Analysis
December 6, 2010
Summary: The almost 30-year
period of friendly relations, based
on the idea of an Aegean and
Eastern Mediterranean balance
between Turkey and Greece, was
established on the basis of a
set of treaties and conventions
signed with the allies of WWI after
the Turco-Greek War of 1919-
1922. Greek Cypriot demands
for independence from British
colonial rule in Cyprus were seen
by the Turks as undermining this
balance, and gradually brought
the harmonious relationship
to an end. In early 1999, Geor-
gios Papandreou, who favored
a rapprochement with Turkey
became the Foreign Minister of
Greece. Papandreou’s desire for
improved relations was recip-
rocated by the late Ismail Cem,
Turkey’s foreign minister at the
time. During a series of visits, the
two worked together to trans-
form the mood of Turkish-Greek
relations into one of friendliness.
While Cem’s departure from
office after the 2002 elections did
not prove critical, Papandreou’s
departure after the 2004 elec-
tions ended the low-key diplomatic
process for a time. Papandreou’s
return to power in 2009, this time
as prime minister, has led to the
resumption of the quiet negotia-
tion process.
Offices
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Zero problems with Greece: Grounds for
optimism
by Ilter Turan
Historically, Turkish-Greek relations
have vacillated between good and prob-
lematic. The Greek invasion of western
Anatolia after the First World War and the
subsequent defeat of the Greek armies,
followed by the establishment of the
Turkish Republic, constituted a difficult
beginning. Yet, within a decade, Turkey’s
President Kemal Atatürk and Greece’s
Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos
had managed to bury the hatchet and
forge a friendship that characterized
relations between the two countries until
the mid-1950s. It was during this period
that Greece and Turkey worked together
successfully to become members of NATO
in 1952.
The almost 30-year period of friendly rela-
tions, based on the idea of an Aegean and
eastern Mediterranean balance between
the two countries, was established on the
basis of a set of treaties and conventions
signed with the allies of WWI after the
Turco-Greek War of 1919-1922. Greek
Cypriot demands for independence from
British colonial rule in Cyprus were seen
by the Turks as undermining this balance,
and gradually brought the harmonious
relationship to an end. Greeks thought it
natural that the island should become a
part of Greece because the majority of its
population was Greek. Turkey believed
that the presence of a sizable Turkish
minority in Cyprus had to be accommo-
dated, and that the island did not consti-
tute a legitimate zone of Greek expansion
because it had been seized from Turkey
in 1878. Unifying Cyprus with Greece,
Turkey judged, would expose Turkey to
significant security risks and upset the
post-1923 balance.
Greece was already a party to the struggle
for Cyprus’ independence when bloody
intra-communal fighting broke out
between the Greek and Turkish communi-
ties there. The bloodshed gradually drew
Turkey into the conflict. The London and
Zurich agreements, which made Cyprus
independent, provided only a temporary
reprieve. Greek Cypriot efforts to change
the status quo envisioned in the agree-
ments revitalized the communal fighting.
When Greece initiated a coup and placed
a man in power whose avowed purpose
was to bring about a union with Greece,
Turkey staged a military intervention. The
island has been divided into Greek and
Turkish zones ever since.
The Cyprus conflict led to the emergence
of additional conflicts between Greece
and Turkey in four ways. First, situations
that were not perceived as problems in the
past were reconstituted as problems: for
instance, the arming of Greek islands close
to the Turkish shore. The Lausanne Treaty
and the Convention on the Turkish Straits
officially banned Greece from militarizing
these islands, yet Greece had initially
proceeded to arm them without reaction
from Turkey. Under the changed circum-
stances, however, Turkey argued that this
Analysis
was a violation of Greece’s treaty obligations. Similarly, Greece
expanded the airspace of its Aegean islands from six to ten miles,
although its territorial waters only extended six miles. Again,
the Turkish response was initially to ignore the change, then to
refuse to recognize it, and finally to challenge it. This is the basis of
perennial Greek complaints that Turkish military aircraft violate
its airspace. And this is why Greek and Turkish warplanes engage
in dangerous dogfights over the Aegean.
Second, technical arrangements of a practical nature were
elevated to questions of security. Flight Information Region (FIR)
for regulating international air traffic, for example, evolved into a
question of sovereignty and thereby security. Each country served
Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs), used to alert pilots to aerial
hazards, leaving parts of the Aegean closed to civilian flights for
long periods.
Third, developments in the international arena introduced new
aspects of conflict to the relationship. The respective economic
zones and continental shelves of Turkey and Greece, for example,
could not be demarcated in the Aegean since the parties failed to
agree on how to do this in a narrow sea containing small islands
and uninhabited rocks. Similarly, while the Greeks argued that
the new International Treaty on the Law of the Sea gave them
the right to extend their territorial waters to twelve miles, Turkey
argued that the Aegean was an exception, as twelve miles would
render the Aegean a Greek sea. Turkey added that such an exten-
sion would be considered a casus belli. This mutual distrust led to
exaggerated estimates regarding major oil and gas deposits in the
contested areas, thereby exacerbating disagreements.
Fourth, Greece began to extend support to domestically-based
ethnic terrorists in Turkey. Greek support for the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party, or PKK, included the provision of funds and
materials; allowing the group to run training camps in Greece;
hosting some of its leaders; and trying to mobilize international
support for the organization in European Union councils and
elsewhere.
