The Sleeping Giant Stays Awake:

The National Security Act of 1947 and Its

Implications for the Exercise of American Power
By Thomas Arndt

A thesis submitted to the

Graduate School – Newark

In partial fulfillment of requirements

for the degree of

Master of Arts
Graduate Program in Political Science

Written under the direction of

and approved by

Newark, New Jersey

May 2009
 ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

The Sleeping Giant Stays Awake:

The National Security Act of 1947 and Its
Implications for the Exercise of American Power
By Thomas Arndt

Thesis director: Dr. Keesha M. Middlemass

Ensuring national security is the most fundamental responsibility of the United

States federal government. For the first 158 years of the Union, the pursuit of this concept

remained largely unaltered and operated in the context of selective isolationism. But

following the conclusion of the Second World War, the Congress passed the National

Security Act of 1947 (NSA), radically redefining the parameters within which America

related with the rest of the world. This sweeping legislation was unprecedented in scope

and set up the primary institutions for the exercise of American hard power that continue

operating to this day, including the civilian-controlled Department of Defense (DOD)

with a new office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the National Security Council (NSC),

and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The present conduct of U.S. foreign policy

and the institutional ‘tools’ available to decision makers are inextricably linked to the

origins of the 1947 NSA. Much like the recent Homeland Security Act of 2002, it was

hatched in the wake of extraordinary historical events, essentially as a large bureaucratic

reorganization of the nation’s military and intelligence-gathering apparatuses. The impact

ii
of this law on the distribution of American institutional power was extensive,

fundamentally altering relations among elements of the U.S. federal government.

Domestically, the executive branch seized tremendous control over foreign policy

relative to the Congress, while the clout of the diplomatic establishment waned relative to

military interests. On the world stage, the U.S. came to act with increasingly assertive

interventionism, conjuring up notions of American hegemony, empire, superpower, and

primacy. Acknowledgements of the myriad domestic and global ramifications that are

directly traceable to the NSA have been rather sparse within academic circles, thus

warranting renewed inquiry. A proper understanding of the conceptual foundations of the

American national security regime and its profound legacy can inform the ongoing debate

over American power – and across several disciplines, including American politics and

foreign policy, international relations, and contemporary global affairs. This inquiry

articulates the essential context, content, and consequences of the NSA, as the former

‘Sleeping Giant’ opted to stay awake as a hegemon following the American victories of

WWII.

iii
 DEDICATION
I would like to formally dedicate this thesis to Dr. Thomas A. Cassilly, who
served in the United States Army during WWII, and was already an accomplished man
by the time that the National Security Act of 1947 was enacted. Dr. Cassilly went on to
work for nearly a quarter-century as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer on the front lines of
America’s diplomatic efforts around the world. Since 2005, he has been both a friend and
a mentor, and was the primary impetus for my decision to attend graduate school. His
lectures at Montclair State University also served as some of the early motivations for my
research looking into the National Security Act of 1947. I plan on continuing my
correspondences with him on this topic.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would also like to acknowledge my entire thesis committee, without which, this
project would not have been possible. Dr. Keesha M. Middlemass and Dr. Mara S.
Sidney have been indispensable in guiding my writing as well as offering the theoretical
perspectives on American political procedure that are the bedrock of the third chapter of
this thesis. Likewise, I am indebted to Division of Global Affairs Professor Richard
Langhorne, whose encyclopedic knowledge of world political history inspired me to
include the fourth chapter on the global legacy of the National Security Act of 1947. Each
member of this interdisciplinary committee has played a distinct and integral role in
shaping this work, as well as my scholarship generally. I shall never forget their
graciousness throughout the process of conducting this research, nor their extensive
contributions to my understanding of Political Science. They share my deepest gratitude.

iv
Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ii

DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE - Historical Context of the National Security Act of 1947 8

A Second World War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Bi-Polar Mania: The Deep Freeze of Cold War Sets In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Conceptual Evolution: The New Creature of National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The Death Knell of Isolationism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

CHAPTER TWO - The ‘Sleeping Giant’ Stays Awake:

Legislative Content and Institutional Formation 24
Conceptual Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
The Law of the Land, Sea, and Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Department of Defense/ Joint Chiefs of Staff (DOD/JCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
The National Security Council (NSC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Amendments to the NSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

CHAPTER THREE - Domestic Consequences: Implications for

Inter-Branch and Inter-Agency Relations 41
The Shift in National Focus toward Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
The Boundaries of Foreign Policy Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
The Context of Postwar Power Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Congress Takes a Back Seat to the Chief Executive on Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
The Stick Whacks the Carrot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

CHAPTER FOUR - The Global Legacy: Exercising United States Hegemony 70

From the Inside Looking Out: National Security and the World Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
From Defensive Offense to Offensive Defense: Expanding Assertive Interventionism . . . . . . 73
American Hegemony in Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

CONCLUSION 90

REFERENCES 94

v
 1

INTRODUCTION

Particularly in times of great conflict, issues of national security come to the fore

as essential topics for scholarly research. Given the present situation of the United States

and the immense challenges it faces at home and abroad, national leaders are faced with

reevaluating the nation’s security apparatus to ensure that it is able to meet emerging

threats. This has indeed been attempted by passage of the Homeland Security Act of

2002, which was hatched in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. It mandated a number of

structural reforms that characterize the current terrorism-focused U.S. national security

regime -- namely the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). However,

this legislation did not alter the fundamental institutional arrangements that have dictated

the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in the name of national security over the last 62 years.

To understand the central features of America’s contemporary defense network, which is

essentially still configured to deal with the threats of nation-states, one must look back to

the attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequent U.S. involvement in the Second World War.

These and other tumultuous events culminated in the National Security Act of 1947

(Public Law 253, 80th Congress) signed July 26th 1947, which marks the largest single

institutional reorganization in the history of the U.S. federal government1. The

implications of this wide-sweeping legislation are felt even today, both domestically and

abroad. It greatly altered power relationships among American foreign policy actors, and

cemented the nation’s preeminent geo-political standing on the world stage.

1
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 marks the second largest institutional/ bureaucratic reconfiguration in U.S.
history, under the DHS. See Lerner, Adrienne Wilmoth. National Security Act (1947).
<http://www.espionageinfo.com/Mo-Ne/National-Security-Act-1947.html>
 2

The process of handling modern conflicts with sub-state actors such as insurgents

in Iraq and remnants of the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as pressing foreign policy

questions surrounding nations such as Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, China,

Venezuela, and others, are directly traceable to the institutional tools set up under the

1947 National Security Act (‘NSA,’ not to be confused with the National Security

Agency or the National Security Advisor2). These include the civilian-controlled

Department of Defense (DOD) with the then new military command structure of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the National Security Council (NSC), and the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), all instrumental to the exercise of American hard power. Debates over the

best course of action for future U.S. foreign policy stand to gain immensely from a proper

understanding of the NSA, thus warranting renewed inquiry into its passage and its

subsequent implications. But to properly articulate the legacy of this momentous law, one

must first examine the roots of the modern U.S. national security state, which grew out of

the chaotic years leading up to 1947.

Such historical pretext to the NSA has indeed been explored by several authors.

Yet, surprisingly little scholarship has been conducted to address the specific issues of

what domestic and/ or global impacts the NSA in particular has produced. In fact, as a

ratio of its effect on the subsequent course of human events, to the attention it has been

paid within academic circles, the NSA has been given relatively little acknowledgement.

Particularly its ramifications for the practice of American politics have been vastly under

recognized in comparison to other landmark legislation of the twentieth century like the

2
The formal title for the National Security Advisor is ‘Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,’
abbreviated APNSA or simply ANSA.
 3

Civil Rights Act of 19643. In fact, only one book has been published that is exclusively

devoted to the NSA of 19474.

Thus in a general sense, this research project aims to rectify the fact that many

students of history fail to properly identify the NSA as the causative mechanism behind

several of the most drastic changes to the functioning of the U.S. federal government, as

well as the formal institutionalization of its hegemony. Over the last several decades,

many scholars of all fields of social sciences and history have asserted rather confidently

that their findings should be understood in the context of the post-WWII environment.

1945 is seen as a key ‘turning point’ for the course of human events and specifically the

turning point for American power in the last century5. It is certainly accurate to view

recent historical phenomena through the lens of this crucial watershed moment. However,

regarding the question of precisely when the U.S. adopted the traits of the hegemonic

power that is so recognizable today, many scholars mistakenly refer to this conceptual

turning point for American ascendancy as being immediately after the conclusion of

WWII itself, as if U.S. hegemony hinged merely on the final salvo of the war. It certainly

did not. Rather, it required the conscious decision of U.S. leaders to break ties with the

past notion of isolationism (or more accurately termed, ‘non-interventionism in Europe’),

as well as the creation of robust military and intelligence apparatuses needed to wield

power on a global scale. Not until specifics are written into law and put ‘on the books’ as

it were, do institutional changes become conduits for action. And although the external

3
On the first page of his introduction, Douglass T. Stuart argues that the NSA is the second most consequential piece
of legislation in modern American history, surpassed only by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
4
See Stuart, Douglas T., Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America.
Princeton University Press. Princeton, NJ. 2008.
5
Hideyo Naganuma identifies the end of WWII as the start of American hegemony. See page 12 in “Reexamining the
‘American Century.’” The Japanese Journal of American Studies. No. 11. 2000.
 4

reality, and indeed the general perception around the world, was that the U.S. had risen to

superpower status by 1945, until American preeminence was ‘set in stone’ and officiated

through actual legislation, the prevailing wisdom was nothing more than a tacit

understanding. In other words, de facto American hegemony required the NSA for its

newfound power to be effectively exercised. Thus perhaps more accurately, the critical

juncture or clinching moment for American hegemony on a global scale was the NSA of

1947 and not simply the proximate conclusion of WWII in and of itself circa 1945 – as is

often mistakenly assumed.

With this premise, the ensuing discussion examines the essential context, content,

and consequences of this landmark legislation for subsequent U.S. hegemony. It draws

upon theoretical foundations and the historical record to qualitatively analyze how this

Act of Congress has shaped the nature of American governance and ushered in a period

of American preeminence on the world stage. What were the factors that spurred

lawmakers into drafting the NSA in the first place? Domestically, what were the intra-

governmental changes to the structure and process of foreign policy formulation? And as

hard power became such a frequently used instrument of the American foreign policy

apparatus, what were some of the global ramifications of the NSA? In the process of

shedding light on these questions, the crucial nexus between domestic political

considerations and foreign policy/ relations shall be elucidated. In fact, the NSA is an

excellent case study in the interplay between these two, sometimes-disjointed purviews of

American governance. Furthermore, it will be argued that there are certain aspects of the

NSA, which at least in theory, have had impacts that run contrary to traditional American

values. In turn, this may provide context for a new window into understanding American
 5

actions past and present. The effects of the NSA, whether perceived as helpful or hurtful,

serve as crucial pretext for studying all post-WWII U.S. military engagements, from

Korea to Iraq and perhaps beyond.

The first chapter sets up the necessary historical context surrounding passage of

the NSA of 1947. It argues that several momentous events of the WWII era directly

shaped the legislation’s intent, including the attack of Pearl Harbor, securing capitulation

from Germany and Japan, as well as coming to realize the Soviet Union’s postwar

intentions under Joseph Stalin. Essentially, these events radically transformed ideas about

how to ensure U.S. national security, thereby resulting in an entirely new approach to its

policy design. Permanent defense and intelligence establishments became geared toward

offense (following the axiom ‘the best defense is a good offense’), and were accepted

even in peacetime. Moreover, by passing the NSA, the U.S. finally severed ties with its

past deference to isolationism/ non-interventionism in Europe, although entering the First

World War had indeed begun this process decades earlier. For even after VJ-Day, it

remained an open question whether the U.S. would withdraw itself from the realities of

the postwar epoch, as it had largely done after the conclusion of WWI. But the NSA

signaled that the ‘Sleeping Giant’ would not go ‘back to sleep.’

Chapter Two examines the actual content of the NSA. It outlines the

establishment of the three primary institutions that the legislation originally set up: the

DOD/ JCS, the NSC, and the CIA. This is done in the context of the political climate in

Washington in the aftermath of victory over Germany and Japan. These new and/ or

vastly overhauled entities are explained in terms of their functionality, their impact on the

process of decision-making, and how they reflected the changes to the national posture of
 6

the United States. In addition, the end of the chapter outlines some notable amendments

to the NSA, chronicling how it as has been tailored over the years to satisfy growing and

evolving national security concerns.

Chapter Three comprises the heart of this thesis. It articulates how the content of

the NSA has so extensively altered the political landscape within the federal government,

with profound implications for U.S. political procedure. By changing power relations

between and among various components of the U.S. government, the NSA fundamentally

transformed the process of American foreign policy formulation. Specifically, the chapter

describes the ascendance of the presidency and the executive branch, relative to the

decline in congressional authority over foreign affairs. This called into question the

practical application of the notion of ‘coequal’ branches by hindering the continued

operationalization of various checks and balances. In addition, the chapter details the

diminishing power of career Foreign Service Officers and other diplomats relative to

military interests. This quite extensively shaped the parameters of national security

decision making by giving military leaders more ‘seats at the table’ of the deliberative

process, thereby theoretically undermining the diplomatic ideals of compromise and

negotiation. And lastly, the end of the chapter briefly discusses the Military-Industrial

Complex (MIC) as a corollary outcome of the NSA. The MIC is described as a function

of the alterations to the organization of the civilian/ military relationship in the U.S.

armed services network, and sheds light on the political/ economic aspects of American

warfare.

Chapter Four examines the result of overall American ascendancy up until the

present day, as ushered in by the NSA. It lays out how the hard power institutions set up
 7

under this legislation have allowed the U.S. to quite extensively alter the course of

foreign political matters through the use of assertive interventionism, whether covert or

overt. From propping up governments around the world, to toppling regimes outright, the

activities of American national security institutions have had myriad political

ramifications with lasting global impact. Many of these outcomes have drawn harsh

scrutiny of American motives, which are seen by some as imperialistic. However, the last

portion of the chapter briefly argues that the most accurate designation for the U.S. is that

of ‘hegemon.’
 8

CHAPTER ONE
Historical Context of the National Security Act of 1947

Geo-political history is littered with instances in which immense shifts in the

distribution of interstate power take place, usually in the aftermath of colossal wars,

perhaps none more pronounced than when the U.S. ascended to the apex of the

global ‘pecking order’ at the conclusion of the Second World War. By extension,

conflicts of epic scale often spawn major structural changes in governance by the

victor(s) to, in a sense, institutionalize the spoils of war regarding changes to the

international balance of power. Furthermore, the content of most large-scale

government reorganizations usually aims to incorporate the lessons learned from the

most significant events immediately prior1. In the same way that generals are always

trying to fight the last war, major policy outcomes on questions of national security

are always seeking to avoid the last major crisis. Thus, to logically articulate the

myriad implications of the NSA once enacted, one must address the contextual

factors that produced the legislation in the first place. To be sure, the U.S.’s

traumatic experiences during and shortly after the unprecedented hostilities of WWII

acted as the lens through which this extensive government reconfiguration was

shaped. This is the crucial historical back-story of the NSA, which was at the heart of

the postwar debates over how America should proceed as an unconditional victor,

with a virtual blank check or tabula rasa for the world it had inherited.

1
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 was passed in direct response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. There are striking
parallels between the 1947 NSA and the 2002 Homeland Security Act in this regard. The former was a massive
institutional reorganization hatched in the wake of the attack at Pearl Harbor, whereas the latter did the same after the
9/11 attacks.
 9

This chapter outlines three primary discursive events that created the

conditions for the NSA of 1947, paving the way for the creation of an entirely new

American national security state. First, the surprise attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941

initially spurred the U.S. from its complacent slumber and flipped the switch of

America’s war machine to the ‘on’ position. It elucidated the country’s relative

vulnerabilities in an age of aviation and weapons of mass destruction, essentially

jolting domestic sentiment into demanding a national security revamp. Second, U.S.

victory over Germany and Japan in 1945, as the world’s sole possessor of nuclear

armaments, produced the U.S.’s position of primacy throughout most of the Western

world. This allowed the country to establish bold new means of dealing with foreign

nations. Third, indications of Soviet antagonism toward the U.S. and general

Communist expansionism shortly after V-E Day served to rival the U.S. on the world

stage, ushering in a period of so-called ‘Cold War.’

Indeed, Soviet-American relations form the bulk of the discussion about the

NSA’s context, but each of these provocative events played an instrumental role in

its formulation, after having been seared deeply into the American psyche. Taken

together, they fostered an overall narrative for the need to aggressively meet the

postwar challenges of radical changes to the nature and distribution of global power2.

And as shall become clear, by 1947 the very concept of national security was forever

altered in the minds of Americans and therefore in the halls of Congress. New and

2
Professor Richard Langhorne has established the validity of discussing power in terms of its nature and distribution
among actors on the world stage. See page 42 in The Coming of Globalization: Its Evolution and Contemporary
Consequences. Second Edition. Palgrave Macmillan, Ltd., New York, NY. 2001.
 10

noticeably more robust hard power institutions were widely accepted as absolutely

necessary for exercising the hegemonic will of the ‘last best hope’ of Earth3.

