Professional Documents
Culture Documents
By
Charles B. MacDonald
Advisory Committee
(As of 1 February 1972)
iii
. . . to Those Who Served
Foreword
Recovering rapidly from the shock of German counteroffensives in the
Ardennes and Alsace, Allied armies early in January 1945 began an offen-
sive that gradually spread all along the line from the North Sea to Switzer-
land and continued until the German armies and the German nation were
prostrate in defeat. This volume tells the story of that offensive, one which
eventually involved more than four and a half million troops, including ninety-
one divisions, sixty-one of which were American.
The focus of the volume is on the role of the American armies — First,
Third, Seventh, Ninth, and, to a lesser extent, Fifteenth —which comprised
the largest and most powerful military force the United States has ever put
in the field. The role of Allied armies — FirstCanadian, First French, and
Second British — is recounted in sufficient detail to put the role of American.
armies in perspective, as is the story of tactical air forces in support of the
ground troops.
This is the ninth volume in a subseries of ten designed to record the his-
tory of the United States Army in the European Theater of Operations. One
volume, The Riviera to the Rhine, remains to be published.
vii
The Author
Charles B. MacDonald is the author of T h e Siegfried Line Campaign
and co-author of Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt, both in
the official series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. He has
supervised the preparation of other volumes in the European and Mediter-
ranean theater subseries and is a contributor to Command Decisions and
American Military History. He is also the author of Company Commander
(Washington: 1947) , T h e Battle of the Huertgen Forest (Philadelphia:
1963), T h e Mighty Endeavor (New York: 1969), and Airborne (New
York: 1970). A graduate of Presbyterian College, he also holds the Litt.D.
degree from that institution. In 1957 he received a Secretary of the Army
Research and Study Fellowship and spent a year studying the interrelation-
ship of terrain, weapons, and tactics on European battlefields. A colonel in
the Army Reserve, he holds the Purple Heart and Silver Star. As Deputy
Chief Historian for Southeast Asia, he is currently engaged in preparing
the official history of the United States Army in Vietnam.
viii
Preface
T h e American armies that absorbed the shock of the German counter-
offensives in the Ardennes and Alsace in the winter of 1944–45 were the
most powerful and professional that the United States had yet put in the
field. T h a t this was the case was abundantly demonstrated as the final cam-
paign to reduce Nazi Germany to total defeat unfolded.
T h e campaign was remarkably varied. As it gathered momentum in
the snows of the Ardennes and the mud and pillboxes of the West Wall,
the fighting was often as bitter as any that had gone before among the
hedgerows of Normandy and the hills and forests of the German frontier.
Yet the defense which the Germans were still able to muster following the
futile expenditure of lives and means in the counteroffensives was brittle.
T h e campaign soon evolved into massive sweeps by powerful Allied col-
umns across the width and breadth of Germany. T h a t the Germans could
continue to resist for more than two months in the face of such overwhelm-
ing power was a testament to their pertinacity but it was a grim tragedy as
well. T o such an extent had they subjugated themselves to their Nazi leaders
that they were incapable of surrender at a time when defeat was inevitable
and surrender would have spared countless lives on both sides.
It was a dramatic campaign: the sweep of four powerful U.S. armies to
the Rhine; the exhilarating capture of a bridge at Remagen; assault cross-
ings of the storied Rhine River, including a spectacular airborne assault;
an ill-fated armored raid beyond Allied lines; the trapping of masses of
Germans in a giant pocket in the Ruhr industrial region; the uncovering
of incredible horror in German concentration camps; a dashing thrust to
the Elbe River; juncture with the Russians; and a Wagnerian climax played
to the accompaniment of Russian artillery fire in the Fuehrerbunker in
Berlin.
This volume is chronologically the final work in the European theater
subseries of the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. I n point
of time, it follows T h e Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, previously published,
and T h e Riviera to the Rhine, still in preparation.
Even more than most of the volumes in the official history, this one is
the work of many people. T h e author is particularly indebted to two his-
torians who earlier worked on the project: Gordon A. Harrison, author of
Cross-Channel Attack, whose felicity of phrase may still be apparent in
some of the early chapters, and Fred J. Meyer, who prepared a preliminary
ix
draft of the entire work. T h e volume as it stands owes much to their con-
tributions. Mrs. Magna E. Bauer prepared a number of detailed and valua-
ble studies on the German side. As always, Mrs. Lois Aldridge of the World
War II Records Division, National Archives and Records Service, displayed
remarkable patience in assisting the author’s exploration of mountains of
records. More than forty senior American officers, including Generals of the
Army Dwight D. Eisenhower and Omar N. Bradley, Generals Jacob L.
Devers and William H. Simpson, and four senior German officers, includ-
ing General Hasso von Manteuffel, gave generously of their time in reading
and commenting on all or parts of the manuscript. Assistance was also re-
ceived from the Cabinet Office Historical Section, London; the Directorate
of History, Canadian Forces Headquarters, Ottawa; and the Militaerge-
schichtliches Forschungsamt, Freiburg.
Within the editorial staff, I am particularly grateful for the assistance
of Mrs. Loretto C. Stevens: the copy editors were Mrs. Stephanie B. Demma,
Mr. Alfred M. Beck, and Mrs. Joyce W. Hardyman. Mr. Elliot Dunay and
his staff, Mr. Howell C. Brewer and Mr. Roger D. Clinton, prepared the
maps. T h e cartographic staff was supplemented by men of the United States
Army to whom I am especially grateful: Specialist 5 Arthur S. Hardyman,
Specialist 5 Edward S. Custer, Specialist 4 Daryl L. DeFrance, and Specialist
5 Mark C. Finnemann. Miss Margaret L. Emerson made the index.
T h e author alone is responsible for interpretations and conclusions, as
well as for any errors that may appear.
II . VICTORY IN T H E ARDENNES . . . . . . . . . . . 22
T h e First Army’s Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A Grim Struggle Around Bastogne . . . . . . . . . . 33
T h e Drive on S t . Vith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Northward Across the Sûre . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
xi
Chapter Page
VII. T H E SAAR-MOSELLE TRIANGLE . . . . . . . . . . 116
Probing the Orscholz Switch . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Expanding the Penetration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Broadening the Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Crossing the Saar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
xii
Chapter Page
Breakthrough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
Thrust to the Rhine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
XIII . T H E RHINE CROSSINGS I N T H E SOUTH . . . . . . . 266
The VIII Corps in the Rhine Gorge .......... 273
T o the Main River and Frankfurt . . . . . . . . . . 279
T h e Hammelburg Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
T h e Seventh Army Crossing at Worms . . . . . . . . . 284
The XX Corps in the Rhine-Main Arc ......... 289
xiii
Chapter Page
XVIII. T H E MYTH OF T H E REDOUBT . . . . . . . . . . 407
T h e First Phase Beyond the Rhine . . . . . . . . . . 409
T h e Struggle for Heilbronn and Crailsheim . . . . . . . 415
To the Hohe Rhoen and Schweinfurt . . ....... 418
A Shift to South and Southeast . . . . . . . . . . . 420
Nuremberg and the Drive to the Danube . . . . . . . . 422
T h e Drive on Stuttgart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
A French Incursion to Ulm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
T h e “Stuttgart Incident” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
From the Danube Into Austria . . . . . . . . . . . 433
XIX. GOETTERDAEMMERUNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443
T h e Meeting at Torgau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445
T h e End in Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458
T h e Drive to the Baltic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
Piecemeal Surrenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464
Surrender at Reims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
XX. EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476
Appendix
A. TABLE OF EQUIVALENT RANKS . . . . . . . . . . 483
B. RECIPIENTS OF T H E DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS 484
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489
GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492
CODE NAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497
BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . 498
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503
Maps
No.
1. Main Effort in the Eifel. 27 January–3 February 1945 . . . . 61
2. The Capture of Schmidt and the Schwammenauel Dam.
5–9 February 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3. T h e Remagen Bridgehead. 7–24 March 1945 . . . . . . . 218
4. Foray to Hammelburg. 25–27 March 1945 . . . . . . . . 282
5. Reduction of the Ruhr Pocket. 4–14 April 1945 . . . . . . 363
6. The Harz Pocket. 11–17 April 1945 . . . . . . . . . . 403
7. The American-Russian Linkup. 25 April 1945 . . . . . . 449
8. Drive to the Baltic. 29 April–2 May 1945 . . . . . . . . . 462
9. Action at Fern Pass. 44th Infantry Division. 1–4 May 1945 . . . 470
xiv
Maps I–XVII are in accompanying map envelope
No.
I. The Western Front, 3 January 1945
II. The Ardennes Counteroffensive, 3–28 January 1945
III. The Drive on Pruem
IV. Clearing of the Vianden Bulge and the Capture of Bitburg,
6–28 February 1945
V. The Saar-Moselle Triangle, 13 January–1 March 1945
VI. Operation GRENADE, 22 February–11March 1945
VII. Eliminating the Wesel Pocket, 3–11 March 1945
VIII. Operation LUMBERJACK, 1–7 March 1945
IX. The Saar-Palatinate Triangle, 12–21March 1945
X. The Rhine River Crossings in the South, 22–28March 1945
XI. Rhine Crossings in the North, 24–28March 1945
XII. Breakout From Remagen, 24–28 March 1945
XIII. Encircling the Ruhr, 28 March–1 April 1945
XIV. Drive to the Elbe, 4 2 4 April 1945
XV. Sixth Army Group Offensive, 27 March–24 April 1945
XVI. Into Austria and Czechoslovakia, 28 April–8 May 1945
XVII. V–E Day, 8 May 1945
Illustrations
Page
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, and Lt. Gen.
George S. Patton, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . 3
Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt . . . . . . . . . . . 6
M4 Sherman Tank in the Ardennes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
M4A3 Sherman Tank With 76-mm. Gun . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel . . . . . . . . . 30
Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Wind-Swept Snow in the Ardennes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Patrols of the First and Third Armies Meet at Houffalize . . . . . . 42
Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Medics Use a “Litter-Jeep” T o Evacuate Patients . . . . . . . . . 47
Men of the 82d Airborne Division Pull Sleds Through the Ardennes Snow 62
Traffic Jam on a Slick Ardennes Road . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Maj. Gen. C. Ralph Huebner . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
T h e Urft Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
T h e Schwammenauel Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Damage to the Schwammenauel Dam Causes Flooding of the Roer River 82
xv
Page
Maj . Gen. Troy H . Middleton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Men of the 4th Division Eating Inside Captured Pillbox . . . . . . 87
Dropping Supplies by Parachute to the 4th Division . . . . . . . 97
Maj. Gen . Manton S. Eddy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Crossing Site on the Sauer River Near Echternach . . . . . . . . 102
Welcome to Germany From the 6th Armored Division . . . . . . . 110
Crew of a 3-Inch Gun on the Watch for German Tanks . . . . . . 119
Removing German Dead After Fighting in Nennig . . . . . . . . 121
Maj . Gen . Walton H . Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Lt . Gen . William H . Simpson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
General der Infanterie Gustav von Zangen . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Bursts of White Phosphorus Shells Light Up the Roer River . . . . . 144
Crossing Sites at Linnich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Derelict Assault Boats Near Linnich . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Smoke Pots Along the Roer Near Dueren . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Crossing Sites at Juelich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Footbridge Across the Roer Serves Men of the 30th Division . . . . . 152
Crossing Sites at Dueren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Maj. Gen. Raymond S. McLain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Maj . Gen. John B. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Pershing Tank T26 With 90.mm . Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Maj. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
T h e Demolished Hohenzollern Bridge at Cologne . . . . . . . . 190
Maj. Gen . John Millikin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
2d Lt . Karl H . Timmerman. First Officer To Cross the Remagen Bridge . 215
Sgt. Alexander Drabik. First American Across the Rhine . . . . . . 217
Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
Ludendorff Railroad Bridge at Remagen . . . . . . . . . . . 224
Maj . Gen . James A . Van Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
T h e Rhine at the Remagen Bridge Site . . . . . . . . . . . 231
Lt . Gen . Jacob L . Devers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Lt . Gen . Alexander M . Patch, Jr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
Engineers of the 87th Division Ferry a Tank Across the Moselle . . . . 251
Troops of the 63d Division Cross Dragon’s Teeth of the West Wall . . 255
Reinforcements of the 5th Division Cross the Rhine in an LCVP . . . 271
Crossing the Rhine Under Enemy Fire at St. Goar . . . . . . . . 277
Raising the American Flag Atop the Lorelei . . . . . . . . . . 278
Maj . Gen . Wade H . Haislip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
Infantry of the 3d Division Climb the East Bank of the Rhine . . . . 288
Duplex-Drive Tank With Skirt Folded . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
Duplex-Drive Tank Enters the Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
Field Marshal Sir Bernard L . Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . 296
American Paratrooper Caught in a Tree . . . . . . . . . . . 310
xvi
Page
Glider Troops After Landing Near Wesel . . . . . . . . . . . 312
Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
The Rhine Railroad Bridge at Wesel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorial Bridge at Mainz . . . . . . . . 327
Ponton Bridge Across the Rhine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
Liberated Prisoners of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
Destruction in the Heart of Wurzburg . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
Infantrymen of the 79th Division Cross the Rhein-Herne Canal . . . . 364
Russian Prisoners Liberated by the Ninth Army . . . . . . . . . 368
German Soldiers Make Their Way Unguarded to a Prisoner-of-War Camp 369
Prisoners of War in the Ruhr Pocket . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
White Flags Hang Above a Deserted Street . . . . . . . . . . . 377
German Prisoners Head for the Rear as American Armor Advances . . 382
German Civilians Carry Victims of Concentration Camp for Reburial . 383
Infantrymen Ride an Armored Car in the Race to the Elbe . . . . . 388
Crossing of the Weser River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
A 12.8-cm. “Flak” Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
“Sixty-One Minute Roadblock’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
Lt. Gen. Edward H. Brooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
A Tank of the 14th Armored Division Enters Prison Camp at
Hammelburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
A Patrol of the 3d Division Makes Its Way Through the Rubble of
Nuremberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
Tanks of the 20th Armored Division Ford the Inn River . . . . . . 440
Paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division Approach Berchtesgaden . . 441
2d Lt. William D. Robertson Shows General Eisenhower His Makeshift Flag 455
General Hodges Meets the Russians at the Elbe . . . . . . . . . . 457
Men of the 103d Division Find Resistance in the Austrian Alps . . . . 463
Austrian Civilians Greet American Troops in Innsbruck . . . . . . 468
Czechoslovakian Villagers Welcome Tank Crew . . . . . . . . . 469
xvii
The U.S. Army Center of Military History
The Center of Military History prepares and publishes histories as required by
the U.S. Army. It coordinates Army historical matters, including historical proper-
ties, and supervises the Army museum system. It also maintains liaison with public
and private agencies and individuals to stimulate interest and study in the field
of military history. The Center is located at 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20005–3402.
xviii
THE LAST OFFENSIVE
CHAPTER I
Prelude to Victory
By the third day of January 1945, the armed forces and nation were prostrate.
Germans in the snow-covered Ardennes One day later on the fourth, the Third
region of Belgium and Luxembourg had Army, which had been attacking in the
shot their bolt. T h e winter counter- Ardennes since 2 2 December, was to
offensive, one of the more dramatic start a new phase in its campaign to push
events of World War II in Europe, was in the southern portion of the bulge.
not over in the sense that the original On these two days in early January,
front lines had been restored, but the deep in the Ardennes, the Allies began,
outcome could no longer be questioned. in effect, their last great offensive of the
A week earlier the Third U.S. Army had war in Europe.
established contact with an embattled Not that the entire front-stretching
American force at the road center of some 450 airline miles from the North
Bastogne, well within the southern Sea to the Swiss border-burst immedi-
shoulder of the German penetration. At ately into flame. (Map I ) * Indeed, the
this point it could be only a matter of Germans no longer ago than New Year’s
time before the Third Army linked with Eve had launched a second counter-
the First U.S. Army driving down from offensive-Operation N O R D WIND-
the northern shoulder. Adolf Hitler, the near the southern end of the Allied line
German Fuehrer, himself admitted on 3 in Alsace. This would take more than a
January that the Ardennes operation, fortnight to subdue.2 Yet the fighting in
under its original concept, was “no Alsace, no matter how real and trying to
longer promising of success.” 1 the men and units involved, was a sec-
On this third day of January the First ondary effort. T h e true turn the war was
Army began its attack to link with the taking was more apparent in the north,
Third Army, to push in what had be- where the last offensive materialized
come known as the “bulge,” and to reach slowly, even gropingly, as the First and
the Rhine River. It was an attack des- Third Armies sought to eradicate the
tined to secure the tactical initiative that last vestiges of the enemy’s thrust in the
the Allied armies had lost temporarily Ardennes. One by one the other Allied
in the December fighting but which, armies would join the fight.
once regained, they would hold until
after Hitler was dead and the German * Maps numbered in Roman are in accompany-
ing map envelope.
1 Magna E. Bauer, MS # R–15, Key Dates Dur- 2 Robert Ross Smith, The Riviera to the Rhine,
ing the Ardennes Offensive 1944, Part 1 , annotated a volume in preparation for the series UNITED
copy in OCMH. STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
2 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
support with a drive across eastern Bel- reason for having army groups and
gium into what became known as the armies. As to advance on a broad front,
Aachen Gap. T h e Third Army, mean- he believed it would be “very important
while, had moved across northern France to us later on to have two strings to our
into Lorraine. In the south a new Allied bow.” 5
force, the 6th Army Group, commanded Yet what persuasion could not effect,
by Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers and com- the enemy counteroffensive in part had
posed of the Seventh U.S. and First wrought. With the German drive threat-
French Armies, had come ashore in ening to split the 12th Army Group,
southern France and extended the Allied Eisenhower had given Montgomery tem-
front into Alsace. porary command of all forces north of
At that point the Germans, strength- the penetration. Not only was the First
ened along their frontier by inhospitable Army included but also the Ninth U.S.
terrain and concrete fortifications (the Army, which had entered the line in
West Wall, or, as Allied troops called it, October north of Aachen between the
the Siegfried Line) , and by proximity to First Army and the British.
their sources of supply as opposed to T h e debate had arisen again as the
ever-lengthening Allied supply lines, had year 1944 came to a close. As soon as the
turned to fight back with surprising Ardennes breach could be repaired, Gen-
effect. Through the fall of 1944 they had eral Eisenhower revealed, he intended to
limited Allied gains in the south to the return the First Army to General Brad-
German frontier along the Saar River ley’s command and to resume operations
and the upper Rhine. In the north, de- within the framework of the broad-front
spite a spectacular airborne assault in the strategy. T h e First and Third Armies
Netherlands by the First Allied Airborne were to drive from the Ardennes through
Army, they had held the 21 Army Group the Eifel to reach the Rhine south of
generally south and west of the Maas the Ruhr, while the 21 Army Group was
River and the First Army west of the to retain the Ninth Army and make a
Roer River, less than 2 3 miles inside major drive to the Rhine north of the
Germany. Ruhr.6
Through the fall campaign, debate Even as the fighting to eliminate the
over a concentrated thrust in the north enemy in the Ardennes developed mo-
as opposed to Eisenhower’s broad-front mentum, the British Chiefs of Staff
strategy had continued to arise from emerged in clear disagreement with
time to time in one form or another. Eisenhower’s views. On 10January they
Tied in with it was a long-standing tenet asked formally for a strategy review by
of Field Marshal Montgomery’s that the Combined Chiefs of Staff (U.S. and
Eisenhower should designate a single, British) , under whose direction General
Eisenhower served. In reply to inquiry
over-all ground commander, presumably
Montgomery himselfTo both argu- 5 Ltrs, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 10 and 13 Oct
ments, Eisenhower had continued to say 44 and 1 Dec 44, as cited in Pogue, The Supreme
no. T h e front was too long, he said, for Command,
Ltr,
pp. 297, 314.
Eisenher to Montgy, 31 Dec 44, as
one man to control it all; that was the cited in Pogue, The Supreme command, p. 409.
PRELUDE TO VICTORY 5
from General George C. Marshall, Chief Allied Versus German Strength
of Staff of the U.S. Army and a member
of the Combined Chiefs, Eisenhower in- In returning to the offensive, General
sisted that in order to concentrate a Eisenhower and his Allied command
powerful force north of the Ruhr for the were dealing from overwhelming
invasion of Germany, he had to have a strength. By 3 January 3,724,927 Allied
firm defensive line (the Rhine) that soldiers had come ashore in western
could be held with minimum forces. Europe.8 They were disposed tactically
Once he had concentrated along the in 3 army groups, 9 armies (including
Rhine, the main thrust would be made one not yet assigned divisions), 2 0 corps,
in the north on the north German plain and 73 divisions. Of the divisions, 49
over terrain conducive to the mobile were infantry, 2 0 armored, and 4 air-
warfare in which the Allies excelled. A borne.9 Six tactical air commands and
secondary thrust was to be made south thousands of medium and heavy bombers
of the Ruhr, not in the vicinity of Bonn backed up the armies. A highly complex,
and Cologne, as the British wanted, be- technical, and skilled logistical appa-
cause the country east of the Rhine there ratus, recovered at last from the strain
is tactically unfavorable, but farther imposed by the pursuit to the German
south near Frankfurt, where a terrain frontier, rendered support; behind the
corridor that runs south of the Ardennes U.S. armies, this went by the name of
extends across the Rhine through Frank- the Communications Zone. T h e Allies
furt to Kassel. would be striking with one of the strong-
Stopping off at Malta en route to top- est, unquestionably the best-balanced,
level discussions with the eastern ally, military forces of all time.
the Soviet Union, the Chiefs of Staff of At first glance German ground
the British and American services-- strength available to the Commander in
sitting as the Combined Chiefs of Staff- Chief West (Oberbefehlshaber West),10
would on 2 February accept the Supreme Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rund-
Commander’s plan. They would do so stedt, appeared equal, even superior, to
with the assurance that the main effort that of the Allies, for Rundstedt con-
would be made north of the Ruhr and trolled, nominally, eighty divisions. In
that this main thrust would not neces- reality, many of these had been dras-
sarily await clearing the entire west bank tically reduced in the fighting. T h e 26th
of the Rhine.7
For all its aspects of finality, this de- 8SHAEF G–3 War Room Daily Summaries, 214-
18. Casualties through 3 January totaled 516,244,
cision was not to end the matter. As though many of these men had returned to duty.
plans for broadening the last offensive U.S. forces had incurred 335,090 casualties, includ-
progressed, various ramifications of the ing 55,184 killed.
controversy would continue to arise. Yet 9Twelve divisions were British, 3 Canadian, 1
Polish, 8 French, and 49 American. There were, in
for the moment, at least, the air was addition, a Polish brigade and contingents of
clear. Dutch, Belgian, and Czechoslovakian troops.
10 Oberbefehlshaber West means either the Com-
mander in Chief West or his headquarters. In this
7For a full discussion of this subject, see Pogue, volume, the abbreviated form, OB WEST, will be
The Supreme Command, pp. 409–16. used to refer to the headquarters.
6 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
pable of fighting German armor on increased armor plate, the old Sherman
equal terms. They plainly were out- remained the basic tank. As late as the
gunned, not necessarily by the enemy’s last week of February 1945, for example,
medium (Mark IV) tank but unques- less than one-third of the mediums in the
tionably by the 50-ton Mark V (Pan- Ninth Army were equipped with a 76-
ther) and the 54-ton Mark VI (Tiger), mm. piece. T h e best of the modifications
the latter mounting a high-velocity 88- of the M4 to reach the theater in any
mm. gun.20 T h e Panther and Tiger also quantity was the M4A3, 76-mm. gun,
surpassed the Sherman in thickness of Wet Series, familiarly known as the
armor and width of tracks. “Jumbo.” Its high-velocity gun had a
Although modifications of the M4 had muzzle brake, and the tank had a new
begun to reach the theater in some quan- suspension system and 23-inch steel
tity in late fall and early winter, most tracks in place of the old 169/16-inch rub-
equipped with a 76-mm. gun, some with ber block tracks. Neither a radically
designed medium tank (the M26,
2 0 A souped-up version of the Tiger, called the
King Tiger or Tiger Royal, appeared in small
mounting a 90-mm. gun) nor a heavy
numbers. tank would reach the theater before the
12 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
control. On occasion, the devastating quarters to the G–3 Air Section at army
heavy bombers of the U.S. Eighth Air headquarters for transmission to the
Force and the Royal Air Force Bomber tactical air command, with an air sup-
Command were called in. Not counting port officer at corps merely monitoring
Allied aircraft based in Italy, the Allies the request. Usually set u p close to the
could muster more than 17,500 first- army headquarters, the air headquarters
line combat aircraft, including approxi- ruled on the feasibility of a mission and
mately 5,000 British aircraft of all types, assigned the proper number of aircraft
6,881 U.S. bombers, and 5,002 U.S. to it. Since air targets could not always
fighters, plus hundreds of miscellaneous be anticipated, most divisions had come
types for reconnaissance, liaison, and to prefer a system of “armed reconnais-
transport. 25 sance flights” in which a group assigned
T h e tactical air commands were the to the division or corps for the day
British Second Tactical Air Force, in checked in by radio directly with the
support of the Second British and First appropriate air support officer. Thus
Canadian Armies; the First French Air the planes could be called in as soon as
Corps, in support of the First French a target appeared without the delayin-
Army; and four American forces, the volved in forwarding a request through
IX, XI, XIX, and XXIX Tactical Air channels. Requests for support from
Commands, in support, respectively, of mediums had to be approved by the G-
the First, Seventh, Third, and Ninth 3 Air Section at army group head-
Armies. All American tactical support quarters and took appreciably longer.26
aircraft–mediums and fighter-bombers In the matter of logistics, the pendu-
-were a part of the Ninth Air Force lum had swung heavily to the Allied
(Maj. Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg). side. Although logistical difficulties had
Like divisions attached to ground contributed in large measure to the
corps and armies, the number of fighter- Allied bog-down along the German
bomber groups assigned to tactical air border in the fall of 1944, opening of
commands often varied, though the the great port of Antwerp in late
usual number was six. A group normal- November, plus the use of major ports
in southern France, had speeded re-
ly had three squadrons of twenty-five
covery of the logistical apparatus. Sup-
planes each: P–38’s (Lightnings), P-
ply losses in the early Ardennes fighting,
47’s (Thunderbolts) , P–51’s (Mus- while locally painful, were no problem
tangs), or, in the case of night fighter in the long run. T h e Germans, for their
groups, P–61’s (Black Widows). T h e part, had expended carefully hoarded
French used American planes, while the reserves in the Ardennes. Although they
basic British tactical fighters were roc- still derived some benefit from prox-
ket-firing Hurricanes and Typhoons. imity to their sources of supply, they
Requests for air support passed from would find that the traditional advan-
the air support officer at division head-
26 Craven and Cate, AAF III, pp. 107–37; The
25Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World War Ninth Air Force and Its Principal Commands in
II, with supplement, p. 156. the ETO, vol. I, ch. VII, and vol. II, part I .
PRELUDE TO VICTORY 15
tage of inner lines had lost some of its Supreme Commander had first call
effect in the air age.27 upon them when he required their di-
rect support for ground operations.
Organization and Command T h e two American army groups rep-
resented, in effect, a new departure in
With the exception of a few new divi- American military experience in that
sions, the American force participating the only previous U.S. army group had
in the last offensive was experienced in existed only briefly near the end of
the ways of battle, a thoroughly profes- World War I when General John J.
sional force scarcely comparable to the Pershing had grouped two American
unseasoned soldiery that had taken the armies under his own command. With
field even such a short time before as little precedent as a guide, the way the
D-day in Normandy. That the Ameri- two army group commanders, Generals
cans had come fully of age had been Bradley and Devers, organized their
amply demonstrated in the stalwart de- headquarters and exercised command
fense of the American soldier against reflected much of their own individual
the surprise onslaught in the Ardennes concepts. Although both retained the
and in the swift reaction of the Ameri- usual “G” and Special Staff organiza-
can command. tion, Devers ran his army group with a
Having moved three months before staff of only about 600 officers and men,
from England, General Eisenhower’s while Bradley employed double that
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expedi- number. T h e numbers told much
tionary Force (SHAEF Main) was about the way each interpreted the role
established in Versailles with adequate of the army group commander: Devers
radio and telephone communications to played it loosely, leaving planning main-
all major commands. A small tent and ly to his army commanders and author-
trailer camp at Gueux, near Reims, izing his staff to seek information at
served the Supreme Commander as a lower levels and make changes on the
forward headquarters. In addition to spot. Much as when he had commanded
the three Allied army groups—6th, 12th, the First Army, Bradley exercised much
and 21—General Eisenhower exercised closer control over his army commanders
direct command over the First Allied and employed his staff in intricate,
Airborne Army (Lt. Gen. Lewis H. detailed planning. General Bradley
Brereton), U.S. and British tactical air after the war liked to point out that he
forces, and the Communications Zone had intimate foreknowledge of every
(Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee). Although move of his armies except in one case
the Allied strategic air forces operated when General Patton set out on an
directly under the Combined Chiefs of operation that he came to rue.28
Staff rather than under Eisenhower, the Under the American system, both
army group and army exercised com-
27A detailed account of logistics in the European mand and logistical functions, while at
theater may be found in Roland G . Ruppenthal,
Logistical Support of the Armies I , UNITED
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washing- 28 Interviews,author with Bradley, 30 Jun 67. and
ton, 1955), and II (Washington, 1959) . Devers, 7 Dec 67.
16 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
the level of corps the commander was stroyer battalion to the infantry division
free of the latter. This system afforded became customary, bringing the size of
the corps commander time to concen- the division to about 16,000 men.
trate on tactical matters and established Similarly, a separate tank destroyer
the corps as a strong component in the battalion was nearly always attached to
command structure. Equipped with the armored division.
modern means of communication and After a first rush to create a “heavy”
transportation, the corps commander armored division comparable to the
had regained a measure of the control early German panzer division, the U.S.
and influence over the actions of his Army had scaled down the medium
divisions that the advent of mass armies tank strength of the armored division
and rapid-fire weapons had originally from 250 to 154 and added more in-
taken away. fantry to provide staying power. T h e
T h e American division in World new organization had dispensed with
War II reflected an early decision to armored and armored infantry regi-
keep the army in the field lean, to avoid ments, providing instead battalions that
duplicating the powerful but ponderous could be grouped in various “mixes”
28,000-man division that had fought in under combat commands. While lack-
the trenches with Pershing. T h e theory ing some of the shock power of the old
was that if all the engineer, medical, heavy division, the new formation had
transport, quartermaster, and other sup- proven flexible, maneuverable, and
port troops that were needed to meet fully capable of meeting the German
any contingency were an integral part panzer division of 1944–45 on at least
of the division, not only would the equal terms. Three of the heavy ar-
division be difficult to control and ma- mored divisions remained-the 1st in
neuver but many of the troops would Italy and the 2d and 3d in Eisenhower’s
often be idle while awaiting a call on command.
the specialties for which they were T h e armored division usually oper-
trained. Better to let infantrymen them- ated in three combat commands, A, B,
selves double as drivers, radio operators, and R (Reserve), each built around a
mechanics, and the like, while special- battalion of medium tanks and a bat-
ized units of heavy artillery, transport, talion of armored infantry, with added
construction engineers, signalmen, tank increments of engineers, tank destroy-
destroyers, tanks, and other support ers, medics, and other services plus artil-
could be attached as required. T h e lery support commensurate with the
method had the added virtue of elimi- combat command’s assignment. Thus
nating the need for a variety of special- each combat command was approxi-
ized divisions since infantry divisions mately equal in power and interchange-
could be tailored by attachments to fit able in terms of combat mission, while
various requirements. in the old heavy division Combat Com-
Because the fighting in Europe posed mands A and B almost always bore the
an almost constant demand for close- major assignments since the reserve
support firepower and antitank defense, consisted usually of some contingent
attachment of a tank and a tank de- pulled from either or both of the larger
PRELUDE TO VICTORY 17
commands to afford the commander a lege. General Eisenhower and two of
maneuver or reinforcing element. In his top American subordinates, Bradley
both type divisions combat commands and Patton, had been closely associated
usually operated under an arrangement in battle since the campaign in North
of two or more “task forces.” Africa, and Lt. Gen. Courtney H.
Much like armor with its combat Hodges of the First Army, who had
commands, infantry divisions almost come to France as Bradley’s deputy in
always employed regimental combat the First Army, and Lt. Gen. William H.
teams. Each of the division’s three in- Simpson of the Ninth Army had devel-
fantry regiments was supported by a oped a close command association with
105-mm. howitzer battalion and in- the others through the fighting of the
crements of divisional support troops fall and early winter. General Devers
while the division’s 155-mm. howitzer and his one American army commander,
battalion was available for reinforcing Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch of the
fires as needed. Seventh Army, were less fully integrated
The corps usually consisted of a in the command team, partly because
minimum of three divisions-two in- they had entered the fight separately by
fantry, one armored. Never did the U.S. way of southern France rather than Nor-
Army employ an armored corps of the mandy, partly because they functioned
type the Germans used in early break-
in a supporting role on a flank and thus
throughs in Poland and on the Western
commanded less direct attention from
Front, partly because of the antipathy
toward specialization and partly be- the Supreme Commander, and partly be-
cause the American infantry division cause General Devers had not been
with a high mobility and with attached Eisenhower’s selection but that of the
tanks and tank destroyers was essentially Chief of Staff, General Marshall, and
the equivalent to the German panzer gren- Patch had been Dever’s choice. Yet the
adier division. Thus a regular corps was military schooling and experience of
considerably heavier in armor than the these two was much the same as that of
presence of one armored and two infantry the others, and the fall and early winter
divisions might otherwise indicate. The campaigns had already produced a
only specialized U.S. corps was the XVIII strong measure of understanding.
Airborne Corps, which like U.S. airborne A potentially divisive element was
divisions was destined to spend more time present in the American command in
in straight ground combat than in its spe- the person of the Third Army com-
cialized role. mander, General Patton. A charismatic
Heading this American force in leader, Patton was also impetuous and
Europe was a group of senior com- had come close on several occasions to
manders who had come to know each summary relief. While General Eisen-
other intimately during the lean years hower had in each case decided finally
of the small peacetime Army and who against that discipline, Patton had sorely
all had absorbed the same doctrinal tried his patience, and as a result of
concepts from the service schools and slapping incidents involving two hos-
the Command and General Staff Col- pitalized soldiers in Sicily, he had
18 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
vowed never to elevate Patton above final objective of the Allied armies, the
army command. Respecting Bradley, Ruhr with its coal mines, blast furnaces,
Patton had agreed without rancor to and factories, the muscle with which
serve under Bradley, one who in North Germany waged war, was the more vital
Africa and Sicily had been his subordi- objective. Without the Ruhr, Ger-
nate. Aware that Patton was impetuous many’s case would fast become hopeless;
and that grim, slugging warfare tried his taking Berlin and all other objectives
thin patience, Eisenhower and Bradley then would be but a matter of time.30
kept a close rein on the Third Army No political or geographical entity,
commander but so unobtrusively that the Ruhr can be fairly accurately de-
Patton himself often thought he was scribed as a triangle with its base along
putting things over on his superiors the east bank of the Rhine River from
when actually they were fully informed. Cologne northward to Duisburg, a dis-
Aware also of Patton’s superior abilities tance of some thirty-five miles. One
in more fluid warfare, Eisenhower and side of the triangle extends eastward
Bradley consciously loosened their hold from Duisburg along the Lippe River
on the rein when breakthrough and pur- to Dortmund, for thirty-five to forty
suit were the order of the day.29 miles; the other side about the same dis-
In the over-all command structure, tance southwestward from Dortmund to
two other potentially abrasive elements the vicinity of Cologne along the Ruhr
were present in the persons of the 21 River. T h e region embraces major
Army Group commander, Field Mar- cities such as Essen, Duesseldorf, and
shal Montgomery, and the First French Wuppertal.
Army commander, General Jean de T h e trace of the front line in early
Lattre de Tassigny. Although Mont- January clearly reflected Allied preoc-
gomery and de Lattre commanded cupation with the Ruhr as an objective
forces considerably smaller than those and General Eisenhower’s broad-front
fielded by the Americans, each was a strategy, plus the accident of the Ar-
dominant personality and as the senior dennes counteroffensive. Starting at the
field representative of one of the major Dutch islands of Noord Beveland and
allies sought a strong voice in command Tholen, the line followed the Maas and
deliberations. Nor was either reluctant Waal Rivers eastward to Nijmegen,
in the face of controversy to call in the where the Allies maintained a small
persuasive force of his head of state. bridgehead north of the Waal, thence
southward along the west bank of the
Terrain and the Front Line Maas to Maeseyck. There the line
turned southeastward across the Maas
At the closest point, the Allied front to reach the Roer River near Heinsberg,
line in early January was some twenty- thence south and southwestward to the
five miles from the Ruhr industrial headwaters of the Roer at Monschau.
area. Although Berlin, the political T h e sector along the Roer–some forty
heart of Germany, might constitute the
30SHAEF Planning Staff, Post-NEPTUNE Courses
29Interviews, author with Eisenhower, 23 Jun 67; of Action After Capture of Lodgment Area,
Bradley, 30 Jun 67; and Devers, 7 Dec 67. SHAEF SGS file, 381, I.
PRELUDE TO VICTORY 19
miles long-represented the only major the Second British Army (Lt. Gen. Sir
breach of the West Wall fortifications. Miles C. Dempsey) , and the Ninth U.S.
At Monschau began what was left Army (General Simpson) . Soon after
of the Ardennes bulge. T h e line ran the Germans had struck in the Ar-
sharply southwest as far as Marche, dennes, the Ninth Army had extended
some forty miles west of the German its boundary southward to encompass
frontier, thence southeast to rejoin the much of the area originally held by the
frontier a few miles northwest of Trier. First U.S. Army, so that the boundary
It then followed the Moselle River to ran in the vicinity of Monschau. With
the southern border of Luxembourg, the exception of the western portion of
there to swing east and parallel the the Netherlands, where canals, rivers,
Franco-German border to the vicinity dikes, and deep drainage ditches sharply
of Sarreguemines. From there to Gamb- compartment the land, this region of-
sheim on the west bank of the Rhine a fered the best route to the primary Allied
few miles north of Strasbourg the front objective, the Ruhr. T h e Ninth Army
was in a state of flux as a result of the might strike directly toward the western
NORDWIND counteroffensive. A few base of the Ruhr, while the British and
miles south of Strasbourg, it again Canadians crossed the Rhine and gained
veered west to encompass a portion of access to the north German plain, there-
Alsace still held by the Germans, called by outflanking the Ruhr and at the
by Allied soldiers the Colmar pocket. same time opening a way toward Berlin.
T h e front line reached the Rhine again T h e Ardennes-Eifel, with its high
east of Mulhouse and followed the river ridges, deep-cut, serpentine streams,
to the Swiss border. and dense forests, had never been tested
T h e terrain immediately in front of by an army moving against opposition
the Allied positions could be divided from west to east except during Septem-
into four general classifications: the ber 1944, when an American corps had
flatlands of the Netherlands and the pushed as far as the German frontier.
Cologne plain, crisscrossed by waterways Even should the Allies elect to avoid the
and studded with towns and villages; Eifel as a route of major advance, that
the Ardennes-Eifel, a high plateau so portion of the high plateau known as
deeply cut by erosion that it appears the Ardennes still would have to be
mountainous; the Saar-Palatinate, an- cleared of the enemy. T h e responsibility
other plateau, sprinkled with coal mines belonged to General Hodges’ First
and steel processing plants, separated Army, operating temporarily under the
from the Ardennes-Eifel by the trench 21 Army Group, and the Third Army
of the Moselle; and the Vosges Moun- (General Patton).
tains-Black Forest massif, two sharply T h e Third Army’s sector, some of
defined mountain regions belonging to which upon the start of the Ardennes
the same geological age but separated counteroffensive had been relinquished
by the trench of the Rhine. to the adjacent Seventh U.S. Army
T h e flatlands in the north were the (General Patch), included, in addition
responsibility of the First Canadian to the Ardennes, a small portion of the
Army (Lt. Gen. Henry D. G. Crerar), line facing the Saar-Palatinate. This
20 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
included the trough of the Moselle, a the full length of Germany’s western
poor route of advance because it is frontier. No thin line of elaborate, self-
narrow and meandering. That part of contained forts like the Maginot Line,
the Saar-Palatinate most open to attack the West Wall was a series of more than
lay opposite the Seventh Army from 3,000 relatively small, mutually sup-
Saarlautern southeastward to the Rhine porting pillboxes or blockhouses ar-
and encompassed two corridors leading ranged in one or two bands, depending
northeast that have seen frequent use on the critical nature of the terrain.
in wartime. Separated by a minor moun- Either natural antitank obstacles such
tain chain called the Haardt, these are as rivers or monolithic concrete projec-
known usually as the Kaiserslautern and tions called dragon’s teeth ran in front
Wissembourg Gaps. Both lead to the of the pillboxes. T h e strongest sectors
Rhine near Mainz, where, after con- of the line were around Aachen—al-
verging, they continue as one past ready breached—and in front of the
Frankfurt to Kassel. Saar. Based on the principle of delaying
That part of the Allied line touching an attacker, then ejecting him with mo-
the Rhine—from Gambsheim to a point bile reserves, the West Wall by 1945
above Strasbourg—was the responsibil- had lost much of its effectiveness, both
ity of the First French Army (General from a lack of reserves and from the fact
de Lattre). From the vicinity of Stras- that many of the emplacements could
bourg the French line swung southwest not accommodate contemporary weap-
into the most rugged terrain on the ons. Yet as many an Allied soldier al-
Western Front, the high Vosges Moun- ready had learned, concrete in almost
tains. Rising almost like a wall from the any form can lend real substance to a
Alsatian Plain, the Vosges reach a height defense. 31
of almost 5,000 feet and in winter are Before the entire Allied front would
covered with deep snows. In the Vosges rest on reasonably economical natural
and on the plain, the German-held obstacles, and thus before the last offen-
Colmar pocket measured on its periph- sive could develop in full force, four
ery about 130 miles. Even after clearing matters of unfinished business in addi-
this pocket, the French would face ter- tion to reconquest of the Ardennes re-
rain hardly less formidable; just across mained to be dealt with. First, the
the Rhine stands the Schwarzwald, or enemy’s second winter counteroffensive,
Black Forest, which guards Germany which had started on New Year’s Eve in
much as the Vosges protect France. Alsace, would have to be contained and
All along the front, with the excep- any gains wiped out. Second, the ene-
tion of the Maas-Waal line in the my’s hold-out position around Colmar
Netherlands and the 40-mile gap along would have to be erased. Third, the
the Roer, the Germans drew strength Germans would have to be driven from
from their concrete border fortifications, an angle formed by confluence of the
the West Wall. Construction of this Saar and Moselle Rivers, known as the
fortified line had begun in 1936, first to Saar-Moselle triangle. And fourth, an-
counter France’s Maginot Line opposite 31For a detailed description of the West Wall,
the Saar, subsequently to protect almost see MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign.
PRELUDE TO VICTORY 21
other hold-out position in the north in pansion of its developing role in the last
an angle formed by juncture of the Roer offensive. Meanwhile, the British would
and Maas Rivers, a so-called Heinsberg eliminate the Heinsberg pocket before
pocket, would have to be eliminated. their assignment in the last offensive
Execution of the first two tasks, both came due.
in Alsace, would so occupy the Seventh Thus the birth of the last offensive
U.S. and First French Armies, operating occurred in January in the Ardennes.
under General Devers’s 6th Army There the First Army at last could strike
Group, all through January and Febru- back at the forces that had hit without
ary that only in March would these two warning in December, and there the
armies be able to join the final drive.32 Third Army might reorient its opera-
Elimination of the Saar-Moselle tri- tions away from the local objective of
angle, on the other hand, the Third succoring Bastogne to the broader as-
Army would accomplish as a logical ex- signment of pushing in the bulge and
32Smith, The Riviera to the Rhine. driving to the Rhine.
CHAPTER II
the northern flank. Nor could the Third north flank, General Hodges of the First
Army, which had to provide the troops Army, agreed with this approach in prin-
for striking the southern flank, make ciple, he advised against it because he
available immediately enough divisions deemed the roadnet close to the border
to do more than stabilize the southern in the north inadequate to sustain the
flank and possibly relieve Bastogne. Be- large force, heavy in armor, that would
cause Bastogne was the key to the road- be necessary for the cleaving blow essen-
net not only to the northwest but to tial to a successful amputation. Nor did
southwest and south as well, and since the 12th Army Group commander, Gen-
nobody knew for sure at the time which eral Bradley, endorse it. Bradley was
way the Germans wanted to go, the need concerned about the effect of winter
to hold Bastogne never came into ques- weather, both on the counterattack itself
tion. 2 and on air support, and of the inhos-
This early commitment to relieving pitable terrain. He was worried too
and reinforcing Bastogne in large meas- about a lack of reserves. Already the 6th
ure dictated the way the Allied command Army Group had extended its lines dan-
would go about eliminating the penetra- gerously to release the bulk of the Third
tion, a drive to squeeze the bulge at its Army for the fight in the Ardennes.
waist rather than its base, then a turn to Although the matter of reserves might
push in what was left. It was a conserva- have been remedied by greater commit-
tive approach but one necessitated, at ment of British troops, the British com-
least in the opening moves, by the sur- mander who also controlled the First
prise, early success, and persisting U.S. Army, Field Marshal Montgomery,
strength of the German assault. wanted to avoid major realignment of
Yet once Bastogne was relieved on the British forces lest it unduly delay return
26th, the way was open for another solu- to the scheduled main effort in the north
tion, the classic though venturesome against the Ruhr.
maneuver for eliminating a deep pene- On 28 December General Eisenhower
tration, cutting it off at its base. This the met with Montgomery to plot the role
Third Army commander, General Pat- of the First Army in the offensive. Al-
ton, proposed, a drive by his army north ready in hand was General Bradley’s
and northeast from Luxembourg City view that the Third Army should strike
into a westward-protruding portion of not at the base of the bulge but from
the Eifel to link with a complementary Bastogne generally northeast toward St.
thrust by the First Army in the vicinity Vith. As formulated after earlier conver-
of Pruem, a road center a little over ten sations with General Hodges and corps
miles inside Germany, southeast of St. commanders of the First Army, Mont-
Vith.3 gomery’s decision was for the First Army
Although Patton’s opposite on the to link with the Third Army at Houf-
falize, nine miles northeast of Bastogne,
2For an account of early decisions, see Cole, The then broaden the attack to drive gener-
Ardennes, pp. 487–88, 509–10. ally east on St. Vith. Noting that he was
3Cole, T h e Ardennes, pp. 610–13, provides a de-
tailed discussion of the deliberations. See also moving British units against the tip of
Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 383, 393. the bulge to assist the First Army to con-
VICTORY IN T H E ARDENNES 25
centrate, Montgomery indicated that the in the fighting, a reconnaissance squad-
attack was to begin within a day or two ron, and a French parachute battalion
of the New Year. covered the sector, while a fresh Ameri-
As the old year neared an end and the can airborne division backed it u p from
two American armies prepared their of- positions along the Meuse. T h e sector
fensives, this was the picture around the was part of the responsibility of the VIII
periphery of the German penetration: Corps (Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton),
From a point north of Monschau the corps that had been hardest hit by
marking the boundary between the First the opening blows of the counteroffen-
and Ninth Armies, the sector of the V sive. Serving at this point under the
Corps (Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow) Third Army, the main body of the VIII
extended southward as far as Elsenborn, Corps was located between St. Hubert
thereby encompassing high ground serv- and Bastogne.
ing as an outpost for the Hohe Venn, In the sector of the VIII Corps, at
then swung west along a deep-cut creek Bastogne itself, and southeast of the
to Waimes, where V Corps responsibility town, the front was in a state of flux be-
yielded to the XVIII Airborne Corps cause here General Patton had begun
(Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway) . T h e opening moves in his part of the offen-
line continued to follow the creek sive two days before the New Year.
through Malmédy to Stavelot, thence Charged with reaching the First Army
along the Ambleve River for a mile or at Houffalize, the VIII Corps was to pass
two to Trois Ponts. At that point, the to the west of Bastogne, then swing
forward trace extended cross-country to northeast on Houffalize. East and south-
the southwest along no clearly defined east of Bastogne, the III Corps (Maj.
feature. Where it cut across the Lienne Gen. John Millikin) was to broaden to
River near Bra, the sector of the VII the east the corridor its armor had forged
Corps (Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins) into the town, then continue northeast
began. T h e VII Corps line extended toward St. Vith. Holding the south flank
southwest across the Bastogne-Liège of the bulge generally along the Sûre
highway to the Ourthe River near River east to the German border, the
Hotton. XII Corps (Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy)
T h e Ourthe was, temporarily, the was to join the offensive later.4
First Army’s right boundary. On the That these opening blows by the
other side Field Marshal Montgomery Third Army collided head on with a
had inserted under his direct command major German effort to sever the corri-
contingents of the 30 British Corps. Run- dor into Bastogne, again encircle the
ning from the Meuse south of Dinant town, and take it, contributed to the
generally eastward to Houffalize, the fluid situation prevailing there. Night
boundary between the 21 and 12th Army was falling on the second day of the new
Groups split the bulge roughly in half. year before the Americans around Bas-
From the army group boundary south- togne could claim that they had parried
east to St. Hubert, fifteen miles west of
4A detailed account of the first four days of the
Bastogne, no formal line existed. Patrols Third Amy’s offensive is provided in Cole, The
of an American regiment hard hit early Ardennes, ch. XXIV.
26 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
what would turn out to be the stronger late on 2 January, the Third Army might
of two final German blows aimed at be able to renew its offensive in earnest
seizing the town. on the same day.
German dispositions within the bulge A veteran force that had come ashore
reflected the broad pattern shaped by on the beaches of Normandy, liberated
early stages of the counteroffensive, plus Paris, and penetrated the West Wall
the recent emphasis on taking Bastogne. around Aachen, the First Army on the
Three infantry divisions on the south eve of resuming the offensive contained
wing of the Fifteenth Army (General der thirteen divisions. Included were three
Infanterie Gustav von Zangen) opposed armored divisions, one of which had
the V Corps in the angle at the northern been badly mauled in a heroic defense
base of the bulge. T h e Sixth Panzer of St. Vith and two of which had given
Army (Generaloberst der Waffen-SS as good as they took in later stages of the
Josef “Sepp” Dietrich) , comprising six Ardennes fight. These two were old-style
divisions, opposed the XVIII Airborne heavy divisions, the 2d and 3d. A loan of
Corps and the VII Corps. Opposite the 2 0 0 British Shermans had helped replace
British in the tip of the bulge and part tank losses incurred in the December
of the VIII Corps were contingents of fighting, and all except a few files had
three divisions of the Fifth Panzer Army been filled in infantry ranks.
(General der Panzertruppen Hasso von A calm-almost taciturn-infantry-
Manteuffel) , while as a result of the ef- man, General Hodges had assumed com-
forts to capture Bastogne the bulk of mand of the First Army in Normandy
that army-nine other divisions and a when General Bradley had moved up to
special armored brigade-was concen- army group. Shaken in the early days of
trated around Bastogne and to the south- the counteroffensive by what had hap-
east of the town. T h e remainder of the pened to his troops, Hodges had come
southern flank was the responsibility of back strong in a manner that drew praise
the Seventh Army (General der Panzer- from his British superior, Montgomery.
truppen Erich Brandenberger) , whose Reflecting both Bradley’s interest and his
five divisions and several separate units own, Hodges’ staff was heavy on infantry-
of battalion or Kumpfgruppe (task men, including the chief of staff, Maj.
force) size extended the line to the Gen. William G. Kean. Two of the three
border near Echternach and southward corps commanders then under the army,
along the frontier as far as the Moselle.5 Generals Gerow and Collins, had long
been members of the First Army’s team,
The First Army’s Attack and both enjoyed a close rapport with
Hodges.
As finally determined by Field Mar- T h e burden of the First Army’s attack
shal Montgomery, the First Army’s attack was to fall on General Collins’s VII
was to begin on 3 January. Since the Corps, which Montgomery had been
troops around Bastogne had stopped a carefully hoarding since early in the
major German effort to take that town counteroffensive for just such a role.
5Situation Map, OKW/WFSt O p ( H ) West (3).
General Hodges directed this corps to ad-
4 Jan 45. vance generally southeast between the
VICTORY IN T H E ARDENNES 27
Ourthe and Lienne Rivers to seize for-
ward slopes of the high marshland of
the Plateau des Tailles, which command
the town of Houffalize. General Ridg-
way’s XVIII Airborne Corps meanwhile
was to advance its right flank to conform
with progress of the VII Corps while
Gerow’s V Corps held in place. Parts of
two British divisions were to push in the
bulge from the west, eventually to be
pinched out short of Houffalize by the
converging First and Third Armies.6
Heavily reinforced, the VII Corps con-
tained almost a hundred thousand men,
including the two armored divisions,
three infantry divisions, and twelve field
artillery battalions in addition to divi-
sional artillery. Each infantry division
had the normal attachments of a medi-
um tank battalion and a tank destroyer
bat tal ion.
Two of the infantry divisions, the 75th GENERALHODGES
and 84th, held a 14-mile corps front ex-
tending from the vicinity of Bra south- by the VII Corps G–2, Col. Leslie D.
westward to the Ourthe near Hotton. In Carter, was basically correct. First con-
an attempt to trap those German troops cern of the Germans, Colonel Carter
still in the tip of the bulge, General Col- believed, was Bastogne. Until the south
lins planned to open the attack with his flank could be stabilized there, the Ger-
two powerful armored divisions in hope mans to the west were liable to entrap-
of a swift penetration across the high ment. A number of divisions that earlier
marshland to his objective twelve miles had fought the VII Corps had moved
to the southeast. As the armor passed south to help at Bastogne, their de-
through the infantry line, the 84th Di- parture leaving Sixth Panzer Army a
vision was to follow the 2d Armored blunted residue of what had once been
Division to mop up while the 83d In- the steel skewer of the counteroffensive.
fantry Division did the same for the 3d Of the panzer army’s six remaining di-
Armored. T h e 75th Division was to pass visions, three under the II SS Panzer
into corps reserve.’ Corps (General der Waffen-SS Willi
T h e estimate of the enemy situation Bittrich) confronted the VII Corps: the
12th Volks Grenadier Division opposite
6FUSA Ltr of Instrs, 1 Jan 45, FUSA Ltrs of In- the left wing of the corps, the 560th
strs file, Jan 45; First Army Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug Volks Grenadier Division in the center,
44–22 Feb 45, pp. 126–27.
7VII Corps FO 14, 2 Jan 45, VII Corps FO file,
and the 2d SS Panzer Division opposite
Jan 45. the right wing. First-line German units,
28 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
these divisions had taken sizable losses evidence of defeatism, even treason.
during the counteroffensive: strengths Model and even the Commander in
varied from 2 , 5 0 0 men in the 560th to Chief West, Field Marshal von Rund-
6,000 in the panzer division. Preoccupa- stedt, had to live with the fiction that
tion with the Bastogne sector and with nobody ever withdrew.
the new counteroffensive (NORD- Even though Hitler himself the next
W I N D ) in Alsace would restrict se- day, 3 January, would issue his qualified
verely, Colonel Carter noted, the reserves admission of failure under the original
that might oppose the American attack.8 concept in the Ardennes, he had arrived
What Colonel Carter could not know by this time at definite ideas of how the
was that on the very eve of the First salient still might be turned to German
Army's attacks, German field command- advantage, and withdrawal had n o part
ers were conceding defeat, not only in in the plan. Taking Bastogne did. De-
terms of the broad objectives of the spite the failure of the latest attempt,
counteroffensive, which as early as Model and his staff at Army Group B
Christmas Eve they had come to accept, were compelled to continue planning for
but also of the limited objective of taking yet another attack on Bastogne, this to
Bastogne. T h e failure to sever the begin on 4 January.9
American corridor to Bastogne had con- As the hour for American attack
vinced the commander of the Fifth Pan- neared, the weather augury was anything
zer Army, General von Manteuffel, that but encouraging. It was bitterly cold.
the time had come to abandon all T h e ground was frozen and covered with
thought of continuing the offensive in snow. Roads were icy. A low, foglike
the Ardennes. Lest the troops farthest overcast so restricted visibility that
west be trapped, Manteuffel appealed planned support from fighter-bombers of
late on 2 January to Field Marshal the IX Tactical Air Command (Maj.
Model, commander of Army Group B , Gen. Elwood R. Quesada) was hardly to
for permission to pull back to a line an- be assured. Yet since hope of improve-
chored on Houffalize. ment in the weather was dim, the attack
Although Model apparently agreed was to proceed. T o p commanders in the
professionally with Manteuffel, he was First Army had for some time been
powerless to act because of Hitler's long- chafing to shift to the offensive lest the
professed decree that no commander give Third Army be called upon to do it all,
up ground voluntarily unless Hitler him- and delay would give the Germans in the
self endorsed the move in advance, some- tip of the bulge that much more time
thing that seldom happened. Since the to escape.10
unsuccessful attempt on his life the pre- 9German material is from Cole, The Ardennes,
ceding July, the Fuehrer had come to pp. 647–48. See also MS # A-858, T h e Course of
accept any indication of withdrawal as Events of the German Offensive in the Ardennes,
16 Dec 1944–14 Jan 1945 (Maj. Percy E. Schramm,
keeper of the OKW/WFSt War Diary).
8VII Corps Annex 2 to FO 14 and Incl 1, VII 10VII Corps AAR, Jan 45; Ltr, Bradley to
Corps FO file, Jan 45; MS # A-924, Operation of Hodges, 26 Dec 44, 12th AGp 371.3, Military Objec-
Sixth Panzer Army, 1944–45 (Generalmajor der tives, vol. IV; Diary of Maj. William C. Sylvan,
Waffen-SS Fritz Kraemer, CofS, Sixth Panzer aide-de-camp to Gen Hodges (hereafter cited as
Army). Sylvan Diary), entry of 2 Jan 45, copy in OCMH.
VICTORY IN THE ARDENNES 29
Stretching all the way across the zone
of attack of the VII Corps, the high
marshes of the Plateau des Tailles added
a third dimension to the obstacles of
woods and deep-cut streambeds that are
common in the Ardennes, thus making
the roadnet the number one tactical ob-
jective. Only one major road, the Liège-
Houffalize-Bastogne highway, led di-
rectly to any part of the objective. A web
of secondary roads connecting the vil-
lages in the region would have to serve
as main avenues of advance despite
numerous bridges, defiles, and hairpin
turns.
Preoccupation with roads was appar-
ent from the first objectives assigned the
armored divisions. Both were to aim at
high ground commanding roads leading
approximately four miles to the south- GENERALCOLLINS
east to the La Roche-Salmchâteau high-
way, a lateral route from which a number 3 January when the hostile weather and
of local roads in addition to the Liège- terrain began to have effect. So foggy was
Bastogne highway provide access to the the atmosphere that not a single tactical
forward slopes of the Plateau des Tailles. plane could support the attack at any
O n the left the 3d Armored Division time during the day. Observation by ar-
(Maj. Gen. Maurice Rose) would have tillery planes was possible for no more
only one road at the start, while on the than an hour. It was a pattern that would
right the 2d Armored Division (Maj. undergo little change for the next fort-
Gen. Ernest N. Harmon) could employ night. On only one day in two weeks
both the main highway leading to Houf- would visibility allow tactical aircraft to
falize and a secondary route to the operate all day; on only two other days
southwest. Cutting the lateral La Roche- would fighter-bombers be able to take to
Salmchâteau highway would eliminate the air at all.
one of only two escape routes left in this Much of the time infantry and armor
sector to the Germans still standing to advanced through snow flurries inter-
the west. Seizing the high ground over- spersed with light rain on a few occasions
looking Houffalize would eliminate the when temperatures rose above freezing.
other.11 During late afternoon and evening of 7
Hardly had the van of the armor January, a heavy snowfall added several
passed through the infantry line early on inches to the cover already on the
ground. Drifts piled in some places to a
11 Unless otherwise noted, the tactical story is
based on the field orders, after action reports, and
depth of three to four feet.
journals of the VII Corps and subordinate units. O n the first day, the enemy from his
30 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
GENERALVON MANTEUFFEL
only a few troops of the Sixth Panzer Tailles, the 83d Division (Maj. Gen.
