A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL (with references)

Selected excerpts from:

BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES on the LAWS of ENGLAND

BOOK THE FIRST. OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS. CHAPTER THE
FIRST. OF THE ABSOLUTE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS.

PERSONS also are divided by the law into either natural persons, or
artificial [persons]. Natural persons are such as the God of nature
formed us: artificial are such as created and devised by human laws
for the purposes of society and government; which are called
corporations or bodies politic.
THE rights of persons considered in their natural capacities are also of
two sorts, absolute, and relative. Absolute, which are such as
appertain and belong to particular men, merely as individuals or single
persons: relative, which are incident to them as members of society,
and standing in various relations to each other. The first, that is,
absolute rights, will be the subject of the present chapter.
BY the absolute rights of individuals we mean those which are so in
their primary and strictest sense; such as would belong to their
persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled to
enjoy whether out of society or in it. But with regard to the absolute
duties, which man is bound to perform considered as a mere
individual, it is not to be expected that any human municipal laws
should at all explain or enforce them. For the end and intent of such
laws being only to regulate the behavior of mankind, as they are
members of society, and stand in various relations to each other, they
have consequently no business or concern with any but social or
relative duties. Let a man therefore be ever so abandoned in his
principles, or vicious in his practice, provided he keeps his wickedness
to himself, and does not offend against the rules of public decency, he
is out of the reach of human laws. But if he makes his vices public,
though they be such as seem principally to affect himself, (as
drunkenness, or the like) they then become, by the bad example they
set, of pernicious effects to society; and therefore it is then the
business of human laws to correct them. Here the circumstance of
publication is what alters the nature of the case. Public sobriety is a
relative duty, and therefore enjoined by our laws: private sobriety is
an absolute duty, which, whether it be performed or not, human
tribunals can never know; and therefore they can never enforce it by
any civil sanction. But, with respect to rights, the case is different.
Human laws define and enforce as well those rights which belong to a
man considered as an individual, as those which belong to him
considered as related to others.
FOR the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the
enjoyment of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by the
immutable laws of nature; but which could not be preserved in peace
without that mutual assistance and intercourse, which is gained by the
institution of friendly and social communities. Hence it follows, that the
first and primary end of human laws is to formation of states and
societies: so that to maintain and regulate these, is clearly a
subsequent consideration. And therefore the principal view of human
laws is, or ought always to be, to explain, protect, and enforce such
rights as are absolute, which in themselves are few and simple; and,
then, such rights as are relative, which arising from a variety of
connections, will be far more numerous and more complicated. These
will take up a greater space in any code of laws, and hence may
appear to be more attended to, though in reality they are not, than the
rights of the former kind. Let us therefore proceed to examine how far
all laws ought, and how far the laws of England actually do, take notice
of these absolute rights, and provide for their lasting security.
THE absolute rights of man, considered as a free agent, endowed with
discernment to know good from evil, and with power of choosing those
measures which appear to him to be most desirable, are usually
summed up on one general appellation, and denominated the natural
liberty of mankind. This natural liberty consists properly in a power of
acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the
law of nature: being a right inherent in a us by birth, and one of the
gifts of God to man at his creation, when he endowed him with the
faculty of freewill.
THIS natural life being, as was before observed, [is] the immediate
donation of the great creator.
Selected excerpts from:
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES on the LAWS of ENGLAND
BOOK I. CHAPTER THE EIGHTEENTH.
OF CORPORATIONS.
WE have hitherto considered persons in their natural capacities, and
have treated of their rights and duties. But, as all personal rights die
with the person; and, as the necessary forms of investing a series of
individuals, one after another, with the fame identical rights, would be
very inconvenient, if not impracticable; it has been found necessary,
when it is for the advantage of the public to have any particular rights
kept on foot and continued, to constitute artificial persons, who may
maintain a perpetual succession, and enjoy a kind of legal immortality.
THESE artificial persons are called bodies politic, bodies corporate,
(corpora corporata) or corporations: of which there is a great variety
subsisting, for the advancement of religion, of learning, and of
commerce.
THE first division of corporations is into aggregate and sole.
Corporations aggregate consist of many persons united together into
one society, and are kept up by a perpetual succession of members, so
as to continue forever: of which kind are the mayor and commonalty
of a city, the head and fellows of a college, the dean and chapter of a
cathedral church. Corporations sole consist of one person only and his
successors, in some particular station, who are incorporated by law, in
order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particularly
that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have
had. In this sense the king is a sole corporation: so is a bishop: and so
is every parson and vicar.
ANOTHER division of corporations, either sole or aggregate, is into
ecclesiastical and lay. Ecclesiastical corporations are where the
members that compose it are entirely spiritual persons; such as
bishops; certain deans, and prebendaries; all archdeacons, parsons,
and vicars; which are sole corporations: deans and chapters at present
and formerly prior and convent, abbot and monks, and the like, bodies
aggregate. These are erected for the furtherance of religion, and the
perpetuating the rights of the church. Lay corporations are of two
sorts, civil and eleemosynary. The civil are such as are erected for a
variety of temporal purposes.
I. CORPORATIONS, by the civil law, seem to have been created by the
mere act, and voluntary association of their members; provided such
convention was not contrary to law,
ALL the other methods therefore whereby corporations exist, by
common law, by prescription, and by act of parliament, are for the
most part reducible to this of the king's letters patent, or charter of
incorporation.
WHEN a corporation is erected, name must be given it; and by that
name alone it must sue, and be sued, and do all legal acts; . . . and by
that same name the king baptizes the incorporation
THERE are also certain privileges and disabilities that attend an
aggregate corporation, and are not applicable to such as are sole; the
reason of them ceasing, and of course the law. It must always appear
by attorney; for it cannot appear in person, being, as sir Edward Coke
says [10 Rep. 32.], invisible, and existing only in intendment and
consideration of law. It can neither maintain, or be made defendant,
to, an action of battery or such like personal injuries; for a corporation
can neither beat, nor be beaten, in its body politic.

Selected excerpts from:

COMMENTARIES on the LAWS of ENGLAND (Sir William Blackstone)
Vol. III, § 301
DILATORY PLEAS are,
1. To the jurisdiction of the court: alleging, that it ought not to hold
plea of this injury, it arising in Wales or beyond sea; or because the
land in question is of ancient demesne, and ought only to be
demanded in the lord's court, &c.
2. To the disability of the plaintiff, by reason whereof he is incapable to
commence or continue the suit; as, that he is an alien enemy,
outlawed, excommunicated, attainted of treason or felony, under a
praemunire, not in rerum natura (being only a fictitious person), an
infant, a feme-covert, or a monk professed.
3. In abatement: which abatement is either of the writ, or the count,
for some defect in one of them; as by misnaming the defendant, which
is called a misnomer; giving him a wrong addition, as esquire instead
of knight; or other want of form in any material respect. Or, it may be,
that the plaintiff is dead; for the death of either party is at once an
abatement of the suit. And in actions merely personal, arising ex
delicto, for wrongs actually done or committed by the defendant, as
trespass, battery, and slander, the rule is that action personalis
moritur cum persona; and it never shall be revived either by or against
the executors or other representatives. For neither the executors of
the plaintiff have received, nor those of the defendant have
committed, in their own personal capacity, any manner of wrong or
injury. But in actions arising ex contractu, by breach of promise and
the like, where the right descends to the representatives of the
plaintiff, and those of the defendant have assets to answer the
demand, though the suits shall abate by the death of the parties, yet
they may be revived against or by the executors: being indeed rather
actions against the property than the person, in which the executors
have now the fame interest that their testator had before.

