221, 223]

"Jurisdiction is essential to give validity to the determinations of administrative agencies and

where jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied, the action of the agency is a nullity.." [City
Street Improv Co. v. Pearson, 181 C 640,185 P. (1962); O’Neil v. Dept. of Professional &
Vocational Standards, 7 CA2d 393, 46 P2d 234]

"The law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on the record of the administrative agency and
all administrative proceedings" [Hagans v. Lavine, 415 US 533]

"Failure to adhere to agency regulations may amount to denial of due process: if regulations are
required by Constitution or statute." [Curley v. United States, 791 F. Supp. 52]

"Indeed, on this crucial point, the majority and Justice Breyer agree in principle: the Federal
government has nothing approaching a police power." [United States v. Lopez, No. 93-1260, 115
S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626]

"...the commerce clause...has always been understood as limited by its terms; and as a virtual
denial of any power to interfere with the internal trade and business of the separate states"
[United States v. DeWitt, 76 US 41 9 Wall 4, 19 L. Ed 593]

A recent Supreme Court decision, dated April 26, 1995, addresses the issues of exclusive
legislative jurisdiction of Congress, the powers of the Federal Government, and the
subsequent subject matter of Federal District Court. Supreme Court Justice Thomas in
concurring majority opinion in United States vs. Lopez, No. 93-1260, 115 S. Ct. 1624,
131 L. Ed. 2d 626, states very clearly, indeed, on this crucial point, the majority and
Justice Breyer {the Justice writing the dissenting opinion} agree in principle: the Federal
Government has nothing approaching a police power, (pg 64.)
Special provision is made in the Constitution for the cession of jurisdiction from the
states over places where the Federal Government shall establish Forts or military works,
and its only in these places, or territories of the United States, where it can exercise a
general jurisdiction, New Orleans vs. United States, 35 U.S. 10 Pet.) 662 (1836).
All legislation is prima facie territorial, American Banana Co. vs. U. S. Fruit, 213, U.S.
347 at 357-358.

FEDERAL JURICDITON

In the United States, there are two separate and distinct jurisdictions, one being that of the States
within their own territorial boundaries and the other being federal jurisdiction. Broadly speaking,
state jurisdiction encompasses the legislative power to regulate, control and govern real and
personal property, individuals and enterprises within the territorial limits of any given State. In
contrast, federal jurisdiction is extremely limited, with the same being exercised only in areas
external to state legislative power and territory. Notwithstanding the clarity of this simple
principle, the line of demarcation between these two jurisdictions and the extent and reach of
each has become somewhat blurred due to popular misconceptions and the efforts expended by
the federal government to conceal one of its major weaknesses. Only by resorting to history and
case law can this obfuscation be clarified and the two distinct jurisdictions be readily seen.

The legal effect of the Declaration of Independence was to make each new State a separate and
independent sovereign over which there was no other government of superior power or
jurisdiction. This was clearly shown in M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209, 212
(1808), where it was held:

"This opinion is predicated upon a principle which is believed to be undeniable, that the several
states which composed this Union, so far at least as regarded their municipal regulations, became
entitled, from the time when they declared themselves independent, to all the rights and powers
of sovereign states, and that they did not derive them from concessions made by the British king.
The treaty of peace contains recognition of their independence, not a grant of it. From hence it
results, that the laws of the several state governments were the laws of sovereign states, and as
such were obligatory upon the people of such state, from the time they were enacted."

The consequences of independence was again explained in Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 523, 526, 527 (1827), where the Supreme Court stated:

"There was no territory within the United States that was claimed in any other right than that of
some one of the confederated states; therefore, there could be no acquisition of territory made by
the United States distinct from, or independent of some one of the states.

"Each declared itself sovereign and independent, according to the limits of its territory.

"[T]he soil and sovereignty within their acknowledged limits were as much theirs at the
declaration of independence as at this hour."

Thus, unequivocally, in July, 1776, the new States possessed all sovereignty, power, and
jurisdiction over all the soil and persons in their respective territorial limits.