Army, those on the extreme west wing Robert C. Macon) on 9 January assumed
near La Roche, were involved. Those the assault role on the left wing of the
authorized to withdraw were mainly con- VII Corps. It took the infantry two days
tingents of the Fifth Panzer Army facing to break into and clear a village south of
the British and the U.S. VIII Corps west the La Roche-Salmchateau highway and
of Bastogne. another day to beat off counterattacks.
While the units of the Sixth Panzer Not until forcibly rooted out would the
Army were to continue to hold, Die- Germans budge from any position.
trich’s headquarters was to pull out, At the same time, the 82d Airborne
gradually relinquishing control to the Division (Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin)
Fifth Panzer Army. Thereupon, the two of General Ridgway’s XVIII Airborne
SS panzer corps headquarters and four Corps had the job of protecting the left
SS panzer divisions that originally had flank of the VII Corps. To do this, the
belonged to the Sixth Panzer Army were airborne division was to press forward
to join Dietrich’s headquarters in the to the line of the Salm River, which like
rear near St. Vith, there to form a re- the Lienne and the Ourthe has its source
serve to guard against attacks near the in the Plateau des Tailles.13
base of the bulge. This was, in effect, Assisted by an attached separate regi-
tacit admission–Hitler’s first–that the ment, the 517th Parachute Infantry, the
Ardennes counteroffensive had failed airborne division jumped off along with
utterly. 12 the VII Corps on 3 January. Like the
Reflecting the withdrawal, resistance armored divisions, the paratroopers and
on the right wing of the VII Corps glidermen met resistance immediately
gradually slackened. Patrols on the 10th from the weather, the terrain, and, to a
entered La Roche, while British troops lesser extent, the enemy. T h e roadnet
on the opposite bank of the Ourthe re- was even more restricted than in front
ported no contact with the enemy. Al- of the VII Corps, and a thick forest
though the British re-established contact stretched across the center of the di-
on subsequent days, they met only light vision’s zone.
covering detachments and, in keeping Possibly because the enemy relied too
with Montgomery’s desire to avoid major heavily on the forest as an obstacle, the
British commitment, pressed their ad- 82d’s 505th Parachute Infantry found
vance only enough to spare the Ameri- relatively few defenders. In three days
cans flanking fire from Germans west of the paratroopers advanced four miles to
the Ourthe. reach the far edge of the forest overlook-
T h e fight was as dogged as ever on the ing the valley of the Salm.
other wing, where in deference to marshy Close alongside the boundary with the
ground and an impoverished roadnet VII Corps, the 517thParachute Infantry
leading to the final objectives on the made only limited progress until it
southeastern slopes of the Plateau des turned abruptly on 7 January to take the
enemy in flank. T h e next day the para-
12 Magna E. Bauer, The German Withdrawal
From the Ardennes, prepared to complement this 12The tactical story is from official records of the
volume, annotated copy in OCMH. XVIII Airborne Corps and subordinate units.
VICTORY IN T H E ARDENNES 33
troopers drove all Germans before them ninglike flashes of artillery pieces sup-
east of the Salm and sent patrols to porting the Third Army. Patrols
range as far as two miles beyond the prepared to probe in that direction the
river. On the 9th they established a small next day, eager to end the separation the
bridgehead across the Salm to be used as counteroffensive had imposed between
a stepping stone when the offensive the First and Third Armies.
turned in the direction of St. Vith. Getting this far had cost the VII Corps
Another division of the XVIII Air- almost 5,000 casualties, a high but hardly
borne Corps, the 30th (Maj. Gen. Leland alarming figure in view of the harsh
S. Hobbs) did much the same thing. weather and terrain. Although fighting
On 6 January the division began limited a deliberate withdrawal action with de-
objective attacks with an attached regi- termination and skill, the Germans had
ment, the 28th Division’s 112th Infantry, lost several hundred more than that in
to forge a bridgehead two miles deep prisoners alone.
in an angle formed by the joining of the
Salm and Ambleve Rivers. A Grim Struggle Around Bastogne
Resistance in the zone of the VII Corps
continued stiffest opposite the left wing Having collided head on with another
along a land bridge between headwaters German effort to capture Bastogne, the
of the Salm and the Ourthe. There the Third Army’s four-day-old offensive had
Germans occupied a forest mass in reached, on the eve of the First Army’s
strength with contingents of the 9th SS attack, positions that mirrored a combi-
Panzer Division moving in to support a nation of American and German inten-
faltering 12th Volks Grenadier Division. tions. Making a main effort against the
T h e infantry of the 83d Division still was corridor southeast of Bastogne, Manteuf-
finding the going slow when the 3d fel’s Fifth Panzer Army with some help
Armored Division’s Reconnaissance Bat- from the right wing of Brandenberger’s
talion discovered a network of back roads Seventh Army had managed to retain or
and trails less staunchly defended. establish positions that formed a salient
T h e reconnaissance troops having four miles wide and four miles deep into
shown the way, the division commander, lines of the Third Army’s III Corps.
General Rose, early a n 13 January sent That the salient was no deeper repre-
a combat command to trace the route, sented a defensive triumph for the III
break out of the woods, and cut the Corps but at the same time marked a fail-
lateral highway that follows the forward ure thus far of this phase of General
slopes of the Plateau des Tailles en route Patton’s offensive. East and north of
from Houffalize toward St. Vith. Al- Bastogne, a line roughly three miles from
though the Germans still made a fight of the town that stalwart soldiers of the
it for towns along the highway, the cut 101st Airborne Division and assorted
by the armor effectively blocked this last lesser units had established and held
major route of escape for German troops through the days of encirclement re-
in the vicinity of Houffalize. mained intact. Against a German attack
As night fell on the 13th, men of the west and southwest of Bastogne, troops
VII Corps could see to the south light- of the VIII Corps had managed not only
34 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
reserve after its tank strength had fallen return to the Third Army. Only Patton’s
dangerously low as a result of heavy chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay,
fighting through much of December. and General Millikin of the I I I Corps,
T h e remaining six of a total of four- a relative newcomer to the Third Army,
teen divisions in the Third Army were had been commissioned as cavalrymen.
split equally between Eddy’s XII Corps Bitterly cold, stung by biting winds
along the generally quiescent line of the and driving snow, American troops on
Sûre River running eastward to the Ger- the frozen ground around Bastogne saw
man frontier and Maj. Gen. Walton H. little change on 3 January in a pattern
Walker’s XX Corps. T h e latter had not too long familiar. Many of the German
been drawn into the Ardennes fight and units had fought here since before Christ-
continued to hold positions in Lor- mas, such respected names as the 3d and
raine. 21 15th Panzer Grenadier Divisions, the 5th
T h e Third Army and its veteran com- Parachute Division, the 1st SS Panzer
mander, George Patton, had entered the Division, and the Panzer Lehr Division,
campaign in France in early August to the last so called because it originally bad
exploit the breakout from Normandy been a training unit. T h e place names
engineered by Hodges’ First Army. too, after more than a fortnight of grim
While one corps turned westward against combat, were accustomed: Marvie,
the ports of Brittany, the bulk of the Wardin, Mageret, Longvilly, Oubourcy,
army had driven swiftly eastward across Noville, Longchamps. So was the tactic
northern France until a gasoline drought o f almost every attack followed by an im-
forced a halt at the border of Lorraine. mediate German riposte, intense shelling
Through the fall Patton’s troops had preceding a seemingly inevitable tank-
fought doggedly across water-logged ter- supported counterattack.22
rain to gain a small foothold within the Early on the 3d the Germans sur-
West Wall at Saarlautern just as the rounded a company of the 87th Division
Ardennes counteroffensive began. While (Brig. Gen. John M. Lentz) on the west
the XX Corps continued to hold that flank of the VIII Corps, though a relief
position, Patton had turned the rest of column broke through before the day
his army toward Bastogne. was out. In the afternoon tanks and in-
Despite General Patton’s affinity €or fantry hit the 101st Airborne Division
armor, most of his staff and his corps (Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor) at Long-
commanders were infantrymen, includ- champs and south of Noville, achieving
ing Eddy of the XII Corps, an old-timer some penetration at both places before
with the Third Army; Walker of the XX the paratroopers rallied to re-establish
Corps, another old-timer; and Middleton their lines. Only the 6th Armored Di-
of the VIII Corps, whose command had vision (Maj. Gen. Robert W. Grow) on
made the sweep into Brittany before the left wing of the III Corps generally
joining the First Army for a rendezvous east of Bastogne made any appreciable
with fate in the Ardennes and then a gain, an advance of from one to two
21The depleted 28th Division and a combat com-
mand of the 9th Armored Division were awaiting 23This account is from official unit records. Ger-
transfer from the Third Army. man material is from manuscripts previously cited.
VICTORY IN T H E ARDENNES 37
miles that took the battered villages of tanks and assault guns of the 9th SS
Oubourcy, Mageret, and Wardin. Panzer Division. T h e airborne troops
T h e renewed German attempt to seize and their armored support claimed to
Bastogne began before dawn on the 4th have destroyed during the day thirty-four
when a regiment of the 15th Panzer German tanks.
Grenadier Division attacked Long- East of the Houffalize highway and
champs in a token assist by Leuttwitz’s east of Bastogne, the 12th SS Panzer
X L V I I Panzer Corps to a main assault and 340th Volks Grenadier Divisions
that began a few hours later close by the achieved greater success in the main
road from Houffalize. Combat raged in German assault. Tank against tank, the
this sector all morning, but at noon German armor forced the 6th Armored
counterattacking paratroopers still main- Division to relinquish all three villages
tained their hold on Longchamps, and taken the day before, but once the
intense artillery fire delivered in open, American tanks had pulled back to high
snow-covered fields had driven back ground west of the villages the Germans
38 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
could make no more headway. Here and Paul W. Baade reluctantly asked and
elsewhere artillery pieces of the III and received permission to call off the attack
VIII Corps shared their power in in the southern part of his 35th Di-
moments of crisis to deal telling blows vision’s front; such a battle of attrition
whenever the Germans massed and had it become that his men could hope to
moved into the open. do no more for the moment than hold
From the moment the 6th Armored their own.
Division halted the panzers, the fighting As was the case with the First Army,
around Bastogne again reverted to pat- the Third Army could count on little
tern. In combat as bitter as any during help from its supporting aircraft of the
the counteroffensive, attack followed XIX Tactical Air Command (Brig. Gen.
counterattack on both sides until it was Otto P. Weyland). So dismal was the
scarcely possible to distinguish which was weather that only briefly on one day, 5
which. January, were planes able to operate. In
Handicapped by piecemeal commit- one way this was a blessing, since the
ment of tardily arriving subordinate weather also cut short a resurgence that
units, the I SS Panzer Corps could do had begun around Bastogne a few days
little more than maintain the minor earlier by a long-dormant Luftwaffe.
gains achieved against American armor For all the success in blunting the
on the 4th. West of Bastogne the X L V I I German thrust on the 4th, few Ameri-
Panzer Corps reacted so strongly to cans viewed the situation with any com-
American efforts to renew the attack on placency. Visiting the front late on the
the 4th with the inexperienced 17th Air- 4th during a German artillery bombard-
borne Division (Maj. Gen. William M. ment, the army commander, General
Miley) that the division had to spend Patton, noted to himself glumly, “We
the next two days reorganizing and ad- can still lose this war.” 24 The com-
justing its positions. (“God, how green mander of the VIII Corps, General Mid-
we are,” said one regimental commander, dleton, kept close personal rein on his
“but we are learning fast and the next division commanders and alerted the de-
time we will beat them.”) 23 pleted 4th Armored and the 11th
Nor could the infantry divisions of Armored Divisions to be prepared to
General Millikin’s III Corps make any move swiftly to the aid of either or both
headway against the salient southeast of of the airborne divisions.
Bastogne. Late on the 5th Maj. Gen. Unknown to the American command,
any crisis engendered by the German
attack had passed by nightfall of 5 Jan-
23Third Army Diary kept by Gen Gay, entry of
5 Jan 45, quoting Col James R. Pierce, 194th Glider uary. Late on that day Field Marshal
Infantry. As two German tanks counterattacked a Model tacitly admitted failure at Bas-
company of the 513th Parachute Infantry on 4 togne by ordering General von Manteuf-
January, Staff Sgt. Isadore S. Jachman seized a
bazooka from a fallen comrade, ran to a position fel to release the 9th SS Panzer Division
close to the tanks, and opened fire. He damaged to go to the aid of the Sixth Panzer Army
one and prompted both to retire but himself died
o f wounds incurred in the fight. A German-born
U.S. citizen, Sergeant Jachman was awarded the 24
George S. Patton, Jr., W a r As I Knew It (Bos-
Medal of Honor posthumously. ton: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947), p. 213.
VICTORY IN T H E ARDENNES 39
in its hour of trial against the American created from Hitler’s household guard.26
offensive from the north. T h e next day Although a regiment of the 17th Air-
Manteuffel took it upon himself to order borne Division entered Flamierge along
the 12th Panzer Division to pull out of a major highway leading northwest from
the line the night of the 7th to constitute Bastogne, the 3d Panzer Grenadier Di-
a reserve. vision counterattacked late on the 7th
Sensing as early as the 6th that the and again early on the 8th, trapping the
Germans soon might begin to withdraw, bulk of a battalion in the town. Most of
General Patton for all his concern about the able-bodied paratroopers eventually
the bitterness of the fight deplored the escaped by infiltrating to the rear, but
possibility. Only the day before he had they had to leave their wounded behind.
acquiesced in the artful persuasion of As divisions of the I I I Corps rejoined
General Bradley to move a newly avail- the offensive on the 9th, any evidence of
able division from the XX Corps to the German withdrawal still was hard to
salient southeast of Bastogne rather than come by, despite Hitler’s approval on the
to use it in a strike against the base of 8th for troops in the tip of the bulge to
the bulge. Still hoping to mount an pull back. Hitler’s authorization affected
attack against the base, Patton worried only units west of Bastogne in any case,
now lest the Germans make good their since the new line he ordered to be held
escape before he could act.25 ran generally northwest from Long-
champs toward the eastward bend of the
Despite the exodus of German armor, Ourthe. Even the affected units made no
American troops found no evidence on precipitate exodus but instead executed
7 and 8 January of German intent to the kind of gradual, grudging withdrawal
withdraw. Although the U.S. divisions that nobody did better than the Germans
around the salient postponed further with their penchant for counterattack
attacks to await arrival of the new di- whenever and wherever a position ap-
vision, patrols found the enemy as full proached the untenable.
of fight as ever. T h e 17th Airborne and Not until the third day of the renewed
87th Divisions meanwhile renewed their offensive, 11 January, did any firm indi-
attacks on both days with the usual vio- cations of withdrawal develop. On the
lent German reaction. west wing of the VIII Corps, the 87th
Division after finally having entered
For the 87th, trying to break into the
Tillet the night before found the Ger-
crossroads settlement of Tillet, midway mans pulling back, abandoning St. Hu-
between Bastogne and St. Hubert, the bert and several smaller towns but
fighting proved bitterly frustrating as leaving behind rear guards, roadblocks,
every attempt met sharp riposte from the
Fuehrer Begleit Brigade, another elite 26Near Tillet, Staff Sgt. Curtis F. Shoup of the
87th Division’s 346th Infantry charged head on
unit heavy in armor that also had been against a German machine gun, firing his auto-
matic rifle as he went. Although German fire cut
him down, he mustered strength as he died to hurl
a hand grenade that knocked out the enemy gun.
25Ibid.; Army Commander’s Notes on the Bas- He was awarded the Medal of Honor posthu-
togne Operation. mously.
40 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
and deadly quilts of mines. At the same River, the survivors of the salient joined
time, southeast of Bastogne, men of the a hastily committed reserve, the Fuehrer
I I I Corps saw their enemy also beginning Grenadier Brigade, to hold fast.27 From
to give ground in the face of an envelop- the American viewpoint, this mattered
ing movement against his salient that little, since emphasis shifted at this point
imposed a forced rather than intentional to the left wing of the III Corps where
retreat. Millikin's troops were to aid the drive
On 9 January a newly arrived but of the VIII Corps toward a linkup with
veteran 90th Infantry Division (Maj. the First Army at Houffalize.28
Gen. James A. Van Fleet) attacked to the Despite German withdrawal on the ex-
northeast through positions of the 26th treme west wing of the VIII Corps, the
Division (Maj. Gen. Willard S. Paul) going was slow. Disorganized in the bit-
along the southeastern fringe of the Ger- ter give-and-take west of Bastogne to the
man salient, while the 6th Armored Di- extent that the corps commander had
vision, later reinforced by a regiment of asked Patton to delay renewed attack, the
the 35th Division, tried a converging 17th Airborne and 87th Divisions pushed
attack from the northwest. T h e axis of forward with little verve. Yet their snail-
advance for both drives was a ridge road like pace made small difference in the
running southeast from Bastogne that end, because the veteran 101st Airborne
served as a watershed for the little Wiltz Division could make only measured
River along the base of the salient. progress astride the road to Houffalize,
Having arrived under a heavy cloak where advance had to be swift if any
of secrecy, the 90th Division on the first Germans were to be trapped farther west.
day took the enemy's 5th Parachute Di- A relatively fresh 340th Volks Grenadier
vision by surprise. Even though a snow- Division, plus counterattacking contin-
storm denied air support and turned gents of the 3d Panzer Grenadier and
roads into slick chutes, the attack on the 12th SS Panzer Divisions, insured not
9th carried just over a mile and the next only firm but often dogged resistance.
day reached high ground commanding T h e most encouraging progress on the
the only road leading out of the salient. direct route toward Houffalize appeared
T h e Germans, despite a stalwart stand about to develop on 10 January east of
denying progress in the converging at- the main highway as General Middleton
tack from the northwest, had no choice inserted a combat command of the 4th
but to abandon the salient.
They began to retire the night of the 27MS # A-876, Ardennes Offensive of Seventh
10th. On the 11th and again on the 12th, Army, 16 December 1944–25 January 1945 (Gen-
eral der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger).
as infantrymen of the 90th Division 2 8I n a n attack in this sector on 1 1 January, a
shook hands with colleagues of the 35th squad leader in the 6th Armored Division's 9th
Division on the other side of the salient, Armored Infantry Battalion, Staff Sgt. Archer T.
Gammon, charged ahead of his platoon to knock
the Americans took over a thousand out two German machine guns and to close in
prisoners. Pulling back to the Wiltz with such daring on a German tank that the tank
River where the cuts, fills, and tunnels began to withdraw. Firing its 88-mm. gun as it re-
tired, the tank killed the intrepid soldier with a
of a railroad aided the defense along a direct hit. Sergeant Gammon was awarded the
natural extension of the line of the Sûre Medal of Honor posthumously.
VICTORY IN T H E ARDENNES 41
Armored Division (Maj. Gen. Hugh J. fensive, this time with the 11th Armored
Gaffey) along the corps boundary to Division (Brig. Gen. Charles S. Kilburn)
seize Bourcy. Located on high ground inserted between the two airborne di-
commanding the highway to Houffalize visions of the VIII Corps.30
where it passed through Noville, an Progress of the renewed drive reflected
enemy strongpoint, Bourcy in American less of American intent than of German.
hands might unhinge the defenses along On the west, in the sector included in
the highway. Yet hardly had the armor Hitler's authorization to German units
begun to advance early on the 10th when to withdraw, patrols of the 87th Division
General Patton called a halt. reached the Ourthe River the first day,
Having shared in the failure to guess the 13th, those of the 17th Airborne Di-
the enemy's intent to launch a counter- vision the next. T h e armor, meanwhile,
offensive in the Ardennes, intelligence attacking generally astride the line Hit-
staffs at SHAEF and the 12th Army ler had designated as stopping point for
Group these days were seeing burglars the withdrawal, had to fight hard for
under every bed. They were concerned every objective and as late as the 15th
lest the Germans spoil the American beat off a counterattack by some twenty
offensive by counterattacking from posi- tanks supported by a covey of fighter
tions near the base of the bulge south- aircraft. Concurrently, the 101st Air-
ward toward Luxembourg City or at borne Division astride the road to Houf-
some point to the southeast where falize encountered the same determined
American lines had been thinned to pro- stand as before. At Foy, south of Noville,
vide forces for the Ardennes. General for example, the Germans counter-
Bradley ordered Patton to pull out an attacked three times, retaking the town
armored division to guard against this at dawn on the 14th with a battalion of
threat. Seeing no burglars himself, Gen- infantry supported by a company of
eral Patton filled the requirement by tanks.
selecting the 4th Armored Division, Yet the airborne troops, too, were
which needed a rest for refitting any- destined soon to experience softening re-
way.29 sistance. On the 14th, the Commander
General Bradley directed further that in Chief West, Field Marshal von Rund-
Patton halt the attack of the VIII Corps stedt, appealed to Hitler to authorize a
immediately and that of the III Corps further withdrawal: the line Hitler
when it reached a logical stopping point. earlier had specified west of Houffalize
Only after the German threat (based, already had been compromised in the
Patton believed, more on rumor than north and was being rolled u p in the
solid intelligence) failed to materialize south. He asked approval to pull back
did Bradley on the 12th give approval farther to anchor a new line on high
for the Third Army to resume the of- ground just east ofHouffalize, extending
29Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 217; Gay Diary,
it northward behind the Salm River and
entry of 10 Jan 45; Leonard Rapport and Arthur southward through” existing positions
Northwood, Jr., Rendezvous With Destiny-A His- east of Bastogne.
tory of the 101st Airborne Division (Washington:
Infantry Journal Press, 1948), p. 643. The last is
one of the better unofficial unit histories. 30
Gay Diary, entries of 10, 11, 12 Jan 45.
42 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
PATROLS
OF THE FIRSTAND THIRD
ARMIESMEETAT HOUFFALIZE
Having accepted by this time the in- On the 15th, men of the 101st Air-
evitability of losing the bulge, Hitler borne Division entered Noville, five
agreed, but he refused to listen to ardent miles south of Houffalize.32 Early the
pleas by both Rundstedt and the Army next morning, the 11th Armored Di-
Group B commander, Field Marshal vision seized high ground along the high-
Model, that they be allowed to withdraw
by stages all the way to the Rhine, the 32In a complementary attack by the 6th Armored
Division on this same day, a gunner in the at-
only line, they believed, that the Ger- tached 603d Tank Destroyer Battalion, Cpl. Arthur
mans in the west still might hope with O. Beyer, dismounted from his vehicle to capture
any assurance to hold. They could with- two Germans. When a German machine gun
draw, Hitler said, but only under pres- opened fire on him, he rushed forward to knock
it out with a grenade, then worked his way along
sure and only as far as the West Wall. a German defense line, wiping out the occupants
There they were to make their stand.31 of one foxhole after another. I n his one-man as-
sault, he destroyed 2 machine guns, killed 8 Ger-
31Bauer, T h e German Withdrawal From the Ar- mans, and captured 18. For this feat, Corporal
dennes; MS # A-858 (Schramm). Beyer received the Medal of Honor.
VICTORY IN T H E ARDENNES 43
way immediately south of Houffalize. to be performed by the V Corps. From
Southwest of the town, a patrol com- the northern shoulder of the bulge close
manded by Maj. Joseph M. L. Greene by its base, the V Corps was to seize a
met a patrol from the 2d Armored Di- defile along upper reaches of the little
vision of the First Army’s VII Corps. Ambleve River, thereby springing loose
Rent by the counteroffensive, the First an armored division for a direct thrust
and Third Armies at last had linked at southward on St. Vith. T h e armor, once
the waist of the bulge. In one way, it free, was to come under command of the
was an empty accomplishment; so meas- airborne corps to constitute the northern
ured had been the advance, such delays arm of a two-pronged thrust on St. Vith.33
had the Germans imposed, that most of For the Third Army, the juncture at
the troops in what might have been a Houffalize did represent a distinct break
sizable pocket had escaped. in the offensive, since it gave Patton an
Juncture at Houffalize nevertheless opportunity he would embrace with
marked completion of the first phase of relish-to return to his original concept
the campaign to push in the bulge. It of an attack close to the southern base of
also meant that the break in communica- the bulge. Patton intended to launch-this
tions between American armies, which thrust across the Sûre River with General
had caused General Eisenhower to put Eddy’s XII Corps.
the First Army under Montgomery’s It was too late at this point (if it had
command, no longer existed. At mid- ever been feasible) to try seriously the
night the next day, 1 7 January, the maneuver Patton had talked about in
First Army returned to Bradley’s 12th December, a full-blooded attack north-
Army Group. eastward across the German frontier to
Pruem to cut off and destroy the Ger-
The Drive on St. Vith mans in the bulge. T h e rationale now for
an attack from the south, directed almost
From the viewpoint of the First Army, due northward in the direction of St.
the juncture at Houffalize marked no Vith, was precisely the opposite of en-
interval in the offensive to erase the velopment, a hope that threat from the
bulge, but it pointed u p a shift in em- south would prompt the Germans to
phasis that had gradually been evolving shift enough strength from the vicinity
as linkup neared. Having begun to attack of Houffalize and Bastogne to enable
early in January in support of the VII Millikin’s I I I Corps and Middleton’s
Corps, General Ridgway’s XVIII Air- VIII Corps to advance with relative ease
borne Corps took over the main assign- toward the northeast. Yet against the
ment, a drive eastward on the road ten- slim possibility that the XII Corps might
ter of St. Vith. Collins’s VII Corps was achieve a breakthrough, despite sharply
to support this drive briefly by also turn- compartmented terrain and heavy snow,
ing east; but because of the northeast- General Eddy held an armored division
ward orientation of Patton’s Third in reserve. T h e 12th Army Group com-
Army, the VII Corps soon would be mander, General Bradley, also proposed
pinched out of the line. 33FUSA Report of Operations, I Aug 44–22 Feb
A more important supporting role was 45.
44 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
that once the First Army took St. Vith, 14th when Hitler ordered two volks ar-
General Hodges should send a corps tillery corps shifted hurriedly from the
south to link with the Third Army's Ardennes to the east in response to the
XII Corps, a shallow envelopment that new Russian offensive and alerted the SS
might trap any German forces still re- divisions for a similar move. All that
maining farther west.34 would be left to hold in the Ardennes
Having at last gained Hitler's permis- would be men who not only had seen the
sion to withdraw from the bulge, Ger- grandiose prospects of the counterof-
man commanders faced the problem of fensive dashed to bits but who also were
how to get out before converging Ameri- embittered by Hitler's pulling out the
can attacks at the base cut them off. They SS divisions for what looked to the men
had to make their withdrawal either on in the foxhole like a rest.36
those days when weather cloaked them T h e new main effort by General
from the Jubo, as German troops called Hodges' First Army had begun even be-
Allied fighter-bombers, or by night. A fore the linkup at Houffalize and a day
shortage of gasoline, that had developed before Hitler authorized withdrawal to
early in the counteroffensive as the logis- a new line east of Houffalize. This line
tical pipeline over snow-drenched Eifel was already breached along its north-
roads broke down, was at this point ward extension, for even while acting in
acute; and the prospects of bottlenecks a supporting role to the VII Corps Gen-
at the few tactical bridges in the snow- eral Ridgway's XVIII Airborne Corps
slick gorge of the Our River along the had established a bridgehead across the
frontier filled many a commander with Salm River and another over the Am-
dread.35 bleve near where the two rivers come
German commanders now faced their together.
number one task of holding the shoul- Beginning on 1 3 January, as a first step
ders of their salient without the services in the drive on St. Vith, the XVIII Air-
of the two SS panzer corps headquarters borne Corps attacked to flatten the
and four SS panzer divisions that Hitler corner formed by the meeting of the
had directed to assemble near St. Vith Ambleve and the Salm. At General Ridg-
under the Sixth Panzer Army. T h e way's insistence, this drive was to be no
Fuehrer was becoming increasingly measured blunting of the angle all along
piqued that field commanders had not the line; emphasis instead fell to the 30th
taken these divisions immediately out of Division from positions on the northern
the line and were still using portions of shoulder some three miles north of the
them as fire brigades in threatened sec- meandering Ambleve River at Malmédy
tors. That the SS divisions soon would to drive southward, thereby posing threat
be totally out of reach of the western of envelopment to Germans in the Salm-
commanders became apparent on the Ambleve angle to the west.37Having re-
placed the 82d Airborne Division along
34Gay Diary, entry of 15 Jan 45; TUSA AAR, the Salm on the right flank of the corps,
Jan 45.
35MS # B-151a (Manteuffel); MS # A-876 36MS # A-858 (Schramm); Bauer, T h e German
(Brandenberger); Bauer, T h e German Withdrawal Withdrawal From the Ardennes.
From the Ardennes. 37Sylvan Diary, entries of 4, 9 Jan 45.
VICTORY I N T H E ARDENNES 45
the 75th Division (Maj. Gen. Fay B.
Prickett) attacked in an easterly direc-
tion toward St. Vith to form the second
arm of a pincers threatening the Ger-
mans in the corner. T h e 106th Division
(Brig. Gen. Herbert T. Perrin) pressed
forward in the angle itself with the sep-
arate 517th Parachute Infantry and the
division’s sole surviving regiment (the
others had been destroyed early in the
counteroffensive) .
Nowhere was there a solid German
line. Although defense was stubborn and
included small counterattacks, it cen-
tered primarily in villages and on oc-
casional key high ground. On the first
day and again on the second, the 30th
Infantry Division south of Malmédy
made the most gains, advancing up to
four miles to take high ground that
guarded approach to the west shoulder
of the defile through which armor of the
GENERALRIDGWAY
V Corps later was to debouch.
Part of the 30th Infantry Division’s
success was attributable to hitting near a T h e big disappointment to the
boundary between major German units Americans was slow progress by the 75th
-to the east the L X V I I Corps (General Division, whose advance across the Salm
der Infanterie Otto Hitzfeld) of Zangen’s toward St. Vith was so limited that it
Fifteenth Army and to the west the XIII took much of the threat out of General
Corps (General der Infanterie Hans Fel- Ridgway’s intended envelopment of the
ber), which was still under control of Germans in the Ambleve-Salm angle.
Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army. Pushing While trying to make allowance for the
back and occasionally overrunning por- fact that the division had seen its first
tions of a depleted volks grenadier di- combat only a day before Christmas,
vision of Felber’s XIII Corps, the both Ridgway and the First Army com-
infantrymen cut into the flank and rear mander, General Hodges, feared all of-
of the 3d Parachute Division of Hitz- fensive punch temporarily gone. On the
feld’s LX VII Corps, prompting Hitzfeld 19th, patrols of the 75th and 30th Di-
to bring up another understrength volks visions at last met to pinch out the 106th
grenadier division in hope of filling the Division and seal off the corner, but so
breach.38 slow had been the 75th’s advance that
two divisions of Felber’s XlII Corps had
38German material is from Bauer, The German escaped with little difficulty. Seeing the
Withdrawal From the Ardennes. problem as one of command, General
46 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
Hodges recommended the division com- trich’s Sixth Panzer Army. Two days
mander’s relief .39 later, in an effort to shore up a faltering
T h e main fight centered in the mean- defense all along the line, General Die-
time on the defile through which armor trich risked Hitler’s wrath by recommit-
under the V Corps was to drive in order ting artillery of the I SS Panzer Corps to
to come upon St. Vith from the north. reinforce fires at the Ondenval defile and
Named for a town on the northern ap- small contingents of tanks from three of
proach, this was known as the Ondenval his four SS panzer divisions to reinforce
defile. local counterattacks.
As the V Corps began its drive early Dietrich might slow the advance but
on 15 January, a new commander took neither he nor cruel winter weather with
over while General Gerow left to head an waist-high drifts of snow could stop it.
army headquarters newly arrived from Sometimes the weather was more of a
the United States, the Fifteenth, destined problem than the enemy. On one oc-
to serve primarily as an occupation force casion two men stopping to rest dropped
as the Allies swept across Germany.40 unconscious from exhaustion. “We are
T h e new corps commander was Maj. fighting the weather,” said General
Gen. C. Ralph Huebner, who had guided Hobbs, commanding the 30th Division,
the veteran 1st Infantry Division since “and losing about one hundred a day.
the end of the campaign in Sicily. ... It is a hell of a country. ” 41
General Huebner’s former command, The state of the weather gave the little
headed now by the former division ar- Ardennes towns an added dimension as
tillery commander, Brig. Gen. Clift prizes of war. Not only did the towns
Andrus, drew the assignment of opening control the roads needed for tanks and
the Ondenval defile for the armor. While trucks but they also afforded shelter, a
the regiments of the 1st Division took chance for the men to thaw out and dry
high ground east of the defile and con- out, to get a night’s sleep under cover.
tingents of the 30th Division wooded T h e towns, unfortunately, were almost
high ground to the west, the ad Di- always in a draw or on a reverse slope,
vision’s 23d Infantry, attached to the 1st making it necessary to seize the high
Division, moved south through Onden- ground beyond and hold it from foxholes
V a l directly against the defile. blasted out of frozen earth with small
A five-day fight developed, primarily explosive charges. It became a matter of
against the 3d Parachute Division. Sens- constant nagging concern to forward
ing the full import of the attack as a commanders to rotate their men and
threat to St. Vith and those German allow all at least brief respite from the
units still west of the town, Field Marshal cold.
Model at Army Group B on the 17th Partly because the German soldiers,
unified command in the sector by trans-
ferring Hitzfelds L X V I I Corps to Die- 4130th Div G–3 Jnl, 22 Jan 45. This division’s
journal contains valuable verbatim records of tele-
39Sylvan Diary, entries of 16, 17, 20 Jan 45. phone conversations. See also Robert P. Hewitt,
40 History of the Fifteenth United States Army Workhorse of the Western Front (Washington: In-
(no publisher, no date), an unofficial unit history. fantry Journal Press, 1946), an excellent unit his-
See also below, ch. XV. tory.
VICTORY IN THE ARDENNES 47
too, wanted shelter, and partly because American soldier reputedly engaged a
buildings made good strongpoints, the German with his fists.42
villages and small settlements at critical T h e enemy, fortunately, was not so
road junctions were hardest to get at. consistently persistent as was the weather.
Although sometimes delayed by mines Nearly all units had the experience of
hidden by the deep snow, tanks and tank advancing for an hour or sometimes even
destroyers proved almost essential for half a day without a round fired at them;
blasting the Germans from the houses. then, suddenly, at a stream bank, a farm-
Artillery could chase the defenders into house, the edge of a wood or a village, a
the cellars, but it could not keep them flurry of fire from automatic weapons or
there. As men of one battalion of the shelling from artillery and mortars, or
23d Infantry entered a village close be- both, might erupt. Sometimes this sig-
hind an artillery preparation, Germans naled start of a counterattack, usually in
emerged in their midst to promote a
fight so intimate that at one point an 421st Div G–3 Jnl, 19 Jan 45.
48 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
no more than company strength, precipi- countryside (la Petite Suisse) , American
tating a sharp but usually short engage- soldiers long ago had christened it the
ment. “Skyline Drive.”
T h e 23d Infantry finally cleared the Even more than in the vicinity of St.
Ondenval defile on the 17th, held it with Vith, it was imperative for the Germans
the help of massed artillery fires against to hold firm along the Sûre River, be-
a battalion-size counterattack supported cause the heaviest concentration of Ger-
by three tanks on the 18th, then passed man force remaining in the bulge, that
on in a blinding snowstorm on the 19th which had fought around Bastogne, was
to seize the first tier of towns beyond. peculiarly susceptible to a thrust from
Through the defile and along another the south. Four divisions of General
road to the west in the 30th Division’s Brandenberger’s Seventh Army, charged
zone, tanks, tank destroyers, and half- with defending the southern flank, and
tracks of the 7th Armored Division (Maj. at least nine of General von Manteuffel’s
Gen. Robert W. Hasbrouck) began to Fifth Panzer Army in the vicinity of
pass early on the 20th, headed for the Bastogne had to withdraw through this
rubble that St. Vith had become after southern portion of the bulge. T h e east-
this same division had fought gallantly west roads they had to use were markedly
for the town in December. inferior to the north-south routes that
beckoned an attacker from the south;
Northward Across the Sure and the Germans had only five tactical
bridges over the Our River, three of
Patton’s Third Army resumed its role which, at and south of Vianden, were
in pushing the Germans back with sur- dangerously close to the existing Ameri-
prise crossings of the Sûre River before can line along the Sûre. T h e bridges in
daylight on 18 January. Close by the any case inevitably meant congestion,
German frontier, a regiment of the 4th slowing the withdrawal and inviting at-
Infantry Division (Brig. Gen. Harold W. tack from the air.43
Blakeley) began to cross into an angle Toward the end of December, the
formed by confluence of the Sure and presence in reserve south of the Sûre of
the Our, while two regiments of the 5th the 6th U.S. Armored Division had
Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. S. LeRoy alarmed General Brandenberger lest the
Irwin) crossed on either side of Diekirch, Americans strike while the bulk of his
less than five miles west of the frontier. strength was trying to help the Fifth
While the men of the 4th Division pro- Panzer Army break Bastogne; but with
tected the 5th Division’s right flank and the shift of the armor to Bastogne and
took out the enemy’s bridges across the the beginning of American attacks there,
Our below the Luxembourg frontier Brandenberger had begun to view his
town of Vianden, four miles north of vulnerable positions along the Sûre with
the Sure, the men of the 5th were to greater equanimity. If his Seventh Army
drive north along a highway that runs was to be hit any time soon, Branden-
within several miles of the frontier. Be- berger deduced, the strike would come
cause the highway follows the crest of a 43German material is from Bauer, The German
ridgeline through semimountainous Withdrawal From the Ardennes.
VICTORY IN T H E ARDENNES 49
not along the Sûre close to the base of vision’s 2d Infantry, was there trouble-
the bulge but farther west where his some German fire: and there the
troops still held positions between Ettel- infantrymen were able to pull back and
bruck at the southern terminus of the cross in an adjacent sector.
Skyline Drive, and Wiltz, positions that Just east of Diekirch, a battalion of
were south and west of the Sûre in one the same division’s 10th Infantry turned
place and between the Sûre and Wiltz the icy, snow-covered river bank to ad-
Rivers in another. vantage by loading men into the assault
Brandenberger was seeing American boats at the top of the slope and shoving
intentions in terms of his own disposi- the boats downhill like toboggans. At
tions. He was stronger west and north- another point engineers tied 150-foot
west of Ettelbruck, where three volks ropes to either end of the boats so that,
grenadier divisions under the LIII Corps once the first wave had passed, they could
(General der Kavallerie Edwin Graf pull the boats back and forth across the
Rothkirch und Trach) held the line. little river. In two places infantrymen
Along the Sûre between Ettelbruck and crossed on footbridges that engineers had
the frontier, he had only one volks quietly shoved into place just before
grenadier division, which with another H-hour.
that was holding a 30-mile stretch of the The night was so dark and the early
West Wall along the frontier to the morning made so obscure by a combina-
southeast, made up the LXXX Corps tion of mist in the river bottom and
(General der Infanterie Franz Beyer) . American smoke pots that the Germans
Although the little Sûre River is ford- were hard put at first to determine the
abIe at many points, the weather was too “extent of the threat posed against them.
cold for wading. Nor was American ar- In many cases U.S. troops passed unseen
tillery to forewarn the enemy with a by German machine gun and mortar
preparatory barrage. T h e night was crews. Already seriously weakened by
black, cold, and silent as men of the 4th loss of field pieces earlier in the Ardennes
and 5th Divisions moved assault boats fighting and by ammunition shortages,
and three-man canvas rafts to the ice- German artillery was “as good as
crusted edge of the stream.44 blinded.” 45Some three hours passed be-
T h e troops gained the surprise they fore the first artillery shells struck along
sought. Hardly a shot sounded along the the river.
Sûre that night before the first waves of By the end of the first day a vehicular
infantrymen touched down on the north ford and several treadway bridges were
bank. Only at a place just west of Die- operating to enable supporting tanks and
kirch, where a machine gun opened up tank destroyers to cross the She. A
on an assault company of the 5th Di- bridgehead up to two miles deep was
solidly established, in enough depth to
44For an annotated account of this attack at a bring the two German bridges over the
small-unit level, see Maj. Dello G. Dayton, The
Attack by XII Corps 18–29 January 1945, unpub- Our downstream from Vianden under
lished MS in OCMH, prepared in the European punishing artillery fire. German troubles
Theater of Operations Historical Section soon after
the war. See also combat interviews with men of
the 5th Division. 45MS # A-876 (Brandenberger).
50 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
had been further compounded when in Panzer Corps to command the two pan-
midmorning the 80th Infantry Division zer divisions. Behind the Fifth Panzer
(Maj. Gen. Horace L. McBride) had Army, engineers began building another
begun to attack to the northeast to drive bridge over the Our.
General Rothkirch’s LIII Corps behind It would have required long hours
the Wiltz and another stretch of the Sûre under ideal conditions for any of these
between Ettelbruck and the Wiltz River expedients to have effect. In view of
and to facilitate the 5th Division’s ad- crippling gasoline shortages and the
vance up the Skyline Drive.46 heavy snowstorm of 19 January, it would
As surprised by the American thrust as take not hours but days.
were the volks grenadiers on the ground, T h e 5th Division in the meantime
the Seventh Army commander, General fought steadily up the Skyline Drive to
Brandenberger, ordered most of the sup- reach a point almost due west of Vianden
porting army artillery and engineer units on the 21st; there the division paused
that had been grouped behind the L I I I amid rumors of impending armored
Corps to shift to the more seriously counterattack. Several observers having
menaced LXXX Corps. He also directed reported heavy German troop move-
a volks grenadier division to fall back ments around Vianden, the division com-
from the western tip of the L I I I Corps mander, General Irwin, was disturbed
to establish a blocking position astride that the 4th Division had been unable to
the Skyline Drive along a cross-ridge keep pace on his division’s right. There
northwest of Vianden, there to form a the original defenders, their positions
mask for the two tactical bridges up- compressed and their backs to the Our,
stream from Vianden. kept the 4th Division’s 12th Infantry at
Field Marshal Model at Army Group a respectable distance from Vianden and
B provided help by ordering first a its vital bridge.
Kampfgruppe, then all that was left of T h e situation was less disturbing on
the Panzer Lehr Division, transferred the 5th Division’s other flank. There the
from the Fifth Panzer Army. He fol- advance up the Skyline Drive had posed
lowed this with an order for a severely such a threat of entrapment to the Ger-
mans of Rothkirch’s L I I I Corps that on
depleted 2d Panzer Division also to turn
2 1 January they began to pull out, leav-
south, then headquarters of the X L VII
ing only strong rear guards to oppose
the 80th Division’s attack to the north-
48Ten days before, on 8 January, in the village east. So precipitate was the exodus that
of Dahl, near Wiltz, a 9-man squad of the 80th
Division’s 319th Infantry commanded by Sgt. Day much of it took place in full view of men
G. Turner fought savagely for four hours to hold of the 5th Division on the high ground.
a house on the fringe of the village against a local
German attack. Turner himself bayoneted two T h e infantrymen cheered to see the Ger-
Germans, threw a can of flaming oil at others, and, mans run. They cheered, too, at the rich
when his ammunition was exhausted, used enemy
weapons to continue the fight. Only three of his
gunnery targets presented by long col-
men still were alive and unhurt when the Ger- umns of trucks, tanks, and horse-drawn
mans broke, leaving behind 1 1 dead and 25 cap- artillery. “Let her go, boys” one artillery
tured. Sergeant Turner received the Medal of
Honor. observer radioed to his gunners; “you
VICTORY IN T H E ARDENNES 51
can’t miss a Jerry wherever you land end, 2 5 squadrons had flown 627 sorties.
them.” 47 Although the pilots as usual made un-
Other observers demanded to know, realistically high estimates of their ac-
“Where is the air?” 48Yet as on so many complishments, the day’s strikes caused
days of the foggy, snowbound January, considerable damage and compounded
there was no air. During the morning, ice the delays that terrain, weather, and gaso-
and snow on runways prevented most line shortages already had imposed on
squadrons of the XIX Tactical Air Com- the German withdrawal.50
mand from taking off, and during the T h e day of 2 2 January was notable for
afternoon pilots of the few planes that another development as well. On that
got up found ground haze too thick for day Hitler ordered the Sixth Panzer
them to spot the targets. Army to quit the Ardennes entirely and
That changed dramatically the next to transfer with all speed to the east to
day, the 22d. A brilliant sun came up, its oppose a broadening Russian offensive,
rays glistening on the new snow cover. an unqualified admission not only that
Four groups of fighter-bombers as- the counteroffensive had failed but also
signed to support the XII Corps began that the Eastern Front again had priority
early to attack, then quickly called for on resources. In addition to headquarters
help until eventually the entire XIX of the two SS panzer corps and the four
Tactical Air Command joined the hunt. SS panzer divisions, the shift included
T h e snow-drenched roads were thick the Fuehrer Begleit and Fuehrer Grena-
with German traffic-much of Roth- dier Brigades and assorted supporting
kirch’s LIII Corps pulling back to the units. General von Manteuffel’s Fifth
northeast, rear elements of the Fifth Panzer Army assumed control of the two
Panzer Army seeking the east bank of the corps in the north that General Dietrich
Our, and the X L V I I Panzer Corps with had been directing in opposing the
the 2d Panzer and Panzer Lehr Divisions American drive on St. Vith.
cutting across the grain of the withdrawal The next day, 2 3 January, was notable,
to go to the Seventh Army’s aid. Snarled too, not in the air, since the weather
by the snow and the deep canyon of the closed in again, but in three places on the
Our, vehicles at the Our bridges were ground. In the north, General Has-
stalled bumper-to-bumper. brouck’s 7th Armored Division came
American pilots were jubilant, re- back to St. Vith, signaling the approxi-
minded of the days in August when so mate end of the First Army’s role in
many of the Germans fleeing France had flattening the bulge. Along the Skyline
been squashed along the roads like in- Drive, General Brandenberger on the
sects. “For the first time [in the Ar- same day turned over defense of the
dennes],” noted General Brandenberger,
“the situation in the air was similar to 50For various reasons, claims of enemy losses
from air action almost always were high. One study
that which had prevailed in Nor- conducted by the British proved by ground check
mandy.”49 When the day came to an that air force claims of German tanks destroyed
in the Ardennes were at least ten times too high.
47
5th Div G–3 Jnl, 21 Jan 45. See Directorate of Tactical Investigation, War Of-
48 Ibid. fice, The German Counter-Offensive in the Ar-
49 MS # A-876 (Brandenberger). dennes, MS in OCMH.
52 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
with almost clocklike regularity as dark- the height of the Ardennes fighting Gen-
ness fell, the Germans deemed him slow eral Eisenhower directed both a comb-
in following u p retrograde movements out of rear echelon units and a program
but doggedly determined. A constant whereby Negro service troops might vol-
nibbling away at German positions unteer for the infantry. T h e Third Army
forced German commanders to weaken was particularly short of infantry replace-
one spot to shore up another, only to see ments until well along in the January
a new penetration develop elsewhere. campaign, and in all cases replacements
What saved them in numbers of in- in terms of experience hardly could
stances, the Germans believed, was an equal the fallen.
American tendency to stop at a given The question of whether the counter-
objective rather than to exploit an ad- offensive in the Ardennes had any
vantage fully and quickly. American chance, however slim, of succeeding and
fighter-bombers, the Germans also noted, thus of whether Hitler was justified in
failed to hit traffic bottlenecks such as gambling major resources on the West-
road intersections and bridges as hard as ern Front would forever remain unan-
the Germans thought they might. 55 swered, one of those imponderables that
Against these observations would have each student of warfare is apt to decide
to be weighed American difficulties. The only for himself. 56 As for the effect of
same cruel weather, the same slick roads the counteroffensive and the heavy losses
affected American operations, probably it entailed on subsequent operations and
more than the Germans’, since the offen- the final quest for victory in Europe, that
sive force is normally the more exposed. remained to be demonstrated as a last
Like the Germans, too, American units offensive born in the cold and snow of
had problems with replacements. Even the Ardennes gradually expanded, even-
the manpower well in the United States tually to encompass Allied armies all
was showing signs of going dry, and at along the line.
55 See Bauer, The German Withdrawal From the 56For a discussion of this point, see Cole, T h e
Ardennes. Ardennes, pp. 673–76.
CHAPTER III
bastions sticking into our lines at the same tention to what he considered the main
time that we try to invade his country.4 effort, a drive to reach the Rhine north
Of eighty-five Allied divisions expected of the Ardennes in preparation for an
to be available in early summer, Eisen- eventual attack north of the Ruhr in-
hower estimated that forty-five would be dustrial area. On 18 January he ordered
needed in defense and reserve if the the 21 Army Group commander, Mont-
Allies were at that time holding a line gomery, to prepare plans for such an
similar to the one actually held on 15 offensive. 7
January, but only twenty-five if the line
followed the Rhine.5 General Bradley’s Proposal
It was the SHAEF plan for cleaning u p
the area west of the Rhine before be- Through the course of the Ardennes
ginning a decisive thrust deep into Ger- fighting, the 12th Army Group com-
many that incited objections from the mander, General Bradley, had been
British Chiefs of Staff. T h e British Chiefs aware that General Eisenhower intended
feared that the plan meant a dispersion a return to a main effort in the north.
of strength and considered that Eisen- Since the Ninth Army was to remain
hower had only enough superiority on under Montgomery’s command and par-
the ground to make a single powerful ticipate in that drive, Bradley eventually
thrust, backed by enough fresh divisions would have to relinquish divisions to
to maintain momentum. This was the bring the Ninth Army to a strength at
basic point at issue when the British least equal to that which had existed
Chiefs on 10January asked formally for before General Simpson had released
a review of strategy by the Combined divisions to fight in the Ardennes. Gen-
Chiefs which led to the Supreme Com- eral Bradley nevertheless hoped to be
mander’s plan being discussed at the end able to continue to attack with his army
of January at Malta. 6 group beyond the Ardennes to cut
Convinced of the soundness of the through northern reaches of the Eifel to
plan and assured of backing by the U.S. the Rhine.8
Chiefs of Staff, General Eisenhower con- Against the obvious difficulties of
tinued to lay the groundwork for a re- attacking in winter over countryside
newed offensive even while waiting for equally as inhospitable as that of the
the Combined Chiefs to rule, though an Ardennes and through the West Wall,
element of the provisional hung over all Bradley could argue that an offensive in
plans made during the period. T h e Su- the Eifel fitted best as a continuation of
preme Commander directed specific at- the attack to reduce the bulge. It would
avoid a pause to regroup; it would insure
4 Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 17 Jan 45, in a constant and mounting pressure against
Pogue files. (These files consist of notes and ex- the Germans; it would capitalize on
tracts from documents in General Eisenhower’s
personal files, assembled by Dr. Pogue when he probable German expectation of an Al-
was preparing his volume, T h e Supreme Com-
mand.) 7 Msg, SHAEF to CG’s AGp’s, 18 Jan 45, SHAEF
5 Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, S–75090, 15 Jan SGS 381, Post-OVERLORDPlanning file, vol. III.
45, War Dept Cable Log. 8 12th AGp Ltr of Instrs 12, 4 Jan 45, 12th AGp
6 See above, ch. I. Rpt of Opns, vol. V.
MAIN EFFORT IN T H E EIFEL 57
lied return t o the offensive in the north: enemy’s Roer River defenses in a posi-
and it would put the 12th Army Group tion to unhinge them.
in a position to unhinge the Germans in To the Supreme Commander, General
front of the 21 Army Group. T o at least Eisenhower, Bradley’s proposal had the
some among the American command, double virtue of being a logical follow-up
rather delicate considerations of national to the job of reducing the bulge and of
prestige also were involved, making it accomplishing part of the general build-
advisable to give to American armies and u p along the Rhine that he intended be-
an American command that had in- fore launching a major offensive deep
curred a reverse in the Ardennes a lead- into Germany. Yet Eisenhower saw a
ing part in the new offensive.9 12th Army Group offensive as no sub-
Attacking through the Eifel also would stitute for a main effort later by the 21
avoid directly confronting an obstacle Army Group. Since Montgomery had
that had plagued Bradley and the First considerable regrouping to do before his
Army’s General Hodges all through the offensive would be ready, Eisenhower
preceding autumn, a series of dams agreed to let Bradley hold on tempo-
known collectively as the Roer River rarily to the divisions earmarked for the
dams in rugged country along head- Ninth Army and take a stab at the Eifel.
waters of the river near Monschau. So General Eisenhower nevertheless
long as the Germans retained control of sharply qualified his approval. If the
these dams, they might manipulate the attack failed to show early promise of a
waters impounded by the dams to jeop- “decisive success,” he intended halting it
ardize and even deny any Allied crossing and shifting strength to the Ninth
of the normally placid Roer downstream Army.11 T h e definition of decisive suc-
to the north. cess was apparently a quick, broad pene-
By pursuing an offensive that the 12th trationof the West Wall.12
Even beyond
Army Group’s planning staff had first that the operation was to be subject to
suggested in November, General Bradley review at any time, and General Bradley
saw a way to bypass and outflank the was to be prepared to pass quickly to the
dams and still retain his ability to sup- defensive, relinquishing divisions to the
port a main effort farther north.10 Brad- Ninth Army.13
ley intended to attack northeastward
from a start line generally along the Ger- T h e Eifel Highlands
man frontier between Monschau and St.
Vith and seize the road center of Terrain would set even narrower lim-
Euskirchen, not quite thirty miles away, its on tactics in the Eifel than in the
where the Eifel highlands merge with the Ardennes. Streams in the Eifel have cut
flatlands of the Cologne plain. This even deeper into the surface of the old
would put American forces behind the plateau, and unlike the patchwork pat-
9 On the last point, see Gay Diary, entry of 24
Jan 45. 11 SHAEFto CG’s AGp’s, 18 Jan 45.
10For the early planning, see 12th AGp, Estimate 12Lt Col T. F. Foote, Staff Rpt. Visit to EAGLE
of the Situation, 29 Nov 4, 12th AGp G–3 file. (12th AGp) TAC, 18 Jan 45, in 12th AGp 371.3,
Memo by Planning Staffs, sub: Future Opns—1945, Military Objectives, V.
23 Dec 44. 13SHAEF to CG’s AGp’s, 18 Jan 45.
58 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
terns in the Ardennes, the forests are tering the Moselle; the Pruem, forming
vast. Although roads are fairly extensive, another north-south barrier a few miles
they twist and climb in and out of the beyond the Schnee Eifel; the Ahr, drain-
stream valleys and through the narrow ing from the Hohe Eifel northeastward
confines of farm villages. to the Rhine; and the Roer. Two of the
Well defined on the southeast by the more important towns within the gen-
convolutions of the Moselle River, the erally pastoral region are Pruem and Bit-
Eifel in the north and northeast merges burg, the latter in a relatively open
irregularly into the Cologne plain, stretch of countryside southeast of
roughly on a line from Aachen through Pruem.
Euskirchen to the Rhine some fifteen T h e northernmost reaches of the Eifel,
miles south of Bonn. From the Belgian the region that General Bradley hoped to
border to the Rhine the greatest depth avoid by making his attack south of the
of the Eifel is about forty-five miles. In Roer dams, has no general geographical
width, the region extends along the name, but American soldiers who had
frontiers of Belgium and Luxembourg fought there had come to know it as the
from Aachen to Trier, a distance of some Huertgen Forest. Although not so high
seventy-five miles. as other parts of the Eifel, this is one of
Close to the frontier, two hill masses the more sharply compartmented sectors
or ridges stand out. Most prominent is and at the time was almost completely
the Schnee Eifel, a forested ridge some covered with forest and the debris of the
ten miles long, roughly parallel to the September to December battles.
Belgian border east of St. Vith, rising T h e route that General Bradley chose
abruptly from the surrounding country- for his main attack cut across the narrow
side to a height of just over 2,000 feet. northwestern corner of the Eifel, avoid-
T h e other is an L-shaped ridgeline or ing the rugged Huertgen Forest. From
hill mass forming a bridge between the the Weisserstein several radial ridges
Hohe Venn and the Schnee Eifel, which stretch northeastward toward Euskirchen
may be called from its highest point at and Bonn, and along two of these run
the angle of the L, the Weisserstein. good roads that converge at Euskirchen.
This ridgeline generally defines the Bel- Although the Roer reservoirs and the
gian-German border southeast of Mon- Schnee Eifel would confine the frontage
schau, then swings to the northeast. Part of the main effort to a narrow ten to
of the north-south watershed for the twelve miles, the advantages outweighed
region, the Weisserstein in conjunction this factor.
with the Hohe Venn and the Schnee Athwart the selected route ran the belt
Eifel also serves as the watershed between of concrete pillboxes, minefields, con-
Eifel and Ardennes. crete antitank obstacles (dragon’s teeth) ,
Except for the Moselle the rivers of and entrenchments of the West Wall.
the Eifel are relatively minor streams, From the Moselle to the northern tip of
but they are important militarily because the Schnee Eifel, the fortified zone was
of their deep, twisting cuts. T h e main relatively shallow, usually not as much
ones are the Our, running along the as a mile, but it drew strength from the
frontier and joining the Sauer before en- difficult terrain, including the gorges of
MAIN EFFORT I N THE EIFEL 59
the Our and the Sauer and the heights Americans intended a limited attack to
of the Schnee Eifel. Farther north the gain the Roer dams. Remarking rela-
line split into two bands that diverged as tively favorable terrain for armor around
much as eleven miles. Pillboxes in the Bitburg, the Seventh Army believed that
second band were considerably fewer the Third U.S. Army might try to estab-
than in the first. lish a bridgehead over the Our River
pointing toward Bitburg but anticipated
T h e Enemy in the Eifel some delay before any attempt to exploit.
N o one at the time expected a major
It was peculiarly difficult to guess in thrust through the Eifel.15
January how strongly the Germans might As January neared an end, the Ger-
defend the West Wall, though the 12th mans would require another week to get
Army Group’s intelligence staff assumed the bulk of the Sixth Panzer Army
that the enemy would make as stalwart a loaded on trains and moving toward the
stand as possible, both because of a need east, but so occupied were the designated
to hold the Allies at arm’s length from divisions with the move that no longer
the Ruhr and because of Hitler’s seem- could theyprovide assistance in the line.
ingly fanatic refusal to yield ground Full responsibility for the defense lay
voluntarily. T h e large-scale Russian of- with Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army on
fensive that had begun on 12 January the north and Brandenberger’s Seventh
increased the likelihood of a determined Army on the south.
defense of the West Wall even though Even as the Americans argued the
the means were slipping away into the merits of a thrust through the Eifel, the
eastern void.14 German command was making the first
Still operating under the Fuehrer’s di- of three adjustments designed to counter
rective of 22 January to complete an the expected Allied return to a main
orderly withdrawal from the Ardennes effort in the north. T h e commander of
into the West Wall, German command- Army Group B , Field Marshal Model,
ers were, as expected, pledged to defend transferred the XIII Corps to the Sev-
the fortifications, but they were looking enth Army, in the process drawing a new
forward to at least temporary respite interarmy boundary running eastward
once they gained the fortified line. De- from a point south of St. Vith through
tected shifts of some Allied units already Pruem, a northward extension of re-
had reinforced the generally accepted sponsibility for the Seventh Army. Al-
view that the Allies would return to a though the boundary with the Fifteenth
major thrust in the north in the di- Army remained for the moment about
rection of Cologne, so that the Germans three miles south of Monschau, this
naturally expected pressure to ease in the boundary too was to be adjusted north-
center. Because the V U.S. Corps ap- ward on 5 February to give the southern-
peared to be readying an attack from most corps of the Fifteenth Army to
positions southeast of Monschau, the Manteuffel’s command, again a side-
Fifth Panzer Army assumed that the
15Material on the German side is from Bauer,
T h e German Withdrawal From the Ardennes and
14FUSA G–2 Estimate No. 64, 21 Jan 45. the Western Front in Mid-January.