Selected excerpts from:

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
Jurisdiction over the person is obtained by the legal service of a valid
process issued out of a court of competent jurisdiction in a case or
proceeding properly pending, or by some party voluntarily appearing,
or by his seeking, taking or agreeing to some act or step in the
proceeding or action to his benefit, or to the detriment of the other
party, other than by one contesting the jurisdiction over his person
only. Pleas based on lack of jurisdiction of the person are in their
nature pleas in abatement and find no especial favor in the law. They
amount to no more than the declaration of the defendant that he has
had actual notice, is actually before the court in a proper action, but
for the informality in the service of process, is not legally before the
court.
This is purely a dilatory plea and when a defendant is seeking to avail
himself on it, he must, for very obvious reasons, stand upon his naked
legal right and seek nothing further than an injunction upon his plea,
then, by logic of the fact, he must necessarily have waived irregularity
of his summons before the court. Here is one reason for the well-
settled rule that if a defendant wished to insist upon the objection that
he is not in court for want of jurisdiction over his person, he must
specially appear for that purpose only, and must keep out for all other
purposes except to make that objection. So it is well-settled that if a
defendant, under such circumstances, raises any other question, or
asks for any relief which can be granted under the hypothesis that the
court has jurisdiction over his person, his appearance is general,
though termed special, and he thereby submits to the jurisdiction of
the court as completely as if he had been regularly served with a
summons. A court cannot, by presuming to act, invest itself with
jurisdiction. Therefore it is proper to inquire into the record, but solely
to determine that question.
No court or tribunal can acquire jurisdiction by the mere assertion of it
or where the facts on which jurisdiction depends are falsely alleged.
[Mulligan v. Smith, 59 Cal. 206, 236 (1881)]. Jurisdiction in any
proceeding is conferred by the constitution or by statute, and any
mode thereby prescribed for the acquisition of jurisdiction must be
strictly complied with. Jurisdiction in any particular case may involve
three aspects – jurisdiction over the cause or subject matter,
jurisdiction over the parties (in personam), and jurisdiction over the
thing, or res, if any (in rem).
Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired in several ways, the most
common being service of process. Thus, by statutory provision, the
court in which an action is pending has jurisdiction over the party from
the time summons is served upon him as provided by statute,
continuing throughout subsequent proceedings in the action.
Numerous cases have reiterated the principle that (in personam)
jurisdiction of the person is acquired on due service of the summons
and a copy of the complaint, or from the publication of the summons is
complete, or on voluntary general appearance. The purpose of
personal service of notice or summons is to apprise a defendant of the
commencement of an action against him and of its nature, so that
within a specified time he may act with reference thereto. However,
jurisdiction in a civil case cannot be obtained over one who is forcefully
brought within the territorial limits of the court.
The words “answer” and “appear” are not synonymous. To construe
the word “answer” as including every “appearance” would amount to
judicial legislation, which is beyond the authority of the court. The
answer of the defendant shall contain: (1) A general or specific denial
of the material allegations of the complaint controverter by the
defendant. (2) A statement of any new matter constituting a defense
or counterclaim. A defendant appears in any action when he answers,
demurs, or gives plaintiff written notice of his appearance, or when an
attorney gives notice of an appearance for him. This makes it plain
that, although an “answer” is an “appearance”, an “appearance is not
necessarily an “answer”. [Schultz v. Schultz, 70 Cal.App.2d 293, 298-
299, 161 P.2d 36]

“Appearance” is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary to be: A coming into

court as a party to a suit, either in person or by an attorney, whether
as a plaintiff or defendant; the formal proceeding by which a
defendant submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. In civil
actions the parties do not normally appear in person, but rather
through their attorney (who enters their appearance by filing written
proceedings, or a formal written entry of appearance). Also, at many
stages of criminal proceedings, particularly involving minor offenses,
the defendant’s attorney appears in his behalf. [See e.g.,
Fed.R.Crim.P. 43]
An appearance may be either general or special, the former is a simple
and unqualified or unrestricted submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, the latter a submission to the jurisdiction of the court for some
specific purpose only, not for the purposes of the suit. A special
appearance is for the purpose of testing or objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court over the defendant without submitting to such jurisdiction;
a general appearance is made where the defendant waives defects of
service and submits to the jurisdiction of the court. [Insurance Co. of
North America v. Kunin, 175 Neb. 260, 121 N.W.2d 372, 375-376]
“General Appearance” is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary: Consent to
the jurisdiction of the court and a waiver of all jurisdictional defects
except the competency of the court. [Johnson v. Zoning Bd. Of
Appeals of Town of Branford, 166 Conn. 102, 347 A.2d 53 @ p. 56.]
An appearance by defendant in an action that has the effect of waiving
any threshold defenses of lack of territorial authority to adjudicate or
lack of notice.

A special appearance is a device used under civil rules to contest

existence of personal jurisdiction. A defendant making a special
appearance has to take care to avoid any inconsistent action that
might serve to waive jurisdictional objection and convert the special
appearance into a general appearance. The rules of civil procedure
also permit the defendant to contest the existence of personal
jurisdiction and to contest the merits of the action as well. In a civil
action, a court acquires personal jurisdiction over a defendant by the
service of process upon the defendant within the forum.
Selected excerpts from:
CONSTITUTION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

PART THE FIRST

A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Article IV. The people of this commonwealth have the sole and
exclusive right of governing themselves, as a free, sovereign, and
independent state; and do, and forever hereafter shall, exercise and
enjoy every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not, or may not
hereafter, be by them expressly delegated to the United States of
America in Congress assembled.
Article V. All power residing originally in the people, and being derived
from them, the several magistrates and officers of government, vested
with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their
substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them.