This condition of supreme sovereignty of each State over all property and persons within the
borders thereof continued notwithstanding the adoption of the Articles of Confederation. Article
II of that document declared:

"Article II. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power,
Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United
States, in Congress assembled."

As the history of the confederation government demonstrated, each State was indeed sovereign
and independent to such a degree that it made the central government created by the
confederation fairly ineffectual. These defects of the confederation government strained the
relations between and among the States and the remedy became the calling of a constitutional
convention.
The representatives which assembled in Philadelphia in May, 1787, to attend the Constitutional
Convention met for the primary purpose of improving the commercial relations among the
States, although the product of the Convention was more than this. But, no intention was
demonstrated for the States to surrender in any degree the jurisdiction so possessed by them at
that time, and indeed the Constitution as finally drafted continued the same territorial jurisdiction
of the States as existed under the Articles of Confederation. The essence of this retention of state
jurisdiction was embodied in Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 of the U.S. Constitution, which defined federal
jurisdiction as follows:

"To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten
Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become
the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings."

The reason for the inclusion of this clause in the Constitution is obvious. Under the Articles of
Confederation, the States retained full and complete jurisdiction over lands and persons within
their borders. The Congress under the Articles of Confederation was merely a body which
represented and acted as agents of the separate States for external affairs, and it had no
jurisdiction within the States. This defect in the Articles made the Confederation Congress totally
dependent upon any given State for protection, and this dependency did in fact cause
embarrassment for that Congress. During the Revolutionary War while the Congress met in
Philadelphia, a body of mutineers from the Continental Army surrounded the Congress and
chastised and insulted its members. The governments of both Philadelphia and Pennsylvania
proved themselves powerless to remedy this situation, so Congress was forced to flee first to
Princeton, New Jersey, and finally to Annapolis, Maryland.[1] Thus, this clause was inserted into
the Constitution to give jurisdiction to Congress over its capital, and such other places which
Congress might purchase for forts, magazines, arsenals and other needful buildings wherein the
State ceded jurisdiction of such lands to the federal government. Other than in these areas, this
clause of the Constitution did not operate to cede further jurisdiction to the federal government,
and jurisdiction over those areas which had not been so ceded remained within the States.

While there had been no real provisions in the Articles which permitted the Confederation
Congress to acquire property and possess exclusive jurisdiction over that property, the above
clause filled an essential need by permitting the federal government to acquire land for the seat
of government and other purposes from certain of the States. These lands were deemed essential
to enable the United States to perform the powers delegated by the Constitution, and a cession of
lands by any particular State would grant exclusive jurisdiction of them to Congress. Perhaps the
best explanations for this clause in the Constitution were set forth in Essay No. 43 of The
Federalist:

"The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of government carries its own
evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every legislature of the Union, I might say of the
world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it not only the public authority might be
insulted and its proceedings interrupted with impunity, but a dependence of the members of the
general government on the State comprehending the seat of the government for protection in the
exercise of their duty might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence
equally dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other members of the
Confederacy. This consideration has the more weight as the gradual accumulation of public
improvements at the stationary residence of the government would be both too great a public
pledge to be left in the hands of a single State, and would create so many obstacles to a removal
of the government, as still further to abridge its necessary independence. The extent of this
federal district is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite nature. And
as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State ceding it; as the State will no
doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the consent of the citizens inhabiting it; as the
inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest to become willing parties to the cession;
as they will have had their voice in the election of the government which is to exercise authority
over them; as a municipal legislature for local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will of
course be allowed them; and as the authority of the legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants
of the ceded part of it, to concur in the cession will be derived from the whole people of the State
in their adoption of the Constitution, every imaginable objection seems to be obviated.

"The necessity of a like authority over forts, magazines, etc., established by the general
government, is not less evident. The public money expended on such places, and the public
property deposited in them, require that they should be exempt from the authority of the
particular State. Nor would it be proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union
may depend to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections and
scruples are here also obviated by requiring the concurrence of the States concerned in every
such establishment."

