Foreign Policy Program
Policy Brief
Summary: As Turkey’s
Constitutional Court prepares to
act on the closure case pending
against the governing Justice
and Development Party (AKP),
Turks across the ideological
spectrum are watching and wait-
ing. Predictions and preferences
abound; active responses are
limited. Caution and inertia
appear to be the order of the
day, even for those most
exposed to the consequences of
political and economic turmoil.
Yet this crisis, more than others of
recent years, could have dramatic
consequences for the evolution
of Turkish society and foreign
policy. Turkey’s EU candidacy
may be irreparably damaged,
nationalist tendencies reinforced,
and relations with the United
States, already troubled, could
be further compromised. Turkey
could emerge from its current
travails as a less credible and less
capable actor on the international
scene.
1744 R Street NW
Washington, DC 20009
T 1 202 745 3950
F 1 202 265 1662
E info@gmfus.org
Turkey’s Travails: Outlook and Strategic
Consequences
by Dr. Ian Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow,
The German Marshall Fund of the United States1
One of the striking aspects of Turkey’s
latest political crisis is its detached, slow-
motion quality. As Turkey’s Constitutional
Court prepares to act on the closure case
pending against the governing Justice and
Development Party (AKP), Turks across
the ideological spectrum are watching
and waiting. Predictions and preferences
abound; active responses are limited.
Caution and inertia appear to be the order
of the day, even for those most exposed to
the consequences of political and
economic turmoil.
Yet this crisis, more than others of recent
years, could have dramatic consequences
for the evolution of Turkish society and
foreign policy. Indeed, the Turkish
talent for survival and adjustment, and
the proven resilience of the Turkish state,
suggest that the most significant
consequences of this crisis may be
external rather than internal. Turks may
adjust to what some observers are calling
an impending “judicial coup.” But Turkey’s
EU candidacy may be irreparably
damaged, nationalist tendencies
reinforced, and relations with the United
States, already troubled, could be further
compromised. Turkey could emerge
from its current travails as a less credible
and less capable actor on the international
scene.
1
This policy brief reflects the author’s conversations in Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey, in April 2008.
Political Dynamics
The prevailing view among informed
observers is that the Constitutional Court
will close down the AKP and ban leading
figures in the party (a separate closure
case has been launched against the pro-
Kurdish Democratic Society Party, DTP).
The pending indictment accuses some
70 individuals in the AKP of seeking to
undermine Turkish secularism. Roughly
half are members of parliament, the rest
are party activists and advisors. If banned,
these individuals could be barred from
politics for five years. Many would lose
their parliamentary immunity, opening the
way for further prosecution on a variety
of charges. A decision in the closure case
is likely within the next six months. The
timing is significant. Even if the AKP is
closed, with leading figures barred from
politics, the party group would retain a
majority in parliament and would be in
a position to re-emerge under a different
name. But if the closure occurs toward the
end of 2008 or later, the party will have
little opportunity to regroup prior to local
elections in the spring of 2009.
Many observers stress that the staunchly
secular elements pressing for closure of
the AKP are, above all, angling to remove
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Foreign Policy Program
Policy Brief
from Turkish politics; all else is secondary. Some would no doubt
like to remove President Abdullah Gul as well. But most observers
agree that the presidency is probably beyond the reach of prosecu-
tion under current conditions.
“The prevailing view among informed
observers is that the Constitutional Court
will close down the AKP and ban leading
figures in the party.”
In recent weeks, Erdogan has held a series of meetings with
members of parliament and political cadres. By all accounts, these
consultations have been animated, with some participants openly
critical of the party’s leadership since gaining a strong mandate in
the July 2007 national elections. In retrospect, the decision to
press forward on controversial issues such as the relaxation of
the headscarf ban on university campuses, is seen by many as
unnecessarily provocative, and part of a general pattern of
political hubris. With 47 percent of the popular vote, a solid
majority in parliament, control of the presidency, growing sway
over the state bureaucracy—and a weak opposition—the AKP has
faced few obvious constraints in pressing ahead with its agenda.