Selected excerpts from:

MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 9: Pleading Special Matters
(a) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue
or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized
association of persons that is made a party. When a party desires to
raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of
any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity, he shall do so by specific negative
averment, which shall include such supporting particulars as are
peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge.
(b) Fraud, Mistake, Duress, Undue Influence, Condition of the Mind. In
all averments of fraud, mistake, duress or undue influence, the
circumstances constituting fraud, mistake, duress or undue influence
shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other
condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.
Rule 11: Commencement of Action
(b) Appearances.
(3) No appearance shall, of itself, constitute a general appearance.
Rule 12: Defenses and Objections - When and How Presented - By
Pleading or Motion - Motion for Judgment on Pleadings
(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief
in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one
is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion:
(1) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) Lack of jurisdiction over the person;
(3) Improper venue;
(4) Insufficiency of process;
(5) Insufficiency of service of process;
(6) Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
(7) Failure to join a party under Rule 19;
(8) Misnomer of a party;
(9) Pendency of a prior action in a court of the Commonwealth;
(10) Improper amount of damages in the Superior Court as set forth in
G. L. c. 212, §3 or in the District Court as set forth in G. L. c. 218,
§19.
Rule 17: Parties Plaintiff and Defendant: Capacity
(a) Real Party in Interest. Except for any action brought under General
Laws, chapter 152, section 15, every action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest. An executor, administrator,
guardian, conservator, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with
whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of
another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in his own name
without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is
brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the Commonwealth.
An insurer who has paid all or part of a loss may sue in the name of
the assured to whose rights it is subrogated. No action shall be
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after
objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder
or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification,
joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had
been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 16A, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
§ 576. Right to travel
The constitutional right to travel includes the freedom to enter and
abide in any state in the Union.[36]

While the freedom to travel within the United States has been held to
be a basic right under the Federal Constitution which is independent of
a specific provision therein,[38] the right of locomotion has also been
held to be a part of the “liberty” guaranteed by the due process
clauses.[39]
Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that the liberty secured by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment consists, in part, in
the right of a person to live and work where he or she will. [42]
[36] Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 106
S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899, 40 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 36158
(1986).
The right of a United States citizen to travel from one state to
another and to take up residence in the state of his or her choice is
protected by the Federal Constitution. Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412,
101 S.Ct. 2434, 69 L.Ed.2d 118 (1981).
[38] [16B Am.Jur.2d,] §§ 612, 613
[39] U.S. v. Lamb, 385 U.S. 475, 87 S.Ct. 574, 17 L.Ed.2d 526
(1967).
Even though one may not have a constitutional right to be in a
certain place, the government may not prohibit one from going there
unless by means consonant with due process of law. Cafeteria and
Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961), reh’g denied, 368 U.S.
869, 82 S.Ct. 22, 7 L.Ed.2d 70 (1961).
[42] Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25
S.Ct. 358, 99 L.Ed. 643 (1905);
Booth v. People of State of Illinois, 184 U.S. 425, 22 S.Ct. 425,
46 L.Ed. 623 (1902);
Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 21 S.Ct. 128, 45 L.Ed. 186
(1900) (also stating that the right to move from one place to another
according to inclination is an attribute of personal liberty).

American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 16A, CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW
§ 577. Rights in public vehicles and places
Under the constitutional guarantee of liberty one may, under normal
circumstances, move at his or her own inclination along the public
highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an
orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing
another’s rights, one will be protected, not only in his or her person,
but in his or her safe conduct.[52]
For example, the right of a citizen to drive on a public street with
freedom from police interference, unless he or she is engaged in
suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality, is a
fundamental constitutional right.[53]
A person is free to live on the street, if that person chooses to do so; a
person may not be held against [his or] her will merely to improve [his
or] her standard of living or because society may find it uncomfortable
to see such people on the street.[60]
[52] Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 44 N.W. 579 (1889); City of
St. Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S.W. 30 (1908) (loitering on the
street)
[53] People v. Horton, 14 Cal.App.3d 930, 92 Cal.Rptr. 666 (5 th Dist.
1971).
[60] Abney v. U.S., 451 A.2d 78 (D.C. 1982), related reference, 616
A.2d 856 (D.C. 1992);
In re Long, 237 Ill.App.3d 105, 180 Ill.Dec. 182, 606 N.E.2d
1259 (2d Dist. 1992) and cert denied, 149 Ill.2d 650, 183 Ill. Dec.
861, 612 N.E.2d 513 (1993).
American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 39, HIGHWAYS, STREETS,
AND BRIDGES
§ 227 Generally
Streets and highways are established and maintained primarily for
purposes of travel by the public,[1] and incidental uses.[2]
… the use of highways for purposes of travel and transportation is not
a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental right,[3]
Because bridges constitute a part of the highways, [7] they are
subject to the same public easement of passage.[8]
[1] Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Smyer, 181 Ala. 121, 61 So.
354 (1913);
Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal.2d 870, 222
P.2d 1 (1950)
(overruled on other grounds by, Rios v. Cozens, 7 Cal.3 792, 103
Cal.Rptr. 299, 499 P.2d 979 (1972));
Yale University v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. 610, 134 A. 268,
47 A.L.R. 667 (1926);
Smith v. City of Jefferson, 161 Iowa 245, 142 N.W. 220 (1950);
Terrell v. Tracy, 312 Ky. 631, 229 S.W.2d 433 (1950);
Brenning v. Remington, 136 Neb. 883, 287 N.W. 776 (1939);
Ex Parte Duncan, 1937 OK 155, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P.2d 1015
(1937);
City of Radford v. Calhoun, 165 Va. 24, 181 S.E. 345, 100 A.L.R.
1378 (1935);
Ex Parte Dickey, 76 W.Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781 (1915);
Park Hotel Co. v. Ketchum, 184 Wis. 182, 199 N.W. 219, 33 A.L.R.
351 (1924).
[2] §§ 249 et seq.
[3] Campbell v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County, 106 Ariz.
542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971);
 Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal.2d 870, 222
P.2d 1 (1950)
(overruled on other grounds by, Rios v. Cozens, 7 Cal.3 792, 103
Cal.Rptr. 299, 499 P.2d 979 (1972));
Duff v. State, 546 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Crim.App. 1977);
Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 71 A.L.R. 604
(1930);
Blumenthal v. City of Cheyenne, 64 Wyo. 75, 186 P.2d 556
(1947).
[8] Gellasch v. Van Syckle, 267 Mich. 378, 255 N.W. 345 (1934).

American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 39, HIGHWAYS, STREETS,

AND BRIDGES
§ 228 Right of all to use
The existence of a public highway creates a public easement of travel,
which permits the general traveling public to use the highway at will.[1]
All persons have an equal right to use the highways for purposes of
travel by proper means, and with due regard for the corresponding
rights of others.[2] The right to use them is not restricted to the citizens
of the municipality[3] or the state.[4]
[1] Town of Ridgefield v. Eppoliti Realty Co., Inc., 71 Conn.App. 321,
801 A.2d 902 (2002);
The “public highway” created by operation of law along every
section line is more than a right of way over which a public highway
may be established; it is a passage or road that every citizen has a
right to use. Douville v. Christensen, 2002 SD 33, 641 N.W.2d 651
(S.D. 2002).
[2] State v. Mayo, 106 Me. 62, 75 A. 595 (1909);
Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co. v. City of Omaha, 114 Neb.
483, 208 N.W. 123 (1926);
Dent v. Oregon City, 106 Or. 122, 211 P. 909 (1923);
Bombard v. Newton, 94 Vt. 354, 111 A. 510, 11 A.L.R. 1402
(1920);
Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 71 A.L.R. 604
(1930).
A traveler is privileged to enter that part of the land in the
possession of another upon which there is a public highway, to the
extent his or her presence there is in the reasonable use of the
highway. Restatement Second, Torts § 192.
[3] Ex Parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 P. 442, 21 A.L.R. 1172 (1920);
Wilmot v. City of Chicago, 328 Ill. 552, 160 N.E. 206, 62 A.L.R.
394 (1927);
New York State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO v. City of
Albany, 269 A.D.2d 707, 703 N.Y.S.2d 573 (3d Dep’t 2000);
Parker v. City of Silverton, 109 Or. 298, 220 P. 139, 31 A.L.R. 589
(1923);
Norfolk & P. Traction Co. v. City of Norfolk, 11 Va. 169, 78 S.E.
545 (1912);
Yarrow First Associates v. Town of Clyde Hill, 66 Wash.2d 371,
403 P.2d 49 (1965).
[4] County Com’rs of Charles County v. Stevens, 229 Md. 203, 473
A.2d 12 (1984).