Since the ratification of the present U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court and all lower
courts have had many opportunities to construe and apply this clause of the Constitution. The
essence of all these decisions manifests a legal principle that the States of this nation have
exclusive jurisdiction of property and persons located within their borders, excluding such lands
and persons residing thereon which have been ceded to the United States.

Perhaps one of the earliest decisions on this point was United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 336 (1818), which involved a federal prosecution for a murder committed on board the
Warship, Independence, anchored in the harbor of Boston, Massachusetts. The defense
complained that only the state had jurisdiction to prosecute this crime and argued that the federal
circuit courts had no jurisdiction of this crime supposedly committed within the federal
government's admiralty jurisdiction. In argument before the Supreme Court, counsel for the
United States admitted as much:

"The exclusive jurisdiction which the United States have in forts and dock-yards ceded to them,
is derived from the express assent of the states by whom the cessions are made. It could be
derived in no other manner; because without it, the authority of the state would be supreme and
exclusive therein," Id., at 350-51.

In holding that the State of Massachusetts had jurisdiction over this crime, the Court held:

"What, then, is the extent of jurisdiction which a state possesses?

"We answer, without hesitation, the jurisdiction of a state is co-extensive with its territory; co-
extensive with its legislative power," Id., at 386-87.

"The article which describes the judicial power of the United States is not intended for the
cession of territory or of general jurisdiction... Congress has power to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over this district, and over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of
the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards,
and other needful buildings.

"It is observable that the power of exclusive legislation (which is jurisdiction) is united with
cession of territory, which is to be the free act of the states. It is difficult to compare the two
sections together, without feeling a conviction, not to be strengthened by any commentary on
them, that, in describing the judicial power, the framers of our constitution had not in view any
cession of territory; or, which is essentially the same, of general jurisdiction," Id., at 388.

The Court in Bevans thus established a principle that federal jurisdiction extends only over the
areas wherein it possesses the power of exclusive legislation, and this is a principle incorporated
into all subsequent decisions regarding the extent of federal jurisdiction. To hold otherwise
would destroy the purpose, intent and meaning of the entire U.S. Constitution.

The decision in Bevans was closely followed by decisions made in two state courts and one
federal court within the next two years. In Commonwealth v. Young, Brightly, N.P. 302, 309 (Pa.
1818), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was presented with the issue of whether lands owned
by the United States for which Pennsylvania had never ceded jurisdiction had to be sold pursuant
to state law. In deciding that the law of Pennsylvania exclusively controlled this sale of federal
land, the Court held:

"The legislation and authority of congress is confined to cessions by particular states for the seat
of government, and purchases made by consent of the legislature of the state, for the purpose of
erecting forts. The legislative power and exclusive jurisdiction remained in the several states, of
all territory within their limits, not ceded to, or purchased by, congress, with the assent of the
state legislature, to prevent the collision of legislation and authority between the United States
and the several states."

A year later, the Supreme Court of New York was presented with the issue of whether the State
of New York had jurisdiction over a murder committed at Fort Niagara, a federal fort. In People
v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225, 233 (N.Y. 1819), that court held that the fort was subject to the
jurisdiction of the State since the lands therefore had not been ceded to the United States:

"To oust this state of its jurisdiction to support and maintain its laws, and to punish crimes, it
must be shown that an offense committed within the acknowledged limits of the state, is clearly
and exclusively cognizable by the laws and courts of the United States. In the case already cited,
Chief Justice Marshall observed, that to bring the offense within the jurisdiction of the courts of
the union, it must have been committed out of the jurisdiction of any state; it is not (he says,) the
offence committed, but the place in which it is committed, which must be out of the jurisdiction
of the state."
The decisional authority upon which this court relied was United States v. Bevans, supra.

At about the same time that the New York Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Godfrey, a
similar fact situation was before a federal court, the only difference being that the murder was
committed on land which had been ceded to the United States. In United States v. Cornell, 25
Fed.Cas. 646, 648, No. 14,867 (C.C.D.R.I. 1819), the court held that the case fell within federal
jurisdiction:

"But although the United States may well purchase and hold lands for public purposes, within
the territorial limits of a state, this does not of itself oust the jurisdiction or sovereignty of such
State over the lands so purchased. It remains until the State has relinquished its authority over the
land either expressly or by necessary implication.

