The Evolving Role of Biological Weapons

Article Submitted to Army Chemical Review (2007)

by Reid Kirby

H istorically, the role of biological weapons has

been in parity with nuclear weapons, under-
going a succession of dynamic compromises. Interest
in biological weapons initially started an extension
of chemical weapons, being a logistically favorable
alternative to nuclear weapons. An abnormous be-
lief is that interest in biological weapons wanes after
acquiring nuclear weapons. This was not the case
in the Cold War with United States efforts. The
role continued during a period of nuclear scarcity
as an augment to the nuclear arsenal. Once there
was a super adequacy of nuclear weapons, the role of
biological weapons evolved to find exclusive utility
in Large Area Coverage (LAC) and Controlled Tem-
porary Incapacitation (CTI). Also a third exclusive
role had existed throughout the program.

Behind the nebulous term “covert” is a third role

of biological weapons, spanning from the off-target
aerial spray attack to the dirty tricks of sabotage and
espionage. What unifies this third role is the utility
of biological weapons to avoid attributing an attack
to an event or opponent; hereafter termed Low Ob-
servable Attribution (LOA). This one role exploits
the principle of surprise, verging on perfidy, and Figure 1. Posological spectrum of United States military
therefore produces the most fear in policy makers chemicals, toxins, and biologicals of the Second World
over the possibility of anonymous strategic biologi- War.
cal attacks that escape retaliation.

Extension (1942 – 1944) Alternative (1945)

When nations began to establish serious undertak-
ings to develop biological weapons after the First
World War, the programs were an extension of chem-
ical weapons technology. Biological weapons follow
the same posological theorem as chemical weapons,
only with greater agent potency (Figure 1). Like-
wise, the purpose of biological weapons retained the
same intent of producing mass casualties, denial of
terrain, and degrading performance.
During the Second World War, the Allied biological
program was distinctly separate from the effort to
develop nuclear weapons. The program often vied
for the same scientists, though for sake of secrecy it
never shared such resources. At a time when feasibil-
ity of nuclear weapons was still questionable, policy
makers familiar with both programs were rest as-
sured that biological weapons provided a logistically
reasonable alternative should the nation fail to build
a nuclear weapon (Figure 2).
 ed later by Navy research in 1950 on the biological
effects of radiation.

As early as June 1946 the United States created a war

plan for nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union. Policy
analysts foresaw an inevitable conflict between Great
Briton and the Soviet Union, and United States
forces were too small to hold back a massive inva-
sion of Soviet forces through Western Europe and
the Middle East. The plan, PINCHER, required 50
nuclear weapons on 20 Soviet cities to destroy 90%
of Soviet aircraft and armor industries, and 65% oil
refineries. The target list gradually grew over the
years in keeping with the number of weapons in
the arsenal. Many believed the required number of
weapons to keep the Soviet Union in check was in
the thousands.

Under President Harry Truman, the number of

nuclear weapons in the arsenal was an extreme se-
cret – even the military establishment was unaware
of the number of nuclear weapons available for war
plans until late 1947. The actual number was un-
derwhelming (figure 3). At the time of PINCHER
there was only 11 nuclear weapons in the arsenal - a
period of nuclear scarcity existed.
Figure 2. Comparative fire paower of different strategic bom-
bardment sorties (1945 - 1951). After the Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear
weapon in 1949, the United States issued NSC-68, a
Just as the Second World War ended, the United policy study that predicted the Soviet Union to have
States was on the cusp of a biological capability with
500-lb clusters of Mark I 4-lb biological bomblets
and the M47A2 100-lb biological bomb with an-
thrax. Though British had selected several cities for
retaliatory biological strikes against Germany, there
was no biological capability to support such plans.
The Army Air Force did not have the organizational
support to conduct biological operations, and the
weapons never entered production.