American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 39, HIGHWAYS, STREETS,

AND BRIDGES
§ 230 Superior rights of public
Streets and highways are primarily for the benefit of the traveling
public, and only incidentally for the benefit of property owners along
them.[2]

American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 39, HIGHWAYS, STREETS,

AND BRIDGES
§ 231 Manner of use
The public easement of passage over a highway or street includes
every kind of travel and communication for the transportation of
persons or property that is reasonable and proper.[1] The easement of
the public in a highway is not limited to the particular methods of use
in vogue when the easement was acquired, but includes all methods
that are later developed,[2] which are assumed to have been
contemplated.[3]
[1] Yale University v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. 610, 134 A. 268,
47 A.L.R. 667 (1926);
People ex rel. Mather v. Marshall Field & Co., 266 Ill. 609, 107
N.E. 864 (1915);
Hall v. Lea County Elec. Co-op., 78 N.M. 792, 438 P.2d 632
(1968);
Sumner County v. Interurban Transp. Co., 141 Tenn. 493, 213
S.W. 412, 5 A.L.R. 765 (1919);
 McClintock v. Richlands Brick Corp., 152 Va. 1, 145 S.E. 425, 61
A.L.R. 1033 (1928).
Bicycles have a recognized place on the highways and are
expressly authorized by statute to use most public ways.
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 370 Mass. 895, 352 N.E.2d 197
(1976).
Horse-drawn carriages, horseback riders, cyclists, and pedestrians
are equally entitled the use of the highways with motor vehicles.
Matson v. Dawson, 185 Neb. 686, 178 N.W.2d 588 (1970).
As to regulation of vehicular traffic, see Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles
and Highway Traffic §§ 1 et seq.
[2]Cloverdale Homes v. Town of Cloverdale, 182 Ala. 419, 62 So. 712
(1913)
(overruled on other grounds by, City of Orange Beach v.
Benjamin, 821 So.2d 193 (Ala. 2001));
McClintock v. Richlands Brick Corp., 152 Va. 1, 145 S.E. 425, 61
A.L.R. 1033 (1928).
[3] McClintock v. Richlands Brick Corp., 152 Va. 1, 145 S.E. 425, 61
A.L.R. 1033 (1928).

CHISHOLM v. GEORGIA (1793)

(2 Dallas) 2 US 419

Man, fearfully and wonderfully made, is the workmanship of his all

perfect Creator: A State . . . is the inferior contrivance of man. Let a
State be considered as subordinate to the People. a State . . . is an
artificial person. [455] in truth and nature, those, who think and
speak, and act, are men. The only reason . . . why a free man [an
original sovereign] is bound by human laws, is, that he binds himself.
Under [the] Constitution there are citizens, but no subjects. [456]
“A State . . . is the work of Man, but Man . . . [is] . . . the work of
God.” [462-463]
the sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the nation at the
Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly
the sovereigns of the country [471]
this great and glorious principle, that the people are the sovereign of
this country nothing but the free course of Constitutional law and
Government can ensure the continuance and enjoyment of them.
[479]

PENHALLOW v. DOANE’S ADMINISTRATORS (1795) (3 Dallas)

3 US 54
sovereignty resides in the great body of the people [93]
It has been properly observed that a court cannot by its own decision
give itself jurisdiction where it had none [95] usurpation can give no
right [109]

MARBURY v. MADISON (1803) (1

Cranch 170) 5 US 137
an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void .

McCULLOCK v. MARYLAND (1819) (4

Wheaton) 17 US 316
The government proceeds directly from the people

COHENS v. VIRGINIA (1821) (6

Wheaton) 19 US 264
We [the Court] have no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The
one or the other would be treason to the constitution . [309]
The people of the United States are the sole sovereign authority of this
country. [347]
The people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is
the creature of their will, and lives only by their will. [389]

THOMPSON v. TOLMIE (1829) (2

Peters) 27 US 157
If there is a total want of jurisdiction, the proceedings are void and a
mere nullity, and confer no right and afford no justification and may be
rejected when collaterally drawn in question. [163]
UNITED STATES v. THE AMISTAD (1841) (15
Peters) 40 US 518
they were natives of Africa, and were born free, and ever since had
been, and still of right were and ought to be, free [525]
born free, and ever since have been, and still of right are free . . .
influenced by the desire of recovering their liberty [529]
They are in a State where they are presumed to be free. [551]
the obligation to surrender was not deemed to exist [553]
all men being presumptively free [559]
born free . . . a right to be everywhere regarded as free . . . [562]
born free, and still, of right, ought to be free, [589]
THE PASSENGER CASES (1849) (7 Howard)
7 How. 283

We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same
community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part
of it without interruption

DRED SCOTT v. SANDFORD (1856) (19

Howard) 60 US 393

The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are

synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the
political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the
sovereignty and who hold the power and conduct the Government
through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the
"sovereign people," and every citizen is one of this people, and a
constituent member of this sovereignty. [404]

PENNOYER v. NEFF (1878)

95 US 714
the validity of every judgment depends upon the jurisdiction of the
court before it is rendered, not upon what may occur subsequently.
[728]
. . . if the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant . .
. , and consequently no authority to pass upon his personal rights and
obligations; if the whole proceeding, without service upon him or his
appearance, is coram non judice and void; if to hold a defendant
bound by such a judgment is contrary to the first principles of justice.
[732]

YICK WO v. HOPKINS (1886)

118 US 356
Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author
and source of law; but, in our system, while sovereign powers are
delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains
with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and
acts.
NORTON v. SHELBY COUNTY (1886)
118 US 425
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

HALE v. HENKEL (1906)

201 US 43
The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He
is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His rights
are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the
organization of the state, . . . He owes nothing to the public so long as
he does not trespass upon their rights. Upon the other hand, the
corporation is a creature of the state. Its powers are limited by law.

BYARS v. UNITED STATES (1927)

273 US 28
'. . . it is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights
of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.'

