It is often assumed that

globalization and neoliber-

alism mean Westernization
on a global scale but such a
view fails to appreciate, for
instance, how the influence
of the Arab world is also
increasing in Africa.
Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad:
Islamic Solidarity in the
Age of Neoliberalism
Mayke Kaag1

In the current era of neoliberalism, there is not only an

expansion of Western influence in many parts of Africa, but
also increased influence from the Arab world. Transnational
Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are a vehicle
of this influence. In a context of structural adjustment, an
increased spread of Western consumption ideals through mass
communication, and a growing sense of the global context
in which one is living, these organizations aim to influence
people’s material and moral well-being. By combining mate-
rial aid with proselytization, they embed their work in ideas
about transnational solidarity and the importance of enlarg-
ing the umma, the global community of the faithful. By dis-
seminating a Salafi form of Islam, they link local believers to
other parts of the Muslim world. They thus nourish processes
of Islamization and Arabization. This paper explores the
interventions of these organizations in Chad, focusing on
the logic of their work and the effects of their involvement
in Chad, characterized by poverty and a strong politicization
of religion.

Introduction

It is often assumed that globalization and neoliberalism mean Westerniza-

tion on a global scale; however, such an assumption fails to appreciate how,
for instance, the influence of the Arab world is also increasing in Africa
(Bennafla 2000; Hunwick 1997). Transnational Islamic nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) are a vehicle of such influence. Their proliferation in
Africa has taken place not in spite of, or on the margins of, globalization and
neoliberalism, but rather in tandem with them.
The relationship between the activities of Islamic NGOs and neoliber-
alism has several dimensions. First, processes associated with neoliberalism,
 such as democratization and political and economic liberalization, are easing
the intervention of nongovernmental organizations—Christian, secular, and
Islamic. In addition, neoliberalism and associated developments, such as
the increasing gap between rich and poor, and state withdrawal from social
service provision, are making interventions of such NGOs even more impor-
tant. At the same time, the work of Islamic NGOs can be seen as a reaction
to neoliberalism, since they sometimes contest the influence of “the West”
africa today 54(3)

and secularized and Westernized elites (Ghandour 2002; International Crisis

Group 2005), including capitalist rent-seeking behavior, individualism, and
lack of solidarity.
In spite of this, Islamic NGOs do not appear in the literature on NGOs
and neoliberal policies in Africa. Studies that focus on local NGOs and civil
society abound (Harbeson, Rothchild, and Chazan 1994; Igoe and Kelsall
2005; Marcussen 1996; Van der Walle, Ball, and Ramachandran 2003), often
4

heralding their capacity to produce development unlike corrupt states (Brat-

ton 1989; Riddell and Robinson 1995; Wellard and Copestake 1993). Studies
Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad

focusing on transnational NGOs (Barrow and Jennings 2001; Callaghy 2001;

Hearn 1998) tend to be more critical, pointing to the fact that their involve-
ment in local development may make weak states even weaker. Others
are critical about neoliberal policies in Africa, but stress the importance of
NGOs in mitigating their effects (Larmer 2005). In none of these analyses
do Islamic NGOs figure at all. Even the idea of “faith-based development”
(Bornstein 2003; Hofer 2003), referring to the importance of religious orga-
nizations in bringing about development and which has recently become
fashionable, is usually seen as only relating to Christian initiatives. A pos-
sible explanation for the inattention to Islamic NGOs is that the concepts
of NGOs and “civil society” are part of the neoliberal project; they therefore
tend to be filled in by categories that match the agenda of liberal democracy
(Bornstein 2003; Williams 1993)—and Western conceptions of development,
in which the very idea of Islamic NGOs appears almost unthinkable.
Islamic NGOs are Islamic in the sense that Islam is an important
source of inspiration for them as organizations. Different Islamic NGOs may
have differing objectives and methods of operation, but all share a founda-
tion in the sacred textual sources of Islam, the Qur’an and the Sunna (the
authoritative practice of the Prophet Muhammad), and in the basic principles
of Islamic law and ethics, acting on their identity, agenda(s), and the manner
in which they obtain and distribute their resources.2 The first transnational
Islamic NGOs were established at the end of the 1970s and in the early
1980s, triggered by the war in Afghanistan and made financially viable by the
oil boom in Arab countries (Ghandour 2002). They based themselves on an
Islamic understanding of solidarity that comprised three elements: ighatha
‘humanitarian relief’, da’wa ‘the call or invitation to Islam’, and jihad in the
sense of armed support of the Islamic cause3 (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan
2003; Ghandour 2002). In some contexts, such as Afghanistan and Bosnia,
these elements have all been present in Islamic NGO activities; but over
the years, these NGOs have evolved, and a process of professionalization
has set in (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003). Some have developed a more
humanitarian outlook, while others have become more politically active
(Ghandour 2002). In Africa, where they have been active since the 1980s,
they have mainly focused on ighatha and da’wa.
An Islamic concept of solidarity not only informs the work of these
NGOs, but is the basis of their funding. The financial aspect of this solidarity
is formed by the religious duty of zakat ‘obligatory almsgiving’ 4 and sadaqa

africa today 54(3)