Augment (1946 – 1954)

At the time of operations CROSSROADS, the 1946
nuclear field trials at Bikini Atoll on naval vessels,
the military establishment recognized biological
weapons would have a synergistic effect if used in Figure 3. Scarcity of strategic nuclear weapons promoted bio-
combination with nuclear weapons; an idea support- logical weapons as an augment.
200 nuclear weapons by 1954, and delivery of half
this number would devastate the United States. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff made a biological warfare ca-
pability a high priority, and the Air Force put them
in the same organizational level as nuclear weap-
ons. The Air Force acquired 500-lb clusters of the
M114 4-lb biological bomblet with brucellosis from
the Chemical Corps. This was an interim item for
strategic attack against Soviet cities to augment the
nuclear arsenal.
Exclusivity
Interest in biological weapons waned significantly
once the number of nuclear weapons in the inven-
tory could saturate potential targets. The Eisen-
hower administration started developing a Single
Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) to coordinate
nuclear delivery systems. The first comprehensive
plan, SIOP-62, envisioned delivering 3,200 nuclear
weapons against the 1,060 targets throughout the
Sino-Soviet block in a preemptive attack, and 1,706
nuclear weapons against 725 targets in retaliation.
This change in strategic nuclear planning produced
an over-kill making strategic biological weapons al-
most irrelevant. The role biological weapons would
adopt exploited areas other weapon systems were in-
capable of achieving: LAC, CTI, and LOA.
Large Area Coverage (1958 – 1969)
Seeking a new edge after the Soviet Union detonated
its first nuclear weapon the United States initiated a
program to build a hydrogen bomb. When a nucle-
ar weapon designer asked General Curtis LeMay for
his requirements for a nuclear weapon design, Le-
May retorted “Why don’t you guys make a bomb to
blow up all of Russia.” The deterrent concept of the
Cold War embraced total destruction of the enemy.
The United States detonated its largest nuclear de-
vise (15 Mt) during operation CASTLE BRAVO in
1954 at Bikini Atoll. Not only did the devise have
almost three times its designed yield of 6 Mt, its
fallout traveled off course over an area far more ex-
tensive than originally estimated (Figure 4). If used
in a combat, significant thermal and blast destruc-
tion from such a devise would affect an area of 80
- 200 square miles; serious-to-lethal fallout covering
50,000 square miles. The impact on national policy
thinking was dramatic.
The Chemical Corps at one time advertised bio-
logical weapons as capable of covering the width
of a continent. The claim resulted from a series of
large-scale field trials with simulants that when ex-
trapolated with the infective dose and aerobiology
of military biologicals indicated the feasibility of
neutralizing targets tens to hundreds of thousands
of square miles in size. A 1952 field trial with simu-
lants demonstrated the technical feasibility of cover-
ing tens of thousands of square miles with a theoreti-
cally infective aerosol. The implications of this field
trial went practically unnoticed until 1957 when the
United States and Great Briton simultaneously and
independently investigated the LAC concept.
The British were dissatisfied with weather conditions
while planning biological field trials with simulants
in southern England in 1957. They therefore decid-
ed on conducting the trials as operational exercises
every six weeks regardless of weather in September
1958. These exercises indicated spray attacks 100 –
300 miles long could readily produce 50% casualties
100 – 150 miles downwind; an employment concept
for an off-target attack, only requiring a mean wind
profile predictable within 45 degrees to target.
The Chemical Corps conducted operation LAC
(Large Area Coverage) in 1957 – 1958. It was the
largest series of open-air experiments of its kind,
measuring coverage over the conterminous United
Figure 4. The 15 Mt CASTLE BRAVO burst in 1954 asserted the
strategic importance of radiological fallout.
States east of the Rocky Mountains. C-119 Fly
Boxcars flew along tracks 1,400 miles long spraying
5,000 lbs of simulants over the Midwest. Samplers
detected aerosols from these trials as far away as
1,200 miles.