UNITED STATES v. MURDOCK (1933)

290 US 389
The [Supreme] Court has recognized that the word "willfully" generally
connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. It
has formulated the requirement of willfulness as "bad faith or evil
intent,"

McNUTT v. G.M.A.C. (1936)

298 US 178

The prerequisites to the exercise of jurisdiction are specifically defined,

They are conditions which must be met by the party who seeks the
exercise of jurisdiction in his favor. He must allege in his pleading the
facts essential to show jurisdiction. If he fails to make the necessary
allegations, he has no standing. If he does make them, an inquiry into
the existence of jurisdiction is obviously for the purpose of determining
whether the facts support his allegations. The authority which the
statute vests in the court to enforce the limitations of its jurisdiction
precludes the idea that jurisdiction may be maintained by mere
averment If his allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his
adversary in any appropriate manner, he must support them by
competent proof. the jurisdictional facts be established, or the case be
dismissed,

KVOS, Inc. v. ASSOCIATED / UNITED PRESS (1936)

299 US 269
A motion to dismiss a bill of complaint for want of jurisdiction . . .
requires the trial court to inquire as to its jurisdiction

SPIES v. UNITED STATES (1943)

317 US 492
. . . the word "willfully" . . . generally connotes a voluntary,
intentional violation of a known legal duty. "It is not the purpose of the
law to penalize frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made
despite the exercise of reasonable care."
MURDOCK v. PENNSYLVANIA (1943)
319 US 105

A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted
by the federal constitution. [113] Freedom of press, freedom of
speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position. [115] The
privilege in question exists apart from state authority. It is guaranteed
the people by the federal constitution. [115]

MILLER v. U.S. (5th Circuit) (1956)

230 F.2d. 486
The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot thus be
converted into a crime.

STAUB v. BAXLEY (1958)

355 US 313
“. . . an ordinance which makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms
which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled
will of an official - as by requiring a permit or license which may be
granted or withheld in the discretion of such official - is an
unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of
those freedoms."

KENT v. DULLES (1958)

357 US 116
"The right to travel is a part of the `liberty' of which the citizen cannot
be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment

NAACP v. ALABAMA (1958)

357 US 449

Like the right of association, [the right to travel freely] is a virtually

unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.

APHTHEKER v. SECRETARY OF STATE (1964)

378 US 500
‘ . . . a personal liberty protected by the Bill of Rights . . . freedom of
travel is a constitutional liberty closely related to rights of free speech
and association . . . "The constitutional right to travel . . . has been
firmly established and repeatedly recognized . . . that a right so
elementary was conceived from the beginning . . . In any event,
freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been
recognized as a basic right under the Constitution."

UNITED STATES v. GUEST (1966)

383 US 745
“The constitutional right to travel . . . is a right that has been firmly
established and repeatedly recognized . . . a right so elementary was
conceived from the beginning . . . In any event, freedom to travel
throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right
under the Constitution."

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA (1966)

384 US 436
Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no
rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.

UNITED STATES v. JACKSON (1968)

390 US 570
If a law has "no other purpose . . . than to chill the assertion of
constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them,
then it [is] patently unconstitutional.

SHUTTLESWORTH v. BIRMINGHAM (1969)

394 US 147
“. . . our decisions have made clear that a person faced with . . . an
unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it and engage with impunity
in the exercise of the right . . . for which the law purports to require a
license.”

SHAPIRO v. THOMPSON (1969)

394 US 618
. . . freedom to travel is an element of the "liberty" secured by [the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment]

BRADY v. UNITED STATES (1970)

397 US 742
Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must
be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.

UNITED STATES v. BISHOP (1973)

412 US 346
The Court, in fact, has recognized that the word "willfully" in these
statutes generally connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty. It has formulated the requirement of willfulness as
"bad faith or evil intent,". . . If his action was not willful, he was [not]
guilty . . .

UNITED STATES v. WILL (1980)

449 US 200
Citing Cohens v Virginia: We [the Court] have no more right to decline
the exercise of jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is
not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.
SUMMARY
The Nature of Free Men and Their Relationship to Government
Persons also are divided by the law into either natural persons, or
artificial. [BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES on the LAWS of ENGLAND.
BOOK THE FIRST. OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS. CHAPTER THE FIRST.
OF THE ABSOLUTE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS.]
Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us [persons in
their natural capacities]. [BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES on the
LAWS of ENGLAND. BOOK THE FIRST. OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS.
CHAPTER THE FIRST. OF THE ABSOLUTE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS.]
Man is the workmanship of his all perfect Creator. [Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 US (2 Dallas) 419 (1793)]
This natural life being, as was before observed, [is] the immediate
donation of the great creator. [BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES on the
LAWS of ENGLAND. BOOK THE FIRST. OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS.
CHAPTER THE FIRST. OF THE ABSOLUTE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS.]
God created man, and endowed him with certain unalienable rights.
[The unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen united States of America].
The absolute rights of man [are the] natural liberty of mankind.
[BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES on the LAWS of ENGLAND. BOOK
THE FIRST. OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS. CHAPTER THE FIRST. OF
THE ABSOLUTE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS.]
By the absolute rights of individuals we mean those which are so in
their primary and strictest sense; such as would belong to their
persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled to
enjoy whether out of society or in it. [BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES
on the LAWS of ENGLAND. BOOK THE FIRST. OF THE RIGHTS OF
PERSONS. CHAPTER THE FIRST. OF THE ABSOLUTE RIGHTS OF
INDIVIDUALS.]
His rights are such as existed by law long before the existence of the
government. [BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES on the LAWS of
ENGLAND. BOOK THE FIRST. OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS. CHAPTER
THE FIRST. OF THE ABSOLUTE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS.]
The principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment
of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by the immutable
laws of nature. [BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES on the LAWS of
ENGLAND. BOOK THE FIRST. OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS. CHAPTER
THE FIRST. OF THE ABSOLUTE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS.]
To secure these rights, man created government. [The unanimous
Declaration of the Thirteen united States of America].
A State is the work of Man, but Man [is] the work of God. [Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 US (2 Dallas) 419 @ 462-463 (1793)]
Government proceeds directly from the people. [McCullock v.
Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheaton) 316 (1819)]
Government is the inferior contrivance of man. [Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 US (2 Dallas) 419 (1793)]
Government is subordinate to the people, by whom and for whom all
government exists and acts.
[Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1886)]
The people are the sole sovereign authority of this country. [Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheaton) 264 (1821)]
Every citizen is one of this people and a constituent member of this
sovereignty.
[Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 US (19 Howard) 393 (1856)]

The sovereign, when traced to his source, must be found in the man.
[Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 US (2 Dallas) 419 @ 458 (1793)]
Sovereignty itself is not subject to law, for it is the author and source
of law. [Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1886)]
All men are presumably free, and everywhere regarded as free, and
influenced by the desire of recovering their liberty have no obligation
to surrender. [United States v. The Amistad, 40 US (15 Peters) 518
(1841)]
An individual may stand upon his rights as a citizen. He is entitled to
carry on his private business in his own way. [Hale v. Henkel, 201 US
43 (1906)]
Where Constitutional rights are involved, there can be no rule making
or legislation which would abrogate them. [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US
436 (1966)]
Exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.
[Miller v. U.S., 230 F.2d. 486 (5th Circuit)(1956)]
An act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void .
[Marbury v. Madison, 5 US 137 (1 Cranch 170)(1803)]
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it is as inoperative as though it
had never been passed.
[Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425 (1886)]