‘voluntary almsgiving’. Zakat, a kind of financial worship, constitutes an act
of social solidarity and an affirmation of faith ((Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan
2003:26). The Qur’an states who has a right to zakat. In many places, it was
traditionally paid to help the needy in one’s own community, but it has
increasingly been understood that the community can encompass the whole
of the umma. This idea took root in rich countries such as Saudi Arabia
and the United Kingdom as Muslims progressively felt that the real poor no

5
longer or only sporadically lived in their own countries—a fact enhanced by
the mass media, which exposed poverty and disasters worldwide. A point of

Mayke Kaag
contention is whether zakat is for needy Muslims only, or also for non-Mus-
lims. Generally, it is considered to be for Muslims only, but if the concept is
widened to include not only Muslims but also those who can become Mus-
lims, aid to non-Muslims becomes appropriate. This means, however, that
da’wa remains an important component of an Islamic NGO’s strategy.
Islamic NGOs from the Arab world generally disseminate what is
often called a Salafi form of Islam. Salafism is a modernist current, which
purports to follow the “pious predecessors” (Arabic, salaf), the first genera-
tion of Muslims, whose practice of Islam it considers to be the “purest” form
(Ghandour 2002). Salafis seek an Islamic revival through the elimination of
what they consider to be foreign innovations (bid’a).5 Through their efforts
to “reeducate” African Muslims about Islam and to purify Islam of allegedly
un-Islamic practices (see Rosander 1997), these NGOs help ease processes
of Islamization and Arabization, with the latter understood as an increased
cultural orientation toward the Arab world, expressed in the adoption of ele-
ments (such as language, styles of clothing, and social and cultural values)
of transnational Arab elite culture as a reference. Arabization and the teach-
ing of Islam and the Arabic language are seen as an antidote to the effects
of Western colonialism and contemporary influences from “the West” (see
Hunwick 1997).
In a context of structural adjustment, an increased spread of Western
consumption ideals by mass communication and a growing sense of the
global context in which one is living, transnational Islamic NGOs aim to
influence people’s material and moral well-being. In combining material aid
with proselytization, they embed their work in ideas about transnational
solidarity and the importance of enhancing the umma, the global commu-
nity of the faithful. In this paper, I illustrate this by focusing on the work of
transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad. In 2004, as many as eleven transna-
tional Islamic NGOs had a presence in Chad, which has become a favored
country of intervention for Islamic (and Christian) NGOs for at least two
 reasons: the first is that it is a poor country, where the needs on the ground
are manifold; second, it is situated at the crossroads of Arab and Black
African and Western spheres of influence, and is, therefore, strategically
important. I first outline what neoliberalism has brought to Chad, sketch
longer-term globalization processes, and indicate how Chad’s contacts with
the Arab world fit into these. I then elaborate on the current interventions
by transnational Islamic NGOs in the country and discuss some effects of
africa today 54(3)

their work on Chadian society. It appears that the opening up of the country
after the end of the civil war has facilitated the arrival not only of Western
organizations, but also of Arab ones, that Islamic NGOs have intervened in
areas that are, or that they see as, neglected, or at least not well covered by
the state, and that their interventions can partly be seen as opposing Western
influence, as is shown by the rivalry between Christian and Islamic organiza-
tions. I conclude with a more general reflection on the study of transnational
6

Islamic NGOs in Chad in the context of neoliberalism.