Erdogan’s energy and charisma are widely seen as encouraging a
highly personalized, tactical approach to politics, at the expense of
strategic thinking.
With the party now facing closure, its members are divided on the
most effective response. AKP is preparing a straightforward legal
defense, but is also contemplating constitutional changes making
it more difficult to close political parties. These would almost
certainly require public referenda. Early elections are another
possible gambit aimed at strengthening the AKP hand. Others
reportedly urge a more vigorous fight, including calls for large-
scale demonstrations, something the AKP has eschewed to date.
In the meantime, the Prime Minister has embarked on a round
of domestic and foreign travel, including meetings in Damascus
to facilitate Syrian-Israeli negotiations (a process that has been un-
derway for at least a year). At times like this, the government can
use all the goodwill it can muster.
In all likelihood, AKP members of parliament (unless banned
themselves, members will retain their seats) will regroup within a
new party. Some may choose to remain as independents, or even
to form smaller breakaway parties. Even a re-branded AKP could
have a different orientation, whether more moderate, more overtly
religious, or more nationalistic in flavor. With leading figures
removed from the political scene, others will see opportunities to
move up within the governing party. Other forces, including the
pervasive Fethulah Gulen organization and its business and civil
society network, will no doubt seek to preserve or increase their
influence. The Gulen network has been supportive of the AKP, but
this stance could change if other alternatives emerge.
Alternative Scenarios and Internal Consequences
The canonical scenario envisions the closure of the AKP followed
by a regrouping of AKP cadres under new colors. The lack of a
credible opposition makes it unlikely that the task of forming a
government will fall on the Republican People’s Party (CHP) or
the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). CHP, once a potent center-
left party, is now given to nationalist posturing under an aging
leadership. MHP remains a marginal actor, although its message
of unreconstructed nationalism is increasingly in tune with
Turkish public sentiment, especially among younger voters. The
stage is set for renewed confrontation between a refashioned AKP
and hard-line secularists within the military, the judiciary, and
elements of the Kemalist elite.
Alternative scenarios range from the mildly optimistic to the
cataclysmic. At least one prominent commentator has suggested
that AKP’s enemies in the constitutional court and elsewhere
might still decide to pull back from a path of “mutually assured
destruction,” opting instead for more limited sanctions against the
AKP, or simply removal of the Prime Minister. Or the court could
press ahead, and even launch additional prosecutions—a whole-
sale purge. In this case, AKP supporters might take to the streets
in large numbers. A few violent provocations could set in motion
a series of events leading to an overt military intervention—an
unlikely but not inconceivable scenario.
Even the canonical scenario would have substantial implica-
tions for Turkey’s internal situation. The pending court case
and possible closure will impose a prolonged period of uncer-
tainty against a backdrop of global financial stringency. Turkey’s
economy has already been damaged by this combination of
domestic and international pressures. Foreign investors are hedg-
ing against further risk, and the Turkish stock market has lost
roughly a third of its value over the last few weeks. After six years
of annual growth in the 6-7 percent range, and a striking increase
in foreign investment, the Turkish economy appears headed for a
period of marked stress. Many Turks argue that economic trouble
2
Foreign Policy Program
Policy Brief
of this kind was already on the horizon before the onset of the
latest political crisis, but there can be little that the closure case has
deepened the economic challenge.
The effects of the closure cases will fall disproportionately on
Turkey’s Kurdish population. In the southeast of the country,
some 90 percent of the vote in the July 2007 elections went to AKP
or DTP. Against a background of continued violence emanating
from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the collapse of Kurdish
political representation will greatly increase the stakes in Turkey’s
long-standing struggle with Kurdish discontent. For all of the
unresolved dilemmas of cultural and political rights, pressures
for autonomy and even separatism, Turkey has not suffered from
inter-communal strife between Turks and Kurds in the southeast
or the cities of western Turkey. A crisis of political representation
in the southeast, accompanied by PKK violence and worsening
economic conditions, could heighten the risk of a more general
confrontation along ethnic lines—another unlikely but troubling
scenario, with obvious links to the unstable situation across the
border in northern Iraq.