Freedom to Travel
Freedom to travel is an element of constitutional liberty, of which the
citizen cannot be deprived.
[Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US 618 (1969); Kent v. Dulles, 357 US
116 (1958)]
The right to travel is a virtually unconditional personal right. [NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 US 449 (1958)]
Freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been
recognized as a basic right under the Constitution. [Aphtheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 US 500 (1964)]
The freedom to travel within the United States has been held to be a
basic right under the Federal Constitution which is independent of a
specific provision therein.
[American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 16A, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, § 576. Right to travel]
[16B Am.Jur.2d,] §§ 612, 613
The constitutional right to travel has been firmly established and
repeatedly recognized.
[United States v. Guest, 383 US 745 (1966)]
Waivers of constitutional rights must be voluntary, knowing, intelligent
acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences. [Brady v. United States, 397 US 742 (1970)]

The right of a citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from

police interference, unless he or she is engaged in suspicious conduct
associated in some manner with criminality, is a fundamental
constitutional right.
[American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 16A, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, § 577. Rights in public vehicles and places]
People v. Horton, 14 Cal.App.3d 930, 92 Cal.Rptr. 666 (5th Dist. 1971).
Citizens have the right to pass and re-pass through every part of the
country without interruption.
[The Passenger Cases, 7 Howard 283 (1849)]
Under the constitutional guarantee of liberty one may, under normal
circumstances, move at his or her own inclination along the public
highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an
orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing
another’s rights, one will be protected, not only in his or her person,
but in his or her safe conduct.
[American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 16A, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, § 577. Rights in public vehicles and places]
Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 44 N.W. 579 (1889); City of St.
Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S.W. 30 (1908) (loitering on the
street)

The Relationship Between Agent and Principal

All power residing originally in the people, and being derived from
them, the several magistrates and officers of government, vested with
authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their
substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them.
[Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Article V.]
Agents . . . [are] consider[ed] as nominal parties, and that the real
parties are their principals.
[Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators, 3 U.S. 54, 1 L.Ed. 57 (1795)]

The State/Agent [municipal corporation] is not a Real Party in Interest.

[Mass.R.Civ.P. 17(a)]

The State/Agent [municipal corporation] has no capacity to bring the

action. [Mass.R.Civ.P. 9(a)]

The Nature of a Corporation or Body Politic

Artificial [persons] are such as created and devised by human laws for
the purposes of society and government; which are called corporations
or bodies politic [municipal corporations]. [BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES on the LAWS of ENGLAND. BOOK THE FIRST. OF THE
RIGHTS OF PERSONS. CHAPTER THE FIRST. OF THE ABSOLUTE
RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS.]
THESE artificial persons are called bodies politic, [or] bodies corporate.

[BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES on the LAWS of ENGLAND. BOOK I.

CHAPTER THE EIGHTEENTH. OF CORPORATIONS.]
When a corporation is erected, name must be given it; and by that
name alone it must sue, and be sued, and do all legal acts; . . . and by
that same name the king baptizes the incorporation.
[BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES on the LAWS of ENGLAND. BOOK I.
CHAPTER THE EIGHTEENTH. OF CORPORATIONS.]
A corporation is a creature of the state.
[A corporation] must always appear by attorney; for it cannot appear
in person, being invisible, and existing only in intendment and
consideration of law. It can neither maintain, or be made defendant,
to, an action of battery or such like personal injuries; for a corporation
can neither beat, nor be beaten, in its body politic.
[BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES on the LAWS of ENGLAND. BOOK I.
CHAPTER THE EIGHTEENTH. OF CORPORATIONS.]
The State/Agent [municipal corporation] is an artificial person.
[Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 US (2 Dallas) 419 @ 455 (1793)]
The State/Agent [municipal corporation] is not In Rerum Natura (The
Plaintiff is not natural). [3 Bl. Comm. 301]

*Every government and any agency thereof is an artificial person

(imaginary).

*Government can interface only with artificial persons.

*The imaginary, having neither actuality nor substance, is foreclosed

from creating and attaining parity with the tangible. [There can be no
joinder between an artificial person and a natural person.]