Building on previous work on secular NGOs in Africa, I explicitly put
Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad

the agency of the NGOs central in the research, as no research had yet been
done on Islamic NGOs in Chad, and information about these organizations
was sparse, while prejudices were plenty. During two field trips to Chad,6
I visited every transnational Islamic NGO’s headquarters, had one or more
interviews with the director or staff members, and in many cases visited
one or more of their projects. In addition, I conducted interviews with other
informants, such as staff from Christian NGOs and Muslim authorities. To
grasp what happens in the interaction between NGOs and the population, I
conducted interviews in different neighborhoods in the capital, N’Djamena,
and in several villages in the south of Chad. For a European non-Muslim
researcher, doing research on transnational Islamic NGOs is not an easy task
in the post-September 11 era. My work aroused suspicion among the NGO
directors: was I a spy for the American government? It was only after exten-
sive informal talks and repeated explanations about my academic affiliation
that they became more relaxed.7 They started to see me as a mouthpiece to
make their good intentions known in the Western world—which of course
had an influence on how they portrayed themselves and their work. Most
of the NGOs were therefore quite open about their material assistance, but
stayed silent about their da’wa activities, about which I gained more data
only when I was out of their offices and in the field. Further research should
be carried out on the dynamics related to the operation of these organiza-
tions in Chad and elsewhere in Africa (Kaag 2007), much as has been done for
Christian and secular NGOs. Since the time of my fieldwork, the American
government’s war on terrorism has forced several NGOs (mainly Saudi ones)
to suspend their activities; however, the general dynamics I describe in this
paper remain valid.
Chad in the Neoliberal Era: Poverty and Conflict
at the Crossroads of the Local and the Global

After twenty years of civil war, Chad entered a period of nominal peace and
democratization in the early 1990s, when Idriss Deby, supported behind the
scenes by Libya, Sudan, and France, defeated his predecessor, Hissene Habré,
in a coup d’état (Buijtenhuijs 1993). In 1992, the government of Chad, under

africa today 54(3)

pressure from the World Bank, the IMF, and other donors, adopted a set of
measures to cure the Chadian economy. After Deby’s coming to power, Chad
gave the impression of being a schizophrenic country (Buijtenhuijs 1993:36):
on the one hand, it had grand discourses, a democratization process, and a
free press, but on the other, there was a general atmosphere of insecurity,
conspiracy, and a declining economy. In 2004, the general atmosphere of
insecurity and threat seemed to have gained the upper hand, people were

7
afraid to talk, and soldiers were omnipresent in the streets of N’Djamena. In
that year, Chad was ranked eleventh on a list of the world’s “least inhabit-

Mayke Kaag
able” countries, with a life expectancy at birth of 45 years, an adult literacy
rate of 45.8 percent, and an adjusted GDP per capita of US$1,002 (United
Nations Development Programme 2004). The situation of most Chadians,
who had already suffered in the civil war and during periods of prolonged
drought in the 1970s and 1980s, had not improved in the 1990s.
The recent coming on line of the oil fields near Doba in the south of
Chad, which are exploited by an American–Malaysian consortium under
the supervision of the World Bank, has led to new expectations among the
Chadian population, but has generated unrest as to who will benefit from the
profits (Bennafla 2000; Ellis 2003; Guyer 2002). The World Bank presented
the project as revenue-driven poverty alleviation, and the Chadian govern-
ment agreed that a large share of the profits would be spent on health and
education and other basic needs for the poor. The project intends to be sensi-
tive to human and environmental concerns, and unprecedented regulatory
arrangements have been made to ensure transparency and accountability. It
has been hailed as a pioneering model for responsible private investment in
Africa, but many negative environmental and social impacts were by 2005
already being reported about how the World Bank and Exxon-Mobil were
handling the project (Massey and May 2005). It became clear that Deby was
unwilling to adhere to the spending arrangements for poverty alleviation,
partly because he was in a difficult situation as a result of the war in the
Darfur region while being under attack from rebels in his own circles.
Since 2003, Chad has become an important element in the U.S. gov-
ernment’s war on terror through the Pan-Sahel Initiative, a U.S. European
Central Command program to train and equip Sahelian countries in the
fight against groups linked to Al-Qaeda. Chad is one of four countries that
are the focus of the program; the others are Mali, Niger, and Mauritania
(Ellis 2004).8
Nevertheless, it is not through these recent events that Chad has
become linked to the wider world. The country has long been a transitional
 area between Islamic, and “animist” and Christian zones, corresponding
with the northern and southern parts of the country respectively. The north
of Chad came into contact with Muslim influences from the north and the
east through trans-Saharan trade and migration, and has been Islamized for
a long time with a strong presence of the Tijaniyya Sufi order. The south is
mainly Christian, the area most affected by colonial development initiatives
and by the Christian mission that arrived in Chad from Cameroon and the
africa today 54(3)

Central African Republic at the beginning of the 20th century.