A Second World War

On the heels of the carnage of WWI, the Second World War marked one of

the most consequential transitional periods in human history, deciding the fate of

several nations and countless individuals. In fact, the entire era (essentially the first

half of the 20th Century) signified a radical turning point for the subsequent conduct

of world affairs, and certainly the NSA owes its creation to this time period, as “… a

codification of the lessons of World War II” (Jackson; 1960, 447). Civil/ ethnic unrest,

international rivalries, and all-out bloodshed had been the mainstay of European

affairs pretty much since 1914. By the 1939 Nazi invasion of Poland, the whole of

the European continent was largely embroiled in events that began to spiral out of

control – becoming more grave with every passing moment. But for the U.S., the

defining moment came on December 7th, 1941, a date which lives in infamy, when

the U.S. Pacific naval fleet was devastated at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in a surprise

Japanese aerial attack4. This single event roused the American ‘Sleeping Giant’ into

a position of utter resolve to respond with military force, concurrent with Germany’s

declaration of war upon the United States. Moreover, it set in motion a series of

events that resulted in rapid U.S. ascendancy over the years to come, in addition to

3
This characterization of the U.S. was originally put forth by President Lincoln in 1862, but gained renewed salience in
the minds of many Americans in the aftermath of WWII.
4
Some observers dispute the notion of the U.S. having been attacked without any forewarning. See Stinnett, Robert B.,
Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor. Simon and Shuster. New York, NY. 2001. However, the
preponderance of evidence suggests that the U.S. political leadership was unaware of the moment, manner, and scale of
the attack.
 11

the nation pulling itself out of the depths of the Great Depression. But no less

important, it triggered a conceptual evolution of the basic understanding of ‘national

security’ – to be examined later in this chapter.

The zeitgeist of post-WWII was jubilant in the immediacy of American

triumph; yet, unconditional victory over Germany and Japan was bittersweet for the

United States, offering only “… limited joy and little clarity about the future” (Sherry;

1995, 113). The war had made the Soviet Union a strange bedfellow of the U.S.,

particularly considering that Marxist ideology was arguably just as diametrically

opposed to American ideals as Hitler’s fascism in Germany had been. Yet, ‘the

enemy of my enemy is my friend,’ as is often said in geo-politics. Thus, with the

removal of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were

essentially handed the offer of hegemony on a proverbial silver platter. Virtually by

default, these two ‘superpowers,’ as they were now called, were able to capitalize on

vacuums of power. In fact, this was arguably the grandest spoil of war for the Allies.

The U.S. in particular was the beneficiary of victory, as an economic powerhouse

and sole possessor of nuclear warheads – attributes that in this period were plainly

unsurpassed. Notwithstanding American influence, the postwar settlements and

conditions of peace were however completely up in the air after 1945, as the binary

hegemons had polar opposite designs for the future.

On grand strategic decisions of how to approach the postwar epoch, the U.S.

was relatively cautious in its reaction. It took a couple of years for the ‘dust to settle,’

and for the country to realize the full extent of the Soviet threat. By extension, some

23 months had passed from the Japanese capitulation to the enactment of the NSA.
 12

But to be sure, the American generals on the march to Berlin knew full well that they

had to continue their engagements and hold ground, in contrast to America’s

experience in Europe after WWI. The American political leadership had recognized

this as well, and opted to hold the territorial gains of the war until favorable

governance could be restored within the newly liberated nations. President Harry

Truman decided relatively early on (perhaps even before becoming president) that

the U.S. could not simply pack up and go home after victory had been secured in the

European and Pacific theatres. The situation would require a sustained effort -- an

expansion of the ‘arsenal of democracy’ -- not just to ‘mop up’ after the war, but also

to proactively engage in most if not all subsequent world affairs in a long-term

strategic capacity. Prolonged engagement was deemed necessary to establish

democracy and therefore many of the monetary peace dividends of victory were

essentially ‘reinvested’ as retained assets within the existing military and national

security establishments5. This was severely complicated, however, as the Soviets let

their intentions be known during and after the bifurcation of Berlin into separate

zones6. What was to follow was extremely tumultuous, jolting the U.S. into a

profound engagement with the rest of the world, as it had never even entertained

previously.

5
After the Japanese surrendered, the U.S. did what it had always done – drawn down its funding for the navy and
military as peace dividends. In fiscal year 1945 (which began on July 1st 1944) it was $90 billion, in 1946 45 billion, in
1947 – just $14.2, and in 1948 it was $10.7 billion (according to correspondences with Dr. Thomas A. Cassilly).

6
There were four separate allied occupation zones including, one quadrant each for France, Great Britain, the U.S., and
the Soviet Union.
 13

After WWI, the U.S. had essentially retreated to its prewar posture, leaving

world leadership for other nations to handle7. However after WWII, this was seen as

untenable and the opportunity was seized to assume a greater role in the direction of

the global community of states. “The United States not only did not withdraw itself

as it had done after the First World War, it also used its power to reshape much of

the world” (Mabry, 1). Indeed, active resistance against the spread of Communist

influence was integral to this process of reshaping, quickly becoming the centerpiece

of the newfangled strategic priorities of U.S. leaders. It became increasingly apparent

that:

[T]he United States was the only power to contain the Soviet threat;
and containment required the kind of entangling alliances and
permanent defense establishment that earlier generations had abhorred
[italics added] (Hogan; 1998, 2).

Additionally, the U.S.’s “… newly won dominance carried with it obligations greater

than merely winning friends and defeating foes. It also meant creating the conditions

conducive to international peace and prosperity” (Hunt; 2007, 150). Furthermore, these

changes occurred “… at a time when the United States could no longer depend on

allies to carry the initial burden of a future war” (Hogan; 1998, 25). Therefore, the U.S.

had to take the lead, and certainly did just that in guiding nations toward a liberal

democratic future, even at the expense of age-old national traditions. However, as

soon as notions of unprecedented world influence came to bear on U.S. leaders, a

realization of the intentions of Stalin’s U.S.S.R. quickly dashed any hopes for

entering a new era of global unity, democracy, and the universal recognition of

7
Though President Wilson’s Fourteen Points became influential at the negotiations of the Paris Peace Conference in
Versailles, the U.S. Senate failed to ratify membership into the League of Nations.
 14

fundamental human rights. This prompted a wholesale reevaluation of American

grand strategy8.

Bi-Polar Mania: The Deep Freeze of Cold War Sets In

The passage of the NSA was perhaps as much about standing against the

perceived threat of Communism as it was about the lessons learned from WWII. Had

it not been for some of the aggressive tendencies of the Soviet Union, the U.S. may

have regressed to its prewar stance, largely disengaging the plurilateral structure of

the states system. Similarly, had the U.S.S.R. acted out of pacifism at the end of

WWII, the U.S. very likely would not have gone to the great lengths of completely

overhauling its defense establishment as per the NSA. Obviously, this did not

happen, and somewhat surprisingly the full and accurate realization of true Soviet

ambition was largely attributable to a single individual - George F. Kennan, a leading

expert on the Soviet Union at the time. In 1946, Kennan had warned of the threat of

Communist expansionism in his infamous ‘long telegram’ and subsequent article,

“The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” written under the pseudonym ‘X9.’ His

recommendations for how to deal with the U.S.S.R. ended up forming the basis of

Truman’s policy of containment10. The long telegram, in particular, shook up the

Washington establishment and provided a clear impetus for Congress to formulate

the NSA the following year, as any complacency on the part of U.S. leaders was

8
For more on U.S. grand strategy in this period and beyond, see Kennedy, Paul, Ed. Grand Strategies in War and
Peace. Yale University Press. New Haven, CT. 1991.
9
See Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 566-582. July 1947.
10
For a comprehensive discussion of containment strategy and policy, see Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of
Containment. Oxford University Press. New York, NY. 1982.
 15

dashed away by the rapid ratcheting up of tensions under Stalin’s perceived

belligerence.

Particularly Eastern Europe was under siege following the annexation of the

Baltic countries, attempts to take over Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in 1945-6,

as well as threats to Turkey and Greece. Certainly, the U.S. had to take some

decisive steps to counter this expansion. In conjunction with the NSA, President

Truman also “… officially promulgated the strategy of containment in the March

1947 Truman Doctrine” (Jablonsky; 2002, 7). This new doctrine, which would have been

difficult to implement without the provisions of the NSA, solidified Truman’s policy

of deliberate opposition to the U.S.S.R. by ‘boxing in’ Soviet expansion and offering

unprecedented support for nations that were resisting the influence of Communism.

It extended specifically to Greece and Turkey, yet over time was expanded to apply

to any nation around the world that had internal resistance to Communism. The U.S.

had always maintained conventional diplomatic relations with other nations, but had

not previously extended financial aid to prop them up in its favor; nor had it been

involved in military training or providing armaments. But these tactics were all put

into motion, as never before seen challenges demanded as yet unattempted policies11.

The resulting escalation of tensions with the Soviet regime tended to favor

unparalleled U.S. support for its allies, as well as the creation of a new defense

establishment. The high Cold War was afoot, and many of the tools needed to fight it

were indeed provided by the 1947 NSA. Essentially, the concept of containment was

11
This also included the Marshall Plan and the later creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in
1949. The alliance originally included ten nations of northwestern Europe, Canada, and the U.S. -- See page 96 in
Goldman, Eric F., The Crucial Decade: America, 1945-1955. Greenwood Press, Publishers. Westport, CT. 1956. The
U.S.S.R. countered with the creation of the Warsaw Pact to rival NATO’s military alliance.
 16

given ‘teeth’ and a strong set of jaw muscles through the NSA, metaphorically

speaking.

Conceptual Evolution: The New Creature of National Security

A primary impetus for creating a coherent polity is to provide for the

collective protection of its inhabitants. With the rise of the post-Westphalian

sovereign state, this concept came to be known as ‘national security.’ Conceptually

speaking, the security of any single nation is not a constant over time, as seen from

the standpoint of an individual unitary actor state. As an ‘ambiguous symbol12,’ it

describes a specific set of demands on the exerciser of power that is unique to the

threats present at a particular moment in time (and open to the interpretations of

leaders). For example, the burdens of U.S. national security after the end of the War

of 1812 were much different than those present after 1945. Specifically in the

context of WWII, U.S. national security was seen through an entirely new lens of the

surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, and subsequently took on striking new features,

becoming fundamentally transformed under the auspices of entirely new types of

threats.

After 1945, the form of the US government adjusted to the functions

required by the changing concept of national security. The American
experience in WWII had indicated that institutions designed for an old
era would not be adequate for the new. Postwar hearings on the Pearl
Harbor disaster concluded that US intelligence procedures were
insufficient for modern-day security challenges, particularly with the
new American status as a global power (Jablonsky; 2002, 8).

12
See page 43 in Berkowitz, Morton and P.G. Bock. American National Security: A Reader in Theory and Practice.
The Free Press, a division of the Macmillan Company. New York, NY. 1965.
 17

Especially with the proliferation of new instruments of death, military

technologies came to be considered a unique threat to U.S. interests, which after

1947 were seen as virtually anything occurring within its sphere of influence;

ostensibly the entire planet.

For most of U.S. history, the physical security of the continental

United States had not been in jeopardy. But by 1945, this
invulnerability was rapidly diminishing with the advent of long-range
bombers, atom bombs, and ballistic missiles (Ibid., 5).

Even though at this juncture the U.S. was the only polity that could claim possession

of nuclear armaments and had thoroughly defeated two of its enemies, the U.S. still

chose a proactive and comprehensive effort to ensure national self-preservation.

As a second aspect to this conceptual evolution, the national trauma of over a

million American dead and wounded service personnel13, and the particularly brutal

nature of the fighting itself, sent shockwaves through the hearts and minds of future

American national security policymakers. “Never again” was not only a popular

slogan; it was a material reaction to the Second World War’s stunning display of

man’s inhumanity to fellow man. Even WWI pales in comparison to WWII, the

former having been more or less confined to remote battlefields, and a conflict in

which civilian infrastructure was left largely undamaged. WWII, on the other hand,

was truly total war, practically an exponential leap in devastation over General

Sherman’s campaign on Atlanta at the end of the Civil War – earning him the title of

13
There were 1,078,162 total U.S. casualties including combat fatalities, deaths due to accident or disease, and
wounded soldiers. <http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/resources/casdeath_pop.html>
 18

‘the father of modern, total warfare14.’ Thus, with unprecedented sacrifice in blood

and treasure, the national psyche had shifted.

In accordance with emergent realities, the U.S. added resisting Soviet

expansionism ‘on the ground’ to its list of security interests – partly to prevent future

surprise attacks, perhaps emanating from the Soviet Union. Thus, given the novel era

that Soviet-American relations had entered into, U.S. fear of attack, as well as the

prospect of a wave of Communism overtaking the European continent (and beyond),

embody the third aspect to the change in perception. The very concept of national

security was reimagined under tensions with the U.S.S.R., eventually becoming

formally recast via the NSA and related policies of the Truman Administration. This

had a profound effect and arguably after that, “… national security needs had started

to dissolve the usual distinction between war and peace in the minds of American

policy makers” (Hogan; 1998, 26). National security came to entail a considerably

broader vision of threat assessment considerations to the point where the American

foreign policy posture was in a state of perpetual military and intelligence vigilance.

Another more inconspicuous distinction came in the very use of the phrase

‘national security’ within the discourse of post WWII congressional hearings. In

testimony to the Senate, Navy secretary James Forrestal (later to be sworn in as the

first Secretary of Defense) commented that, “… our national security can only be

assured on a very broad and comprehensive front. I am using the word ‘security’

here consistently and continuously rather than ‘defense’” (Romm; 1993, 2). This

quotation beautifully illustrates the importance of terminology in describing core

14
This is according to “Sherman’s March: The Shocking Campaign that Ended the Civil War.” The History Channel
Presents. A&E Home Video. DVD. 2007.
 19

versus peripheral security. ‘National defense,’ which had previously been the

operative phrase to describe America’s protection of its citizens, essentially

constituted what is today recognized as ‘homeland security.’ Both phrases connote

defense mechanisms being (1) confined to the geographic territory or core of the

U.S. [homeland] and (2) operating in a reactive capacity [defensively]. ‘National

security’ on the other hand, employs a much more liberal interpretation of the

concept’s definition. It conveys that the ‘national’ component of the phrase could be

expanded to include peripheral American interests in geographic regions outside of

U.S. soil proper. And likewise, the term ‘security’ is malleable insofar that it entails

guarding against all threats no matter their origin, and to do so perhaps even in a

proactive (even preemptive) manner. In short, providing for the common defense

became dependent on entirely external occurrences in the estimation of national

leaders.

By 1947, the U.S. defined ‘national security’ in such broad terms that it came

to include virtually any threats emanating from anywhere on the entire planet. As

part of the globalization of conflict and how it is waged, the re-envisioning of how to

secure America made a great deal of sense to U.S. leaders. Far off threats arguably

posed just as great a risk to domestic tranquility as any others, and oceans separating

the U.S. from the rest of the world merely fostered a false sense of security. In an era

of “… atomic bombs, of planes faster than sound, of electronics and of germ warfare,

distance loses much of its value as a defensive barrier” (Folsom; 1949, 2). In response,

the U.S. certainly had “… taken the mantle of transatlantic leadership” (Hunt; 2007,

150) among Western nations and extended its hand of influence around the rest of the
 20

world as well. National security blossomed into a notion hinging on proactive

imposition in foreign affairs; virtually anything that was occurring around the world

was of concern, especially in Europe and the Americas.

This linkage of national security to so many interdependent factors,

whether political and economic or psychological and military,
expanded the concept, with the subjective boundaries of security
pushed out further into the world, encompassing more geography…
[T]he new term ‘national security’ helped create a means for
politicians and officials to bridge the gap between domestic and
foreign policy… that fundamentally revised America’s perception of
its relationship to the rest of the world (Jablonsky; 2002, 5-6).

To meet the considerable demands of containing and opposing the Soviets

“… the expansive concept of US national security led increasingly to the dominance

of military-security concerns and a transcendent military establishment. A major

factor was the Soviet military buildup” (Ibid., 5). American national security

accordingly became a new creature to meet the perceived threat. Certainly, the

predominant American worldview of the time was one that favored the U.S.

assuming a central role in international affairs – to prevent a Communist ‘domino

effect’ throughout Europe and the rest of the world, “…which held that if one nation

fell to the Communists, its neighbors would surely follow” (Ambrose; 1997, 79).

Therefore, not only did the U.S. want to beef up security for its homeland, it also set

out to engage the security needs of American WWII allies around the world (of

course with the exception of the U.S.S.R.), as well as former adversaries to prevent

the conditions that many felt had sparked the war. This is perhaps further evidence of

the misleading nature of the term ‘national security’ in the American context after

WWII. In reality, the tools set up under the NSA had much less to do with domestic
 21

security concerns and more to do with the U.S. sustaining its interests within the

global security environment. Essentially, U.S. security after WWII morphed into

world security for the survival and prosperity of the liberal democratic tradition. In

that sense, the ‘National Security Act’ is perhaps a misleading name for the

legislation. It is clear that it had as much to do with regulating the global security

environment as it did securing the U.S. homeland. In essence, it would perhaps have

been more aptly named the ‘International Security Act.’

The Death Knell of Isolationism

Aside from the recognition of postwar American power, there was no

guarantee that the U.S. would come to fully utilize this newly acquired global

influence. In fact, after the last salvo of WWII, the U.S. sat at a pivotal juncture,

facing whether to accept the demands of a brave new world order or to regress into

the bastion of isolationism that had more or less been the nation’s most fundamental

foreign policy tenet ever since its inception. In contrast to the conclusion of the First

World War, would the U.S. decide to break its rather virulent tradition of

isolationism once and for all to actively engage the world? Would the time-honored

notion be abandoned in order to seize the grand window of opportunity that

presented itself and come to engage the world proactively as opposed to just

reactively?

There was certainly some debate as to the shape of postwar American power;

however, the general consensus was that the U.S. should seize this new opportunity

to become a world-class superpower, and indeed it did. However to do so, the

 22

country’s leaders would have to embrace the very policies of engaging the external

world, which previous generations had abhorred for most of the previous 158 years.

Specifically, ‘entangling’ alliances became commonplace under the purview of the

Truman Doctrine, running contrary to the wishes put forth in George Washington’s

farewell address. This came to be the final death knell for the already tenuous

understanding of American ‘isolationism.’