In theory operation LAC demonstrated that a bio-
logical sortie spraying 4,000 lbs of a biological could
produce 50% casualties over a 100,000 square mile
target. A single fighter sortie with a nominal arma-
ment of spray tanks was capable of covering 25,000
to 50,000 square miles with a similar casualty rate
(Figure 5).
LAC was a major change in employment concept,
and even applied to on-target attacks with biological
bomblets. Strategic Air Command’s initial biologi-
cal capability had a coverage of 30 square miles per a
medium bomber sortie. When self-dispersing bom-
blets were developed, this could increase to about
100 square miles per a medium bomber sortie. By
the mid-1960’s improvements in biological bomb-
let design and delivery systems meant a single B-52
with an expanded SUU-24/A dispenser (Figure 6)
and flettner rotar bomblets could cover an area over
10,000 square miles. Putting this in perspective, the
120 square mile city of Kiev required 40 nuclear
weapons, or two to five B-52 sorties. The LAC con-
Figure 5. Hypothetical spray attack with Q fever (OU) in preper-
ation of an amphibious assault based after coverage data from
a field trail with simulants.
Figure 6. The SUU-24/A Bomblet Dispenser gave SAC a true stra-
tegic biological capability.
cept meant biological weapons could surpass nuclear
weapons in casualty potential, without precisely lo-
cating concealed or hardened targets.
Controlled Temporary Incapacitation (1947 – 1969)
After the Second World War, many officers believed
strategic bombing was a mistake, only with the
United States having to rebuild Germany and Japan
after the war. The Air Chemical Officer, Brigadier
General Edward Montgomery stated in September
1947:
“If it were possible to develop an agent with
a very widespread effect and a persistency of
effect of weeks or months, the possibility of
imposing our will on an enemy by political or
military seizure of strategic and vital localities,
personalities, or facilities, might be entirely fea-
sible. The nation which can develop the atom
bomb should be capable of developing such a
non-lethal running mate.”
Major General Carl A. Brandt, Air Force Deputy
Director of Requirements, outlined the Air Force’s
position on biological weapons in October 1948 as
requiring a biological that produced either tempo-
rary or permanent incapacitation that minimized
postwar problems.
Though the Air Force later changed its position to
wanting “killer” biologicals for strategic attack in
1952, the Chemical Corps continued to recognize
the importance of incapacitants. The 1958 Duer
Reeves Committee urged the military establishment
to adopt chemical biological warfare, particularly
non-lethal agents and those that circumvent protec-
tive masks. A year later Defense Research & En-
gineering director Dr. Herbert York endorsed the
findings. By this time, the Chemical Corps was in-
vesting three-forth of its research and development
budget on incapacitants.
At the 435th National Security Council meeting,
Figure 7. Hypothetical defense of South Vietnam using Venezu-
elan Equine Enchephalitis (NU) and bovine brucellosis (AB).
18 February 1960, Dr. York presented the concept
of CTI, relying on an array of chemicals and bio-
logicals. A 10,000-lb ballistic missile was capable
of incapacitating a target over a square mile in size,
roughly equivalent to the effect of a tactical nuclear
weapon. Unlike nuclear weapons, the effects pro-
duced casualties with a controlled rate and dura-
tion of action without death or permanent debility.
Furthermore, unlike tactical nuclear weapons, such
a concept would not result in destruction of mate-
rial, or hamper mobility from blown-down physical
obstacles.
Hypothetically, Figure 7 illustrates CTI in the de-
fense of South Vietnam against a massive invasion
from North Vietnam by integrating with maneuver.
United States forces would withdraw to the Tourane
perimeter, and South Vietnamese forces to the Sai-
gon perimeter. Simultaneous B-47 raids with bio-
logical bomblet dispensers would strike positions in
North Vietnam and around the defending perim-
eters. Then, United States and South Vietnamese
forces would break out during the first week when
Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (NU) would ef-
fectively neutralize North Vietnamese forces in the
south, and then converge on North Vietnam a week