60 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
slipping to the north. T h e third step, an ranks might be stiffened a little with
exchange of sectors between headquar- concrete and barbed wire, their task
ters of the Fifth Panzer and Fifteenth eased by bad weather and rugged terrain,
Armies in order to put a panzer com- but the balance of forces remained hope-
mand in the path of the expected Allied lessly against them. Recognizing this
main effort, was destined to be delayed situation, the First U.S. Army’s G–2, Col.
by the attack in the Eifel. Benjamin A. Dickson, expressed some
As events developed, early stages of the optimism about the chances of swiftly
American drive into the Eifel would cracking the West Wall and piercing the
pass north of the Seventh Army, striking Eifel.16
primarily at the front of the Fifth Panzer In the last analysis, as the Third Army
Army, manned by the L X V I Corps staff pointed out, quick success depended
(General der Artillerie Walter Lucht) primarily on the enemy’s will to fight.
and the LXVII Corps. It would later in- Poorly trained and ill-equipped troops
volve also the extreme south wing of the could give good accounts of themselves
Fifteenth Army, a responsibility of the even in the fortifications of the West
LXXIV Corps (General der Infanterie Wall and the snowbound compartments
Karl Puechler) . of the Eifel only if they wanted to.17 As
Although the divisions committed in the drive toward Euskirchen got under
this sector still included such illustrious way, just how much the individual Ger-
names as the 3 d Parachute and 9th Pan- man soldier still wanted to fight was the
zer, these were in reality little more than question.
remnants of true divisions; and while
they still fought, the German command A Try for Quick Success
would make little effort to rebuild them.
T h e Germans planned instead to pull T h e first phase of the offensive was to
these once-elite formations from the line be a frontal attack aimed at penetrating
for rehabilitation in keeping with the the West Wall on a 25-mile front from
theory that some respite would follow Monschau to Luetzkampen, near the
withdrawal into the West Wall. T h e northern tip of Luxembourg. (Map I )
Eastern Front had priority on replace- General Ridgway’s XVIII Airborne
ments at this point in any case, and such Corps on the right wing of the First
replacements as did reach the west went Army was to make the main effort. Hold-
to the infantry and volks grenadier di- ing two infantry divisions in reserve for
visions that were to stay behind to hold exploitation, Ridgway was to strike with
the fortifications. two others to pierce the fortified line
In a general way, Allied intelligence between the Schnee Eifel and the Weis-
anticipated this policy. It meant, in sum, serstein astride the Losheim Gap. Named
that in an effort to create a reserve, the after a town along the border, the gap is
Germans would have to thin their ranks a narrow corridor that in 1914, 1940, and
in the Eifel to a point where no coherent 1944 had served German armies well as
line would exist. Defense would have to
16See, for example, FUSA G–3 Estimate No. 63,
be by strongpoints, relying of necessity 16 Jan 45.
on scraps and scratch outfits. T h e ragged 17TUSA G–3 Periodic Rpt, 27 Jan 45.
J Smith
MAP 1
62 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
a débouché. Once through the gap, the Collins’s VII Corps with two infantry
airborne corps would have access to one and two armored divisions.18
of the main routes leading to Euskirchen. T h e Third Army’s role in this first
At the same time, General Huebner’s phase of the operation was to protect the
V Corps on the north was to penetrate First Army’s right flank. General Patton
the western spur of the West Wall in the planned to attack at first only with Mid-
Monschau Forest and protect the army’s dleton’s VIII Corps, whose northernmost
left flank by crossing northern reaches of division, the 87th, was to advance abreast
the Weisserstein and seizing Schleiden of the XVIII Airborne Corps to the
and Gemuend, both important road cen- vicinity of Losheim while the 4th and
ters astride a more circuitous but usable 90th Divisions to the south broke
route to Euskirchen. To exploit success
18 12th AGp Ltr of Instrs 12, 4 Jan 45; SHAEF
by either Huebner or Ridgway, the First Liaison Rpt 432, Intentions, 28 Jan 45, in 12th
Army’s General Hodges held in reserve AGp 371.3, Military Objectives, V.
MAIN EFFORT IN T H E EIFEL 63
through the West Wall along and just the 87th, 4th, and 90th Divisions. On the
south of the Schnee Eifel. These two 30th, the V Corps jumped off in the
divisions then were to block to the south- north.
east, whereupon Patton intended to in- T h e story of all these first attacks could
sert a fourth division on the right of the be told almost in a word: weather. By
87th to advance northeast with the 87th. the end of January the month’s un-
With protection of the First Army as- usually heavy snowfall and low tempera-
sured, Patton then might advance with tures had left a snow cover one to two
three corps abreast northeast to the feet deep everywhere and in some places
Rhine or turn southeast to take the West drifts u p to a man’s waist. Snow glazed
Wall in flank and roll it up southward the hills, choked the valleys and the
to Trier.19 roads, and hid the enemy’s mines. On
T h e line of departure for the attack the first day, it snowed again all day and
was irregular. In the north, where units into the night. 20
of the V Corps still held the positions on Plowing through the deep snow, the
which they had stabilized the northern two divisions of the XVIII Airborne
shoulder of the counteroffensive some Corps encountered only sporadic opposi-
weeks earlier, it ran from Monschau tion, often taking the form of occasional
south to the ridgeline that served as an patrols or scattered rifle fire. Yet men
outpost of the Hohe Venn near Elsen- marching all day through the snow even
born. Below that point, the attack would without sight or sound of the enemy were
begin from positions gained during the exhausted when night came from sheer
last few days of fighting. Those generally physical exertion. It would take the two
followed the highway leading into St. divisions four full days to traverse the
Vith from the north. Beyond St. Vith the eight to twelve miles from their jump-off
line retracted to the southeast generally positions to the high ground confronting
along the trace of the Our River and the the West Wall in the Losheim Gap.
German frontier. It was in some ways a curious twilight
Thus the XVIII Airborne Corps still war. One night, for example, a patrol
was from eight to twelve miles away from the 82d Airborne Division, sent to
from the forward pillboxes of the West investigate a report that the adjacent
Wall, which followed the eastward- 87th Division had occupied a village near
bulging contour of the Belgian-German Losheim, found no soldiers, American or
border. Since the countryside in this German. Behind blackout curtains the
bulge is either heavily wooded or villagers had their lights on. Now and
studded with villages, the troops making then a shell crashed nearby, and between
the main effort faced a difficult task even times the paratroopers could hear babies
to reach the fortified line. crying.
T h e 1st Infantry and 82d Airborne On the other hand, an enemy who was
Divisions of the XVIII Airborne Corps nowhere in particular might be any-
opened the attack on 28 January. The
next day the VIII Corps attacked with 20 Unless otherwise noted, the tactical story is
based on official unit records and combat inter-
views conducted soon after the action by historians
19TUSA Opnl Dir, 26 Jan 45. of the European Theater Historical Section.
64 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
TRAFFIC
JAM ON A ROAD
SLICKARDENNES
on either side of the road meant no schau, and the 2d Division (Maj. Gen.
escape for either force. The paratroopers Walter M. Robertson), striking north
opened fire first, their accompanying through the twin border villages of
tanks pouring withering machine gun Krinkelt-Rocherath, near Elsenborn,
fire into the massed enemy. Surprised were to converge at a road junction
and without comparable fire support, un- within the Monschau Forest astride the
able to scatter or retreat, the Germans northern end of the Weisserstein at a
had no chance. Almost 200 were killed; customs house called Wahlerscheid. Both
a handful surrendered. Not an American divisions would have to pass through
was hurt. Wahlerscheid, a pillbox-studded strong-
Foot troops moved slowly, but they point, before parting ways again to con-
could always move. Behind them ar- tinue toward Schleiden and Gemuend.
tillery, supply, service, and armored ve- Contingents of the 99th Division mean-
hicles jammed the few cleared roads. while were to clear the Monschau Forest
Especially congested was the zone of the west of the converging thrusts, and the
1st Division where every few hundred Ninth Army’s southernmost division was
yards a partially destroyed village to make a limited objective attack to
knotted the roadnet. When leading rifle- protect the left flank of the attacking
men of the 1st Division reached the West corps.
Wall, only one artillery battalion had In the long run, the V Corps would
managed to displace far enough forward benefit from the fact that its attack
to provide support. Trucks bringing struck along the boundary between the
food and ammunition often failed to get Fifth Panzer and Fifteenth Armies, but
through. Had the opposition been de- in the early stages the presence of West
termined, the traffic snarls could have Wall pillboxes would mean stiffer re-
proved serious; as it was, the only tactical sistance than that against the main effort.
result was to slow the advance. Yet nowhere was the resistance genuinely
It was 1 February—the fifth day of the determined. The Germans of General
attack—before the two divisions of the Puechler’s LXXIV Corps and General
XVIII Airborne Corps could begin to Hitzfeld’s LXVII Corps simply had not
move against the West Wall itself. Close the means for that kind of defense. As
by on the right, reflecting the day’s de- elsewhere, deep snow was the bigger
lay in starting to attack, the Third problem, while ground fog and low over-
Army’s 87th Division needed yet another cast restricted observation for artillery
day to reach the pillboxes. and denied participation by tactical air-
North and south of the main effort, craft altogether .
the V Corps and the bulk of the VIII Approaching within a few hundred
Corps hit the West Wall earlier. One yards of the Wahlerscheid road junction
division near Monschau, the 9th, north- late on 31 January, the 9th Division
ernmost unit of the V Corps, was already repulsed a counterattack by an under-
inside the fortified zone at the time of strength German battalion. Soon there-
the jump-off on 30 January. after patrols discovered that the pillboxes
The 9th Division (Maj. Gen. Louis A. at Wahlerscheid were organized for de-
Craig), moving southeast from Mon- fense only to the south, a response to the
66 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
fact that the 2d Division in December approached the crossing site, a fury of
had hit these same pillboxes from the small arms fire erupted from the east
south in the abortive attack toward the bank. Although one rifle platoon got
Roer dams. T h e 9th Division’s 39th In- across before the worst of the firing be-
fantry moved in on the rear of the forti- gan, the rest of the battalion backed off
fications early on 1 February. T h e 2d to look for another site. Casualties were
Division in the meantime was fighting relatively light—for the entire regiment
its way through Krinkelt-Rocherath, for two days, 9 killed, 29 wounded—but
scene of an epic stand by the same di- it was noon the next day before all men
vision during the counteroffensive, and of the leading battalion were across the
then moving into the Monschau Forest Our.
to come upon Wahlerscheid from the A few miles to the south two regiments
south. of the 90th Division had much the same
As night came on 1 February, both the experience. T h e leading battalions of
2d and 9th Divisions were ready to file each regiment came under intense fire at
past Wahlerscheid. In three days the the selected crossing sites opposite the
attack of the V Corps had begun to show German outposts, but individual com-
genuine promise. panies managed to maneuver to the
On the south wing of the offensive, south to cross the river and come upon
the 4th (General Blakeley) and 90th the opposition from the rear.
Divisions (Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks) Despite these successes, the 4th and
of the VIII Corps at the same time had 90th Divisions advanced only slowly
run into the stiffest fighting of all, partly through deep snow against scattered but
because of the obstacle of the Our River. determined nests of resistance for the
T h e lines of departure of the two di- next three days. Partial explanation lay
visions lay close to the Our, and for the in that both divisions were facing the 9th
90th and the right regiment of the 4th, Panzer Division, a shell of a unit but one
crossing the river was the first order of still capable of steadfast defense at se-
business. Narrow and shallow, the Our lected points. By 1 February the 90th
was frozen solid at some points and easily Division was in sight of the West Wall
fordable at others, but steep, slippery around the villages of Heckhuscheid and
banks were a barrier to wheeled traffic Grosskampenberg, while the 4th Di-
and, as it turned out, to tracked vehicles vision still had several villages to clear
as well. Yet what made the river most before climbing the slopes of the Schnee
difficult was that it was tied into the West Eifel. 22
Wall defenses. Although the main line
22In advancing on Heckhuscheid just after night-
lay two to three miles behind the river, fall on 1 February, Cpl. Edward A. Bennett’s
the Germans had erected at every likely company of the 90th Division’s 358th Infantry
crossing point fortified outpost positions. came under heavy machine gun fire from a house
on the edge of the village. Bennett crawled for-
Aiming at the southern end of the ward alone, dispatched a guard outside the house
Schnee Eifel, one regiment of the 4th with a trench knife, then charged into the house
Division on the first day, 29 January, and killed three Germans with his rifle, eliminated
three more with a .45-caliber pistol, and clubbed
tried to cross the Our four miles south- a seventh to death. He was awarded the Medal of
east of St. Vith. As the leading battalion Honor.
MAIN EFFORT I N T H E EIFEL 67
These two divisions were destined to the Rhine north of Duesseldorf with all
continue their attacks into the West Wall possible speed.” 25 To achieve this, the
but as part of another operation. On 1 First Canadian Army was to attack not
February, the Damocles sword that had later than 8 February and the Ninth
hung over the 12th Army Group’s of- Army not later than 10February. T h e
fensive from its inception suddenly fell. Ninth Army was to receive the equiva-
lent of the resources loaned the 12th
A Shift to the North Army Group at the start of the Ardennes
counteroffensive, or at least five divisions.
On 1 February General Eisenhower With thinned ranks, Bradley’s armies
ordered General Bradley to cancel the were to go on the defensive except in the
12th Army Group’s drive on Euskirchen north where the First Army was to seize
and shift troops north to the Ninth the Roer River dams and, subsequently,
Army.28 H e made the decision even to jump the Roer to protect the Ninth
though Bradley’s thrust, while slowed by Army’s right flank.
weather and terrain, was encountering Informally, General Eisenhower modi-
no major opposition from the Germans. fied these terms considerably. Even
Only a complete breakthrough could though Bradley was to relinquish troops
have saved Bradley’s offensive, and that immediately to the Ninth Army, the
was yet to come. Supreme Commander would allow his
Several considerations prompted the offensive in the Eifel to continue until 10
Supreme Commander’s decision. Con- February with the declared objective of
tinuing pressure from Field Marshal gaining a line from Gemuend to Pruem
Montgomery, some feeling of pressure that would include the Weisserstein and
emanating from the meeting of the Com- the Schnee Eifel and thus afford control
bined Chiefs at Malta, Eisenhower’s own of the Losheim Gap for possible future
unswerving conviction that the best way operations. Yet no matter how far this
to victory was in the north against the attack had progressed by 10 February,
Ruhr—all played a part. Also, Eisen- the First Army from that time was to
hower in mid-January apparently had concentrate on a primary mission of
given Montgomery at least an implicit attacking across the Roer to protect the
promise that he would make a decision Ninth Army’s flank.26
on Bradley’s offensive by the first day of Disappointed with the Supreme Com-
February. 24 mander’s decision, General Bradley
Eisenhower’s order halting the Eifel nevertheless took hope in the possibility
offensive was in its formal, written form that he later might turn the First Army’s
clear-cut. “It is of paramount impor- attack across the Roer to the south, per-
tance,” the directive said, “ . . . to close haps to join in a thrust by the Third
Army to clear the entire Eifel region. In
33Msg, SHAEF to CG’s 12th and 21 AGp’s, S-
77434. 1 Feb 45, 12th AGp 371.3, Military Objec- that General Eisenhower granted the
tives, V. Third Army permission to “continue the
24Ltr, Montgomery to Eisenhower, 12 Jan 45,
Pogue files: Memo for Record, Bradley for G–3, 25 S–734, 1 Feb 45.
17 Jan 45: 21 AGp Dir, M–548, 21 Jan 45. The last 26 Notes on Conference with Army Comdrs, 2 Feb
two in 12th AGp 371.3, Military Objectives, V. 45, in 12th AGp, 371.3, Military Objectives, V.
68 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
probing attacks now in progress,” on the was to remain under the First Army,
theory of preventing the enemy from General Collins was to assume responsi-
shifting reinforcements to the north and bility for the southern portion of the
with a view to taking advantage of any Ninth Army’s Roer River line, the same
chance to improve the army’s position front the corps had held before the
for future action, Bradley found real en- counteroffensive, and prepare to attack
couragement. At headquarters of the to protect the Ninth Army’s flank. I n
Third Army “probing attacks” were addition, the V Corps had to mount an
popularly known as the “defensive- attack against the Roer dams.
offensive,” which meant, in more widely T h e First Army was to try again to
understood terminology, a major attack. penetrate the West Wall in the Eifel, but
Bradley knew, too, that the Supreme under the revised conditions chances of
Commander himself well understood decisive success were meager.
General Patton’s special lexicon.27
Patton’s orders, issued on 3 February, A n End to the Offensive
scarcely mentioned defense. T h e Third
Army, Patton directed, was to continue For four more days, through 4 Feb-
to attack on its left to seize Pruem, to ruary, the thrusts of the XVIII Airborne
drive northeast with its right from the Corps and the V Corps continued much
vicinity of Echternach to take Bitburg, as before, particularly in the zone of the
and to be prepared to continue to the airborne corps where the 1st Infantry
Rhine. 28 and 82d Airborne Divisions at last en-
Since the job of taking Pruem fell tered the West Wall. While not every
naturally to the VIII Corps and thus pillbox was manned, the cold, the snow,
constituted a continuation of the attack the icy roads hindering support and sup-
then in progress, though in a different ply, and the strength lent the defense by
context, the Third Army’s drive into the concrete shelters still imposed slow go-
Eifel was barely troubled by the decision ing. By 4 February the two divisions had
of 1 February. T h e First Army was more advanced little more than a mile inside
severely straitened. While General Pat- the German frontier, although a suffi-
ton gave u p only two divisions to the cient distance to insure control of the
Ninth Army, one of which was an inex- first tier of villages on a five-mile front
perienced unit from the army reserve, within the Losheim Gap. T h e advance
General Hodges had to surrender the represented a penetration of the densest
two reserve infantry divisions of the concentration of pillboxes in this part
XVIII Airborne Corps and the three di- of the West Wall.
visions of the VII Corps that had been T h e V Corps meanwhile made sub-
standing by to exploit in the Eifel. Al- stantially greater progress. Indeed, had
though headquarters of the VII Corps any authority still existed to turn the
27Ibid.; 12th AGp Ltr of Instrs, 7 Feb 45, con-
Eifel drive into a major offensive, the
firming previous oral orders; Omar N. Bradley, advances of the V Corps after clearing
A Soldier’s Story (New York: Henry Holt and Co., the Wahlerscheid road junction on 1
1951), P. 501. February might have been sufficient to
28TUSA AAR, 1 Aug 44–9 May 45, vol. I, Opns,
P. 255.
justify alerting the forces of exploitation.
MAIN EFFORT IN T H E EIFEL 69
On 2 February both the 2d and 9th Di- north, he also managed to put hands on
visions pushed almost four miles beyond small contingents of the 3d Panzer
Wahlerscheid, one in the direction of Grenadier Division, which had been
Schleiden, the other, Gemuend. withdrawn from the line for refitting.
Much of their success again could be Yet despite these countermoves, the 9th
attributed to the luck of striking astride Division by nightfall of 3 February stood
the boundary between German units. As less than two miles from Gemuend, the
early as 29 January the northernmost 2d Division only a few hundred yards
unit of the L X V I I Corps, the 277th from Schleiden.
Volks Grenadier Division around Krin- Had the Americans been intent on ex-
kelt-Rocherath, had lost contact with the ploiting their limited penetration, Hitz-
southernmost unit of the L X X I V Corps, feld would have been hard put to do
the 62d Infantry Division, whose south- anything about it, but the hope of major
ern flank was at Wahlerscheid. Even after exploitation through the Eifel by the
the 277th Volks Grenadiers began to First Army was beyond recall. General
withdraw into the West Wall on the last Hodges on 4 February made it official
two days of January, no contact or even with a letter of instructions spelling out
communication existed between the two various shifts of units for his newly as-
units. 29 signed tasks.30 Not only was the VII
In driving southeast from Monschau, Corps to move northward to take over
the 9th Division had virtually wiped out a portion of the Ninth Army's Roer
the 62d Infantry Division. As units of River line but the XVIII Airborne Corps
both the 2d and 9th Divisions poured also was to shift to assume responsibility
northeast through the resulting gap at for a part of the Roer line adjoining the
Wahlerscheid on 2 February, outposts of VII Corps. T h e V Corps was to extend
the 277th Division on higher ground two its positions southeastward to relieve the
miles to the southeast could observe the airborne corps while at the same time
American columns, but the 277th’s com- attacking to seize the Roer dams.
mander, Generalmajor Wilhelm Viebig, Occurring late on 6 February, relief
had no way of determining what was of the airborne corps signaled an end to
going on. Although Viebig's artillery the offensive in this part of the Eifel. The
could have damaged the U.S. units, so line as finally established ran along high
seriously depleted were his ammunition ground overlooking Gemuend and
stocks that he decided to fire only if the Schleiden from the west, thence south-
Americans turned in his direction. eastward across the northeastern arm of
As darkness came on 2 February, the Weisserstein to the boundary with
Viebig's corps commander, General Hitz- the Third Army near Losheim.
feld, learned of the penetration. Order- Blessed from the first with little more
ing Viebig to extend his flank to the than ambition, the main effort in the
Eifel had ground to a predictable halt.
29German material is from Magna E. Bauer, MS
# R–65, The Breakthrough of the West Wall Be- 30
See First Army Report, 1 Aug 44–22 Feb. 45,
tween Ormont and Monschau. pp. 154–55.
CHAPTER IV
having tried in vain to penetrate the tically that Parker had to reduce the
78th lines in early stages of the counter- preparation to five minutes. Accustomed
offensive. This was the 272d Volks to longer shelling before an American
Grenadier Division with a strength of attack, the Germans in the pillboxes in
about 6,000 men.3 T h e division was a front of the 310th Infantry waited under
part of Puechler’s LXXIV Corps of the cover for the fire to continue. They
Fifteenth Army, destined to be trans- waited too long. In a matter of minutes,
ferred on 5 February to control of the men of the 310th Infantry were all
Fifth Panzer Army. 4 around them. In three hours they cleared
T h e object of the limited attack was thirty-two pillboxes and took the village
to extend the 78th Division’s holdings of Konzen. Their final objective, the
to the south and southeast to gain the next village to the south, fell the next
north bank of the Roer River from morning. So swift was the success that
Monschau to Einruhr, the latter guard- the flame-throwing tanks saw little use.
ing passage of the Roer along a highway In the center, the tanks of CCA had
leading southeast to Schleiden. T h e as- trouble with mines concealed by deep
signment was to be divided between the snow, but by late afternoon they man-
311th Infantry on the east and the 310th aged to work their way in the wake of
Infantry on the west, each responsible the infantry to the fringe of Eicher-
for taking two of five villages in the scheid. With infantrymen close behind
target area. Attached to the 78th Divi- them, they roared into the village and
sion, Combat Command A (CCA) of began a systematic mop-up just as dark-
the 5th Armored Division was to take ness came.
the fifth village in the center with the
Only on the extreme left wing of the
help of a battalion of the 311th Infan-
try. Because the 310th Infantry would 311th Infantry, at Kesternich on the
be rolling u p the West Wall as it ad- road to Einruhr, was the story basically
vanced, a platoon of British flame-throw- different. There the 2d Battalion already
ing tanks, called Crocodiles, was assigned held a few of the westernmost houses,
in support.5 the sole lasting gain from a bitter fight
T h e attack began with a good break. for the village in December. Yet despite
Although the division commander, Gen- long familiarity with the terrain and the
eral Parker, had intended a half-hour most minute planning, the first com-
artillery preparation, General Simpson, panies to enter the main part of the
with an eye toward building a reserve village found control almost impossible.
for the Ninth Army’s coming offensive, Although the men had studied the loca-
cut the ammunition allocation so dras-
tion of the houses from a map, they were
difficult to recognize. Many were de-
stroyed, some were burning, and the
378th Div G–2 Estimate, 26 Jan 45.
4 See above, ch. III. snow hid landmarks. Communications
5A good unit history, Lightning—The Story of with tankers of the supporting 736th
the 78th Infantry Division (Washington: Infantry
Journal Press, 1947). supplements official records. Tank Battalion failed early. Mines ac-
T H E ROER RIVER DAMS 73
counted for two tanks, antitank fire two Schmidt and the Schwammenauel Dam.
more.6 T h e task, Huebner told Parker, was the
With the Germans doggedly defending most vital at that time on the entire
each building, it took two full days to Western Front; until the dam was in
clear the last resistance from Kesternich. hand, the Ninth Army dared not cross
Capturing the town might have taken the Roer. Added to this glare of the
even longer had it not been for a squad spotlight was the fact that the 78th
leader in Company E, S. Sgt. Jonah E. Division had had only limited battle
Kelley. Each time Kelley’s squad as- experience and the fact that the very
saulted a building, he was the first to name of the town of Schmidt had be-
enter. Although wounded twice early in come a kind of bugaboo among Ameri-
the fighting, he refused evacuation. His can soldiers after the beating another
left hand useless, he continued to fire his division had taken there in November.
rifle by resting it across his left forearm. All the ingredients for a bad case of the
Late on the second day, Kelley led an jitters were present at the start.
assault on a machine gun position. Ger- As General Parker prepared his plan
man fire cut him down as he expended of attack, it was obvious that terrain
the last three rounds from his rifle and would narrowly restrict the force that
knocked out the machine gun. 7 could be applied against Schmidt and
In the two-day action, the 311th the dam. Schmidt lies spread-eagled on
Infantry lost 224 men, the bulk of them the eastern slopes of a high hill mass, in
from the 2d Battalion. Just why Kester- general an east-west ridge with fingers
nich cost so much became clear as artil- poking out to north, northeast, and
lery observers found they could direct south. Adjacent high ground to the
observed fire from the village on all north beyond the little Kall River, which
remaining German positions west of the in German hands had contributed to
Roerstausee. failure at Schmidt in November, was
controlled by the neighboring XIX
Toward Schmidt Corps.
It would be hard to get at Schmidt
In advance of the pending shift of the along the route from the southwest that
First Army’s boundary to the north, the the 78th Division had to take. Except
78th Division on 2 February passed to for a narrow woods trail from Woffels-
operational control of the V Corps. That bach, close by the Roerstausee, the only
evening the division commander, Gen- feasible approach from this direction is
eral Parker, traveled to headquarters of along a lone main road following the
the V Corps to receive from General crest of the Schmidt ridge. T h e road
Huebner the order for the capture of passes from the open ground of the
Monschau corridor through more than
6 Organized and trained to operate amphibious
tanks in the invasion of Normandy, the 736th had
a mile of dense evergreen forest before
been converted to a standard tank battalion in emerging again into broad fields several
November but had received no medium tanks un- hundred yards west of Schmidt, where it
til January. See 736th Tank Bn Hist.
7 Sergeant Kelley was awarded the Medal of climbs Hill 493 before descending into
Honor posthumously. the town. A narrow but militarily im-
74 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
THEURFTDAM
portant feeder road parallels the main the rest of the Monschau corridor and
road on the north for a few miles before seize a line running inside the woods
joining the main road at a point where from the Kall River in the north through
the Germans had constructed a nest of the nest of barracks to the Roerstausee.
wooden barracks, believed to be strongly (Map 2) From there the attack was to
fortified. proceed almost due east along the axis
In addition to normal attachments, the of the main road into Schmidt, thence,
78th Division was to be reinforced by while subsidiary drives secured villages
the reserve combat command of the 7th north and east of the town, southeast to
Armored Division, an engineer combat the Schwammenauel Dam. T h e 309th
battalion, fires of V Corps and 7th Ar- Infantry, attacking with its 3d Battalion
mored artillery, and planes of the XIX from within the Monschau corridor at
Tactical Air Command. Jump-off was Rollesbroich, was to make the main ef-
scheduled for 0300, 5 February. fort in the first phase, seizing the bar-
General Parker intended first to clear racks at the juncture of the feeder road
T H E ROER RIVER DAMS 75
SCHWAMMENAUEL DAM
and the main highway. Thereupon the darkness moved cross-country through a
310th Infantry was to pass through and web of pillboxes. T h e infantrymen slip-
take Schmidt. ped past at least 35 concrete pillboxes
T h e attack began on a bright note, and bunkers from which 135 Germans
for late in the afternoon of 4 February later emerged; but not a shot disturbed
a company of the 9th Division reached them.
the Urft Dam after little more than a As the battalion advanced through
cross-country march. Although American successive checkpoints and the word
artillery fire had done some damage to came back over the field telephones, “No
outlet tunnels, the big dam still was in- enemy contact,” commanders prepared
tact. the next step. It looked like a penetra-
T h e beginning of the 78th Division’s tion, but could it be exploited? Engi-
attack went well—unexpectedly well. neers and reconnaissance troops moved
T h e 3d Battalion, 309th Infantry (Lt. out to see if the roads were clear, partic-
Col. Floyd C. Call), got off on time at ularly the feeder road north of the main
0300, 5 February, and in rain-drenched highway, the main axis of the 309th’s
76 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
H. C. Brewer,
Jr
MAP 2
advance. Meanwhile, other troops of the battalion “advancing toward the final
division, including attached tanks of the objective” and meeting small arms fire
7th Armored Division’s CCR, prepared for the first time.8 Shortly thereafter the
to clear the remaining villages in the infantrymen of the 309th overran the
Monschau corridor. German barracks, catching some men
A little after daylight, General Parker sleeping, others eating breakfast. Move-
alerted the 310th Infantry for an im- ment orders for the 310th Infantry,
mediate move through the 309th. Fifteen
minutes later Colonel Call reported his 8310th Inf Jnl, 5 Feb 45, entry 0726.
T H E ROER RIVER DAMS 77
parently with the concurrence of Gener- in added delays, pressure for quick
al Huebner—directed that all units success increased. General Huebner or-
resume their original missions. T h e dered that the attack on Schmidt itself be
310th Infantry was to pass through the made at daylight on 6 February and
309th at 0300 the next morning, 6 Feb- that the Schwammenauel Dam be taken,
ruary. if possible, the same day. T h e First Army
Both regiments were in low spirits, commander, General Hodges, was to
thoroughly confused by the day of arrive at the division command post in
changing orders 11 . Men of at least one the morning, which was a military eu-
battalion of the 309th learned that both phemism for “Get cracking, or else!”
division and corps commanders were At 0300 on 6 February, the 310th In-
displeased with their performance. T h e fantry began passing through the lines
men of the 310th Infantry were tired, of the 309th with two battalions in
wet, and frustrated, and the regimental column, but hardly had the men crossed
commander warned that they would be their line of departure when they came
in poor condition for the next day’s under intense grazing fire from auto-
attack. T h e day of 5 February closed on matic weapons. As the men went to
frayed nerves. ground, commanders temporarily lost
While the 311th Infantry had escaped control. At daylight, the men rallied, but
most of the confusion, that regiment’s commanders in the thick woods had no
progress, too, was slow. T h e order to real idea where they were. T h e day was
cross the Roer at Ruhrberg General overcast, and dim light filtering through
Huebner canceled in the afternoon when heavy fir branches scarcely brightened
reconnaissance revealed that the Ger- the gloom under the trees. Enemy artil-
mans had blown a great gap in the road- lery and mortar fire ranged in. One bat-
way over the Paulushof Dam and that talion counted about 200 rounds of
the swollen Roer was too deep and swift mortar fire in half an hour. Apparently
to ford. unobserved, the shelling caused few
T h e order never had interrupted casualties, but it was enough to stymie
operations. One battalion continued to advance. Tanks coming u p the road to
push across cruel terrain north of support the attack drew antitank fire
Ruhrberg, the back way to Schmidt. Al- and backed into hull defilade out of
though resistance was never resolute, the contact with the infantry.
job of clambering through woods, u p In early afternoon the infantry tried
and down steep hills, and challenging a a new attack, but it had no punch. Since
succession of pillboxes wore the men out. observers were unable to adjust artillery
Yet they took the hamlet of Woffelsbach by sight in the thick woods, artillery
and thus, by nightfall, were roughly on a preparation was worse than useless, serv-
line with the 309th Infantry in the main ing only to fell trees and branches in the
attack. path of the infantry. Commanders still
Since all attempts to speed the main had only a vague idea of where the men
attack had failed and one had backfired were.
11310th Inf Jnl, 5 Feb 45, entry 1849; Combat Just before dusk, Company A on the
interviews with men of 3d Bn, 309th Inf. extreme right walked into an ambush.
T H E ROER RIVER DAMS 79
an attack in early afternoon. With in- 309th could participate in the final thrust
fantrymen riding the tanks, the column on the Schwammenauel Dam.
prepared to make a dash over the crest General Parker’s plan for the final
of Hill 493 and across a mile of open thrust called for the 310th Infantry to
fields into the town. pass through Schmidt early on 8 Feb-
Hardly had the lead tank crossed the ruary and drive east and southeast along
crest of the hill when armor-piercing the highway to Hasenfeld at the foot of
shells struck it three times. As the tank the dam. As soon as the 310th had ad-
burst into flames, the other tanks scur- vanced far enough along this road to
ried back to the woods line. uncover a line of departure for an attack
Reorganizing, the infantry set out to southward against the darn, the 309th
d o the job alone. Covered by fire from Infantry was to follow and move cross-
light machine guns, one company country to take the dam.
plunged across the crest of the hill. If this plan was to be executed swiftly,
Despite persistent German fire, most of Schmidt had to be fully in hand, a con-
the men had by late afternoon gained dition General Parker believed already
the westernmost houses in the northern met. On 8 February the men of the 310th
part of the town. Another company tried Infantry discovered otherwise. Many of
to come in through a draw south of the houses, particularly those along the
Schmidt but found the approach covered road to Hasenfeld, remained to be
by fire from automatic weapons. Night cleared, and the Germans yielded none
was falling as the company gained the without a fight. Noontime came and
first houses. Only at this point did the went, and the 310th still was battling to
tanks arrive to help in a house-to-house get past the last houses and into the
mop-up of the town. open.
T h e First Army commander, General
Toward the Dam Hodges, made no effort to hide his dis-
satisfaction with the pace of the attack.
On the same day that the first Ameri- T h e target date for the Ninth Army’s
can troops entered Schmidt, 7 February, offensive across the lower reaches of the
a regiment of the 82d Airborne Division Roer, i o February, was little more than
began to attack southward across the a day away; but not until the 78th took
corps boundary to cross the deep draw the dam could the Ninth Army move.
of the Kall River and move cross-country T h e First Army artillery commander,
to cut the enemy’s escape route from Brig. Gen. Charles E. Hart, had seen to
Schmidt, the road from Schmidt north- it that 40 battalions of artillery (780
east to the Roer at Nideggen. Terrain guns) could be called upon to help the
imposed such limits on the advance that attack; General Hodges found it hard to
by the time the 311th Infantry got to understand why with this amount of
Schmidt, little hope remained for a siz- artillery they could not “blast a road
able prisoner bag. T h e next day another from our present front line positions
regiment of the 82d Airborne crossed straight to the dam.” 13
the Kall gorge and relieved the 309th
Infantry in Kommerscheidt so that the 13Sylvan Diary, entries of 6 and 8 Feb 45.
T H E ROER RIVER DAMS 81
Shortly before noon on 8 February, commander and a veteran unit, the go-
General Hodges telephoned the V Corps ing on g February again was slow. Not
commander, General Huebner, to ex- until late afternoon did either the Goth
press again his dissatisfaction. A few Infantry on the road to Hasenfeld or the
minutes later the commander of the 9th 311th Infantry along the northeast bank
Division, General Craig, walked into the of the reservoir advance far enough to
V Corps headquarters on a routine visit. enable the 309th Infantry to begin its
How long, Huebner asked Craig, would attack against the dam. It was 1800—
it take to shift a combat team of the 9th after nightfall in this period of short
Division to Schmidt to attack the dam? winter days-when the leading 1st Bat-
Craig said he could do it “immediately.” talion, 309th, passed through the 311th
Huebner told him to move not only a Infantry and headed for the dam.
combat team but also the division head- Groping through the darkness, the 1st
quarters. When Craig arrived in Battalion upon approaching the dam
Schmidt, the 78th Division’s 309th and split into two groups, one to gain the top
311th Regiments were to be attached to of the dam and cross over, the other to
the 9th Division. 14 reach the lower level and take the power
Placing a telephone call to his division house. Those men moving against the
command post, General Craig urged such lower level were particularly apprehen-
speed in the movement that first units sive lest the Germans at any moment
of his division already were en route to blow the dam, sending tons of concrete,
Schmidt before he himself got back to earth, and water cascading down upon
his command post. Turning over its them.
sector to the 2d Division, the 60th In- With the upper group was a team
fantry led the way. A second regiment from the 303d Engineer Battalion, spe-
followed as a reserve, while the third cially briefed on the nature of the big
regiment remained behind under at- dam. T h e engineers pressed forward at
tachment to the 2d Division. By mid- 2300 to begin a search for demolitions.
night men of the 9th were in Schmidt German fire at first forced them back,
getting set to attack before daybreak the but by midnight they were at last able to
next morning. start.
General Craig directed the 311th In- T h e engineers intended to cross the
fantry to clear wooded high ground dam to the spillway and there descend
along the north and northeast banks of into an inspection tunnel that intelli-
the Roerstausee while the Goth Infan- gence reports stated ran through the
try took over the drive to Hasenfeld. T h e dam. Crouched low against continuing
309th Infantry remained on alert to German rifle fire, the men raced across
move against the dam itself. but found a portion of the spillway
Despite the introduction of a new blown and access to the tunnel denied.
There was only one other way, to slide
14 Capt. Joseph M. Mittelman, Eight Stars to down the 200-foot face of the dam and
Victory, A History of the Veteran N i n t h U.S. In- gain the tunnel through its bottom exit.
fantry Division (Washington: Ninth Division As-
sociation, 1948), p. 309: Sylvan Diary, entry of 8
Although the task was slow and
Feb 45. treacherous, the engineers accomplished
82 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
it. Entering the tunnel, they expected at two demolitions would release no major
any moment to be blown to kingdom cascade of water but a steady flow calcu-
come. T h e explosion never came. Sub- lated to create a long-lasting flood in the
sequent investigation revealed that the valley of the Roer.15
Germans already had done all the dam- Allied commanders could breathe
age intended. They had destroyed the easily again. The reservoirs that directly
machinery in the power room and had and indirectly had cost so many lives at
blown the discharge valves. They had last were in hand. It would have been
also destroyed the discharge valves on a better, of course, had the Schwam-
penstock that carried water from the menauel Dam been taken intact, thus
upper reservoir on the Urft to a point 15Lightning, pp. 118–20, contains a vivid account
of discharge below the Schwammenauel of the engineer action. In comments on the draft
Dam, which explained why they had MS for this volume, General von Manteuffel notes
that Hitler had specifically ordered that the dams
allowed the Urft Dam itself to fall into be destroyed but, Manteuffel says, he had for-
American hands intact. Together the bidden it.
T H E ROER RIVER DAMS 83
obviating any change in the Ninth forest had nullified much of the artil-
Army's plan for crossing the Roer; but lery's power, as weather did for air sup-
it was enough that the Germans had port. Too many cooks had appeared
been forced to expend their weapon from time to time to meddle in the tacti-
before any Allied troops had crossed the cal broth, but once the pressure was off
river downstream. and the division's role could be assessed
In the end the success belonged basi- with some perspective, General Huebner
cally to the 78th Division. For all the dis- could remark to General Hodges that he
satisfaction with the pace of the attack, had "made him another good divi-
this relatively inexperienced division sion." 16
had driven through rugged terrain over
a severely canalized approach. Dense 16Sylvan Diary, entry of 10Feb 45.
CHAPTER V
roles. T h e last troops of the 9th Panzer peeled off to left and right to clear the
Division, for example, had departed the thin line of pillboxes, seize Brandscheid,
L X V I Corps only two days earlier to be and make room for the division’s third
rebuilt before shifting to the north regiment in the center. Yet no sooner
against the expected Allied main effort. had the infantrymen emerged from the
What was left of the 5th Parachute Divi- woods cover of the Schnee Eifel onto
sion-little more than a Kampfgruppe— relatively open but sharply compart-
still belonged to the XIII Corps but was mented ground leading to Pruem than
out of the line in a backup position. hastily culled German artillery and in-
Remnants of the 2d Panzer Division with fantry reserves had appeared. Overex-
a few tanks also were still around but in tended, tired from a long drive across
a reserve role for the Seventh Army. France and Belgium, lacking the strength
Artillery support averaged about two to exploit, the 4th had come to a halt. 6
understrength battalions per front-line As in September, the 4th Division’s
division, though additional support plan in February was to pause one day
could be provided by a volks artillery in the shadow of the Schnee Eifel while
corps located astride the interarmy patrols probed the West Wall. A delay
boundary. T h e West Wall, on which also would afford time for engineers to
German commanders counted strongly clear and repair roads that were rapidly
to offset the shift of troops to the north, breaking down in an unseasonable thaw.
was thinner astride the Schnee Eifel than In the very early hours of 4 February,
anywhere else along the frontier. however, a reinforced platoon of the 8th
Furthermore, American troops occupy- Infantry found the first belt of pillboxes
ing the Schnee Eifel from September unoccupied, the Germans milling about
until the beginning of the Ardennes on foot and in horse-drawn wagons,
counteroffensive had demolished many obviously unprepared for a fight. Just as
of the pillboxes. a previous commander had done in
September, the division commander,
Into the West Wall General Blakeley, ordered immediate
attack.
T h e VIII Corps’ 4th Division knew By 0600, 4 February, the 8th Infan-
the demolished pillboxes well; it was try’s 1st Battalion was toiling up the
the same unit, that had attacked the slopes of the Schnee Eifel in a snow-
Schnee Eifel in September. T h e division storm and utter darkness to lead the
would get a rare opportunity to refight attack. An hour later the 22d Infantry’s
an earlier engagement over the same 1st Battalion, a few hundred yards to the
ground, under similar conditions of south, joined the move. T h e first objec-
enemy strength, against at least one of tive of both battalions was a road along
the earlier opponents. Little would be the crest of the Schnee Eifel, a string
changed except the weather and stronger beaded with pillboxes. Follow-up bat-
support on the division’s flanks. talions of each regiment were to turn
In September two regiments of the 4th left and right to strip off the beads.
Division had caught the Germans un- 6 The action is covered in MacDonald, T h e Sieg-
prepared atop the Schnee Eifel and had fried Line Campaign.
T H E DRIVE ON PRUEM 87
As in September, success the first day thrust and the winter attack were not to
was complete. Dazed, disorganized end there. As before, the Germans
troops of the 326th Volks Grenadier would be unable to muster sufficient
Division were nowhere near a match for strength to expel the invaders, but they
the assaulting force, even with the added could make every yard of advance in-
strength of the pillboxes. T h e 8th Infan- creasingly costly.
try took 128 prisoners and incurred only On the second day, 5 February, Ger-
one casualty. After swinging southwest, man artillery and mortar fire increased
the 22d Infantry reached a fortified considerably. A battalion of the 22d In-
crossroads at the woods line overlooking fantry toiled all morning to clear 11
Brandscheid. Again as in September, pillboxes in and around the crossroads
seizing the crossroads and Brandscheid above Brandscheid. Thereupon 2 com-
itself awaited the second day. panies poised for a final' assault out of
Unfortunately for the Americans, the the woods across five hundred yards of
similarities between the late summer open ground into the village. With them
88 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
were 10medium tanks and 7 tank de- into the same pattern of easy early suc-
stroyers equipped with 90-mm. guns. cess followed quickly by stiffening resist-
Shortly after midday, tanks and tank ance.
destroyers opened fire against all visible T h e 90th was to make a two-pronged
pillboxes along the road into Brand- attack. T h e 359th Infantry was to take
scheid. Heavy machine guns from the Habscheid in a frontal assault from a
woods line chattered support. Infantry- starting point just over a mile from the
men burst from the forest cover, shoot- town along the main highway from the
ing their rifles and bazookas and tossing Our River through Habscheid to Prons-
white phosphorus grenades as they ran. feld. Thereupon the 357th Infantry was
Although the Germans returned the fire to pass through for the attack on Prons-
at first, it diminished as the Americans feld itself, not quite five miles away. T h e
closed in. Within three hours, the 22d 358th Infantry in the meantime was to
Infantry held Brandscheid and a formi- take over at Brandscheid and drive
dable ring of pillboxes. T h e cost was southeast to seize high ground along the
surprisingly light, a total of 43 casualties, Pruem River between Pronsfeld and
of which 3 were fatalities. Pruem.
T h e 8th Infantry for its part con- At 0400 on 6 February, without artil-
tinued to roll up the fortified line to the lery preparation, all three battalions of
northeast. As the day wore on, the job the 359th Infantry jumped off abreast,
became increasingly difficult as resist- guiding on the main highway into Hab-
ance stiffened like a coil spring under scheid. Despite the general alert occa-
compression. sioned by the previous day’s fighting,
A few hundred yards to the north, the the regiments took the Germans by sur-
87th Division began during the night of prise. All but two rifle companies were
5 February to carry out its mission of inside Habscheid by daylight. Of about
cutting the road along the northern end eighty Germans captured, some were
of the Schnee Eifel to protect the corps taken asleep at their posts.
left flank. Although men of the 87th had Then the problems began. O n the
little trouble gaining the crest of the approach to Habscheid the highway
ridge, lateral movement the next day passed through a band of dragon’s teeth,
northeast and southwest was slowed, the road itself blocked by a heavy gate
chiefly by the increased enemy artillery of logs anchored in concrete. As day-
fire. T h e division nevertheless accom- light neared, engineers blew the barrier,
plished its limited mission in relatively only to discover that the infantry pass-
short order. ing in the dark had failed to take out
T h e 90th Division thus far had par- enemy machine guns in nearby pillboxes
ticipated in the fighting only with a that were sited to cover the gate. Alerted
demonstration by fire on 5 February by the explosion, the Germans came to
against Habscheid to distract German life, drenching the engineers with auto-
attention from the 4th Division’s attack; matic weapons fire and calling down
a more direct role was in the offing mortar and Nebelwerfer fire on the spot.
before daylight on the 6th. In perform- Along with the engineers, the fires
ing it, the 90th too was destined to run pinned down the two reserve rifle com-
T H E DRIVE O N PRUEM 89
panies that had yet to reach Habscheid. neighboring unit to the south, the 276th
As daylight came, maneuvers to get Volks Grenadier Division. 7
around the enemy proved impossible. Before daylight on 6 February, an
While the engineers waited, unable infantry battalion plucked from the vi-
to sweep the road ahead for mines, in cinity of Habscheid and the 326th’s en-
and beyond Habscheid the bulk of the gineer battalion, a force totaling about
infantrymen, slowly clearing pillboxes, 450 men, counterattacked at Brand-
reported they had gone about as far as scheid. For the Americans, the counter-
they could without tank support. T h e attack could have come at no more
situation for a moment threatened to inopportune time. A few hours earlier,
become a deadlock, but the Germans around midnight, a battalion of the 90th
had not the numbers close at hand to Division’s 358th Infantry had moved
exploit their temporary advantage. T h e toward Brandscheid to assume control
moment passed. When at length a self- from the 22d Infantry. It was a memo-
propelled 155-mm. gun arrived to fire rably miserable night—cold, black, half-
directly at the pillboxes covering the raining, half-sleeting. After walking
approach to Habscheid, the defenders almost four miles, the men arrived in
ran. T h e engineers at last could start Brandscheid at 0430, thoroughly soaked.
sweeping the road. Even so, it was after T h e relief of the 22d Infantry was in
nightfall before they had cleared it and process when the Germans struck.
tanks could get forward. Hitting from the south, the Germans
Meanwhile, it was at Brandscheid that quickly stove in the 22d Infantry’s line,
the first of the enemy’s adjustments in shattered Company K, and penetrated
reaction to the attack became apparent. into the village. While individual rifle-
In the village nobody on either side got men and the crews of the three tank
much sleep through the night of 5 destroyers fought on in the center of the
February. village, Company L, the only unit whose
From the German viewpoint, the 4th relief had been completed, counterat-
Division’s penetration at Brandscheid tacked. In a little over two hours the
had virtually collapsed the south flank confused fight came to an end. More than
of the 326th Volks Grenadier Division. 150 Germans surrendered.
Constantly committed since 16 Decem- Abortive as the Germans thrust
ber, the division was a skeleton. Its two proved, it caused substantial casualties.
regiments had only about 140 men each. T h e relieving battalion of the 358th In-
Only two 75-mm. guns were in the anti- fantry lost only 9 men, but the 3d Bat-
tank battalion; only eight artillery pieces talion, 22d Infantry, had 12 men killed,
in support. T h e division’s north flank 98 wounded, and 38 missing: some of the
missing, who had been cut off in pill-
broken by the surprise penetration of
boxes outside the village, later rejoined
the West Wall on the Schnee Eifel, the their companies.
division lacked the men even to seal off
the thrust at Brandscheid, much less to 7 In addition to German sources previously cited,
counterattack. The corps commander, see MS # B–561, 326th Volks Grenadier Division,
26 January–17 April 1945 (Generalmajor Erwin
General Lucht, ordered help from the Kaschner, CG).
90 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
After waiting through the morning to stalled bumper to bumper. Nothing was
make sure Brandscheid was secure, two lost but tempers and sleep.
battalions of the 22d Infantry resumed Even more than the attacks of the
the attack at noon, moving east from the other divisions of the VIII Corps, that
crossroads above Brandscheid to take the of the 11th Armored Division would
first row of villages beyond the Schnee benefit from striking along the enemy’s
Eifel. Here i n September another bat- interarmy boundary. From a point just
talion of the 4th Division had run into south of Habscheid, the front was the
trouble after neglecting to take high responsibility of the Seventh Army’s
ground while advancing down a valley XIII Corps, but the volks grenadier di-
to cross the little Mon Creek. This time vision charged with the defense was so
strength was at hand to do both jobs at acutely short of men that a portion of
once, and what was left of the 326th the line close to the boundary could be
Volks Grenadier Division could have defended only by outposts.
little effect on the outcome. Except for Beginning at 0400, shortly before the
artillery fire, the Germans fought back German counterthrust at Brandscheid,
feebly. T h e same was true on the Schnee two dismounted armored infantry bat-
Eifel where the 8th Infantry continued talions moved abreast from Heckhu-
to roll u p the pillbox line to the north- scheid, southwest of Habscheid, toward
east and established contact with the 87th Losenseifen Hill (Hill 568), an eminence
Division. bristling with pillboxes that had been a
T h e 4th Division’s success on 6 Feb- key objective of an American division
ruary boded well for the future, par- in September. No artillery preparation
ticularly when considered in context preceded the move. In the darkness, the
with an event of early morning on the Germans in the few pillboxes that were
south flank of the corps where, south- manned hardly knew what hit them. By
west of Habscheid, contingents of the 0830 the armored infantrymen com-
11th Armored Division had attacked the pletely controlled Losenseifen Hill in a
West Wall. penetration a mile and a half deep into
Scheduled to begin before dawn on the West Wall.
6 February, the 11th Armored Division T h e successes of 6 February meant
barely struggled into position on time. that the VIII Corps had breached the
T h e thaw and freeze, rain and snow, West Wall on a front of approximately
constant since 1 February, had turned eleven miles, prompting the corps com-
roads into quagmires in some places and mander, General Middleton, to acceler-
in others had glazed them with mud and ate and broaden the attack. Urging the
4th and 90th Divisions to increase the
ice. So great was the traffic congestion
tempo of their thrusts, he told the 87th
during the march that few of the divi-
Division and the 11th Armored to dis-
sion’s tanks could make it forward, thus regard previously assigned objectives and
leaving the first assignment to the ar- “continue on through.” 8 T h e armor
mored infantry. T h e enemy fortunately was to advance beyond the corps to high
had no planes in the air to take advan-
tage of the long columns of vehicles 8 4th Div Jnl, 6 Feb 45.
T H E DRIVE O N PRUEM 91
ground some four miles southwest of Attacking southeast along the Hab-
Losenseifen Hill, there to help the scheid-Pronsfeld road, the 357th Infan-
neighboring III Corps to get across the try intended to slip one battalion in the
Our River and into its section of the darkness past Hill 510 to take a second
West Wall. height, Hill 511. Another battalion was
to follow to seize the bypassed hill.
German Countermeasures It failed to work out that way. Con-
trol proved difficult in the dark, and the
General Middleton's directive actually approach march was slow. Daylight and
would have little practical effect. On 7 with it enemy fire caught the two bat-
February the inevitable slowness of clear- talions strung out along the highway,
ing pillboxes, combined with the local the point of the leading battalion still
German countermeasures, provided the short of Hill 511. Fire from the first hill,
Germans an additional twenty-four thick with pillboxes, split the column.
hours to ready other steps to oppose the T h e fire isolated most of the leading
attack. Only on the left wing of the 4th battalion in an open saddle between the
Division was the defense still soft. There two hills for the entire day. T h e other
two battalions of the 8th Infantry de- battalion finally cleared the pillboxes on
scended the slopes of the Schnee Eifel Hill 510 but was unable to cross open
and advanced almost unopposed as ground to come to the support of the
much as two miles, crossed the upper leading battalion until after dark. Only
reaches of the Mon Creek, and reached then were the men able to occupy Hill
the west bank of the Mehlen Creek. 511.
On the north the 87th Division spent T h e 358th Infantry meanwhile
the day clearing pillboxes. T h e 11th launched a three-pronged attack out of
Armored Division on the south did the Brandscheid. Moving southeast early on
same, postponing any major effort to 7 February, the 3d Battalion had little
execute its new mission until the adja- trouble taking Hill 521, a wooded height
cent regiment of the 90th Division came on the west bank of the Mon Creek. O n
abreast. the other hand, both the ad Battalion,
It was in the center that the hard clearing pillboxes between the other two
fighting took place as the 22d, 357th, and units, and the 1st came under consider-
358th Regiments pushed attacks toward able fire and counted their successes not
Pruem and Pronsfeld. None could gain in yards gained but in pillboxes reduced.
more than a mile, and all had to fight T h e 1st Battalion proceeded methodi-
off a number of small but determined cally about its task, using tanks and tank
counterattacks launched by conglomer- destroyers as a base of fire to button up
ate units, anything Generals Lucht and the pillboxes, and by dark had cleared
Felber could find-remnants of division ten and taken about eighty prisoners.
engineer battalions, local security forces, T h e ad Battalion moved much more
and the like. In only one case would the slowly, partly because the men found
counterattacks cause genuine concern, many camouflaged pillboxes not pre-
but they would materially delay the viously reported, partly because the Ger-
advance nonetheless. mans took cover in the concrete forts
92 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
more infantry divisions and the 11th 345th Infantry, moving before daylight,
Armored had been identified, the danger seized a village on the upper reaches of
became obvious. the Pruem River. On the south flank
At this point the army group com- the 359th Infantry cleared bypassed pill-
mander, Field Marshal Model, shifted boxes in the 90th Division’s zone, but
the Seventh Army boundary northward enough of a gap still existed between
to eliminate the nuisance of responsi- the 90th Division and the 11th Armored
bility divided with the Fifth Panzer Division to discourage the reluctant
Army. He also permitted unrestricted armor again from starting its drive to
use of the Seventh Army’s reserve, the the southeast.
2d Panzer Division. Hard fighting once more was the or-
Given a free hand, the Seventh Army der of the day in the center where the
commander, General Brandenberger, arrival of the 2d Panzer Division made a
elected to reinforce the threatened sec- clear impact. T h e 4th Division’s 8th In-
tor not only with the panzer division but fantry, which had reached the Mon
also with two Kampfgruppen—all that Creek the day before against little op-
that was left—of the two volks grenadier position, had to fight all through the 8th
divisions, the 276th and 340th. These and into the 9th to clear the village of
he shifted into the sector of the XIII Gondenbrett. On the regiment’s right,
Corps from the adjoining corps to the two small counterattacks hit the com-
south, even though continued identifi- pany of the 22d Infantry in Obermehlen,
cation of a U.S. armored division in while another struck Am Kopf Hill, west
Luxembourg indicated that the Third of the village. These delayed the 22d
U.S. Army soon might launch another Infantry’s own attack until shortly past
thrust farther south. noon on the 8th. In the afternoon the
Brandenberger also directed north- 2d and 3d Battalions set out to clear the
ward from the Seventh Army’s left wing last houses of Obermehlen and open
a Kampfgruppe of the 352d Volks slopes to the south, whereupon the 2d
Grenadier Division. Felber’s XIII Corps Battalion tried to cross the Mehlen Creek
thus would contain Kampfgruppen of in order to take high ground between the
four volks grenadier divisions, the 5th creek and the settlement of Tafel,
Parachute Division, and the panzer divi- whence most of the counterattacks ap-
sion. T h e corps would have in addition a peared to be coming.
separate armored battalion equipped Swollen by the thaw to a width of
with Tiger tanks. Counting vehicles of fifteen feet in some places, the Mehlen
this battalion, of the panzer division, Creek proved a major obstacle. A few
and of occasional guns in the volks gren- men of the 2d Battalion found fords;
adier divisions, the XIII Corps would others stepped into deep water and had
have approximately seventy serviceable to swim for it. Except for the weapons
tanks and assault guns. platoon, which was cut to pieces by ma-
For the Americans, the added Ger- chine gun fire during the crossing, most
man strength was all too apparent on 8 of Company G nevertheless made the far
February. T h e only notable advance was bank. T h e platoons advanced halfway u p
in the north where the 87th Division’s the high ground against a surprising lack
94 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
River a little over a mile east of Gonden- len—in enemy hands, they made no
brett. Yet when another battalion at- attempt to push farther.
tempted to turn south to take a village At 1300 the enemy again sought a de-
on the road to Pruem, the opposition cision on the high ground. With five
suddenly stiffened. T h e explanation was tanks and two companies of infantry,
to be found in that the regiment had the Germans struck. In an hour Com-
shifted its attack from the relatively un- pany A had shot all its bazooka rockets
defended left flank of the Fifth Panzer but had two tanks to show for them. Still
Army into the Seventh Army’s sector and neither the 1st Battalion’s reserve com-
the domain of the 2d Panzer Division. pany nor supporting tanks could get
T h e immediate task still facing the across the Mehlen Creek to help. Shells
22d Infantry on 9 February was to re- from German tanks plowed into the 2d
capture the high ground between the Battalion in Obermehlen, disorganizing
Mehlen Creek and Tafel so that the one company there. “Krauts,” the 2d
village of Niedermehlen in turn might Battalion reported, “[are] all over the
be taken and the main road to Pruem place.” 12Yet up on the hill Companies
opened. T h e regiment’s plan was to A and C with the help of intensive shell-
attack with the 1st Battalion across the ing by the 44th Field Artillery Battalion
creek, then to converge on Niedermehlen absorbed the shock of the enemy thrust,
from two sides with its other two bat- taking severe casualties but giving no
talions. ground.
Because road conditions precluded T h e 3d Battalion meanwhile had cir-
bringing u p bridging equipment, the 4th cled west of Niedermehlen, and even
Division’s engineers decided to get the before the Germans struck at Companies
1st Battalion across the creek on an im- A and C had attempted with the aid of
provised log bridge. By 0930 the bridge a platoon of tanks and another of tank
was in and two companies began to cross. destroyers to push into the village. Fire
Both these had made it when, within ten from at least three German tanks or
to fifteen minutes of the first man’s cross- assault guns halted every attempt.
ing, an enemy machine gun opened fire An inconclusive fire fight continued
u p the creek valley from the south. This through the afternoon until Companies
forced the third company to cover. Dur- A and C had defeated the counterattack
ing the next five hours, fifteen men fell beyond the creek. At that point, behind
while trying to brave the machine gun a TOT 13 fired by four battalions of ar-
tillery, companies of the 2d and 3d
fire. Every effort to knock out the Ger-
Battalions pressed into Niedermehlen.
man gunner failed.
Resistance collapsed, and within two
Companies A and C in the meantime hours the village was clear, a hundred
made their way up the high ground and Germans captured. T h e day’s fighting
dug in to defend. Although more numer- cost the 22d Infantry 121 men, most of
ous than the three platoons of Company
G the day before, they were little better 1222d Inf Jnl, 9 Feb 45.
13 TOT stands for time on target, a method of
off. Without tanks and with the only timing the fire of artillery pieces in various loca-
supply road—that through Niedermeh- tions to fall on a target simultaneously.