A Clash of Elites?
Since the current confrontation has structural origins in
Turkish society and changing demographics. These are most
unlikely to be resolved as a result of political maneuvering or legal
judgments. Many Turkish and foreign analysts have interpreted
the rise of AKP as, above all, a class-based phenomenon supported
by populist politics and skillful organization at the grass roots
level. Urbanization and flourishing small- and medium- sized
businesses in Anatolia have all contributed to AKP’s success and
funding. More conservative social attitudes and more visible
religiosity are also part of the mix. It is almost certainly mislead-
ing to portray the current political struggle as a simple clash
between Islamists and secularists. Larger social dynamics are also
at play, and these underlying forces will not be removed as a result
of party closures or the departure of leading politicians. Almost
certainly, they will remain as part of the Turkish scene, to be
taken up by new movements. Turkey’s embattled secularists are
impelled not only by their belief that the struggle for secularism is
“existential,” but also by a sense that time is not on their side. The
appointment of top judges by an AKP-oriented president would,
over time, change the balance in the constitutional court and
make it far more difficult to pursue party closures on the grounds
of anti-secular intent. AKP in power has facilitated the emergence
of a new, parallel elite that is making its presence felt in business,
government, and the media.
The pending closure case and the prospect of a broad political re-
alignment is compelling Turks at many levels of society to look to
their own equities. The commercial dynamism of recent years has
not changed the importance of the state—and the importance of
political access—in the Turkish economy. AKP in government has
proven adept at supporting individuals and firms in their milieu
via the party’s influence over civil service appointments, govern-
ment contracts, and access to favorable financing. None of this
is new, of course, and it is arguable that the AKP has been more
inclusive and transparent in its behavior than other governments
in recent Turkish history. But a prolonged period of paralysis, or
divisions within the AKP, could upset economic as well as ideolog-
ical alignments. Under these conditions, long-standing anxieties
about the place of minority groups in the Turkish economy and
society have come to the fore, including more frequent allegations
of anti-Semitism and pressure on the Alevi community.
Foreign Policy Effects and Implications for American
Interests
Internal and external factors are interwoven in Turkey’s current
travails. The indictment against the AKP contains a long list of
quotes and anecdotes intended to support the charge of anti-
secular activity by the party’s leaders. The indictment also makes
numerous references to the role of the United States and the
European Union as enablers of the AKP’s religious agenda, includ-
ing the role of the AKP as a vehicle to promote moderate Islam in
Turkey and the Muslim world (Turkey’s participation in the G-8’s
Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative and the Alliance
of Civilizations are mentioned explicitly). The sovereignty
conscious, nationalistic tone is very much in line with the xeno-
phobic mood evident in Turkish society over the last few years,
and reflected in the German Marshall Fund of the United States’
public-opinion survey Transatlantic Trends and others. Many
Turks see the country’s travails as the product of foreign as well as
internal pressures. Reform-minded internationalists in business,
the media, and intellectual circles are increasingly marginalized
and have little voice in political opposition where nationalism
of the left (CHP) and right (MHP) prevails. To be sure, the AKP
does have a substantial globally-oriented faction, but an embattled
government is less able to act on these instincts.
AKP closure and the ensuing political realignment would have im-
portant implications for Turkey’s foreign policy and role as a stra-
tegic actor. First and foremost, the perception of a “judicial coup”
is likely to have a severe effect on Turkey’s already troubled EU
candidacy. EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn has already
mentioned the probable suspension of accession negotiations.