"When therefore a purchase of land for any of these purposes is made by the national
government, and the State Legislature has given its consent to the purchase, the land so
purchased by the very terms of the constitution ipso facto falls within the exclusive legislation of
Congress, and the State jurisdiction is completely ousted."

Almost 18 years later, the U.S. Supreme Court was again presented with a case involving the
distinction between state and federal jurisdiction. In New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10
Pet.) 662, 737 (1836), the United States claimed title to property in New Orleans likewise
claimed by the city. After holding that title to the subject lands was owned by the city, the Court
addressed the question of federal jurisdiction:

"Special provision is made in the Constitution for the cession of jurisdiction from the States over
places where the federal government shall establish forts or other military works. And it is only
in these places, or in the territories of the United States, where it can exercise a general
jurisdiction."

In New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837), the question before the Court involved an
attempt by the City of New York to assess penalties against the master of a ship for his failure to
make a report regarding the persons his ship brought to New York. As against the master's
contention that the act was unconstitutional and that New York had no jurisdiction in the matter,
the Court held:

"If we look at the place of its operation, we find it to be within the territory, and, therefore,
within the jurisdiction of New York. If we look at the person on whom it operates, he is found
within the same territory and jurisdiction," Id., at 133.

"They are these: that a State has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons
and things within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation, where that jurisdiction is not
surrendered or restrained by the Constitution of the United States. That, by virtue of this, it is not
only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a State, to advance the safety, happiness and
prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every act of legislation
which it may deem to be conducive to these ends; where the power over the particular subject, or
the manner of its exercise is not surrendered or restrained, in the manner just stated. That all
those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps, more properly
be called internal police, are not thus surrendered or restrained; and that, consequently, in
relation to these, the authority of a State is complete, unqualified and exclusive," Id., at 139.

Some eight years later in Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), the question of federal
jurisdiction was once again before the Court. This case involved a real property title dispute with
one of the parties claiming a right to the contested property via a U.S. patent; the lands in
question were situated in Mobile, Alabama, adjacent to Mobile Bay. In discussing the subject of
federal jurisdiction, the Court held:

"We think a proper examination of this subject will show that the United States never held any
municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in and to the territory, of which Alabama or
any of the new States were formed," Id., at 221.

"[B]ecause, the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction,
sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a State or elsewhere, except in the cases in
which it is expressly granted," Id., at 223.

"Alabama is therefore entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the territory within her
limits, subject to the common law," Id., at 228-2.

CHARGES OF TREASON, MISPRISION OF TREASON,

MISCONDUCT, NEGLECT OF DUTY, CORRUPTION, AND DEFRAUDING THE
GOVERNMENT

Respectfully Submitted:

___________________________________________
Bobby Worthy, Founder of “The Justice league”

cc: Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick J. Leahy

U.S. President Barrack Obama
U.S. Attorney Jennifer Hudson & Courtney Cox
Robert D. Grant, Special Agent in
Charge, FBI, Chicago, Illinois
Senator Richard Durbin
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.
Chief Judge David R. Herndon
 ADDRESS TO SEND COMPLAINT TO

Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick J. Leahy

United States Senate
Committee on Judiciary
224 Dirksen Senate Offices Building
Washington D.C. 20510

President Barrack Obama

United States of America
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC. 20500

U S Attorney Courtney Cox

750 Missouri Ave. 3rd Floor
East St. Louis, IL 62201

U S Attorney Jennifer Hudson

9 Executive Drive
Fairview Heights, IL 62208

Special Agent in Charge Robert D. Grant

F.B.I Chicago Division
2111 W. Roosevelt
Chicago, IL 60608

Senator Richard J. Durbin

United States Senator (Illinois)
525 South 8th Street
Springfield, IL 62703

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.

Supreme Court of the United States
One 1st Street, N.E.
Washington DC 20543

Chief Judge David R. Herndon

Melvin Price Federal Courthouse
750 Missouri Avenue
East St. Louis, IL 62201