*The legal manifestation of this is that no government, as well as any

law, agency, aspect, court, etc. thereof, can concern itself with
anything other than corporate, artificial persons and the contracts
between them.
*These four sentences have been attributed to Hagans v Lavine, 415
US 528 (1974). A thorough reading of the case fails to reveal these
phrases (thanks to Richie the Notary for pointing this out). After
disseminating information that these cites cannot be found there,
numerous websites now attribute Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators,
3 US 54 (1795) or Cruden v. Neale, 2 N.C. 338, 2 S.E. 70 (1796).
They were not found in those decisions either. It seems to have been
regurgitated ad nauseum on the internet without verification. Some
opinion is now circulating that this is a "bogus quote." These words of
wisdom make sense, are well-written, and are consistent with other
decisions. They must have originated somewhere, but the origin has
been very elusive. Since our goal is to be able to substantiate every
reference cited, the search will continue. These four sentences are the
missing pieces of the In Rerum Natura NOTICE OF SPECIAL
APPEARANCE procedure. The procedure is sufficient without them, but
it's a little bit like driving around with a missing hubcap. If anyone can
authoritatively cite the source (including page number), please
disseminate the information on truth@masteragency.com.
Use of Highways, Streets and Bridges
Streets and highways are primarily for the benefit of the traveling
public.
[American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 39, HIGHWAYS, STREETS,
AND BRIDGES, § 230 Superior rights of public]
Streets and highways are established and maintained primarily for
purposes of travel by the public.
[American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 39, HIGHWAYS, STREETS,
AND BRIDGES, § 227 Generally]
Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Smyer, 181 Ala. 121, 61 So.
354 (1913);
Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1
(1950)
(overruled on other grounds by, Rios v. Cozens, 7 Cal.3 792, 103
Cal.Rptr. 299, 499 P.2d 979 (1972));
Yale University v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. 610, 134 A. 268, 47
A.L.R. 667 (1926);
Smith v. City of Jefferson, 161 Iowa 245, 142 N.W. 220 (1950);
Terrell v. Tracy, 312 Ky. 631, 229 S.W.2d 433 (1950);
Brenning v. Remington, 136 Neb. 883, 287 N.W. 776 (1939);
Ex Parte Duncan, 1937 OK 155, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P.2d 1015 (1937);
City of Radford v. Calhoun, 165 Va. 24, 181 S.E. 345, 100 A.L.R. 1378
(1935);
Ex Parte Dickey, 76 W.Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781 (1915);
Park Hotel Co. v. Ketchum, 184 Wis. 182, 199 N.W. 219, 33 A.L.R.
351 (1924).
The existence of a public highway creates a public easement of travel,
which permits the general traveling public to use the highway at will.
[American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 39, HIGHWAYS, STREETS,
AND BRIDGES , § 228 Right of all to use]
Town of Ridgefield v. Eppoliti Realty Co., Inc., 71 Conn.App. 321, 801
A.2d 902 (2002);
The “public highway” created by operation of law along every
section line is more than a right of way over which a public highway
may be established; it is a passage or road that every citizen has a
right to use. Douville v. Christensen, 2002 SD 33, 641 N.W.2d 651
(S.D. 2002).
The public easement of passage over a highway or street includes
every kind of travel and communication for the transportation of
persons or property that is reasonable and proper.
[American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 39, HIGHWAYS, STREETS,
AND BRIDGES, § 231 Manner of use]
Yale University v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. 610, 134 A. 268, 47
A.L.R. 667 (1926);
People ex rel. Mather v. Marshall Field & Co., 266 Ill. 609, 107 N.E.
864 (1915);
Hall v. Lea County Elec. Co-op., 78 N.M. 792, 438 P.2d 632 (1968);
Sumner County v. Interurban Transp. Co., 141 Tenn. 493, 213 S.W.
412, 5 A.L.R. 765 (1919);
McClintock v. Richlands Brick Corp., 152 Va. 1, 145 S.E. 425, 61 A.L.R.
1033 (1928).
Bicycles have a recognized place on the highways and are
expressly authorized by statute to use most public ways.
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 370 Mass. 895, 352 N.E.2d 197
(1976).
Horse-drawn carriages, horseback riders, cyclists, and pedestrians
are equally entitled the use of the highways with motor vehicles.
Matson v. Dawson, 185 Neb. 686, 178 N.W.2d 588 (1970).
The easement of the public in a highway is not limited to the particular
methods of use in vogue when the easement was acquired, but
includes all methods that are later developed.
[American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 39, HIGHWAYS, STREETS,
AND BRIDGES, § 231 Manner of use]
Yale University v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. 610, 134 A. 268, 47
A.L.R. 667 (1926);
People ex rel. Mather v. Marshall Field & Co., 266 Ill. 609, 107 N.E.
864 (1915);
Hall v. Lea County Elec. Co-op., 78 N.M. 792, 438 P.2d 632 (1968);
Sumner County v. Interurban Transp. Co., 141 Tenn. 493, 213 S.W.
412, 5 A.L.R. 765 (1919);
McClintock v. Richlands Brick Corp., 152 Va. 1, 145 S.E. 425, 61 A.L.R.
1033 (1928).
Cloverdale Homes v. Town of Cloverdale, 182 Ala. 419, 62 So. 712
(1913)
(overruled on other grounds by, City of Orange Beach v.
Benjamin, 821 So.2d 193 (Ala. 2001));
McClintock v. Richlands Brick Corp., 152 Va. 1, 145 S.E. 425, 61 A.L.R.
1033 (1928).
All persons have an equal right to use the highways for purposes of
travel by proper means, and with due regard for the corresponding
rights of others.
[American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 39, HIGHWAYS, STREETS,
AND BRIDGES , § 228 Right of all to use]
State v. Mayo, 106 Me. 62, 75 A. 595 (1909);
Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co. v. City of Omaha, 114 Neb. 483,
208 N.W. 123 (1926);
Dent v. Oregon City, 106 Or. 122, 211 P. 909 (1923);
Bombard v. Newton, 94 Vt. 354, 111 A. 510, 11 A.L.R. 1402 (1920);
Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 71 A.L.R. 604 (1930).
The right to use them is not restricted to the citizens of the
municipality or the state.
[American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 39, HIGHWAYS, STREETS,
AND BRIDGES , § 228 Right of all to use]
Ex Parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 P. 442, 21 A.L.R. 1172 (1920);
Wilmot v. City of Chicago, 328 Ill. 552, 160 N.E. 206, 62 A.L.R. 394
(1927);
New York State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO v. City of
Albany, 269 A.D.2d 707, 703 N.Y.S.2d 573 (3d Dep’t 2000);
Parker v. City of Silverton, 109 Or. 298, 220 P. 139, 31 A.L.R. 589
(1923);
Norfolk & P. Traction Co. v. City of Norfolk, 11 Va. 169, 78 S.E. 545
(1912);
Yarrow First Associates v. Town of Clyde Hill, 66 Wash.2d 371, 403
P.2d 49 (1965).
County Commissioners of Charles County v. Stevens, 229 Md. 203,
473 A.2d 12 (1984).
The use of highways for purposes of travel and transportation is a
common and fundamental right.
[American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 39, HIGHWAYS, STREETS,
AND BRIDGES, § 227 Generally]
Campbell v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County, 106 Ariz. 542,
479 P.2d 685 (1971);
Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1
(1950)
(overruled on other grounds by, Rios v. Cozens, 7 Cal.3 792, 103
Cal.Rptr. 299, 499 P.2d 979 (1972));
Duff v. State, 546 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Crim.App. 1977);
Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 71 A.L.R. 604 (1930);
Blumenthal v. City of Cheyenne, 64 Wyo. 75, 186 P.2d 556 (1947).
Because bridges constitute a part of the highways, they are subject to
the same public easement of passage.
[American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Volume 39, HIGHWAYS, STREETS,
AND BRIDGES, § 227 Generally]
Gellasch v. Van Syckle, 267 Mich. 378, 255 N.W. 345 (1934).

Licensing Requirements
Requiring a permit or license is an unconstitutional censorship or prior
restraint upon those freedoms.
[Staub v. Baxley, 355 US 313 (1958)]
When the state imposes a charge for the enjoyment of a right, it is
patently unconstitutional.
[Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105 (1943); United States v.
Jackson, 390 US 570 (1968)]
A person faced with an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it
with impunity and exercise the right. [Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,
394 US 147 (1969)]

The Element of Wilfullness

The word "willfully" generally connotes a voluntary, intentional
violation of a known legal duty.
[United States v. Murdock, 290 US 389 (1933); Spies v. United States,
317 US 492 (1943); United States v. Bishop, 412 US 346 (1973)]
It [the Supreme Court] has formulated the requirement of willfulness
as "bad faith or evil intent."
[United States v. Murdock, 290 US 389 (1933)]
If his action was not willful, he was [not] guilty. [United States v.
Bishop, 412 US 346 (1973)]

Jurisdiction of the Court

Jurisdiction in personam. Power which a court has over the defendant’s
person and which is required before a court can enter a personal or in
personam judgment.
[BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY] [Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed.
565 (1878)]