Isolationism describes a certain mentality that was especially pervasive in the

interwar period (191815-1941), but it is certainly not reflective of the overall

historical actions of the United States. In fact, U.S. isolationism was extremely

selective in that it discriminated between many potential elective engagements,

depending on the individual circumstances. This is what most countries have done

historically so American isolationism was hardly a reliable rule of thumb. What is

more, the term itself (seen in the American context) is deeply problematic and

incredibly misleading. It implies that the U.S. was somehow cordoned off from the

rest of the world in every conceivable regard. Yet, the U.S. had always engaged

extensively in trade, maintained diplomatic ties with the world, and accepted droves

of foreign immigrants to its shores. Additionally, from Cuba to the Philippines and

from Panama to the battlefields of France during WWI, the American GI has been

far from isolationist16 – even before that term was used to describe this default

foreign policy stance up until Pearl Harbor.

15
Among many U.S. leaders, the concept of isolationism had also been prevalent before, and even during WWI.
16
See Meade, Walter Russell. “The American Foreign Policy Legacy.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1, pp. 163-76.
January/February 2002.
 23

Thus, American ‘isolationism’ is much more selective than previously

assumed and is more accurately characterized as non-interventionism in Europe

proper. Of course, U.S. entry into WWI was a glaring exception to this rule17. But

considering the circumstances surrounding American successes during WWII and

the incipient challenges thereafter, there is little question but that shortly after the

war, “American policymakers began to discard the last remnants of the country’s

prewar isolationism” (Hogan; 1998, 2). Furthermore, if the U.S. government had wanted

to return to its reclusive posture, then it certainly would not have passed the NSA,

which constituted a formal break with past tendencies by setting up institutions

designed to administer hegemony and relate with the external world rather

intrusively. In fact, entry into WWII was not in and of itself the marker for the U.S.

turning its back on its former isolationist inclinations – as is often stipulated. It took

the NSA of 1947 and the parallel provisions of the Truman Doctrine to firmly

solidify this position, as democratic allies the world over were ‘propped up’ by the

United States. By 1947, America’s traditional deference to isolationism was

shattered once and for all, and the nation’s foreign policy entered uncharted waters.

With the essential context behind the NSA now established, this analysis turns to the

actual content of the NSA of 1947 and the institutional arrangements it created.

17
Additionally, the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act and financial aid to Great Britain prior to U.S. entry into WWII
could be viewed as a financially entangling engagement.
 24

CHAPTER TWO
The ‘Sleeping Giant’ Stays Awake: Legislative Content and
Institutional Formation

Given the novel era the U.S. had entered, the American leadership in Washington

was poised to enact several crucial reforms while the dust was still settling from the epic

conflict of WWII. But, the honeymoon of victory was brief and came to an end with the

sobering realization of Soviet designs. Political and legislative agendas began to be

consumed by the specter of the Communist threat1 while radical advancements in the

instruments of death had policymakers on edge. Thus, the visceral desire to usher in a

period of lasting peace and prosperity following such a hard-fought victory over two

separate enemies, as well as the prior depths of the Great Depression, was largely

eclipsed by external affairs, namely growing instability in Eastern Europe and Southeast

Asia. The U.S. faced the increasing burden of supporting many foreign anti-Communist

governments in a variety of ways under the auspices of the Truman Doctrine, coupled

with the fact that the U.S. had initiated unprecedented nation-building efforts in both

Germany and Japan. Accordingly, U.S. security interests were no longer exclusively

national in scope. Shouldering the burden of responsibility to secure foreign nations

allied with the U.S., along with other important commitments abroad2, became a staple of

the new security paradigm -- one in which a global game of ideological chess with the

Soviet Union took center stage. This struggle made clear what America’s postwar

security apparatus would require in order to uphold international obligations and defend

1
McCarthyism and the ‘Red Scare’ became increasingly prevalent in American political discourse following the
analysis offered by Soviet expert George F. Kennan.
2
The Marshall Plan was the key component of the U.S.’s growing international obligations. Subsequently, the Berlin
Airlift became perhaps the most visible example of this policy of distributing aid to several nations.
 25

democracy in the most vulnerable of nations. As a wall of red began to descend over the

map of the Eurasian landmass3, most minds were made up that American military and

intelligence-gathering capabilities needed to be widened dramatically and reconfigured in

order to be congruent with the situation at hand.

Incorporating all of the lessons learned from prior events, the recalibrated notion

of how to ensure America’s safety not only included bolstering homeland defenses in

order to avert another surprise military attack. It also recognized that such aggression

could be perpetrated against allied nations, and that in the long run, if liberal democracy

were to survive in the world as a form of government, then it would at least have to hold

its ground. To be sure, the U.S. was at the center of this Herculean effort, as the only

nation capable of effectively intervening in this regard. All told:

[T]he evolving form of the US government after the National Security Act
of 1947 was a creative, military-focused response to the evolving Cold
War concept of national security set against a backdrop of Soviet
militarism [and] global reliance on the United States (Jablonsky; 2002, 10).

With such colossal challenges looming before the nation, U.S. leaders knew full well that

engaging the U.S.S.R. would not merely require increased spending on military men and

material, but also a large-scale growth and wholesale reorganization of the administration

behind American hard power4. This included the policy creation component, as well as

the logistics of actually carrying out military and intelligence activities ‘on the ground.’

Focusing on three main institutions set up by the NSA, the Department of Defense/ Joint

3
The U.S.S.R. quickly acquired many ‘satellite’ nations following the end of WWII, and by 1947, Ukraine, Poland,
Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and others were turned ‘red.’ Moreover, a National Research and Policy
Committee in 1948 stated that “the rulers of the Soviet Union have stated repeatedly that they expect the Communist
system to engulf the whole world…” See Houser, T.V., Chairman. Research and Policy Committee of the Committee
for Economic Development. “The Problem of National Security: Some Economic and Administrative Aspects.” A
Statement on National Policy. July, 1956.
4
For a look at contemporary issues in American hard power, as shaped by the 1947 NSA, see Campbell, Kurt M., and
Michael E. O’Hanlon. Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security. Basic Books, A Member of the Perseus
Books Group. Cambridge, MA 2006.
 26

Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency, this

chapter articulates the structural reconfiguration of the U.S.’s military and intelligence

hardware. It also addresses some subsequent amendments to the original version of the

law, and their basic significance.

Conceptual Considerations

The language of the NSA and the institutions it set up was explicit, but there is

more to the law than meets the eye. It also sent out a very strong implicit statement. After

having been awakened by the attack on Pearl Harbor, the ‘Sleeping Giant5’ (i.e., the

United States) signaled to the rest of the world that the nation’s war machine and its

vigilance would remain awakened after the war was over vis-à-vis the creation of a

permanent defense establishment. Some would even argue that the ‘Sleeping Giant’ has

become an insomniac (to continue the metaphor), and that the U.S. has been ‘running the

world6,’ by acting as the ‘world’s policeman’ (Hunt; 2007, 308). Regardless of the most

proper characterization, the architects of postwar American power decided that fresh

tools were needed to carry out a grand strategic vision of resisting the Soviet threat

during the Cold War, which often led to military interventions in several other sovereign

nations around the world, particularly in East Asia and Central and South America. The

NSA of 1947 provided these desired tools in the form of new government entities and

subsequently facilitated assertive interventionism in international affairs on the part of

5
This metaphor has been somewhat popularized in recent decades. It is conventionally attributed to Japanese Admiral
Isoroku Yamamoto, as quoted in the 1970 film Tora! Tora! Tora! But there is apparently no evidence that Yamamoto
actually ever said or wrote ‘sleeping giant.’ He did however, fear getting involved in a protracted war with the United
States military - see <http://www.economicexpert.com/a/Isoroku:Yamamoto:s:sleeping:giant:quote.html>
6
David J. Rothkopf has given his book this title. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council
and the Architects of American Power. Public Affairs, a member of Perseus Books Group. Cambridge, MA. 2004.
 27

U.S. executive leadership under the guise of the recalibrated definition of national

security described in Chapter One.

Comprehensive legislation geared toward structural or institutional changes in the

apparatus of government is perhaps the most potent method of achieving lasting reform

on any front. Such laws allow for the agendas of governments to be physically carried out

via means previously unavailable. Thus, extensive institutional changes become powerful

and lasting new conduits for actual political action, not just of the administration in

power at the time, but also for subsequent officeholders. For this reason, postwar

lawmakers recognized that an Act of Congress would be needed to provide a statutory

basis for exercising American hegemony. The extent of the national security adaptations

they had envisaged could not be handled within the executive branch alone, by changes

in bureaucratic leadership and/ or internal policy directives. Due to the gravity of the

situation facing the U.S., it is no surprise that the law that emerged from the U.S.

Congress constituted “… the most sweeping reorganization… in the nation’s history”

(Hook; 2005, 40). It even bordered on a ‘back to the drawing board’ approach for foreign

policy formulation. Certainly, many of the positions and responsibilities that

policymakers built into the law were functioning previously but operated in different

capacities and under different names. For example, the U.S. did have intelligence officers

before the CIA was created, but they were few in number, had limited responsibilities,

and worked under the banner of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). After the

implementation of the NSA, however, myriad jobs and entire areas of policymaking that

did not exist prior to 1947 opened up for the first time. Moreover, Congress had not

touched the issue area since “… the National Defense Act of 1920 authorized the War
 28

Department… to plan for the entire economy in wartime” (Koistinen; 1980, 11). Accordingly,

officials across political parties supported creation of an updated bill that would

completely overhaul the foreign policy contingent of government.

Though it could be said that there was relative harmony in government regarding

the need for the U.S. to reorganize itself after WWII, the intervening years (1945 to 1947)

nonetheless produced some disagreement as to what exactly this would look like.

American leaders diverged as to how the U.S. should react to its new standing in the

world. A rather vociferous debate opened up over fears of the U.S. turning away from its

liberal-democratic tradition to embrace the dangers of a ‘garrison state,’ perhaps

becoming a modern day Sparta of sorts. Yet, such concerns quickly fell by the wayside,

overshadowed by the prevailing disposition of post-WWII America -- one in which a

heavily militarized national posture and a more unified permanent defense establishment

in peacetime were seen as tenable. Indeed such a vision for the future has materialized.

Many had imagined:

… a prominent role for the United States in world affairs and included the
conviction that national security in an age of total war required some
elaboration of the state’s authority to organize civilian and military
resources behind a permanent program of peacetime military preparedness
(Hogan; 1998, 23).

In fact, if the U.S. were to be in the position of ever actually confronting the Red

Army with conventional weaponry, then military preparedness and responsiveness would

be integral to any chance of success. This was a challenge in and of itself and was to be

aided by certain provisions of the NSA, for in many ways the U.S. military still had to

grow and transform itself, arguably more so than was the case during the actual war.

Much of the weaponry initially used by American GIs against Germany and Japan was
 29

WWI-era hardware, and machines of war (firearms, munitions, trucks, tanks, planes, etc.)

had been expended nearly as quickly as they could be produced. Traditionally, defense

budgets had been slashed following the conclusion of major wars as peace dividends.

However, the conditions of the post-WWII era had produced a very fragile peace, and de-

funding the military was thought by many of the more hawkish public officials to be

reckless and dangerous. Therefore, the U.S. ramped up its military footprint from policy

through to implementation, and American hard power entered a new phase.

The Law of the Land, Sea, and Air

The National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, 80th Congress) was the result

of the U.S.’s decision to rise to the occasion and meet the aforementioned geopolitical

realities head on. It sought to adjust the form and function, or the roles and procedures, of

conducting the nation’s most solemn duty – the protection of its citizens. Michael Hogan

refers to the NSA as the “… Magna Charta of the national security state” (Hogan; 1998, 24),

which put in motion a litany of quite radical alterations to ‘business as usual’ for the

American national security establishment. The NSA created a whole host of new entities

within the U.S. federal government, “… many of which… are now among the best

known and most powerful organs of government” (Ibid., 3). These incredibly influential

institutions seem to be accepted as ‘par for the course’ and are taken for granted by the

public at large in contemporary times. However, in consideration of the full breadth of

American governmental history, the establishment of these new tools is quite distinct

from the more humble posture of the previous national security regime. The implications
 30

of this sea change are widespread, but before delving into the impact of the NSA, the

actual tangible manifestations of this unprecedented law are examined.

The bulk of the reconfiguration in the NSA involved changes in the

administration of both military and intelligence activities, explicitly setting up three

primary institutions integral to this project. It set up the DOD/ JCS for military affairs,

the NSC for foreign policy formulation, and the CIA for intelligence and covert

operations. What made these new entities different from previous military and

intelligence agencies, however, was the extent to which they were configured to engage

external events as part of a uniquely robust foreign policy machine. In fact, it is

somewhat ironic that a permanent defense establishment was really geared toward having

the U.S. stay on offense, both strategically and in terms of geography. Thus, the posture

of the entities created by the NSA, in effect, institutionalized the new status quo of

American hegemonic influence, and came to be profoundly potent new instruments in the

toolbox of subsequent foreign policy formulators, as evidenced by every U.S. military

conflict after 1947.

Although the three main provisions of the NSA had never been entertained prior

to WWII, they were considered urgent following its conclusion. And once these powerful

institutions were set up, it became increasingly difficult for the U.S. leadership not to

utilize them frequently, and some would argue indiscriminately. With this persistent

structure of national security decision-making, under which the U.S. still operates, fully

comprehending the ubiquitous legacy of this legislation is integral to a proper

understanding of the wider geo-political posture of the world’s last ‘superpower.’

Accordingly, the actual content of the NSA should be examined in attainment of a better
 31

understanding of what exactly the law achieved, and the ramifications of the new

institutions that were set up.

Department of Defense/ Joint Chiefs of Staff (DOD/JCS)

Since the end of WWII, the United States military has been the most formidable

and well funded fighting force ever assembled on Earth. Rivaled only in recent times by

the former U.S.S.R., the extent of American military superiority has reached staggering

proportions following the fall of the Iron Curtain. In 2003, the U.S. Congress allocated

over $400 billion in national defense/ military expenditures, which is roughly 47% of the

total amount spent on militaries around the entire globe (Hook; 2005, 5). That is more than

the next twenty nations’ military expenditures combined7. As such an extensive

apparatus, the military has become a colossal bureaucracy in its own right. The Pentagon,

completed and dedicated in 1943, is one of the largest office buildings on the planet, with

over 17.5 miles of corridors and hallways8. With this in mind, the question of how all that

power is structured and managed becomes extremely salient, and to be sure, the NSA

played a pivotal role as the largest reorganization of this military might.

The U.S. Constitution clearly proscribes the powers of the president as “…

Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the

several States…” (Article II, section 2). But, the hands-on leadership of the defense

establishment is also paramount in order for the president to have his strategic objectives

effectively carried out by career men and women in uniform. Before 1947, this was

handled by the Secretary of War as well as the Secretary of the Navy, which were both

7
Russia is second on the list of military expenditures, with about $68 billion allocated in the defense budget.
8
See <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/pentagon.htm> for more interesting details on the Pentagon.
 32

cabinet-level posts within the president’s administration. However, the 1947 NSA

effectively consolidated the main duties of these branches into a single civilian-controlled

leadership position. They were displaced by the new office of the Secretary of Defense,

who acts as “… the president's principal defense advisor and oversees the DOD. The

secretary advises the president on military strategy and policy, sets defense budgets, and

administers the department” (Military Administration, 2008). Meanwhile, the uniformed

leaders of each separate branch of the armed services were integrated into a single body -

- the Joint Chiefs of Staffs or JCS command9, which:

…has six members: the heads of the four branches of the military—the
army and air force chiefs of staff, the chief of naval operations, and the
Marine Corps commandant—the chairman, and the vice-chairman. The
chairman of the JCS is the highest ranking officer in the military (Ibid.).

This was indeed unprecedented. “For the first time in our history, legislation

established a peacetime Joint Chiefs of Staff… [italics added]” (Trager; 1977). Under this

mantle, the NSA “… unified the armed forces, expanded the defense budget, [and]

harnessed science to military purposes…” (Hogan; 1998, 3). There was also considerable

“… pressure for a major reorganization that would make the air force independent and

unify the armed services” (Jablonsky; 2002, 8).

The War Department was split to create an air force independent of the
army, and they together with the Navy Department came under the new
Department of Defense, headed by a civilian, cabinet-level secretary
possessed of real authority over the entire military and the civilian
secretaries heading up the three main departments (Hunt; 2007, 141).

Consolidation of the armed forces was aimed at promoting “… cooperation among the

military branches and greater coherence in overall planning and operations” (Ibid., 141).

The U.S. military had become a more nimble and unified force, uniquely able to engage

9
The fifth branch of the armed services, the U.S. Coast Guard, became subsumed into the Department of Homeland
Security in 2002.
 33

in offensive campaigns around the globe. Also in terms of military reorganization, the

NSA “established… the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), the Munitions

Board, the War Council, and the Research and Development Board…” for the

development of new weaponry (Hogan; 1998, 66). In total, this expansion constituted “… the

most important governmental restructuring for defense and reorganization of the armed

forces since the beginning of the Republic” (Trager; 1977).

Therefore, as far as the implications for American military power, the NSA was

an extensive consolidation of America’s strength in arms, and by centralizing the defense

establishment vis-à-vis the DOD, inter-service rivalry was curtailed10. Particularly under

civilian leadership, the Secretary of Defense became a powerful voice in the direction of

foreign policy. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff became increasingly involved in the

process of agenda setting at the White House, a practice that was much less prevalent

prior to 1947. The various chiefs of each military branch meet regularly with each other,

and with the president, to keep him abreast of ongoing operations, and to serve in an

advisory capacity. Moreover, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs acts as a statutory advisor

on military affairs to the president’s National Security Council. These relationships

highlight the growing seat of the military at the foreign policy table, as well as the nexus

between civilians in the executive branch and enlisted officials. Overall, the growth and

reconfiguration of this massive arm of the U.S. federal government would prove

instrumental in some of the greatest shifts in intra-governmental power relations, which

are examined in the next chapter.