96 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
them lost on the high ground east of the last of the West Wall pillboxes to take
Mehlen Creek. high ground along the west bank of the
Even as these events occurred, the 4th Pruem. T h e 357th Infantry at the same
Division commander, General Blakeley, time pushed about a mile south of Hill
committed his reserve, the 12th Infantry, 511 in what was in effect flank protection
to take a village off the 22d Infantry’s for the 358th Infantry, while the third
right flank. T h e regiment accomplished regiment, the 359th. cleared the last of
the gap between the infantry and the
its task with little difficulty and the next
day, 10February, reached the west bank armor on Losenseifen Hill. For the most
of the Pruem River southwest of Pruem. part, during these two days the Germans
were content to sting the attackers with
T h e Final Phase mortar and artillery fire.
Operations at this point entered a new
T h e 22d Infantry’s task also was near phase, dictated by an uncompromising
completion, though remnants of the 2d tyrant called logistics. Not built for
Panzer Division with their backs to the heavy military traffic, the roads of Bel-
Pruem River still fought hard for at gium and Luxembourg had literally dis-
least every other yard of ground. On 10 integrated under a combination of
February the 1st Battalion engaged in a alternate freeze and thaw, daily rains and
bitter house-to-house fight to clear Tafel floods, and the coming and going of big
and again had to repel a tank-supported tanks, trucks, and guns. T h e entire engi-
counterattack. T h e 3d Battalion moved neer strength of the VIII Corps was
more easily to occupy high ground di- barely sufficient to keep the most essen-
rectly west of Pruem. During the day tial supply routes open. In a few days
another seventy-three men were killed or the 22d Infantry was to report that with
wounded. Although the 22d Infantry all roads to the regiment’s rear impass-
was at the threshold of its objective, the able, nothing remained in the forward
town of Pruem, the regiment would ammunition supply point. Some units of
arrive there nearly spent. Reluctant to the VIII Corps had to be supplied by
commit individual replacements during airdrops.
the battle, the regimental commander As early as 8 February, General Mid-
doubted that his thinned and tired forces dleton, as eager as anybody in the Third
would have the strength for another Army to get on with the attack, felt
house-to-house struggle the next day.14 impelled to suggest to General Patton
On 9 and 10 February the 90th Di- that he call off the offensive until the
vision also advanced, slowly at first, but road situation improved.15T h e next day,
with a dash on the second day as the 9 February, Patton agreed that when the
enemy in the north of the division’s zone corps reached the Pruem River, the at-
fell back behind the Pruem River. When tackers might desist and all units dig in
the Germans withdrew from Hill 519 on for defense.
9 February, the 358th Infantry followed, For the 4th Division this order was
then the next day broke free behind the qualified by instructions to watch for
14 22d Inf Jnl, 10 Feb 45. Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 239.
15
THE DRIVE ON PRUEM 97
DROPPING
SUPPLIES BY PARACHUTE TO THE 4TH DIVISION
any enemy withdrawal, and if one oc- Corps had run out the period of grace
curred to “jump on it.” 16 When prison- granted with the general standfast or-
ers on the 10th reported the Germans ders of 1 February, and a new condition
evacuating Pruem, General Blakeley thwarted for the moment any subterfuge
took advantage of the qualification to Patton might have attempted to change
continue the attack into the town. De- matters. On 10February General Brad-
spite its losses, the 22d Infantry fought ley ordered Patton to give u p head-
into the fringes on the 11th and the next quarters of the III Corps to the First
day occupied the rubble that Pruem had Army, which meant that the VIII Corps
become. would have to assume responsibility for
It was the condition of the roads that General Millikin’s sector. Although Gen-
stopped the VIII Corps, but even had eral Middleton would inherit one of the
the roads held u p the attack would have two divisions of the III Corps, the new
come to a halt on 10February. T h e VIII responsibility still would involve consid-
1622d Inf Jnl, 10Feb 45. erable adjustment and reorganization.
98 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
T h e VIII Corps had achieved sub- launched another of the probing attacks
stantially the objectives set. T h e corps authorized by the decision of 1 February.
had made a clean penetration of the West T h e objective of the attack was limited—
Wall, and three out of four divisions had Bitburg, the other major road center in
reached the Pruem River. Pruem itself the western Eifel, eighteen miles south-
was in hand. General Middleton thus west of Pruem; but Patton had more in
would be free to turn his attention to mind than Bitburg. He was, he hoped,
the south where other events, under way kindling a flame that eventually would
since 6 February, invited participation become a full-fledged fire carrying the
b y the VIII Corps. Third Army all the way to the Rhine.
For to the south General Patton had
CHAPTER VI
near Echternach, had been taken and the farther north—nothing left but weak
corps south flank thus secured. volks grenadier divisions. T h e only ex-
Before General Eisenhower’s decision ception was the 212th Volks Grenadier
of 1 February, General Patton had in- Division, located on the extreme left
tended that the XII Corps attack on 4 wing of the army near the confluence of
February in order to tie in with the the Sauer with the Moselle, protecting
Euskirchen offensive. Having protested the city of Trier. T h e 212th had fallen
the target date on the basis that Patton back to the West Wall ahead of the oth-
had no appreciation of “time and space ers and thus had gained time to refit and
factors,” the XII Corps commander, Gen- reorganize.3
eral Eddy, was pleased when Eisen- With the northern boundary just over
hower’s general standfast orders resulted a mile southeast of Vianden, the LXXX
in a two-day postponement. 2 Unfortu- Corps under General Beyer was destined
nately, the postponement virtually coin- to come under attack first. From north to
cided with the unseasonable thaw, and south, Beyer’s divisions, all volks grena-
the XII Corps would find it difficult to dier units, were the 79th, 352d, and the
be ready even by the night of 6 February. relatively strong 212th. Before the new
By the 2d many motor pools and supply American attack began, the 352d would
depots already were under water, and be lost to the effort to protect Pruem.
rapidly rising rivers threatened tactical Any weakening of the already thin line
bridges. By the 4th the level of the in the south worried the Germans. Rund-
Moselle had risen over thirteen feet and stedt himself, the Commander in Chief
ripped away floating bridges uniting the West, remained for a long time seriously
XII and XX Corps. T h e river that the concerned over the possibility of an
XII Corps had to cross, the Sauer, was a American advance u p the general line of
swollen torrent. the Moselle on either side of Trier. 4 Yet
From the German point of view, the the Germans there would have the ad-
raging river was about the strongest de- vantage of the West Wall, which was
terrent to American success that com- particularly strong on either side of
manders in this sector could count on. Trier, the early thaw with its rains and
T h e remnants of two panzer divisions, swollen rivers, and the terrain. T h e Our
which the U.S. Third Army G–2, Col. and Sauer Rivers in the sector faced by
Oscar W. Koch, believed still with the the XII Corps run through sharp gorges
Seventh Army, already had moved north; with clifflike sides sometimes 600 feet
the only remaining armored reserve, the high. T h e four-mile stretch from Bollen-
2d Panzer Division, would be used to dorf to Echternach, where the U.S. XII
counter the attack on Pruem before the Corps would assault, was further pro-
XII Corps operation got underway. T h e tected by large wooded stretches close up
situation in the Seventh Army’s center to the Sauer.
and on its left wing was thus much the
same as that confronting the XIII Corps
3The German story is based principally on MS
# B–123 (Gersdorff), as confirmed by German
2 Quotation is from Patton, War As I Knew It, situation maps for the period.
p. 234. 4MS # C–020 (Maj Percy E. Schramm).
BITBURG AND T H E VIANDEN BULGE 101
CROSSING
SITE ON THE SAUERRIVERNEARECHTERNACH
the shots were signals, the entire east tecting the 5th Division’s right flank. Yet
bank of the river appeared to come to there too, many of the boats met disaster.
life. Brilliant flares lighted the scene. A round of mortar or artillery fire hit
Even those men who survived the treach- one boat broadside, sinking it in a flash
erous current could scarcely hope to and sending the occupants with their
escape the crisscross of fire from auto- heavy equipment floundering helplessly
matic weapons. downstream. Another boat began to drift
Only eight men—one boatload—of directly toward a German machine gun
each assault regiment of the 5th Division spitting fire from the bank. Frantically,
reached the far shore. Continuing Ger- the men in the boat tried to change their
man fire denied reinforcement. course by grabbing at rushes along the
It was somewhat better at Echternach, water’s edge, but in the process, they
where Companies A and B formed the swamped the frail craft. Shedding as
assault wave of the 417th Infantry, pro- much equipment as they could, the men
BITBURG AND T H E VIANDEN BULGE 103
plunged into the icy water. Some made artillery support, he directed all available
it to the bank. T h e current swept others artillery battalions to mass their fire be-
downstream. yond the crossing site.7 Tanks and tank
In such a melee, squad, platoon, and destroyers he told to move boldly for-
company organization went for naught. ward to take German pillboxes under
Thrown helter-skelter against the Ger- direct observed fire. T h e corps com-
man-held bank, the men tried to reor- mander, General Eddy, personally or-
ganize but with little success. A house set dered tank destroyers armed with 90-mm.
afire on the Luxembourg side of the river pieces to go to the water’s edge. He also
lit the landscape with an eerie flame that told General Irwin to cross his regiments
aided German gunners. In the end it in the 80th Division’s or 417th Infantry’s
would be determined that 56 men and 3 sectors should those units establish firm
officers of Company A had made it, 52 bridgeheads before the 5th Division
men and 2 officers of Company B; but could get across.8 Yet as night came on 7
no one could have arrived at any figures February, the sixteen still were the only
during the early hours. Before daylight men of the 5th Division on the German
came, most of Company C also got across, side of the river.
but nobody else. Only after nightfall Contingents of both the 80th Division
brought concealment were crossings re- and the 417th Infantry meanwhile
sumed. achieved some success against the high
I n the 80th Division’s sector near Wal- ground beyond the river. By nightfall of
lendorf the attack began at 0300 the the first day (7 February), a battalion
morning of 1 February, two hours later of the 80th Division held high ground
than the main assault. With surprise northeast of Wallendorf, a mile and a
hardly possible in view of the general half beyond the Sauer, and one company
alert occasioned by the earlier assaults, was in Wallendorf. With a verve and
the men of the 80th smoked likely cross- initiative often displayed by the inexperi-
ing sites with shells from attached chemi- enced, Companies A and B of the 417th
cal mortars, thereby drawing enemy fire Infantry cleared pillbox after pillbox
to the smoke, then began to cross the and occupied a portion of the high
river elsewhere. T h e stratagem helped ground northeast of Echternach. There,
considerably and casualties were “not ex- in later afternoon, three German tanks
ceptionally heavy”; 6 during the first and a small infantry force counter-
twenty-four hours the bulk of at least six attacked, but Pfc. Lyle Corcoran knocked
companies gained the far bank. out one tank with a bozooka, another
Of the five attacking regiments, the mired helpless in the mud, and a third
two of the 5th Division had the worst of withdrew. That ended the threat.
it. Although the two little separate eight- T h e big problem still was the river.
man groups hardly represented even a Although all units had plans to put in
toehold, the division commander, Gen- bridges once the first wave of riflemen
eral Irwin, determined to treat them as
such. With no further need to withhold 7 Between 0130 and 0600 divisional and corps ar-
tillery in the XII Corps fired 29,000 rounds. See
TUSA AAR.
680th Div AAR, Feb 45. 8XII Corps msg file, 7 Feb 45.
104 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
was across, every effort to span the stream rent at Echternach, and before daylight
failed. In the 417th Infantry’s sector, the another fifteen boatloads of riflemen
160th Engineer Battalion tried three made it. Yet as had happened to their
times to anchor a cable across the river predecessors twenty-four hours earlier,
for a footbridge, but the current severed German fire and the raging river quickly
the first two and enemy machine gun fire cut these men off from reinforcement
sank the boat carrying the third. Despair- and supply.
ing of success by this method, the engi- T h e story would continue the same in
neers constructed a bridge on the near the XII Corps for three more days, until
bank and tried to float it into position, 11 February when engineers at last suc-
but the current soon made quick work ceeded in bridging the river. That the
of it too. weak and usually isolated units on the
Dependence on footbridges was one far shore could hold their own and even
reason the 5th Division’s right regiment, expand their positions was a testament to
the 11th Infantry, failed to get more than the courage and tenacity of the men and
eight men across the river. T h e regi- commanders concerned, plus the excel-
ment’s assault plan was based on sending lent support they got from their artillery;
only patrols by boat, then constructing but it was a testament, too, to the general
footbridges for the bulk of the infantry. ineffectiveness of their enemy. Although
Every effort to put in the bridges failed. the Germans might defend a position
T h e coming of night on 7 February doggedly and impose severe casualties on
changed the situation but little. A few the attacker before giving up, a passive
more men of the 80th Division got across, defense augmented by mortar and Nebel-
either in assault boats or by swimming werfer fire was about all they could offer.
when the boats capsized, but frustration They simply had no reserves for deter-
continued generally to be everybody’s mined counterattacks.
lot. For the Americans it was an incredibly
Giving up hope of crossing during the difficult operation. T h e cliffs on the east
night and planning a new attempt the bank were no less precipitous whether a
next day, the 5th Division’s 10th Infantry man was attacking up them or merely
sent a boat to rescue its eight men from trying to manhandle a case of K rations
the far bank, while the eight of the 11th to hungry comrades at the top. T h e mud
Infantry held fast. After a heavy machine was deep, the weather always wet and
gun section of the 11th Infantry’s Com- cold. Trench foot and respiratory dis-
pany K and six boatloads of Company F eases abounded, and evacuation across
got across, contact was at last established the swollen Sauer was virtually impossi-
with the eight men who still remained on ble. German fire and the river greedily
the far bank. Still no one could claim consumed assault boats and bridging
that the 5th Division possessed any kind equipment, and bringing u p more over
of workable holding beyond the Sauer. the ruined roads of Luxembourg was a
Some time in the early hours of the slow process.
8th, three platoons of Company G, 417th In the end it was sheer power mixed
Infantry, and a heavy machine gun pla- with determination and ingenuity that
toon of Company H conquered the cur- did the job. Although the corps lost at
BITBURG AND T H E VIANDEN BULGE 105
least a dozen bridges to the river, others to halt the attack for a day. 9 General
at last were put in to stay. When two or Eddy declined. T h e unremitting pres-
three engineers were unable to bring sure of infantry and artillery was having
back assault boats, six men did the job, a slow but inexorable effect; Eddy saw
limiting the number of infantrymen who no reason to check the momentum.
could be carried but nevertheless gradu- Had General Eddy been able to view
ally increasing the strength on the far the situation through his adversary’s
bank. T h e 5th Division used big search- eyes, he would have been even more
lights to illuminate the night crossings. convinced that he had chosen the right
Pontons lashed together served as ferries course. Once the Germans actually oc-
for vital heavy equipment. Moving u p cupying the sector were rooted from
close to the river, 155-mm. self-propelled their pillboxes, little else would stand in
guns poured direct fire on German pill- the way. Divining that the Echternach
boxes. One battery alone destroyed eight thrust was the southern arm of a pincers
pillboxes in one 24-hour period. To re- movement designed eventually to link
supply men of the 417th Infantry on with the attack of the VIII Corps on
the heights above Echternach, fighter- Pruem, the Germans gambled that n o
bombers dropped specially loaded belly move would be made against Trier. They
tanks. When these eluded the infantry- shifted the south regiment of the 212th
men, artillery liaison planes braved small Volks Grenadier Division from Trier to
arms fire to drop supplies with impro- assist the rest of the division. Although
vised parachutes. Whenever weather per- Army Group B provided a weak Kampf-
mitted, fighter-bombers of the XIX gruppe of the 560th Volks Grenadier
Tactical Air Command roamed far and Division—all that was left of that unit—
wide, ready to strike at a moment’s notice to replace the 212th’s southern regiment,
at any indication that the Germans were so critical was the situation around
reinforcing the sector. Echternach that this Kampfgruppe too
By 1 1 February, when the first tactical had to be committed there. Beyond these
bridges were in, the 5th Division, includ- two units, no other reinforcements were
ing the attached 417th Infantry, had in prospect.10
forged a bridgehead three miles wide and T h e only other step the Germans were
a mile deep; but several hundred yards able to take immediately to help Beyer’s
of pillbox-studded terrain still separated LXXX Corps was to shift the right
the bridgehead from the closest regiment boundary of the corps to the south to a
of the 80th Division. Nor had the two point just north of Wallendorf so that
assault regiments of the 80th Division yet the adjacent L I I I Corps (Rothkirch)
joined their holdings. On the other hand, could bear some of the burden. Thus
within the two divisions, thirteen infan- once the 80th U.S. Division was across
try battalions were across the river. the river and turned north, the opposi-
Visiting the sector on 12 February, tion came from units of the LIII Corps.
General Patton was so appalled by the Yet this corps had already been drained
condition of the roads and yet so con- of resources in efforts to shore up the
vinced that the crossings were no longer 9 Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 240.
in danger that he volunteered permission 10 MS # B–123 (Gersdorff).
106 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
faltering XIII Corps in the fight to save Although the Germans in most places
Pruem and could provide little more fought with determination, they could
than conglomerate artillery and antitank take credit for only part of the delay. T h e
units hastily converted to infantry roles.11 condition of supply roads west of the
T h e Germans nevertheless continued Sauer and continuing problems of get-
to make a telling fight of it. So long as ting men and heavy equipment across
they were able, with the help of the West the swollen river accounted for much of
Wall, weather, terrain, and river, to re- it. Without the little M29 cargo carrier
strict the size of the bridgehead, they (Weasel) , a kind of full-tracked jeep,
would at the same time restrict the vehicular traffic in the mud of the bridge-
amount of power, including tanks, that head would have ground to a halt. Nor
the Americans might bring to bear. did the 80th Division, in particular,
Six more days—12 through 17 Feb- launch any large-scale attacks, concen-
ruary—were to pass before the XII Corps trating instead on mopping up pockets
could carve a full-fledged bridgehead of resistance, jockeying for position on
from the inhospitable terrain. On the high ground north and northeast of Wal-
morning of the 12th the two assault regi- lendorf, and building up strength in
ments of the 80th Division finally linked supporting weapons and supplies before
their bridgeheads, and that evening the making a major effort to expand and
two divisions also joined. After 11 Feb- break out of the bridgehead.12 One un-
ruary, when the 417th Infantry reverted usual item of equipment introduced to
to control of its parent division, units of both the 5th and 80th Divisions in the
the 76th Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. bridgehead was the T34 multiple rocket
William R. Schmidt) began crossing the launcher, a 60-tube cluster of 4.5-inch
river to assume defensive positions along rocket launchers mounted on a Sherman
the Pruem as the 5th Division turned tank. 13
north, but this was a slow process simply
because the 5th’s advance was slow. The Vianden Bulge
On 14 February the 5th Division's
11th Infantry finally took Ernzen, south- T h e 80th Division was to begin its new
ernmost of the villages on the high advance early on 18 February, but at first
ground between the Sauer and the it would be directed less toward capture
Pruem, but only after artillery lined u p of Bitburg than toward helping elimi-
almost hub-to-hub on the other side of nate an enemy hold-out position lying
the Sauer joined with fighter-bombers to between the XII Corps bridgehead and
level the buildings. En route northward, the penetration of the VIII Corps at
a battalion of the 2d Infantry fought its Pruem. While the VIII Corps drove
way out of the woods as night came on south and southeast, the 80th Division
the 16th and entered Schankweiler,
12 80thDiv AAR, Feb 45.
thereby coming roughly abreast of the 13For an evaluation of these weapons, see Con-
80th Division, but the village was not stance McLaughlin Green, Harry C. Thomson, and
entirely in hand until the next day. Peter C . Roots, The Ordnance Department: Plan-
ning Munitions for War, UNITED STATES ARMY
IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955). pp.
11Ibid.; XII Corps G–2 Periodic Rpts. 329–30.
BITBURG AND T H E VIANDEN BULGE 107
was to move north and northeast, the Felber’s XIII Corps, severely straitened
two to join at the village of Mauel, on by the Pruem fighting, the northern half.
the Pruem River equidistant from For all the desire of the corps com-
Pruem and Bitburg. manders to withdraw, “Hitler, like a
T h e enemy’s hold-out position quickly small child, refused to part with even a
came to be known on the American side small portion of his toy, the West
as the Vianden bulge, after a town on the Wall.” When General Felber broached
Our. T h e bulge was some twenty-two the subject of withdrawal to the Seventh
miles wide from north to south, from the A r m y commander, General Branden-
90th Division’s forward lines near Hab- berger, the army commander had to re-
scheid to the 80th Division’s positions fuse even though he personally favored
north of Wallendorf. It was eleven to it.15 Brandenberger himself had recom-
thirteen miles deep, from the German mended the same thing to Army G r o u p
frontier along the Our to the Pruem. It B, but Field Marshal Model, severely
encompassed some of the most rugged piqued because Brandenberger had
terrain in the entire Eifel. A steep, failed to repulse the American drives,
heavily wooded bluff capped by lime- was in no mood to agree even had Hit-
stone ledges marks the east bank of the ler’s standfast orders not blocked the
Our. Behind the bluff and the pillboxes way. Model already was contemplating
of the West Wall, the land alternately relief of the Seventh A r m y commander.
rises and plunges in a series of high, Strained relations between the army
irregular ridges and deep ravines dotted and the army group commander came to
with thick stands of fir trees and laced a head only two days after the Americans
with twisting secondary roads. opened their drive to eliminate the
German commanders responsible for bulge. At a meeting at the Seventh
the Vianden bulge wanted to withdraw, Army’s forward headquarters on 20 Feb-
to exchange the extended, meandering ruary, Model castigated Brandenberger
periphery of the bulge for a considerably before his staff and relieved him. He
shorter line behind the Pruem River. immediately elevated General Felber,
Since they lacked the strength to counter- who was present, to command of the
attack the American penetrations to Seventh A r m y .
north and south, the bulge had little If the disgrace of relief hurt Branden-
tactical significance. Nor did the Ger- berger’s pride, it also may have saved his
mans have enough resources even to hold life. Hardly had he left when an Ameri-
the bulge for any appreciable time. can bomb landed on the headquarters
Once the boundary of the LIII Corps building, killing or severely wounding
was shifted southward to give Roth- several staff officers. T h e chief of staff,
kirch’s troops some of the burden of the stripped of his clothing by the blast, in-
bridgehead battle with the XII U.S. curred only a superficial head wound;
Corps, responsibility for the Vianden the new commander, General Felber,
bulge was split almost in half. Reduced who had just left the building for a fare-
to two weak volks grenadier divisions
and a few conglomerate units, the LIII 14MS # B–123 (Gersdorff).
Corps held the southern half; General 15 MS # B–494 (Felber).
108 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
well tour of his XIII Corps, also incurred the 6th Cavalry Group were to remain
a slight wound.16 to be taken over by the VIII Corps. With
Upon Felber’s advancement, General- two armored and three infantry divisions
leutnant Graf Ralph von Oriola assumed and a cavalry group, the VIII Corps
command of the XIII Corps. After study- would be strong enough to help elimi-
ing the situation in his sector, Oriola nate the Vianden bulge, despite an
made the same recommendation to Fel- elongated front. Time and almost super-
ber that Felber had made to Branden- human engineer efforts eventually would
berger—withdraw behind the Pruem. correct the supply situation. T h e attack
T h e new Seventh Army commander was to begin on 18 February at the same
found himself in the uncomfortable po- time the 80th Division of the XII Corps
sition of having to refuse the very request moved northeastward from Wallendorf.
he himself had made a few days before.17 T h e VIII Corps commander, General
Forced to deny a maneuver that he Middleton, planned to use only three of
actually endorsed, Felber devised a sim- his divisions, plus the cavalry group.
ple plan that assured him at least a Shifting the 90th Division and the 11th
measure of operational control of his Armored westward to enable greater con-
army. Working through his chief of staff, centration within the 6th Armored Di-
General Gersdorff, he told his subordi- vision’s sector along the Our, he directed
nate commanders they would in the fu- the 90th to drive southeastward from
ture receive two versions of all orders. Habscheid. T h e division was to gain the
One would direct continued defense and Pruem River from Pronsfeld all the way
was to be filed in official records. T h e to the appointed contact point with the
other would give the order Felber ac- XII Corps at Mauel. Using only one
tually intended; it was to be destroyed combat command at first, the 11th
after receipt. To justify withdrawals, op- Armored was to thrust due south to clear
erational reports to higher headquarters a pie-shaped sector between the 6th
were to be falsified, all withdrawals of- Armored and 90th Divisions, featured by
ficially to be made because of overwhelm- high ground overlooking the village of
ing American strength.18 Irrhausen on a relatively major east-west
On the American side, neither the road. Two days after the first attacks, the
bogging down of the VIII Corps attack 6th Armored Division was to strike
because of crumbling supply roads nor southeastward from a small bridgehead
General Bradley’s order of 10 February already established across the Our north
removing headquarters of the III Corps of the village of Dahnen, west of Irrhau-
from the Third Army was to be allowed sen. T h e 6th Cavalry Group (Col. Ed-
to thwart Patton’s offensive. Although ward M. Fickett) meanwhile was to cross
one division was to depart with the head- the Our on the right flank of the 6th
quarters, the 6th Armored Division and Armored and clear the southwestern
corner of the bulge. Both armored di-
16 Interview, Maj Fred Meyer with Gersdorff, visions were to be pinched out as the
28 Jul 53; MS # B–123 (Gersdorff). attacks of the cavalry and the 90th Di-
17 MS # B–052, XIII Corps, 18 February–21
March 1945 (Oriola).
vision converged along the south bound-
18Interview, Meyer with Gersdorff, 26 Jul 53. ary of the corps.
BITBURG AND T H E VIANDEN BULGE 109
WELCOME TO GERMANY
FROMTHE 6TH ARMORED
DIVISION
fantry, swinging southeast around the Wall without having to attack the pill-
359th’s right flank. Later he would com- boxes frontally across the swollen Our
mit the 358th Infantry around the right and u p the east bank escarpment. 20
flank of the 357th to make a broader, CCB made the first assault to break out
final swing southeast to the Pruem at of the bridgehead, while CCA, west of
Mauel. the Our and farther south opposite Das-
As this maneuver got underway on 20 burg, staged a mock crossing of the river.
February, the 6th Armored Division near Beginning at 0645, artillery laid an in-
Dahnen began to break out of its little
bridgehead across the Our. Established 20The 6th Armored Division, under the super-
vision of its commander, General Grow, published
originally by CCB as a diversion for the an unusual history. Providing a day-by-day factual
attack of the XII Corps on 6 February, account of all units, without embellishment, it is
the bridgehead was about two miles wide an excellent source. See Combat Record of the
Armored Division (Germany, 1945). Action
but less than a mile deep. It nevertheless Sixth
in the 20 February attack also is covered by ex-
provided a basis for penetrating the West tensive combat interviews.
BITBURG AND THE VIANDEN BULGE 111
21Interview, Meyer with Grow, 6 Aug 53. 2280th Div FO 31, 14 Feb 45.
BITBURG AND T H E VIANDEN BULGE 113
to die. By nightfall of the 21st, when the contact with contingents of the 80th Di-
mop-up was complete, 337 Germans had vision just north of Obergeckler.
emerged from the West Wall bunkers, Before the day was out, the 90th Di-
hands high in surrender. vision too had swept to the corps bound-
With the West Wall eliminated and ary. At a cost of some 600 casualties, of
Hill 408 taken, time for exploitation ap- which approximately 125 were killed,
peared at hand. As a first step in commit- three divisions and a cavalry group had
ment of the 4th Armored Division, the pierced the West Wall in the rough ter-
corps commander, General Eddy, at- rain of the Eifel and established a solid
tached Combat Command B to the 80th front along the Pruem River. I n the
Division. On 23 February the armor process, they took more than 3,000
drove northeast to take Sinspelt and its prisoners. 24
bridge over the Enz River on a main
highway nine miles due west of Bitburg. To Bitburg and the Kyll
It was no easy assignment, for in a last-
ditch effort to prevent breakout, the T h e Vianden bulge cleared, the XII
Germans rushed the remnants of the 2d Corps on 24 February was free to turn
Panzer Division down from Pruem.23 full attention to seizing Bitburg. Having
Nevertheless, as night fell Sinspelt and a assumed command of the corps tempo-
serviceable bridge over the Enz were rarily when on 22 February General
secure. Eddy left for a brief rest, the 4th
Also taken was the settlement of Armored Division commander, General
Obergeckler, along the corps boundary Gaffey, ordered CCB released from con-
just over a mile west and slightly north trol of the 80th Division and directed the
of Sinspelt. There a battalion of the entire armored division to strike north-
319th Infantry kept pace with the armor eastward. T h e armor was to jump the
and as night came was in position to wel- Pruem and Nims Rivers, cut major roads
come Colonel Davall's task force from leading north out of Bitburg, and build
the 6th Armored Division, approaching u p along the Kyll River two miles be-
from the north. yond the town. T h e 5th Infantry Di-
Task Force Davall had begun to move vision was to take the town and reach the
at 1630 from the village of Jucken, on a Kyll to the east and southeast.
secondary road six miles northwest of In the days since 18 February, while
Obergeckler. Brushing aside a show of the 80th Division had been expanding
resistance at a crossroads not quite two the XII Corps bridgehead to north and
miles from the starting point, the task northeast, the 5th Division had cleared
force continued southward through the the west bank of the Pruem to a point
night, gathering in surprised Germans only six miles southwest of Bitburg. At
along the way. At 0740 the next morning, the same time, the division had re-
24 February, Task Force Davall made grouped and turned over much of its
Pruem River line in the south to the
76th Division.25 Once the 5th had crossed talion of the 2d and two of the 10th
the Pruem, contingents of the 76th also Infantry were across the stream farther
were to cross and drive southeast to pro- south and had cut the Echternach-
tect the 5th’s right flank. Bitburg highway. T h e 2d Battalion, 2d
From the first it was apparent that Infantry, took a bridge over the Nims
crossing the Pruem River would be con- intact, and one of the 10th Infantry’s
siderably easier than crossing the Sauer. battalions crossed over the ruins of a
There was nothing to equal the clifflike demolished bridge. A regiment of the
terrain along the Sauer, and the worst of 76th Division meanwhile crossed the
the flood waters resulting from the early Pruem through the 10th Infantry’s
thaw had passed. Yet hardly anyone bridgehead and also jumped the Nims.
could have anticipated how “unquestion- T h e fate of Bitburg was sealed even
ably easy” the crossing would be.26Start- had there been no 4th Armored Division
ing at 2300 the night of the 24th, a racing northeastward along the left flank
battalion of the 2d Infantry crossed the of the infantry. As early as the evening
river within an hour and took high of 25 February, a day before the infantry
ground just north of the village of crossed the Nims, a task force of the 4th
Wettlingen. An hour later a battalion of Armored had a bridgehead over the sec-
the 10th Infantry crossed a few miles to ond river a mile and a half northwest of
the south on the heels of a patrol that Bitburg. With planes of the XIX Tac-
found a serviceable vehicular ford. Only tical Air Command almost constantly
scattered mortar and small arms fire op- overhead, the bulk of two combat com-
posed either crossing. mands got across the Nims on 26 Feb-
As the infantrymen fanned out to the ruary and spread out to northeast and
north and northeast, the story was much east. Part of the 80th Division’s infantry
the same everywhere. “Germans came followed in the wake of the armor to
forward bearing white flags and sickly bring in the prisoners, while one regi-
smiles.” 27 By nightfall of 26 February, ment moved north and established con-
one battalion of the 2d Infantry stood on tact with the VIII Corps at Mauel.
the Nims River less than a mile from the On the German side, the new Seventh
western edge of Bitburg. Another bat- Army commander, General Felber, ap-
pealed to his superiors time after time
25On 27 February, as Pfc. Herman C. Wallace for help, but to little avail. In the end,
of the 76th Division’s 301st Engineer Combat Bat-
talion was helping clear mines from a road near Army Group B managed to detach a de-
the river, he stepped on an S-mine, an antiperson- pleted infantry division, the 246th, from
nel device that when activated normally leaps the Fifth Panzer Army to the north, but
upward to explode in the air. Hearing the sound
indicating that his step had activated the mine, the division began to move toward Bit-
Private Wallace spared those around him by hold- burg only on 27 February. That was far
ing his foot on the mine and placing his other too late. 28
firmly beside it. This confined the explosion to the
ground but inevitably killed him in the process. As early as 26 February fighter-bomber
He was awarded the Medal of Honor posthu- pilots reported the Germans evacuating
mously.
26 The Fifth Infantry Division in the E T O ,
“Across the Sauer Into the Siegfried Line.” 28 MS # B–831,Seventh Army, 20 February-26
27Ibid. March 1945 (Felber).
BITBURG AND T H E VIANDEN BULGE 115
Bitburg. Well they might, for by night- prepared defenses lay behind, and only
fall of the 26th a task force of the 4th a miracle could enable the Germans to
Armored Division had reached the west man another solid front in the Eifel.
bank of the Kyll two miles northeast of T h e Third Army commander, General
the town, and by nightfall of the 27th a Patton, meanwhile had been turning his
battalion of the 5th Division’s 11th In- attention to one more detail that had to
fantry occupied a village a mile southeast be attended to before he could make a
of the town while another battalion final thrust to the Rhine. Striding into
poised in the southern fringe of Bitburg the 76th Division’s command post early
itself. Before midday on 28 February the on 26 February, Patton placed a fist on
11th Infantry delivered the coup de the operations map at the ancient Roman
grâce to a town already severely battered city of Trier on the Moselle.29
by American planes and artillery. Almost unnoticed in the bigger pic-
Beginning on 4 February with the ture of the Western Front, an infantry
start of the VIII Corps offensive aimed division and an armored division of the
at Pruem, two corps of the Third Army Third Army’s XX Corps had been nib-
in just over three weeks had penetrated bling away at the German position south
the West Wall in some of the most for- of Trier that had become known as the
bidding terrain to be found along the Saar-Moselle triangle. T h e XX Corps
Western Front. At its widest point, the from the south and the 76th Division
penetration measured more than twenty- from the north, Patton directed, were to
five miles. T h e VIII Corps at the end of envelop Trier.
February stood on the Pruem while the
XII Corps bulged eastward to the Kyll.
Although the Rhine still lay some fifty 291st Lt. Joseph J. Hutnik and Tech. 4 Leonard
Kobrick, eds., W e Ripened Fast-The Unofficial
miles away and terrain still might con- History of the Seventy-Sixth Infantry Division
stitute a major obstacle, the enemy’s (Germany, n.d.), p. 102.
CHAPTER VII
tacked toward Nennig and two other the Orscholz Switch a powerful force for
villages on the Moselle floodplain north- another counterattack. While the 94th
west of Tettingen and Butzdorf, the go- Division was preparing its two thrusts,
ing was less easy, but as night came on 15 the enemy’s 11th Panzer Division had
January these three villages forming the ‘been en route to the very sector General
western anchor of the Orscholz Switch Malony had chosen for his first attacks.
also were in hand. Having been scheduled for the Arden-
T h e rapidity with which the two nes counteroffensive but not committed,
thrusts had broken into the switch posi- the 11th Panzer Division early in January
tion was attributable in large measure was shifted south across the army group
to the fact that the enemy’s 416th Infan- boundary, which bisected the northern
try Division, responsible for the sector corner of the Saar-Moselle triangle. With
since November, was gravely overex- the shift the panzer division became a
tended. Only two regiments held the reserve for Army Group G.
entire Orscholz Switch, while the third T h e commander of Army Group G,
defended in the West Wall beyond the General Blaskowitz, planned a variety of
Saar. Only the division replacement exercises in which he would use the
battalion was available as a reserve.3 panzer division in concert with other
Before dawn on 15 January, even as units to complement a faltering Opera-
the 3d Battalion, 376th Infantry, moved tion N O R D W I N D in Alsace, but for
toward Nennig and the other villages on lack of additional units, none of the
the Moselle floodplain, the 416th Divi- plans had materialized. I n the end,
sion’s replacement battalion counter- Blaskowitz assigned the panzer division
attacked at Butzdorf and Tettingen. Al- to the LXXXII Corps (General der
though close-in fighting raged for a time Infanterie Walther Hahm) , one of three
in both villages, the Germans in the end corps operating directly under the army
had to fall back. Of some 400 who made group without an intervening army
the counterattack, scarcely more than a headquarters. The LXXXII Corps was
hundred escaped; some died from minor responsible for a long stretch of the Saar
wounds after prolonged exposure in the and for the Orscholz Switch. In order to
subfreezing cold.4 relieve pressure on the embattled Sev-
As General Malony had hoped, the enth Army in the Ardennes, the 11th
attacks had prompted German counter- Panzer Division was to make a strong
attack with attendant German losses. armored raid out of the Orscholz Switch,
What he had not counted on was a coin- three and a half miles to the southwest to
cidence that provided the Germans in heights on the east bank of the Moselle
overlooking the meeting point of the
8 MS # B-573, Battles of the 416th Infantry German and Luxembourg frontiers.
Division Between the Moselle and the Saar From Target date for the raid was mid-Janu-
5 October 1944 to 17 February 1945 (Oberleutnant
Karl Redmer, after consultation with various of- ary. T h e axis of attack was to run directly
ficers of the 416th Div, LXXXII Corps, and ad- through Butzdorf and Tettingen. 5
jacent units): MS # B-090, Rhineland Campaign
(Generalleutnant Kurt Pflieger, CG 416th Diu). 5MSS # B-417, The 11th Panzer Division in the
Ibid., Byrnes, History of the 94th Infantry Di- Rhineland, 20 December 1944–10 February 1945
vision in World War II, pp. 95–98. (Generalleutnant Wend von Wietersheim, CG 11th
T H E SAAR-MOSELLE TRIANGLE 119
CREW OF A 3-INCH GUN on the watch for German tanks in the Saar-Moselle
triangle.
For want of fuel and because capacity 30 assault guns, and 2 relatively full-
of bridges over the Saar was limited, strength panzer grenadier regiments.6
some 50 Mark V (Panther) tanks of the American pilots reported German
11th Panzer Division had to remain east armor crossing the Saar during the day of
of the Saar. T h e raid would be entrusted 16 January, so that when night came the
to 30 Mark IV (medium) tanks, 20 to 94th Division was fully alert. At Butz-
dorf, Tettingen, Nennig, and the other
Unless otherwise noted, sources for 11th Panzer
Panzer Division); # B–066, Engagements Fought Division actions are as cited in the footnote above.
by LXXXII Army Corps During the Period 2 Note that some of the German officers, having
December 1944 to 27 March 1945 (Oberst Ludwig worked without benefit of contemporary records,
Graf von Ingelheim, CofS LXXXII Corps); # sometimes erred on dates. Byrnes in his 94th Di-
B–573 (Redmer). See also Magna Bauer, Army vision history provides a detailed lower-level
Group G, January 1945, MS prepared in OCMH German account, apparently from prisoner inter-
to complement this volume. rogations.
120 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
villages, the men worked through 17 cupied many of the houses. Again close-
January to lay antitank mines and bring in fighting raged.
u p tank destroyers and additional ba- Throughout the afternoon the lone
zookas. (The 94th Division as yet had no American company in Butzdorf fought
attached tank battalion.) Through the back, but as night approached the sur-
night the sound of tracked vehicles vivors controlled only a few buildings.
emanated from woods and villages to the So fire-swept was the open ground be-
north and northeast. Then at 0300 on 18 tween Tettingen and Butzdorf that the
January a patrol returned with two Americans could bring neither reinforce-
prisoners who confirmed all suspicions: ments nor supplies forward. As darkness
the prisoners were from 11th Panzer fell General Malony authorized the sur-
Division. vivors in Butzdorf to fall back.
At dawn on the 18th the storm broke. T h e company commander in Butz-
For twenty minutes German mortars dorf, 1st Lt. David F. Stafford, already
and artillery worked over Butzdorf and had arrived independently at the con-
Tettingen, then from the northeast from clusion that withdrawal was the only
the nearby village of Sinz emerged a course left to him short of surrender or
long column of tanks, assault guns, half- annihilation. Tearing doors off their
tracks bulging with greatcoated Ger- hinges to serve as litters for the seriously
mans, and infantry on foot. Despite wounded, what was left of the company
heavy concentrations of defensive artil- slowly pulled back through Stygian dark-
lery fire, the Germans kept coming. As ness and a heavy snowfall while guns of
half the force struck Butzdorf, the other the 284th and 919th Field Artillery
half swung in a wide arc to hit Tettin- Battalions fired covering concentrations.
gen. When the survivors reached Tettin-
For more than an hour confusion gen, they found a fresh battalion of the
reigned in both villages as German tanks 376th Infantry in position to defend that
and assault guns shot u p the landscape village. Although no one could have
and infantrymen of both sides fought at known it at the time, the high-water
close quarters among the damaged build- mark of the raid through the Orscholz
ings. Mines disabled some of the German Switch had come and gone. T h e Ger-
vehicles, and a 57-mm. antitank gun mans had taken Butzdorf, and three days
caught one tank broadside, but in the later, during the night of 2 1 January,
main it was a job for intrepid infantry- they succeeded in fighting their way into
men stalking with bazookas. half the village of Nennig on the Moselle
floodplain and into a castle northeast of
Shortly after 0900 the Germans fell
Nennig, but that was the end. Handi-
back, but just before noon ten tanks
capped by absence of heavy tanks,
again emerged from Sinz, took up hull
severely restricted by the snow-covered
defilade positions and persistently terrain (one thrust on Nennig bogged
pounded the two villages. At 1430 three down when the tanks foundered in an
battalions of German infantry launched a antitank ditch concealed by snowdrifts) ,
fresh assault, this time directed primarily and punished by artillery fire directed
at Butzdorf. Again the Germans oc- from an observation post on heights west
T H E SAAR-MOSELLE TRIANGLE 121
REMOVING
GERMANDEADAFTERFIGHTING
I N NENNIG
of the Moselle, the 11th Panzer Division penetration at Orscholz, combined with
could only slow the tempo of the 94th that at Tettingen, might be exploited
Division's thrusts.7 later into a double envelopment of the
Hardly had the echoes of the fighting center of the switch position.
with the panzer division died down when Orscholz perched atop a ridge with
General Malony aimed another limited snow-covered open fields gently sloping
objective attack into the German line. to the south. T h e only logical covered
This time he chose to strike at the approach to the village from the posi-
eastern anchor of the Orscholz Switch, at tions held by the 94th Division was
Orscholz itself, where a regiment of the through the Saarburg Forest, southwest
overextended 416th Infantry Division and west of the village. Through this
still was responsible for the defense. A forest the 3 0 1 s t Infantry commander,
Col. Roy N. Hagerty, planned to send
7For a description of German difficulties, see
MSS # B-417 (Wietersheim) and # B-066 (In-
his 1st Battalion in a surprise attack just
gelheim). before dawn on 2 0 January. T h e battal-
122 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
ion was to reach the east-west Oberleu- Although the regimental commander,
ken-Orscholz highway running through Colonel Hagerty, sent a company from
the woods, then to turn eastward and another battalion to reinforce the attack,
strike at Orscholz. every effort to get across the clearing
As the men of the 1st Battalion moved merely increased the casualty toll. One
into position, the night was bitterly cold company lost sixty men to antipersonnel
and a swirling snowstorm made night- mines alone. Tank destroyers tried to
time control even more difficult than help, but the ground in the clearing was
usual. Daylight had come before the two marshy and not frozen solidly enough to
assault companies were ready to cross the support the self-propelled guns. Patrols
line of departure, a stretch of dragon’s sent out after nightfall in search of a
teeth in a clearing a few hundred yards route past the German defenses found no
south of the Oberleuken-Orscholz high- solution.
way. Company B on the left moved si- When daylight came again, the regi-
lently forward, not a shot barring the mental executive officer, Lt. Col. Donald
way. Company A on the right was less C. Hardin, sent to replace Colonel Miller
fortunate. As the men passed among the as battalion commander, told Colonel
projections of the concrete antitank Hagerty it would take an entire regiment
obstacle a drumbeat of explosions filled to push the attack successfully. Although
the air. Mines. the corps commander, General Walker,
Company B meanwhile continued earlier had modified the 1-battalion
silently through the forest, reached the restriction imposed on the 94th Divi-
highway, and turned east toward Or- sion’s attacks and had granted approval
scholz. T h e advance guard overran for using as much as a regiment to ex-
several German machine gun positions, ploit a penetration,* General Malony saw
but in general the move was unopposed. no reason to reinforce what was in effect
Reaching the edge of the woods over- a failure at Orscholz. He gave his permis-
looking Orscholz, the company com- sion to abandon the effort.
mander, Capt. Herman C. Straub, halted Captain Straub and Company B in the
his men to await the rest of the battalion. meantime had not long remained un-
At the line of departure, the battalion detected at the woods line overlooking
commander, Lt. Col. George F. Miller, Orscholz. Learning by radio of the mis-
had tried to shift Company A to the left fortune that had befallen the rest of the
to follow in the footsteps of Company B, battalion, Captain Straub shifted his
but too late. T h e explosions in the mine- men south of the Oberleuken-Orscholz
field had alerted the Germans in pill- highway to a position adaptable to all-
boxes and communications trenches round defense. With the aid of protective
overlooking the clearing. Company A fires from the 301st field artillery, the
came under a withering crossfire from company held, but not without serious
automatic weapons. As the men fell to losses aggravated by the bitter cold.
the ground for protection, mortars and With the attack abandoned, word went
artillery ploughed the clearing with out to Captain Straub to fight his way
deadly bursts. Among those killed was
Colonel Miller. 8 94th Div G–3 Jnl, 18 Jan 45,
T H E SAAR-MOSELLE TRIANGLE 123
out. Straub answered that he “could not tanks and set up a third for the kill.
comply.” Many of the men were seriously Spotting three tanks advancing up a
wounded; at least one already had narrow street, the men climbed to the
frozen to death; and ammunition was top of a house, then crept from one roof-
almost gone. Although Colonel Hagerty top to another to gain a position above
himself talked with Straub by radio, the tanks. T h e first rocket from Pietrzah’s
outlining a plan to cover the company’s bazooka missed, but a second sent the
withdrawal with smoke, the captain lead tank up in flames. Another rocket
again said withdrawal was impossible. put a quick end to the tank in the rear.
Every attempt to move, he said, brought T h e third tank, trapped between the
heavy enemy fire that pinned the men other two, fell ready prey to a rifle gren-
to their positions. ade fired by a man on the ground, Pvt.
Company B and attachments, a force Albert J. Beardsley.10
of approximately 230 men, raised a white In the attack at Nennig, the battalion
flag.9 of the 376th Infantry had the assistance
of a company of armored infantrymen.
Expanding the Penetration This presaged introduction of a new
force in the Orscholz Switch, a combat
For another day after the misfortune command of the 8th Armored Division.
at Orscholz, those units of the 94th T h e armored division, yet to see combat,
Division that had penetrated the western had rushed across France earlier in the
end of the switch position at Tettingen month in reaction to Operation NORD-
and Nennig would be fully occupied WIND. Not used in that fight, the divi-
fending off the 11th Panzer Division. sion had been attached temporarily to
Only on 23 January would the division the Third Army for combat training.
be free to recoup the minor loss of T h e army commander, General Patton,
ground incurred and return again to saw in the attachment an opportunity to
consolidating and expanding the pene- give the division battle experience while
tration. at the same time remedying the 94th
Renewed limited objective attacks Division’s lack of attached tanks. He gave
began early on 23 January when a bat- General Malony the 8th Armored’s Com-
talion of the 376th Infantry moved to bat Command A (Brig. Gen. Charles F.
retake the northern half of Nennig, lost Colson) , but stipulated that the armor
to the Germans the preceding night. It
took all day to root a stubborn enemy
from the damaged houses and at the
10On the same day, T. Sgt. Nicholas Oresko led
same time eliminate five Mark IV tanks. his platoon of the 302d Infantry in an attack to
Two men, T . Sgt. Nathaniel Isaacman, clear German-held pillboxes near Tettingen. Ser-
a platoon sergeant, and Pvt. John F. geant Oresko singlehandedly knocked out a ma-
chine gun that was pinning down his men with
Pietrzah, alone accounted for two of the fire from a bunker. Wounded in the hip, he re-
fused evacuation and again advanced alone to
9301st Inf and 94th Div AAR’s, Jan 45; 94th Div knock out another machine gun firing from a field
G–3 Jnl, 21–22 Jan 45; Byrnes, History of the 94th fortification. Still Oresko refused evacuation until
Infantry Division, p. 138; Combat interview with his platoon’s mission had been accomplished. He
Hagerty. Direct quotation is from Hagerty. subsequently received the Medal of Honor.
124 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
was to be used for only forty-eight the 376th Infantry assigned to take the
hours.11 castle was, by the early hours of 25
Prodded by General Walker and his January, so worn out from the fight at
staff officers at XX Corps headquarters,12 Nennig that the commander urged that
Malony was determined to get as much some other unit be given the task. T h e
help as possible from the combat com- CCA commander, General Colson, vol-
mand before the time limit expired. He unteered his unit. At dawn on 25 Janu-
intended to use the armor to help turn ary, half the combat command, organized
the limited penetration of the Orscholz as a task force under Lt. Col. Arthur D.
Switch into a genuine breach that might Poinier, commander of the 7th Armored
be exploited quickly into breakout. Infantry Battalion, jumped off, only to
Malony’s plan revolved around cap- discover quickly that the 11th Panzer
ture of Sinz, northeast of Butzdorf and Division still had a lot of fight left. So
Tettingen, and wooded high ground perturbed at the slow pace of the day’s
northwest of Sinz. From there, in a sub- advance was the corps commander, Gen-
sequent stage, he planned to take Mun- eral Walker, that he removed all restric-
zingen, a mile and a half to the east, a tions on the size of the forces the 94th
village crowning the hogback ridge lead- Division might commit. “Go ahead,” he
ing deep into the Saar-Moselle triangle. said, “and use them all.” 13At the same
Holding the high ground northwest of time, he tacitly agreed to extending the
Sinz and at Munzingen, the 94th Divi- time limit on use of the combat com-
sion would be all the way through the mand an extra day—through 27 January.
Orscholz Switch, in a favorable position As finally decided, two regiments and
for exploitation. the combat command were to make the
T h e role of the armor in the Sinz attack. On the left, the 302d Infantry
attack was to advance northeast from the (Col. Earle A. Johnson) was to pave the
vicinity of Nennig, clear pillboxes along way for the armor; on the right, the
a road leading into Nennig from the 376th Infantry (Col. Harold H. Mc-
west, then help infantry of the 94th Clune) was to move on Sinz. Avoiding
Division take the village. Before com- open ground south of Sinz, the regiment
mitting the armor, General Malony in- was to attack through woods southwest
tended his infantry to occupy high and west of the village and link with the
ground northeast of Nennig, including armor along the highway in the woods
the castle occupied earlier by units of for the assault on the village itself. A
the 11th Panzer Division. That would set battalion of the 302d, operating directly
up more favorable conditions for using under division control, meanwhile was
the armor. to recapture Butzdorf, lost on the first
As events developed, the battalion of day of German counterattacks.
T h e most encouraging success on 26
11In addition to official 8th Armored Div records,
see also 94th Div G–3 Jnl for the period; Capt. January came on the right. There an
Charles R. Leach, In Tornado’s Wake—A History antipersonnel minefield hidden by the
of the 8th Armored Division (8th Armored Divi- deep snow stymied one battalion, but
sion Association, 1956); Gay Diary, entry of 17
Jan 45.
1294th Div G–3 Jnl, 23–26 Jan 45. 13 94thDiv G–3 Jnl, 25 Jan 45.
T H E SAAR-MOSELLE TRIANGLE 125
two companies of another battalion two infantry companies at last gained a
slipped past and gained the woods over- toehold in the village against stalwart de-
looking Sinz from the west. Although fenders of the 11th Panzer Division. In
three German tanks supported by infan- the process, CCA’s 18th Tank Battalion
try counterattacked, bazookas accounted knocked out eight German tanks but lost
for two of the tanks and drove the other six of its own.
away. Artillery fire took care of the Ger- When General Malony asked to keep
man infantry. T h e two companies dug the combat command to finish taking
in for the night, protecting their left and the village the next day, General Walker
rear with the 376th Infantry’s reserve declined. T h e period of indoctrination
battalion, which got safely past the mine- was over. T h e 94th Division was to take
field and into the woods by following a rest, then later to resume its limited
the route the two leading companies objective attacks. 14
had taken.
According to the plan, the armor was Broadening the Effort
to have linked with this force along the
highway bisecting the forest, but the Almost coincident with the arrival- of
armor and the 302d Infantry on the left a new directive from General Walker
ran into trouble. Intense machine gun to resume the attack but to employ no
fire from the north stopped the infantry- more than a regiment at a time, the
men, while the armor after getting into February thaw and the rains came. Be-
the western edge of the woods came to ginning on 2 February rain fell for eight
a halt before a deep antitank ditch. days, turning foxholes into frigid dirty
T h e next day, 27 January, as the corps bathtubs and roads into oozing ribbons
commander, General Walker, warned of mud. Yet the attacks began, concen-
that the armored combat command trating on objectives designed to obtain
would be withdrawn that night, General eventual control of the hogback ridge
Malony committed a battalion of his leading into the depths of the Saar-
reserve, the 301st Infantry, to help clear Moselle triangle.
a path for the tanks. Although armored Malony first turned the 302d Infantry
engineers during the night had bridged against Kampholz Woods, southeast of
the antitank ditch, the fresh infantry Tettingen on the western slopes of the
battalion had to spend all morning tak- ridge. Resistance was stubborn, partic-
ing out machine guns and an antitank ularly from a nest of pillboxes on ap-
gun before the armor could cross. Soon proaches to the woods from the west.
after midday CCA’s tanks at last started T h e last of the pillboxes held out until
forward and quickly linked with men of 8 February.
the 376th Infantry overlooking Sinz. Meanwhile, Malony reverted to his
Assault on the village itself was original plan of gaining a hold on the
delayed, first by a counterattack against hogback ridge at Munzingen by first
the left flank in the woods, then by ac- taking Sinz. Moving just before daylight
curate German tank fire from hills and on 7 February, a battalion of the 301st
woods north and east of Sinz. Darkness
was falling when a platoon of tanks and 1494th Div G–3 Jnl, 27 Jan 45.
126 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
elaborate program of corps and division problem. Company B’s 1st Platoon, for
artillery fire was designed to isolate the example, lost all but sixteen men in a
battlefield but to guard surprise by be- minefield before the platoon sergeant, T.
ginning only as the infantry moved to the Sgt. Henry E. Crandall, managed to blast
attack.17 a path through with primacord. T h e
T o exploit success, General Walker Germans in a nearby pillbox kept
had no armored force immediately avail- Crandall and his trapped men under
able. T h e 8th Armored Division early in vicious machine gun fire until the sur-
February had passed to another com- vivors got past the mines, then surren-
mand. Even though the 10th Armored dered docilely.
Division (Maj. Gen. William H. H. A battalion of the 376th Infantry had
Morris, Jr.) had been attached to the a similar experience in Bannholz Woods,
XX Corps on 11 February, General north of Sinz, the scene of such bitter
Eisenhower had specified that the divi- fighting in the earlier limited objective
sion be employed only with his approval, attacks. Before dawn, men of this bat-
a reflection of post-Ardennes insistence talion pushed past unwary German de-
on a sturdy reserve. Walker asked Eisen- fenders to gain the far edge of the woods
hower, through General Patton, for per- with little difficulty, then later rounded
mission to use the 10th Armored, but up the prisoners. Totally different from
received only a promise that the armor the panzer grenadiers, these Germans
would be released once the infantry had no stomach for the fight.
achieved a clear breakthrough.18 Walker By this time, the 94th Division’s lack
took the reply as sufficient authority to of tank support had been remedied with
direct General Morris to reconnoiter attachment of the 778th Tank Battalion,
zones of advance and prepare for early which participated in the 376th Infan-
commitment . try’s attack. Tanks also came to the
Rain was falling when before daylight rescue of men of the 302d Infantry in
on 19February men of the 301st Infantry their drive from Kampholz Woods to
moved east from Sinz up the slopes of the the crest of the hogback ridge along the
hogback ridge in the direction of Mun- forward line of Orscholz Switch pill-
zingen. In less than two hours the pattern boxes. There the infantrymen were tak-
the fighting would assume became ap- ing comparatively severe casualties from
parent. An occasional group of Germans pillboxes manned by troops of the 416th
would fight back tenaciously, particularly Infantry Division until, with daylight,
when protected by pillboxes or bunk- the tanks arrived.
ers, but in the main the opposition bore Only a few hours after dawn on 19
no comparison to that put u p earlier by February, the fact was clear that the 94th
the panzer division. By daylight the 1st Division had penetrated the Orscholz
and 3d Battalions held the crest of the Switch, whereupon General Malony
ridge, just short of Munzingen. urged General Walker to send the 10th
Antipersonnel mines were the biggest Armored Division through. Walker in
turn telephoned the Third Army com-
1794th Div FO 11, 16 Feb 45. mander, General Patton, for permission.
18Combat Interview with XX Corps G–3, 5 Mar
45; Gay Diary, entry of 18 Feb 45. Unable to reach General Bradley at 12th
128 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
Army Group headquarters, Patton tele- cleared two villages along the line of
phoned directly to SHAEF, where the departure. Not long after midnight the
operations officer, Maj. Gen. Harold R. combat command coiled for the night
Bull, agreed but with the proviso that almost halfway up the triangle.
the armored division be returned to the CCA encountered greater difficulties
SHAEF reserve as soon as the Saar- at first. One column, attacking u p the
Moselle triangle was clear. Since Patton highway astride the hogback ridge, ran
already was thinking of going beyond into mines and fire from assault guns in
the original objectives if all went the first village beyond Munzingen and
smoothly, the restriction rankled. He at each of two succeeding villages, but in
had to accept it nevertheless and notified all cases the result was more a question of
Walker to turn the armor loose.19 delay than genuine opposition. At one
T h e delay in permission to use the point the column overran a regimental
armor held up the exploitation until the command post.
next day, 20 February, but once com- CCA’s left column, hampered by a
mitted, the armor was not to be denied. traffic jam and an unmapped American
Moving along the west side of the tri- minefield at the line of departure near
angle close to the Moselle, the Reserve Sinz, got moving only after full daylight
Combat Command (Col. Wade C. Gat- had come; but by midafternoon it was
chell), with the 94th Division’s 376th apparent the column would quickly
Infantry attached, was to advance almost make u p the lost time. Although antitank
thirteen miles to the northern tip of the minefields and craters blown in the roads
triangle while CCA (Brig. Gen. Edwin forced the tanks to move cross-country at
W. Piburn) drove north u p the center of the beginning of the thrust, once high
the triangle. When CCR reached the tip, ground three miles northeast of Sinz was
CCA was to swing northeast, hoping to taken the column returned to the roads.
take advantage of enemy confusion to Bypassing opposition, one task force
seize bridges across the Saar at Kanzem streaked north and then northeast along
and Wiltingen, and thereby point a dag- secondary roads and as darkness came
ger toward occupied high ground north of Tawern,
Except for the problem of herding almost at the tip of the triangle.
prisoners, CCR’s advance on the 20th T h e next day, 21 February, CCR re-
was almost a road march, even though newed its advance and reached the ex-
the attack was delayed until midday treme tip of the triangle, while the rest
while a battalion of the 376th Infantry of CCA headed for Tawern, eliminating
last remnants of opposition. T h e 94th
19 Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 244; Byrnes, Division meanwhile was clearing that
History of the 94th Infantry Division, p. 254; Gay part of the triangle southeast of the
Diary, entry of 19 Feb 45. Intentions to go beyond armored columns and taking the remain-
the triangle are clear from XX Corps FO 16, 19
Feb 45.
ing pillboxes of the Orscholz Switch from
20An excellent account of the 10th Armored Di- the rear.
vision’s action is to be found in Maj. J. Cantey, After two days of exploitation the Saar-
et al., The 10th U.S. Armored Division in the Saar-
Moselle Triangle, a research report prepared at Moselle triangle was clear at a cost to the
The Armored School, May, 1949. Germans in dead and wounded of an
T H E SAAR-MOSELLE TRIANGLE 129
estimated 3,000 and as many more cap- 150 feet wide, still swollen from the early
tured. Only in the 94th Division, where February thaw.
the thick antipersonnel minefields en- Through the night convoys carrying
countered on 19 February raised the divi- assault boats toiled toward the Saar, but
sion’s casualties to over a thousand dawn came in the 10th Armored Divi-
wounded, were U.S. losses severe. sion’s sector with no sign of the boats.