In recent history, religion has become politicized in Chad. After inde-
pendence, a Christian southerner became the first president, and the main
positions in the administration were occupied by southerners. They had been
educated at French schools, which the majority of Muslims had boycotted.
Another factor contributing to this southern dominance was the fact that
France had focused on developing the south. This situation and the openly
8

negative attitude of the president and his fellows led to increasing tensions
between the Muslims and those in power. After a long period of guerrilla
Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad

and civil war, the northerners seized power in the mid-1980s. Under the first
Muslim president, Hissene Habré, southerners felt that northerners were
progressively occupying their area by installing northern administrators. The
arrival of large numbers of Muslim traders and Muslim cattleowners, who
actually were fleeing the droughts in the north, reinforced this sentiment.
These factors and the conversion of former Christians and animists in the
south have made Islam more widespread in the south.
In 1990, Habré fell from power, and Deby, one of his former col-
laborators, took the presidency. Despite the democratization process, the
functioning of the state—with the group in power using state resources for
its own purposes—has not fundamentally altered and conflicts and tensions
between the Muslim North and the Christian South consequently continue.
Differences between these areas have become prominent in most thinking
about religious, social, and political dynamics—which makes it difficult
(and often politically undesirable) to perceive variations and differentiation
within the two camps. Since 2004, exploitation of the oil fields in the south
has aggravated tensions further.
While oil reserves have been bringing Chad to the forefront of Western
attention, the country has been (re)intensifying its ties with Arab countries
since the 1980s. Heightened orientation toward the Arab world is economic
and religious–cultural in character. Chadian imports from the Gulf States
have increased, and Arab investments in real estate, public works, and
industry have grown (Bennafla 2000). Sudan can be considered an old player
in Chad, but Sudanese influence has recently been facilitated by Deby’s rise
to power as a result of Sudanese support.9 Libyan investments in Chad have
increased too, since the settlement of the twenty-year-old conflict over the
Aouzou Strip10 in the mid-1990s.
In addition to investments, Arab bilateral and multilateral aid has
become increasingly important. The King Faysal University and the Central
Market in N’Djamena were financed by Saudi Arabia. Multilateral support
has mainly been provided through the Islamic Development Bank and the
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa. Ties with the Arab world
are developing further as growing numbers of Chadians are studying in
Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, increasing numbers of immigrants to Saudi
Arabia are keeping in touch with their families back home, and large num-
bers of Chadians are performing the hajj, made possible in part by improved
means of transport. This intensification of contacts with Arab countries

africa today 54(3)

has been accompanied by processes of changing perceptions of Islam and a
process of Arabization.
Neoliberal policies have not brought much improvement to ordinary
Chadians’ lives, but instead have favored some external and internal actors
and fueled frustration for others. This frustration tends to be grafted onto
old cleavages and is exacerbating existing tensions between Muslims and
Christians, and between the north and the south. Alongside the increase in

9
influence from western actors—states, NGOs and enterprises—normally
associated with globalization and neoliberalism, Chad’s links with the Arab

Mayke Kaag
world have been intensified, as well. The Islamic NGOs studied in this arti-
cle form part of the growing influence of the Arab world. In the following sec-
tion, we explore how they are intervening in Chad, characterized as it is by
poverty, internal political and religious tensions, and a growing geopolitical
importance of the country.

The Intervention of Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad

The transnational Islamic NGOs operating in Chad in 2004 comprised one

Libyan, three Sudanese, one Kuwaiti, and six Saudi organizations. In the same
year, a total of forty-two international NGOs were working in the country.11
What is interesting here is that two waves of arrivals can be discerned.
The first Islamic NGOs arrived in the mid-1980s, at the time of the serious
droughts and the coming to power of Hissene Habré. Internationally, the late
1970s and early 1980s had seen the establishment of the first transnational
Islamic NGOs, which in the following years started to work in various parts
of Asia and Africa. For example, the International Islamic Relief Organiza-
tion (IIRO), one of the first Saudi transnational NGOs set up by the Saudi
government (in 1978), arrived in Chad in 1986. The arrival of the Suda-
nese organizations al-Dawa al-Islamiya and the International African Relief
Agency (IARA) in Chad in the same period can partly be related to Sudan’s
foreign policy, which was oriented toward the spread of Arabo-Islamic cul-
ture in Africa (Grandin 1993). Al-Dawa al-Islamiya at that time, however,
was not only in the hands of Sudan, but for a large part funded by Libya and
progressively by the Saudis. The latter were afraid that Khadaffi would use
the organization to increase his influence in Chad, and they tried to outbid
him financially (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003:115).
The second wave began at the end of the 1990s. In 1993, a national
conference in Chad had set in motion the process of (formal) democratization
 and peacemaking—which led to a constitutional referendum and elections in
1996–1997.12 In the context of new beginnings, some high-placed individu-
als started a lobby in the Gulf States to attract Islamic NGOs by organizing
meetings and conferences at which it was explained that Chad was a poor
country in need of material, social, and cultural support. Saudi Arabia in the
mid and late 1990s had seen an upsurge in new NGOs independent of the
Saudi state, but often still administered by members of the Saudi elite. These
africa today 54(3)