10
For more on the schisms between the services, see pages 5-6 in Hoover, Herbert, Chairman. The Commission on
Organization of The Executive Branch of Government. “The National Security Organization.” A Report to the
Congress. February, 1949.
 34

The National Security Council (NSC)

Perhaps most significantly for foreign policy creation, the 1947 NSA set up the

National Security Council or NSC as “… a gatekeeper controlling the flow of foreign-

policy advice from other government officials” (Hook; 2005, 40). The law outlines how the

Council is configured and designates certain officials as members of this deliberative

body. They include the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary

of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others who serve in an

advisory capacity and solely at the pleasure of the president. In addition, NSC meetings

include the more recently created position of “… special assistant for national security,

more commonly known as the national security advisor” (Ibid., 103). These officials have

“… the task of formulating national policy, assuring the president a wide range of advice,

and seeing to the implementation of his decisions” (Hunt; 2007, 142). With these

prescriptions for strong national security policy influence, the NSC became a vital

component of how matters of peace and war were to be handled.

Certainly an imposing institution, and indeed salient for the purposes of this

assessment of the NSA’s impact, the NSC is nevertheless a rather fluid body. Policy is

predominantly shaped by the president under which it operates, and is adaptable to

differing circumstances and different holders of power.

[T]he Council’s role is advisory only. It recommends; it does not decide.

Whatever security policy may be finally approved by the President, after
such modifications or rejections of the Council’s view as he may
determine, is the policy, not of the Council, but of the Chief Executive
(Cutler; 1956, 441).

Given this adaptability, the NSC has evolved over the tenure of successive U.S.

Presidents, and a brief overview of this history is helpful in articulating how it can
 35

function. President Truman saw limited utility in the NSC as a deliberative body. But, “it

was President Eisenhower who built the Council into a well-proportioned structure of

substance and strength” (Ibid., 458). During his administration, “… the National Security

Council… emerged as a mechanism of the executive branch of the federal government

for advising the President on matters of high policy, equal in importance to the Cabinet”

(Ibid., 441). From Eisenhower on, the NSC has been a permanent fixture of the national

security establishment.

Once unleashed, the NSC continually renewed itself as a powerful institution and

spawned some unintended consequences, in some cases usurping the role of foreign

policy creation. The National Security Act specified that the NSC was to coordinate and

expedite the policies approved by the president, but never to initiate policy. But this

guiding tenet of the NSC was not always followed, especially under President Nixon’s

National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (before he moved to become Secretary of

State). This was also the case under President Carter’s advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski,

during the Iran hostage crisis and the proposed intervention that he had urged in the face

of opposition from Secretary of State Vance. Finally, there was the Iran/Contra affair, in

which a junior officer of the Council conducted a major foreign policy operation whereby

Congress and the Department of State were totally ignored. These were rather clear cases

of the NSC actually determining foreign policy, with little more than an assumption that

the president would approve. Accordingly, the NSC has evolved into a creature of its

own, and has garnered tremendous power in the foreign policy process; before, such a

power structure was nonexistent.

 36

Given the context of what the U.S. was trying to accomplish in the postwar years,

it is perhaps no wonder that such a large infrastructure of research, intelligence, advice,

consultation, strategy formulation, and policy creation, which plays out behind closed-

door sessions of the NSC, was needed to support and properly administer the new-found

increase in American power. In other words, it makes sense that with more security

commitments, more government employees are needed to address them. As questions of

foreign policy become increasingly complex, more voices with specialized knowledge

within the policy debate are enormously helpful to the president’s process of decision-

making. Chapter Three examines the implications of the NSC in the form of changes to

intra-governmental relations.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Because there was not a clearly defined external threat to the U.S. homeland after

1815, the U.S. saw no need to maintain an intelligence service like those present in many

nations of Europe. But in 1947, the NSA “… established the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) and the position of Director of Central Intelligence to consolidate U.S. intelligence

efforts in the face of a hostile Soviet Union” (Intelligence; 2004, 289). Headquartered at

Langley, Virginia, the CIA essentially carried over the foreign intelligence-gathering

function of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), which had served more or less in the

same capacity during WWII. President Truman disbanded the OSS shortly after the

Japanese surrender, reasoning that it had been badly needed during the war, but not after

its conclusion during peacetime. Yet, the U.S.S.R. had been busily expanding its

equivalents, the N.K.V.D. and later the K.G.B. around the world, and as would later
 37

become apparent, even within the borders of United States proper. Thus, the U.S.

followed suit.

In 1947, the CIA had only the duties of collecting foreign intelligence, while the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was relegated to predominately handling domestic

intelligence, although the bureau is still able to conduct overseas investigations as well11.

At this time, the CIA was essentially only an information-gathering outfit. But by 1949,

when it was obvious that the Soviets were expanding their intelligence activities, the CIA

began to conduct covert operations or so-called ‘black ops12.’ The difference was that

surgical clandestine activities were pursued in peacetime after passage of the NSA, and

the CIA became a permanent establishment that not only gathered information -- it also

acted on it. Thus, with a new name and a fresh mandate, the CIA became something akin

to a foreign policy enforcement agency. Under the leadership of Director Allen Dulles,

the agency grabbed the ball and ran with it: the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadeq in

Iran in 1953, Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, and later Salvador Allende in Chile in

1973, as well as the attempted assassinations of Fidel Castro in Cuba, Patrice Lumumba

in the Congo, and so on.

The creation of the CIA was seen as badly needed considering that foreign policy

makers, even in post-WWII America, could not always regulate the behavior and

practices of people and governments in far-off places. Besides economic sanctions and

overt military engagement, foreign policies often lack any real ‘teeth.’ However, with the

advent of covert operations in non-direct conflict situations, policymakers were given a

11
Conversely, the CIA cannot legally carry out operations domestically.
12
The first of such operations in the postwar era were actually initiated under the State Department’s covert unit with
the innocuous title, “Office of Special Projects.” See page 311 of Brinkley, Douglass and Townsend Hoopes. Driven
Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, NY. 1992.
 38

powerful tool at their disposal to in effect, ‘give history a nudge,’ in the words of Joseph

Stalin. This aspect of the foreign policy apparatus would become indispensable for the

American government in waging the Cold War, but at the same time, would come under

intense scrutiny as it evolved “… into what is now its dubious image: an organization of

spies and ‘dirty tricks’” that utilized tactics such as subversion, sabotage, assassination,

etc. (May; 1992, 67). The blowback experienced by this kind of behavior on the part of the

CIA and its generally secretive nature has made this agency perhaps the most

controversial aspect of the U.S. federal government right up until the present day. Even

“… large portions of the American public… believe that agencies designed to protect

them are, in fact, endangering them” (Moynihan; 1997, 61). Steeped in controversy and mired

in secrecy, the CIA has become one of the most contentious yet consequential aspects of

the ubiquitous legacy left behind by the NSA of 1947. In fact, without the NSA having

set up the CIA, none of the aforementioned operations would have been possible in the

first place, radically altering the course of modern political history around the globe. This

begins to touch on some of the more profound ways in which the NSA had such a

tremendous global legacy, to be described in Chapter Four.

Amendments to the NSA

After being amended in 1949, 1953, 1957, and as recently as 1986, the NSA has

renewed its imposition of military and intelligence hegemony within the U.S. system of

governance, as well the U.S.’s hegemony among the global community of states. “… The

1949 amendment to the National Security Act began a series of evolutionary changes that

would culminate in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act with an emphasis on centralized,

 39

accountable authority and joint unified command…” (Jablonsky; 2002, 10). These two

amendments were the most consequential of all the changes made to the NSA over its

history, and are briefly addressed here. Given the many alterations, it could be said that

the act has become a ‘living document,’ as a law that has been tailored frequently to meet

the administrative challenges of new eras, incorporating lessons learned under operation

of previous stipulations. Yet, the underlying implications of the Act remain unaltered by

the revisions and “… the basic structure remains in place today” (Lerner). Without

belaboring the details of each amendment, it is important to point out that most of the

reasons for reconfiguring the original 1947 NSA have had to do with changes in duties

and responsibilities among components of the Department of Defense/ military branches

or simply the names of defense institutions13.

First, the 1949 amendment to the NSA reflected President Truman’s

dissatisfaction of certain portions of the original law. In addition to removing the

individual military service secretaries from serving on the NSC, the amendment allowed

for more specialization at the DOD by creating “… the offices of deputy secretary and

three assistant secretaries of defense” (SecDef Histories). It also gave greater authority to the

military leadership by increasing the JCS Joint Staff to include 210 officers (Ibid).

Second,

… the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of

1986 (PL 99-433), sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona)
and House Representative Bill Nichols (D-Alabama), attempted to reduce
interservice rivalries and the services' independent organization,
promoting ‘jointness’ within the DOD. The act specified the chairman of
the JCS as the ‘principal military advisor to the President, the National

13
Part of the 1949 Amendment to the NSA (Public Law 216, 10 August 1949) was intended to establish the name
‘Department of Defense’ instead of ‘National Military Establishment.’ For obvious reasons, American legislators
wanted to avoid the negative perceptions that stemmed from the acronym – “NME,” pronounced “enemy.”
 40

Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense’ (Military Administration;

2008).

Moreover, “In addition to reporting JCS positions on issues and problems, the JCS

chairman could now give any advice he or she thought appropriate,” even directly to the

president himself (Ibid.). The reorganization also created the position of vice-chairman of

the JCS. The discussion now turns to the heart of this research project – the myriad

political ramifications of intra-governmental alterations to the power structure of foreign

policymaking.
 41

CHAPTER THREE
Domestic Consequences: Implications for
Inter-Branch and Inter-Agency Relations

With such an extensive shakeup of the nation’s military and foreign policy

apparatuses via a legislative mandate, the U.S. federal government was plunged into a

significant period of transition throughout the implementation phase of the NSA of 1947.

Many of the changes regarding institutional formation/ reorganization were deliberate,

tangible, and quickly took effect. However, the NSA also laid the groundwork for longer-

term consequences that have since played out behind the scenes of American political

procedure and are more conceptual in nature. In fact, they have largely been persistent

right up until the present day, many of which were unintentional or even altogether

unimaginable at the time of the law’s inception. These domestic political implications are

of tremendous importance, as they represent a large part of the evolutionary story of the

American experiment after 1947 and how it has been conducted by successive waves of

elected officials at the height of global power. They also comprise the crux of the NSA’s

legacy, and serve as the heart of this research project.

But salience has not yet given way to proper and thorough articulation in this area

of political history, even decades after the fact. Consider that the title of the only book

entirely devoted to the NSA contains the byline “A History of the Law that Transformed

America1.” But overall, the author delves almost exclusively into the historical lead-up to

the law, leaving many questions unanswered as far as how the nation’s politics, and

foreign policy in particular, were actually transformed after 1947. Articles published on

1
See Stuart, Douglas T., Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America.
Princeton University Press. Princeton, NJ. 2008.
 42

matters relating to the NSA are equally sparse in this regard and offer only marginal

insight into the NSA’s effect on internal power relations. The fundamental aim of this

chapter is to rectify some of the gaps in this understanding, specifically pertaining to the

NSA’s implications for inter-branch and inter-agency relations within the U.S. federal

government as it affects the creation of foreign policy.

Just as the share of power the U.S. wields relative to that of other nations is in

constant flux, the sharing of power among elements within the U.S. is equally fluid,

changes to which can have profound ripple effects. Accordingly, this chapter examines

the NSA as a primary causative mechanism behind post-WWII alterations to the

distribution of foreign policy influence between the legislative and executive branches, as

well as between entities comprising the military and diplomatic establishments – shifts

which still dictate the operational confines of most foreign policy creation in

contemporary times2. Specifically, this includes the general trend of increased

presidential power over matters of foreign policy and national security/ warfare relative

to the decline of Congress’ role in such issues, as well as the simultaneous rise of the

Department of Defense (DOD) to in many ways supersede the Department of State

(DOS). Given the complexity of such concepts, the span of time they cover, and the lack

of ‘cut and dry’ causal linkages or ‘one size fits all’ explanations, this chapter also

discusses some of the inextricably-linked parallel facilitators of, or catalysts for, changes

to intra-governmental power at the federal level. This is crucial for a sound analysis, as

other factors, many emanating from the same historical and contextual paradigm as the

NSA, have acted in tandem to fundamentally transform the operational and “…

2
Interpretation of the NSA’s lasting political legacy should inform how the U.S. may or may not be structurally
configured to effectively address the many pressing foreign matters American leaders are currently confronted with.
 43

architectural face of the federal government…” (Hogan, 3). By extension, this discussion

draws upon the historical record when appropriate, recognizing analytical considerations

which may be relevant only to specific periods of American government leadership.

Given this framework of analysis, this chapter has three main purposes: (1) to establish

the NSA as a profoundly disruptive force for inter-branch and inter-agency relationships

-- vastly reconfiguring how policy actors interact with one another, (2) to describe the

parallel facilitators of the trends in power relations spawned by the NSA, and (3) to offer

insight into the tangible impacts or ‘ripple effects’ of changes to intra-governmental

power-sharing. The next and final chapter delves into the global consequences of the

NSA, and its impact on the exercise of American power beyond domestic political

practices.

Extensive scholarship has already been conducted on the many causes of

fluctuations in power sharing within the federal government, though not directly centered

on the NSA topically. Much of this institutional theory has been focused on inter-branch

relations, and less so on differences in authority between entities within individual

branches, particularly regarding legislatively derived shifts of power within the apparatus

of foreign policy. Although some are keen to identify the general trends of descending

influence for Congress and the practice of diplomacy after WWII (Binder, Quirk; 2005), most

authors seem to gloss over the direct line of causality that can be drawn from the NSA to

such shifts in intra-governmental power. This area of political science merits a deeper

inquiry.

Binder and Quirk do however note that:

… the balance of Constitutional power in foreign affairs and war has been
substantially altered over the course of the nation’s history… [as a] result
 44

of accumulated legislative change, executive activity, and, to a lesser

extent, Court decisions (Binder, Quirk; 2005, 353-4).

They add that the shifts in power “… which distinctly advantages the executive, can be

attributed to no single cause and no single source… [but] Congress’s contribution to this

state of affairs centers on the establishment of the contemporary national security

state…” (Ibid., 349). This makes the point that the institutions set up under the NSA, as

well as others like the National Security Agency, were instrumental in the growing

imbalance of foreign policy clout between Congress and the Presidency. Yet, the NSA in

particular is not singled out for its overwhelmingly predominant role in the power shifts,

especially when it comes to the decline of diplomacy. Instead, intra-governmental

relations are seen in a broader historical context and not necessarily in light of specific

changes that came about through legislative action. However, this analysis of the NSA’s

domestic political consequences focuses on both of these approaches, as they both have

had notable impacts. This is precisely the logic that precedes this chapter, as it seeks to

articulate the changes in the power relations of the federal government, which were far

and away shaped by the NSA of 1947. But before doing so, there are some other

important considerations.

The Shift in National Focus toward Foreign Policy

The lawmakers who crafted the NSA clearly intended for more U.S. attention to

be allocated toward foreign affairs (i.e., military might and intelligence capability under

the guise of global leadership). Such a desire was an intrinsic part of the NSA’s policy

design and the network of institutions it established. In fact, if one were to visualize the

U.S.’s primary areas of concern or its overall national agenda as a pie chart over time, the
 45

NSA facilitated a massive widening of the wedge representing foreign affairs – perhaps

even beyond half of its time and effort. This is certainly embodied in virtually every

presidential administration since the conclusion of WWII, perhaps with the exception of

Presidents Eisenhower, Ford, and Clinton. In fact, most postwar Commanders-in-Chief

have been more or less consumed by foreign policy matters and accordingly had a legacy

defined by them. And although the institutions set up under the NSA did not

automatically cause agendas to be preoccupied with foreign policy, they certainly

allowed for this to be the case.

To illustrate the shift in focus -- Truman dealt the death blow to Imperial Japan

with the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, signed the NSA into law,

and became embroiled in the Korean conflict. Kennedy faced down the Soviets with the

Cuban missile crisis and the Bay of Pigs incident. Johnson, though also deeply immersed

in a whole host of domestic issues3, was bogged down with escalation of the Vietnam

War. Nixon centered his administration on Vietnam policy, détente with the Soviets, as

well as the Open Door policy with China and even deliberately surrounded himself with

weak cabinet members so that he and his foreign policy guru, Henry Kissinger, could

reign supreme over the course of such matters4. Carter was faced with the Iranian hostage

crisis surrounding the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, as well as the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan. Reagan dealt with the vestiges of the Cold War, while

intervening militarily in Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, and by proxy in Afghanistan vis-à-vis

the Mujahideen. George H.W. Bush ousted Noriega from Panama as well as Saddam

3
LBJ initiated the Great Society and Model Cities Program as part of the ‘War on Poverty,’ and of course signed the
Civil Rights Act into law, the importance of which must not be understated.
4
From “The Presidents: Nixon.” The American Experience. PBS home video. 1990.
 46

Hussein from Kuwait during the Gulf War, while his son, George W. Bush (43) launched

wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of a larger ‘War on Terror’ after the suicide terrorist

attacks of 9/11.

The domestic accomplishments of these presidents are somewhat less memorable,

and pale in comparison to their focus on external events. Perhaps with the exceptions of

Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, this cannot be said for any president prior to

WWII and passage of the NSA – a testament to the law’s impact by configuring the

robust federal government posture in the handling of foreign affairs. In fact, many of the

aforementioned achievements would have been considerably more remote or even

impossible without the institutions set up by the NSA. This highlights the overall shift

toward foreign policy that the NSA had in large part been responsible for

institutionalizing, which in turn, made modern presidential legacies primarily contingent

upon foreign affairs.