Alerted to make the crossing opposite
Crossing the Saar the village of Ockfen, a mile and a half
northeast of Saarburg, men of the at-
Despite the speed of the 10th Armored tached 376th Infantry took cover in
Division’s advance, the bridges over the houses and cellars.
Saar River at Kanzem and Wiltingen Southeast of Saarburg, sixty 12-man
were blown before the tanks got there. assault boats and five motorboats were
Operating on the theory of using the available for the assault battalions of the
armor until SHAEF said stop, General 301st and the 302d Infantry; the first
Walker in midafternoon of 21 February boat arrived an hour after the planned
ordered General Morris to jump the assault time of 0400 (22 February) . Con-
river. During the night the armor was to cealed by the darkness and a dense fog,
cross northeast of Saarburg while the men of both battalions then prepared to
94th Division crossed southeast of the cross, one battalion opposite the east
town. T h e bridgeheads then were to be bank village of Serrig, the other at the
joined, whereupon the 94th was to pro- west bank village of Taben.
tect the armor’s south flank while Morris Carrying a squad of Company C, 302d
drove on Trier. T h e crossings of the Infantry, under Staff Sgt. John F. Smith,
Saar then could be linked with the long- the first boat pushed out into the river
held bridgehead to the southeast at at Taben at 0650. T h e fog still held, and
Saarlautern.21 so difficult was the terrain that the Ger-
Influencing General Walker’s desire mans had positioned few defenders at
for a quick crossing before the enemy the site.
could recover from the debacle in the T h e road leading down the west bank
triangle was the nature of the terrain on was steep and winding. Along the far
the far bank, plus the fortifications of the bank ran a in-foot retaining wall, backed
West Wall. Almost everywhere the east by precipitous wooded slopes leading to
bank dominates the approaches from the Hoecker Hill, an eminence three-fourths
west, usually with great wooded, clifflike of a mile from the river. Finding a ladder
slopes. West Wall pillboxes arranged in in place, Sergeant Smith and his men
the normal pattern of mutual support quickly scaled the retaining wall and
covered all the slopes but were in great- captured the startled occupants of a pill-
est depth, sometimes up to three miles, box. Other boatloads of men crossed with
at those points where the terrain afforded little enemy interference, pulled them-
any real possibility for an assault cross- selves up the clifflike sides of Hoecker
ing. T h e river itself was from 120 to Hill, and sent patrols upstream and
down to broaden the base of the bridge-
21XX Corps FO 17, 21 Feb 45. head. Before the morning was well along,
130 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
all the 1st Battalion was across and head- the crossing site that the 81st Chemical
ing north toward Serrig to link with men (Smoke Generator) Company could get
of the 301st Infantry, while another bat- no smoke generators into position to
talion crossed to defend Hoecker Hill screen the site. Neither could the assault
and the south flank. companies of the attached 376th Infantry
T h e crossing went less smoothly op- get down to the river.
posite Serrig. There the assault boats for I n the brief time between daylight and
the 3d Battalion, 301st Infantry, were late afternoon of 22 February, the Ger-
even later arriving, and the noise of man- mans had managed to supplement the
handling them to the water's edge alerted local defense battalions in this part of
troops of a local defense battalion in the the West Wall with those remnants of
east bank pillboxes. Although German the 256th Volks Grenadier Division that
fire was blind in the dark and the fog, it had escaped across the Saar ahead of the
served to scatter the boats of the leading American armor. Although ill-prepared
company so that the men touched down to counter such a quick thrust against
with little organization remaining. Since the Saar line, the LXXXII Corps com-
few of the boats survived the swift cur- mander, General Hahm, was helped
rent on the return journey, through the when his southern boundary was shifted
morning only one company, operating northward to coincide roughly with the
in little isolated groups, was on the east east end of the Orscholz Switch, thereby
bank. One group under the company freeing one regiment of the 416th Infan-
commander, Capt. Charles W. Donovan, try Division that had not been involved
nevertheless took a few buildings on the in the Orscholz fight. He also benefited
northern edge of Serrig and held them from the fact that one of the panzer
until the afternoon when other men of grenadier battalions of the 11th Panzer
the 3d Battalion crossed in a fresh batch Division had yet to leave the area. These
of assault boats equipped with outboard forces General- Hahm would-be able to
motors. White phosphorus shells fired by bring to bear as the bridgehead fight
the 81st Chemical Battalion and smoke continued. 23
pots emplaced at the crossing site helped At Ockfen General Morris had no
make up for loss of the fog cover. As alternative but to postpone the 376th
night fell on 22 February, Serrig was Infantry's assault again until after night-
secure, the bridgeheads of the 301st and fall. Beginning an hour before midnight,
302d Infantry Regiments joined. two battalions, each in column of com-
At Ockfen, northeast of Saarburg, the panies, at last began to cross.
10th Armored Division's assault boats In the northernmost sector, that of the
finally arrived at midday. Under pressure 3d Battalion, the darkness was all that
from Patton, 22General Morris ordered a was required. T h e leading company
crossing in late afternoon; but by this reached the east side of the river without
time the fog had dissipated and German drawing a single round of enemy fire,
machine gun fire from West Wall pill- quickly cleared the pillboxes guarding
boxes so splattered the flats leading to
half-tracks of Combat Command B (Col. difficulty now that the Germans’ escape
William L. Roberts), leading the 10th route had been cut, CCB headed east on
Armored’s advance, crossed the Taben the last leg of the drive to relieve the 5th
bridge early on 25 February, the 94th Ranger Battalion. By midmorning, de-
Division’s northward drive had been spite long-range fire from the same Tiger
slowed by tenacious resistance from pill- tank that had caused trouble in Irsch,
boxes and by heavy mortar fire. Held up contingents of the combat command
on the fringe of Beurig, the infantrymen reached the Rangers. Hard-pressed by
realized they would be unable to take shelling and counterattacks during the
the village before the armor arrived. second day and third morning in their
They sent guides back down the road to isolated position, the Rangers had not
intercept the tanks and lead them along only managed to survive but also had
a wooded trail that bypassed Beurig and bagged about a hundred Germans.26
led to the Beurig-Zerf highway. The only While these events were taking place
infantry available to assist the tanks were beyond the Saar, General Patton had
three officers and twenty-four men of the been fighting a rear guard action against
Ranger battalion who had become sepa- return of the 10th Armored Division-to
rated from their unit and had joined the SHAEF reserve. On 23 February all
CCB’s column in Taben. Patton could achieve was a 48-hour
By midafternoon the lead tank platoon respite. When that period expired, he
of CCB had emerged from the woods pleaded with the 12th Army Group com-
onto the main highway and was headed mander, General Bradley, for help. Brad-
east into the village of Irsch. Despite a ley himself took responsibility for letting
roadblock in the center of the village, Patton use the armor until nightfall of
Irsch appeared deserted. Two of the 27 February for the express purpose of
platoon’s five tanks had passed the road- taking Trier.27
block when a Tiger tank, a ground- By dawn of 27 February conditions
mount 88-mm. gun, and two Panzer- were good for a quick strike north to
fausts, all concealed behind nearby build- Trier. During the preceding afternoon,
ings, opened fire. In rapid succession they CCB had advanced beyond the Rangers’
knocked out the last three U.S. tanks. roadblock, taking Zerf and gaining a hold
Hurrying forward, the little group of on the highway leading north to Trier,
Rangers helped the tankers put the Ger- eleven miles away. Light ponton bridges
mans to flight, but CCB delayed clearing were operating both at Taben and Serrig
the village until after nightfall, when a and a heavy ponton bridge was at Saar-
company of armored infantrymen, mov- burg. Only the disturbing fact that
ing southeast from the Ockfen bridge- prisoner identifications on 26 February
head and also bypassing Beurig, arrived revealed the presence of a new German
to help. T h e infantrymen took 290 unit, the 2d Mountain Division, ap-
prisoners from the 416th Division.25
T h e next day, 26 February, while the
301st Infantry cleared Beurig with little 26
Combat Interview with Lt: Col. J. J. Richard-
son, CCB, 10th Armored Division.
25Cantey, The 10th U.S. Armored Division in 27 Patton, War As I Knew It, pp. 246–47; Gay
the Saar-Moselle Triangle, pp. 90–91. Diary, entries of 24 and 25 Feb 45.
T H E SAAR-MOSELLE TRIANGLE 133
peared to stand in the way of a rapid turned CCA north u p the main highway
drive to Trier. to Trier. As directed by General Patton
Rushed forward by Army Group G to the preceding day, the 76th Division of
bolster the sagging LXXXII Corps, the the XII Corps turned away from the suc-
2d Mountain Division, like so many cessful drive on Bitburg to head toward
other German units, was considerably Trier from the north.
less impressive than its name might in- For all the lack of solid defensive
dicate. Its two infantry regiments, for units, the Germans on 27 February man-
example, had only recently been recon- aged to delay CCA’s column at several
stituted from supply and other noncom- points, usually with isolated tanks or
batant units, and most of the men were assault guns lying in ambush in terrain
Austrians lacking fervor for a losing that restricted CCA’s tanks to one road.
cause. Utilizing the sharp defiles, woods, T h e most serious delay occurred in mid-
and dense concentrations of pillboxes afternoon south of the village of Pel-
below Trier, the mountain division lingen where a minefield 300 yards deep
nevertheless might have proved an effec- disabled two tanks. Armored engineers
tive delaying force had sizable numbers had to spend painful hours under small
of men been able to get into position to arms fire clearing a path, and further
block a northward drive before CCA advance for the day was stymied.
started it. As it was, the division, arriving Since Trier still lay some six miles
from the southeast, got there too late and away and the appointed hour for release
could be used only to block to the east of the 10th Armored Division had come,
and southeast.28 General Patton again had to appeal to
Defense of Trier itself remained a re- General Bradley for continued use of
sponsibility of Army Group B’s Seventh the armor until Trier fell. Having had
Army, already sorely pressed by the drive no word from SHAEF on keeping the
of the U.S. XII Corps on Bitburg. By division, Bradley told him to keep going
this time most of the troops of the Sev- until higher authority ordered a halt.
enth Army’s 212th Volks Grenadier Di- And, the 12th Army Group commander
vision, originally charged with defense added, he would make it a point to stay
of the city, already had gone north to away from the telephone.30
oppose the XII Corps and about all that T h e morning of 1 March, after CCA
was left to defend Trier were two local took Pellingen, General Morris sent the
defense battalions, the city’s police, and main body of the combat command
the crews of several stationary 88-mm. northwest to the juncture of the Saar
antiaircraft batteries. 29 and the Moselle to prevent any Germans
At dawn on 27 February, while the remaining in West Wall pillboxes along
94th Division and the Ranger battalion the Saar from falling back on Trier. A
sought to expand the Saar bridgehead task force continued up the main road
to east and southeast, General Morris toward the city while CCB passed
through Pellingen and swung to the
28MS # B–066 (Ingelheim). See also MS # northeast to come upon the objective
B–238, Report, 10 February–24 March 1945 (Gen-
eralmajor Wolf Hauser, CofS First Army).
29MS # B–123 (Gersdorff). 30 Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 249.
134 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
from the east. In late afternoon, as both dered a platoon of infantry and a pla-
CCA’s task force and CCB continued toon of tanks to dash across. As the
to run into trouble on the fringes of the infantrymen complied, a German major
city from pillboxes and 88-mm. antiair- and five men ran toward the bridge from
craft pieces, Colonel Roberts, CCB’s the far side with detonating caps and an
commander, ordered the commander of exploder.
the 20th Armored Infantry Battalion, They were too late.
Lt. Col. Jack J. Richardson, to enter It mattered not whether the delay in
Trier along a secondary road between blowing the bridge was attributable to
the other two attacking forces. Richard- concern for the historic monument or
son was to head straight for the city’s to the fact that the German officer was
two Moselle bridges.31 drunk. What mattered was that the 10th
T h e night was clear, the moon full, Armored Division had a bridge across
and visibility excellent as Task Force the Moselle.
Richardson in early evening started to- By morning contingents of Combat
ward Trier. Entering the city before Commands A and B had swept into all
midnight, the task force encountered a parts of the city, and the prisoner bag
German company with four antitank increased as sleepy-eyed Germans awoke
guns, but the surprised Germans sur- to find American tanks all about them.
rendered without firing. One of the pris- Task Force Richardson alone took 800
oners revealed that he had been detailed prisoners. A day later, early on 3 March,
as a runner to notify a demolition team troops of the 76th Division arrived to
at one of the bridges when the Americans establish contact with the armor on the
arrived. north bank of the Moselle.
Splitting his force, Richardson sent T h e Orscholz Switch, the Saar-Moselle
half toward each of the bridges. T h e triangle, Trier, and the heavily fortified
northern team found its bridge blown, section of the West Wall around Trier
but the team moving to the ancient —all were taken. With the success of the
Kaiserbruecke, which had stood since operation, the Third Army had torn a
the Roman occupation of Trier in the gaping hole in the West Wall from
earliest days of the Christian era, reported Pruem to a point below Saarburg.
its bridge intact. Rushing to the bridge Studying the operations map, General
himself in a tank, Colonel Richardson Patton could see two new inviting pros-
found his men under small arms fire from pects before him. Either he could turn
the far bank. Directing .50-caliber ma- to the southeast and envelop the Saar
chine gun fire from his tank onto the industrial area, or he could head through
far end of the bridge, Richardson or- the Eifel and up the valley of the Moselle
to the Rhine at Koblenz.
31 The following account is based primarily on In either case, the Germans appeared
combat interviews with Richardson and Maj. C. R.
King (10th Armored Division historian). powerless to stop him.
CHAPTER VIII
Operation GRENADE
While the First Army was focusing ontryman with a distinctive appearance;
the Roer River dams and the Third he stood over six feet tall and kept his
Army probing the Eifel and clearing thehead clean shaven. Most of his staff were
Saar-Moselle triangle, Field Marshal infantrymen, too, including the chief of
Montgomery’s 21 Army Group was staff, Brig. Gen. James E. Moore, and
launching the new Allied main effort. had come to the theater from a training
Under Montgomery’s plan, General command Simpson earlier had held in
Crerar’s First Canadian Army was to the United States. T h e headquarters al-
open the offensive with Operation VERI-ready had established a reputation for
TABLE, a drive southeastward u p the steady, workmanlike performance. As
left bank of the Rhine from positions General Bradley was to put it later, the
gained by the big airborne attack the Ninth Army, “unlike the noisy and
bumptious Third and the tempera-
preceding fall in the vicinity of Nijme-
gen. A few days later General Simpson’smental First,” was “uncommonly nor-
Ninth Army from positions along the mal.”
Roer River generally northeast of During the Ardennes counteroffen-
Aachen was to launch Operation GRE- sive, the Ninth Army had remained on
NADE, an assault crossing of t h e Roerthedefensive, extending its lines north
followed by a northeastward drive to and south in order to free troops to re-
link with the First Canadian Army inforce the First Army. All through
along the Rhine. From positions along January the army had held a 40-mile
the Maas River in between Americans front extending from the vicinity of
and Canadians, the Second Army was to Monschau near headwaters of the Roer
be prepared to make a complementary downstream to Linnich, northeast of
attack if required. Aachen. T h e command included only
five divisions under the XIII Corps
Youngest Allied army then opera- (Maj. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.) and
tional on the Continent, the Ninth the XIX Corps (Maj. Gen. Raymond
Army nevertheless had seen consider- S. McLain) .
able fighting-in the conquest of the T o prepare for Operation GRENADE,
Brittany peninsula in September and in it was necessary both to narrow the
the drive from the German border to army’s front and to build the army’s
the Roer River in November and early strength to at least ten divisions. Reduc-
December. T h e Ninth Army’s com-
mander, General Simpson, was an infan- 1 Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 422.
136 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
serve. 3 T h e total strength of the army proached, the Ninth Army’s accumu-
was 303,243 men. Because the First Ar- lated stocks of supplies rose to huge pro-
my’s VII Corps, which had four divi- portions. In one 5-day period (10–14
sions, was to support the Ninth Army’s February), for example, the army re-
attack, the corps in effect added addi- ceived well over 40,000 long tons, the
tional strength to the GRENADE force of biggest delivery to any army in the the-
approximately 75,000 men. 4 ater in a comparable period. Most of it
In direct support of the Ninth Army arrived by rail in more than 6,000
was the XXIX Tactical Air Command freight cars.7
(Brig. Gen. Richard E. Nugent), em- Stocks of gasoline in the army’s depots
ploying five groups of fighter-bombers rose to over 3 million gallons, repre-
(375 planes) and one tactical recon- senting over five days of supply with five
naissance group. For ground fire sup- days’ reserve. Augmenting ammunition
port the GRENADEforce (the Ninth deliveries with strict rationing, the army
Army and the VII Corps) had 130 bat- amassed 46,000 tons of ammunition,
talions of field artillery and tank de- equivalent to at least twenty days’ sup-
stroyers, totaling more than 2,000 guns, ply at normal rates of expenditure, four
one of the heaviest concentrations to be times the normal army stockage in the
employed on the Western Front. T h e theater. It enabled all artillery units of
two corps making the main effort (XIII the XIX Corps to place two units of fire
and XIX) had one artillery piece for at battery positions in addition to basic
each ten yards of front, plus tanks, tank loads. T h e XIII Corps provided two
destroyers, antiaircraft guns, and infan- units of fire for artillery of two of its
try cannon. 5 In armor the GRENADE divisions and one unit for that of the
force had only what had come to be re- other two. T h e weight of the artillery
garded as normal in the theater, but a projectiles that the XIX Corps alone
powerful assembly nonetheless. Each could throw at the enemy in six days
corps had an armored division and each of combat on a 2-division front was
infantry division had an attached tank 8,138 tons.8
battalion, a total of 1,394 tanks. More
than two-thirds of these were the old T h e Terrain and the Enemy
Sherman with the 75-mm. gun.6
As the target date for GRENADEap- In attacking across the Roer River in
the vicinity of Linnich and Juelich and
3 A twelfth division, the 75th, while assigned to advancing northeastward to the Rhine,
the Ninth Army effective 17 February, was placed
under operational control of the British. NUSA 7NUSA G–4 Periodic Rpts and G–4 Jnl for the
Sitrep, 18 Feb 45. period.
4NUSA G–1 Daily Sum, 23 Feb 45; VII Corps 8NUSA Quartermaster and Ordnance AAR’s,
Estimated Loss Report, 2400, 1 Mar 45, VII Corps Feb 45; Annex 2 to XIX Corps FO 30, 6 Feb 45;
G–1 Battle Casualties file. and Annex 5 to XIII Corps FO 5, 8 Feb 45. Total
5 NUSA Artillery Sec AAR, Feb 45; NUSA FA ammunition allocation for the XIX Corps for the
and T D Info Sum 57, 26 Feb 45; 2d Revised Copy period D-day to D plus 5 included: 202,880 rounds
of Appendix 1 to Annex 3, VII Corps FO 15, 22 for 105-mm. howitzers; 64,800 rounds for 155-mm.
Feb 45. howitzers; 14,400 rounds for 155-mm. guns; 4,500
6NUSA Armored Sec AAR, Feb 45. One of the rounds for 4.5-inch guns; and 9,000 rounds for 8-
separate tank battalions had only light tanks. inch howitzers. XIX Corps G–4 Jnl, 7 Feb 45.
138 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
the Ninth Army was to drive diagonally a broader base for attack, they assigned
across the Cologne plain. Generally flat, the northwestern third of the forest to
open country traversed by an extensive the Ninth Army.
network of hard-surfaced roads, the As planning for the attack began, the
Cologne plain stretches from the high- Roer River dams were still under Ger-
lands of the Eifel to the lowlands of man control, making of the Roer River
northern Germany and the Netherlands. a disturbing question mark. While the
T h e only high ground worthy of the Roer is normally a placid stream only
name in that part of the plain to be some ninety feet wide, the Ninth Army’s
crossed by the Ninth Army is an egg- engineers estimated that a combination
shaped plateau extending eastward from of spring thaws and destruction of the
the vicinity of Linnich and rising no Roer dams would convert it into a lake
higher than 400 feet above sea level. Al- as much as a mile and a half wide. Even
though this gently sloping plateau was after the waters subsided, the Roer val-
not a critical feature, it drew attention ley would be soft and marshy, impass-
from the Ninth Army’s planners be- able to vehicles operating off the roads.10
cause once it was taken, “the remainder The planners chose crossing sites at the
of the attack was all downhill.” 9 T h e narrowest points of the river, mostly at
land throughout the plain is mostly ara- the locations of destroyed bridges.
ble and was planted predominantly in As the Roer was critical in determin-
grain and stock beets. Observation and ing the line of departure, so the Erft
fields of fire were excellent. guided the northeasterly direction of the
T h e only natural military obstacles main attack. Cutting diagonally across
were two big forests and two rivers, the the Cologne plain, the Erft splits the
Roer and the Erft. T h e larger of the for- 25-mile. distance between the Roer and
ests was in the north. Beginning on the the Rhine almost in half. It enters the
east bank of the Roer opposite Heins- Rhine at Neuss, opposite Duesseldorf.
berg, it extended northward some Neither the Erft nor the Erft Canal,
twenty miles to the Dutch border near which parallels the river for much of its
Venlo and secreted a portion of the course, are major military obstacles, but
West Wall. Along with the presence of a boggy valley floor up to a thousand
a number of small streams immediately yards wide helps turn the waterways
west of the Roer, this obstacle prompted into a good natural defense line. Con-
the Ninth Army’s planners to forgo versely, the river-canal complex might
Roer crossings in that sector. T h e other be utilized as flank protection for north-
wooded area was the Hambach Forest, eastward advance to the Rhine in the
east and southeast of Juelich. Although vicinity of Neuss, the use that the Ninth
planners originally assigned its capture Army intended to make of it.
to the First Army, on the theory that Although American intelligence offi-
responsibility for a critical terrain fea- cers assumed the enemy would achieve
ture should not be split, when it became
apparent that the Ninth Army needed 10 XIXCorps G–2, Terrain’ XIX Corps Front to
Rhine, 30 Oct 44, 406th Inf Jnl, Feb 45; 1104th
Engineer Combat Gp Rpt, 28 Feb 45, XIX Corps
9 Conquer, p. 147. AAR, Sec III, Feb 45.
OPERATION GRENADE 139
some defensive advantage from these While American G—2’s deemed the
natural features, particularly the Roer, defensive network well planned and or-
they looked to the villages, towns, and ganized, all indications were that the
cities on the plain to provide the core enemy had far too few troops to man the
of resistance. T h e assumption was natu- lines. This strengthened the belief that
ral in view of the Ninth Army’s ex- the defense would be based on strong-
perience in November and December in points in towns and villages rather than
driving from the German border to the on a continuous prepared position in
Roer, where the Germans had turned depth. 12
villages into mutually supporting strong- Along the entire Roer front from
points. south of Dueren to Heinsberg, intelli-
T h e biggest city in the zone to be gence officers believed, the Germans had
crossed by GRENADE forces was about 30,000 men supported by 70
Muenchen-Gladbach, a textile center. tanks. They estimated six divisions with
With suburbs and a contiguous city of 23,500 men and 110 tanks to be in re-
Rheydt, Muenchen-Gladbach had a pre- serve near Cologne. Four miscellaneous
war population of 310,000.
Considerably divisions that had been out of contact
smaller but vital as road centers were for some time were presumed capable
the towns of Dueren and Juelich on the of intervention with 17,000 men and 55
Roer, both already almost obliterated by tanks. 13
Allied bombs, and Elsdorf, Erkelenz, That was the view on 1 February
Viersen, Duelken, and Krefeld. when General Eisenhower gave the
T h e Germans had augmented the word to mount GRENADE, but from that
built-up sectors with extensive field day on, the Ninth Army noted a steady
fortifications that a large foreign labor decrease in German strength. On 6 Feb-
force had been constructing since late ruary, for example, General Simpson
fall. There were three lines. T h e first observed that the Fifth Panzer Army
hugged the east bank of the Roer. T h e still was committed defensively in the
other two ran six and eleven miles be- Eifel. Simpson’s hopes rose for a speedy
hind the Roer, the third tying in with penetration of the Roer defenses. “We
the Erft River. In the main these forti- will have some tough fighting,” he said,
fications consisted of entrenchments in “but I think we are going right
a sawtooth pattern with exits into the through.” 14
towns and villages. Antitank obstacles After 8 February, the First Canadian
and emplacements for antitank, antiair- Army’s drive southward from the Nij-
craft, and field pieces were located at ir- megen bridgehead (Operation VERI-
regular intervals within and between
the lines. Mines and barbed wire were 30th and 104th Div Estimates of the Situation, 5
placed rather spottily along the east and 7 Feb 45, respectively,
12 XIX Corps G–2 Estimate, 17 Feb, and G–2
bank of the Roer.11 Periodic Rot. 19 Feb 45.
13NUSA G–2 Estimate, 2 Feb 45, in XIII Corps
11In addition to intelligence sources previously G–2 Jnl file, 4 Feb 45.
cited, see: Photo Defense Overprint maps of 30 Jan 14NUSA Ltr of Instrs 13, 6 Feb 45; Notes on
and 1 Feb 45 in XIII Corps G–2 Jnl, 3 Feb 45; VII Conf with Officers of 115th Inf, Gen Gerhardt, and
Corps Estimate of the Situation, 22 Feb 45; and Others, 7 Feb 45, in 115th Inf AAR, Feb 45.
140 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
soldier appreciated the difficulties of into the Eifel and the Canadian attack
making the various transfers and meet- southeastward from Nijmegen seriously
ing the new drive once it began. Gaso- interfered with German efforts to
line shortages, unseasonal February strengthen the line behind the Roer. Of
thaws that turned highways previously particular concern was the necessity to
blocked by ice and snow into quagmires, shift the 116th Panzer and Panzer Lehr
bomb damage to the limited rail net in Divisions to oppose the Canadians. T h e
the Eifel, responsibility for shipping the 116th still would be engaged there when
Sixth Panzer Army to the east, the way Operatn GRENADEjumped off, and the
Allied aircraft denied almost all day- Panzer Lehr would be withdrawn into
light movement, personnel and materiel reserve only on the very eve of Opera-
losses in the Ardennes—all combined to tion GRENADE. General Krueger’s LVIII
project a dismal picture. Panzer Corps could not be withheld as a
“I am not a pessimist,” Rundstedt re- reserve but had to be committed in the
ported on 12 February, “but in view of line in command not of armor but of
the decisive nature of the coming bat- infantry. Nor would the projected shift
tles, I consider it my duty to give a clear of headquarters of the Fifth Panzer and
report of the situation as I see it.”17 Fifteenth Armies be completed before
In all of Army Group B , Rundstedt the American attack began. Because of
said, infantry strength amounted to the the continuing American drive in the
equivalent of forty-five battalions or six Eifel, the exchange would be delayed
and a half full divisions. Within the until the Americans were well beyond
Fifth Panzer and Seventh Armies, each the Roer.18
battalion faced two-thirds of an enemy As D-day for Operation GRENADE ap-
division, and within the Fifteenth Army, proached, the German lineup in the
most threatened of all until the shift threatened sector was as follows: From a
with the Fifth Panzer Army could be boundary in the north near Roermond,
made, an entire division. Nor could re- corresponding to the boundary between
serves to improve the balance in the British and Americans, Army Group B’s
Fifteenth Army be assembled and Fifteenth Army (General von Zangen)
shifted as quickly as additional Ameri- was responsible for a front some fifty
can forces could be expected to arrive. miles long, extending south to include
T h e proportion of forces on the Fif- Dueren. T h e northern third was held
teenth Army’s front was destined to be by the XII SS Corps (Generalleutnant
at least two and a half times less favor- Eduard Crasemann) with two infantry
able than during the prolonged fighting divisions; the center around Linnich by
west of the Roer in November; avail- the LXXXI Corps (General der Infan-
able artillery ammunition would be less terie Friedrich Koechling) with two in-
than a third that expended in the earlier fantry divisions bolstered by a volks
fighting. artillery corps; and the southern third
As Allied intelligence had detected, around Dueren by the LVIIIPanzer
the American drive from the Ardennes 18Magna E. Bauer, Reorganization of the West-
ern Front, MS prepared in OCMH to complement
17As quoted by Schramm. this volume.
142 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
General Gillem’s XIII Corps. By taking Roer dams. Not for about twelve days
the road center of Erkelenz and clearing would the water in the reservoirs be ex-
the east bank of the Roer to a point west hausted.21
of Erkelenz, the XIII Corps was to open Upstream from Dueren, where the
the way for an unopposed crossing of river’s banks are relatively high, the
the river by General Anderson’s XVI worst effect of the flood was to increase
Corps. the current sharply, at some points to
What happened next depended on more than ten miles an hour. Down-
whether conditions favored rapid ma- stream along most of its length, the Roer
neuver or forced a plodding infantry poured over its banks and inundated the
advance. Given slackening resistance valley floor. Just north of Linnich where
and firm footing for tanks, General the river is normally 25 to 30 yards wide,
Simpson intended to push immediately it spread into a lake more than a
with full strength to envelop Muenchen- mile wide. More common were inunda-
Gladbach from south and east, then tions of 300 to 400 yards. T h e ground
drive on to the Rhine. Should the ar- on both sides of the flooded floor was
mor be roadbound or the enemy stub- soft and spongy. While engineers
born, the two corps on the left were to watched over the slowly receding river,
make the main effort, rolling u p the GRENADEunderwent successive post-
West Wall fortifications as far north as ponements. 22
Venlo and clearing the big forest lying Acting on advice of the engineers,
between Roermond and Muenchen- General Simpson at last set D-day for 23
Gladbach. With supply routes then February, one day before the reservoirs
open from Heinsberg to Roermond, the presumably would be drained. Although
army was to hit Muechen-Gladbach the river still was in flood, it had re-
from west and south and push on to the ceded eight to fourteen inches below the
Rhine. peak, and the current at few places ex-
Both plans conservatively assumed or- ceeded six miles an hour. By seizing the
ganized resistance throughout the Co- first practicable moment when the river
logne plain. On the other hand, General might be crossed with reasonable chance
Simpson added, “If the violence of our of success instead of awaiting a return
attack should cause disruption of the to normal, General Simpson hoped to
enemy resistance, eachcorps will be pre- achieve some measure of
pared to conduct relentless pursuit in In making the attack, leading waves
zone, and phases will be abandoned in were to cross the river in assault boats,
favor of taking full advantage of our while follow-up troops were to use foot-
opportunity.” 20
All plans were complete in expecta- 21 See above, ch. V.
tion of a D-day on 10 February when, 22For analysis of the flood, see II Corps Engi-
neers, Operations in the European Theater, VI;
on the eve of the attack, the Germans NUSA G–2 AAR, Feb 45; XIII Corps G–2 AAR,
destroyed the discharge valves on the Feb 45; XIX Corps G–2 Spot Rpt, 14 Feb 45; 102d
Div G–3 Jnl, 10Feb 45.
25Conquer, pp. 165-66; 104th Div G–2 Periodic
20 NUSA Ltr of Instrs 10 28 Jan 45; Conquer, Rpt 119, 22 Feb 45; 30th Div G–3 Jul, 20 Feb 45;
pp. 147–51. 102d Div G–3 Jul, 22 Feb 45.
144 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
BURSTS
OF WHITE
PHOSPHORUS
SHELLSLIGHTUP THE ROERRIVER
AT LINNICH
bridges that engineers were to begin Each assault division in the Ninth
constructing at H-hour. In all divisions Army planned to screen its crossing sites,
except the 84th, which was to cross on a either by smoke generators and pots
one-battalion front, the number of as- placed on the west bank or by phos-
sault boats was insufficient for the first phorus shells fired across the river by
wave, so that units had to plan to shut- chemical mortars. A smoke generator
tle or find other means of crossing. Since company and a chemical mortar battal-
shuttling in frail assault boats might ion were in support of each corps. In the
break down in the face of a strong cur- adjacent VII Corps, General Collins
rent, the 8th Division proposed to make delegated the decision on using smoke
motor-driven double-boat ferries of its to the assault division commanders. 24
assault boats. Some other units planned Within each division sector, attached
to rely on cable ferries or LVT’s (land corps engineers were to start at H-hour
vehicles, tracked), amphibious tractors 24VII Corps Engineers, Operations in the Euro-
nicknamed alligators. pean Theater, VI.
OPERATION GRENADE 145
to build at least three vehicular bridges. T h e enemy thus far had given no sign
Although the threat posed by the Roer that he knew the long-expected attack
dams had passed, each division still was was at hand. Although an occasional
to carry five days’ supply of rations and German plane appeared over the flat-
gasoline against the possibility that lands west of the Roer before dark, all
bridging might be delayed or knocked seemed to be on routine reconnaissance
out. T o assure ammunition supply or bombing and strafing missions. In-
points beyond the Roer soon after the coming artillery and mortar shells were
crossings, the XIX Corps attached two few.
truck companies to each of its two as- In higher German headquarters, at-
sault divisions, while the XIII Corps tention still was focused on the Third
planned to use three companies under Army’s attacks on Bitburg and Trier
corps control for the same purpose.25 and the First Canadian Army’s drive in
In case bridges went out, LVT’s and the north. Employing a Canadian corps
dukws (2½-ton amphibious trucks) on the left and a British corps on the
were to ferry essential supplies. Al- right, Operation VERITABLE had carried
though emergency airdrops probably approximately seventeen miles from
would be unnecessary since the threat jump-off positions along the Dutch
from the Roer dams had ended, 500 frontier near Nijmegen, more than a
C–47 transport planes loaded with third of the distance to final objectives
enough supplies to maintain one divi- along the Rhine upstream from Wesel.28
sion in combat for one day remained on Beginning at 0245 on the 23d, the
call.26 massed artillery began its thunderous
bombardment. Forty-five minutes later,
Challenging t h e Swollen River infantrymen of six divisions lowered as-
sault boats into the swollen Roer to do
On the night of 22 February, the battle from the first with a treacherous
GRENADE force stirred. No sooner was it current.
dark than infantrymen began moving Because the river spread into wide
into cellars as close as possible to the riv- inundations both north and south of
er’s edge. Engineers started transporting Linnich, the 84th Division (Maj. Gen.
boats and bridging equipment to within Alexander R. Bolling) of the XIII Corps
easy carrying distance of the water. Ar- had to cross at a destroyed highway
tillerymen were careful to fire no more bridge on a one-battalion front within
than normal concentrations lest the en- the town, where, by contrast, the river
emy discern from increased fire what was still in a narrow channel. ( M a p
was afoot.27 VI) T h e first wave got over with rela-
25XIX Corps Admin Order 15, 7 Feb 45; XIII tive ease. “ I really don’t know whether
Corps Flood Plan, 8 Feb 45; XIII Corps G–4 AAR,
Feb 45. 28For operations of the First Canadian Army, see
26XIII Corps G–4 AAR and Engineer AAR, Feb Col. C. P. Stacey, T h e Victory Campaign—Opera-
45; XIX Corps AAR, Sec IV, Feb 45; NUSA G–4 tion in Northwest Europe, 1944–1945, “Official
AAR, Feb 45. History of the Canadian Army in the Second
27Unless specifically noted, sources for all com- World War,” vol. III (Ottawa: T h e Queen’s
bat actions are official records and combat inter- Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1960), pp.
views of units involved. 460–526.
CROSSING
SITES
AT LINNICH
OPERATION GRENADE 147
the enemy fired any shots at us or not,” In the sector of the 102d Division
said 1st Lt. Richard Hawkins of the (Maj. Gen. Frank A. Keating) on the
334th Infantry’s Company A. “Our own right wing of the XIII Corps upstream
guns going off all around us . . . from Linnich, two regiments made the
drowned out all other sounds.”29 Al- assault. As in the 84th’s sector, fire from
though the current hurled two boats far the east bank was meager, partly because
downstream, the bigger problem was a a patrol had crossed thirty minutes
drift of almost all boats some seventy- before H-hour and knocked out four
five yards downstream, making it diffi- machine guns in front of the 407th In-
cult in the darkness to get them back to fantry. Near misses from mortar fire up-
the crossing site for the second wave. set several craft carrying men of the
Engineers beginning at H-hour to 405th Infantry, but rubber life vests
build three footbridges ran into diffi- saved the men from drowning.
culties with all three. One was almost Again it was the second wave that ran
completed when bypassed Germans into most difficulty, for the current car-
opened fire with automatic weapons, ried many of the boats used by the first
making it impossible to anchor the wave far downstream where they impo-
bridge on the east bank. Another had tently sat out successive stages of the
n o sooner been completed when an as- assault. When the follow-up battalion
sault boat plunged downstream from of the 405th Infantry reached the river,
the neighboring division’s sector and the men could find at first only two
knocked it out. A direct hit on a cable boats. After an intensive search turned
by an enemy shell knocked out a third up a few more, one company got across.
just as it too was almost completed. Other men meanwhile tried LVT’s, but
T h e follow-up battalion had to cross so muddy was the far bank that these
by shuttle with the few assault boats craft could not get far enough u p for the
that could be retrieved. When one foot- men to disembark. As in the 84th Divi-
bridge finally completed just before sion’s sector, an LVT went out of con-
noon stayed in, the engineers aban- trol, crashed into a partially completed
doned attempts to build others and con- infantry support bridge, and sent parts
centrated on vehicular bridges. An in- of the bridge careening downstream.
fantry support bridge was ready for light T h e struggle to build bridges was for
vehicles by 1730, but a treadway bridge, the 102d Division also a discouraging
finished three hours later, had to be task. When engineers completed the first
closed when a German plane strafed and footbridge for the 405th Infantry just
damaged it. Only after more than four before daylight, German artillery
hours were spent on repairs was the promptly knocked it out. They put in
treadway again ready for traffic; men of another about the same time for the
the 84th Division thus spent all of D- 407th Infantry, but enemy shelling was
day on the east bank without tank or too intense for the infantry to use it.
tank destroyer support. Spattered by shell fragments, the bridge
spanned the river for three hours before
29Theodore Draper, T h e 84th Infantry Division
in the Battle for Germany (New York: The Viking
a tree fell on it, snapped a cable, and
Press, 1946), p. 145. An excellent unit history. set the pontoons adrift. Shortly after
148 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
DERELICT
ASSAULT
BOATSNEARLINNICH
midday the engineers at last opened a every 57-mm. gun in the division to be
workable footbridge and a support towed across immediately.
bridge suitable for light vehicles. Although other engineers opened a
T h e infantry support bridge had a treadway bridge about the same time,
short life; no sooner had the 407th’s just as a company of tank destroyers
antitank company with its towed 57-mm. started to cross three low-flying German
guns crossed than a shell knocked it out. planes knocked out the bridge. Another
treadway was completed before mid-
Getting sufficient antitank support to
night, but before tank destroyers could
the far bank became a major concern, use it trucks loaded with rubble had to
for by noon signs of impending counter- cross and build up a soggy exit route on
attack had begun to develop in front of the far bank. 30 It was well after mid-
the 102d Division. With the infantry
support bridge finally operating again 30Maj Allan H Mick,ed., With the 102d Infantry Division
Through Germany (WashingtonInfantryJournal Press, 1947),
about 2100, General Keating ordered p 129
OPERATION GRENADE 149
SMOKEPOTSALONGTHE ROERNEARDUEREN
night before tank destroyers in appre- built for the 115th Infantry because the
ciable numbers began to move beyond flooded Roer was more than 400 yards
the river. wide. Both the first wave and the follow-
Two miles upstream to the south in up units were to cross in assault boats
the sector of General McLain’s XIX and LVT’s, with additional forces cross-
Corps the swollen river proved as big an ing later over bridges to be built at Jue-
obstacle to successful assault as it had lich for the 175th Infantry.
for the XIII Corps. There the 29th Di- T h e 175th, on the other hand, was to
vision was to cross around Juelich, the depend almost entirely on bridges,
30th Division three miles farther up- since the river alongside the east bank
stream. town of Juelich flows between high
Both assault regiments of the 29th banks. Half an hour before the end of
Division (Maj. Gen. Charles H. Ger- the artillery preparation, two 25-man
hardt) faced special crossing problems. patrols were to cross in assault boats to
North of Juelich, no bridges were to be stake out small holdings where engi-
CROSSING
SITES
AT JUELICH
OPERATION GRENADE 151
31Joseph H. Ewing, 29 Let’s Go! A History of (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948), p.
the 29th Infantry Division in World War II 233. This is an excellent unit history.
152 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
been much the same, a patrol only the before the preparation fires began. Yet
night before had discovered that the from that moment everything seemed to
current was too swift at that point for go wrong. German artillery fire cut the
assault boats. T h e engineers quickly first cable. A second snagged in debris
made plans for two cable ferries, but and snapped. A mortar shell cut a third.
they were able to fasten a rope on the A fourth held long enough for engi-
far bank for only one. Almost two hours neers to construct about fifty feet of
before the artillery preparation began, bridge before the current snapped the
a company of infantrymen began to pull cable and the bridge buckled. Doggedly,
themselves across in rubber boats, but the engineers tried again. This time the
the current proved too swift even for cable stayed, but the coming of daylight
that method. Only thirty men reached brought such increased German shelling
the east bank. that darkness had fallen on D-day be-
Engineers succeeded finally in fasten- fore they got a footbridge in.
ing an anchor cable for a footbridge just T h e 120th Infantry had resorted to
OPERATION GRENADE 153
LVT’s to get the bulk of two companies proven far more costly. Fortunately for
across the Roer not long after the officialthe eventual outcome of Operation
H-hour of 0330, while the rest of the GRENADE, the enemy in general was
regiment later in the day crossed on the neither capable nor determined.
footbridge constructed for the 119th In- Opposite Linnich, the 84th Division
fantry. T h e problem of getting the in- had the good fortune to strike almost
fantry across at last solved, all hands astride a German corps boundary. T h e
could turn to a treadway bridge that lone unit in the assault, the 334th In-
other engineers already had started. Not fantry’s 1st Battalion, hit the extreme
until midnight was this bridge com- north flank of the 59th Infantry Divi-
pleted; men of the 30th Division, like sion of Koechling’s LXXXI Corps, tak-
those of the 84th, had spent all of D-day ing the Germans by surprise and occupy-
without tank or tank destroyer support. ing the village of Koerrenzig before day-
As costly as German shelling proved light. At that point the 1st Battalion
to be in the 30th Division’s sector and turned north in keeping with the mis-
elsewhere, it would have been consider- sion of clearing enough of the east bank
ably greater had it not been for the use of the Roer for the neighboring XVI
of smoke. The 29th and 30th Divisions Corps to cross unopposed. In the proc-
used both smoke pots and chemical ess the battalion began to roll up from
smoke generators. T h e 30th Division be- the flank defenses of the 183d Infantry
gan its screen before dawn and kept it Division of Crasemann’s XII SS Corps.
up, not for twelve hours as planned, but By nightfall the 1st Battalion was ap-
for thirty-three, in itself testimony to proaching the crossroads village of Baal,
the effectiveness of the screen. T h e 102D,
three miles from the crossing site, while
Division discontinued its screen after the 335th Infantry came in to seal the
less than two hours because it interfered 334th’s flank to the east.
with directing artillery fire. T h e other Baal was one of only three places
two divisions, the 84th and 102D, de- where the Germans on D-day mustered
pended primarily on smoke pots em- counterattacks. As night was approach-
placed along the west bank, although ing, a battalion of the 183d Division
both used white phosphorus shells fired supported by several tanks or assault
by chemical mortars to assist the first guns drove south out of Baal at the same
waves. T h e 102d, Division maintained time men of the 334th Infantry were
one smoke screen as a feint at a point trying to break into the village. Ameri-
where no crossing was contemplated. can artillery and eager Thunderbolts of
T h e smoke drew enemy fire while at the the XXIX Tactical Air Command broke
true crossing site nearby, unscreened, up the enemy thrust before the opposing
scarcely any shells fell. forces could actually clash on the
ground. Occupying Baal proved rela-
The First Day on the East Bank tively simple after that, though just be-
fore midnight three understrength Ger-
T h e Roer was unquestionably diffi- man battalions struck with considerable
cult. In the face of a capable, determined verve. For a while the conflict was in-
enemy on the east bank, it could have tense on the periphery of the village,
154 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
but by morning small arms and artillery hoc corps commanded by a tank special-
fire had driventhe Germans
off.32 ist, Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein, not
T h e day’s strongest German counter- enough of the 11th Panzer Division had
action developed to the south against yet arrived from the Saar-Moselle tri-
the 102d Division. There the 407th In- angle to justify that arrangement. T h e
fantry on the north wing had taken the Fifteenth Army commander, General
enemy in the village of Gevenich by von Zangen, early decided to attach in-
surprise, seizing 160 prisoners, and in crements of the two divisions as they
the afternoon occupied an adjacent vil- arrived to Koechling’s LXXXI Corps.
lage to the north. T h e 405th Infantry Although Zangen had yet to determine
on the south wing entered Tetz, south- the exact location of the American main
ernmost of the day’s objectives, against effort, he deduced from analysis of cross-
minor opposition; but because of diffi- ing sites along the Roer that it probably
culties at the crossing sites, it was was directed against the LXXXI
midafternoon before the regimental Corps.33
commander, Col. Laurin L. Williams, While attachment of the panzer divi-
could send a force northeastward against sions augured well for the future, it
two other objectives, Boslar, two miles would be at least the next day before
from the Roer, and Hompesch. any part of the divisions could arrive.
Despite a no-minute artillery prepara- For immediate counterattack, the
tion fired by fourteen battalions, the LXXXI Corps commander, General
men of the 405th Infantry had gotten Koechling, had to depend on his own
no farther than Boslar when darkness slender resources. These were two infan-
came. Something had infused new spirit try battalions, one each from his two
into the defending troops of the 59th divisions, plus remnants of two separate
Division, whose performance elsewhere tank battalions and an understrength
on D-day had been, at best, lackluster. assault gun brigade.
That something was an impending Returning the infantry battalions to
counterattack, signs of which the Amer- division control, Koechling gave each
icans had been detecting since just be- division a company of the assault gun
fore noon. brigade with twelve to fourteen 75-mm.
As the broad outlines of the Ninth guns and smaller portions of the two
Army’s attack emerged during the morn- tank battalions. T h e 59th Division
ing of 23 February, the Army Group B then was to strike toward Gevenich, the
commander, Field Marshal Model, had 363d Infantry Division toward Boslar
acted swiftly to place his reserves, the and Tetz.
9th and 11th Panzer Divisions, at the The 102d Division commander, Gen-
disposal of the Fifteenth Army. Al- eral Keating, meanwhile reacted to the
though Model had intended to employ indications of impending counterattack
the two divisions together under an ad 33German material from MSS # C–020
(Schramm); # B–812 (Zangen); # B–576, LXXXI
32MS # B–812, Fifteenth Army, 23–28 February Corps, 25 January–21 March 1945 (General der
1945 (General der Infanterie Gustav von Zangen) ; Infanterie Friedrich Koechling); # B–053, Corps
Draper, T h e 84th Division in the Battle for Ger- Bayerlein, 11 February-5 March 1945 (General-
many, pp. 151–54. leutant Fritz Bayerlein).
OPERATION GRENADE 155
by ordering his reserve, the 406th Infan- Mark V tanks with bazookas. Still the
try, into position south and east of Tetz. Germans persisted.
T h e 405th and 406th Infantry Regi- What the Americans reckoned as the
ments then formed a defensive arc ex- fourth try brought the gravest crisis.
tending from high ground between Three hours before dawn on 24 Febru-
Gevenich and Boslar, through Boslar, ary, tanks and infantry swarmed into
and back to the river south of Tetz. T h e the village. While the Americans hud-
407th Infantry on the north continued dled in cellars, forward observers called
to hold Gevenich and the next village down artillery fire on their own posi-
to the north. Confident of his strength tions. By daylight the Germans had
in infantry, General Keating felt keenly fallen back, and a count revealed a sur-
his lack of antitank support on the east prisingly low total of thirty American
bank. It was this concern that through casualties.
the afternoon and evening punctuated In the sector of the XIX Corps, the
the engineers’ futile efforts to keep Germans launched no counterattacks
bridges functioning across the Roer in and in general proffered no stiffer pas-
hope of getting tanks and tank destroy- sive resistance than against the XIII
ers across. Corps. T h e defending troops were from
As it turned out, the defenders at the same 363d Division that gave the
both Gevenich and Boslar had to rely 102d Division such a hard time at Bos-
primarily on artillery fire and bazookas. lar.
Although the German thrust at Geve- T h e 115th Infantry, on the north wing
nich proved relatively weak and caused of the 29th Division, had no trouble
little concern, the Germans at Boslar taking the village of Broich, but when
attacked at least seven times. T h e first the men moved out toward high ground
thrust hit just before 2100, employing to the northeast on which they intended
a mixed force of about 20 assault guns to anchor the division’s bridgehead, they
and tanks accompanied by about 150 encountered grazing fire from automatic
infantry. While American artillery fire weapons emplaced in farm houses and
was dispersing tanks and infantry before entrenchments on the reverse slope. Not
they reached Boslar, some of the infan- until darkness came and the men made
try bypassed the village and penetrated a stealthy night attack was this position
the lines of a battalion of the 406th In- secured.
fantry. A reserve rifle company sealed T h e 175th Infantry in the meantime
off that penetration. had run into less resistance in Juelich
In subsequent thrusts, some infantry than expected, but clearing Germans
and tanks got into the streets of Boslar. from the debris of the destroyed town
It was a night, said the commander of remained a slow process. By nightfall
the defending battalion, Lt. Col. Eric E. Juelich was in hand except for the Cita-
Bischoff, of “indescribable confu- del, a medieval fortress surrounded by a
sion.” 34Infantrymen accounted for four moat. According to plan, the assault
companies left the Citadel for follow-up
troops to clear.
34Combat interview with Bischoff. In the adjacent 30th Division, the ad-
156 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
vance proceeded apace, despite the prob- Five battalions of artillery fired at
lems inherent in crossing at a wide part maximum rate to help men of the 119th
of the flooded Roer. A battalion of the Infantry into Hambach. They timed
119th Infantry on the north was in the their concentrations to allow the infan-
first village rooting Germans from cel- try five minutes to cross on a dead run
lars less than fifteen minutes after the from the line of departure to the first
artillery preparation lifted. Soon after houses. T h e village fell with only a few
dawn the same battalion cleared another shots fired. Most of a 126-man German
village to the north. garrison had to be routed from cellars
Leading companies of the 120th In- where they had retired to sit out the
fantry had harder going because of an American shelling.
extensive antipersonnel minefield in a T h e scheme of maneuver and results
patch of woods near the village of Kraut- in the attack on Niederzier were similar.
hausen. T h e 2d Battalion took at least When shells armed with proximity fuzes
seventy-five casualties in the woods but exploded over open trenches west of the
still jumped off before dawn against village the Germans “just got u p and
Krauthausen and the neighboring vil- left.”36 T h e 120th Infantry lost n o ta
lage to the south. One company employ- man.
ing marching fire took the latter village With some relatively unimportant ex-
at the cost of one killed and two ceptions, the XIX Corps as dawn came
wounded, while two companies envel- held all its planned D-day bridgehead;
oped Krauthausen from south and yet difficulties could still lie ahead in the
north. Hambach Forest, where the Germans
Both regiments then used follow-up well might elect to stand, or might arise
units to push out to slightly higher from an open corps right flank. T h e un-
ground to the east. T h e 119th Infantry protected right flank had developed be-
also sent a battalion against a village at cause the First Army’s VII Corps,
the edge of the Hambach Forest and charged with protecting the flank, had
took it by midafternoon. been having the hardest fight of all to
Since the 30th Division would be on get across the Roer and stay there.
the outside of the Ninth Army’s wheel
to the north with the farthest to go of The VII Corps at Dueren
the four assault divisions, the com-
mander, General Hobbs, decided to keep As protection for the Ninth Army’s
going through the night. Reserve bat- wheel, General Collins’s VII Corps of
talions of both assault regiments moved the First Army had to make the deepest
northeastward before midnight against penetration of all, to the Erft River be-
Hambach and Niederzier, the only vil- yond Elsdorf, thirteen miles from the
lages remaining in the division’s sector Roer at Dueren, and do the job with its
short of the Hambach Forest. Distant
American searchlights bouncing light off pioneered in use of battlefield illumination during
clouds made twilight of the darkness.35 the drive to the Roer in November. See Mac-
Donald, T h e Siegfried Line Campaign.
36Combat interview with Maj. Cris McCullough,
35 Among American units, the Ninth Army had ExecO, 1st Bn, 120 Inf.
OPERATION GRENADE 157
own right flank exposed for at least two reserve. At the last minute, both divi-
days until another corps to the south sion commanders decided against using
joined the attack. T h e zone of the VII smoke lest it hinder artillery observa-
Corps further included two obstacles tion and confuse infantrymen moving
expected to be strongly contested: ruins through build-up urban areas on the
of the town of Dueren and most of the east bank.
Hambach Forest. T h e bulk of the first waves of the
As in the corps of the Ninth Army, the 415th Infantry, on the north wing of the
VII Corps was to employ two divisions 104th Division, got across with little
to assault the river line, the 104th (Maj. difficulty, although the current and
Gen. Terry de la Mesa Allen) on the small arms fire turned one company
left, the 8th (Maj. Gen. William G. back. Crossing opposite the northern
Weaver) on the right.37Because Dueren fringe of Dueren, the 413th Infantry’s
was the hub of communications to east 1st Battalion had more trouble. After
and northeast, Collins divided the town the first company had crossed without
between the two divisions. T h e infan- opposition, German artillery and ma-
trymen first were to establish a bridge- chine guns opened fire. Eight boats-of
head anchored on high ground about Company C stuck on the top of a check
four miles from the Roer, from the vil- dam and then upset. T h e rest of the 1st
lage of Oberzier in the north to Stock- Battalion shifted to the 415th Infantry’s
heim in the south. At that point Collins sector to cross.
intended to send the 4th Cavalry Group By daylight German artillery fire be-
to clear the Hamback Forest while the gan to make the engineers’ job all but
3d Armored Division passed through the impossible. Northwest of the Dueren
infantry to gain the Erft. suburb of Birkesdorf, work began on an
To even a greater degree than the infantry support bridge at 0415, but fif-
rest of the GRENADEforce, the VII teen minutes later artillery and mortar
Corps would find the swollen Roer the shells destroyed much of the equipment
biggest obstacle to achieving D-day ob- and killed or wounded nineteen men.
jectives. Because the current everywhere Althoughthe engineers persisted, their
might prove too swift for footbridges, first success came only after nightfall
all the assault infantry were to cross by and at a new site.
boat, each regiment with two battalions Upstream opposite Birkesdorf another
abreast. A platoon of engineers with fif- group of engineers, working under
teen or sixteen boats was assigned to seemingly constant fire, had completed
each rifle company in the first wave, about 160 feet of a support bridge by
while corps engineers held sixty boats in 1300 when an enemy artillery piece, ap-
parently by indirect fire using long base
37Unofficial histories of these two divisions—Leo observation methods, got the range and
A. Hoegh and Howard J. Doyle, Timberwolf
Trucks (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946).
scored several direct hits. T h e men hur-
and Lt. Marc F. Griesgach, Combat History of t h e riedly laid out smoke pots, but through
Eighth Infantry Division in World War II (Baton the smoke the German. shells still came
Rouge: Army and Navy Publishing Co., 1945)—are
useful more for color than for following the action
in on target. Much of the bridge was
in detail. destroyed.
TO MARIAWEILER ROER RIVER TO AAGHEN
I
At three other sites artillery and often day and into the night was the position
rifle and machine gun fire prevented of the 8th Division upstream to the
engineers even from starting construc- south. Plagued by an open right flank
tion until after nightfall on D-day. All and daylong observation from foothills
countermeasures failed; counterbattery of the Eifel highlands, the 8th had the
fire, smoke, direct fire by tanks on ma- roughest D-day experience of all.
chine gun positions, even gradual expan- T h e leading 13th and 28th Infantry
sion of the bridgehead—none of these Regiments were to cross in assault boats
during 23 February checked the deadly and in double assault boats driven by
accuracy of the enemy fire. T h e first outboard motors. Cable ferries and foot-
bridge was not open to traffic until mid- bridges were to be put in as soon as pos-
night. The 415th Infantry at the only sible for the reserve companies.
feasible ferry site managed to get three Fifty minutes before the scheduled H-
57-mm. antitank guns across, but those hour of 0330, only five minutes after the
remained during D-day the only sup- artillery preparation began, the 28th In-
porting weapons east of the river. fantry’s 3d Battalion was to open the
Fortunately, the enemy’s 12th Volks assault with the mission of cutting en-
Grenadier Division of Krueger’s LVIII emy communications to the south and
Panzer Corps failed to follow through southeast by taking Stockheim. No en-
with determined resistance once the in- emy fire opposed the 3d Battalion’s cross-
fantry got across. T h e 415th Infantry ing, but the swift river current caused
took two villages en route to Oberzier trouble enough. While about three-fifths
without difficulty and by midafternoon of the two leading companies got across,
had buttoned up along the Dueren- the current swept the rest downstream.
Juelich railroad, the D-day objective Even many of those who made it lost
line. T h e 413th Infantry met only light their weapons in swamped or capsized
resistance at first in Birkesdorf and boats. Fortunate it was that the crossing
Dueren, although enemy machine guns took the Germans by surprise; twenty-
and artillery were increasingly trouble- three rose up from riverside trenches
some as the day wore on. T h e regiment and surrendered. T h e prisoners’ rifles
nevertheless cleared most of the north- served the men who had lost their own
ern half of Dueren by dark. In Birkes- weapons in good stead. Behind a rolling
dorf the men captured an entire battal- barrage of white phosphorus fired by a
ion of the 27th Volks Grenadier Regi- company of the 87th Chemical Battalion,
ment, complete with staff. “In compar- the assault companies continued to the
ison with its earlier achievements,” the edge of woods overlooking Stockheim,
Fifteenth Army commander was to note there to await the rest of the battalion
later, “the 12th Volks Grenadier Divi- before seizing the village.
sion had very much disappointed the T h e 3d Battalion’s crossing was the
command during the initial defensive only real success the 8th Division could
battle.” 38 report. Almost without exception the
More precarious by far through the units that began to cross at H-hour
found one difficulty piled upon another.