later as bovine brucellosis (AB) began to neutralize
forces defending Hanoi.
Low Observable Attribution (1944 – 1975)
The United States Navy made a simulated large-scale
attack on San Francisco in September 1950. The at-
tack went completely unnoticed by the public. Sev-
eral miles offshore, a surface vessel made a lumbering
spray attack using 130 gallons of stimulant. Another
part of the trials involved Underwater Demolition
Teams infiltrating the dockyards and emplaced bio-
logical aerosol generators. Another concept tested
around the same time was the E-4 marine mine; a
submarine delivered mine that would surface at a
preset time, generate a biological aerosol, then scut-
tle itself. The trials demonstrated the peculiar covert
nature of biological warfare. The enemy would not
know that there was an attack until days later with
the arrival of casualties, and even then may lack suf-
ficient evidence to locate the source.
The covert nature of biological warfare transcends its
uses, from bio-crimes through bio-operations (Fig-
ure 8). LOA supplies operational security and sur-
prise. In the case of bio-crimes, bio-espionage, and
bio-sabotage, LOA extends into desired anonymity,
making an attack indistinguishable from an act of
nature rather than a specific opponent.
Putting aside the irrational, purposeful use of bio-
logical weapons is never an anomalous or anony-
mous event. The delay in casualty effects and near
nonexistent tangible evidence may confound attri-
bution to a specific event or opponent. In the case
of bio-terrorism, ultimately anonymity is counter
productive, as it does not assert the destructive pow-
er needed to promote their peculiar social-political
agenda. Moreover, the planned exploitation of bio-
logical weapon effects obviates anonymity in mili-
tary operations.
Figure 5 illustrates a hypothetical off-target spray
attack by a stealth aircraft. The target could be a
heavily defended beachhead intermixed with ci-
vilian communities. Using Q fever (OU), a large
number of casualties throughout the region with
minimal fatalities (<1%) could be expected. Such
an attack employs both LAC and CTI concepts. It
also exhibits LOA, where the defenders are unaware
of an attack until 14 days later when an amphibious
force comes ashore unopposed during a particularly
overwhelming outbreak of disease.
Figure 8. Spectrum of biological incidences.
Figure 9. E-22 Liquid BW Portable Generator would have pro-
vided Special Forces a biological capability.
A study on special biological operations issued in
October 1958, the Baldwin Report, stated unequivo-
cally that the United States was vulnerable to co-
vert biological attack. Fort Detrick responded by
creating its Special Operations Division (SOD), or
the dirty tricks guys. While SOD created the most
highly sensitive weapon systems of the United States
biological warfare program, the gadgetry was more-
or-less tactical and not thought of as a significant
contribution to biological capabilities. Nonetheless,
SOD did provide the technical support to identify
potential risks from LOA, including numerous field
trials that demonstrated the vulnerable of critical fa-
cilities to covert biological attack.
One gadget of unique LOA use was the E-22 (Figure
9). A backpack devise, Special Forces could emplace
it upwind of a critical target well outside of the de-
tection of perimeter security. Hypothetically, using
an agent like shigella dysentery (Y), a camp fever,
could result in an outbreak several days later that
would bring the target’s operations to a halt (Figure
10). Such an attack would go without detection, and
physical evidence of an attack may well elude inves-
tigators.
Legal & Ethical Restraints
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 was a no first use pledge
not to use chemical biological weapons. The Biolog-
ical Weapons Convention of 1975 was an outright
ban on the development, production, stockpiling,
and use of biological weapons, including transfer
of such weapons to other parties. If nations respect
these treaty commitments, then the list of potential
biological aggressors is a very small list. Maintain-
ing these proscriptive norms is an essential part of
our biological security. Should these proscriptive
norms fail, there are three legal/ethical principles
that may restrict the use of these weapons: distinc-
tion, discrimination, and proportionality.