In a similar fashion, even most legislators over the last several decades, and

certainly those with presidential ambitions (e.g., Hillary Clinton, John McCain, John

Kerry, and others) have wished to be primarily involved with foreign issues. And even

though lawmakers operate more in an oversight capacity or an advisory role, areas of

foreign policy seem to be the most prized committee assignments. In fact, the most

prestigious and coveted top spots for committeeships in Congress have become the

Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees, as well as the Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence in the House of Representatives5. And in terms of sheer

notoriety, more members of the public are likely to know who the chairperson of the

5
The U.S. House of Representatives also has Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees, but the Senate does
not have a Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
 47

Foreign Relations Committee is, as opposed to the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

Committee chairperson, for example. Likewise, people may be able to name the

Secretary of State or Defense, but not Commerce or Labor. This is indicative of the

extent to which foreign affairs take up a growing portion of U.S. governing business, and

this undoubtedly became much more pronounced following the 1947 NSA. But as shall

become clear, the degree of attention paid to foreign affairs by lawmakers and the public

(their constituency) has done little to compensate for Congress’ overall declining role in

formulating foreign policy, described by Stephen R. Weissman as “a culture of

deference6.”

With this general description of the modern American political psyche, it becomes

clear that the era of the NSA has been focused resoundingly on external events or geo-

political issues, as well as the liberal use of military force. But, merely having a

presidency defined by landmarks in foreign policy/ warfare does not necessarily reveal

anything about the state of the White House’s relationship with Capitol Hill. Nor does it

portend whether military or diplomatic activities were of most significance in the creation

of foreign policy. But before turning to the material nature of the move toward the

exertion of more presidential and military clout, one must also consider a brief overview

of the Constitutionally-derived boundaries of power relations between elements of the

federal government, as a control for how the balance of power would later be disrupted.

6
This is the title of Weissman’s book. For much more on the decline of Congress in foreign affairs, see A Culture of
Deference: Congress’s Failure of Leadership in Foreign Policy. Basic Books, a member of the Perseus Book Group.
New York, NY. 1996.
 48

The Boundaries of Foreign Policy Creation

In theory, each branch of the U.S. federal government is co-equal, according to

the Constitution. Yet, depending on the era in question and the national agenda of the

time, certain branches have had both waxing and waning levels of prominence within the

government. Much of this stems from the simple configuration of the separation of

powers, an indispensable staple of American democracy.

The executive branch carries out the law, and in many instances, rather

extensively shapes its form. It therefore occupies a very ‘hands on’ position within

governance. The legislative branch actually crafts legislation and controls the nation’s

purse strings, but most foreign policies are not formally legislated7 and Congress

appropriates funds while others actually spend it. And by virtue of its structure, it is in

more of a follower position due to its general disunity among 535 members, as well as its

ex post role as ‘overseer’ and ‘debater.’ The judiciary is by default the least assertive

branch. The Supreme Court consists of the fewest numbers (just nine individual jurists)

and cannot initiate changes in policy. It can only decide the constitutionality of various

cases ‘after the fact,’ which are sent up the ladder of appeals by lower federal circuit

courts.

Nonetheless, the U.S. Constitution is somewhat ambiguous in outlining the role

and authority of members of the federal government in shaping how the nation should

conduct international relationships. It “…is especially vague with regard to the day-to-

day conduct of U.S. foreign policy” (Hook; 2005, 104). However, the Constitution does insist

7
That is perhaps why they are called foreign policies and not laws. In fact, lawmakers seldom, if ever, set foreign
policy via legislation. There are however some noteworthy specific historical exceptions to this general rule of thumb,
such as military sales to other countries. For more, see Brown, Harold. Thinking About National Security: Defense and
Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World. Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, CO. 1983.
 49

that it be conducted almost exclusively at the federal level of government8. In fact, the

concept of foreign affairs being handled at the federal level is one of the central

differences between the original colonial Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.

Under the latter, cohesive foreign policy was delegated to the national government so it

could be spoken with one voice, instead of being conducted incoherently with various

colonies striking arrangements with any foreign nation they saw as being the most

advantageous. And ‘one voice’ of foreign policy generally translated into having

relatively few people ‘in the loop,’ and in the case of the U.S., a very strong executive –

notably stronger than the parliamentary liberal democracies of Western Europe, which

have Prime Ministers.

Article II, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution state:

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy…

when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require
the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments… He shall have Power… to make treaties…shall appoint
Ambassadors, …and all other Officers…[and] shall receive ambassadors
and other public Ministers…

With these basic proscribed powers, the president accordingly occupies the very hub of

the foreign policy formulation process (Hook; 2005, 99-104). And although there are indeed

both domestic and transnational influences on the individual holding office in the White

House, one should not forget that once all is said and done, final decisions rest with a

single individual: the president. The degree to which secondary influences are recognized

and incorporated in the policy process depends very much on the managerial style of the

president in question. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the president is elected by a

national constituency, an argument could be made that American foreign policy is less

8
State and local governments can pass resolutions on international matters but they are only suggestive and of course
non-binding.
 50

than ideally democratic. In other words, relative executive impunity over matters of

foreign policy are essentially ‘baked into the cake’ of the American structure of

government. But, this is perhaps no surprise considering that the framers of the

Constitution likely could never have envisaged the extent to which the U.S. would

assume such an assertive role in global politics. Their description of foreign policy

creation was accordingly quite ambiguous, leaving most of the decision-making power to

the head of state.

Congress’ role as arbiter of the nations purse strings, having power to declare war

(in the House of Representatives), reserving power to ratify treaties, giving consent over

nominations of ambassadors and cabinet level foreign policy posts (in the Senate),

imposing unilateral sanctions, and general oversight is however considerable. But

notwithstanding these duties, most of America’s relationship with other nations, hostile

or otherwise, has operated outside of these congressional constraints on executive

impunity. Moreover, many of the more formal or procedural powers of Congress have

become watered-down or partially displaced, in large part due to the new institutions of

the NSA. In fact, short of declaring war and funding government operations, Congress is

quite powerless when it comes to the trajectory of foreign policy matters and has opted to

give the executive branch considerable leverage over them.

This is especially true because formal declarations of war (the ultimate extent of

foreign policy decisions) are to some extent antiquated, not having been utilized since

WWII, and do not reflect modern warfare, which does not necessarily equal war. In its

traditional spirit, war refers to readily identifiable, formally conscripted troops that

represent the interests of a unitary polity openly facing off against a comparable force
 51

with the same characteristics on the fields of battle. But modern conflict is characterized

by smaller-scale, transnational, and often asymmetrical conflicts (Ferguson; 2004b, 241).

Thus, presidents have instead acted under the banner of the precedent set by the Gulf of

Tonkin Resolution, which in 1964 gave LBJ extensive war making powers (arguably

away from the original intent of the Constitution). And even after passage of the War

Powers Resolution of 19739, which limited the president’s capacity to make war

indiscriminately, chief executives have still been relatively unencumbered in acting

militarily. Because the resolution merely stipulated that the Congress should be notified

48 hours before the use of force, and that U.S. troops could only be engaged for 60 days

without subsequent approval, many military operations have been able to be carried out

within this window. Moreover, Congress has often tacitly approved executive decisions

by merely authorizing the use of force in a general sense. Therefore, John Dean, former

counsel to President Nixon, reached the conclusion that:

[I]t seems we've reached the point where the Constitution is no longer
relevant on matters of a president's war-making powers. Presidents, the
Congress and the courts have made going to war, once a serious
constitutional issue, and a purely political question. As a result, in the last
half century, the war powers clause of the Constitution has become a
nullity, if not a quaint relic (Dean; 2002).

As for other congressional sources of foreign policy power, formal treaties are

seldom utilized by modern presidents, and so the Senate is rarely tasked with ratifying

them. Moreover, funding streams are budgeted and appropriated far in advance of their

use. Thus, if the president decides a particular course of action, changes by Congress can

customarily only be made ‘after the fact,’ assuming that relevant committee members

9
For a more detailed explanation of this landmark legislation, which sought to ‘right the ship’ of a lopsided legislative-
executive relationship on foreign policy, see pp. 169-200 in Blechman, Barry M. and W. Philip Ellis. The Politics of
National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy. Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, NY. 1990.
 52

have been briefed on the matter(s) at hand. And even then, the ‘general oversight’

conducted in the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and other jurisdictionally relevant

committees, is meager compared to the president who acts as the ‘sole organ’ of the

foreign policy process. Aside form reporting requirements, congressional oversight is

usually only reactionary and often non-binding (Hook; 2005, 125-6). Therefore, a picture

emerges of an authoritative executive who, when all is said and done, makes the final call

on the direction of foreign policy. Thus, the presidency was already very strong by virtue

of the Constitution, dating back to the founding of the nation. It would seem that given

these realities, it would be difficult to tip the balance of inter-branch power even further

in favor of the presidency. However, the NSA certainly did exactly that and reinforced

this very important feature of American democracy, by actually expanding and

solidifying the position of the chief executive and the military.

The Context of Postwar Power Relations

Running parallel to the conceptual evolution of national security described in

Chapter One, the change of focus toward foreign affairs would naturally require that

certain existent relationships among components of the federal government would be

altered to accommodate the new strategic priority of engaging world politics as never

before. And because fledgling entities such as the DOD/ JCS, NSC, and CIA had not

existed previously in such form, entirely new working relationships were obviously

forged between them and other government nodes. But characteristic of each of these

relationships, whether new or merely renewed, is that they tended to favor an increase in

the power of the president over Congress and the military over diplomats -- constituting a
 53

convergence and eventual solidification of the U.S.’s military power with its executive

political power. However, it is important to consider that the ebb and flow of such

relationships has always remained fluid over the entire course of the nation’s history. But,

the NSA was particularly instrumental in changing them in this particular direction,

arguably more so than any other Act of Congress during the twentieth century.

The inter-branch and inter-agency power shifts spawned by the NSA were

however, quite gradual, and took on a plethora of different forms. Therefore, they were

somewhat inconspicuous, but no less consequential. Especially during the early Cold War

years, they went largely unquestioned and were not seen as particularly detrimental to the

democratic process10. After all, a uniquely strong, lopsided, and even ‘imperial

presidency’ (relative to Congress and the Supreme Court) had been in place essentially

since FDR’s inauguration in 193311, while ongoing military operations had somewhat

eclipsed the need for diplomacy since 1941. Thus, coming off the heels of victory

through an unprecedented global military campaign, the executive branch and the

military already retained the lion’s share of influence over the nation by the time of the

NSA’s passage in 1947. But at the beginning of the Truman Administration and just two

years since the end of the FDR Administration (the longest in U.S. history, and perhaps

also the most consequential given the rigors of WWII), the NSA provided a formal

continuation of these trends, and as documented in Chapter Two, even more statutory

power to the executive branch and the armed services.

10
These changes were unquestioned largely by default. During the early Cold War years, many of the shifts to inter-
branch power relations had yet to fully materialize, and were accordingly unarticulated by the social science field.
Furthermore, it is the central mission of this thesis to establish the nature and extent of changes to power relations
spawned by the NSA, which have largely remained undeveloped or altogether ignored by political science literature.
11
FDR even tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to increase the number of justices on the Supreme Court, so that he could
‘pack the court.’ See Shea, Christopher. “Supreme Switch: Did FDR’s Threat to ‘Pack’ the Court in 1937 Really
Change the Course of Constitutional History?” The Boston Globe. December 4, 2005.
<http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/12/04/supreme_switch/>
 54

Coupled with the fact that extraordinary times were widely believed to require

equally extraordinary responses, the ascendance of the presidency and the military vis-à-

vis the NSA were perceived by the House of Representatives in particular to be part of

what was necessary for America to succeed in the postwar years (Trussell; 1947a). There

had indeed been much deliberation over specific amendments to the NSA (e.g., whether

to preserve the Marine Corpse as a separate armed service branch or further unify the

services), but most lawmakers were basically on the same page as far as the need to unify

the defense establishment and provide the president with many new institutional tools.

Even with a Republican House and Senate, Truman won many of the provisions he had

favored, which wound up in the final version of the bill on July 25th of 1947. Both the

Senate and the House passed the NSA overwhelmingly, without contest and by a voice

vote -- with the ‘yeas’ greatly outnumbering the ‘neas’ (Trussell; 1947b).

Meanwhile, the relative decline of Congress and the State Department were

byproducts of presidential/ military ascendancy, as opposed to a conscious or purposeful

degradation of their influence (Weissman; 1996). Nonetheless, if the U.S. were to take center

stage among the global community of states, then the geo-political realities of this epoch

required a shakeup of American governance structure, which at least in the short term,

may have made a great deal of sense to U.S. leaders. But with the profound impact of the

NSA’s institutional reforms and the context of the subsequent 62 years of their real-world

implementation, contemporary political scientists are uniquely able to interpret these

changes in power sharing it had ushered in, and draw conclusions as to their advantages

or disadvantages.
 55

Certainly, the effects of the NSA on power relations have by no means been

uniform over time. The trend toward a stronger president and military have been a

relative constant since 1947, as it was institutionally based and therefore ‘hard-wired’

into the structure of modern American government by the NSA. However, the extent to

which these asymmetrical exertions of power have predominated has fluctuated, and in

some cases, the changes took years or decades to be fully realized. Moreover, they

materialized differently under various presidential administrations, largely depending on

extemporaneous circumstances such as party affiliation, which has certainly played a

role. Republican presidents after Eisenhower have generally amplified this trend, whereas

Democratic presidents after Johnson have served to soften its blow. This stems from the

inherent ideological predisposition toward a more holistic and dovish approach to

international affairs, which contemporary liberalism tends to espouse. Virtually the

opposite is true of modern conservatism and most Republican presidents over the last

several decades, which have tended to be markedly more hawkish and unilateral.

Therefore, relations are often a function of the ideological approach or managerial style

of presidential leadership (Hook; 2005, 114-5).

In a similar vein, when the Commander-in-chief asserts a more liberal

interpretation of presidential powers, (especially in times of war such as Lincoln, FDR,

Bush 43) then the other branches are relegated to more of a follower position. And when

the president chooses to listen to the military more than diplomats, then the State

Department tends to suffer (Stearns; 1973). But regardless of momentary approaches to the

exercise of American power, the NSA tilted the balance of federal authority in ways that
 56

transcended particular officeholders, bringing about “… an institutionalized national

security presidency” (Binder, Quirk; 2005, 357).

Congress Takes a Back Seat to the Chief Executive on Foreign Policy

Over the course of American political history, many factors have disrupted the

consistent balance of power between each branch of government. The nature of relations

between Congress and the presidency has been particularly tumultuous (Weissman; 1996).

At times adversarial or even hostile, the working relationship between these two branches

has periodically been racked by disagreement or inaction, particularly when each is

controlled by a different political party. And when the Senate and House of

Representatives has been divided as well, the Congress has sometimes become all but

impotent in addressing new issues (particularly since the Vietnam War), thus leaving the

executive branch with greater responsibilities (Hook; 2005, 130-31). Under more conciliatory

political environments, usually when both are controlled by the same party, this has been

a more equitable relationship and the gears of government have turned more smoothly.

But aside from partisan divides between the branches or disunity within them, a major

component of the interaction between Congress and the president has been characterized

by the shifting balance of power that can occur when conducting ‘the people’s business.’

Certainly, the general parameters of this balance are defined by the Constitution, but

when acted upon by outside forces such as wide-sweeping reorganizational legislation,

the balance can become severely disrupted. Whether a rise in one branch’s power relative

to another is desirable or beneficial is a preferential matter – certainly debatable, but

beyond the aim of this analysis. What is clear however, is the fact that the NSA and the
 57

conditions from which it arose greatly enhanced the power of the presidency relative to

the sinking influence of Congress, especially regarding matters of foreign policy. This

separation of power has since become a wide rift, with the executive branch’s virtual

monopoly on foreign policy towering over the legislative branch.

By passing the NSA, Congress gave the executive branch a whole array of new

tools over which it had few practical controls. Interestingly, it did not include many

stipulations for the preservation of its own authority in the bill, and the few mentions of

legislative oversight that were included, did little to compensate for the power it had

voluntarily ceded. This greatly enhanced the power of the presidency, and accordingly,

the post-NSA foreign policy complex has become defined by the executive branch

carving out more areas of control over external affairs, for every bit that Congress

relinquished. In this and other instances, “Congress’ role in foreign affairs and war has

become increasingly marginalized and, moreover… it is largely Congress’ own fault”

(Binder, Quirk; 2005, 368). It is rather obvious that the executive branch was deliberately

granted more power through the creation of the DOD/ JCS, NSC, and CIA, all of which

were placed under direct presidential control. And precisely because these new agencies

(representing billions of dollars in spending and thousands of federal employees with

security clearances) were by default oriented within the executive branch, it undoubtedly

became more and more able to dictate the course of foreign policy. In fact, it became so

massive that bluntly stated, there was less congressional oversight to go around, both in

terms of sheer numbers of issues and numbers of legislators tasked with addressing them.

Therefore, aside from enumerated and publicly transparent powers, U.S. presidents since

Truman have been able to exact considerable control over foreign policy through control
 58

of the aforementioned entities, almost entirely detached from Congress. The NSC in

particular greatly enhanced presidential power and his prerogative to decide virtually all

major matters of national security policy – a body that by the Eisenhower years had

become a very influential foreign policy think tank within the office of the president

(Cutler; 1956).

There is little doubt that subsequent to the implementation of the NSA, the U.S.

Congress “increasingly… took a back seat to the person of the president, who

commanded general deference as the embodiment of the nation in a semipermanent state

of war” (Hunt; 2007, 140). Therefore, the wide scope of the law had essentially “… created a

new Presidency, one far more demanding than in the more quiet past” (Jackson; 1960, 448).

Some have even gone so far as to allege that after 1947, “… the office was now

something like a combination of prime minister and king…” (Hunt; 2007, 149). In any event,

the leader of a single free nation had informally become ‘the leader of the free world.’

With this in mind, the president had grown uniquely powerful relative to other

elected public officials, but also more powerful relative to previous presidents in times

past. This is perhaps plainly obvious to most, but it bears consideration in the context of

the increasingly ‘imperial’ presidency after the WWII era12. This process of advancement

has been a parallel facilitator of the rise of the presidency, furthering the trend initiated by

the NSA. But interestingly, its provisions also furthered the process of advancement and

growth in power in the first place, so that the two were (and actually still are) mutually

reinforcing.