38MS # B–814 (Zangen). In the cold, damp night air, men of
160 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
the 28th Infantry’s other assault battal- dling over, five bringing the boat back.
ion, the 1st, could start none of the T w o companies crossed in that manner.
motors on their six power boats. T h e T h e rest of the battalion began crossing
two lead companies then secured ten after dark by a cable ferry. By 2130 that
assault boats each and tried to paddle night the 2d Battalion was at last assem-
across. In the first company out, five bled east of the river.
boats made it, landing forty men on the For the 13th Infantry, in the mean-
east bank. T h e other five boats time, almost everything went wrong
swamped. T h e next company lost all ten from the first. T h e two leading battal-
boats, sunk or destroyed by enemy fire. ions were supposed to cross in fourteen
T h e remainder of the battalion pulled double assault boats powered by out-
back to reorganize and wait for a foot- board motors. Near a destroyed high-
bridge. way bridge at Dueren, eighteen men of
T h e reserve 2d Battalion had scarcely Company I actually landed in this fash-
better luck. Company F in the lead was ion on the east bank. At the same time,
supposed to cross in the boats used by Company K came under intense ma-
the 3d Battalion, but only half of those chine gun fire. One boat overturned.. O n
returned from the first crossing and they all the others the motors failed, although
had to transport the 3d Battalion’s the men in one boat succeeded in pad-
follow-up company. Eventually the men dling across. Only thirty-six men of the
of Company F rounded up seventeen 3d Battalion made it. Two platoons of
boats and paddled themselves across. Al- Company I arrived by cable ferry later
though most of the men reached the far in the day. That was the sum total of
side, all their boats swamped or over- the 3d Battalion’s assault.
turned. Some 140 men who assembled It was even worse for the 13th Infan-
on the east bank about 0630 had 30 rifles try’s 2d Battalion farther south. Short
among them. Hardly had they begun rounds of white phosphorus shells fired
moving southward toward their objec- by American artillery knocked out four
tive, a village close by the river, when of company E’s boats before the crossing
heavy shelling from upriver and small began. Although ten boats were
arms fire from the village tumbled them launched, all swamped. T h e mishaps
into abandoned German trenches, reduced the three rifle platoons to fifty-
where they remained under fire the rest six men and thoroughly disorganized
of the day. They stood alone, for the the company.
rest of the 2d Battalion was stranded on Company F put twelve men over the
the west bank without boats and would river under 1st Lt. E. W. Coleman, but
not get across until the next morning. when motors on other boats failed and
T h e footbridge for which the 1st Bat- the men found they could not handle as-
talion commander waited never got sault boats in the current, the rest of the
built. A combination of enemy shelling company stayed on the west bank. Lieu-
and the swift current compelled the en- tenant Coleman’s dozen men fought
gineers to abandon the project. In the their way into a factory, capturing
middle of the afternoon the battalion twelve Germans in the process, but
began a shuttle system, ten men pad- other Germans promptly counterat-
OPERATION GRENADE 161
tacked and besieged the small force the crossing with the aid of a rampaging
rest of the day. Coleman lost the pris- current and the fire of a supporting
oners and half his own men; he and six volks artillery corps, neither the 12th
others managed to hold out, even though Volks Grenadier Division at Dueren nor
all were wounded. a weak 353d Infantry Division south of
As German fire became more and the town made any move to counterat-
more intense, the 2d Battalion aban- tack the disorganized bridgehead forces.
doned all efforts to cross. Although di- Through it all, attached corps engi-
visional artillery and the 4.2-inch mor- neers struggling to construct five vehic-
tars of the 87th Chemical Battalion ular bridges across the Roer had run
smoked all known enemy observation into the same problem of shelling and
points, neither the quantity nor accuracy current that beset those engineers who
of German artillery or mortar fire ap- tried to build footbridges or cable fer-
preciably diminished. ries. At most sites the men worked in
T h e 3d Battalion continued trying to vain even to get an anchor cable across.
cross throughout the day but without At a site selected for an infantry support
much success. Ferries, which proved to bridge for the 13th Infantry, enemy
be the only feasible way of conquering shells came in at an estimated rate of
the current, were in operation only a 125 an hour throughout D-day and into
few minutes before artillery or mortar the night. T h e following day as the rate
shells severed the cables. By noon all of fire increased to an estimated 2 0 0
ferries had ceased to operate, and the rounds an hour, the engineers aban-
supporting company of the 12th Engi- doned the site.
neer Combat Battalion was down to Although fire at that particular site
eight men. Only with the coming of was exceptionally severe, it was heavy
darkness did the harassed engineers and enough at all bridge sites to deny any
infantrymen gain any respite, but by successful construction during D-day.
midnight the 13th Infantry still had only T h e first bridge to be completed in the
four complete companies and elements 8th Division’s sector was a Bailey bridge
of two others east of the Roer. These put in on the masonry piers of the de-
succeeded in pushing only about 400 stroyed main highway bridge into Due-
yards beyond the river into the heaps of ren. That span was open to traffic on
rubble that represented the southern the morning of 24 February. No others
half of Dueren. opened until the 25th. In constructing
Thus it was that the 28th Infantry’s nine bridges for the 8th and 104th Divi-
3d Battalion, which had reached the sions, engineers of the VII Corps in-
woods line overlooking Stockheim, was curred a total of 154 casualties, of which
the only unit of the 8th Division that 8 were killed and 1 was missing.
came near accomplishing its D-day mis- T h e experience of the 8th Division
sion. That even this battalion, consid- revealed strikingly the extent to which
erably Landerstrength and inadequately the enemy depended on the flooded
armed, had made any progress had to be Roer covered by preregistered artillery
credited chiefly to the nature of German and mortar fire to stop the attack. To
resistance. Having all but smashed the that kind of opposition the 8th Division
162 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
was particularly vulnerable. T h e divi- the Ninth Army’s divisions were to ex-
sion’s crossings were made at points pand their footholds on the east bank
where steep banks confined the river to and begin the wheel to the north, while
its normal course and where the river the VII Corps strengthened its admit-
emerged from a torrential descent tedly weak flank protection. T h e only
through a twisting gorge from the high- major change in plan was made late on
land reservoirs. T h e current in conse- 23 February upon the recommendation
quence was probably at least twice as of General Gillem, commander of the
swift as in the lower and broader reaches XIII Corps, and General Anderson,
downstream from Dueren. T h e crossings commander of the uncommitted XVI
also took place under the shadow of high Corps. Noting the quick success of the
ground from which the enemy could 84th Division, the two commanders
command the entire river valley around agreed that Anderson need not wait to
Dueren. cross the Roer until Gillem had cleared
the east bank as far north as Erkelenz;
T h e First Day’s Results instead the XVI Corps might begin
crossing as early as the following day, as
Despite the 8th Division’s problems, soon as the 84th Division had taken the
the great hammerblow of GRENADE next village downstream from
when viewed as a whole had effectively If the Roer crossing had proven ex-
crushed the enemy. With contingents of pensive in terms of bridging equipment
six divisions on the east bank, there and assault craft, it had been relatively
could be n o real doubt henceforth of economical in what mattered most—
the outcome. T h e deep thrust of the men’s lives. T h e entire Ninth Army lost
84th Division in the north as far as Baal 9 2 killed, 61 missing, and 9 1 3 wounded,
and the advance of the 30th Division in a total of just over a thousand. T h e VII
the center into Hambach and Nieder- Corps incurred comparatively heavier
zier, more than two miles east of the losses: 66 killed, 35 missing, and 280
Roer, made it particularly evident that wounded, a total of 381.40
GRENADEhad irreparably torn the en-
emy’s river line.
39XIII Corps AAR, Feb 45.
On 24 February, barring unforeseen 4012th AGp, G–1 Daily Sum, Master File, 1 Jan-
developments on the German side, all 2 8 Feb 45.
CHAPTER IX
(Maj. Gen. Ira T. Wyche) to stage a Division (Maj. Gen. Lunsford E. Oli-
feint several miles downstream while ver) on the right flank of the X I I I
the 35th Division took Hilfarth and Corps also released the 102d Division to
actually crossed the river. To assist the help. Under General Gillem’s plan, the
crossing, the division commander, Gen- 102d was to attack the town itself while
eral Baade, sent his 137th Infantry into the 84th cut roads to the west.
the bridgehead of the XIII Corps to Although first contingents of the ene-
take over the assignment of driving my’s 338th Infantry Division had arrived
north down the east bank. I n hope of during the night of 25 February at Er-
keeping the Germans from demolishing kelenz in an effort to bolster the falter-
a highway bridge they had left intact to ing XII SS Corps, their efforts were so
serve their garrison in Hilfarth, the weak as to be hardly apparent. O n the
692d Field Artillery Battalion early on 26th the 102d Division cut through al-
the 25th began to place harassing fire most without opposition to find Erke-
around the bridge. lenz practically deserted. After dodging
A battalion of the 35th Division’s enemy shelling to gain one village, the
134th Infantry hit Hilfarth before day- 84th Division passed on to another to
light on 26 February. Despite a vicious find not only no opposition but, in the
curtain of fire from automatic weapons, village Gasthaus, beer on tap.
the infantrymen forced their way into T h e resistance had been more chal-
the town, only to discover that the Ger- lenging to the XIX Corps because of
mans had turned it into a lethal nest of General von Zangen’s hurried commit-
mines and booby traps. T h e bulk of the ment of portions of the 9th and 11th
battalion’s casualties came from those. Panzer Divisions, but the challenge was
By midmorning, with the town in short-lived. Just before dark on the 25th
hand, infantrymen provided covering the 30th Division’s 117th Infantry broke
fire with their machine guns while en- stubborn resistance by panzer grenadiers
gineers erected two footbridges across at Steinstrass, while the 119th Infantry
a narrow stretch of the Roer. As some at the same time bypassed the village to
riflemen began to cross, others turned drive almost two miles beyond. Moving
their attention a few hundred yards fast, shooting as they went, men of the
downstream. There either thirty-six 119th ran a gantlet of heavy flanking
hours of harassing fire by the 692d Field fire that knocked out eight supporting
Artillery or faulty German demolitions tanks, but in the process the men took
had saved the coveted highway bridge. more than 200 prisoners, including all
By noon tanks and other vehicles were of a Nebelwerfer company that never
rolling across. got a chance to fire. At the end of the
Giving the XVI Corps responsibility day the division commander, General
for seizing its own foothold over the Hobbs, could report to General Mc-
Roer had in the meantime freed the Lain: “It looks like things are beginning
84th Division to concentrate on driving to break a bit.”
some three miles beyond Baal to take
the road center of Erkelenz. Inserting a
combat command of the 5th Armored 730th Div G–3 Jnl, 25–26 Feb 45.
168 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
Hobbs was right. Things were begin- begun to break it by a simple process
ning to break. of continuous, unremitting attack all
Between them, the 29th and 30th Di- along the corps front for seventy-two
visions were rolling u p from the flank hours. “Contrary to their former custo-
the enemy’s second line of field fortifi- mary manner of fighting,” the com-
cations and having surprisingly little mander of the 12th Volks Grenadier
trouble doing it. T h e 29th Division on Division would note, the Americans
25 February took five villages and “continued their fighting day and night.
marked up an average advance of about As the enemy could always bring new
four miles, then the next day gained the infantry into the conflict while on our
southern rim of the egg-shaped plateau side always the same soldiers had to
that extends from the Roer to the Erft. continue fighting, the over-exertion of
During those two days, the attached our own infantry was extreme.”8
330th Infantry (83d Division) lost not T h e hardest fighting occurred on the
a man killed and had only fifty-nine approaches and within the southern
wounded. With some men riding at- reaches of the Hambach Forest along
tached tanks, a regiment of the 30th Di- both sides of an uncompleted Aachen-
vision on the 26th advanced more than Cologne autobahn. T h e explanation be-
three miles. Another bound like that came apparent with capture of prisoners
would put even the outside unit of the from the 9th Panzer Division’s 10th Pan-
Ninth Army’s wheel onto the egg-shaped zer Grenadier Regiment, but even that
plateau. once-elite regiment could give only
T o the corps commander, General slight pause to a relentless American
McLain, it was clear that the way to push. To break up a counterattack at
the Rhine was opening. Only antitank one village, a battalion of the 415th In-
fire remained effective; the German in- fantry got nine battalions of artillery to
fantry appeared confused and drained of fire for fifteen minutes. Making a night
all enthusiasm for the fight. attack along the axis of the Dueren-
Although the time for exploitation Cologne railroad, a lone company of the
seemed at hand, General McLain was re- 413th Infantry captured 200 men, all
luctant to turn the drive over to his that remained of the 1st Battalion, 10th
armor lest the Germans had manned Panzer Grenadier Regiment. T h e bag
their third and final prepared defense included the battalion commander.
line, which ran five miles to the north At the same time, the 8th Division’s
through the village of Garzweiler, 13th Infantry was wiping out the last
roughly on an east-west line with Erke- resistance in Dueren with an attack pre-
lenz. McLain told the 30th Division to ceded by a 10-minute artillery prepara-
continue as far as Garzweiler, where- tion in which four battalions fired more
upon the 2d Armored Division was to than 1,500 rounds. In an attack on a vil-
take over. lage two miles to the east, two battalions
Nor was all the success confined to of the 121st Infantry fought all day on
units of the Ninth Army. While resist- 25 February without success but per-
ance still was stickier opposite the VII
Corps, General Collins’s divisions had 8 SM
# B–080 (Lan ghaeuser).
NINTH ARMY TO THE RHINE 169
sisted through the night until at last the Also present was a Kampfgruppe of the
Germans had enough and pulled out. 3 d Panzer Grenadier Division, rushed
O n the 25th, the 8th Division com- northward from the Eifel. Yet neither
mander, General Weaver, suffered the could do more than impose minor
fourth in a series of heart attacks and wounds on the full-strength American
was evacuated. He was succeeded by division. In taking the first village
Brig. Gen. Bryant E. Moore, former as- astride the Dueren-Cologne highway,
sistant division commander of the 104th CCA lost eight tanks to concealed Ger-
Division. man antitank guns, but that was the
While the two infantry divisions con- worst that happened to any part of the
tinued to drive through the night, Gen- 3d Armored Division all day. As night
eral Collins ordered his cavalry and came, contingents of CCB were drawn
armor across the Roer bridges. T h e ma- up before Elsdorf, ready to hit the town
neuver he planned for 26 February was the next morning.
simple, flexible, and admirably designed For the better part of 27 February
to exploit the full shock of armor. the 9th Panzer Division made a fight of
With the 13th Infantry attached, the it in Elsdorf, but with fire support from
3d Armored Division (General Rose) a company of tanks positioned in a
split into six task forces, one built neighboring village an infantry bat-
around the 83d Reconnaissance Bat- talion broke into the town before noon
talion, the others each with a nucleus and began a systematic mop-up. With
of one battalion of tanks and one of the tank company was a T26 medium
armored infantry, plus increments of tank armed with a 90-mm. gun, one of
engineers, tank destroyers, and artillery. the first twenty of this model (the Persh-
With two task forces, Combat Com- ing) sent to the European theater for
mand A on the right was to attack testing. T h e tank gave a good account of
astride the Dueren-Cologne highway to itself. At a range of a thousand yards,
gain the Erft River while CCB, also with the Pershing hit and destroyed two Mark
two task forces, was to take the road IV tanks, drilling holes through the
center of Elsdorf, northeast of the Ham- thick side armor, and stopped a Mark
bach Forest a few miles short of the VI Tiger with a hit at the vulnerable
Erft. One task force was to remain in turret joint.
division reserve and the 83d Reconnais- By midafternoon Elsdorf was suffi-
sance Battalion was to serve as a bridge ciently cleared to enable General Rose
between the two combat commands. to commit his division reserve north-
T h e 24th Cavalry Squadron was to pro- eastward toward the Erft alongside the
tect the left flank inside the Hambach 83d Reconnaissance Battalion. As night
Forest . came the armor held a 3-mile stretch of
I n striking northeastward, the Ameri- the Erft's west bank, and after dark in-
can armor was turning away from the fantrymen waded across to establish two
enemy's L V I I I Panzer Corps into the small bridgeheads.
sector of the LXXXI Corps, where the O n 27 February the VII Corps thus
last of the 9th Panzer Division had ar- completed its role in Operation GRE-
rived to assume a passive defensive role. NADE. In two bounds the armor had cov-
170 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
ered ten and a half miles from the with such swiftness, German command-
original Roer bridgehead line to the ers who as late as 24 February could
Erft to seal the Ninth Army’s south hope that the Ninth Army’s crushing
flank. Although General Collins would drive was not designed to converge with
be quick to exploit the crossing of the the Canadian thrust southeast from
Erft, the exploitation was logically not Nijmegen were at last impelled to face
part of GRENADE but belonged to an- reality. Operation GRENADE at that point
other operation General Bradley had clearly was the hammer aimed at crush-
been designing to carry his 12th Army
ing the southern wing of Army Group
Group to the Rhine.9
H against the anvil of Operation VERI-
Rundstedt’s Appeal TABLE. Success of the operations meant
encirclement or crushing defeat both for
As these events had been occurring Army Group H’s southern wing, the
9See below, ch. X. First Parachute Army, and that part of
N I N T H ARMY T O T H E RHINE 171
T h e next day, the 27th, the Ninth Army tanks. Although rain on 26 and 27 Feb-
commander, General Simpson, sanc- ruary grounded tactical aircraft, it was
tioned commitment of the first of his too light to spoil the footing.
armored divisions in a major shift to an O n the last day of February and the
exploitation phase. first day of March, events proved con-
T h e question in Simpson’s mind, as clusively that the battlefield belonged
it had been in General McLain’s, was to armor. All along the front American
whether infantry should continue to units recorded advances of from seven
lead the way in the zone of the XIX to ten miles, and there was little the
Corps until the advance had passed the Germans could do about it.
German trench system that cut across By the end of 28 February, the 2d
the front through Garzweiler. There Armored Division (commanded now by
was room already to insert a new unit Brig. Gen. I. D. White) and an at-
between the 29th and 30th Divisions, tached regiment of the 83d Division
but should this be another infantry di- stood only seven miles from the Rhine.
vision or should it be armor? Gambling T h e next day, 1 March, a single regi-
that the enemy was n o longer capable ment of the 29th Division took Muen-
of an organized defense on any line, chen-Gladbach almost without a fight.
Simpson told General McLain to send On the same day, a motorized task force
the armor through to the Rhine at of the 35th Division raced to Venlo on
Neuss. As events developed, n o real con- the Maas, more than twenty-five miles
cern was necessary, for before the armor beyond the bridge at Hilfarth where
could get going on 28 February, the the division had crossed the Roer. T h e
30th Division took Garzweiler with no task force was out of contact with the
particular trouble. enemy most of the way, probably be-
Elsewhere on the Ninth Army’s front cause of the German withdrawal from
no one would even question the im- the Roermond salient.
mediate use of armor. A combat com- It was all along the front a typical
mand of General Oliver’s 5th Armored pursuit operation, a return at last to
Division already had gone into action in the halcyon days of August and early
the XIII Corps, originally as flank pro- September. For most of the troops most
tection; General Gillem ordered the of the time the tenseness of battle gave
rest of the division to attack through way to dull fatigue. T h e setting no
the 102d Division on 28 February. T h e longer looked like a battlefield. In one
84th Division in the meantime motor- town electric lights were on, trolleys
ized a task force of infantry and tanks. running. Many a village bore n o scar.
While the 35th Division continued Returning to the fight after two days of
northwestward to gain maneuver room rain, tactical aircraft lent a kind of dis-
for the XVI Corps, General Anderson cordant note with their noisy attacks on
alerted a combat command of the 8th fleeing German columns. Almost all fir-
Armored Division (Brig. Gen. John M. ing seemed to have an air of unreality.
Devine) to cross the Roer on 27 Febru- Giving way to exhaustion, one lieu-
ary and take up the fight to the north. tenant fell asleep in a ditch, later to be
T h e weather remained favorable for awakened by a German woman carry-
NINTH ARMY TO THE RHINE 173
ing a child and fleeing from some sense- mans accomplished during those two
less machine gun chatter down the road. days was an exchange of General von
Yet the battle had not ceased; it had Manteuffel, commander of the Fifth
only been shattered. T h e bits here and Panzer Army, for the Fifteenth Army
there, meaningless in the larger picture, commander, General von Zangen, a step
were grim and bloody for the troops in implementing the long-projected
unlucky enough to r u n into them. T h e transfer of zones between the two ar-
84th Division, for example, after lung- mies. Yet not for another six days would
ing nine miles on 27 February, sud- the staffs complete the exchange. Gen-
denly came upon a determined group eral von Manteuffel promptly ordered
of Germans of the 8th Parachute Di- the Panzer Lehr Division to counterat-
vision at a town west of Muenchen- tack southeastward from Muenchen-
Gladbach. With a skillfully organized Gladbach with the aim of linking with
defense that belied the haste with which a northwestward strike by the 11th Pan-
the paratroopers had had to turn from zer Division, but the Panzer Lehr still
their British foes in the north to their was assembling when the proposed base
American enemies at their rear, the Ger- of Muenchen-Gladbach fell. T h e loss
mans brought war back to the 334th In- prompted Manteuffel to order the feeble
fantry in a daylong fight as bitter as any 11th Panzer to desist. T h e XII SS Corps
in the campaign. continued to fall back to the north, out
Company G bore the brunt of the ac- of contact with the rest of the army,
tion. It finally required an advance over while the LXXXI Corps and the 9th
open ground with marching fire, hand and 11th Panzer Divisions (the two op-
grenades, and in the end bayonets to ex- erating at this point under Corps Bayer-
terminate the enemy. Of an estimated Zein) withdrew eastward behind the
50 paratroopers, only 2 surrendered. Erft. 14
Company G incurred 40 casualties out
of a force of about 125 riflemen who Efforts To Seize a Bridge
took part.
T h e next day, 1 March, as the 84th O n the American side, commanders
Division broke away again, General began thinking seriously of the possi-
Simpson shuffled his reserves to make bility of taking intact a bridge across
fresh troops available in each attacking the Rhine. Nobody really counted on
corps to maintain pressure. He trans- succeeding, but all deemed it worth a
ferred the 75th Division (commanded try. Strong armored punches aimed at
now by Maj. Gen. Ray E. Porter), the bridges would at least cut up the
which had been under operational con- enemy and possibly trap large numbers
trol of the British, to the XVI Corps even if the armor failed to take a bridge.
and shifted the 79th Division (General T h e Supreme Commander, General
Wyche) from the XVI Corps to the Eisenhower, indicated to General Simp-
XIII Corps. His army reserve, the 95th
Division (Maj. Gen. Harry L. Twad- 14MSS # B-812 (Zangen); B-053 (Bayerlein); #
C-020 (Schramm); # B-202, Fifth Panzer Army,
dle), he attached to the XIX Corps. 1-17 April 1945 (Generalmajor F. von Mellenthin,
About the only thing of note the Ger- cofS).
174 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
Group H to replace General Student, from the start. Four tanks knocked out
an officer in whom Hitler had little con- quickly at the head of the column
fidence.16 blocked passage of the others. T h e in-
General Blaskowitz and the com- fantry went on alone to try to clear a
mander of the First Parachute Army, new route. When the tanks in early
General der Fallschirmtruppen Alfred afternoon again attacked, they reached
Schlemm, had been up against many of the vicinity of the bridge from the south
the same problems faced by their col- but ground to a halt under heavy mor-
leagues to the south: virtually no re- tar fire punctuated now and then by
serves and adamant refusal by Hitler to the sharper sting of an antitank gun or
allow any withdrawal to the east bank Panzerfaust .
of the Rhine. In an effort to salvage T h e two attached battalions of the
something in the face of continued pres- 379th Infantry meanwhile fought their
sure from the First Canadian Army and way to the highway connecting Krefeld
a new threat by U.S. troops from the and Uerdingen and tried to turn east-
rear, the German commanders had de- ward to the bridge. T h e paratroopers
cided to try to fashion a bridgehead fought back stubbornly. Tantalizingly
west of the Rhine extending from Uer- close to the bridge, neither infantry nor
dingen in the south to Geldern in the tanks could push the few remaining
west and beyond Xanten in the north. yards. A 13-foot hole in the road at the
To do the job at Uerdingen, General west end of the bridge denied passage
Schlemm ordered there what was left of €or the tanks, and without their help
the 2d Parachute Division, some three the infantry was unable to pierce a thick
or four understrength battalions. T h e curtain of small arms fire.
paratroopers arrived on 2 March, only a After dark a six-man engineer patrol
step ahead of the American armor. 17 led by Capt. George L. Youngblood
Unaware of the arrival of the para- slipped past the defenders, gained the
troopers, the 2d Armored Division made bridge, and crossed it, cutting all visible
plans to attack toward the bridge at demolition wires in the process. T h e
0200, 3 March. In hope of keeping the patrol went all the way to the east bank
Germans from demolishing the bridge, before turning back. Yet the engineers
the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battal- either missed the critical wires or the
ion kept up a continuous harassing fire. enemy put in others during the night,
Beginning soon after nightfall on 2 for at 0700 the next morning, before a
March and using shells fixed with prox- new attack could gain the bridge, the
imity fuzes, the artillery fired for more Germans blew the center and west
than fifteen hours. spans.18
T h e attack itself ran into trouble Fighting to clear Uerdingen contin-
ued throughout 4 March and into the
16Bauer, Army Group G , January 1945. morning of the 5th. At the same time
17MSS # B–084, First Parachute Army, 20
November 1944–21 March 1945 (General der Falls- 18General Schlemm says: “At Uerdingen the
chirmtruppen Alfred Schlemm); # B–147, Army demolition wires were shot out by artillery fire.
Group H, 10 November 1944–10 March 1945 Their replacement took hours.” MS # B–084
Oberst Rolf Geyer, Opns Officer, AGp H). (Schlernm).
178 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
the corps commander, General McLain, before they could fire. T h e 84th Division
ordered the 95th Division to drive for meanwhile cleared Moers and Homberg
road and rail bridges at Rheinhausen, but found road and rail bridges leading
not quite six miles downstream from across the Rhine into Duisburg already
the Adolf Hitler bridge, with the armor destroyed.
attacking northward on the 95th’s left. Operation GRENADE as originally con-
Resistance proved to be light. T h e rea- ceived was over; but if the Ninth Army’s
son seemed apparent when during the General Simpson had his way, GRENADE
morning of 5 March pilots of artillery would be extended to include a bridge-
observation planes reported both bridges head over the Rhine and a drive to the
at Rheinhausen already down. By mid- northeastern corner of the Ruhr indus-
afternoon the XIX Corps had completed trial region. Since 1 March Simpson’s
its role in reaching the Rhine but had staff had been considering this strata-
failed to get a bridge. gem, based in the main on the theory
There was another reason for the light of seizing a bridge intact but, failing
resistance. In breaking through at Uer- that, on a quick surprise crossing.19
dingen, the XIX Corps had compro- General Simpson settled on a plan to
mised the bridgehead line that General cross the Rhine between Duesseldorf
Schlemm, the First Parachute Army and Uerdingen, then to turn north to
commander, had been trying to hold. clear the east bank for further crossings
With the approval of Blaskowitz at Army and to gain relatively open country
Group H , Schlemm authorized with- along the northern fringe of the Ruhr.
drawal to a second and smaller bridge- It was a stratagem that hardly could
head line extending from the conflu- have failed, for Hitler’s refusal to agree
ence of the Ruhr River with the Rhine to timely and orderly withdrawal behind
at Duisburg in the south to the vicinity the Rhine had left his field commanders
of Xanten in the north. This was a line little with which to defend the historic
of no retreat designated by Hitler per- moat and in early March totally unpre-
sonally to enable continued supply of pared to counter a crossing.
coal by barge to the German Navy along Yet Simpson’s superior, Field Marshal
major canals leading to the North Sea Montgomery, said no. To a bitter Ninth
ports. Army staff, his refusal rested, rightly or
Yet this line also quickly proved too wrongly, on the effect an impromptu
ambitious. As the XIX Corps on 5 American crossing might have on the
March finished clearing its share of the Field Marshal’s own plans for staging a
Rhine’s west bank, the 5th Armored Di- grand set-piece assault to cross the Rhine
vision of the XIII Corps dashed into on a broad front.20
Orsoy, on the Rhine opposite one of the
canals the Germans needed for their 19Conquer, pp. 189–90.
20Conquer, p. 190. Speaking with some authority
coal barges. With tanks and half-tracks on the British viewpoint, Chester Wilmot in The
in high gear and firing as they went, Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper & Brothers,
CCR swiftly covered the last two miles 1952). page 677, wrote that Montgomery refused
because a crossing near Duesseldorf would have
into Orsoy, cutting through German in- involved the Ninth Army in the “industrial
fantry and overrunning artillery pieces wilderness” of the Ruhr. In none of his published
NINTH ARMY T O T H E RHINE 179
The Wesel Pocket Sevelen, five miles southeast of Geldern,
but there had a stiff fight to take the
Operation GRENADE as originally con- town. (Map VII) A battalion of the
ceived was over and would gain no new 134th Infantry made contact with the 1st
lease on life beyond the Rhine. Yet it British Corps at Geldern, but resistance
would be extended northward along the there too was determined. Although the
west bank, for the Ninth Army still 8th Armored Division still had met no
would have a hand in reducing those real opposition, the armor was about to
Germans remaining west of the river. he pinched out by the change in bound-
Swinging northeastward after an initial ary that sent the neighboring XIII
thrust northward from the Roer cross- Corps northward. CCB would be at-
ing site, General Anderson’s XVI Corps tached the next day to the 35th Divi-
would be thrown into a tough after-fight sion, while CCR on the extreme right
against remnants of the First Parachute had to be recalled to make room for
Army. The resistance would be stub- units of the XIII Corps.
born, for never would Hitler actually Contact between the forces of Opera-
authorize withdrawal. tions VERITABLEand GRENADEon 3
From 28 February through 3 March March at Geldern created a continuous
the XVI Corps had been slicing through Allied perimeter around those Germans
relatively undefended country. In driv- remaining west of the Rhine. Units of
ing first to Venlo and thence north- the 1st British Corps had reached posi-
eastward in the general direction of tions generally on a north-south line
Rheinberg, midway between Wesel and between the Xanten Forest, west of
Duisburg, a motorized task force of the Xanten, and Geldern, while the Cana-
35th Division and a lone combat com- dians still were fighting to wrest a ridge-
mand of the 8th Armored Division had line within the Xanten Forest from
led the way, each on a narrow front. For German paratroopers.
much of the time the armor had to stick The perimeter for the moment cor-
to a single road, where its striking power responded roughly to the outer bridge-
at the head was seldom more than a pla- head line that General Schlemm of the
toon of tanks and a company of in- First Parachute Army was trying to
fantry; but neither this nor any other establish, b u t not for long. The ad-
handicap really mattered. vances at Geldern and Sevelen meant
Indications that the road march might that in the center as in the south the
be nearing an end emerged on 3 March. Germans would have to fall back to the
T h e 35th Division’s Task Force Byrne inner bridgehead line, which in this sec-
(a reinforced 320th Infantry) reached tor ran about six miles east of Geldern
along the western edge of the Boenning-
hardt Forest. The southern edge of the
works did Montgomery himself comment. German
commanders almost to a man believed a surprise bridgehead would be anchored on
crossing would have met little resistance, a view Orsoy.
reinforced by events in succeeding days elsewhere From the vicinity of Xanten to Orsoy,
along the Rhine. See in particular MSS # B–084
(Schlemm) ; # B–147 (Geyer) ; # A–965 (General- the German bridgehead was some six-
major Karl Wagener) . teen miles wide. It encompassed the
T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
only high ground in this generally flat northward to take the bridges. Although
portion of the Rhineland: a boomerang- the bridges lay outside the American
shaped ridge in the north covered by the boundary, the commanders informally
Xanten Forest, the wooded Boenning- eased boundary restrictions.
hardt Ridge on a northwest-southeast General Baade's 35th Division at-
axis that bisected the Geldern-Wesel tacked on 4 March with two regiments
highway, and a series of isolated hills abreast. On the left two battalions of
south of the Boenninghardt Ridge. the 320th Infantry came under intense
Within the bridgehead General fire from small arms, mortars, and artil-
Schlemm still had more than 50,000 lery as they approached the Hohe Busch,
men, representing contingents of almost a small forest not quite half the distance
every division that had put up such a to Rheinberg astride the Sevelen-
determined stand against Operation Rheinberg highway. Fire from neither
VERITABLE,including four parachute artillery nor tank destroyers could neu-
divisions, the Panzer Lehr and 116th tralize the German positions. Although
Panzer Divisions, and a panzer grena- a platoon of rifllemen got into a village
dier division.21 Only in the north oppo- just west of the wood, the men with-
site the Canadians was the bridgehead drew when the enemy began closing
line solidly organized, for there the Ger- around them. Under the impression that
mans had made a grudging withdrawal the platoon held the village, five me-
back to a natural line of defense. Else- dium and two light tanks of the 784th
where hasty withdrawal had left few Tank Battalion moved in. With Panzer-
German units with any real integrity. fausts the Germans knocked out one of
Within the bridgehead, two bridges the mediums and both the lights, and
still spanned the Rhine, a road bridge only the timely arrival of a reserve rifle
and a rail bridge, both leading to Wesel, company spared the others. Even after
the city on the east bank that would the infantry cleared the village, the Ger-
lend its name to the pocket of German mans after dark came back, besieging
troops. Those bridges obviously would one American platoon in a hotel with
be a key Allied objective, both because hand grenades thrown through the win-
they stood almost exactly in the middle dows.
of the bridgehead and because they held It was a touch of the old war again,
out promise for crossing the Rhine with of the days before anyone talked of Ger-
dry feet. man collapse, not only here but to the
Because of the sparse opposition the south where two battalions of the 137th
Americans had been meeting, Allied Infantry on the 35th Division's right
commanders believed the best chance of wing also ran into trouble.
getting the Wesel bridges rested with Attacking from a point southeast of
the XVI Corps. T h e assignment went to Sevelen, a leading company of one bat-
the 35th Division and its attached com- talion encountered heavy fire at the base
bat command, which were to drive of one of the isolated hills that afforded
northeastward to Rheinberg, thence a logical extension of any defensive line
based to the north on the Boenning-
31MS # B–084 (Schlemm). hardt Ridge and the Hohe Busch. Two
N I N T H ARMY T O T H E RHINE 181
knocked out three 88’s, five 20-mm. While the Canadians plugged away at
antiaircraft guns, and four machine die-hard opposition in Xanten, General
guns. Reaching the southern fringe of Anderson’s XVI Corps headed north
Rheinberg as darkness fell, they waited with two task forces, Task Force Byrne
for the 35th Division’s 137th Infantry still on the left, Task Force Murray
to come u p during the night and secure (the 137th Infantry with what remained
the rest of the town. of the 8th Armored Division’s CCB) on
T h e fight for Rheinberg had all but the right. Both task forces soon discov-
annihilated CCB’s armor; of 54 tanks, ered that the hard fighting for Rhein-
39 were lost. For both the 36th Tank Bat- berg on 5 March had been a harbinger
talion and the 49th Armored Infantry, of what was to come. Although a British
it had been the first real fight, strikingly division on the left of Task Force Byrne
sharp action when compared with the provided help, the two task forces could
skirmishing that had marked the com- do no more through the next three days
bat command’s brief previous experience than inch forward.
in battle. Although the men had dis- Then as suddenly as the determined
played considerable valor, they had paid resistance had formed, it disintegrated.
dearly with a loss of 92 killed, 31 miss- During the night of 9 March the Ger-
ing, 220 wounded. In official tones, the mans blew both the highway and rail-
8th Armored Division’s staff summarized way bridges at Wesel, leaving only a few
what had gone wrong: “The employ- rear guards and stragglers on the west
ment of the tank elements could have bank, Passing through Task Force Mur-
been improved through the provision of ray, the 134th Infantry the next morn-
closer infantry support, and undoubted- ing swept to the demolished highway
ly such support would have materially bridge almost unimpeded.
decreased the tank losses of the Combat
Command.” 24 T h e Beginning of the End
A daylong spectator at the events
around Orsoy was the First Parachute In just over two weeks the Ninth
Army commander, General Schlemm. 25 Army had driven approximately 53
Fully expecting the Americans to send miles, from the Roer at Juelich to the
a column of tanks streaking northward Rhine at Wesel, and had cleared some
immediately to cut off his remaining 34 miles of the west bank of the Rhine
troops from the Wesel bridges, Schlemm from Duesseldorf to Wesel. In the proc-
nevertheless put into effect plans for a ess the army had captured about 30,000
new defensive line. Ordering two of his Germans and killed an estimated 6,000
three corps headquarters to retire east of more while absorbing less than 7,300
the Rhine, he placed the remaining casualties.26In the companion drive, the
bridgehead under one corps. T h e First Canadian Army had driven ap-
bridgehead still encompassed the town proximately 40 miles from the Dutch-
of Xanten and most of the Boenning- German border near Nijmegen to
hardt Ridge.
24 8th Armored Div AAR, Mar 45.
25 MS # B–084 (Schlemm). 26Conquer, p. 198.
184 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
Wl. T h e casualties in VERITABLE were many. This was the presence of millions
15,600, prisoners, 22,200.27 of noncombatants-native civilians, im-
T h e First Canadian Army’s task had pressed workers from other countries,
been the more difficult of the two, for and liberated prisoners of war.
the fortune of the delay imposed on In some measure the Allies had ex-
Operation GRENADE by the flooded Roer perienced the problem before in France,
River had shoved the bulk of German Belgium, and the Netherlands, but the
strength to the north. T h e First Para- populace in those countries had been
chute Army clearly had been superior friendly. In earlier fighting just within
to the Fifteenth Army. In addition, the German frontier, many of the ci-
flooded ground over the first few miles vilians had fled the battle zone; but now,
of the Canadians’ route of attack had as the Allies thrust deeper, there was
imposed serious difficulties. nowhere for them to go. Literally masses
Although Field Marshal Montgomery of humanity wandered about, cluttering
had not intended it so, the two opera- roads, slowing traffic, sometimes clog-
tions had developed in a pattern already ging prisoner-of-war channels. Destroyed
made familiar in Sicily and again in homes, damaged water, sanitary and
Normandy, where Montgomery’s troops electrical facilities, and a complete
attracted German reserves while Ameri- breakdown of civilian transportation
can forces achieved a breakthrough and added to the problem. To establish some
rapid exploitation. In Normandy more semblance of order out of the chaos was
favorable terrain had lured the Germans a mammoth asignment that by 15 March
to Montgomery’s front; here it was be- already was occupying more than forty
cause the Canadian attack had started Military Government detachments in
first. As in Normandy, the Americans the Ninth Army’s zone.28
with their immense transportation re- Meanwhile, the great build-up for
sources were admirably suited for the crossing the Rhine began, underscoring
breakthrough role. the fact that Operations GRENADE and
For all the speed of execution, Opera- VERITABLE marked the beginning of the
tion GRENADE was complex, involving end. Not only had these operations put
the crossing of a flooded, defended river, the Ninth Army, the Canadians, and the
followed by two major changes in direc- British into position to cross the Rhine
tion of attack and a minor adjustment but they had unleashed a flood of offen-
at the end, A trace along the middle of sive operations elsewhere, designed to
the Ninth Army’s course would resem- carry all Allied armies to the river. In-
ble a giant S. deed, a contingent of one American
T h e operation also had introduced army already had stolen a march on all
another complication that all Allied ar- others and jumped the big obstacle with-
mies now would experience as they out pause.
thrust deep into the interior of Ger-
28 An instructive essay on this subject may be
27Stacey, The Victory Campaign, p. 522. found in Conquer, pp. 195–97,
CHAPTER X
Operation LUMBERJACK
Although the American attacks in the along the Rhine. As Collins turned
Eifel and the Saar-Moselle triangle were south, other contingents of the First
unpopular with Field Marshal Mont- Army were to launch a narrow thrust
gomery, they were in reality of assistance from the vicinity of the road center of
to him, for they did, in fact, limit the Euskirchen southeast to the Ahr River,
units the Germans could disengage to there to converge with a thrust by the
send north. They also put General Brad- Third Army through the Eifel and cre-
ley’s forces into better positions for gain- ate a pocket of trapped Germans in the
ing the Rhine whenever the signal came northern reaches of the Eifel.
and denied hard-pressed German units Bradley’s plan went by the code name,
the respite they desperately needed. LUMBERJACK. 2
In making plans for going beyond Despite having relinquished units to
those limited objective attacks, General flesh out the Ninth Army, the 12th Army
Bradley had to consider not only the re- Group still was a powerful force. In the
sponsibility for protecting the right flank First Army, General Hodges had twelve
of the Ninth Army as far as the Erft in divisions (three of them armored), plus
Operation GRENADE but also an addi- another at reduced strength (the 106th)
tional task that the Supreme Com- and two cavalry groups. In the Third
mander, General Eisenhower, assigned Army, General Patton had ten divisions
on 20 February. Before Bradley could (including three armored) and two
turn full attention to gaining the west cavalry groups. While nondivisional ar-
bank of the Rhine, he had to extend his tillery was in no such strength as that
protection of the Ninth Army’s right which had helped the Ninth Army over
flank by clearing a triangle of land be- the Roer, it was impressive nevertheless.
tween the Erft and the Rhine extending Each corps in the First Army, for exam-
northward from Cologne to the conflu- ple, retained its usual attachments of
ence of the two rivers near Duessel- four battalions of 155-mm. howitzers,
dorf.1 two battalions of 155-mm. guns, and a
Bradley logically gave the assignment battalion each of 4.5-inch guns and 8-
to the First Army’s General Hodges for inch howitzers. In deference to the role
execution by Collins’s VII Corps. Once GENADE, the VII Corps had two ad-
the job was completed, the VII Corps ditional battalions-one light, one me-
was to take Cologne, then head south dium. T h e 32d Field Artillery Brigade
1 Ltr. Eisenhower to Bradley, 20 Feb 45, 12th Opeation LUMBERJACK, Outline Plan, 23 Feb
AGp Military Objectives, 371.2, vol. VI. 45, Hq 12th AGp.
186 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
with two 8-inch gun and two 240-mm. equivalent of only six and a half full
howitzer battalions, operating under the divisions.5
First Army’s control, assumed positions During late February, no major
favoring the north wing. 3 changes occurred in the German order
T h e breakdown of roads under the of battle opposite the First and Third
February thaw was of some concern to Armies except those occasioned by Op-
all but prompted few special measures eration GRENADE and by the Third Ar-
except in the First Army where the two my’s attacks in the Eifel and the Saar-
assault divisions of the VII Corps were Moselle triangle. Hit by the U.S. VII
authorized to accumulate five days’ sup- Corps in GRENADE,the southernmost
ply of ammunition before jumping the corps of Zangen’s Fifteenth Army,
Roer. Both armies were relatively close Krueger’s LVIII Panzer Corps (still mi-
to major railheads—the Third Army to nus the armor the corps name implied),
Luxembourg City and Thionville, the had been pushed back, in some places
First Army to Liège—so that rail trans- behind the Erft River and Canal system.
port could handle much of the burden In continuing northeast after crossing
except for the last few miles to the front. the Erft, the VII Corps would strike the
Nor was either army so heavily engaged remnants of Koechling’s LXXXI Corps
throughout February but that some sup- and of Corps Bayerlein, the latter com-
plies could be stockpiled. T h e First posed of what was left of the 9th and
Army, for example, built up its Class 11th Panzer Divisions after their piece-
III (gasoline) reserves from 1.8 days of meal and futile commitment against
supply to 6 days. Nevertheless, with the GRENADE. From a boundary with the
lesson of the 4th Division’s supply prob- Fifteenth Army immediately south of
lems near Pruem in mind, General Dueren, Manteuffel‘s Fifth Panzer Army
Bradley directed both armies to instruct stood with three corps behind the Roer
division staffs in how to obtain emer- River and its upper tributaries while
gency supply by air. He directed also awaiting the shift in zones with the
prepackaging of vital supplies at various Fifteenth Army that was to come around
airfields for prompt loading if needed. 4 1 March beginning with exchange of
Intelligence officers estimated approx- the two army commanders, Manteuffel
imately 40,000 Germans in front of the and Zangen. Commanded at this point
First Army and some 45,000 facing the by General Felber, the Seventh Army
Third Army. If the G–2’s erred at all, stood behind the Pruem and Kyll Riv-
they erred on the side of caution; as ers, impotently awaiting continued
noted during the first fortnight in Feb- strikes by the American Third Army.
ruary in the pessimistic report of Field In reaching the Erft River late on 27
Marshal von Rundstedt, the Germans February, General Collins’s VII Corps
in all of Army Group B amounted to the had fulfilled its mission in Operation
GRENADE. Yet because of the added as-
signment of guarding the Ninth Army’s
flank all the way to the Rhine, the corps
3 FUSARpt of Opns, 23 Feb–8 May 45, p. 5;
TUSA AAR, Feb–Mar 45.
4 Ibid. 5 For details, see above, ch. VIII.
OPERATION LUMBERJACK 187
would make no pause at the Erft except north of Cologne, leaving the city to be
that necessary to expand the bridgeheads taken later. General Collins split re-
established on the 27th and to put in sponsibility for the assignment between
bridges. By the end of the first day of General Rose’s 3d Armored Division
March, the corps was beyond the Erft and the 99th Infantry Division (Maj.
complex astride the main highways lead- Gen. Walter E. Lauer) .
ing from Juelich and Dueren to Co- T h e critical assignment went to the
logne. (Map IX) Despite frantic efforts armor, beefed u p during the opening
by German planes, usually operating phase of breaking out of the Erft bridge-
singly, six class 40 bridges were in place head with attachment of the 99th Divi-
across the Erft. sion’s 395th Infantry. Rose was to strike
Resistance was at most places light, north from the bridgehead to cut the
mainly mortar fire and shells from rov- Cologne–Muenchen-Gladbach highway
ing self-propelled guns. Only at Moed- at the town of Stommeln, thereby sever-
rath, lying between the river and the ing a vital artery leading into the Ninth
canal, was the defense determined. Army’s flank, then was to turn northeast
There, a local defense force, reinforced to reach the Rhine at Worringen, eight
by stragglers from units of the LVIII miles downstream from Cologne. A
Panzer Corps, held contingents of the clear intent was to split the enemy’s sec-
8th Division’s 121st Infantry at bay for tor swiftly and forestall reassembly and
two days until a battalion of the 28th counterattack by remnants of the panzer
Infantry crossed the Erft farther north divisions of Corps Bayerlein. Mean-
and came in on the German flank. 6 while, General Lauer’s infantry was to
T h e conspicuous feature of the terrain clear the ground between Rose’s armor
immediately beyond the Erft, west and and the Erft with help from the 4th
southwest of Cologne, is a low, plateau- Cavalry Group, while the 8th and 104th
like ridge some twenty-five miles long, Divisions on the corps right wing fought
the Vorgebirge. T h e slopes of the ridge their way through the lignite mining
are broken by numerous lignite (“brown district in the direction of Cologne. 7
coal”) surface mines with steep, clifflike When the armor attacked before day-
sides. Abandoned mines have filled light on 2 March, all thrusts were suc-
with water to create big lakes, often con- cessful, but they failed to precipitate
fining passage to the width of the road- immediate breakout. Conglomerate Ger-
ways. Factories and heavily urbanized man units, mainly from the 9th Panzer
settlements abound. Northwest of Co- Division, fought back stubbornly behind
logne, the country is generally flat and antitank ditches and obstacles that made
pastoral, dotted with villages and small up an extension of the third line of
towns, particularly along the major field fortifications the Germans had pre-
highways radiating from Cologne. pared behind the Roer. T h e gains here
Because of the basic requirement of were insufficient to have any effect on
protecting the Ninth Army’s flank, the the counterattack projected for that day
VII Corps was to make its main effort by t h e 11th Panzer Division into the
7 VII Corps Opns Memo 163, 25 Feb 45; VII
6 8th Div AAR, Mar 45. Corps FO 16, 1 Mar 45.
188 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
Ninth Army’s flank; that failed to come tration of antitank guns, the columns
off only because the Ninth Army’s cap- converged on the town in late afternoon.
ture of Muenchen-Gladbach prevented Aided by P–47 air strikes against the
the Panzer Lehr Division from launch- antitank defenses, they cleared the last
ing its converging thrust.8 resistance by nightfall. General Rose
As night fell on 2 March, the armor meanwhile sent a column from his re-
had expanded the Erft bridgehead to a serve, Combat Command Boudinot, be-
depth of three miles, which carried it yond Stommeln to a village just four
beyond the northern reaches of the miles from the Rhine. Only one more
Vorgebirge into open country. From town lay between the armor and the
that point the Germans would be capa- final objective of Worringen.
ble only of delaying actions, almost al- T h e 99th Division had made com-
ways in towns and villages since the flat parable progress on the left, cutting the
terrain afforded few military features. Cologne–Muenchen-Gladbach highway
Although reinforced from time to time at several points late on 3 March. Nor
by stragglers spilling across the Erft be- was success confined to the left wing of
fore the steamroller of the Ninth Army, the corps. Moving toward Cologne
Corps Bayerlein had n o depth. Con- astride the Aachen-Cologne highway and
glomerate forces usually including a few the adjacent right-of-way of the uncom-
tanks or self-propelled guns would have pleted Aachen-Cologne autobahn, the
to gauge their defense carefully to keep 104th Division made relatively short but
from being overrun in one village lest nevertheless telling gains.10 So did the
there be nothing left to defend the next 8th Division, advancing astride the
one. Dueren-Cologne highway. Bearing the
That fact was demonstrated early on additional responsibility of protecting
3 March when two task forces of Com- the open right flank of the corps, the 8th
bat Command Hickey moved before Division had the slower going but still
dawn to take the Germans by surprise took the second row of towns beyond the
in two villages southwest of Stommeln.9 Erft and gained a firm hold on western
So complete was the surprise in the first slopes of the Vorgebirge. T h e 104th
village. that the attacking armored in- Division cleared a big forest astride the
fantrymen incurred not a single cas- Aachen-Cologne highway and crossed
ualty. At both villages the Germans the crest of the Vorgebirge.
were annihilated, leaving nobody to a Even though the 3d Armored Division
final village still remaining short of still had several miles to go to reach the
Stommeln, the division’s intermediate Rhine, the VII Corps commander, Gen-
objective.
Combat Command Howze moved 10 Asthe 104th Division prepared to attack before
against Stommeln from three sides. De- daylight on March, a German shell struck the
command post of the 2d Battalion, 414th Infantry,
spite an extensive antitank minefield killing the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Joseph
covered by a relatively strong concen- M. Cummins, Jr., and two visiting officers, Col.
Anthony J. Touart, 414th Infantry commander,
8 MS # B–202 (Mellenthin). See above, ch. IX. and Col. George A. Smith, Jr., assistant division
9 The 3d Armored Division usually labeled its commander. See Hoegh and Doyle, Timberwolf
combat commands after their commanders, Tracks, p. 257.
OPERATION LUMBERJACK 189
difficulties of attacking through the coal- talion of the 8th Division’s 28th Infan-
mining district but also the fact that the try meanwhile reached the river south
division was striking the north flank of of Cologne. For the third time in less
the L V I I I Panzer Corps. than a fortnight, the enemy’s forces were
T h e armor nevertheless broke into split. T h e remnants of the L V I I I Pan-
Cologne soon after daylight, to be fol- zer Corps, along with contingents of the
lowed two hours later by the 104th Di- 3 d Panzer Grenadier Division, which
vision from the west. I n a precursor of had fallen back southward away from
what was to come as Allied armies fanned Cologne, formed a last-ditch defense
out all across Germany, the stiffest fight across an eastward bend of the Rhine
developed around an airfield where the but began to evacuate the position early
Germans turned sixteen stationary 88- the next morning.17
mm. antiaircraft guns against the tanks General Collins and his VII Corps
of Combat Command Hickey. T h e had completed their assigned role in the
tanks finally eliminated the guns in drive to the Rhine in exactly two weeks,
smoke-screened cavalrylike charge. Al- at once a spearhead for the First Army
most all resistance by the 9th Panzer Di- and protection for the flank of the Ninth
vision collapsed a short while later when Army. In operations begun on 2 5 Feb-
the division commander, Generalmajor ruary, only two days after the VII Corps
Harald Freiherr von Elverfeldt, was had assaulted the Roer River line, other
killed. 15 parts of the First Army meanwhile had
As evening approached, the First joined the race to the Rhine.
Army commander, General Hodges,
shifted the southern boundary of the VII Toward Bonn and Remagen
Corps to the southeast to provide room
for the 8th Division to drive to the T h e operations had begun with lim-
Rhine south of Cologne and cut the en- ited goals, though with the certainty that
emy’s last landward escape route.16 T h e they later would be expanded. T h e plan
next day, 6 March, the 3d Armored was to uncover the line of the upper
drove quickly through the heart of the Roer, protect Collins’s VII Corps during
city, a wasteland from long years of its added assignment beyond the Erft,
aerial bombardment, and reached the and at the same time gain a leg on the
Hohenzollern bridge, only to find a drive to the Rhine.
1200-foot gap blown in it. Close by amid General Hodges directed General
the sea of ruins stood the stately Cologne Millikin’s III Corps, which had joined
cathedral, damaged but basically intact. the First Army in the reorganization
By noon of 7 March almost all of that followed halting of the main effort
Cologne had been cleared, despite in the Eifel, to cross the Roer south of
curious crowds of civilians jamming the Dueren and reach the Erft River north-
rubble-strewn streets. No road or rail ward from the road center of Euskirchen.
crossing of the Rhine remained. A bat- When the VII Corps turned to take
17MSS # B–202 (Mellenthin); # B–080 (Lang-
15Ibid. haeuser); # B–098, 353d Infantry Division, 2–22
16VII Corps G–3 Jnl, 5 Mar 45, March 1945 (Oberst Kurt Hummel, CG).
192 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
enabled the 9th Division’s 39th Infantry from Euskirchen, while CCA was to
to repeat the river crossing maneuver in move south and enter the zone of the
late afternoon. Before daylight on 27 78th Division, then turn east, oriented
February, men of the 9th Division at- generally toward Euskirchen. CCA was
tacked south to clear their own bridge to be joined later by the rest of the
sites at Nideggen, picturesquely located armored division operating in a “zone of
on the rim of the Cologne plain over- advance” within the sector of the late-
looking the gorge of the Roer and the running 78th Division. T h e 14th Cavalry
road leading back to Schmidt and the Group was to follow CCA and protect
Roer dams. Resistance was firmer than the south flank of the corps.21
that faced by the 1st Division, mainly Attacking in early afternoon of 28
because the 9th Division had crossed February, CCB before daylight the next
into the sector of General Puechler’s morning came abreast of the most ad-
LXXIV Corps and encountered a rela- vanced battalions of the 1st Division
tively battle-worthy unit, the 3 d Para- along the Neffel Creek, half the 15-mile
chute Division. Having undergone a distance from Roer to Erft. Beginning
hasty reorganization following the Ar- its attack a day later on 1 March, CCA
dennes counteroffensive, the division smacked almost immediately into a de-
contained its full complement of three fensive position lying behind the upper
parachute regiments, though all were reaches of the Neffel Creek and barring
understrength. 20 the way to the village of Wollersheim.
T h e 78th Division’s 311th Infantry Manned by troops of the 3 d Parachute
crossed the Roer on the last day of Feb- Division, the position was reinforced by
ruary through the 9th Division’s sector several tanks and assault guns.22When
and immediately attacked to the south, an attack by dismounted armored infan-
covering more than a mile against the trymen failed to carry it, CCA held u p
272d Volks Grenadier Division. This for the night to await arrival the next
completed the river-crossing maneuver morning of an infantry battalion from
in the I I I Corps, but as the 78th Division the 78th Division.
created its own bridgehead plans pro- On the second day of March genuine
ceeded for the V Corps to follow a simi- exploitation developed all along the
lar procedure for getting beyond the front of the III Corps. A double envelop-
Roer reservoirs. ment by CCA’s 52d Armored Infantry
T h e III Corps commander, General Battalion and an attached battalion of
Millikin, had moved quickly to get his the 310th Infantry carried the sticky po-
armor into the fight as soon as the in- sition at Wollersheim, while the 309th
hospitable terrain of the Eifel lay behind. Infantry put the 78th Division into the
CCB of the 9th Armored Division (Maj. eastward drive and came almost abreast
Gen. John W. Leonard) was to attack of CCA. Those two advances brought an
east between the 1st and 9th Divisions to end to solid defense by the enemy’s 3d
reach the Erft several miles downstream Parachute Division. Already the 353d
20 III Corps AAR, Feb 45; MS # B–118, LXXIV 21III Corps Opnl Dir # 4, 28 Feb 45.
Corps, 2 October 1944–28 March 1945 (General der 22III Corps AAR, Mar 45; MS # B–118 (Puech-
Infanterie Karl Puechler). ler).
194 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
Infantry Division in the north and the three days following brought preoccupa-
272d Volks Grenadier Division, the lat- tion with boundary changes and juggling
ter trying to prevent expansion of the of units as General Bradley’s original
78th Division’s bridgehead to the south, plan for clearing the west bank of the
were reduced to executing isolated de- Khine underwent revision. Prompted by
laying actions. the relative ease with which Millikin’s
The commander of the L X X I V Corps, III Corps was advancing, the change
General Puechler, had. nothing left to limited responsibility of Collins’s VII
use in the fight except a weak Kampf- Corps to the city of Cologne while the
gruppe of the 62d Volks Grenadier Di- III Corps was to clear the west bank of
vision, which had been reorganizing the Rhine throughout the rest of the
behind the line when the American First Army’s zone from Cologne to the
attack began. He sent that force to the Ahr River. At the same time the III
north to try to maintain contact with the Corps retained responsibility for crossing
faltering LVIII Panzer Corps, but so the Ahr and establishing contact with
weak was the Kampfgruppe that the at- the Third Army.24
tacking American troops hardly noticed T h e first shift came on 2 March when
its presence.23 General Millikin transferred the 14th
The 1st Division on the 2d got within Cavalry Group to his north flank for
three miles of the Erft, while in the attachment to the 1st Division in antici-
center, the 9th Armored’s CCB crossed pation of broadening the 1st Division’s
the river along the Euskirchen-Cologne sector. The boundary change became ef-
highway. Following in the wake of CCB, fective the next day, 3 March, as the 26th
one regiment of the 9th Division ap- Infantry jumped the Erft and began to
proached within two miles of the Erft. climb the Vorgebirge, southwest of Co-
To many a soldier in the III Corps, logne, seven miles from the Rhine.
this day and those immediately follow- While the 9th Armored’s CCB held in
ing could be summed u p in two words: place on the Erft, awaiting relief by
mud and fatigue. As light snow flurries units of the 1st Division, CCA took the
ended in midmorning, a warm sun ancient walled town of Zuelpich against
triggered a latent springtime in the soil little more than a show of resistance. At
and turned roads and fields into clinging the end of the day General Millikin
mud. The mud and daytime attacks assigned the armor a specific zone be-
alone would have been enough to pro- tween the 9th and 78th Divisions.
duce fatigue, but hardly was there a Despite the importance Bradley and
commander who did not continue to the First Army’s General Hodges at-
push his men through much of the night tached to gaining bridgeheads over the
in order to overcome the advantage that Ahr River for linkup with the Third
flat, open fields afforded the enemy in Army, it was obvious from orders issued
observation. by Millikin and his division commanders
At command levels, 2 March and the that the fabled Rhine was the more ir-
23III Corps AAR, Mar 45; MS # B–118 (Puech. 2412th AGp Ltr of Instrs 16, 3 Mar 45, 12th AGp
.
ler) Rpt of Opns, vol. V.
OPERATION LUMBERJACK 195
Infantry Division of the V Corps crossed Third Army, had made a start on the
the 78th Division’s Roer bridges and assignment in late February and the first
headed south through the Eifel toward days of March with the “probing attacks”
Gemuend at the head of the Roer res- that captured Trier and advanced the
ervoir system. 29 VIII Corps to the Pruem River and the
T h e boundary adjustments on the XII Corps to the Kyll. T h e decision
American side continued on 5 March General Patton faced then—whether to
when General Hodges made the change turn southeast and envelop the Saar in-
that allowed the 8th Division of the VII dustrial area or to head through the
Corps to drive to the Rhine south of Eifel to the Rhine—the army group
Cologne. Late the same evening Hodges commander, General Bradley, already
also adjusted the boundary between the had made for him. T h e goal was the
III and V Corps, turning it distinctly Rhine.
southeast to a point on the Ahr upstream On the assumption that this job would
from Ahrweiler, thereby providing the be soon done, Patton planned a second-
III Corps over ten miles of frontage on ary attack to set the stage for clearing the
the Ahr. Saar. To General Walker’s XX Corps,
Those two moves eliminated any lin- he assigned a narrow one-division zone
gering misconception about the impor- north of the Moselle running from the
tance Bradley and Hodges attached to Kyll to one of the big northward loops
crossing the Ahr River. Early the next of the Moselle, some thirty-six miles
day General Millikin shifted all his di- downstream from Trier. T h e zone en-
vision objectives to the southeast—the closed a shallow depression lying be-
1st Division to Bonn, the 9th Division tween the high ground of the Mosel
to Bad Godesberg, the 9th Armored Di- Berge, which parallels the Moselle, and
vision to Remagen and the Ahr from the main Eifel massif. Clearing it would
Sinzig to Bad Neuenahr, and the 78th provide access to the transverse valley
Division to Ahrweiler. When the 9th leading to the Moselle at the picturesque
Armored’s G–3, Lt. Col. John S. Grow- wine center of Bernkastel and thence
don, telephoned to ask whether the into the heart of the Saarland.31
armor should continue to make its main To General Bradley’s protest that the
effort toward the Rhine, the III Corps Third Army was spreading its forces too
G–3, Col. Harry C. Mewshaw, replied thin and would be unable to make a
unequivocally that the Rhine was of ‘‘power drive” to the Rhine, Patton re-
secondary importance. T h e main goal, plied that the terrain and the roadnet in
he said, was “to seize towns and cross- the Eifel permitted a power drive by no
ings over the Ahr River.” 30 more than two divisions in any case.32
T h e VIII and XII Corps faced the Hohe
Patton in the Eifel Eifel, the high or volcanic Eifel, a region
even more rugged in places than the
T h e force that was to link with troops
of the First Army along the Ahr, Patton’s 31TUSA Opnl Dir, 3 Mar 45; XX Corps AAR,
Mar 45. For further mention of this attack, see
29Quotation is from III Corps AAR, Mar 45. below, ch. XII.