Specifically defined prerequisites must be met by the party who seeks

the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor.
[McNutt v. G.M.A.C., 298 US 178 (1936)]
[The moving party, Plaintiff] must allege in his pleading the facts
essential to show jurisdiction.
[McNutt v. G.M.A.C., 298 US 178 (1936)]
If he fails to make the necessary allegations, he has no standing.
[McNutt v. G.M.A.C., 298 US 178 (1936)]
The jurisdictional facts must be established, or the case be dismissed.
[McNutt v. G.M.A.C., 298 US 178 (1936)]
A motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction requires the trial court to
inquire as to its jurisdiction.
[KVOS, Inc. v. Associated / United Press, 299 US 269 (1936)]
No court or tribunal can acquire jurisdiction by the mere assertion of it
or where the facts on which jurisdiction depends are falsely alleged.
[Mulligan v. Smith, 59 Cal. 206, 236 (1881)] Jurisdiction in any
proceeding is conferred by the constitution or by statute, and any
mode thereby prescribed for the acquisition of jurisdiction must be
strictly complied with. Jurisdiction in any particular case may involve
three aspects – jurisdiction over the cause or subject matter,
jurisdiction over the parties (in personam), and jurisdiction over the
thing, or res, if any (in rem). [BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY]
A court cannot by its own decision give itself jurisdiction where it had
none; usurpation can give no right.
[Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators, 3 U.S. 54, 1 L.Ed. 57 (1795)]
The validity of every judgment depends upon the jurisdiction of the
court. [Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714 (1878)]
Where there is an absence of jurisdiction, all administrative and
judicial proceedings are a nullity.
[Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157, 7 L.Ed. 382; Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cr.
9, 3 L.Ed. 471]
If there is a total want of jurisdiction, the proceedings are void.
[Thompson v. Tolmie, 27 US (2 Peters) 157 (1829)]
Judgment of court lacking jurisdiction is void. [Burnham v. Superior
Court of California, County of Marin, 110 S.Ct. 2105 (1990)]

To hold a defendant bound by such a judgment is contrary to the first

principles of justice.
[Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714 (1878)]
A court of justice, indeed, ought at its peril to take notice of its own
jurisdiction.
[Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators, 3 U.S. 54, 1 L.Ed. 57 (1795)]

Special Pleadings
An appearance may be either general or special, the former is a simple
and unqualified or unrestricted submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, the latter a submission to the jurisdiction of the court for some
specific purpose only, not for the purposes of the suit. A special
appearance is for the purpose of testing or objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court over the defendant without submitting to such jurisdiction ;
a general appearance is made where the defendant waives defects of
service and submits to the jurisdiction of the court. [BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY] [Insurance Co. of North America v. Kunin, 175 Neb.
260, 121 N.W.2d 372, 375-376]
No appearance shall, of itself, constitute a general appearance.
[Mass.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(3)]

A special appearance is a device used under civil rules to contest

existence of personal jurisdiction.
[BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY]
Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, even on final
determination.
[Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 P.2d 906 @ p. 910]
A defendant making a special appearance has to take care to avoid
any inconsistent action that might serve to waive jurisdictional
objection and convert the special appearance into a general
appearance.
[BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY]
If a defendant wished to insist upon the objection that he is not in
court for want of jurisdiction over his person, he must specially appear
for that purpose only. [BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY]
A special appearance is purely a dilatory plea. [BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY]
Dilatory pleas are Special Pleadings. [Mass.R.Civ.P. Rule 9]
Dilatory pleas are, (1) to the jurisdiction of the court: (2) to the
disability of the plaintiff (i.e.: not In Rerum Natura - being only a
fictitious person), or (3) in abatement.
[COMMENTARIES on the LAWS of ENGLAND (Sir William Blackstone)
Vol. III, § 301]
Pleas based on lack of jurisdiction of the person [Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)
(2)] are in their nature pleas in abatement. [BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY]
Abatement is either of the writ, or the count, for some defect in one of
them; as by misnaming the defendant, which is called a [commercial]
misnomer [Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (8)]; or other want of form in any
material respect. [COMMENTARIES on the LAWS of ENGLAND (Sir
William Blackstone) Vol. III, § 301]

Duty of the Court

The Courts must be watchful against any stealthy encroachments upon
the citizen’s constitutional rights.
[Byars v. United States, 273 US 28 (1927)]
“[The] Party having superior knowledge who takes advantage of
another’s ignorance of the law to deceive him by studied concealment
or misrepresentation can be held responsible for that conduct.”
Fina Supply, Inc. v. Abilene National Bank, 726 S.W.2d 537 (1987)]

“When circumstances impose duty to speak and one deliberately

remains silent, silence is equivalent to false representation.” [Fisher
Controls International, Inc. v. Gibbons, 911 S.W.2d 135 (1995)]

Civil Liability for Abuse of Process

“A judge must be acting within his jurisdiction as to subject matter and
person [in personam jurisdiction] , to be entitled to immunity from civil
actions for his acts.” [Davis v. Burris, 51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689
(1938)]
“When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of
clearly valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial
immunity is lost.” [Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (1980)]

“When a judicial officer acts entirely without jurisdiction or without

compliance with jurisdictional requisites he may be held civilly liable
for abuse of process even though his act involved a decision made in
good faith, that he had jurisdiction.” [Little v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 217 Miss. 576, 64 So.2d 697]

“Public officials, whether governors, mayors or police, legislators or

judges, who fail to make decisions when they are needed or who do
not act to implement decisions when they are made do not fully and
faithfully perform the duties of their offices.” And “. . . there is no
absolute immunity.”
[Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)] [Citing: Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961)

Oath of Office
Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly
committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3 “to support this
Constitution”. [18] No state legislator or executive or judicial officer
can war against the Constitution without violating his solemn oath to
support it. [18] To yield to such a claim would be to enthrone
lawlessness, and lawlessness, if not checked, is the precursor of
anarchy. [22] For those in authority thus to defy the law of the land is
profoundly subversive not only of our constitutional system, but of the
presuppositions of a democratic society. [22] The State “must . . .
yield to an authority that is paramount to the State.” [22] Every act of
government may be challenged by an appeal to law, as finally
pronounced by this [Supreme] Court. [23]
[Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 @ p. 18, 22, 23 (1958)]

All offices Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, both of the States and of
the Union, are bound by oath to support it [the Constitution]
[Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 US (2 Dallas) 419 @ 468 (1793)]

Usurpation of Jurisdiction
“[The Court] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the
other would be treason against the constitution.”
[United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980)] [Citing: Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821)]
Penalties for Treason and Misprision of Treason (State)

“Whoever commits treason against the commonwealth shall be

punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life.” [Massachusetts
General Laws, ch. 264 – CRIMES AGAINST GOVERNMENTS, §2 Penalty
for treason.]

“Whoever, having knowledge of the commission of treason, conceals

the same and does not as soon as may be disclose and make known
such treason to the governor, or to a justice of the supreme judicial or
superior court, shall be guilty of misprision of treason, and shall be
punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or by
imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years, or in jail
for not more than two years.” [Massachusetts General Laws, ch. 264 –
CRIMES AGAINST GOVERNMENTS, §3 Misprision of treason; penalty.]

Penalties for Treason and Misprision of Treason (Federal)

“Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against

them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within
the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer
death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under
this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding
any office under the United States.” [Treason. Title 18 United States
Code §2381]

“Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having

knowledge of the commission of any treason against them, conceals
and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same
to the President or to some judge of the United States, or to the
governor or to some judge or justice of a particular State, is guilty of
misprision of treason and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than seven years, or both.” [Misprision of Treason. Title 18
United States Code §2382]