sought an outlet for their funds and were willing to respond to the Chad-
ian call. The Libyan World Islamic Call Association arrived in Chad only
after the end of the conflict over the Aouzou Strip and the historic visit of
reconciliation by Khadaffi to N’Djamena in 1998 (Haddad 2000).
Islamic NGOs in Chad concern themselves primarily with concrete
aid: constructing mosques and wells and providing support for orphans,
healthcare, and education. The construction of wells and mosques often
10

goes hand in hand, based on the idea that Muslims need water to purify
themselves before praying. The care for orphans is a core activity of most
Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad

NGOs, be it the financing of orphanages (for example, IIRO) or the sponsor-

ing of orphans who stay with relatives through a kind of foster-parents plan
(for example, al-Dawa al-Islamiya). Caring for orphans is rooted in Islam:
the Prophet himself was an orphan, and many hadiths point to the value of
providing care for these children.
In the area of healthcare, several NGOs run small clinics in towns such
as N’Djamena, Abeche, and Sarh. A popular activity is the organization of
medical caravans (Délégation Spéciale du Prince Sultan, AMA, al-Muntada
al-Islamiya), whereby a team of doctors and nurses travels through the
country, organizes consultations for the population, and carries out simple
surgery. These caravans have a strong publicity effect.
In the educational field, Islamic NGOs have constructed schools for
formal education and Quranic schools, and ensure their continued func-
tioning by financing teachers’ salaries. AMA, for instance, has financed
eleven formal schools for a total of 2764 pupils and pays the salaries of one
hundred twenty-eight teachers. It has constructed seven Quranic schools for
four hundred fifty pupils (Agence des Musulmans d’Afrique 2002). Al-Dawa
al-Islamiya finances schools in Sarh and Abeche for a total of six hundred
pupils and a school in N’Djamena for a thousand. The World Association of
Islamic Call from Libya finances, among several educational projects, a sec-
ondary school and a library in N’Djamena. All the organizations consider the
teaching of, and in, Arabic highly important. For them, the Arabic language
stands for a way of living and perceiving that is inspired by Islam and Arab
culture—values that in their view are marginalized in the Chadian state’s
secular (laic) educational system.
According to the NGO Directorate of the Ministry of Planning, NGOs
sign a protocole d’accord with the Chadian state through the Directorate of
Cooperation when they arrive. When they effectively start their work, they
have further dealings with the NGO directorate. They have to submit a plan
of operations, and the directorate puts them in contact with the relevant
ministry. These parties together frame a project agreement, in which the
NGO’s plan is seen as complementary to government policy. The Sudanese
organization Al Biir / International Benevolence Foundation, for example,
builds health centers in cooperation with the Ministry of Health.
Material aid is not the only focus of these NGOs. As Islamic NGOs
(and not NGOs merely run by Muslims), they have a missionary function:
they are, at bottom, concerned with the advancement of Islam, be it by

africa today 54(3)

deepening people’s understanding of Islamic principles and by improving
Muslims’ religious practices (re-Islamization), or by converting non-Muslims
(Islamization). This missionary aspect comes most explicitly to the fore
in activities in the field of religious education and the promotion of Islam
(sponsoring Quranic teachers, distributing learning materials, and so on), but
in fact underlies all other NGO activities. On the Saudi NGO al-Haramain
website, for example, the most important aims of the organization include

11
“Being quick to provide aid to the Muslims who suffer from catastrophes,
disasters and calamities and to benefit them with material assistance to

