Bete cana nk mG GS CrcdT URPOS), YOR STULYING MULIZAT CAMPAIGNS Tt 4s a pleasure, to be with you today. Military education, ty virtue of the march of science, assunes © place of great importance. The ineress= ing couplexity of soders warfare requires that we continue to broaden the vision and knowledge of our military leaders. This can be done only through education. No lenger is any one branch of the service able to isolate itself from the others. The problen has becone one of unified effort through mutual gupport, This in turn requires mutual understanding of the problens, missions, and capabilities of euch branch of the service. he principal reason for studying any wilitary compaign is to determine 4¢ possible what lessons can be learnods ‘There are lessons to be leamed tn every campaign, but the student orre badly Af he expects to make hinselt a master of strategy and tactios by sbsorting ali the lessens of Past campaigns and applying thon in actual ware ‘tthe first thing he must learn de there are no standard situations and no standard solutions to military provlems. the student met use past experience to condition his thinking and planning for future operations. the principles of war we read so such chav’ do. cur standart text Docks wore ovalved over eonturiee of warftre and are sound tut there are sany interpretations of these princivies+ our initary student of today should bear in nind that history 12 fui of asspios where bold wen with inferlar forves have vsed new end radios toterpretations of these principles to win decisive victories ty subject today ter the 1-29 Campaign in the Pacific." 1 would liketo review with you the conduct of this canpaign and the lessons to be derived therefrom, TH MSI ‘he primary aission of tho Twontisth Air Forve, the first 3-29 organisation committed to conbat, was to achieve the earliest possible pro- gressive dislocation of the Japanese silitary, industrial, and eeonomte fystess and to undermine the sorale of the Japanese people to a point where their capacity and will to wage war was decisively woakened, ‘The secondary seission was to operate in support of /acific operations, ‘The Muriqnan-pased Petje attacked the aiveraft industry of Japan and the urban industrial areas ae top priority. As the attack progressed, the mining of eneny harbors and ses approaehes, and strikes against aras and munitions producers wore initiated, Luring the final stages of attack, oil installations and transportation were raised to high priority, the first attack on a transportation target taking plage the last cay of bonbing operations. QBQANTZATION | ; ‘fo accorplish the strategie mission of very heavy bosbardnect, the qwentioth Air Force was created in Aprih 1944 to function directly under ‘the doint Chiefs of Staff, The headquarters was established in Washington, “with General Arnold in command. Responsibility for logistic support was “vented in the theater commander, Adsiral Ninits, ‘At the tine the Twontieth Air Foree was created, Ghina offered the ay imodiate bases fron which Japan itself eould be attacked, Therefore, n unit, the Twentieth Boaber Comand, consisting of one combat wingy -2-‘was deployed in the China~DurnaeIndia theater. Organisation and training of the 329 units in the United States were geared to the 5-2) production line. As production progressed, the Twenty= firet Benber Command wae orysniaee for deployment in the Marianas. ‘The organisation of the Twenty-first Bouber Comund involved @ eon~ Siderable change from other overseas air unite, The limited land nass of the Yarianas led to the decision to concentrate an entire wing on a single base involving over 12,000 personnel and 190 2986 ‘The Wing Headquarters was established as the dominant operating entity ae contrasted with the squadron or bomb group, In the interests of econosy and efficiency, servite functions were uarged to high degree. ‘Five wings were in operation from the Marianas at the end of the wary ‘one on Saipan, two on Tinian, and two on Guam, These wings becane operational between November 44 anddune 45, the last wing having scarcely a sonth's ‘operation when the war ended, ‘The oumber of airplanes used in initial attacks averaged about 75 with the weight of the attack crowing to an average of 600 airplanes in the last month of the war. Additional units in the support of the operation were the Seventh Fighter Command, consisting of one wing of Mustangs, took ite place on Iwo Jian during April 45, one reconnaissance squadron of modified 1-298 for photo reconnaissance, and one group of 1-24 airuraft for weather reconnaissance in ‘the base area, During the later phase of operations, the 509th Composite Group, with special equipment, wae moved into place on Tinian to carry out the atonic dob operation. ‘The primary woapon of the Twentieth Air Force was the B-®? airplane,