Professional Documents
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CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
v.
J.J.,
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Amalia
The court sustained the petition alleging that 15-year-old J.J. unlawfully received a
stolen motorcycle, found the offense to be a felony, and adjudged him a ward of the court.
The court placed J.J. on probation and ordered him to complete a 21-day, in-patient
Deputy Erik Duesler stopped J.J. on the highway in Crest after observing him riding a
50cc Honda off-road motorcycle without a helmet. When asked about the motorcycle's
registration, J.J. told Deputy Duesler that he had purchased it from a guy he knew only as
Skye for $200 three or four days before. J.J. did not have the pink slip. He was also unable
to provide Deputy Duesler with a phone number or address for Skye. An inspection of the
motorcycle showed that it had been modified to operate without a key. Deputy Duesler
At the dispositional hearing, the court reviewed the probation report, which described
J.J.'s extensive drug use. The deputy district attorney reminded the court that J.J. committed
the offense of receiving stolen property less than two weeks after his annual review on a
prior offense of shooting a person with a pellet gun. The court followed the probation
wardship. The parties did not object to any of the conditions of probation. Those conditions
"Minor shall not use a computer that contains any encryption, hacking,
cracking, scanning, keystroke monitoring, security testing, steganography,
Trojan or virus software. [¶] . . . [¶]
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"The minor shall not have a MySpace page, a Facebook page, or any other
similar page and shall delete any existing page. The minor shall not use
MySpace, Facebook, or any similar program.
"The minor is not to use a computer for any purpose other than school
related assignments. The minor is to be supervised when using a computer
in the common area of his/her residence or in a school setting."
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b) provides that the
juvenile court may impose on the minor "any and all reasonable conditions that it may
determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and
rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." The juvenile court has broader discretion in
formulating the terms of the minor's probation than that exercised with adult
probationers. (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910 (Victor L.).) "[E]ven
where there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the state to control the
conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults . . . .' "
(Ginsberg v. New York (1968) 390 U.S. 629, 638.) "This is because juveniles are deemed
to be 'more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor's
constitutional rights are more circumscribed.' [Citation.]" (Victor L., at p. 910.) Thus,
" 'a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an
adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile
court.' " (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 (Sheena K.).)
Nonetheless, the constitutional doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth may limit the
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underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of 'fair warning.'
[Citation.]" (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) "The vagueness doctrine bars
enforcement of ' "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application." [Citation.]' [Citation.] A vague law 'not only fails to provide adequate
notice to those who must observe its strictures, but also "impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." [Citation.]'
[Citation.]" (Ibid.)
"Restrictions upon access to the Internet necessarily curtail First Amendment rights."
(In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1235 (Stevens).) " 'Through the use of chat
rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates
farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and
newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer.' " (Id. at p. 1236, quoting Reno
v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997) 521 U.S. 844, 870.) As the Stevens court observed,
" 'Two hundred years after the framers ratified the Constitution, the Net has taught us what
the First Amendment means.' " (Stevens, at p. 1236, quoting Lessig, Code and Other Laws of
Cyberspace (1999) p. 10.) Given the importance of these First Amendment rights, a
probation condition that imposes limitations on the form of Internet use "must closely tailor
unconstitutionally overbroad." (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890; see also Stevens, at
p. 1237.)
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We review facial challenges to probation conditions de novo. (Sheena K., supra,
40 Cal.4th at pp. 885-888.) We may uphold those conditions "even though they restrict a
probationer's exercise of constitutional rights if they are narrowly drawn to serve the
important interests of public safety and rehabilitation [citation] and if they are specifically
banishing him to Iran].) Here, we conclude the challenged conditions fail to satisfy these
requirements.
We begin by rejecting the People's argument that J.J. forfeited his constitutional
claims by failing to object to the computer and Internet conditions at the dispositional
hearing. In Sheena K., the Supreme Court held that the minor did not forfeit her
raise the issue in the juvenile court. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.) Her
challenge presented "a pure question of law, easily remediable on appeal by modification
of the condition." (Id. at p. 888.) However, the Supreme Court cautioned that its
conclusion "[did] not apply in every case in which a probation condition is challenged on
conditions of probation may be raised for the first time on appeal, since there may be
circumstances that do not present "pure questions of law that can be resolved without
reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court." [Citation.]' "
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(Id. at p. 889, italics added.) Applying these principles, we conclude that J.J.'s
J.J.'s claims present pure questions of law. J.J. directs his overbreadth arguments to
the probation conditions prohibiting: (1) computer use for anything but school-related
purposes; and (2) use of chat rooms, instant messaging, and social networks such as
MySpace and Facebook. Resolution of the overbreadth claims focuses on the language of
the conditions and the nature of the offense giving rise to wardship. To the extent the court
considered J.J.'s juvenile record in imposing the probation conditions, those facts are few and
undisputed. He argues that the condition barring his use of computers contaminated with
viruses or other unwanted software is unconstitutionally vague. That claim can be resolved
by considering the language of the condition and remedied by adding clarifying language.