Distinction
Distinction is a legal concept requiring openness
between combatants. Though military art requires
secrecy and deception, distinction draws a line be-
tween perfidy and legitimate action. Some will con-
clude weapons that are inherently covert in nature
are treacherous, as the British opined of submarines
in the First World War. LOA is an aspect of biologi-
cal warfare that many may conclude as perfidy by
nature. The principle of distinction applies mostly
to treachery (e.g., impersonating non-combatants).
Therefore, distinguished from legitimate military ac-
tion, LOA from bio-criminals, bio-espionage agents,
bio-terrorists, and bio-saboteurs may be perfidy ow-
ing to the manner of conduct.
Discrimination
Discrimination requires military actions distinguish
between combatants and noncombatants. The bel-
ligerents of the Second World War openly bombed
civilian population centers, an act that on the sur-
face violates the principle of discrimination. The Al-
lies ultimately legitimated their strategic bombings
as justly attacking enemy war industry, and it was a
double effect that civilians were part of the carnage.
A problem with biological warfare is that while there
is a matured acceptance to target enemy war indus-
tries, as the ethical norms exist today, it is an ethical
lapse to target the civilian workers without physical
destruction of these industries themselves.
Figure 10. Hypothetical Special Forces attack on a well guarded
facility with shigella dysentery (Y).
The principle of discrimination originates under the
presumption of lethal force, while CTI entreaties
non-lethal force. Some may believe that CTI fol-
lows this principle by discriminating non-lethal
effects towards non-combatants. The argument is
debatable. The term non-lethal is more properly
less than lethal, as some fatalities are expected. Not
being exempt from the principle of discrimination,
CTI requires development of the double effect con-
cept for an ethical justification.
Proportionality
Proportionality requires offensive force applied not
to exceed what is required for attaining the objective.
The evidence from field trial data demonstrated bio-
logical weapons could effectively cover vast areas. It
also demonstrates poor controllability in placement,
requiring a disproportionately larger area of cover-
age to attack an intended target. The LAC role of
biological warfare is most difficult to reconcile under
proportionality; seemingly an indiscriminate means
of warfare.
Scenarios & Policy
The chemical biological policy of the United States
has traditionally been retaliation in kind. The policy
changed in 1956 to permit use when ever militarily
advantageous. The policy was an incomplete ges-
ture. President Eisenhower stated he changed the
policy only to give appropriate prioritization to the
chemical biological program to develop a credible
retaliatory capability, and did not intended to ap-
prove use.
On 8 December 1966, the White House Science
Advisory Committee wrote a memorandum to
President Lyndon Johnson on the use of biological
weapons. The memorandum recommended a no
first use policy, recognizing that both civilian and
military planners could not conceive of a single sce-
nario where the United States would initiate biologi-
cal warfare.
Later, Harvard Professor Metthew Messelson wrote
a surprisingly US-centric policy paper in 1968 rec-
ommending the United States ratify the Geneva
Protocol of 1925. The argument made was essen-
tially about nuclear parity and a counter-productive
economy of scale – sponsoring biological warfare
developed a technology base that benefited less af-
fluent nations more than the United States. In 1969,
President Richard Nixon, after consultation from
his national security advisors, announced an end to
the United States biological warfare program. The
program was dismantled, the weapons destroyed,
and the United States ratified the Geneva Protocol
of 1925 and ascended to the Biological Weapons
Convention of 1975.
The history of the biological warfare program reveals
the military utility of these weapons in relation to a
nascent nuclear arsenal, and the exclusivity of LAC,
CTI, and LOA as that arsenal matures. The un-
proven nature of biological warfare left uncertain-
ties that precluded serious acceptance. The potential
after-effects of biological warfare were too complex.
Even the most promising area, CTI, was politically
unusable given the anticipation of some fatalities,
disproportionately among the young, elderly, and
infirmed.
While biological warfare invokes fear in many, as po-
litical artifacts, its use must be in congruence with
the values of the military and political establish-
ments sponsoring their development. The United
States program indicates a state-sponsored program
can develop militarily effective biological weapons
– though scenarios for use were nonexistent. It is
unlikely that a scenario for using biological weapons
will exist outside of the isolated experiment, follow-
ing a global nuclear conflict, the terminus of a pro-
tracted war of attrition, or the replacement of our
current international norms with an intrepid alter-
native.
Reid Kirby is a project manager in St. Louis, Missouri. He has a BS from
Lindenwood College in Valuation Science with a minor in Biology, including
special studies in behavioral toxicology and biotechnology.
Please direct all inquires related to this article to -
Mr. Reid Kirby
EXIMDYNE
2208 Autumn Trace Parkway
Wentzville, Missouri 63385
United States
rkirby@eximdyne.com
+1 314 324 0997
 Principles of War: Biological Aspects
Numerous military scholars have conceived their own principles of war. Sun Tzu, Napoleon Bonaparte, Carl Von Clausewitz, and
Antoine Henri Jomini are prominent examples. The nine principles of war here have been in use since 1921 by the United States Army.
Operations other than war, and the growing influence of maneuverists in military thinking are leading to a revision of these principles.
Nonetheless, the principles of war have served as an immutable quality of successful military action, an explication of the learned truths
of military art.
Biological weapons use does not exist outside of these principles. Though other nations have slightly different principles than the nine
here, there is remarkable similarity. These principles reveal the qualities of biological weapons that affect an aggressor’s war planning
when incorporating biological weapons.

