3Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)T
, J., dissenting
514 U. S. 549, 566(1995).Recently we have endeavored to more sharply defineand enforce limits on Congress’ enumerated “[p]ower . . .[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3.
marked the first timein half a century that this Court held that an Act of Con-gress exceeded its commerce power. We identified threecategories of activity that Congress’ commerce powerauthorizes it to regulate: (1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of inter-state commerce; and (3) “activities having a substantialrelation to interstate commerce . . .
., those activitiesthat substantially affect interstate commerce.” 514 U. S.,at 558–559. Emphasizing that we were unwilling to “con-vert congressional authority under the Commerce Clauseto a general police power,”
at 567, we struck down aban on the possession of firearms within a 1,000-footradius of schools because the statute did not regulate anactivity that “substantially affect[ed]” interstate com-merce,
at 561.Five years after
, we reaffirmed the “substantialeffects” test in
, 529 U. S. 598(2000). We rejected Congress’ attempt to “regulate none-conomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on thatconduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce,” andheld unconstitutional the civil remedy portion of the Vio-lence Against Women Act of 1994.
at 617, 619. Wecould think of “no better example of the police power,which the Founders denied the National Government andreposed in the States.”
at 618.IIIIn upholding §931(a), the Ninth Circuit recognized that
had “significantly altered the land-scape of congressional power under the Commerce Clause”