30 III Corps G–3 Jnl file, 6–7 Mar 45. 32 Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 252.
OPERATION LUMBERJACK 197
western reaches of the Eifel that the Corps stood generally along the Pruem
corps already had conquered. There, in River, still some ten miles short of the
an effort to overcome the weird convolu- Kyll. As a corollary to successful clearing
tions of the land, the limited roads gen- of the Vianden bulge, the 6th Cavalry
erally follow the low ground along the Group and the 6th Armored Division
stream beds, somehow eventually ending had made substantial advances beyond
u p at the Ahr, the Rhine, or the Moselle. the Pruem, but they were in the south
If the Third Army in this kind of ter- of the corps zone, relatively far from
rain was to hope to keep pace with the the main roads leading to the Rhine at
First Army on the open Cologne plain, Brohl. Besides, the 6th Armored was ear-
daring would have to be a major part of marked for early transfer to the SHAEF
of the plan. reserve, that irritating outgrowth of the
When the Third Army's long-term Ardennes counteroffensive that seemed
ally, the XIX Tactical Air Command, constantly to be plaguing some unit of
reported that the enemy already showed the Third Army. Thus Middleton or-
evidence of withdrawing and probably dered the 4th Division at the town of
would limit his stands to blocking posi- Pruem to enlarge its bridgehead over the
tions along the roads, that was all Patton Pruem River, whereupon the 11th Ar-
needed. He ordered that, once the VIII mored Division was to pass through and
and XII Corps had established bridge- strike due east to jump the Kyll, then
heads over the Kyll, an armored division strike northeast to the Rhine. The 4th
of each corps was to thrust rapidly north- Division was to follow to mop up, the
eastward along the better roads without 87th Division was to protect the north
regard to the wooded heights in between. flank, and the 90th Division, taking the
Artillery and fighter-bombers were to place of the 6th Armored, was to ad-
take care of the high ground until motor- vance on the south wing. 34
ized infantry could follow to secure the With units of the XII Corps already
gains.33 up to the Kyll, General Eddy gave the
Since General Bradley's plan for Op- job of forging a bridgehead to an infan-
eration LUMBERJACK had put the burden try division, the 5th; then the 4th
of linking the First and Third Armies Armored Division was to pass through to
along the Ahr River on the First Army, drive northeast to Andernach. T h e 5th
General Patton was free to think pri- Division and the 80th were to follow,
marily in terms of reaching the Rhine. while the 76th Division protected the
He directed Middleton's VIII Corps to right flank.35
gain the river around Brohl, midway be- On the enemy side, it was an under-
tween the Ahr and the ancient Rhine statement to say that German com-
town of Andernach, while the XII Corps manders viewed the pending Third
(commanded again by General Eddy Army offensive with anxiety, since the
after return from a brief leave) came up February attacks in the Eifel already had
to the river at Andernach.
When Patton's order came, the VIII 34 VIII Corps Opnl Memos 26 and 27, 1 and 2
Mar 45; VIII Corps G–3 Jnl file, 1–3 Mar 45.
35XII Corps Opns Dirs 83 and 84, 1 and 2 Mar
33XIX TAC AAR, Mar 45. 45.
198 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
severely lacerated General Felber’s Sev- threatened part, General Felber believed,
enth Army. How long the Seventh Army was the center opposite Bitburg, for
could hold in the Eifel depended entirely there stood the U.S. 4th Armored Di-
on how soon and how vigorously the vision, a unit looked upon with consid-
Americans attacked. erable respect by German commanders.
A breakthrough across the Kyll could With this in mind, Felber shifted to
prove fatal, not only to the Seventh Army the sector headquarters of the XIII
itself but to the two corps (LXVI and Corps on the premise that the corps com-
LXVII) forming the center and south mander, General von Oriola, having only
wing of the Fifteenth Army and to the recently arrived at the front, would be
entire First Army, the north wing of steadier under the coming crisis than
Hawser’s Army Group G. Should the would General von Rothkirch, com-
First and Third U.S. Armies quickly mander of the LIII Corps, who for weeks
join along the west bank of the Rhine, had been watching his command disinte-
the two corps of the Fifteenth Army grate. Thus the new lineup of corps from
would be encircled. In the process, the north to south was the LIII Corps (Roth-
Third Army’s clearing of the north bank kirch) near Pruem, the XIII Corps
of the Moselle would expose from the (Oriola) opposite Bitburg, and the
rear the West Wall pillboxes in the Saar- LXXX Corps (Beyer) between Bitburg
land, still held by the First Army. and the Moselle.
A partial solution, as the Seventh T h e Seventh Army contained, nomi-
Army’s General Felber saw it, was for the nally, ten divisions, but only two—rem-
Seventh Army to withdraw from the nants of the 2d Panzer Division east of
Eifel and protect Army Group G’s rear Bitburg and the 246th Volks Grenadier
by defending the line of the Moselle; but Division, the latter hurried down from
in view of Hitler’s continuing stand-fast what was now the Fifteenth Army’s sec-
orders, nobody higher up the ladder of tor too late to save Bitburg—could
command took the proposal seriously. muster much more than a small Kampf-
T h e only change made was to transfer gruppe. Both divisions were to remain
the faltering Seventh Army on 2 March with the XIII Corps in keeping with the
from Model’s Army Group B to Haus- theory that Patton’s main thrust would
ser’s Army Group G . By vesting control be made there with the 4th Armored
in the army group headquarters that had Division. Because the attack by the U.S.
most to lose should the Seventh Army VIII Corps would spill over the Seventh
collapse, the change inferred some Army’s northern boundary against the
strengthening of the Seventh Army by extreme south wing of the Fifteenth
Army Group G. In reality, it merely Army, another division with some credit-
shifted from one army group headquar- able fighting power remaining, the 5th
ters to another the dolorous task of pre- Parachute Division of the LXVI Corps
siding over the Seventh Army’s agony. (Lucht), also would be involved. Neither
From confluence of the Kyll and the the Seventh Army nor the Fifteenth
Moselle near Trier to a point near Army had any reserves, although the
Pruem, the Seventh Army’s zone covered Seventh did possess a separate tank bat-
some thirty-five miles. T h e most seriously talion with some ten to fifteen Tiger
OPERATION LUMBERJACK 199
tanks. This battalion General Felber ducing West Wall pillboxes on the
wanted to send to his center opposite Schnee Eifel ridge, the 87th Division
Bitburg, but he would still be searching found that the fortifications still put con-
for sufficient gasoline to move the tanks siderable starch into the defense.
from a field repair shop in the sector of Passing through the infantry shortly
the LIII Corps when the American at- after midday on 3 March, Combat Com-
tack began. 36 mand B of the 11th Armored Division
Because of the requirement to get attacked to seize crossings of the Kyll in
from the Pruem River to the Kyll, Gen- a big bend of the river north of Gerol-
eral Middleton’s VIII Corps began to stein, some eleven miles northeast of
attack first. Indeed, since the south wing Pruem. Delayed by confusion in the
of the corps had never stopped attacking passage of lines, the armor failed to ad-
after clearing the Vianden bulge and vance the first afternoon as much as two
since the XX Corps and the 76th Di- miles. It was nevertheless apparent that
vision of the XII Corps still were giving the Germans could muster no real
the coup d e grâce to Trier as the month strength short of the Kyll once the tanks
of March opened, no real pause devel- got rolling. By late afternoon the next
oped between the February probing at- day, 4 March, the combat command
tacks and the March offensive. overlooked the Kyll from heights a mile
For the 4th Infantry Division, enlarg- southwest of Gerolstein, but patrols sent
ing its minuscule bridgehead over the down to the river drew intense small
Pruem to enable the 11th Armored Di- arms fire from both the east bank and
vision to pass through, the task was no from high ground in the bend of the
pushover, primarily because of the pres- river. Antitank and artillery fire also
ence of the enemy’s 5th Parachute Di- rained from the east bank in disturbing
vision. Given some respite since the volume.
American drive on Pruem had bogged Having followed the path of least
down on 10 February, the Germans de- resistance, the armor had come u p to
fended from well-organized positions and the Kyll south of its intended crossing
employed unusually large numbers of site at a point where troops trying to
machine guns. So determined was the cross would be exposed to fire not only
resistance that General Middleton at one from dominating ground beyond the
point postponed the target date for the river but from the big bend as well.
armored exploitation twenty-four hours, Impressed both by the terrain and the
although subsequent gains prompted amount of German fire and apparently
him to reinstate it for the original date reluctant to risk involving the armor in
of 3 March. Nor was stanch resistance what could be a time-consuming river-
confined to the sector of the 4th Division. crossing operation, the division com-
Protecting the corps left flank by re- mander, General Kilburn, asked for
infantry help. While the 4th Division
36German material comes primarily from MSS cleared the high ground in the bend of
# B–831 (Felber); # B–828 (Zangen); # B–123 the Kyll, Kilburn suggested, CCB might
(Gersdorff): and # B–797, LIII Corps, 27 February
—10 March 1945 (Oberst Werner Bodenstein, Opns
swing to the north and cross the river
Officer LIII Corps). north of the bend.
200 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
Although the corps commander, Gen- on 6 March. At the same time, men of
eral Middleton, approved, the maneuver the 359th Infantry crossed a few hundred
took time, particularly when determined yards to the south. By late afternoon
Germans, again mainly from the 5th contingents of the 90th Division had
Parachute Division, kept a regiment of taken Gerolstein and established a
the 4th Division out of the bend in the bridgehead over a mile and a half deep
river through much of 5 March. By 6 and some two and a half miles wide.
March, the fourth day after passing General Middleton in early evening
through the 4th Division, CCB did get ordered General Kilburn to alert a sec-
some troops across the Kyll, but only ond combat command, CCA, to cross the
armored infantry supported by a smat- Kyll through the 90th Division’s bridge-
tering of tanks and tank destroyers that head. In the end, CCB also would back-
managed to cross at a ford before the track and use the 90th Division’s crossing
river bed gave way. site.
Even with a foothold already estab- Just before daylight on 7 March, engi-
lished on the east bank, General Kilburn neers of the 90th Division—having
remained reluctant to commit his armor worked with the aid of searchlights—
to the river crossing operation. Again opened a Bailey bridge over the Kyll. In
he prevailed on General Middleton for midmorning, CCA began to cross. T h e
permission to use infantry of the 4th 11th Armored Division at last might get
Division. Only after the infantrymen had started in earnest on an exploitation that
expanded CCB’s foothold were the tanks was to have proceeded without interrup-
and tank destroyers to renew the drive tion beginning five days earlier. Yet Kil-
toward the Rhine. burn’s men would have to hurry if again
’While the armor dallied, less con- they were not to be overtaken by events
servative
forces elsewhere in the VIII precipitated by mare audacious units, for
Corpsrapidly rewrote the entire script to the south, opposite Bitburg, General
for crossing the Kyll. Assigned to protect Eddy’s XII Corps had struck in a man-
the left flank of the corps, the 87th Di- ner not to be denied.
vision went a step further, overtook the Veterans of many a river-crossing op-
armored spearhead, and jumped the Kyll eration, infantrymen of the 5th Division
just after midday of the 6th on a bridge sent patrols across the Kyll before day-
captured intact. T h e 90th Division, com- light on 3 March, then threw in foot-
manded now by Brig. Gen. Herbert L. bridges to allow the bulk of two
Earnest and committed on 2 March on battalions to cross near Metterich, due
the corps south wing to relieve the 6th east of Bitburg. Fanning out to the high
Armored Division, scored an even more ground, the infantry cleared Metterich
striking advance. At the point on the before nightfall, while engineers put in
Kyll southwest of Gerolstein that Gen- a vehicular bridge before daylight on the
eral Kilburn earlier had spurned as a 4th. Except against the crossings them-
crossing site, a task force organized selves, the Germans reacted strongly, at
around the division reconnaissance troop one point launching a determined
and two attached medium tank com- counterattack supported by three tanks,
panies jumped the river before daylight apparently from the 2d Panzer Division,
OPERATION LUMBERJACK 201
but to no avail. By dark on 4 March, the support, the armor quickly picked up
bridgehead was ready for exploitation. It speed. T h e combat command’s reports
was only a question of when General of the day’s advance soon began to read
Patton chose to turn the 4th Armored like a bus or railroad timetable—0845:
Division loose. Orsfeld; 1135:Steinborn; 1350: Meis-
Patton, Eddy, and the armored di- burg; and at the end of the day: Weiden-
vision commander, General Gaffey, had bach, twelve miles northeast of the
only one real concern: weather. Days of bridge over which the armor had crossed
alternating rain and rapidly melting the Kyll.
snow, freeze and thaw, already had In one day CCB’s tankers had broken
wreaked havoc on the generally poor through the north wing of Oriola’s XIII
roads of the Eifel, and continued precipi- Corps, plunged deep into the south wing
tation could severely crimp the plan for of Rothkirch’s L I I I Corps, and sent over
the armor to drive boldly forward on the a thousand Germans straggling back to
roads, leaving the ground in between to prisoner-of-war compounds. T h e fighting
air and artillery. Yet weather alone was at day’s end at Weidenbach emerged
hardly sufficient reason to delay the ex- from a desperate effort by General von.
ploitation. T h e armor got set to move at Rothkirch to delay the advance with the
daylight the next day, 5 March. only reserve he could assemble, a Nebel-
General Gaffey’s orders were explicit. werfer brigade. Draining the last drops
Passing through the 5th Division’s of fuel from command cars and other
bridgehead, two combat commands were vehicles, Rothkirch managed also to send
to drive north for some eight miles over toward Weidenbach a few of the Tiger
parallel roads in rear of the enemy’s Kyll tanks that had been languishing in a
River defenses. Having sliced the under- repair shop, but they failed to arrive
pinnings from much of the XIII Corps during the night and were destined to
and part of the LIII Corps, the armor be shot up individually in the next day’s
was to swerve northeast near the village fighting.
of Oberstadtfeld (five and a half miles Rothkirch also ordered the 340th
southeast of Gerolstein) and head for the Volks Grenadier Division, continuing to
Rhine near Andernach, there to seize hold positions along the Kyll west of the
any bridges that might still stand. 37 American penetration, to escape during
Combat Command B in the lead the night along a secondary road still
quickly began to roll. As the tanks ap- open north of Weidenbach. Counting on
proached the first village north of the the Americans’ calling off the war during
5th Division’s forward line, artillery and the night, Rothkirch intended the 340th
rocket fire ranged near the column; but to establish a blocking position at Ober-
the tanks roared ahead. A contingent of stadtfeld, but hours before dawn on the
Germans in the village threw hands high 6th, the American combat command was
in surrender. Although rain, snow flur- on the move again. T h e tanks entered
ries, and overcast denied any tactical air Oberstadtfeld long before the men of
the 340th arrived, forcing the Germans
37XII Corps FO 15, 2 Mar 45; 4th Armored Div
to abandon all vehicles and artillery and
FO 12, 3 Mar 45. to try to escape by infiltrating northeast-
202 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
ward across the tail of the American to defend from woods and adjacent high
column.38 ground failed to materialize. Germans in
Unlike CCB, the 4th Armored’s CCA great bunches, sometime numbering in
found the going slow on the first day, 5 the hundreds, streamed from hills,
March, primarily because CCA had been woods, and villages to surrender.
relegated to secondary roads farther east. At one point, so many surrendering
Boggy from alternate freeze and thaw, Germans were clustered about a column
the roads and a demolished bridge over of tanks of the 37th Tank Battalion that
a creek at the village of Oberkail held the L I I I Corps commander, General von
the day’s advance to a few miles. Hardly Rothkirch, driving past in his command
had the tankers warmed their motors the car, assumed it was a German formation.
next morning, 6 March, when continu- Too late he saw what was actually hap-
ing reports of rapid gains by CCB pening.
prompted General Gaffey to order CCA “Where do you think you’re going?”
to follow in the other command’s wake asked 1st Lt. Joe Liese of the 37th Tank
on the main highway, leaving the sec- Battalion’s Company B.
ondary roads to the 5th Division. “It looks like,” Rothkirch replied, not
T h e infantry division now was ex- without a touch of irony, “I’m going to
periencing real problems—not so much the American rear.” 39
from the enemy as from the complexities Monitoring the American radio net,
of traffic on narrow, poorly surfaced, German intelligence quickly picked up
winding roads. Until all vehicles of the the news of Rothkirch’s capture and the
armored division could clear the bridge- extent of CCB’s penetration. Apparently
head, the armor had priority; yet the with approval of OB WEST, Model at
infantrymen also were under orders to Army Group B tacitly acknowledged the
move swiftly lest the armor get too f a r fact that the LIII Corps had been cut off
beyond reach of infantry support. With from the rest of the Seventh Army by
great distances hampering radio com- subordinating the corps to Zangen’s Fif-
munications and the roads too congested teenth Army, whose LXVI and LXVII
for motor messengers, orders to forward Corps still held portions of the West
units of the 5th Division had to be Wall opposite the U S . V Corps, Model
dropped from liaison planes. also ordered forward a new commander
T h e weather on 6 March again was so for the LIII Corps, Generalmajor Wal-
bad—rain and fog—that tactical aircraft ther Botsch, who earlier had been
for the second day could provide no charged with preparing defenses for a
help; but the armor scarcely needed it, bridgehead to be held at Bonn and
for the Germans were in a state of con- Kemagen. Even though troops of the
fusion. Even though the tankers actually American First Army were fast bearing
cleared the enemy from little more than down on both those towns, so urgent did
the road and shoulders, preattack con- Model consider the need for a new com-
cern that the Germans might continue mander of the LIII Corps that he refused
38 MS # E-797 (Bodenstein); XII Corps G–3 Jnl, 39 George Dyer, XII Corps-Spearhead of Patton’s
5 Mar 45; 4th Armored Div Periodic Rpt, 6 Mar Third Army (XII Corps History Association, 1947)
45. (hereafter cited as Dyer, XII Corps), p. 330.
OPERATION LUMBERJACK 203
to allow General Botsch to wait long gen, General von Zangen ordered Gen-
enough to brief his successor on the situa- eral Hitzfeld of the L X V I I Corps to
tion at Bonn and Remagen.40 assume command of the 272d Volks
From that point, no commander on Grenadier Division, already forced back
the German side could have entertained onto this corps by the south wing of the
any genuine hope for continued defense attack of the U.S. III Corps. He was
west of the Rhine either by the LIII then to turn over his West Wall obliga-
Corps or by the other two corps of the tions to the L X V I Corps, and with the
Fifteenth Army still in the Eifel, the 272d and his own divisions (89th and
L X V I (Lucht) and L X V I I (Hitzfeld). 277th) to counterattack on 7 March into
T h e three corps obviously were in im- the flank of the III Corps southeast of
minent danger of encirclement. It was Rheinbach to cut the “funnel” leading
without question now a matter of trying to the Ahr River and Remagen.4I
to save whoever and whatever to help After making the usual protest that the
defend the Rhine, but in view of the project simply was not feasible, Hitzfeld
stranglehold the word of Hitler still ex- went through the motions of readying
ercised at every level, nobody would the counterattack. Already the corps was
authorize withdrawal. Botsch, the other in a somewhat better position to assemble
corps commanders, Zangen at Fifteenth than might have been expected, for as
Army, and Model at Army Group B— early as 3 March the 89th Infantry and
all focused their General Staff-trained 277th Volks Grenadier Divisions had be-
minds on issuing defense, assembly, and gun limited withdrawals from the West
counterattack orders that looked as pretty Wall positions in the vicinity of the
as a war game on paper but made no Roer reservoirs. By 6 March the two di-
sense in the grim reality of the situation visions were some five miles behind their
in the Eifel. In the process, each pro- original lines, almost out of contact
tested to his next higher commander the with the Americans except on the right
idiocy of it all. wing where the 2d Division of the U.S.
Model, for his part, ordered the 11th V Corps had joined the general of-
Panzer Division—or what was left of it fensive. 42
after withdrawal from the triangle be- Even so, assembling for counterattack
tween the Erft and the Rhine north of in the face of continuing advances by
Cologne-to recross the Rhine at Bonn the III Corps in the north and the north-
and counterattack southwest toward eastward thrusts of the VIII Corps still
Rheinbach to cut off spearheads of the was impossible. About all Hitzfeld ac-
First U.S. Army’s III Corps. That was a complished in that direction was further
patent impossibility. T h e remnants of to clog roads already choked with with-
the panzer division would be too late drawing columns and to expose the north
even to recross the Rhine, much less flank of the LX VI Corps. Continued bad
counterat tack. flying weather was the only thing that
Still convinced the main objective of prevented Allied aircraft from turning
the III Corps was not Bonn but Rema- the entire situation to utter chaos.
41MSS # B-101 (Hitzfeld); B-828 (Zangen).
40MS # B-828 (Zangen). 42MS # B-828 (Zangen).
204 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
The position of General Lucht’s LXVI thirteen and a half miles, roughly half
Corps, still holding some West Wall po- the distance between the jump-off on
sitions astride the Weisserstein water- the Kyll and the Rhine near Andernach,
shed, was most perilous of all. Already then veered northeast off the main high-
the south wing of the corps had been way in the direction of the road center
forced back by the drive of the U.S. of Mayen. That added another five miles
VIII Corps to the Kyll River northeast to the day’s total before the armor had
of Pruem. With the north flank exposed to stop for the night because of crum-
also by Hitzfeld’s withdrawal, Lucht’s bling roads. Other than a growing prob-
divisions now were in serious trouble, a lem of handling hundreds of prisoners,
fact underscored early on 6 March when the combat command had no real diffi-
the V Corps commander, General Hueb- culty all day except for an undefended
ner, began to broaden his thrust—here- roadblock that took about an hour to
tofore confined to the 2d Division on his remove and occasional fire from assault
north wing—by sending the 69th Di- guns or isolated field pieces on the
vision (Maj. Gen. Emil F. Reinhardt) flanks. Although CCA attempted to di-
eastward in the center of his zone. It verge from CCB’s route to force a second
would be driven home with even greater passage a few miles to the south, de-
emphasis the next day when the 28th molished bridges eventually forced that
and 106th Divisions also joined the combat command to tie in again on the
attack. While a regiment of the 2d Di- tail of CCB.
vision plunged forward ten miles and T h e infantry divisions of the X I I
took a bridge intact across the Ahr River, Corps in the meantime still found the
a column of the 28th Division (Maj. going slow because of boggy roads, de-
Gen. Norman D. Cota) overran Lucht’s molished bridges, heavy traffic, and
command post, bagging most of the corps sometimes determined resistance. Hav-
headquarters, including the chief of staff. ing turned north immediately after cross-
Lucht himself escaped because he was ing the Kyll, the armor had left the in-
away at the time.43 fantry to deal with the two divisions
When General Botsch arrived to join (246th Volk Grenadier and 2d Panzer)
the LIII Corps with the unenviable as- upon which the Seventh Army’s General
signment of assuming command, he Felber had based his unenthusiastic
learned he had scarcely any combat hopes o f stopping the armor. As night
troops left. Such as there were—tiny rem- came on the 6th, neither the 5th Divi-
nants of the 326th and 340th Volks sion nor the 76th, the latter having
Grenadier Divisions —the corps chief of crossed the Kyll southeast of Bitburg,
staff had organized into battle groups held bridgeheads more than a few miles
and given the only realistic mission pos- deep.
sible, to harass American columns as best Matters would improve only slightly
they could. for the infantry divisions the next day,
During the day of 6 March, CCB of 7 March. A predawn counterattack, for
the 4th Armored Division gained another exampIe, knocked a battalion of the 5th
Division from a village on the north-
43V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 394. eastern periphery of the bridgehead.
OPERATION LUMBERJACK 205
Although real and disturbing to the to be taken prisoner by those who fol-
men and commanders who had to over- lowed. Here and there along the road
come it, this resistance when viewed clusters of impressed laborers of almost
against the backdrop of developments every European nationality waved and
elsewhere in the Eifel on 7 March was cheered.
negligible and futile. It was on this day At one point, 1st Lt. Edgar C. Smith,
that defenses of the LXVI and LXVII piloting an artillery observation plane,
Corps in front of the U.S. V Corps be- spotted a column of retreating Germans
gan to fall apart. On 7 March also the not far ahead, obscured from the tankers
11th Armored Division in Middleton’s by the rolling countryside. At Smith’s
VIII Corps at last got across the Kyll urging, a company of Sherman tanks
River in strength at Gerolstein and ad- speeded up in pursuit.
vanced eleven miles. As night fell, the “They’re only 1,500 yards from you
armor took the important crossroads vil- now, go faster,” radioed Lieutenant
lage of Kelberg, near a famous prewar Smith.
automobile race course, the Nuerburg Later he reported they were only a
Ring. In the process, the tankers forced thousand yards away, still screened by
the newly arrived commander of the the terrain.
LIII Corps, General Botsch, and his After another pause, the radio crack-
headquarters troops to flee. led again.
Even more spectacular and—in the “They’re around the next curve,”
end—decisive was the advance on 7 Smith said. “Go get ’em!”
March of the 4th Armored Division’s T h e tanks burst upon the rear of the
front-running CCB. Backtracking sev- startled Germans and raked the column
eral miles to get on a better highway and with 75’s and machine guns.44
avoid the crumbling roads that had As night fell, the head of CCB’s col-
stalled advance the evening before, CCB umn coiled on the reverse slope of the
attacked in early morning through rain last high ground before the Rhine, three
and fog. Brushing aside halfhearted re- miles from the river, across from Neu-
sistance in the first village, the column wied. T h e drive to the Rhine was all but
paused on the fringe of the second, Kai- finished in just over two and a half days.
sersesch, while a German-speaking sol- T h e 4th Armored Division had driven
dier, using an amplifier, demanded sur- forty-four airline miles—much longer
render. A heterogeneous collection of by road—from the Kyll to a spot over-
German troops meekly complied. Racing looking the Rhine. T h e division took
on, the tankers drew their next fire five 5,000 prisoners, captured or destroyed
miles farther along at Kehrig. This time volumes of equipment, including 34
a demand for surrender drew more fire tanks and assault guns, and killed or
from Panzerfausts and antitank guns, but wounded 700 Germans. T h e division
an artillery concentration on the town itself lost, 29 men killed, 80 wounded,
brought a quick end to the defiance. 2 missing.
From that point, the advance was little
more than a road march with the tank-
ers signaling German soldiers rearward 44 Dyer, XII Corps, pp. 330 and 334.
206 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
In the process, the armor had spread stood across the Rhine in the Third
havoc through whatever cohesion still Army’s zone. In keeping with that re-
remained in the German defense west port and to avoid exposing tanks and
of the Rhine and north of the Moselle. other vehicles to antitank fire from the
Everywhere irregular columns of foot east bank of the Rhine and to the fire of
troops interspersed with a confusion of stationary antiaircraft guns ringing near-
motor and horse-drawn vehicles toiled by Koblenz, the men and vehicles of the
toward the Rhine, hoping to find a 4th Armored Division stopped short of
barge, a ferry, perhaps a bridge still the Rhine itself and remained under
standing. Other Germans gave them- cover on the reverse slope of the last
selves u p by the hundreds, particularly high ground short of the river.
in front of the V and VIII Corps, while T h e coming of daylight on 8 March
still others—some successfully, most not provoked something of a mystery. From
—tried to slip behind the armored spear- the high ground observers could see Ger-
heads to escape southward across the mans retreating individually and in rag-
Moselle. Abandoned equipment, ve- ged columns toward what maps showed
hicles, antitank guns, and field pieces, to be a railroad bridge near Urmitz.Be-
many of them smoldering, dotted the cause of haze and generally poor visi-
Eifel in macabre disarray. bility, they were unable to make out a
Yet for all the striking success of the bridge, but presumably the Germans
drive, a chance to cap it with an even were gravitating there in order somehow
more spectacular achievement remained. to get across the Rhine. As the day wore
Unknown to commanders and men of on, some prisoners and civilians said the
the 4th Armored Division, a few miles Germans had already destroyed several
upstream from CCB’s position, midway spans of the railroad bridge while others
between Andernach and Koblenz, near reported that the bridge still stood.
the village of Urmitz, a bridge across the CCA had readied an attack to be
Rhine still stood, the Crown Prince Wil- launched before daylight on the 9th to
helm Railroad Bridge. drive to the bridge and seize it if it was
Although the 4th Armored Division still intact when word came that General
was under orders to seize any bridge Bradley had approved the Third Army’s
over the Rhine still standing, nobody turn southward across the Moselle. T h e
entertained any real expectation that a 4th Armored Division was to change di-
bridge might be taken; and in line with rection and try to seize a bridge over
General Eisenhower’s plan for a main that river.
effort across the Rhine by Montgomery’s Soon after daylight on the 9th, after
21 Army Group, the thoughts of senior CCA had abandoned its plan to drive for
commanders in the Third Army were the bridge at Urmitz, the Germans de-
turning from the Rhine to the Moselle, molished it. Close investigation ex-
which General Patton hoped to cross in plained the conflicting reports the
order to trap the Germans in the West Americans had received. T h e Germans
Wall in front of the U.S. Seventh Army. had earlier destroyed two spans of the
Aerial reconnaissance had already con- railroad bridge, but beneath the rails
firmed in any case that no bridge still they had hung a tier for vehicular traf-
OPERATION LUMBERJACK 207
fic. It was the makeshift bridge that they was because of a happening a few miles
destroyed early on the 9th. to the north in the zone of the First
Whether CCA could have taken the Army's III Corps. There a 9th Armored
bridge before the Germans blew it was Division only recently oriented to make
problematical, for by that time the Ger- its main effort to seize crossings of the
mans had become exceedingly wary of Ahr River had found a Rhine bridge in-
bridges falling into Allied hands. That tact at Remagen.
CHAPTER XI
crossing sites, that between Andernach of it was attributable to the fact that
and Koblenz.4 prior to March, responsibility for pro-
tecting the Rhine bridges had rested
The Germans at Remagen entirely with the Wehrkreise (military
districts). Troops of the Wehrkreise
With Allied troops approaching the were responsible not to any army com-
Rhine, the order and efficiency normally mand but to the military arm of the
associated with things German had Nazi party, the Waffen-SS, and jealous
become submerged in a maelstrom of rivalry between the two services was
confused and contradictory command more the rule than the exception. As the
channels. Nowhere was this more appar- fighting front in early March fell back
ent than at the railroad bridge on the from Roer to Rhine, responsibility was
southern fringe of Remagen. There a supposed eo pass from Wehrkreis to army
small miscellany of troops was operating group and army, but in practice Wehr-
under a variety of commands. An army kreis commanders jealously held on to
officer, Capt. Willi Bratge, was the so- their command prerogatives. Further-
called combat commander of the entire more, antiaircraft troops answered nei-
Remagen area, ostensibly with the power ther to army headquarters nor Waffen-
of over-all command but only in event SS but instead to the Luftwaffe; and
of emergency. Capt. Karl Friesenhahn, within the Army itself the Field Army
an engineer officer, was the technical or (Feldheer) vied for authority with the
bridge commander. An antiaircraft of- Replacement Army (Ersatzheer) .
ficer, responsible to neither, commanded T o complicate matters further, a num-
antiaircraft troops in the vicinity. Men ber of recent command changes had had
of the Volkssturm were under Nazi party an inevitable effect. On 1 February,
officials. Furthermore—though no one at Wehrkreis V I had relinquished author-
Remagen yet knew it—another officer, a ity for Remagen to Wehrkreis XII.
major, was destined soon to come to the Then, on 1 March, came the shift that
town to supersede Bratge's command.5 took place at the height of Operation
This confusion and contradiction was GRENADE, exchange of zones between the
repeated at almost every level of com- Fifth Panzer and Fifteenth Armies. A
mand all along the Rhine front. Much few days later, as German troops fell
back from the Roer, General Puechler's
412th AGp Outline Opn UNDERTONE, 7 Mar 45.
5The German story is primarily from a study
L X X I V Corps, gravitating on Bonn,
by Ken Hechler, Seizure of the Remagen Bridge, might have been expected to command
based on postwar German manuscripts and con- any bridgehead retained in the vicinity
temporary German records and prepared in OCMH
to complement this volume. A U.S. Army historian
of Bonn and Remagen; but instead,
in Europe during World War II.Mr. Hechler sub- Field Marshal Model at Army Group B
sequently wrote a comprehensive and authoritative set u p a separate command, the one un-
account of the Remagen action, The Bridge at
Remagen (New York: Ballantine Books, 1957). The
der General Botsch, commander of a
published work includes considerable material badly depleted volks grenadier division.
developed by Mr. Hechler through postwar inter- Botsch was to be responsible directly to
views in the United States and Germany, and has
also been used extensively in the preparation of
Zangen's Fifteenth Army.
the first half of this chapter. As General Botsch tried to appraise the
210 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
situation, he ran head on into the differ- the futile assignment of trying to resur-
ing views of his two superiors, Zangen rect the L I I I Corps without even being
and Model, as to the course the Ameri- accorded time to brief his successor, his
cans presumably would follow—Model erstwhile disputant at Bonn, General von
with his belief that the main thrust Bothmer. Thus was lost to the Bonn-
would be made on Bonn, Zangen with Remagen defense the one commander
the idea that the Americans would ex- who, because of his knowledge of the
ploit the “spout of the funnel” leading complicated command setup and the true
to Remagen. To be prepared for either nature of German reverses west of the
eventuality, Botsch wanted to place his Rhine, might have forestalled what was
headquarters midway between the two about to happen at Remagen.
towns, but Model insisted that he locate When the Fifteenth Army commander,
at or near Bonn. There Botsch ran afoul General von Zangen, learned of Botsch’s
of Bonn’s local defense commander, shift, he told General Hitzfeld, com-
Generalmajor Richard von Bothmer, mander of the LXVII Corps, to send
who raised questions as to just who was someone to Remagen to check personally
in command at Bonn. Trying to resolve on the situation there. A short while
the conflicts, Botsch spent much of the later, at 0100 on 7 March, at the same
first few days of March driving back and time Zangen ordered the LXVII Corps
forth between command posts of the to counterattack the spout of the funnel
Fifteenth Army and Army Group B and leading to Remagen, he also told Hitz-
between Bonn and Remagen. feld the Remagen bridgehead was then
Although tiring and frustrating, these the responsibility of the LXVII Corps.
peregrinations probably established Gen- With the bulk of his troops still thirty-
eral Botsch as the one man who under- five miles from the Rhine, sorely beset
stood how the diverse command complex on all sides and under orders to launch
worked. Driving u p the Ahr River Val- a counterattack that on the face of it was
ley toward the Fifteenth Army’s head- impossible, and with American troops no
quarters early on 6 March, Botsch also more than ten miles from Remagen,
got a firsthand view of pandemonium in Hitzfeld could do little. Summoning his
the making as individuals and depleted adjutant, Major Hans Scheller, he told
units retreated pell-mell toward the him to take eight men and a radio and
Rhine. This personal knowledge of how proceed to Remagen, there to assume
serious matters really were well might command, assemble as much strength as
have stood the Germans in good stead at possible, and establish a small bridge-
Remagen, but General Botsch had no head. He specifically warned Scheller to
chance to use it. check immediately upon arrival as to the
For it was General Botsch to whom technical features of the Remagen rail-
Field Marshal Model turned in the after- road bridge and to make sure the bridge
noon of 6 March to replace the captured was prepared for demolition.
General von Rothkirch in command of At approximately 0200 (7 March),
the L I I I Corps. 6 At 1700 Botsch left on Major Scheller and his eight men started
for Remagen in two vehicles over wind-
6See above, ch. X. ing, troop-choked, blacked-out Eifel
A RHINE BRIDGE A T REMAGEN 211
roads. In the darkness, Scheller’s vehicle proved short-lived; and despite the fact
quickly became separated from the other, that two attempts came heartbreakingly
the one that carried the radio. Running close to success, the failures appeared to
low on fuel, Scheller ordered his driver confirm the general opinion that the
to take a long detour to the south to seek methodical Germans would see to it that
out a supply installation where he might nobody got across the Rhine the easy
get gasoline. Shortly after 1100 on 7 way.
March Major Scheller, still without a T h e possibility still continued to in-
radio, finally reached the Remagen trigue commanders at every level. When
bridge. Sounds of battle already were General Hodges visited headquarters of
discernible in the distance. the III Corps on 4 March, for example,
he and the corps commander, General
T h e Hope for a Bridge Millikin, spoke of the possibility of
taking the bridge at Remagen; but with
As the crucible neared for the Ger- troops of the III Corps still a long way
mans at Bonn and Remagen, probably from the Rhine, the discussion was brief.
none of the American troops or their T h e next day, with the 1st Division ad-
commanders, who on 6 March began to vancing on Bonn, the division com-
make great strides toward the Rhine, mander asked General Millikin what to
entertained any genuine expectation of do in case the highway bridge at Bonn
seizing a bridge across the river intact. could be seized. On 6 March Millikin
(See Map IX.) Some units were under put the question to the First Army G–3,
formal orders to seize and hold any Brig. Gen. Truman C. Thorson. T h e
bridge that still stood, but more as a bridges, Thorson ruled, should be cap-
routine precaution than anything else. tured wherever possible.
Nobody had made any positive plans The G–3 of the III Corps, Colonel
about what to do should such a windfall Mewshaw, and an assistant had mused
occur. over the likelihood of taking the Rem-
Back in February, as the First Army agen bridge with paratroops or a picked
drive began, some staff officers had toyed band of Rangers; but so slight appeared
with the idea that a Rhine bridge might the chance that the discussion never
be taken. So remote appeared the chances went beyond the operations section. In
nevertheless that they went ahead with the directive issued to the 9th Armored
a request to Allied air forces to continue Division on 6 March, the order in regard
to bomb the bridges. Inclement weather to the bridge at Remagen was to “cut by
rather than plan had provided the fire”; the order also restricted artillery
bridges respite from air attack during fire against the bridge to time and
the early days of March. proximity fuze. Early in the evening of
In the Ninth Army, of course, a flurry 6 March the III Corps also asked the air
of hope for a Rhine bridge had devel- officer at First Army to refrain from
oped on the first day of March, inviting bombing both the Bonn and Remagen
the attention of the Supreme Com- bridges.
mander himself.7 Yet that hope had That same evening, 6 March, General
7 Ibid. Millikin talked by telephone with the
212 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
9th Armored Division commander, Gen- A regiment of the 1st Division on the
eral Leonard. Among other things, Gen- corps north wing got within four miles
eral Leonard recalled later, Millikin had of the Rhine northwest of Bonn.
something like this to say about the rail- T h e next morning, 7 March, as troops
road bridge at Remagen: “Do you see of the neighboring VII Corps eliminated
that little black strip of bridge at Rem- the last resistance around Cologne, Gen-
agen? If you happen to get that, your eral Hodges transferred responsibility
name will go down in glory.” 8 for clearing Bonn to General Collins’s
Yet despite all deliberation about the corps, but with the responsibility went
bridge on 6 March, this was the same day the means, the 1st Division. At the same
that Colonel Mewshaw confirmed for the time, infantry of the 9th Division con-
9th Armored Division G–3 that the di- tinued to close in on Bad Godesberg, and
vision’s main effort should be aimed not the 9th Armored’s CCA jumped the Ahr
at the Rhine but at crossings of the Ahr. at Bad Neuenahr, even though the Ger-
Furthermore, neither the 9th Armored mans fought doggedly to hold open the
Division nor that division’s Combat Ahr valley highway, the main route of
Command B, the unit headed toward withdrawal for General Hitzfeld’sLXVII
Remagen, mentioned in its field order Corps. Combat Command B meanwhile
taking the bridge at Remagen, although sent one column southeastward to cross
General Leonard did note the possibility the Ahr near its confluence with the
orally as a matter of course to the CCB Rhine and another column toward Rem-
commander. agen.
For all the talk about getting a bridge Built around the 27th Armored In-
over the Rhine, the prospect remained fantry Battalion and the 14th Tank Bat-
little more than a fancy. talion (minus one company), the task
force heading for Remagen was under
Advance to the Rhine the tank battalion commander, Lt. Col.
Leonard Engeman. T o lead the column,
On 6 March, as General Millikin Colonel Engeman designated an infantry
shifted the objectives of his divisions platoon and a tank platoon, the latter
southeastward to conform with the First equipped with the new, experimental
Army’s emphasis on crossings of the Ahr T26 Pershing tank mounting a 90-mm.
River, the advance of the III Corps gun.
picked u p momentum. Despite time lost Because bulldozers had to clear rubble
to a determined German delaying force from the roads leading out of Stadt Meck-
at the road center of Rheinbach, the 9th enheim before the armored vehicles
Armored Division’s Combat Command could pass, Task Force Engeman got a
A gained more than ten miles and fairly late start on 7 March. T h e column
stopped at midnight less than two miles began to move only at 0820, but the Ger-
from the Ahr. CCB reached Stadt Meck- mans apparently gained nothing from
enheim, only eight miles from the Rhine. the delay. T h e first opposition—desul-
tory artillery and small arms fire—de-
8 Combat interview with General Leonard; see
also interview with General Millikin and his com-
veloped more than three miles from the
ments on the draft MS of this volume. starting point. Another mile and a half
A RHINE BRIDGE A T REMAGEN 213
to the east the column turned south, and At each end stood two stone towers, black
just before noon entered a big patch of with grime, giving the bridge a fortress-
woods west of Remagen. Here and there like appearance. Only a few yards from
little clusters of Germans passed, hands the east end of the bridge, the railroad
behind their heads, anxious to give them- tracks entered a tunnel through the
selves u p to the first Americans who black rock of a clifflike hill, the Erpeler
would take the time to deal with them. Ley.
A few minutes before 1300, the leading A year before the start of World War
infantry platoon commander, 2d Lt. II, the Germans had devised an elaborate
Emmet J. Burrows, emerged from the demolition scheme for the bridge that
woods on a high bluff overlooking Rem- included installing an electric fuze con-
agen. Below him, the view of the Rhine nected with explosives by a cable encased
gorge, even in the haze of 7 March, was in thick steel pipe. Even if the electric
spectacular. fuze failed to work, a primer cord might
T h e railroad bridge just outside be lit by hand to set off emergency
Remagen, Lieutenant Burrows took in charges. Later, at the end of 1944, engi-
at a glance, still stood. neers had made plans to blow a big ditch
across the Remagen end of the bridge to
The Crisis at the Bridge forestall enemy tanks until the main
demolitions could be set off.
Down at the bridge, confusion reigned, Long at his post, the engineer com-
much as it had all morning. Since soon mander at Remagen, Captain Friesen-
after daylight, frightened and disorgan- hahn, knew the demolition plan well,
ized groups of German troops had been but only a few days before 7 March an
fleeing across the bridge, bringing with order had arrived that complicated the
them tales of the strength of American task. Because a bridge at Cologne had
forces pouring down the Ahr valley. T h e been destroyed prematurely when an
wounded and the stragglers—tired, American bomb set off the explosive
dispirited men with heads bowed— charges, OKW had ordered that demoli-
added stark punctuation to the accounts. tions be put in place only when the
Lumbering supply vehicles, horse-drawn fighting front had come within eight
artillery, quartermaster and other rear kilometers of a bridge; and igniters were
echelon service units created mammoth not to be attached until “demolition
traffic jams. T h e jams would have been seems to be unavoidable.” 9 In addition,
worse had not a 4-day rush job to lay both the order to prepare the explosives
planks across the railroad tracks at last and the demolition order itself were to
been finished the night before. be issued in writing by the officer bear-
Built in 1916, the railroad bridge at ing tactical responsibility for the area.
Remagen was named for the World War Until just before noon, 7 March, the
I hero, Erich Ludendorff. Wide enough officer bearing tactical responsibility at
for two train tracks, plus footpaths on Remagen was Captain Bratge. In a grow-
either side, the bridge had three sym- ing lather of excitement at the hegira of
metrical arches resting on four stone 9A translation of this order appears as Annex 1
piers. T h e over-all length was 1,069 feet. to 99th Div G–2 Periodic Rpt, 7 Mar 45.
214 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
German units and stragglers, Bratge early advance from the Ahr valley, but a short
in the morning telephoned headquarters while later these troops melted into the
of Army Group B to ask for instructions, fleeing columns and disappeared. When
but he was able to get through only to a an antiaircraft unit stationed atop the
duty officer. T h e officer assured him that Erpeler Ley withdrew, ostensibly under
A r m y Group B was not particularly orders to go to Koblenz, even that
worried about the situation at Remagen; strategic observation point was left un-
Bonn appeared to be the most threatened manned.
point. At 1115,Bratge looked up from the
For actual defense of Remagen and unit orders he was checking at the bridge
the bridge, Captain Bratge had only to see a red-eyed major approaching. His
thirty-six men in his own company, plus name, the major said, was Hans Scheller.
Friesenhahn’s handful of engineers and General Hitzfeld of the LXVII Corps,
a smattering of unreliable Volkssturm, he continued, had sent him to take com-
the latter technically not even under mand at Remagen.
Bratge’s command. T h e antiaircraft Once Captain Bratge had assured him-
troops that earlier had been set up on self that the major was, in fact, from- the
the west bank had left in midmorning, LXVII Corps and that his orders were
joining the retreating hordes crossing legitimate, he was pleased to relinquish
the bridge. command. Together the two officers went
General Botsch, Bratge knew, had to check with the engineers on progress
asked Field Marshal Model at Army of the demolitions, Although reports be-
Group B for an entire division to defend gan to arrive that Americans had reached
at Bonn and a reinforced regiment at the bluffs overlooking Remagen, Scheller
Remagen. That kind of strength, Model was reluctant to order the bridge de-
had replied, simply was not available. stroyed. An artillery captain, arriving at
Although Model had promised some re- the bridge, had insisted that his battalion
inforcement, none had arrived. During and its guns were following to cross the
the evening of 6 March, Bratge had tried bridge, and Major Scheller felt keenly
to reach General Botsch’s headquarters that combat units should not be penal-
to ask for help, but had been unable to ized by having the bridge blown in their
get through. H e had no way of knowing faces, particularly when they were bring-
that Botsch’s headquarters had pulled ing with them precious items such as
out to go to Botsch’s new command, the artillery pieces.
LIII Corps. An officer sent from General
von Bothmer’s headquarters at Bonn to On the hill above Remagen, Lieuten-
give Bratge this information had wan- ant Burrows’s excitement at discovering
dered into American positions and been the bridge intact had brought his com-
captured. pany commander, 1st Lt. Karl H. Tim-
At one point Captain Bratge managed merman, hurrying to the vantage point
to corral the remnants of a battalion from at the edge of the woods. Timmerman in
the 3d Parachute Division and persuaded turn called for the task force com-
the officers to set u p a defense to the mander, Colonel Engeman.
southwest to block an expected American T h e task force commander’s first reac-
A RHINE BRIDGE AT REMAGEN 215
mm. fire from the towers, a volcano of having the order in writing, then re-
rocks, dirt, and noise erupted. Captain lented in the interest of time.
Friesenhahn on his own initiative, when Warning the civilians and soldiers to
he saw the Americans appear, had ex- take cover, Captain Friesenhahn turned
ploded the charge designed to prevent the key designed to activate the electric
tanks from reaching the bridge. Timmer- circuit and set off the explosives. Nothing
man and his men could see the Germans happened. He turned it again. Still noth-
on the other side of the river scurrying ing happened. He turned it a third time.
to and fro, apparently getting ready to Again, no response.
blow the bridge itself. Realizing that the circuit probably
Major Scheller and Captain Bratge was broken, Friesenhahn sought a repair
had already crossed the bridge to the team to move onto the bridge; but as
railroad tunnel. Friesenhahn hurried to machine gun and tank fire riddled the
join them to get the order to destroy the ground, he saw that not enough time
bridge, but concussion from a tank shell remained to do the job that way. He
knocked him to the floor of the bridge, called for a volunteer to go onto the
unconscious. Fifteen precious minutes bridge and ignite the primer cord by
passed before he came to his senses. Still hand. When a sergeant responded, Fries-
dazed, he resumed his trek toward the enhahn himself went with him as far as
tunnel. the edge of the bridge and there waited
In the railroad tunnel, pandemonium. anxiously while the sergeant, crouching
Terrified civilians cowering against the to avoid shells and bullets, dashed onto
walls, children wailing. Reluctant Volks- the bridge.
sturm awaiting only a chance to sur- After what seemed an eternity, the
render. Clusters of apprehensive soldiers, sergeant started back toward the east
some foreign workers, even some ani- bank at a run. Seemingly endless mo-
mals. White phosphorus shells from the ments passed. Had the sergeant failed?
American tanks across the river creating Would the primer cord ignite the charge?
a heavy, eye-stinging smoke screen. Some At last, a sudden booming roar. Tim-
soldiers caught outside the tunnel bers flew wildly into the air. T h e bridge
screaming as the phosphorus burned into lifted as if to rise from its foundations.
their flesh. Cowering against the explosion, Fries-
As Captain Bratge rushed outside to enhahn breathed a sigh of relief. T h e job
survey the situation, he came upon Cap- was done.
tain Friesenhahn and yelled at him to get Yet when he looked u p again, the
the order from Major Scheller to blow bridge was still there.
the bridge. When Scheller gave his ap-
Lieutenant Timmerman had barely
proval, Bratge insisted on waiting while
finished the order to his men of Com-
a lieutenant wrote down the exact timing pany A, 27th Armored Infantry Bat-
and wording of the order. Going ouside talion, to storm across the railroad bridge
again, he shouted to Friesenhahn to blow when the explosion came. Some men
the bridge. True to his instructions from flung themselves to the ground for pro-
OKW, Friesenhahn insisted at first on tection. Others watched in awe as the
A RHINE BRIDGE AT REMAGEN 217
bridgehead over the Ahr River at Sinzig, “This will bust him wide open . . . .
he would be acting contrary to an order Shove everything you can across it.”13
still in effect if, instead, he reinforced General Eisenhower’s reaction was
the Rhine crossing. He hesitated only much the same. Only the planners ap-
momentarily. Send the rest of the ar- peared to question in any degree the
mored infantry battalion across imme- advisability of exploiting the coup. T h e
diately, he told Engeman; then he drove SHAEF G–3, General Bull, who hap-
to his own command post for a meeting pened to be at Bradley’s headquarters
with his division commander, General when the news arrived, remarked that a
Leonard. crossing at Remagen led no place and
General Leonard’s first reaction to that a diversion of strength to Remagen
the news was mock concern against would interfere with General Eisenhow-
Hoge’s upset of the plans. “But let’s er’s plan to make the main effort north
push it,” he added, “and then put it up of the Ruhr.14 Yet Bradley would have
to Corps.” 11 none of it, and Eisenhower confirmed
At 1630 the 9th Armored Division that view.
chief of staff telephoned the command “Well, Brad,” Eisenhower said, “we
post of the III Corps. expected to have . . . [four] divisions
“Hot damn!” cried a little sergeant as tied u p around Cologne and now those
he transferred the call to the chief of are free. Go ahead and shove over at
staff and threw down the telephone. least five divisions instantly, and any-
“We got a bridge over the Rhine and thing else that is necessary to make cer-
we’re crossing over!” 12 tain of our hold.” 15
Although the corps commander, Gen- Confirmed approval to exploit the
eral Millikin, was away from the com- crossing reached the III Corps at 1845
mand post, his chief of staff, Col. James on 7 March, and an hour and a half later
H. Phillips, believed he knew how his General Hodges relieved the corps of
commander would react. Even before the assignment of driving south across
trying to contact Millikin, he told the the Ahr. General Millikin in the mean-
9th Armored Division to exploit the time had been making plans to motorize
crossing. the reserve regiments of his two infantry
When Phillips relayed the news to divisions and rush them to the bridge.
headquarters of the First Army, General Engineers, artillery, antiaircraft–units
Hodges ordered engineers and boats to of all types stirred in the early darkness
Remagen even before calling General and headed for Remagen. All roads lead-
Bradley at 12th Army Group for ap-
proval. 13Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 510.
“Hot dog, Courtney”—General Brad- 14Ibid. For General Bull’s view of this event, see
ley later recalled his own reaction— John Toland, T h e Last 100 Days (New York:
Random House, 1966), pp. 214–15.
15Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe
(New York: Doubleday and Company, 1948), p.
380; Capt. Harry C. Butcher, USNR, M y Three
Years with Eisenhower (New York: Simon and
11 Hechler, T h e Bridge at Remagen, p. 155. Schuster, 1946). p. 768. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story,
12 Ibid., p. viii. page 514, says four divisions.
220 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
ing toward the little Rhine town soon ion, a tank destroyer company, and a
were thick with traffic. Before midnight platoon of armored engineers of the 9th
three heavy caliber artillery battalions Armored Division; a regiment and two
already were in position to fire in sup- additional battalions of the 78th Divi-
port of the little band of infantrymen sion; a regiment and one additional bat-
east of the Rhine. talion of the 9th Division; and one and
At the bridge, the handful of engi- a half batteries of antiaircraft artillery.
neers from Task Force Engeman worked During that twenty-four hours and
unceasingly to repair the damage the into the next day, 9 March, General
demolition had done to the flooring of Eisenhower’s initial jubilation over cap-
the bridge. Although considerable work ture of the Ludendorff Bridge cooled
remained, the engineers shortly before under the impact of admonitions from
midnight signaled that tanks might try his staff. Committed to a main effort
to cross, north of the Ruhr with the 21 Army
Nine Sherman tanks of the 14th Tank Group, he actually had few reserves to
Battalion crossed without incident, but spare for Remagen. Late on g March his
the first tank destroyer to try it foun- G–3, General Bull, informed General
dered in an unrepaired hole in the Bradley that while the Supreme Com-
planking. T h e vehicle appeared to teeter mander wanted the brideghead held
precariously over the swirling waters far firmly and developed for an early ad-
below, but for almost five hours every vance southeastward, he did not want it
effort either to right the destroyer or to enlarged to a size greater than five divi-
dump it into the river failed. At 0530 sions could defend. Bradley in turn told
(8 March) the vehicle was at last re- General Hodges to limit advances to a
moved. thousand yards a day, just enough to
In the 27th Armored Infantry Batta- keep the enemy off balance and prevent
lion’s minuscule bridgehead, the infan- him from mining extensively around the
trymen and their limited tank support periphery. Once the troops reached the
spent a troubled night fighting off autobahn, seven miles beyond the
platoon-size counterattacks along their Rhine, they were to hold in place until
undermanned perimeter and expecting General Eisenhower ordered expansion.
the Germans at any moment to strike in Thus, almost from the start, the forces
force. At dawn, when the disabled tank in the Remagen bridgehead were to op-
destroyer was removed from the bridge, erate under wraps that would not be re-
the arrival of a battalion of the 78th moved for more than a fortnight.
Division’s 310th Infantry relieved the
pressure. As the first vestiges of daylight O n the German Side
appeared, a battalion of the 9th Divi-
sion’s 47th Infantry also crossed into the Like the Americans, the Germans had
bridgehead. no plan ready to cope with the situation
In the twenty-four hours following at Remagen. Indeed, the fact that the
seizure of the bridge, almost 8,000 men U.S. Ninth Army had made no immediate
crossed the Rhine, including two ar- move to jump the Rhine had lulled
mored infantry battalions, a tank battal- many German commanders into the be-
A RHINE BRIDGE A T REMAGEN 221
lief that the Allies would pause to mop mored Division’s sweep to the Rhine
u p and regroup before trying to cross; above Andernach, that the headquarters
and that had engendered a measure of at first reacted apathetically. When
apathy in regard to the possibility of Model returned during the morning of
losing a bridge. 8 March, he ordered the 11th Panzer
Nor did the Germans have any reserves Division, which by that time was prepar-
close at hand to throw quickly against the ing to recross the Rhine at Bonn to make
little Remagen bridgehead. Most com- the projected counterattack southwest
bat units near Remagen were still on the toward Rheinbach, to sweep the Ameri-
west bank, struggling to escape Ameri- cans into the river and blow the Luden-
can pincers and get back somehow across dorff Bridge.
the Rhine. Most of the service troops in T h e 11th Panzer Division had about
the Remagen area were busy ferrying the 4,000 men, 25 tanks, and 18 artillery
depleted combat forces. pieces, a force that well might have
As the news about the Ludendorff struck a telling blow had it been avail-
Bridge spread slowly through a disor- able soon after the first Americans
ganized German command, officers near crossed the Rhine. Yet the panzer- di-
Remagen assembled about a hundred vision, assembled near Duesseldorf, had
engineers and antiaircraft troops and somehow to obtain gasoline for its ve-
fought through the night of the 7th, but hicles and thread a way along roads al-
to little avail. One group of Germans did ready jammed with traffic and under
reach the bridge itself with explosives in attack from Allied planes. Not until two
hand, but men of the 78th Division cap- days later, 10 March, were even the first
tured them before they could do any contingents of the division to get into
damage. action against the bridgehead.16 Field
Because of the fluid tactical situation, Marshal Model meanwhile designated a
many higher German commanders were single commander to co-ordinate all
on the move during the night of 7 March counteraction at Remagen, General Bay-
and failed for hours to learn about loss erlein, erstwhile commander of Corps
of the bridge. Field Marshal von Rund- Bayerlein, who had fallen back before
stedt’s headquarters got the word earlier the drive of the VII Corps on Cologne.
than most through a chance conversation Bayerlein on 9 March took command of
between the operations officer and local a heterogeneous collection of service
commanders. Nobody could find the troops opposite Remagen with the prom-
Army Group B commander, Field Mar- ise of the incoming 11th Panzer Division,
shal Model, in whose sector the debacle some 300 men and 15 tanks masquerad-
had occurred. Model himself was at “the ing under the name of the once-great
front,” his headquarters on the move. Panzer Lehr Division, another 600 men
When OB WEST finally did establish and 15 tanks under the seemingly im-
contact with Army Group B , Model still perishable 9th Panzer Division, and a
was away. So preoccupied was the army company-size remnant of the 106th Pan-
group staff with trying to save divisions zer Brigade with 5 tanks. Once all troops
of the LXVI and LXVII Corps, threat- 16MS # B–590, 11th Panzer Division, 6–21 March
ened with entrapment by the 4th Ar- 1945 (Generalleutnant Wend von Wietersheim).
222 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
LUDENDORFF
RAILROAD
BRIDGEAT REMAGEN
river under the 9th Infantry Division was frequently at the bridge, getting ac-
commander, General Craig; but Hodges curate, timely information from the east
continued to complain. Unaccustomed bank was a frustrating chore. In the
to working with Millikin, whose III first days of an impromptu operation of
Corps in months past had served under this sort, there were bound to be short-
the Third Army, Hodges and his staff ages of matériel and of specialized
made no attempt “to hide the fact that troops. One of these was in Signal Corps
everybody here wishes the bridgehead units. So frequently did vehicles and ar-
command had fallen to General Col- tillery cut telephone lines laid across
lins.” 21 the railroad bridge and so often did de-
Millikin’s problems, on the other bris and a swift current break wires
hand, were myriad. Although he himself strung in the river that telephone com-
munications with the east bank were
21Sylvan Diary, entry of 9 Mar 45; see also tele-
phone messages in III Corps G–3 Jnl file, 8–9 Mar
out about as much as they were in.