Objective
Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
Biological weapons use is in support of a specific objective, and therefore part of an integrated war plan. The choice of biological
weapon is uniquely in congruence with an ultimate objective, and is not the objective within itself.
Offensive
Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
Biological weapons use directly reduces defending forces creating a period of debility ripe for exploitation. In the defense, biological
weapons use supports successive counter-offenses in a protracted or retreating action. The duration-of-action must be sufficiently long
enough to eliminate the risk of the target regrouping, but not so long as to burden exploitation forces with medical management.
Mass
Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time.
The casualties from biological weapons have the net effect of mass, allowing a smaller force to engage the far more populous. The
rate-of-action of a biological weapon governs the timing of massing forces.
Economy of Force
Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
Biological weapons used on ill-defined and poorly located targets, reduces the forces necessary to secure an area. Neutralizing poten-
tial threats in such areas allows for withdraw of forces to mass in other areas.
Maneuver
Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
Biological weapons do not create areas of physical destruction to limit mobility. They do cover a substantially greater area than that
targeted that primarily impacts operations downwind to an extent several times greater than chemical weapons. Generally, occupa-
tion within 24-hours after the attack is possible with minor precautions. Some biological weapons, using agent-vector combinations
or dry-type agents for a secondary aerosol effect, can persist for days to years to render an area unsafe to occupy.
Unity of Command
For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort.
Due to the characteristic large area covered, employing biological weapons is generally limited to strategic and operational strikes.
Proper command and control is rarely participle by units below Corps level, and must be coordinated throughout the area impacted
to avoid fratricide.
Security
Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantages.
Friendly forces potentially exposed to biological weapons may receive adequate prophylaxis, indoctrination, and notification to avoid
inadvertent losses from biological weapons. The need to maintain secrecy to avoid revealing the impending use of biological weapons
limits the amount of protective preparation.
Surprise
Strike the enemy at a time and/or place and in a manner for which he is unprepared.
To have an appreciable affect on the battlefield, the target must be susceptible to the biological weapons available. The use of agent
mixtures, faints with simulants, and novel biologicals will confound target protective action and responses.
Simplicity
Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.
Biological weapons have inherent complexities that challenge integration into war plans. The storage half-life, freeze-free chilled
transportation, an elasticity to wind, humidity, and sunlight, limits employment to situations where these features are suitably pre-
dictable so as not to force revision of coordinated military activities.