12
For more on this concept, see Schlesinger, Arthur Meier. The Imperial Presidency. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Boston, MA. 2004.
 59

Consider that the U.S.’s share of global power likely has not grown considerably

after the fall of the Soviet Union, but its overall amount of power has. To put it another

way, the U.S. of 2009 is considerably more powerful than the U.S. of 1947 or even 1991,

given rapid technological change, population increase, and a larger federal budget of

annual non-deficit spending. Just the fact that the president from 1945 on would be in

control of weapons that were literally capable of destroying the entire planet and all of its

inhabitants, constituted a massive increase in the amount of power available to the U.S.

President. For the first time in history, the president did indeed have his finger on the

proverbial ‘red button,’ single-handedly responsible for the final decision to deploy the

most destructive weapons of war that have ever been devised by humankind. Thus, in a

theoretical sense, President Truman had overnight assumed a responsibility of power that

dwarfed that of all presidents that came before him, and this trend has continued. With

such an unprecedented attainment of raw hard power, the NSA vested a tremendous

amount of faith and trust in the office of the presidency as well as the military itself.

Along with this increase in power over global politics, partly as a result of the

NSA and partly as a result of America’s overall growth, the notion of assertive

interventionism though the liberal use of force became an instrument of foreign policy13 –

much better defined and much more often utilized. In fact, over the course of the second

half of the 20th century, the U.S. acted militarily against Korea, Vietnam, Libya, Panama,

Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Unilateralism increased as a general trend

over the course of these engagements as well, certainly as evidenced by the recent

13
The Pact of Paris, also known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, sought to eliminate warfare as an instrument of
foreign policy. Instead of being a tool for exacting leverage over another nation, military engagement was to be
reserved for the gravest of crises and relegated to the proverbial ‘last resort’ in international affairs. However, with the
events of WWII, and the positioning of the bi-polar world with two superpowers on either side of the planet, the U.S.
and the Soviet Union were all but reluctant to abide by this general principal as they acted assertively in the many
flashpoints and proxy conflicts of the Cold War.
 60

intervention in Iraq14. But even aside from these periodic states of war, the NSA’s

procurement of perpetual peacetime readiness gave way to “… a growing militarization

of the American government and an increase of presidential and Executive Branch power

normally associated with wartime” (Jablonsky; 2002, 9). This model continued throughout

the frigid struggle of the Cold War period and remains persistent.

It is the primary argument of this chapter that the NSA, as a single piece of

legislation, was responsible for the single most radical set of alterations to inter-branch

relations of the 20th Century, in which the executive branch became demonstrably more

authoritative and the legislative branch much less so. However, this shift of power

constituted a seemingly paradoxical transition. On one hand, there was a consolidation of

federal government power within the executive branch, while on the other hand there was

a concurrent defragmentation or diffusion of its administration via new bodies and

agencies such as the NSC or CIA operating inside of it (as described in Chapter Two).

Yet, because these characteristics were all localized within the executive branch, they all

served to increase the power of the president.

With the additional tasks inherent in the global leadership role the U.S. had

assumed after 1947, the national agenda became overwhelmed with emergent problems.

The result was that inevitably, the executive branch would be more ‘on its own’ in

handling foreign affairs. The profound shift toward such issues placed greater burden on

the executive branch such that the institutional framework that the NSA imposed quite

radically enhanced the president’s power. Where before, Congress’ leash on the

presidency was relatively close, but it became all but severed after 1947. But

14
Even though some 49 nations comprised the original “coalition of the willing,” the U.S. has carried the vast majority
of the military burden in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
 61

interestingly, the growth of executive influence over foreign matters was not formally

compensated for by a growth of legislative influence within the realm of domestic issues.

Yet, the reality was that the more attention the executive branch paid to foreign affairs, a

vacuum of sorts allowed for Congressmen and women to focus much more on constituent

service and addressing domestic policy issues (Hook; 2005, 137). Thus, this feature of

modern American democratic governance has become a fundamental dichotomy and a

kind of division of labor that Congress may have trouble reversing, should it ever wish to.

As it turns out, the balance between these two branches is not particularly delicate. It

usually only changes significantly in the aftermath of relatively large-scale institutional

reorganizations such as the NSA.

The Stick Whacks the Carrot

As a direct result of the NSA, there have also been notable intra-branch

fluctuations in authority, concentrated within the executive branch. These changes to the

balance of foreign policy influence have primarily been manifest as the prodigious

growth of the Department of Defense, while “… the State Department suffered a steady

decline of influence” (Hunt; 2007, 143). In fact, Monteagle Stearns points out that

“American diplomats analyzing the decline in influence and prestige of their profession

since World War II are apt to identify the cause with the passage of the National Security

Act of 1947 (Stearns; 1973, 163). His argument posits that under the provisions of the NSA,

military officials were entrenched and excessively institutionalized within the process of

decision-making, at the NSC, JCS, and elsewhere. To some extent, this had the effect of

leaving diplomats ‘out in the cold’ on formulating policy, instead relegated to being mere
 62

messengers of foreign policies that tended to be markedly more hawkish in tone. The

diplomatic establishment, comprised of ambassadors and career Foreign Service Officers,

became severely undermined by the military wing of the foreign policy apparatus, as the

NSA “… institutionalized the National Military Establishment [later DOD] as a major

rival to the State Department in the field of foreign policy15” (Hogan; 1998, 68).

Nature provides only two options in the event of hostility: fight or flight.

However, mankind’s heightened intellectual capacity has devised a third option – to

negotiate. This is precisely the basis for diplomacy and the U.S. Department of State.

And because it is uncharacteristic of the U.S. to avoid foreign policy challenges (i.e.,

flight), particularly when the interests of liberal democracies are at stake, American

foreign policy usually consists of a balance of carrot (i.e., negotiation) and stick (i.e.,

fight) -- that is, incentives for cooperation and punishment for opposition. But in the

majority of cases after 1947, the stick increasingly beat out the carrot. As a recent

example, the Bush Administration's first term was partly characterized by the rivalry

between Secretary of State Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon, a feud in

which Rumsfeld held the upper hand – leading to preemptive war against Saddam

Hussein’s Iraq (Warner; 2003).

This type of leadership conflict is partly due to the inherent tension between these

two cornerstones of American government (Morris; 2008). The DOD is designed for

aggression and resolve (i.e., defense) whereas DOS is designed for negotiation and

compromise. Therefore, these two poles of the foreign policy apparatus are especially

prone to rivalry and/ or disruptions to their sharing of power. “Far from enhancing the

influence of the State Department and Foreign Service, any dichotomy between military
15
The National Military Establishment was later renamed the Department of Defense in 1949.
 63

or intelligence policy and diplomatic policy works greatly to their disadvantage” (Stearns;

1973, 164).

Another way of approaching this power shift is to think of it as ‘hawks’ trumping

‘doves.’ The context of America’s WWII experience and the resulting NSA made clear

that “… Washington needed to provide military leaders with a permanent and influential

role in the formulation of peacetime foreign and security policy” (Stuart; 2008, 7).

Therefore, this changed the culture and ideology of government to be somewhat more

hubristic, moving the nation and its leaders toward a more jingoistic mentality16. And

because the use of force had solved the problem of Hitler, many policymakers became

stuck in the idea that because controlled violence can in some instances produce peace

and a desirable outcome, that somehow violence was necessarily the best or even the only

option. This led many policymakers, and particularly presidents, down the road of

weighing more heavily the opinions of military advisors in securing interests abroad

through the use of force instead of compromise or negotiation. And precisely because the

strength of American arms is so overwhelmingly lopsided compared to most countries or

sub-national adversaries, many in the foreign policy inner circle have therefore been

more easily able to justify interventionism -- the Powell doctrine17 by default. Thus, it

makes sense that diplomats would be undermined in an age when the U.S. could virtually

dictate the course of politics in the Western world by virtue of its strength, while it was

openly hostile to the East dominated by the Soviets until 1991. In other words, why try to

16
This entire notion of American hubris and state use of violence (particularly in light of the post-9/11 political
environment) is thoroughly detailed in Scheuer, Michael. Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror.
Brassey’s US Inc., Washington, D.C., 2004.
17
The Powell Doctrine, outlined by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Secretary of State Colin
Powell, urges that the best way to secure military objectives is to summon overwhelming force to encourage
adversaries to stand down voluntarily, thus minimizing bloodshed. This is a form of deterrence, which could be
characterized as having the ability to “… inspire caution in any would-be aggressor” (Kaufmann; 1956, 141).
 64

get people to follow you with incentives when it can be done with the butt of a gun, or

even just the mere knowledge that guns are present? This is perhaps the bluntest way of

stating a very legitimate reality in weighing the need for military might or diplomatic

overtures to solve geo-political problems that the U.S. faces.

Representative of this split, the president’s top two and most powerful cabinet

members are the Secretaries of State and Defense. Constitutionally speaking, State is a

higher office, by virtue of presidential succession. After the Speaker of the House and the

President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the Secretary of State is next in line to occupy the

Oval Office, should the president and vice-president be incapacitated. Yet after 1947, this

logic came under assault, not in terms of theoretical power discrepancies, but as far as the

enhanced position of military leaders in policy formulation through the NSC and other

conduits. The institutionalization of military interests within the National Security

Council, in particular, came to typify the Department of Defense’s increased standing at

the foreign policy roundtable. In fact, the “… militarization of the government meant that

by the 1950s, with the exception of the Secretary of the Treasury, the heads of domestic

agencies had become second-tier officials” (Jablonsky; 2002, 10). But when elements of an

administration are disjointed, the ramifications can be disastrous, and that is the inherent

danger of having one entity eclipse another – in this case the DOD over the DOS.

Bureaucracies are both beneficiaries and victims of compartmentalization. Max

Weber articulated the positive aspect of having administrative separation and a clear

division of labor, with hierarchical structures as nodes within a larger arena of business or

governance (Kilcullen; 1996). But when separate agencies work as strictly nuclear entities

intent on their own interests/ funding, and are separated by so-called ‘walls’ (as in the
 65

case of intelligence agencies that often ‘stovepipe’ their data), particularly when

responsibilities overlap, then the result can be less than ideal. This balance is a constant

‘give and take’ that is constantly in flux, given factors such as changes in funding, new

legislative mandates, different leadership within individual bureaucracies, and certainly

the status of ongoing operations. But such issues of bureaucratic interaction are not just a

question of roles and procedures, or how they carry out their work, but rather which

entity has the upper hand of influence.

A movement along the continuum of weakening diplomacy was furthered by the

NSA favoring further compartmentalization/ specialization. It took place virtually by

default, as the NSA created further division of labor within the military and intelligence

apparatuses, and filled the need for more specialization of roles within government as a

result of the increasingly complex geo-political environment and America’s extraordinary

responsibilities. In turn, this led to certain bureaucracies becoming more powerful

relative to others. Such is the case with the military rising to prominence over the

diplomatic establishment. And even though the Department of Defense (previously the

NME) was newly created in 1947, it immediately caused a relative drop-off in the

influence of the Department of State, largely carrying over the status quo of foreign

policy processes pervasive during the war. And since then, the DOD has grown

prodigiously along with increases in defense spending18.

But the tension between the diplomatic and military interests also extends into

other realms -- namely to the NSC, which is often comprised of many members with

18
For decades, the U.S. defense budget has hovered around 4-5% of GDP, with most of this money being appropriated
directly to the DOD. As of 2005, it was estimated at 4.06% of GDP, so as U.S. GDP increases, the total amount
appropriated for defense rises accordingly. See The World Factbook. “Country Comparisons – Military Expenditures.”
Central Intelligence Agency. April, 2009. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2034rank.html>
 66

military/ intelligence backgrounds. In fact, there has long been a rivalry between the State

Department and the NSC in particular. “The conflicts between these two powerful poles

in the foreign policy universe have been epic” (Morris; 2008). For instance, National

Security Adviser Henry Kissinger (before becoming Secretary of State) dueled with then

Secretary of State Bill Rogers during the Vietnam era19, while Carter’s National Security

Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski battled Secretary of State Cyrus Vance during the botched

attempt to rescue American citizens held captive in Tehran20. But beyond political feuds

of individual institutional heads, the tension can be felt in more general terms.

The overall trajectory of post-WWII foreign policy reveals an interesting paradox.

With one hand, the U.S. set up the United Nations as a bastion of diplomatic engagement,

negotiation, and compromise for all member nations. But with the other hand, the U.S.

passed the NSA of 1947, which was the most wide-sweeping legislation of its era in

terms of the decline of diplomatic influence. Within the span of two years, the U.S. set up

these outwardly contradictory institutional arrangements – the U.N. for talking and the

institutions of the NSA for acting. Niall Ferguson mentions this concept when he argues

that one of the greatest inconsistencies of American power since WWII has been its

creation of the U.N. while support for diplomacy has been systematically eroded over the

decades21. In large part due to the NSA, this process has reached the point where

diplomacy has taken a distant back seat in U.S. foreign policy formulation and many

19
See pp. 340-42 in Prados, John. Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to
Bush. William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, NY. 1991.
20
This operation was known as Operation Eagle Claw. It failed to rescue any hostages, resulting in the deaths of eight
U.S. service personnel. For more details, see On This Day – 25 April. “1980: Tehran Hostage Rescue Mission Fails.”
BBC News. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/25/newsid_2503000/2503899.stm>

21
See video of Ferguson, Niall. “Living Dangerously? Risk in the 21st Century.” Lecture at the McIntire School of
Commerce UVA. <http://www.niallferguson.com/site/FERG/Templates/General2.aspx?pageid=10>
 67

conservative Americans and/ or Republicans have come to disparage the U.N., regarding

it as a ‘meaningless debating society’ and limiter of American sovereignty (Risman; 2004).

This discussion does not aim to address the normative aspect of questions

regarding whether such growth, concentration, and use of hard power has been a wise

course of action for the U.S. over the last several decades. Rather, it seeks to merely

articulate the changes spawned by the NSA – many of which are departures from prior

American tradition. There are likely both advantageous and detrimental aspects to the

NSA’s legacy for domestic political power arrangements dealing with foreign affairs.

Similarly, there have been both winners (e.g., military advisors) and losers (e.g., Foreign

Service Officers) in this process of change. But it is rather more important to

appropriately acknowledge that the NSA, as an Act of Congress over 60 years in

operation, has had a central role in producing the realities of subsequent American power

at home and abroad. Based on this research, it is clear that without the establishment of

the main institutions of the NSA (DOD/ JCS, NSC, and CIA), the federal government’s

power relationships would never have been altered so extensively, nor would the U.S.

have been able to reach the full extent of its contemporary hegemony.

Lastly, the interplay between the two fluctuations of power (i.e., the presidency

over Congress and the Defense Department over the State Department) incidentally also

favored entities entirely outside of government. That brings this chapter to its final point.

Under the purview of domestic impact, the NSA set in motion many of the essential

ingredients for the rise of the Military-Industrial-Complex (MIC), which forms the nexus

between endogenous economic interests and exogenous national security considerations

(Lens; 1970). This network of individuals in and out of government comprises an ‘iron
 68

triangle,’ of sorts, consisting of the Department of Defense or DOD (providers), the

relevant armed services committees in Congress (appropriators), the private-sector

interest groups representing the weapons manufacturers (beneficiaries22), and certainly

also one other key ingredient – the executive branch officials conducting foreign policy

and those who push for the use of force (authorizers). In many instances, the latter

component of the network is the Commander-in-Chief himself. Without a president’s

decisions to wage war, the MIC essentially falls flat on its face in many ways. Thus, the

proliferation of warfare as a political tool and the resultant expenditures on costly state-

of-the-art military hardware have become business as usual – the American nexus

between capitalism and warfare23.

President Eisenhower was careful to warn against the MIC in his farewell address:

[T]his conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms

industry is new in the American experience. The total influence --
economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every State
house, every office of the Federal government. Yet we must not fail to
comprehend its grave implications… we must guard against the
acquisition of unwarranted influence… The potential for the disastrous
rise of misplaced power exists and will persist (Eisenhower; 1961).

Thus, the financial motives behind the MIC have been called into question by

leaders and analysts alike. Defense contracts are certainly a staple of the U.S. budget, yet

some “scientists and other experts… argued that American arms building was driven by

indigenous pressures more than Soviet threats” (Sherry; 1995, 322). This condemnation of

the U.S.’s motives is certainly debatable, yet the financial component of the MIC is

22
For more excellent work on the MIC (particularly in its early years), see Koistinen, Paul A.C., The Military-
Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective and/ or Lens, Sidney. The Military-Industrial Complex.
23
This was equally applicable to Communism. When the military deposed Khrushchev in 1964, it insisted that his
successor Brezhnev give a virtual blank check for the defense budget. Indeed it was at least doubled so that in certain
categories like tanks and certain missiles – it even surpassed the U.S. Overall however, it could not quite rival the
U.S.’s spending power. In fact, as a portion of the entire budget, the U.S. spent roughly 5% at its peak on defense,
whereas some estimates have that number at 30% of the U.S.S.R.’s total budget for the same period.
 69

crucial to point out insofar that it can fan the flames of conflict and lead to saber rattling

down the line. Short of the effect of deterrence, bullets and bombs are essentially useless

without people to attack and kill. Arguably then, this network rests largely upon the

notion of assertive interventionism. This is an area of the NSA’s domestic impact that

quickly pivots into worldwide implications, as the conditions surrounding the MIC has

frequently led to the liberal use of force and elective military engagements as an

extension of foreign policy.

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CHAPTER FOUR
The Global Legacy: Exercising United States Hegemony

The analysis now turns to some of the global ramifications of the NSA, how it

came to change the U.S. into a worldwide player, and therefore also change the rest of the

planet in the process. Plainly stated, the signing into law of the NSA was a discursive

event that propagated an entirely new era for the world, and not just for the United States.