3
Foreign Policy Program
Policy Brief
Opponents of Turkish membership will likely seize on the closure
of Turkey’s popular governing party as further rationale for
shunting Turkey toward a special relationship with the European
Union rather than full membership. Even in the best case, negotia-
tions, once suspended, may be very difficult to restart, especially
if accompanied by a hardening of anti-EU sentiment in Turkey.
Under these conditions, Turkey’s political and economic reforms
would be more difficult to sustain, foreign investors would retreat,
and Turkey’s convergence with Europe would be set back across
the board. Those Turks who argue for a reorientation of Ankara’s
strategy, toward Eurasia or the Middle East, would find their case
strengthened regardless of its merits. The net result would likely
be a more nationalistic and inward-looking Turkey, and a more
difficult partner for Europe and the United States.
Second, Turkey’s regional policies will surely be affected by a
protracted political crisis and a hollow EU candidacy. Senior
Turkish diplomats stress that the country’s foreign policy will not
be affected by domestic crises, and this view has been supported
by a series of highly visible visits to Damascus and elsewhere.
The AKP leadership clearly has a stake in underscoring Turkey’s
international credibility and activism, not least to demonstrate the
government’s moderate, Western credentials. But over time, politi-
cal and economic weakness is likely to constrain Ankara’s ability
to pursue an active regional policy, including the widely discussed
notions of “strategic depth” and “zero problems” with neighbors.
Indeed, if the AKP is closed, leading advocates of the new look
in Turkish foreign policy may be replaced by figures with a more
parsimonious and tougher approach to the country’s international
engagements. On key issues, not least policy toward Iraq, Iran,
and Cyprus, the military and security establishment are likely to
drive Turkish decision-making; a return to more traditional
patterns of influence over foreign policy. Dialogue with the
Kurdish leadership in northern Iraq, essential to containment of
the PKK challenge, will be more elusive. In the Aegean, the détente
with Greece is unlikely to be reversed, but movement toward
resolution of core issues will be more difficult. Ankara’s
international partners should anticipate closer attention to
Turkey’s sovereignty and strategic interests more narrowly defined.
Finally, Turkey’s travails and their foreign policy effects will have
significant implications for U.S. interests and strategy. Without
question, it will be far more difficult for Washington to argue
Turkey’s case for EU membership in the face of perceived demo-
cratic reversals. Access to Incirlik and other aspects of security
cooperation could become more contentious, and more closely
measured in terms of cooperation against the PKK, at a time when
multilateral approaches to Iraq are becoming even more essential
to disengagement and the avoidance of regional chaos. Overall,
security issues will return to the center, and the goal of a
diversified relationship in which economic and civil society
ties are enhanced may be even more elusive. A more stressful
economic climate on all sides will reinforce this tendency to focus
on the bilateral and the geopolitical. Only with regard to Iran,
the Palestinian issue, and perhaps Russia, where Turkey’s security
establishment and professional diplomats are more likely to share
American perceptions, might the absence of AKP in its current
configuration serve American interests. In grand strategic terms,
setbacks to Turkey’s reform efforts and European aspirations,
and even more vigorous Turkish nationalism—all likely if Turkey
continues on its current path—will complicate Turkish-American
relations and undermine the prospects for stability on Turkey’s
borders.
Dr. Ian Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, GMF
Dr. Lesser is a GMF senior transatlantic fellow in Washington, DC,
where he focuses on Mediterranean affairs, Turkey, and international
security issues. Prior to joining GMF, he was a public policy scholar
at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Lesser
is also president of Mediterranean Advisors, LLC, a consultancy
specializing in geopolitical risk. Previously, he served as vice president
and director of studies at the Pacific Council on International Policy
(the western partner of the Council on Foreign Relations) and an
adjunct staff member at RAND. From 1994-1995, he was a member of
the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State,
responsible for Turkey, Southern Europe, North Africa, and the
multilateral track of the Middle East peace process.
About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a
nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution
dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding
between the United States and Europe. GMF does this by supporting
individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by
convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes,
and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can
address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF
supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to
Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both
sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington,
DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels,
Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.