In this way, Cyprus had triggered a host of other disagreements
with Greece, compounding the erosion of trust between the two
countries and generating feelings of insecurity on both sides.
The poor state of Turkish-Greek relations was always a cause for
concern in NATO during the Cold War. Open conflict between
the two allies at best embarrassed and at worst imperiled the alli-
ance. Despite mediation efforts disagreements were not solved,
only contained, and always risked flaring up into major conflicts,
2
as in the case of the 1995 Kardak/Imia Rocks crisis. Each country
invested considerable funds to ramp up defenses against the other,
and they often worked to undermine each other in international
councils.
This tension-ridden relationship came to a head in late 1998 and
early 1999, when the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was forced to
leave Syria upon Turkey’s threat to intervene militarily. Greece
hosted him and tried to find a place for him to go. After traveling
to several European capitals, Öcalan returned to Greece and
was sent to Kenya where he was hosted in the Greek Embassy.
He was seized by Turkish agents on his way to the airport and
flown to Turkey. This series of events brought Turkey and Greece
back to the brink of open hostilities. It also led to the removal
of key figures in the Greek government and intelligence service.
Especially noteworthy was the replacement of Foreign Minister
Theodoros Pangalos by Georgios Papandreou, who favored a
rapprochement with Turkey.
Papandreou’s desire for improved relations was reciprocated by
the late Ismail Cem, Turkey’s foreign minister at the time. During
a series of visits, the two worked together to transform the mood
of Turkish-Greek relations into one of friendliness. The fact that
Greece had become a member of the EU in 1981 had consider-
ably allayed Greek feelings of insecurity in relation to Turkey,
while the commencement of Cyprus’ EU accession negotiations
had reduced Greek anxieties about the future status of the island.
Hence, conditions allowed Papandreou to pursue a new path. In
the meantime, Turkey, aspiring to become a member of the EU
and trying to cope with economic challenges, was also not inter-
ested in perpetuating the conflict.
Many issues plague the Turkish-Greek relationship, and their
resolution is an accordingly complex matter. Negotiations are
a give-and-take process, and each side and its respective public
must believe that it has obtained a good deal. Governments,
opposition parties, and the general public keep close track of such
negotiations to ensure that national interests are protected. The
attempt to resolve the many disputes between Turkey and Greece
thus necessarily took place behind closed doors, only to be made
public once a final agreement had been reached. Teams led by the
respective undersecretaries of the Turkish and Greek ministries
of foreign affairs began exploratory talks under the leadership of
Papandreou and Cem. While Cem’s departure from office after
the 2002 elections did not prove critical, Papandreou’s departure
after the 2004 elections ended this low-key diplomatic process for
a time.
Analysis
Papandreou’s return to power in 2009, this time as prime minister,
has led to the resumption of the quiet negotiation process. In the
meantime, the Turkish government is reported to have dropped
references to the 12-mile extension of Greek territorial waters as
a casus belli in the last version of its national security document.
It has also been reported that alleged violations of Greek airspace
and dogfights between warplanes are becoming less frequent.
Widespread rumors in the press that the basics of an agreement
are in place, remain unconfirmed by governments. It is speculated
that Turkey will recognize the 12-mile limit – with some excep-
tions regarding islands near its shore – which will end the incon-
gruity between territorial waters and airspace in the Aegean - and
that the parties will take the continental shelf issue to the Inter-
national Court of Justice in The Hague. Some sources have even
suggested plans are underway to exploit underwater resources in
the Aegean together, a rumor that has been denied by the Greek
Prime Minister.
It is entirely possible that a Turkish-Greek modus vivendi will
come about soon. Greece is suffering from an economic crisis
in which its defense expenditures play a major role. Turkey is
interested in becoming a major economic and political actor in
its surrounding regions by peacefully settling differences with
its neighbors, as per Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero
problems with neighbors” dictum. And both countries want
Turkey to become a member of the EU. However, in order to
reduce the number of contentious issues between it and the oppo-
sition during the upcoming campaign, it is likely that the Turkish
government will wait to make its final move until after the June
2011 elections.
İlter Turan, Professor, Bilgi University
İlter Turan is currently a professor of political science at Istanbul’s Bilgi
University, where he also served as president between 1998-2001. His
previous employment included professorships at Koç University (1993-
1998) and Istanbul University (1964-1993), where he also served as the
chair of the International Relations Department (1987-1993), and the
director of the Center for the Study of the Balkans and the Middle East
(1985-1993). Dr. Turan is the past president of the Turkish Political
Science Association and has been a member of the Executive Commit-
tee and a vice president of the International Political Science Associa-
tion (2000-2006). He has served as the program chair of the 21st World
Congress of Political Science in Santiago, Chile, July 12-16, 2009. He is
board chair of the Health and Education Foundation and serves on the
board of several foundations and corporations. He is widely published
in English and Turkish on comparative politics, Turkish politics, and
foreign policy. His most recent writings have been on the domestic and
international politics of water, the Turkish parliament and its members,
and Turkish political parties. He is a frequent commentator on Turkish
politics on TV and newspapers.
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