It is obvious that the starkness of the sea change during the period of 1940-1947 and the

implications for the most fundamental aspect of American foreign policy -- its

geo/political posture or standing in the world -- were extremely widespread. This has

since come to include everything from innocent civilians being killed by American

bombs, to the rise and fall of many unsavory regimes the world over, as well as the more

positive economic and security benefits that are also a part of the NSA’s legacy.

Accordingly, the global consequences of this law are quite momentous in scope, forever

changing the fortunes of people the world over, the international distribution of power,

the general direction of geopolitics, and the very heart of the politics of American

warfare.

Although the shift in power relations among elements within the U.S. federal

government was undoubtedly very consequential, the alterations to its international

relationships and conduct of foreign policy were perhaps equally profound. These

changes are perhaps more obvious and visible than the domestic alterations to

governmental power relations, but they warrant significant inquiry in their own right. The

NSA provided the institutional mechanisms, which in such form had not existed

previously, for the U.S. to effectively exercise a certain level of global dominance and
 71

extensively shape the direction of foreign affairs. Although American ascendancy in the

period surrounding WWII is seldom disputed, the matter of how to characterize it has

been hotly contested within academic circles1. Pinning down the extent of U.S. power is

crucial to establishing the ways in which extroverted American foreign policy has

impacted people and power structures outside the realm of its formal jurisdiction.

On one hand, this is largely a question of semantics, and really boils down to a

debate over what to call the United States – an empire, superpower, or hegemon? Perhaps

none or all of these terms are an apt description. But, these terms are arguably little more

than labels, which shed little light on the true nature of American power on the world

stage. On the other hand, one could also argue that terminology is very important because

of the connotations that are conveyed by certain words. For example, terms such as

‘empire’ in particular are often used critically to paint post-WWII America in a negative

light.

Nonetheless, any valid evaluation of this basic question is fruitful only in

consideration of the details of the explanation. For instance, how was the NSA

responsible for bolstering America’s influence on the global stage, thereby altering the

course of politics in foreign nations? What were the specific features of American control

over the direction of global politics after 1947? How does America’s driving force in the

direction of world political issues fit into a discussion of the U.S. rising to its hegemonic

position? With these questions in mind, the goals of this chapter are twofold: (1) to

articulate how the NSA facilitated a global legacy of American power and its specific

role in shaping foreign political matters, as well as (2) to discuss the particular nature of

1
This ongoing debate across various schools of thought is explored in Ferguson, Yale H., “Approaches to Defining
'Empire' and Characterizing United States Influence in the Contemporary World.” International Studies Perspectives,
Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 272-280. August 2008.
 72

American hegemony after 1947 in order to put it in the context of overall American

ascendance.

From the Inside Looking Out: National Security and the World Abroad

As is the case with virtually all institutional creation, the form follows the

function. In other words, the legislators who craft new agencies or bureaucracies begin

with the starting point of what the entity must be able to accomplish. Subsequently, they

configure its structural form to match the desired functionality. In the case of the NSA,

this logic can be broken down into the law’s main component parts – creation of the

DOD/ JCS, the NSC, and CIA.

The functionality of these institutions is more carefully detailed in Chapter Two,

but nonetheless warrants a brief recap at this stage of analysis. After the conclusion of

WWII, the DOD/ JCS had to become a massive fighting force under the guise of military

preparedness, capable of waging multiple, simultaneous wars on foreign battlefields

(Stuart; 2008). It also had to manage never before seen weaponry such as nuclear weapons

and jet fighter planes. It was accordingly configured to accommodate these perceived

needs, and was made into a larger, better-funded, civilian-controlled bureaucracy with a

separate Air Force branch (Clinton; 1997). Meanwhile, the JCS integrated the various

military branches into an additional layer of hierarchical control. The NSC, which had no

prewar equivalent, had to be a close-knit public sector think tank of sorts, featuring a

broad range of government agency perspectives in the setting of foreign policy. It had to

be nimble yet comprehensive and be able to advise the president on foreign policy/

national security matters (Cutler; 1956). Consistent with this prescription, it was set up with
 73

relatively few members of the heads of various national security entities as well as others

within the executive administration, and featured a larger policy role for military

interests. Lastly, the CIA had to be a covert agency not only capable of merely gathering

intelligence, but also actively carrying out operations to either prop up or subvert foreign

governments (Halperin; 1975). Therefore, the agency came under direct executive control

(where before the OSS had been part of the military), while also being given a new

mandate, a much larger budget, and a new level of secrecy. Interestingly, a common

feature that all of these institutions share is their focus on external events, leaving them

quite detached from the realm of the domestic political agenda2.

This suggests that those who crafted the NSA were conscious and deliberate about

the U.S. rising to the level of the new mantle of global leadership. Yet, few could have

imagined the extent to which the U.S. came to routinely act with unilateral hostility.

However, it is precisely this element of direct foreign interventionism with the use of

hard power which has characterized the majority of the NSA’s global legacy, and which

signaled a fundamental reversal of American national posture.

From Defensive Offense to Offensive Defense: Expanding Assertive Interventionism

The larger context of assertive interventionism by the U.S. and its theoretical

implications bears further explanation. Once President Truman signed the NSA into law

on July 26th 1947, America’s official arrival as the ‘800-pound gorilla’ on the world stage

constituted a geo-political repositioning of national posture from a defensive offense (i.e.,

2
Certainly there are corollary effects such as an overall change in focus on the part of the national government,
diversion of funding streams, and economic impacts vis-à-vis the Military-Industrial Complex. But, the exclusivity of
the mission of these institutions is characteristic of the ‘wall’ between domestic politics and foreign policy, which has
been pervasive even long before 1947.
 74

reactive revenge during WWII) to an offensive defense (i.e., proactive maintenance of

primacy after 1947). This is a fundamental reconfiguration of strategic positioning and is

essentially a 180-degree turnaround from the isolationist tendencies that had previously

characterized U.S. foreign policy for over a century. This goes to the heart of the

monumental importance of the NSA and its capacity to exert control over issues in global

affairs. The logic of this notion proceeds as follows:

The U.S. fight against the Axis Powers was fundamentally defensive insofar that

America had suffered a surprise attack by Japan at Pearl Harbor, and had war declared

against it first by Hitler’s Nazi Germany. What followed in the form of U.S. military

campaigns during the ensuing war was certainly offensive in nature, yet it was

reactionary and therefore at root, constituted fundamentally defensive action. Bluntly

stated, the U.S. did not throw the first punch. Reluctant American entry into WWII was

therefore aggressive on the surface, but fundamentally self-protective in its aim --

essentially as revenge for the Pearl Harbor sucker punch and to thwart any further

attacks. In fact, throughout this entire period, the U.S. was positioned in a fundamentally

defensive mode, both militarily and diplomatically. This general prescription for

American relations with the rest of the world has commonly been referred to as

isolationism, a concept which may be somewhat misleading (as explained in Chapter

One). Nevertheless, through the means at its disposal, the U.S. had a very limited steering

role in geopolitics and certainly was not in the ‘driver’s seat.’ The great powers of Europe

retained the vast majority of sway in global affairs via international institutions, global

economics, and colonial enterprises in Africa and Southern Asia.

 75

The inherent conservatism of U.S. foreign policy essentially continued throughout

WWII. Although it was also intertwined with notions of aiding the British in the fight

against Hitler (e.g., the Lend-Lease Act) as well as stamping out fascism and later

genocide, isolationism largely remained the default mode of operations for U.S.

policymakers. In fact, even after victory was secured, many American leaders wished to

revert to a humble and pacifist posture, until realizations of Soviet intentions became

more widely recognized. “… Without the challenge of the Soviet Union after the Second

World War, American hegemony would have been without the major threat that gave

impetus to the more formal programs and alliances…” (Agnew; 2005, 59). Therefore, as the

quintessential formal program emerging from WWII, the impetus for passing the NSA

and its many programmatic elements would likely have been diminished or altogether

removed with no counterbalance to American free rein throughout the world. However,

after inheriting the mantle of global leadership and implementing the widespread

institutional changes found in the NSA -- changes almost exclusively geared toward

increasing American capacity to intervene in foreign affairs -- American foreign policy

underwent an about face, becoming markedly more liberal in the sense of being

extremely ambitious.

Thus by sheer contrast, the U.S. post-NSA essentially stayed on offense insofar

that its foreign policies were much more proactive than before. After having solidified its

might internationally, the U.S. carried the added burden of ‘holding the line’ and

defending the geo-political status quo in which it held a central position3. This is

sometimes referred to as the paradox of world power, where with increased power comes

3
Steven Ambrose and Douglass Brinkley discuss this ‘central position’ within the global community of states after
WWII in terms of strength. They point out that “by every index available, save that of men in arms, the United States
was the strongest nation in the world” (Ambrose, Brinkley; 1997, 61).
 76

increased responsibility and therefore increased scrutiny. Yet, for the prospects of

preserving the status quo indefinitely, a fundamentally offensive strategy at root would

need to be employed. This is precisely what came to pass, as America did not stand down

at the end of WWII. It did virtually the opposite as its “… reach extended to a wide range

of points around the globe” (Hunt; 2007, 145-6). Accordingly, in the majority of subsequent

American warfare, the U.S. did throw the first punch, preemptively launching military

campaigns for political reasons and without direct provocation (e.g., Korea, Vietnam,

Iraq, etc.).

This change in posture was consistent with the ubiquitous saying that ‘the best

defense is a good offense.’ Instead of sitting back, and reverting to a ‘wait and see’

approach for the direction of global politics, the NSA signified a conscious decision to

proactively shape future events occurring outside the borders of the United States.

Analogous to a sports team playing ahead by several points late in a game, the U.S.

undertook bolder action and could afford to take greater offensive risk. For example, it is

clear that the U.S. did not fear an attack on the homeland from Korea or Vietnam, but

consistent with the basic vision of the Truman Doctrine and in the context of the Cold

War, U.S. leaders felt that those engagements were worth the shedding of American

blood and the spending of U.S. treasure. Therefore, the U.S. entered the era of ‘offensive

defense,’ which basically still persists to this day. And to be sure, this massive piece of

legislation institutionalized a shift in posture vis-à-vis the overall trajectory of U.S.

foreign policy, irrespective of the individual leaders in the White House -- from Truman

to Obama. In other words, the changes ushered in by the NSA became a systemic feature

of American democracy, and in this case, structure has tended to outweigh agency. With
 77

thousands of men and women working in new bureaucratic institutions with the sole

mission of addressing external political matters, it became nearly impossible for the U.S.

not to maintain this offensive posture and draw upon unrivaled military and intelligence

strength. Although certain periods of American leadership have somewhat curtailed the

excesses of foreign interventionism, it has remained an indispensable component of the

American foreign policy apparatus ever since 1947.

Consistent with the ‘offensive defense’ of the postwar/ post-NSA era, many U.S.

activities abroad have been undertaken which clearly demonstrate this notion. Perhaps

most pertinently, countless foreign regimes have been altered to accommodate what was

perceived to be in the best interest of the U.S. at various moments in history, mostly

carried out by the CIA. From the installation of the Shah in Iran in 1953, to the

destabilization of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo in 1960, and the 1973 coup d'état of

Salvador Allende in Chile4, the spy agency has perhaps more than any single entity of

any government, played a direct role in shaping the political fortunes of nations and

leaders the world over (Bowden; 2006). There are countless other accounts of the CIA

meddling in the politics of foreign nations, some of which are well-documented and

others which remain either cloaked in secrecy or embellished by detractors of U.S.

policy. Although unsuccessful, attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro with exploding cigars

for example, have become fodder for the plotlines of Hollywood spy movies and are truly

the stuff of legend.

But whatever the reality (particularly difficult to research given the clandestine

nature of CIA operations and the fact that many of them have yet to be fully declassified),

4
Each of these covert operations, in addition to many others, is detailed by Mark Bowden and William J. Daugherty in
their book, Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency.
 78

such events are not to be trivialized or taken lightly. They entail grave life-and-death

decisions, which have radically altered the global political environment over the last

several decades, and in turn have spilled over into ramifications for everyday citizens of

nations that have had their leaders arbitrarily and/ or undemocratically instated or

toppled5. At face value, this is undoubtedly inconsistent with American values, and as a

result, such activities have drawn intense criticism of, and hostility toward, the U.S. –

often termed ‘blowback.’ Open and public Iranian government hatred of the U.S. as the

‘Great Satan’ is a good example of this, creating tough policy questions for subsequent

formulators6. The key point here, however, is that in addition to others, all of the

aforementioned occurrences are directly traceable to the creation of the CIA. Although

the particular leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), as well as the

president himself, holds complete discretion over the utilization of the organization’s

operatives, the aforementioned events could not have transpired were it not for the

agency’s creation via the 1947 NSA. Moreover, even the most considerate and sensitive

periods of progressive leadership in this area have produced outcomes which many feel

are morally detestable and/ or simply counterintuitive to U.S. interests.

In fact, most of the criticism of American foreign policy has centered on notions

of CIA secrecy, conspiracy, illegitimacy, backroom deals, corruption, and non-elected

5
This can be thought of in terms of ‘illiberal democracy’ – a democratically elected government, which once in power,
turns to authoritarianism and squelches any dissent. Converse to this model of regime change, the U.S. has frequently
acted in the opposite manner – creating what could be called an ‘illiberal autocracy’ of sorts – by stamping out dissent
and using violent overthrows at the outset to instill a democracy longer-term. But of course, this was not only the model
for American policy. The installation of the Shah in Iran stands out as a counterexample of how the U.S. has also
overthrown democratically-elected regimes and installed more authoritarian regimes that are more pro-American.
6
The bulk of foreign policy formulation after 1947 has arguably been characterized by short-term solutions to long-
term problems, perhaps due to the constantly changing administration in power at the White House and the partisan
atmosphere in Washington. This is a kind of myopic foreign policy – near sighted in scope and largely unable to
anticipate what lies around the corner. This detracts from institutional memory with every new presidential
administration. Sometimes said to be set up as a system formed by geniuses so that it could be run by fools, American
democracy and its resulting foreign policies have in the estimation of many been, irrational, counterproductive,
inchoate, and dysfunctional.
 79

experts. This all plays into the overall view, determined by certain U.S. adversaries such

as Osama bin Laden and others as yet unknown, that America is fundamentally ‘evil’ in

its aims. Similar strains of such criticism are also leveled by the extreme fringes of the

American political landscape -- extreme left-wing conspiracy theorists as well as radical

right-wing conservatives. Nonetheless, such individuals highlight the militant secrecy of

American security agencies, which in turn makes their activities ripe with suspicion.

Under this view, the lack of transparency is certainly grounds for a condemnation of the

actions undertaken in the name of American ‘security,’ which has become a rather fuzzy

notion. Virtually anything with a potentially detrimental impact to U.S. interests (as far as

a realist perspective would have one believe) has been seen as ‘actionable’ at some point

over the last several decades.

Similarly, but perhaps to a slightly lesser extent, the prodigious growth of the U.S.

armed forces under the guise of the DOD has also led American foreign policymakers

down the path of assertive interventionism through overt military conflict. For all of its

sophistication and civility, the U.S. has undoubtedly been one of the most aggressive

powers in the modern world. Indeed, many view these conflicts on the part of the U.S. as

justifiable or even necessary. But that is an entirely separate normative issue, varying

greatly case by case, which is beyond the scope of this analysis. What is plainly obvious

however is that the U.S. has initiated more instances of conventional warfare than any

other single nation since WWII. From Korea to Vietnam, Iraq to Afghanistan7, the U.S. --

including leaders from both major political parties -- has seldom shirked away from the

liberal use of force in a distinctly Machiavellian sense, whereby the ends are said to

7
To name a few additional examples worthy of noting, the U.S. has also acted militarily (with various missions and
rules of engagement) on the ground, at sea, or from the air against nations such as Grenada, Libya, Iran, Lebanon,
Panama, Yugoslavia, and Somalia.
 80

justify the means. This has also radically shaped the world’s political environment,

leading to the deaths of millions, restricting territorial control of foreign nations (e.g.,

Korea and the first Gulf War), and toppling regimes outright (e.g., Manuel Noriega in

Panama, Mullah Mohammed Omar’s Taliban in Afghanistan, and Saddam Hussein’s

Ba’ath Party in Iraq, among others). Whether for better or for worse, the impact of these

elective engagements is not to be understated, and whether covert or overt, U.S.

interventions have produced countless winners and losers -- however U.S. policymakers

have in large part have decided their fate.

As an extension of this, the liberal use of force by U.S. leaders exposes the

connective tissue between American power and American-style neoliberal capitalism8. In

fact, “many Americans, including leading figures in the government, believed that they

could use their power to order the world in the direction of democratic capitalism on the

American model (Ambrose; Brinkley; 1997, 61). Therefore, “… the U.S. government set out

after 1947 to sponsor an international order in which its military expenditures would

provide a protective apparatus for increased trade… across international boundaries”

(Agnew; 2005, 124). In turn, this would theoretically help to ensure U.S. national security

without having to fire a single shot. This relationship was integral to America’s postwar

‘grand strategy,’ as “… the US promotion of democracy and American values worldwide,

facilitated by communication advances, was linked to free trade, American economic

prosperity, global stability, and thereby US national security” (Jablonsky; 2002, 11). In

reality, the promulgation of neoliberal capitalism did not preclude the U.S. from using

8
For more on this relationship in much broader perspective, see Goodwin, Craufurd D., Ed., Economics and National
Security: A History of their Interaction. Duke University Press. Durham and London. 1991.
 81

force -- to quite ironically -- instill the kind of economic interconnectivity that many had

felt would remove the need for conflict in the first place.

With this picture of American endeavor in mind, it is clear that the ‘American

experiment’ had blossomed into an increasingly global project of hegemonic enterprise.

It was to be an entirely new paradigm after 1947. In other words, once awakened, the so-

called ‘Sleeping Giant’ never really went back to sleep. In fact to continue the metaphor,

it developed quite a severe case of insomnia, extending its influence into virtually “…

every nook and cranny of the world” (Hogan; 1998, 2). Thus, ‘staying awake’ entailed more

than mere vigilance. It became akin to a new kind of manifest destiny (albeit non-

territorial and excluding Soviet ground), reaching in this case to span almost the entire

globe, instead of merely to the west coast of the North American continent.