Mayke Kaag
enliven the eeman [faith] in the hearts and implant knowledge in their
breasts if Allah Most High so wills.”13
These missionary activities are directed at Muslims who, in the eyes
of these organizations, have only a limited knowledge of Islam. In the south
of Chad, predominantly Christian and animist, missionary activities are
primarily directed at the non-Muslim population. In this zone, organiza-
tions such as al-Makka al-Mukarrama, AMA, and al-Muntada have centers
for recent converts. One of their strategies is to go preaching in the villages,
and men who show an interest in becoming a Muslim are then taken back
to the center, where they get a course of one to nine months, during which
time they are fed and housed; after their course, they ideally return to their
villages and start spreading the message themselves. Another strategy con-
sists of approaching local power holders, such as the chefs de canton, the idea
being that when they convert, their family and partisans will follow. Part of
the sensitization process can be the offering of presents or money, the prom-
ise of an all-expenses-paid visit to Saudi Arabia to perform the hajj, and/or a
community project. The chef de canton of Dunia, for example, was offered a
trip to Mecca by AMA, and from there he went on to Kuwait, where he met
the amir, through whom he obtained a center with a mosque, a school, and a
clinic for his canton. The AMA 2001 annual report includes the cost of seven
people’s pilgrimage to Mecca (Agence des Musulmans d’Afrique 2002).
The Islamization discourse used by the organizations stresses the
global umma and the unity of the Muslim community. They bring the mes-
sage of Islam as one; at the same time, however, they strongly differentiate
between “good” and “bad” Islam (Rosander 1997: 2). There is a strong accent
on right behavior, such as the correct ways of dressing, praying, fasting, and
so on. Rosander observes in this respect: “Formal gestures and roles repeat-
edly acted out tend to become more authentic as times passes and the per-
former gradually identifies with his or her role” (1997:17). The idea is that,
during the course of Islamization, frame and idiom become essence.14
 It must be stressed that Islamization is a complex process, which
cannot simply be attributed to the efforts of one organization. Let us take the
example of a village in the south of Chad, where (so I was told) the village
chief had recently become Muslim, with a large group of villagers. When I
visited the village, it appeared that it had not been sudden, but rather a com-
plex and ongoing process, in which Muslim merchants from the north had
settled in the village some years before, a village chief from an adjacent vil-
africa today 54(3)

lage had spent time in Nigeria and converted to Islam there before returning
home, preachers affiliated with the Grand Mosque in Moundou had invested
time and effort in the village, and, finally, sensitization by AMA had made
progressively more people Islamize over the years. In the background is
always the fact that people associate Islam with power, as most of those in
high positions in the (local) administration and the military are Muslims.
12

Effects in Chad
Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad

It is reasonable to expect that in Chad, a country that exhibits strong politici-

zation of religion and Muslim–Christian tensions, the interventions of these
NGOs would have political implications, particularly in the south, an arena
of real Christian-Muslim competition.
The Islamic and Christian NGOs are actors in this arena, and they feel
that they are there to defend a cause. Each side suspects the other of using
aid as a means of gaining converts. The other is often suspected of having
hidden political objectives, or of being a political instrument in the hands
of states or global power blocs. The director of an Islamic NGO suspected
the Christian NGO World Vision of being politically active in a town where
both organizations were operational. A staff member at an American Protes-
tant NGO qualified the transnational Islamic NGOs as puppets in a master
plan of the Saudi state. More often, however, Christian organizations—and
Christians in Chad more generally—see the “Islamic threat” as coming from
Sudan. They fear that Islamic influences from there will result in Chad’s
becoming an Islamist state. Christian organizations frequently suspect the
Islamic organizations of being given preferential treatment by the Chadian
administration; however, a nun from a Roman Catholic mission, who could
critically reflect on her own position, noted that “every party tries to win
over the population by gifts; we [Roman Catholics] also impose [ourselves],
for instance through healthcare.”
It is important to note that Christian organizations may have pros-
elytizing objectives in much the same way as Muslim organizations do.
The Chadian national association of Protestant churches, the Entente of
Evangelical Churches and Missions in Chad (EEMET), explicitly mentions
evangelization as one of its objectives, in addition to the improvement of
religious practices, the fighting of “wrong doctrines” within its own com-
munity, and the defense of the interests of the evangelical community vis-à-
vis the state. In its vision statement, the proselytization component appears
even more strongly, as it is stated that the aim is “to make the whole of the
Chadian nation the followers of Jesus Christ” (EEMET 2003). These three
objectives—the education of their own community, the conversion of others,
and the defense of the group’s interests—basically parallel those of many
Muslim organizations.
There is little direct confrontation between Christian and Islamic
organizations, but the people at the grassroots level—the target groups of

africa today 54(3)

NGO activities—often feel the consequences of their rivalry. Sometimes it
is only that they have to deal with two different messages or approaches—
which can be confusing.15 Not uncommonly, however, the rivalry between
Christian and Islamic organizations takes a fiercer turn, with the slandering
of the other party and the fueling of fear.
Efforts are being made not to polarize the strained relationship any fur-
ther. In this respect, Roman Catholic organizations are generally more open