J.J. argues that this limitation on his computer and resulting Internet use is
overbroad because it forecloses access to "countless benign and protected uses, and is
Both state and federal courts have rejected the total ban on the First Amendment
right to Internet use by a probationer or parolee. (See, e.g., Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th
at p. 890; Stevens, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1234-1235; U.S. v. Holm (7th Cir. 2003)
326 F.3d 872, 877-878 (Holm).) The Holm court observed that "such a ban renders
modern life — in which, for example, the government strongly encourages taxpayers to
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file their returns electronically, where more and more commerce is conducted on-line,
and where vast amounts of government information are communicated via website —
that imposes limitations on a person's constitutional rights must closely tailor those
condition of Holm's supervised release. (Holm, supra, 326 F.3d. at pp. 876-877.) Holm was
his home computer. (Id. at pp. 873-874.) He presented undisputed evidence at sentencing
that he had not used workplace computers in committing his crimes. (Id. at p. 878.) On
appeal, the court directed the district court to more carefully tailor the parole condition on
remand, stating: "We are confident that the district court can fashion precise restrictions that
protect the child-victims used in Internet pornography and at the same time reflect the
The court in Stevens reached a similar resolution after reviewing both federal and
state cases involving parole conditions limiting a child molester's access to the Internet.
(Stevens, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1231, 1236-1239.) Stevens had befriended the
victim in a youth program. After his arrest, police seized an incriminating photo album and a
video recording. A search of Stevens's home computer showed that he had not used it to
download child pornography, contact the victim, or commit any other crime. Stevens
pleaded guilty to one count of lewd conduct upon a child under the age of 14 and served time
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in prison. A special condition of his parole stated: " 'You shall not possess or have access to
computer hardware or software including the internet.' " (Id. at p. 1231.) Stevens sought
habeas corpus relief and the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) modified the condition to allow
limited use of the Internet. (Id. at p. 1232.) In the face of BPT's claim that the case was
moot, the court addressed the merits, ruling that the special condition was unconstitutionally
overbroad. (Id. at p. 1240.) It noted that "BPT was legitimately concerned that a released
child molester's unfettered access to a computer might result in criminal conduct. [However,
in contrast with cases upholding bans on Internet use], the broad prohibition on use of the
computer and Internet bore no relation to Stevens's conviction for child molestation and
imposed a greater restriction of his rights than was reasonably necessary to accomplish the
In this case, the probation condition that prohibits all non-school-related use of
computers — and resulting ban on Internet access — suffers from the same constitutional
defect as the conditions in Holm and Stevens. It is not tailored to J.J.'s conviction for
receiving stolen property, his history of drug abuse, or the juvenile court's dual goals of
rehabilitation and public safety. (Babak S., supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1084.) And
absent any connection between J.J.'s criminal history and the blanket Internet ban, there
is no support for the People's claim that it is properly related to future criminality.
We also strike as overbroad the probation condition which prohibits J.J.'s use of chat
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is nothing in the undisputed record to suggest J.J. used instant messaging or social
networking sites to obtain the stolen motorcycle or drugs. Thus, the probation condition
suffers from the same defect as Holm, Stevens and the ban on J.J. using the Internet for non-
school-related purposes.
articles suggesting that "[t]ens of millions of computers are infected with this unwanted,
malicious software . . . , almost all against the owner's will and without their knowledge."
He notes that other software listed in the probation condition must be intentionally
installed by the computer user. J.J. asserts that he could use one of these computers and
unwittingly violate the conditions of his probation. The People respond that the
probation condition "is specific in its prohibition on the computers [J.J.] cannot use
because of the programs contained on [them]" and argue that modification to prohibit
fair warning. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) The People do not dispute that
computers may contain viruses, Trojan, keystroke monitoring and other unwanted
software unknown to the computer's owner. Instead, they argue that we should uphold
sanctions for violation of probation in circumstances where he could only guess whether
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the computer he was using contains the prohibited software. (Sheena K., supra, 40
Cal.4th at p. 890.) Thus, it is possible that J.J.'s unwitting, technical violation of the
probation condition could subject him to penalties at the discretion of his probation
officer or the court. The ability to selectively punish for innocent action based on a
knowingly use a computer that contains any encryption, hacking, cracking, scanning,
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reword the probation condition regarding the use of
computers contaminated with viruses or unwanted software so that it reads: "Minor shall not
knowingly use a computer that contains any encryption, hacking, cracking, scanning,
The judgment is further modified to strike the probation conditions which read:
(1) "The minor is not to use a computer for any purpose other than school related
assignments. The minor is to be supervised when using a computer in the common area
of his/her residence or in a school setting . . ."; and (2) "The minor is prohibited from
participating in chat rooms, using instant messaging such as ICQ, MySpace, Facebook, or
other similar communication programs. [¶] The minor shall not have a MySpace page, a
Facebook page, or any other similar page and shall delete any existing page. The minor
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The judgment is affirmed as modified.
MCINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
MCDONALD, J.
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