American Hegemony in Perspective

Countless hegemons have come and gone throughout history. So long as there is

significant geopolitical power to be had on the ‘world stage,’ a particular polity will

naturally assume the mantle of hegemony within a particular geographic region – just as

various natural environments will almost always produce an apex predator (e.g., lion,

polar bear, killer whale, etc.). Thus in certain respects, the U.S. was a hegemonic power

long before the events surrounding WWII. Perhaps as far back as the declaration of the

Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the U.S. held a hegemonic position within its corner of the

globe. However, the NSA in particular ensured that the U.S. would have the necessary

tools to continue and expand this hegemony after the end of WWII into places where it

had never existed previously -- into the heart of Europe as well as Southeast Asia.
 82

Therefore, a viable way of analyzing the NSA’s effect on American ascendancy

and its global implications is to view the passage of the law as a landmark moment along

the continuum of the gradual and protracted rise of American power. Others have noted

that in a more general sense, “World War II and the early Cold War were the culmination

of a long, steady trend toward matching and then surpassing the might of other states of

the developed world” (Hunt; 2007, 150). Even more precise, 1947 in particular seems to be

the most critical turning point for the exercise of American hegemony, as described in the

introduction.

Notwithstanding this assertion, the victories of WWII themselves did, of course,

confer additional power upon the U.S., merely as a result of the vacuum of hard power

left by the defeated military machines of Germany and Japan – momentary hegemons in

their own right9. Thus, an increased position of hegemony was not exclusively conferred

upon the U.S. through the NSA, but also by the precipitous decline of its mortal enemies.

Although the same is true for the U.S.S.R., which was likewise thrust into a new realm of

hegemony in its part of the world (East Germany and other satellite nations), the U.S. had

solidified its new position in the world vis-à-vis the NSA as a matter of statutory

procedure.

On a more basic level, the U.S. deliberately chose to embrace its hegemonic

position after WWII for the simple reason that it could. In other words, once America got

a taste of leading the global dominion, it became increasingly difficult for the U.S. – even

9
From defeating the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, to the conquest in Manchuria, Korea, etc., Japan had
been a hegemon throughout the East Asian and Pacific theatres. In fact, the U.S. at Pearl Harbor was seen as a thorn in
Japan’s side, much like Cuba had been for the U.S. during the missile crisis of 1962, and this was a primary impetus for
the Pearl Harbor attack. However, Japanese hegemony in East Asia was relatively short lived, roughly from 1905 until
the utter destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 (some have considered this level of influence to have extended
back even further to the Meiji Restoration of 1868). German hegemony in central Europe was even shorter-lived,
militarily speaking, only during the war itself from roughly 1939 to 1944-5. These powers have also been considered
by many to be empires as well (e.g., Third Reich or ‘third empire’).
 83

politically untenable – to back down and relinquish such stature. The NSA was passed in

such a political environment. However, in practical terms “U.S. hegemony simply meant

that if there were a problem, America likely would be viewed as part of the solution”

(Binder, Quirk; 2005, 355). Where before the U.S. was merely reacting to external events,

after 1947 it became the main actor in geo-politics and other nations looked to the U.S.

for answers and/or approval for the overarching direction of global affairs.

In light of these considerations, the NSA surely did not cause the U.S. to become

a hegemonic power outright, but it was indeed a parallel facilitator or partial causal

mechanism of its newfound influence within the international states system. For example,

without the tools it provided, it would certainly be debatable if the U.S. could ever have

successfully held the line against the Soviets in places far away from the homeland –

particularly the heart of Europe10. In consideration of such a counterfactual, the NSA was

at a minimum, instrumental in reaffirming U.S. hegemony on an unprecedented scale and

further accelerating its process of ascendance, which can be viewed in a macro historical

context.

Conceptually, the NSA came on the back of the Monroe Doctrine and the

Roosevelt Corollary, and “by 1948, President Truman was applying to the entire world

the words directed in earlier times to the Western Hemisphere” (Jablonsky; 2002, 5). This

included the expectation of non-interventionism on the part of all foreign nations in any

region within the U.S.’s sphere of influence. By extension, this suggested that the U.S.,

on the other hand, could intervene wherever it saw fit (aside from nations of the Soviet

10
Although other flashpoints had flared up elsewhere during the Cold War (i.e., Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, etc.), the true
geographic battlefield of ideas was waged on the continent of Europe. In fact, Europe was seen by either side as the
buffer between East and West. As Europe went, so would go the rest of the world -- either towards capitalist democracy
or socialist authoritarianism, as the U.S. and Soviet Union attempted to ‘flip’ nations into adopting their respective
economic and political systems.
 84

Bloc), and indeed it did. However, the ‘teeth’ needed to back up such ambitious global

imposition were indispensable to this equation, and were certainly provided by the NSA.

Thus, incipient U.S. power was essentially turbocharged by the NSA; since 1947, no

single Act of Congress has rivaled the law’s level of power creation.

One may be hard pressed to comprehend how a single law -- a document of words

-- could actually increase the amount of power that the U.S. wielded. Indeed, an increase

in American power did not come ‘on line’ merely with the stroke of Truman’s pen.

However, through the process of legislative implementation along with the associated

spending increases for the Department of Defense, the NSA did, in fact, create the

capacity for the U.S. to exercise more hard power over time – power that had not existed

previously11.

Although a conventional understanding of ‘hegemony’ may be a fair term to

characterize this exercise of newfound U.S. power, it is not without certain problematic

elements. The most pronounced shortcoming of the word is that it essentially only takes

into account the premises of a positivist understanding of nation-states. For this reason, it

is somewhat aligned with a realist viewpoint of international relations, and fails to reflect

the present nature of post-international politics, whereby myriad sub-state actors also play

an increasingly crucial role in governance structures. For instance, American hegemony

may hold a certain degree of ‘sway’ over the affairs of the Mexican government and its

activities in the region, but has little direct influence over the increasingly powerful

illegal drug-smuggling cartels there, which have undoubtedly been recalcitrant since

11
Of course, realist theory in international relations posits that this perhaps matters less than the amount of power the
U.S. had (albeit increasing) in relation to that of other states.
 85

9/1112. Moreover, through various aspects of globalization (sometimes described as a

type of Americanization), U.S. hegemonic control now extends into entirely new social,

economic, and cultural spheres that were unimaginable shortly after WWII (e.g., global

investment markets, mass media, etc.).

Due to this imprecision and the difficulty of capturing complex macro social

phenomena in a single word, countless terms have been put forth to describe the U.S. in

addition to hegemon, particularly since having attained a ‘front and center’ position

within the global community of nations. “There is no shortage of labels available to apply

to what the United States has become… [to] include reluctant imperialist, imperial

republic, democratic crusader…, or the first nation of modernity” (Hunt; 2007, 308). Add to

this -- ‘empire,’ ‘superpower,’ ‘hyperpower,’ ‘omni-power,’ and ‘unipolar power.’

Although these words may all more or less convey a similar meaning to the lay

observer, scholars make crucial distinctions between them. The true nature and extent of

American power has drawn the attention of many analysts regarding these intensively

problematic terms, which have sparked protracted debates among academics (e.g., Niall

Ferguson, Alexander Motyl, and Charles S. Maier, to name a few). There is little

consensus about what words such as empire or hegemony actually confer, and which

specific criteria need to be satisfied in order for a polity to ‘qualify’ for either

designation. There is palpable ambivalence within the many competing schools of

12
It has become increasingly apparent that the primary reason the drug cartels in Mexico have become so strong after
9/11 is because with the increased focus on aviation as a threat, many former cartels of South American nations such as
Colombia have moved their operations to land-based means of exporting their product to the United States, as opposed
to using aircraft. This has, in turn, empowered Mexican drug lords, which have become valuable middlemen in the
trade, exploiting the vulnerabilities of the shared border of the U.S. and Mexico to more easily smuggle contraband into
the U.S. on the ground.
 86

thought13 and there are certainly no definitively ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers per se, just

subjective perspectives backed by empirical evidence. However, given certain particular

features of American democracy and how others have characterized these terms, one can

certainly argue that “… the word hegemony… is a much better term for describing the

historic relationship between the United States and the rest of the world than is the word

empire” (Agnew; 2005, 1).

Given its ascendance and the questionable use of American hard power to reshape

the global political landscape, some still characterize the U.S. as a neo-imperial power if

not an all out empire14. Others contend that American leadership (however it is described)

on a global scale has ushered in a period of Pax Americana or American peace and

stability. They cite that the U.S. has “… made the world a safer, more prosperous, and

enlightened place” (Hunt; 2007, 309). Furthermore, many have considered “… the

overarching U.S. mission in the world in terms of a genuine, consistent commitment to

freedom and self-determination” (Ibid., 309). World leadership, in and of itself, is largely a

neutral term – it can be utilized either for evil or for righteous ends, and under this view

American power has been exercised predominately in pursuit of the latter. Renowned

Harvard scholar Niall Ferguson largely agrees with this sentiment, and interestingly uses

the term ‘empire’ to describe the U.S. in a completely non-derogatory sense. He contends

that the U.S. empire has been the primary force for good in the world since WWII and

that its influence should even be expanded to further guide humanity toward a more

13
For example, Charles S. Maier’s entire book is devoted to the U.S. and the concept of empire, and yet he states that
“at the end I have decided to avoid claiming that the United States is or is not an empire” (Maier; 2006, 3). This
highlights the potential complexity behind a single term such as ‘empire.’
14
Some have adapted these non-territorial mechanisms of U.S. influence to suggest that America is not a traditional
empire, but rather a neo-imperial power. See Janowski, Louis. “Neo-Imperialism and U.S. Foreign Policy.”
Commentary and Analysis. AmericanDiplomacy.org. July 7, 2004.
<http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2004_07-09/janowski_bush/janowski_bush.html>
 87

democratic and prosperous future. He writes that “… many parts of the world would

benefit from a period of American rule. But what the world needs today is not just any

kind of empire. What is required is a liberal empire…” (Ferguson; 2004a, 2). Consistent with

this notion, hegemony or Ferguson’s conception of U.S. empire, can be seen as a form of

positive leadership exemplifying the potentially beneficial nature of having a unipolar

power as a stabilizing force in the world. Thus, there is a fine line between leadership and

oppression, which is largely responsible for producing the debate at hand. Although most

Americans would largely welcome this more rosy view of American ‘empire,’ most still

reject the term because of its conventional understanding.

The overarching point here is that the U.S. did nonetheless attain a certain level of

prevalence after the end of WWII and more acutely after passage of the NSA. However

useful, scholarly debates over semantics of what specific characteristics the

aforementioned words confer (as complicated by the immeasurably complex world

presently in existence) are of less impact than how the terms shape the perceptions of

those who use the word in an extreme sense. For instance, detractors of the U.S. who

employ pejoratives do as much damage to America’s image as those using terms like

‘moral nation,’ ‘world leader,’ or ‘last best hope’ do to bolster it. And although certainly

less utilized in popular discourse, ‘hegemon’ is perhaps the most accurate term for the

U.S. because it is not weighted down with positive or negative values. It speaks to the

nuance of how power is exercised in a complex and constantly evolving political

environment, while still acknowledging the undeniable level of hard power that the U.S.

does wield. ‘Empire,’ on the other hand, is not only less appealing to a pro-American
 88

viewpoint, but it also has several problematic elements, which are incongruent with the

U.S. case.

The competing notions of the benevolent empire on one hand, and the ‘blame

America first’ for the world’s ills on the other, are two perspectives that seem to talk past

each other in a rather unproductive manner. But it can be reasonably asserted that

America has been both -- simultaneously a force for expanding democracy, freedom, and

prosperity, as well as the perpetrator of specific instances of moral failure (e.g.,

segregation, CIA-backed assassination, inadvertent bombing of civilians, and

undoubtedly many others). This speaks to the deeply paradoxical nature of American

power, always dependant upon its leadership at various junctures in history. Thus, the

divide is largely a question of focus. Most level-headed observers would acknowledge

that elements of both are true, but either side makes the normative decision that

benevolence or malicious intention should be the starting point in an analysis of

American power, and therefore that one greatly outweighs the other. This thesis will of

course not settle this debate, one that is likely to persist for decades or even centuries into

the future. Yet, this analysis of the NSA demonstrates that the tools it provided to U.S.

leaders and that the institutions it created were instrumental in establishing superpower

status and operationalizing the hegemony that stemmed from the WWII victories – no

matter what their ends.

Right up until the present day, the decision-making processes leading to the

military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq by the U.S. have been shaped extensively

by the changes embodied in the NSA of 1947. The executive branch and the military

have seized the vast majority of influence over the course of American foreign policy. By
 89

now, this has become a solid and largely uncontested foundation of American hegemony,

and the ‘sleeping giant’ of the U.S. military machine remains wide awake – restless even.

The U.S. seems intent on continuing the mantle of hegemony far into the 21st Century,

although external forces outside of its reach have begun to call this position into question.

The issue going forward though is how much longer can it sustain this position? Will the

NSA continue to dictate the nature of American power and will the ‘Sleeping Giant’

continue to remain awakened?

 90

CONCLUSION

In consideration of the present extent of American hegemonic influence on the

world stage, coupled with the demands of modern interconnectivity, it is clear that

avoiding engagement with foreign actors (whether seen as ‘entangling’ or not) is an

antiquated luxury for American foreign policy. Isolationism has long been dead – both

for the U.S. as well as extranational foreign policy actors – in an increasingly globalized

world. As detailed in Chapter One, the NSA signaled the death knell for this concept in

the U.S. over 60 years ago and recalibrated the notion of national security. In order to

recognize why this is so significant, the preceding discussion examined precisely how

American involvement abroad affected the international political environment over the

course of subsequent years. Thus, the role of American hegemonic power – particularly

its hard power – is an indispensable contextual component of virtually all modern

geopolitical inquiries.

This thesis has, in particular, examined the exercise of American hegemony as a

function of changes to domestic power relations and their effect on the deliberative

process of decision-making. Furthermore, this analysis has suggested that the

maldistribution of power over matters of foreign policy/ national security caused by the

NSA has led more readily to the use of force in national security policymaking – a good

example of how domestic political circumstances can directly pivot into global

ramifications. Moreover, such imbalance of power is arguably further from traditional

American political procedure, and less consistent with the ideals of separation of powers

and checks and balances outlined in the U.S. Constitution. To be sure, the NSA is
 91

demonstrably responsible for many of these changes to federal-level power sharing,

which emerged out of the post-WWII epoch.

The executive branch, and the military in particular, have come to seize the vast

majority of control over the main thrust of American foreign policy. Conceptually, this

translates into a certain degree of detrimental impact for the practice of pluralistic

democracy as well as the ideal of multiple advocacy or diversity of viewpoints in national

security decision-making1. The consolidation of executive branch power vis-à-vis the

NSA has made the legislative branch (comprised of popularly elected members)

considerably less influential in the handling of foreign affairs/ national security issues by

shifting power over to non-elected appointees and career civil servants. This has made

U.S. foreign policy formulation even less pluralistic than it had been previously, and at

least theoretically, somewhat less democratic by partly circumventing public

representation which is the cornerstone of republican government2.

Moreover, the desirable aspects of employing a model of multiple advocacy in

highly consequential decision-making at the federal level have been greatly curtailed by

the NSA as a result of the military and diplomatic establishments having been put on

unequal footings. Certainly, creation of the DOD/ JCS gave military leaders many more

‘seats at the table’ of the foreign policy process at the NSC; before 1947, they had

essentially been relegated to a loose network of advisers serving at the pleasure of the

president. Although the role of human agency in the president and other top officials

retains significant influence over final policy outcomes, the structure of the national

1
The model of multiple advocacy in foreign policymaking is outlined by Alexander L. George in “The Case for
Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy.” American Political Science Review. Vol. 66, No. 3, pp. 751-785.
September 1972.
2
Executive branch appointees still do have to win Senate confirmation, and the Congress does retain sizeable oversight
capacity over the military and its budget.
 92

security regime crafted by the NSA has essentially ‘stacked the deck’ against diplomatic

options being placed at the fore of the entire process. Hostile action is ideally reserved for

when all other options have been exhausted, yet the ‘last resort’ in foreign policy has

frequently been utilized as a viable policy option toward the outset of deliberations. The

American populace aside, this increase in military clout at the top rungs of American

power has also made the deliberative process less pluralistic within the machine of

government as well. In turn, America’s ability to negotiate to secure its government’s

interests via conventional diplomatic channels has in many ways been eclipsed by its

ability to demand them via military means – consistent with the notion that warfare is

diplomacy by other means.

As the U.S. enters a new era of hegemonic stature, it is unclear which foreign

policies it will choose to pursue. What is clear however is that the operational confines of

U.S. power will continue to be defined in large part by the NSA of 1947, barring some

radical future reorganization or subsequent amendments. Even the Homeland Security

Act of 2002 had little impact on the sub-units of the institutional structure that comprise

the American security apparatus. It merely added another level to the bureaucratic

hierarchy by consolidating several security agencies into the Department of Homeland

Security (headed by the new Secretary of Homeland Security). Those institutions created

by the NSA in 1947 however remain intact and were largely left unaltered by the new

American national security regime created in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Therefore, both the favorable and the undesirable aspects of the NSA’s legacy are

still being written. Its implications for the exercise of American power will continue to

unfold; the perception of the need for security remains high and the NSA will likely
 93

continue to shape precisely how and to what end American power is exercised.

Accordingly, this comprehensive piece of legislation will demand further scholarship,

even though at face value it might otherwise appear to be just another example of ‘settled

history’ -- bringing little to bear on modern security studies. Much more can certainly be

said about how the NSA so radically altered the behavior of the ‘Sleeping Giant,’ whose

restless posture seems likely to continue.

 94

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