13
to Islamic organizations than Protestant ones, while an open attitude toward
the other party by and large appears to be easier for Muslims than for Chris-

Mayke Kaag
tians. The sense of being the minority party contributes to a defensive atti-
tude on the part of many Christian actors. This point is nicely illustrated by
the fact that a director of an Islamic NGO expressed his open attitude toward
his Christian colleagues while stressing that he saw the rivalry between them
as nothing bad; however a Christian director experienced this rivalry not as
something amusing or natural, but as truly threatening. A Protestant orga-
nization organized a seminar entitled “How to Respond to the Objections of
the Muslims against Christian Faith?” to enable its members to defend them-
selves. In the booklet accompanying the seminar, information on Islam was
provided, as were the correct answers to six of the main Muslim objections
to Christianity (about the idea of the Trinity, of Jesus being the Son of God,
and so on). The booklet ends with the question: Who will win the battle?—
and the answer is that Christianity will win only when all Christians are
mobilized; otherwise, Christians will become Muslims (Haq 2004).
In addition to Christian–Muslim competition, there is the intra-Mus-
lim arena. The more established form of Islam is that of the Sufi order of
the Tijaniyya. Staff members of the Islamic NGOs from the Arab world
frequently embrace more Islamist and reformist forms of Islam. In their way
of thinking, the way Africans practice Islam is not “real” Islam, and they
often emphasize the need to purify Islam in Africa of its un-Islamic elements,
which for many of them includes Sufi orders in general and the Tijaniyya
in particular. There is a strong focus on learning Arabic and on Mecca and
Madina as the true center of the Muslim world. They can thus be considered
anti-Sufi. While being welcomed by the Muslim establishment as a partner
in the Islamic cause, they are therefore partially seen as a threat. But Sufi
Islam is also not a static institution: there are more reformist-Islamist ten-
dencies, especially among younger and better-educated urban people, who
tend to view positively the message of the Arab NGOs.
For ordinary people in villages and urban neighborhoods, the interven-
tion of Islamic NGOs may offer a rare opportunity to obtain a well, a mosque,
 or medical treatment. The Islamization message may be equally welcome
in situations of insecurity. In the south for instance, tensions between
mostly Muslim cattleholders and non-Muslim farmers are currently an
explosive problem (Arditi 2003). To solve them, the local administration is
approached—an administration that, as we have seen, is nowadays usually
Muslim. In such cases, it helps appellants to be a Muslim, but becoming
Muslim is undertaken for more than material or political reasons: faith
africa today 54(3)

gives moral support, and having clear rules to follow adds to a feeling of
security. A Muslim convert in a southern village stated that praying five
times a day gave him strength, as it made him feel he was not alone in facing
his problems. People who had become Muslim in the south added that the
ban on alcohol was a good thing: whereas before, they had spent much of
their income on alcohol, they now had more money and energy to put to
productive uses. This perception does not prevent people from feeling that
14

Islamization leads to cleavages in villages and families, in particular because

politics are infiltrating local communities along religious lines.
Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad

Concluding Observations

The first Islamic NGOs arrived in Chad when Chadians needed help as a
result of the civil war and the severe droughts of the 1980s. The opening up
of the country after the war and the start of a process of democratization
have facilitated the arrival of not only Western, but also Arab organizations.
Islamic NGOs intervene in areas that are, or that they perceive as having
been, ignored or not well covered by the state, such as (religious) education
and healthcare. Their interventions can partly be seen as a reaction to West-
ern influence. Their accent on the learning of Arabic and on Islamic educa-
tion is inspired by a strong feeling that it is a natural antidote to an artificial
colonial legacy expressed among other things in Western-style education
and a secular state system, and against current Western influences (such as
morals perceived as lax) put out by the mass media. In addition, they see it
as a way of improving traditional Islamic education, which one of the NGO
directors indicated as being “very primitive.” In these ways, they find a will-
ing ear among Chadian Muslim intellectuals and their financial supporters
in the Arab world. A web of transnational Islamic solidarity is thus being
nourished on the giving and receiving sides.
In all these respects, the intervention of Islamic NGOs fits into this era
of neoliberalism, but the last aspect has in the last few years become increas-
ingly important. The age of neoliberalism is no status quo, nor is it the end
of history, and, as Kalb (2004) rightly observes, since the mid 1990s, “pure”
liberalism has given way to more conservative stances, in which culture is
playing an important role. The idea of a clash of civilizations appears to be
replacing the idea of the global village. Both Christian and Islamic NGOs
are acting within this dynamic, and are reacting to it globally and locally. It
should however be realized that more generally, ideas about Islamic NGOs
in the West are influenced by this worldview, as well. These NGOs thus
often tend to be portrayed as the Big Evil, forcing fundamentalist Islam on
Africans. The reality is much more complex: Islamic NGOs are part of a
broader dynamic, one that is fueling Islamization processes, and can only
reinforce or bend ongoing developments.
It has been argued for the Chadian civil war that not only external
intervenors used local actors to pursue their own agendas, thereby exacer-

africa today 54(3)

bating internal cleavages, but that internal actors also made use of possibili-
ties offered by external interference (Nolutshungu 1996). In the same vein,
instead of nurturing an image of Arab NGOs as mighty invaders, it is more
useful to see the effects of the interventions of Islamic NGOs in Chad as
a dynamic in which internal actors too feel attracted by external messages
for different reasons. People may see possibilities for reducing their level
of poverty by accepting material help, or they may Islamize because they

15
feel morally and religiously strengthened and can face their difficult living
circumstances. Alternatively, they may see the opportunity to gain political

Mayke Kaag
support or power. Rosander (1997:2) rightly states that Islamization processes
frequently contribute to a polarization between religious practices and
between traditional and reformist Islam, but people find support and relief
here too. It is only from this double angle that we can begin to understand
the interventions of transnational Islamic NGOs and current Islamization
processes in Sub Saharan Africa.

Notes

1. African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands, kaag@ascleiden.nl. Research has been made
possible by financial support from WOTRO, the Van Coeverden Adriani Stichting, the “Islam in
Africa” program (ASC/CEAN) and the African Studies Centre.
2. This obviously does not mean that the Muslim character of such a NGO may not be contested
among Muslims, comparable to the ways in which the work of Christian NGOs is disputed
among Christians.
3. This understanding only makes up part of the broader meaning of the concept of jihad. The
denotation is of a struggle or a challenge; it is also often used to indicate the inner struggle
to master oneself.
4. Muslims with an income below a certain threshold (nisab) do not have to pay zakat.
5. It must, however, be stressed that there is much disagreement between different groups who
call themselves Salafi as to “true” Salafism, as well as to the appropriate method of reform.
6. From March to June 2004 and in September 2004.
7. I felt it also helped that I am a woman, and that I came on foot to their offices, and not in a
posh, four-wheel drive.
8. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Chad’s former ambassador to the United States pointed to the
danger that the Chadian president might use the equipment and better-trained armed forces
for his own ends. See also Africa Confidential (2004), which states that U.S. military cooperation
will draw President Deby further into Washington’s sphere of influence; however, a recent
 report by the International Crisis Group (2005) stresses that, though the goals of the initiative
are ambitious, “the day-to-day activities are often rather mundane.”
9. The relationship between Deby and Sudan has been negatively affected by the Darfur crisis.
The president’s own ethnic group, the Zaghawa, is a main target of attacks by the Sudanese
government-supported Janjaweed militias, putting Deby in the middle of a web of competing
interests.
10. The Aouzou, in northern Chad, is a strip of land that lies along the border with Libya. In 1973,
africa today 54(3)

Libya tried to seize the strip to gain access to its minerals and to use it as a base of influence
in Chadian politics. This action marked the beginning of a war for control of the area. In 1994,
a decision of the International Court of Justice granted sovereignty over the Aouzou strip to
Chad.
11. There were sixty-nine foreign NGOs registered with the ministry of Planning, but only forty-
two were operational: that is, they sent reports to the Ministry (source: interview Ministry of
Planning, NGO Direction, N’Djamena, April 2005).
16

12. See Buijtenhuijs (1993) for a detailed account of this Conference and its related dynamics, and
Buijtenhuijs (1998) for the subsequent democratization process.
Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad

13. www.alharamain.org. The Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs dissolved the charity worldwide in
2004 after the U.S. government had accused it of funding terrorism.
14. A member of an American Christian NGO in Chad stated that this was the difference between
the approaches of Christian organizations like his and Islamic organizations: Islamic organiza-
tions focus on the outside and appearances, while Christians work the other way round, trying
first to bring about a change of heart—which of course he considered the right approach
morally.
15. A staff member with a Christian organization, for instance, said that when they intend to dig
a well in a village they first form and train a management committee, while an Islamic NGO
simply digs a beautiful well and then leaves, making the villagers feel that the Roman Catholic
organization is far too demanding.

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18
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