45. Neither liaison officers, who often were
A RHINE BRIDGE AT REMAGEN 225
delayed in threading their way back town of Linz, not quite three miles
across the congested bridge, nor radio southeast of the bridge.
communications could solve the prob- In the high wooded hills east of the
lem entirely. bridge progress was slower. There the
Committing incoming infantry units 9th Division’s 60th Infantry had been
on the far bank was a piecemeal propo- able to go less than a mile from the
sition, geared both to when units ar- river. German tenacity there could be
rived and to where the most pressing explained in part by the rugged terrain
need existed at the time. Not even the but owed much also to relatively strong
various components of all regiments artillery support. Since artillery units
were able to stay together, and splitting had retreated across the Rhine ahead of
the parts of divisions was the rule. This the infantry and tanks, a number of
heightened problems of control that them had reached the east bank in fair
haste, improvisation, and the sharply shape, particularly those a little farther
compartmented terrain had already north where advance of the VII Corps
made bad enough. had shoved them across the Rhine be-
T o General Millikin, the way to over- fore the III Corps came u p to the river
come his problems was not to make bold at Remagen. A volks artillery corps
thrusts here and there but to expand the from the north was committed early to
entire periphery of the bridgehead sys- the fighting east of Remagen, and other
tematically. On 8 March he ordered a artillery units were on the way. Soon
controlled advance to three successive the Germans would be employing
phase lines: the first—two and a half against the bridgehead some fifty 105-
miles north and south of the Ludendorff mm. barrels, another fifty 150-mm. how-
Bridge and about two miles deep—de- itzers, and close to a dozen 210-mm.
signed to free the bridge site from small pieces. T h e shortage of ammunition
arms fire; the second designed to elimi- rather than guns was the more serious
nate observed artillery fire; and the problem. 23
third—extending as far north as Bonn, Although the extent of progress belied
as far south as Andernach, and east well it, General Millikin intended the east-
beyond the autobahn—designed to free ward and southeastward thrusts to be his
the bridge site of all shelling.22 main effort, in keeping with the theory
As night fell on 10March, the 78th —advanced by both Bradley and Eisen-
Division’s 311th Infantry had advanced hower—that the troops in the bridge-
beyond the first phase line and taken head could best serve the over-all scheme
Honnef, almost five miles north of the by driving toward the Lahn River val-
bridge, Progress was marked too in the ley and the Frankfurt-Kassel corridor.
south, where the 27th Armored Infantry At the same time, Millikin reasoned,
Battalion captured a village beyond the such thrusts would also more quickly
eliminate German observation on the
bridge. General Hodges for his part
22III Corps Opnl Dir 10, 8 Mar 45; General
wanted the III Corps first to push north-
Millikin’s comments on the draft MS of this vol-
ume. 23 MS # B–547 (Genegalleutnant Eduard Metz).
226 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
ward in order to clear crossing sites for with the 130th Infantry reinforced by
General Collins’s VII Corps. Yet he tanks, Field Marshal Model ordered that
failed to make this clear to Millikin un- the regiment be used to bring the 340th
til the fourth day, 11 March, when for Volks Grenadier Division back to rea-
the first time he crossed the Rhine into sonable strength. Thus, the 130th too
the bridgehead. Even then he issued no went into the defensive line.26
specific order, although he did make Unlike Bayerlein, Model believed that
several allusions to the north and no decisive counterattack could be
strongly suggested that the main effort launched until sufficient infantry rein-
be made in that direction.24 forcement arrived to release the armored
T h e suggestion was enough for Milli- units from the line. In this he was sup-
kin. He promptly put emphasis behind ported by General von Zangen, under
the 78th Division’s thrust by narrowing whose Fifteenth Army Bayerlein’s forces
the division’s sector and shifting the bulk opposing the bridgehead operated. Yet
of the 9th Division to the northeast. On in disagreement with Zangen, Model in-
the following day, 12 March, with the sisted that the strongest line be built in
arrival of most of the 99th Infantry Di- the north to thwart what he remained
vision in the bridgehead to take over the convinced would be the Americans’ ma-
southern and southeastern portions of jor thrust. At a meeting on 11 March
the periphery, he ordered all units with Model and the new Commander in
shifted back to their parent divisions; but Chief West, Field Marshal Kesselring,
by that time, the chance for a really Zangen protested this line of thought.
spectacular drive northward had passed. Field Marshal Kesselring for his part
Indications that the going might be- apparently sanctioned it, for Model’s
come more difficult developed as early view prevailed. 27
as 11 March, when contingents of the With disapproval of the plan to use
11th Panzer Division counterattacked at the 130th Infantry offensively, General
Honnef, temporarily regaining the Bayerlein saw his last hope for an effec-
town.25On the same day a second volks tive counterattack pass. T o Bayerlein,
artillery corps reached the front. On 13 there was no chance of assembling suf-
March, as remnants of the 340th Volks ficient forces to drive the Americans into
Grenadier Division arrived, the German the Rhine once they had gained addi-
commander, General Bayerlein, put tional time to reinforce their bridge-
them into the line east of Honnef. Later head.28 On the other hand, Model’s
in the day the 130th Infantry Regiment, decision did serve to slow operations in
a well-equipped and comparatively fresh the sector where the American com-
separate unit of 2,000 men, arrived from mander, General Millikin, now planned,
the Netherlands. Although Bayerlein temporarily, his main effort. Thus Gen-
wanted to counterattack immediately eral Hodges’ dissatisfaction with Milli-
24 Combat interview with Col Phillips, CofS IIII
Corps; Sylvan Diary, entry of 11 Mar 45; Gen 26 See criticisms in MS # B–829 (General der
Millikin’s comments on the draft MS of this vol- Infanterie Gustav von Zangen).
ume. 27MSS # B–829 (Zangen) and # B–101 (General
25 MSS # A–970 (Bayerlein) and # B–590 der Infanterie Otto Hitzfeld).
(Wietersheim). 28 MS# A–970 (Bayerlein).
A RHINE BRIDGE A T REMAGEN 227
kin’s handling of the bridgehead fight move to the river only during the night
continued. of 9 March. Construction of the first
At the bridge site, concentrated efforts bridge, a treadway from Remagen to
were made from the start toward supple- Erpel, began early on 10 March.
menting the Ludendorff railroad bridge. Although jammed roads leading to
One of the first units to arrive for the Remagen continued to hamper bridge
purpose was Naval Unit No. 1, a U.S. construction, the most serious delays de-
Navy force with twenty-four LCVP’s rived from German artillery fire and air
(landing craft, vehicle and personnel) attacks. During 8 and 9 March, the Ger-
that had been attached to the First Army mans maintained an average rate of one
for some months in anticipation of the shell every two minutes in the vicinity
Rhine crossings.29 Also quick to arrive of the bridge sites, but by 1 0 March,
was an engineer unit of the III Corps, their fire had fallen off to four or five
the 86th Engineer Heavy Ponton Bat- rounds per hour.31 Artillery fire during
talion, with orders to operate three fer- the course of construction of the Rem-
ries, one well north of the Ludendorff agen treadway bridge destroyed four
Bridge, one close to the bridge at Rem- cranes, two Brockway trucks, two a i r
agen, and the third well south of the compressors, three dump trucks, and
bridge. As assembled by the engineers, thirty-two floats. T h e treadway, never-
the rafts were made of five pontons cov- theless, was opened for limited traffic at
ered with wooden flooring. Used as free 0700, 11 March, and for full use in late
ferries propelled by 22-hp. outboard afternoon. A heavy ponton upstream at
motors, the craft began to operate as Linz was opened at midnight on the
early as the morning of 9 March. T h e 11th. On the 13th engineers closed the
ferries and LCVP’s were augmented on Ludendorff Bridge in order to repair
14 March by dukws (2½-ton amphibious damage caused by Captain Friesenhahn’s
trucks) of the 8 19th Amphibious Truck emergency demolition.
Company. 30 Unlike the artillery fire, German air
Survey teams of the 1111th and 1159th attacks were more annoying than de-
Engineer Combat Groups, scheduled to structive. A strong cordon of defenses
build tactical bridges across the Rhine, around the bridge manned by the 16th
reached Remagen during the morning Antiaircraft Artillery Group, antiaircraft
of 8 March. Because of road priorities battalions borrowed from the divisions
granted at first to infantry units and of the III Corps, and additional units
engineers who were to operate ferries, transferred from the V Corps sharply
the bridging units themselves began to interfered with German accuracy. On 12
March, at the height of air attacks against
28LCVP’s could carry thirty-six soldiers with full the bridge, sixteen 90-mm. gun batteries
combat equipment, vehicles u p to the size of ¾-ton were emplaced on the west bank of the
ambulances or trucks, or four tons of cargo. See
Samuel Eliot Morison, T h e Invasion of France and
Rhine and twenty-five batteries of auto-
Germany (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, matic antiaircraft weapons were almost
1957), pp. 317–23. equally divided between the two banks,
30For the engineer story, see AAR’s of the engi-
neer units, III Corps Engineer War Diary, and 31Sylvan Diary, entries of 8–10 Mar 45; III Corps
combat interviews with engineer officers. AAR, Mar 45.
228 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
With a grinding roar of tearing steel, hardly could be ruled out. 38Since the
the Ludendorff railroad bridge slipped, electric circuit designed to set off the
sagged, and with a convulsive twist main demolitions had been tested shortly
plunged into the Rhine. Of those work- before it was to be used and was in order,
ing on the bridge at the time, 93 were something happened to the circuit
injured, 28 killed. shortly before Friesenhahn turned the
T h e collapse of the bridge could be key. Most Germans familiar with the
attributed to no one specific factor but events believed that a lucky hit from an
rather to a combination of things, some American shell—probably fired by a
even antedating the emergency demoli- tank—severed the main cable leading to
tion. As far back as 1940 Allied planes the demolitions. T h e Americans them-
had launched sporadic attacks against the selves conducted no immediate post-
bridge, and in late 1944 had damaged it mortem, and once the bridge had fallen
to such an extent that it was unservice- into the Rhine, the evidence was gone.
able for fifteen days. Then came the Whether the reason could be ascer-
heavy planking to convert the bridge for tained or not, Hitler at the time was
vehicles; the assault by the 27th Armored determined to find scapegoats to pay for
Infantry Battalion’s Company A and the the debacle. He convened a special 3-man
fire of the big Pershing tanks that ac- military tribunal that acted with little
companied it; Friesenhahn’s emergency regard for legal niceties.39 T h e tribunal
demolition; the drumbeat of hundreds condemned to death two majors who had
of infantry feet; the heavy tread of tanks commanded engineer troops in the vi-
and other vehicles; the pounding of Ger- cinity of the bridge, Herbert Strobe1 and
man artillery; the vibrations from Ger- August Kraft; a lieutenant of Flakartil-
man bombs, from American antiaircraft lerie, Karl Heinz Peters; the major sent
pieces and big 8-inch howitzers emplaced by General Hitzfeld of the LXVII Corps
nearby, from the near misses of the V– to assume tactical command at the
2’s; and then the weight of heavy engi- bridge, Hans Scheller; and the previous
neer equipment as the Americans tried tactical commander, Captain Bratge.
to repair the bridge. All had to be borne T h e engineer in charge of demolitions,
by the downstream truss alone after Captain Friesenhahn, who had been cap-
Friesenhahn’s demolition so damaged the tured by the Americans, was acquitted
upstream truss that it was useless. In the in absentia. Because Bratge too was an
end, it was too much for one weakened American prisoner, he survived. T h e
truss. 37 other four died before firing squads.
More speculative is the explanation of
why the German demolitions failed, in Expansion of the Bridgehead
the first place, to destroy the Ludendorff
Bridge. Sabotage, for example, either by T h e loss of the Ludendorff Bridge had
a German soldier or a foreign laborer, no effect on operations in the Remagen
bridgehead. T h e bridge had been closed
38Hechler, in T h e Bridge at Remagen, pages
37 Combat interview with Lt Col Clayton A. Rust, 212–20, analyzes the various speculations in detail.
CO 276th Engineer Combat Bn. 39Ibid., pp. 192–212.
A RHINE BRIDGE A T REMAGEN 231
for repairs since 13 March, and the forces bridgehead. Beginning early on 15
in the bridgehead already were accus- March, the 1st Division of General Col-
tomed to working without it. General lins's VII Corps had crossed the Rhine
Hodges nevertheless quickly authorized over the I I I Corps bridges and on ferries,
construction of a floating Bailey bridge and at noon the next day, Collins as-
about a mile downstream from Remagen. sumed responsibility for the northern
In a remarkable engineering feat, the portion of the bridgehead. In the process,
Bailey bridge was completed in just un- Collins's corps absorbed the 78th Di-
der forty-eight hours and opened for vision.
traffic on 20 March. 40 T h e specific role the Supreme Com-
One reason for a new bridge was the mander, General Eisenhower, intended
presence of a new force in the Remagen the Remagen bridgehead to play in fu-
ture operations meanwhile had been
40III Corps Engineer War Diary, 120600 Mar 45. made clear on 13 March. T h e bridge-
232 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
head, Eisenhower directed, was to be Army had already staged a diversion; the
used to draw enemy units from the Ruhr First Army had crossed the Rhine. 43
area opposite the 21 Army Group and While advances in the Remagen
from the 6th Army Group’s Rhine cross- bridgehead continued to average only
ing sites in the south. Although an ex- about a thousand yards a day, Hodges
ploitation eventually might be made in was convinced this was less a reflectiion
the direction of Frankfurt, a minimum of German strength than of timidity in
of ten First Army divisions had to be American attacks. By 17 March the Ger-
reserved for the time being as a possible man order of battle opposite the bridge-
“follow-up force” for the 21 Army head sounded impressive on paper—in
Group, still designated to make the Al- addition to those units early committed,
lied main effort 41. the Germans had brought in contingents
From this restriction, it was obvious of the 26th, 62d, 272d, 277th, and 326th
that Eisenhower had no wish to see the Volks Grenadier Divisions; the 3d and
bridgehead expanded appreciably. Gen- 5th Parachute Divisions; and the 3d Pan-
eral Bradley in turn told the First Army zer Grenadier Division—but in no case
to advance no farther than a line ap- were these real divisions. All were -bat-
proximately twenty-five miles wide at the talion-size Kampfgruppen or else had
base along the Rhine and ten miles deep, been fleshed out to something more than
in effect, a slight expansion of the third regimental strength with inexperienced
phase line that the III Corps commander, replacements culled from various Wehr-
General Millikin, earlier had imposed.42 kreise u p and down the Rhine.44In most
T h e First Army’s General Hodges dis- cases the Americans characterized the re-
agreed, though to no avail. Like almost sistance as “moderate to light.’’ Although
everybody at First Army headquarters, the German defense appeared to be “or-
Hodges was piqued about the elaborate derly,” the more serious problem was
preparations Field Marshal Montgomery difficult terrain.45
was making for his 21 Army Group’s By 16 March, when troops of the 78th
crossing of the Rhine and the emphasis Division made the first cut of the Ruhr-
General Eisenhower continued to place Frankfurt autobahn northeast of Hon-
on that crossing when, in Hodges’ view, nef, expansion of the bridgehead had
a breakout from the Remagen bridge- proceeded to the point where artillery
head could have been staged at will. no longer was able to support the attacks
With evident amusement he listened to properly from the west bank of the
the story-probably apocryphal—of how Rhine. As artillery units began to cross
the 21 Army Group on 7 March had the river, engineers supporting the VII
asked Supreme Headquarters to stage a Corps began construction of three more
diversion before Montgomery jumped tactical bridges to care for the increased
the Rhine and how, five minutes later, logistical burden. Keyed to the north-
SHAEF passed the word that the First ward advance of the infantry east of the
41SCAF 232, SHAEF to Bradley, 13 Mar 45, in 43Sylvan Diary, entry of 15 Mar 45, and passim.
12th AGp Military Objectives, 371.3, vol. VI. Quote 44III Corps and VII Corps AAR’s Mar 45, and
is from Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 517. pertinent German MSS.
42 12th AGpLtr of Instrs No. 17, 13 Mar 45. 46III Corps AAR, Mar 45.
A RHINE BRIDGE AT REMAGEN 233
Rhine, the first of the bridges was com- Americans afforded no pause in their
pleted late on 17 March, another on 1 9 attacks. Once relieved from the line, the
March, and a third, located at the south- depleted German armored units had to
ern fringe of Bonn, on 21 March. be committed piecemeal again to try to
Screened by smoke from chemical gen- block the continuing thrusts. Although
erators, the engineers incurred only one this produced occasional intense combat,
casualty during the course of construc- particularly at towns or villages blocking
tion.46 main highways, nowhere was it sufficient
Of all the American attacks, those to to stall or throw back the infantry of
the north and northeast by the 1st and the two American divisions. Operating
78th Divisions continued to bother the with only normal tank and tank de-
German army group commander most. stroyer attachments, the 78th Division
More than ever convinced that the on 21 March gained the Sieg River, the
Americans intended to make their main northern limit of the bridgehead as au-
effort northward toward the Ruhr, Field thorized b y General Bradley. At that
Marshal Model recognized that a strong point the corps commander, General Col-
counterattack had to be staged soon or lins, attached to the 78th Division a
the Americans would breach the natural combat command of the 3d Armored
defensive line in the north, the Sieg Division to attack east along the south
River, which enters the Rhine just down- bank of the Sieg. By 22 March the di-
stream from Bonn, and then be ready for visions of the VII Corps had reached the
exploitation. final bridgehead line, both at the Sieg
On 19 March Model began to strip all River and along the west bank of the
armored units from the eastern and little Hanf Creek that empties into the
southern portions of the line to assemble Sieg just over nine miles east of the
them in the north for counterattack. In Rhine.
the process, he introduced the LXXIV T h e 9th and 99th Divisions of the III
Corps to command the northern sector, Corps, commanded now by General Van
then ordered the commander, General Fleet, profited from the shift of German
Puechler, to exchange places with the armor to the north. O n 18 March the
tank expert, General Bayerlein of the 9th Division at last cut the autobahn,
LIII Corps, thereby reversing the two while patrols from the 99th Division
corps headquarters. As finally consti- reached the meandering Wied River al-
tuted, the ring around the Remagen most due east of Remagen. Other con-
bridgehead involved the LIII Corps un- tingents of the 99th Division drove
der Bayerlein in the north, the LXXlV swiftly southward close along the Rhine
Corps under Peuchler in the center, and almost to a point opposite Andernach.
the LXVII Corps under General Hitz- By 20 March the I I I Corps had reached
feld in the south.47 the prescribed bridgehead line.
Unfortunately for Model’s plan, the As both corps neared the planned line,
General Hodges at the First Army’s
46 VII Corps Engineer Office, Rhine Crossings of headquarters fretted at the restrictions
VII Corps; VII Corps AAR, Mar 45.
47 MSS # A–970 (Bayerlein); # B–829 (Zangen);
still binding his troops. Watching with
# B–101 (Hitzfeld). admiration far-reaching drives west of
234 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
the Rhine by the Third Army, Hodges were aiming directly for the Ruhr, Field
was convinced the end for Germany was Marshal Model managed to assemble the
near. “The war is over, I tell you,” he bulk of the German armor for his long-
kept repeating to his colleagues; “the delayed counterattack under the direc-
war is over.” 48 tion of General Bayerlein. Yet when the
T h e next day, 19 March, as pleasant Germans struck the divisions of the VII
but unfounded rumors swept the First Corps, their efforts were poorly co-ordi-
Army of an impending armistice, Hodges nated and far too weak for the job. It
flew, at the 12th Army Group command- was, in effect, not one counterattack but
er’s behest, to meet General Bradley in several small ones that brought intense
Luxembourg City. During the morning, fighting at various points but, in the end,
Hodges learned, Bradley had conferred gained nothing. T h e Germans merely
with General Eisenhower. In anticipa- frittered away irreplaceable troops that
tion of an early attack by Montgomery’s would be needed desperately the next
2 1 Army Group to cross the Rhine, day elsewhere along the periphery of the
Hodges was authorized to send a maxi- Remagen bridgehead and already were
mum of nine divisions into the Remagen needed at other points on the elongated
bridgehead. From 23 March on, he was Rhine front, where on 23 March porten-
to be prepared to break out to the south- tous events had begun to occur.
east, the main objective to be Limburg T h e capture of the Ludendorff rail-
and the Lahn River valley and linkup road bridge and its subsequent exploita-
with Third Army troops once Patton’s tion was one of those coups de théâtre
forces crossed the Rhine.49 that sometimes happen in warfare and
T h e wraps thus were about to be re- never fail to capture the imagination.
moved from the First Army, though the just how much it speeded the end of the
final unveiling was predicated on Mont- war is another question. T h e bridgehead
gomery’s crossing the Rhine. T h e date dealt a serious blow to German morale
for the First Army’s big push later would that may well have been partly responsi-
be set for 25 March. ble for lackluster resistance at other
In preparation for the attack, Hodges points, and it served as a magnet to draw
on the 21st sent General Huebner’s V a measure of fighting strength from other
Corps into the bridgehead to take over sites. On the other hand, the German
the southern periphery from the 99th Army clearly would have been beaten
Division. When the attack date came, without it, perhaps just as quickly.50
nine divisions, including three armored From 7 through 24 March, the Rem-
divisions, would be ready for the ex- agen bridgehead fighting cost the III
ploitation. Corps approximately 5,500 casualties, in-
It remained for the Germans to write cluding almost 700 killed and 600
a final, futile postscript to the Remagen missing. The VII Corps, from 16 through
bridgehead fighting. On 24 March, still 24 March, incurred not quite 1,900
imbued with the idea that the Americans casualties, including 163 killed and 240
48 Sylvan Diary, entry of 18 Mar 45. 50For a German view, see Wagener, MS # A-
49Ibid., entries of 19–20 Mar 45. 965.
A RHINE BRIDGE A T REMAGEN 235
missing. In the same time span, the Ger- played in the drive to the Rhine was to
mans lost more than 11,700 men as open. A precursor of what it would be
prisoners alone. like was to be seen in a drive already
When the First Army attacked again underway by the Third Army into the
on 25 March, a new war of movement Saar-Palatinate.
even more spectacular than that dis-
CHAPTER XII
The Saar-Palatinate
General Patton of the Third Army To the Allies, the Saar-Palatinate had
was “just a little envious” of the First been an important goal since preinva-
Army’s Rhine crossing at Remagen.1 sion planning days. T h e Saar was second
Yet there was little he could do immedi- only to the Ruhr as a source of Ger-
ately—once the 4th Armored Division many’s war-making muscle, and the
had turned away from the Rhine—to region screened feasible Rhine crossing
emulate it. T h e Third Army was obli- sites lying between Mainz and Mann-
gated to assist in a pending drive to heim. Both the Third Army and Gen-
eliminate the last German position west eral Devers’s 6th Army Group needed
of the Rhine, and Patton himself was access to those crossing sites to assure
eager to expand his army’s part in that their logical roles in the final broad-
operation from support to major effort. front advance into the heart of Ger-
T h e position to be erased had become many.
known to American planners and com- From the German viewpoint, the
manders, after the political entity that Saar-Palatinate was important both for
made u p the bulk of the area, as the its economic significance and for the
Saar-Palatinate. Lying south of the Mo- military obstacle it posed to Allied ar-
selle, the area embraced more than 3,000 mies. Based on the nearby iron ore of
square miles and included the Saar in- Lorraine and on extensive coal fields in
dustrial region, the old Bavarian Palati- the Saar River basin around Saar-
nate, part of the provinces of Rhineland bruecken, the heavy industry of the
and Hessen, and a belt of French terri- Saar contributed 10 percent of Ger-
tory along the Franco-German border in many’s iron and steel capacity. Coal pro-
the northeastern corner of Alsace. Near duction totaled 7,000,000 tons annually.
the southern base of the region stood Despite the proximity of Allied troops
the West Wall, there stronger than any- and almost daily raids by Allied planes,
where else. On the western edge, Gen- the Germans in early March still were
eral Walker’s XX Corps, having cleared shipping twelve trainloads of coal daily
the Saar-Moselle triangle and captured to plants east of the Rhine, and the
Trier, had already pierced the West foundries of the Saar continued to
Wall; the rest of the Third Army, hav- operate. At Homburg, northeast of Saar-
ing conquered the Eifel, was in behind bruecken, stood one of the comparatively
the German defenders. few synthetic oil plants still producing
in the Reich; and at Ludwigshafen,
1 Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 254. across the Rhine from Mannheim, some
T H E SAAR-PALATINATE 237
ment and annihilation of First Army rectly southeast through Hagenau to the
will be imminent.” 3 Rhine. 4 (Map IX)
T h e answer from Field Marshal von Anticipating early completion of op-
Rundstedt, acting out his last days as erations to clear the west bank of the
Commander in Chief West, was suc- Rhine north of the Moselle, General
cinct, uncompromising. Eisenhower on 13 February had told his
Hold the Saar-Palatinate. two American army group commanders,
Bradley and Devers, to begin planning
American Plans for a joint drive to sweep the Saar-
Palatinate. Assigned a target date of 15
For the Americans, clearing the Saar- March, the offensive was to begin only
Palatinate would be a return to unfin- after the 21 Army Group had reached
ished business that the Third and Sev- the Rhine. It was to be designed both to
enth Armies had been conducting in draw enemy units from the north and to
December when forced to retrench to provide an alternate line of attack across
help defeat the Ardennes counter- the Rhine should the principal Allied
offensive and Operation N O R D W I N D , drive in the north fail. T h e main effort,
the secondary counteroffensive in Al- SHAEF planners contemplated, was to
sace. Both armies had reached the West be made by the 6th Army Group’s Sev-
Wall guarding the Saar-Palatinate in enth Army, which was to be augmented
December. T h e Third Army had forged by transferring one armored and three
two bridgeheads into the fortified line, infantry divisions from the Third
one of which, at Saarlautern, remained Army.5
intact. T h e Seventh Army had cleared During the first week of March, Gen-
northeastern Alsace and jumped the eral Devers at 6th Army Group approved
Lauter River at two points to confront a plan (Operation UNDERTONE)pre-
the West Wall, but the necessity to pared by General Patch’s Seventh Army.
spread out in order to free Third Army Three corps were to attack abreast from
units for the Ardennes and to recoil be- Saarbruecken to a point southeast of
fore Operation N O R D W I Nhad
D forced Hagenau. A narrow strip along the
withdrawals, in some places as much as Rhine leading to the extreme northeast-
nineteen miles. Through most of Febru- ern corner of Alsace at Lauterbourg was
ary the Seventh Army had staged limited to be cleared by a division of the First
objective attacks to straighten lines and French Army under operational control
gain favorable ground for a major of- of the Seventh Army. T h e Seventh Ar-
fensive against the Saar-Palatinate. Nev- my’s main effort was to be made in the
ertheless, by the end of the first week in center u p the Kaiserslautern corridor.6
March, most of the northeastern corner
of Alsacestill was in German hands.The 4 These actions are covered in Robert Ross Smith,
The Riviera to the Rhine, a forthcoming volume
front departed from the Saar River near in the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
Sarreguemines and extended almost di- WAR II series.
5 SHAEF GCT/37057/Plans, Note on Early Con-
centration for Saar Offensives, 14 Feb 45, SHAEF
files.
3MS # B–600 (Hawser). 6Seventh Army Report, pp. 698–99.
T H E SAAR-PALATINATE 239
18 Unless otherwise noted, the German story is 19 MSS # B–377, Fighting of the LXXXIX Corps
based on the following MSS: # B–238 (Hauser); From 10 to 16 March (General der Infanterie
# B–123 (Gersdorff); # B–831 (Felber); # B–600 Gustav Hoehne); # B–831 (Felber).
(Hausser); and # C–020 (Schramm). 2094th Div AAR, Mar 45.
T H E SAAR-PALATINATE 243
regiment had to stay behind. Although Despite the withdrawals to aid the
General Hausser decided, reluctantly, to Seventh Army, Army Group G’s other
give the division to theLXXXIX Corps major component, the First Army under
rather than hold it in reserve, only the General der Infanterie Hermann
reconnaissance battalion would reach the Foertsch, remained the considerably
corps before the Moselle front erupted. stronger force. Having benefited by
Hausser had only one other hope for a transfer of a number of the Nineteenth
reserve. For more than a week he had Army’s divisions following withdrawal
sought to withdraw the 559th Volks from the Colmar pocket, the First Army
Grenadier Division from a salient ex- had seen little major fighting in recent
tending beyond the West Wall south of weeks except that in the Saar-Moselle
Saarbruecken; but since that would in- triangle and the limited objective at-
volve abandoning some West Wall posi- tacks in Alsace launched by the Ameri-
tions, authority had to come from Hitler can Seventh Army in February. Yet the
himself. T h e permission finally arrived weakest point of the First Army front
but, as events were to prove, too late. was at the same time the most threat-
T h e first contingents of the division be- ened, and the necessity of giving up di-
came available to assist the Seventh Army visions to the Seventh Army meant that
only on 15 March. General Foertsch could do little about it.
On the left of the LXXXIX Corps, T h e point in question was the bridge-
responsible for another twenty-five miles head beyond the Saar River and the
of steep, rocky, vine-clad river bank, West Wall south of Trier established by
stood General von Oriola’s XIII Corps, the U.S. XX Corps. There stood the
consisting of remnants of three volks LXXXII Corps under General Hahm,
grenadier divisions and the 2d Panzer part of which earlier had been driven
Division. None of the divisions could be from the Saar-Moselle triangle. Until 10
classed as more than a Kumpfgrupee and March, the corps still had only three di-
the panzer division, though somewhat visions, two of which had been roughly
stronger in numbers than the others, treated in the triangle. T h e third, the
had only a few tanks. T h e rest of the 2d Mountain Division, was also seriously
Moselle front to the vicinity of Trier, understrength following its futile, piece-
thence southeast along the Ruwer River meal counterattacks against the bridge-
to a point of contact with the First Army head over the Saar. O n 10March com-
three miles south of the Moselle, be- mand of the remnants of another divi-
longed to General Beyer’sLXXX Corps. sion passed from the Seventh Army’s
Beyer commanded remnants of three
LXXX Corps to the LXXXII Corps, but
volks grenadier divisions.21
with it came responsibility for defending
an additional three miles of front close
to Trier. With this addition, General
21MSS # B–052, XIII Corps, 18 February–21
Hahm’s line ran from a point east of
March 1945 (Generalleutnant Ralph von Oriola); Trier southeast to the other American
# B–082, The Final Fighting of the LXXX Army bridgehead over the Saar at Saarlautern.
Corps From the Marne to the Danube (General
der Infanterie Franz Beyer), p. 3. Somewhat less than one-half of this line
244 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
benefited from West Wall fortifica- lower Moselle near Cochem for a quick
tions. 22 thrust that could cut the entire army
Containing the Saarlautern bridgehead group off from the Rhine.
was one of the responsibilities of the Yet Kesselring, true to his charge from
LXXXV Corps, commanded by General his Fuehrer—whether he believed in it
der Infanterie Baptist Kniess. T h e corps or not—refused to sanction either with-
had three divisions, all nearly at full drawal or a deliberate delaying action.
strength; but one, the 559th Volks Grena- “The positions,” Kesselring said, “have
dier, was destined for transfer to the to be held.” 24
Seventh Army.23 Unlikethe commander
of the adjoining LXXXII Corps and Through the Hunsrueck
those defending the Moselle, General
Kniess was confident his troops could General Patton’s plan of attack was
hold against frontal attack, for the West admirably designed to ,capitalize o n Ger-
Wall in his sector was in considerable man weaknesses. Striking first, Walker’s
depth. It was concern about American XX Corps might attract any available
breakthrough from the rear that plagued reserve, whereupon Eddy’s XII Corps
both Kniess and the commanders of two was to jump the Moselle at one of the
other corps that extended the First Army defenders’ weakest points, the sector of
line southeast to the Rhine. Although Hoehne’s LXXXIX Corps. Quick con-
these two corps, the XIII SS and the XC, vergence of the two drives well might
would no doubt be driven back from trap the other two corps of the Seventh
their advanced positions in Alsace, they Army, and a logical extension of Eddy’s
would gain strength by retiring into the thrust southward alongside the Rhine
West Wall. could, as the German General Felber
When the new Commander in Chief feared, trap all of Army Group G.
West, Field Marshal Kesselring, paid his For the opening attack, General
first visit to First and Seventh Army Walker had an outsize corps of four in-
headquarters on 13 March, the army fantry divisions, two cavalry groups, and
group commander, General Hausser, and an armored division. One cavalry group,
the two army commanders used the oc- the 3d, started the fighting during the
casion to emphasize how sterile and po- afternoon of 12 March with a diversion-
tentially disastrous they considered the ary attack in a loop of the Moselle near
policy of all-out defense west of the the confluence of the Moselle and the
Rhine. It could only result, they insisted, Ruwer. After nightfall, as a drizzling rain
in wholesale losses, perhaps annihilation. showed signs of diminishing, troops of
T h e latter, General Felber of the Seventh three infantry divisions moved toward
Army pointed out, seemed highly likely, lines of departure along the periphery
because the U.S. 4th Armored Division of the Saar bridgehead south of Trier.
was apparently concentrating along the At 0245 on 13 March an impressive total
of thirty-one divisional and corps field
22 MS # B–066 (Ingelheim).
23MS # B–121, L X X X V Corps, 25 January–23 24Quotation is from MS # B–600 (Paul Haus-
March 1945, Operations in the Saar (General der ser). See also MSS # B–123 (Gersdorff); # B–831
Infanterie Baptist Kniess). (Felber); # B–238 (Wolf Hauser).
THE SAAR-PALATINATE 245
artillery battalions opened fire. Fifteen taking out the strongpoints after daylight
minutes later, the infantry moved came.
through the darkness to the attack. By early evening of 13 March, the 94th
T h e 94th Division (General Malony) and 80th Divisions both had firm holds
on the left headed east toward the cross- on the first ridgeline beyond the original
roads town of Hermeskeil, ten miles bridgehead, as much as two miles from
beyond the Ruwer; the 80th Division the jump-off points, and bridges were in
(General McBride) in the center drove place across both the Ruwer and a feeder
southeast toward Weiskirchen and Lo- stream that cut the 80th Division’s zone.26
sheim, approximately seven miles away. Unlike the other two units, the 26th Di-
Capture of these objectives would put vision in the pillbox belt near the Saar
the XX Corps through the most densely came in for frequent local counterat-
wooded portions of the Hunsrueck and tacks, but that division also advanced as
open the way for armor. T h e 26th Divi- much as two miles.
sion (General Paul) meanwhile attacked T h e next day, 14 March, the drive
almost due south in a narrow zone close slowed down. T h e Germans, wherever
to the Saar to roll u p the West Wall. encountered, fought back defiantly, giv-
After daylight, a regiment of the 65th ing no indication of general withdrawal.
Division (Maj. Gen. Stanley E. Rein- This was particularly true among the pill-
hart), new to combat, staged a diver- boxes faced by the 26th Division, where
sionary, limited objective attack in the a combination of concrete-reinforced re-
Saarlautern bridgehead. 25 sistance and rough terrain brought ad-
Nowhere was the going easy. T h e ter- vances that had to be measured in yards
rain—high, fir-covered hills, deep draws rather than miles. A counterattack by
and ravines, and a secondary roadnet al- the regiment of the 6th SS Mountain
ready churned into mud by German ve- Division that had been left behind by
hicles—was enough in itself to see to its parent division for want of gasoline
that; but the German regiments, seri- slowed the advance of the 80th Divi-
ously depleted in numbers, could take sion.27 When the weather cleared in the
advantage of the difficult ground only at afternoon, planes of the XIX Tactical
isolated points rather than along a con- Air Command got into the fray in
tinuous line. In the darkness, the at- strength, but because it was hard to pin-
tacking battalions stumbled onto some point advance positions in the thick fir
enemy positions, ran into minefields, and
drew heavy small arms and mortar fire, 26Part of the success achieved by the 80th Divi-
but more often than not, a sideslipping sion’s 318th Infantry was directly attributable to
the actions of one officer, 2d Lt. Harry J. Michael.
to left or right brought quick relief and He singlehandedly captured two machine guns and
continued advance. T h e action was more their crews, then led his platoon in a charge that
an infiltration than an attack, with re- carried an artillery position and seized three guns.
A few hours later he individually captured 13
serve companies and reserve battalions Germans, wounded 4, and killed 2, then again led
a successful charge against German pillboxes. T h e
25For assignments, see XX Corps FO 18, 10Mar next morning a shot from ambush cut Lieutenant
45. Unless otherwise noted, this account is based Michael down. He was awarded the Medal of
on official records of the XX Corps and its divi- Honor posthumously.
sions. 27MS # B–066 (Ingelheim).
246 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
forests, the strikes had to be confined to on the 16th to pass through the 94th and
targets well in front of the infantry. 80th Divisions. T h e goal was the Nahe
Visiting all three division command River, some twenty-five miles away.
posts during the day, the Third Army
commander was disturbed at the slow Across the Lower Moselle
pace. General Patch’s Seventh Army,
General Patton knew, was to begin its Playing a large part in Walker’s de-
offensive the next morning. Patton was cision was the situation in the zone of
concerned lest Patch beat him to the General Eddy’s XII Corps on the lower
Rhine. 28 Moselle. There, before dawn on 14
Patton need not have worried. On the March, two infantry divisions had set out
third day, 15 March, no general German to cross the river.
collapse developed, but the signs were T h e terrain along the lower Moselle
there. The 94th Division’s 302d Infantry is forbidding at the river line itself—
plunged forward four miles and reached precipitous, forested slopes rising to a
a point less than three miles from the thousand feet, with egress from the river
division objective of Hermeskeil. A bat- bottom by steep twisting roads—but only
tallion of the 80th Division’s 318th In- a mile or two from the river most of the
fantry fought its way into Weiskirchen, roads emerge onto open, relatively flat-
one of that division’s objectives, there surfaced ridgelines broad enough for mil-
encountering a veritable hornet’s nest of itary maneuver. Thus the XII Corps
opposition. T h e battalion nonetheless commander, General Eddy, anticipated
achieved a sizable gain and was on the that once his infantry had reached the
edge of more open country. Another crest of the ridgelines, armor could
battalion made an even deeper thrust quickly take over and drive the remain-
farther south. Although the 26th Divi- ing thirty miles to the Nahe River. Al-
sion had the usual hard time with pill- though he ordered his infantry divisions
boxes, the 26th’s attack was a subsidiary to attack toward the Nahe as soon as they
operation that nobody looked on as the had established bridgeheads over the
bellwether of the drive. Moselle, he alerted the 4th Armored
T o the XX Corps commander, Gen- Division for rapid commitment and
eral Walker, the time for exploitation urged corps engineers to begin building
seemed at hand. Although air reconnais- bridges capable of handling tanks even
sance found no evidence of wholesale as the infantrymen were crossing the
German withdrawal, this report merely river in assault boats.29
reinforced Walker’s determination to Concealed by darkness and a heavy fog,
commit his armor. A swift strike by tanks two regiments of the 90th Division (Gen-
might trap the Germans before they had eral Earnest) and one of the 5th (Gen-
a chance to escape. eral Irwin) began to cross the Moselle
Just after midnight Walker told the at 0200, 14 March, behind a 30-minute
10th Armored Division, already on one- artillery preparation. A second regiment
hour alert, to jump off before daylight
28See XII Corps FO 16, 11 Mar 45. Unless other-
wise noted, the tactical story is from official records
28 Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 259. of the corps and divisions.
T H E SAAR-PALATINATE 247
of the 5th Division—arrival of its assault was similarly impressed. When Irwin
boats delayed by traffic-jammed roads— asked for trucks to transport his infantry,
crossed two hours later. Only an occa- Eddy cautioned that he intended to com-
sional inaccurate burst of fire from rest- mit the 4th Armored Division (General
less German machine gunners interfered Gaffey) early the next day. To Irwin’s
with any of the crossings. protest that his infantry could reach the
O n the far bank, the infantrymen objective while the armored division was
found resistance centered almost exclu- sorting itself out after crossing the river,
sively in the towns and villages. In Treis, Eddy insisted that the exploitation was
riverside nexus of several good roads a job for armor.30
leading southeast and six miles down- To the German LXXXIX Corps com-
stream from Cochem, contingents of the mander, General Hoehne, it was equally
enemy’s 159th Division held a battalion apparent that the American bridgehead
of the 5th Division’s 2d Infantry at bay was firmly established and soon would
until after nightfall when opening of a explode. While he knew that the main
treadway bridge across the Moselle en- body of the 6th SS Mountain Division
abled tanks to help mop up. It took a probably would arrive the next day, he
battalion of the 90th Division’s 357th also recognized that the division was too
Infantry until noon to clear other troops depleted from the futile counterattack
of the 159th Division from the town of south of Trier and the loss of a regiment
Brodenbach, while in another town just to General Hahm’sLXXXII Corps even
over a mile downstream the 6th SS to postpone the inevitable. As the divi-
Mountain Division’s reconnaissance bat- sion began to arrive piecemeal early on
talion held out until midafternoon. the 15th, Hoehne committed it against
In the meantime, the other battalions the left flank of the U.S. 90th Division,
of both the 5th and 90th Divisions had hoping thereby at least to hold open an
been occupying the high ground between escape route eastward to the Rhine.31
and behind the villages. By nightfall General Hoehne’s preoccupation with
some units had pushed more than two the American left flank became manifest
miles beyond the river; casualties in the on 15 March in the pattern of American
two divisions together totaled less than advance. On the left, in the relatively
a hundred. At first concealed by fog, then narrow triangle of land between the
by smoke, and hampered only by a swift Moselle and the Rhine, the 90th Divi-
current and sporadic, ineffective German sion’s 357th Infantry absorbed two sharp
shelling, engineers soon after nightfall counterattacks, one supported by two
opened treadway bridges to serve both tanks, another launched by newly arrived
divisions. troops of the 6th SS Mountain Divi-
T h e comparative ease of the crossing sion. At the forest-cloaked village of Pfaf-
early prompted the 5th Division com- fenheck, midway between the Moselle
mander, General Irwin, to alert a regi- and the Rhine, a hundred SS troopers
ment for a fast motorized advance the
next morning, 15 March, aimed at the 30 The 5th Division telephone journals are a
valuable source for this period.
corps objective along the Nahe River. 31MS # B–377 (Hoehne). See also MSS # B–123
T h e corps commander, General Eddy, (Gersdorff; # B–831 (Felber).
248 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
supported by a lone tank fought furi- yond the Moselle, more than half the
ously and successfully against the 357th distance to the Nahe River. T h e tankers
Infantry’s 2d Battalion to hold a road stopped for the night in Simmern, only
leading to the Rhine. Although a pla- a few miles from the Soonwald, the last
toon of Company E forced its way into big terrain obstacle short of the Nahe.
the village in early morning, the Ger- Convinced beyond doubt that CCB’s
mans cut off and captured the riflemen deep thrust presaged a quick end to
before reinforcements could arrive. organized resistance, General Eddy at-
Attacking down parallel roads to the tached motorized regimental combat
southeast, the 90th Division’s other two teams from the 90th and 5th Divisions
regiments expanded the bridgehead line to CCA and CCB, respectively. In order
six miles beyond the Moselle before the to broaden the front and prevent other
4th Armored Division’s Combat Com- German units from turning against the
mand A passed through in the afternoon. penetration, he ordered the 89th Divi-
T h e armor almost immediately ran into sion (Maj. Gen. Thomas D. Finley) , ex-
stubborn resistance built around four periencing its first combat, to cross the
antitank guns and extended the line only Moselle beside the 5th Division early
a little more than an additional mile the next morning, 15 March. Shifted by
before coiling for the night. General Patton from the VIII Corps, the
On the right wing of the XII Corps, 11th Armored Division was to follow
where the enemy corps commander soon on the 17th.34
lost all communications with his 159th With General Hoehne’s LXXXIX
Division and presumed the unit doomed, Corps split by Combat Command B’s
similar resistance failed to develop.32 thrust, the Seventh Army commander,
T h e advance was spectacular. Passing General Felber, made the usual cry for
through troops of the 5th Division at help to his Army Group G superior,
noon, the 4th Armored’s Combat Com- General Hausser. Noting that the first
mand B quickly picked up momentum. contingents (two infantry battalions) of
Roadblocks at the entrance of each town, the 559th Volks Grenadier Division had
usually defended by no more than a arrived in the army’s sector during the
cluster of riflemen and machine gunners, afternoon, Hausser promised to do what
were about all that stood in the way. he could to speed the rest of the divi-
White sheets fluttered from upper-story sion. He also ordered the First Army to
windows, a now familiar sign that Ger- release another volks grenadier division,
man civilians had divined the approach- but in view of the canopy of Amer-
ing end. Enjoying a bright, sunlit day, ican fighter planes that spanned the
fighter-bombers of the XIX Tactical Air Saar-Palatinate during daylight, neither
Command worked in close co-ordination division probably would be able to ar-
with the armor and before night fell had rive in time to help.
flown 643 sorties to claim a new record For his own part, General Felber or-
for five groups in one day.33In just over dered General Hoehne to conduct a
five hours, CCB moved sixteen miles be- fighting withdrawal using those forces of
32 MS # B–377 (Hoehne).
33XII Corps Opnl Dir 88, 16 Mar 45. 34Ibid.
T H E SAAR-PALATINATE 249
theLXXXIX Corps that were east of the Army commander in late morning of the
American penetration, If compelled, 16th. Patton asked General Eisenhower
Hoehne was to fall back across the Rhine. for another armored division, the 12th,
What was left of the 159th Division was then in Seventh Army reserve, and Eisen-
to be attached to the XIII Corps (Gen- hower agreed. Like General Eddy’s XII
eral von Oriola) and was to assume a Corps, Walker’s XX Corps was to have
bridgehead defense north of the Nahe six divisions.36
River. T h e bridgehead was to be used as In the XII Corps, meanwhile, the ex-
a reception station for the XIII Corps ploitation involved no delay. Renewing
once approval for the corps to withdraw the drive from Simmern, the 4th Ar-
could be wrung from higher command.35 mored’s CCB took the obstacle of the
T h e German commanders had every Soonwald in stride and plunged almost
reason to ask for withdrawal; two corps unimpeded another fourteen miles. T h e
of the Seventh Army, the XIII and head of the column reached the Nahe
LXXX Corps, both still holding along River at noon near Bad Muenster, two
the Moselle, were in danger of encircle- miles upstream from the corps objective
ment. T h e 4th Armored Division break- of Bad Kreuznach, seized a railroad
through was but one aspect of that bridge intact, and quickly established a
danger. T h e German commanders also bridgehead.
had to cast wary glances over their left Fighter-bombers of the XIX Tactical
shoulders at the attack of the U.S. XX Air Command again were out in force,
Corps. bombing and strafing anything German
that moved on the roads. Ironically, it
Plunge to the Nahe and Fall of Koblenz was the fighter-bombers that saved the
German Seventh Army commander, Gen-
In General Walker’s XX Corps, com- eral Felber, and his chief of staff, Gen-
bat commands of the 10th Armored Di- eral von Gersdorff, from capture. In the
vision (General Morris) began passing process of moving their command post,
through infantry of the 80th and 94th the two officers had to take to the woods
Divisions before daylight on 16 March. to escape strafing American planes. Min-
Although the Germans of General utes later tanks of the 4th Armored Divi-
Hahm’sLXXXII Corps during the night sion passed nearby, unaware of the prey
had formed a new crust of resistance the planes had forced into hiding. For
sufficient to deny genuine armored ex- an hour Felber and Gersdorff had to
ploitation for another twenty-four hours, hide in the woods before they were able
no doubt remained among either Ameri- to escape over a back road.
can or German commanders as the day It was but a short-lived respite for the
ended that a deep armored thrust was in two German officers. Even as they re-
the offing. joined the rest of the Seventh Army staff
When it came, the exploitation would in Gensingen, midway between Bad
possess added power as a result of a visit Kreuznach and the Rhine, the 4th Ar-
the Supreme Commander paid the Third mored’s other attacking combat com-
35 MSS # B–831 (Felber); # B–123 (Gersdorff). 36 Patton, War As I Knew It, pp. 259–62.
250 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
mand was fast bearing down on them. March about five miles upstream from
Having run into stanch resistance near Koblenz. Through a narrow clearing in
the north edge of the Soonwald from the the high woodlands that feature most of
6th SS Mountain Division's reconnais- the narrow triangle between the Moselle
sance battalion, Combat Command A and the Rhine, the regiment was to drive
again had found the going slower than southeast about seven miles to the Rhine,
had CCB; but once air and artillery sup- thus cutting off the defenders of Koblenz
port had helped overcome the opposi- from any possible aid from the south. A
tion, CCA too began to roll. T h e head second regiment, crossing the Moselle
of CCA's column reached the Nahe op- opposite Koblenz itself, was to reduce
posite Gensingen before dark. Although the city.
all bridges over the river had been de- Aware from intelligence reports that
molished, fire from the tankers’ guns the enemy's LXXXIX Corps had few
forced the Seventh Army staff again to troops for defending the little triangle
flee.37 other than weak contingents of the 276th
At the Moselle River, German miseries Yolks Grenadier Division and local Ko-
were compounded on 16 March in two blenz defense forces, General Culin an-
places. Upstream from Cochem and the ticipitated no major fight. T h e utter ease
5th Division crossing sites, General Fin- of the 347th Infantry's crossing nonethe-
ley's 89th Division before daylight sent less came as a surprise. Not a shot, not a
two regiments across the river in assault round of shellfire, indeed, not a sign of
boats against a modicum of resistance. the enemy met the two assault battalions.
As with the earlier crossings, fighting Dawn was fast approaching when the first
was restricted almost entirely to the river- opposition developed, a scattering of
side villages, and there the weak task small arms fire in a village several hun-
forces of General von Oriola's XIII dred yards from the river.
Corps could hope to hold only briefly. T h e first really troublesome resistance
By the end of the day, the inexperienced came in the afternoon at Waldesch, mid-
89th Division held a substantial bridge- way between the Moselle and the Rhine.
head and was ready to receive the tanks There recently arrived contingents of
of the 11th Armored Division. the 6th SS Mountain Division effectively
German troubles also increased down- blocked a little corridor of cleared land
stream near the confluence of the Moselle leading to the Rhine.
with the Rhine. There General Middle- Noting the ease of the 347th Infantry’s
ton, his VIII Corps reduced to but one crossing, General Culin saw no need to
division and cavalry group, sent his lone repeat the process opposite Koblenz. In-
division, the 87th, across the Moselle to stead, he ordered a second regiment to
capture the city of Koblenz. 38 cross in the 347th’s sector, then swing
T h e 87th Division commander, Gen- northeast against the city. By the end of
eral Culin, planned to do the job with the day, 16 March, two battalions were
two regiments. T h e 347th Infantry was in the southern fringes of the city and
to cross the river before daylight on 16 had cleared a new Moselle crossing site
37 MSS # B–831 (Felber); # B–123 (Gersdorff). for the rest of the regiment.
38VIII Corps FO 15, 14 Mar 45. To the German Seventh Army com-
T H E SAAR-PALATINATE 251
ENGINEERS
OF THE 87THDIVISION
ferry a tank across the Moselle.
mander, General Felber, advent of the Aided by deadly airbursts from high-
new American force removed any ration- velocity antiaircraft guns firing from be-
alization that might have existed for the yond the Rhine, the 1,800-man Kampf-
LXXXIX Corps to attempt to hold gruppe Koblenz put u p a stout defense
longer west of the Rhine. At noon on the the next day, 17 March, even though
16th he told the corps commander, Gen- the outcome of the fight was inevitable.
eral Hoehne, to begin his withdrawal, T h e last resistance was destined to fade
though in Koblenz itself Kampfgruppe early on 19 March with no more than
Koblenz was to fight to the last. As night half a hundred survivors escaping across
came, a heavy fog favored the evacua- the Rhine.40
tion. Some 1,700 men, all that remained
of Hoehne’sLXXXIX Corps, made it to
the east bank.39
Volks Grenadier Division (Col. Werner Wagner,
39MSS # B–377 (Hoehne); # B–123 (Gersdorff); Actg Comdr.)
# B–831 (Felber). See also MS # B–124, 276th 40MS # B–377 (Hoehne).
252 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
Rhine was the XC Corps (General der stanch opposition there. T h e other was
Infanterie Erich Petersen) with two on the extreme right wing where an at-
volks grenadier divisions and remnants tached 3d Algerian Infantry Division (3e
of an infantry training division. Division d’Infanterie d’Algerie) was to
Although the Germans worried most clear the expanse of flatland between
about a breakthrough in the sector of Hagenau and the Rhine. There an urban
Petersen’s XC Corps into the Wissem- area closely backing the Moder River de-
bourg Gap rather than through Simon’s fensive line and flat ground affording
XIII SS Corps into the Kaiserslautern superb fields of fire for dug-in automatic
corridor, the shifts and countershifts weapons accounted in large measure for
made in preceding weeks to salvage re- the more difficult fighting.42
inforcements for the Seventh Army ac- Elsewhere local engagements some-
tually had left the XIII SS Corps the times were vicious and costly but usually
stronger. In addition to two volks grena- were short-lived. Antipersonnel and anti-
dier divisions, Simon’s corps had the 17th tank mines abounded. German artillery
SS Panzer Grenadier Division, at this fire seldom was more than moderate and
point not much more than a proud name, in most cases could better be classified
but a unit possessing considerably more as light or sporadic. That was attribut-
tanks and other armored vehicles than able in part to a campaign of interdiction
were to be found in the entire adjacent for several days preceding the attack b y
corps. T h e American main effort thus planes of the XII Tactical Air Command
aimed at the stronger German units, (Brig. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus) and by
though at this stage of the war strength D-day strikes by both the fighter-bombers
in regard to German divisions was but a and the mediums and heavies of the
relative term.41 Eighth Air Force. T h e latter hit West
As General Patch’s Seventh Army at- Wall fortifications and industrial targets
tacked before daylight on 15 March, the in cities such as Zweibruecken and Kai-
apparent answer on German intentions serslautern. T h e weather was beautifully
was quick to come. Only in two places clear, enabling the aircraft to strike at a
could the resistance be called deter- variety of targets, limited only by range
mined. One was on the left wing, where and bomb-carrying capacity. Among the
the 63d Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. German casualties were the operations
Louis E. Hibbs) sought to bypass Saar- officers of two of the three XC Corps
bruecken on the east and cut German divisions.43
escape routes from the city. T h e fact that Of the units of the outsized (six di-
the 63d Division early hit the West Wall visions) XV Corps, only a regiment of
provided ready explanation for the the 45th Division (Maj. Gen. Robert T.
Frederick) faced a water obstacle at the
41For the German story, see MSS # B–071, XC start. That regiment had to cross the
Infantry Corps December 1944–23 March 1945
(General der Infanterie Erich Petersen); # B–711,
Blies River at a site upstream from where
Engagements of the XIII SS AK West of the Rhine
(Waffen-SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Ekkehard Al- 42 Unless otherwise noted, the account of Seventh
bert, CofS, XIII SS Corps); # B–121 (Kniess); # Army action is based on official records of Seventh
B–238 (Wolf Hauser); and # B–600 (Paul Haus- Army and subordinate units.
ser). 43MS # B–071 (Petersen).
254T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
the Blies turns northeast to meander u p force them from the village. Supported
the Kaiserslautern corridor. Yet even by a platoon of tank destroyers and the
before dawn men of the regiment had regimental antitank company organized
penetrated the enemy’s main line of de- as a bazooka brigade, another of the 7th
fense beyond the river. Aided by search- Infantry’s battalions counterattacked.
lights, they bypassed strongpoints, leav- The men knocked out four multiple-
ing them for reserves to take out later. barrel 20-mm. flakwagons and seven as-
As night came the 45th Division had sault guns and freed the besieged
driven almost three miles beyond the battalion.
Blies to match a rate of advance that was On the Seventh Army’s right wing,
general everywhere except in the pillbox pointed toward the Wissembourg Gap,
belt near Saarbruecken and on the flat- divisions of General Brooks’s VI Corps
lands near the Rhine. experienced, with the exception of the
On the right wing of the XV Corps, 3d Algerian Division, much the same
men of the 100th Infantry Division (Maj. type of opposition. Although all four
Gen. Withers A. Burress) drove quickly attacking divisions had to overcome the
to the outskirts of the fortress town of initial obstacle of a river, either the
Bitche. Perhaps aided by the fact that Moder or a tributary, they accomplished
they had done the same job before in the job quickly with predawn assaults.
December, they gained dominating posi- The Germans were too thinly stretched
tions on the fortified hills around the to do more than man a series of strong-
town, leaving no doubt that they would points. On the corps left wing, the 42d
clear the entire objective in short order Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Harry J.
the next day, 16 March. Collins) overcame the added obstacle of
The only counterattack to cause a p attacking along the spine of the Lower
preciable concern hit a battalion of the Vosges by avoiding the roads and villages
3d Division’s 7th Infantry. Veterans of in the valleys and following the crests of
combat from the North African cam- the high ground. Pack mules, already
paign onward, the regiments of the 3d proved in earlier fighting in the High
Division (Maj. Gen. John W. O’Daniel) Vosges, provided the means of supply.
were making the main effort in the cen- As with the 3d Division, a battalion
ter of the XV Corps in the direction of of the 103d Infantry Division (Maj. Gen.
Zweibruecken and the Kaiserslautern Anthony C. McAuliffe) ran into a
corridor. Although a company of sup- counterattack, but the reaction it
porting tanks ran into a dense minefield, prompted was more precautionary than
disabling four tanks and stopping the forced. Having entered Uttenhofen,
others, a battalion of the 7th Infantry northwest of Hagenau, the battalion en-
fought its way into the village of countered such intense small arms fire
Uttweiler, just across the German fron- and shelling from self-propelled guns
tier. Then an infantry battalion from the that the regimental commander author-
17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, s u p ized withdrawal. When German infantry
ported by nine assault guns, struck back. soon after nightfall counterattacked with
T h e Germans quickly isolated the support from four self-propelled pieces,
American infantrymen but could not the battalion pulled back another few
THE SAAR-PALATINATE 255
TROOPS
OF THE 63D DIVISION
cross dragon’s teeth of the West Wall.
hundred yards to better positions on the He brought the enemy under such ac-
edge of a copse. curate rifle fire that others of his platoon
In the sector of the 36th Infantry Di- were able to bypass the minefield and
vision (Maj. Gen. John E. Dahlquist), take the Germans in flank.44
the day’s fighting produced a heroic per- The 3d Algerian Division meanwhile
formance by a rifleman of the 142d got across the Moder with little enough
Infantry, Pfc. Silvestre S. Herrera. After trouble but then encountered intense
making a one-man charge that carried a house-to-house fighting. Despite good ar-
German strongpoint and bagged eight tillery support made possible by the un-
prisoners, Herrera and his platoon were limited visibility of a clear day, grazing
pinned down by fire from a second posi- fire from automatic weapons prevented
tion protected by a minefield. Disregard- the Algerians from crossing a stretch of
ing the mines, Herrera also charged this open ground facing the buildings of a
position but stepped on a mine and lost 44Private Herrera was awarded the Medal of
both feet. Even that failed to check him. Honor.
256 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
stroy the German forces. “We are all,” generated by the heat began to show u p
he added, “in the same army.” 50 on headquarters situation maps, but by
As worked out in detail by Patch and 19 March a graphic representation of the
Patton, the two armies split the area be- Third Army’s gains looked, in the words
tween the Nahe River and the Rhine of Patton’s colleague, General Hodges of
almost equally, with a new boundary the First Army, “like an intestinal
running just north of Kaiserslautern and tract.” 53 With the added weight of the
reaching the Rhine south of Worms. Pat- 12th Armored Division (Maj. Gen. Rod-
ton nevertheless intended to take Kaiser- erick R. Allen), General Walker’s XX
slautern himself and then turn one Corps made the more spectacular gains.
infantry and one armored division south- By midnight of the 19th, the 12th
east, deeper into Patch’s zone, to link Armored was across the upper reaches
with the Seventh Army’s VI Corps along of the Nahe and had gone on to jump a
the Rhine. Thereby he hoped to trap little tributary of the Nahe, more than
any Germans who might remain in front twenty-three miles from the armor’s line
of the Seventh Army in the West Wall. of departure of the day before. T h e 10th
That accomplished, Patton “would clear Armored Division stood no more than
out of [Patch’s] area.” 51T h e plan pre- six miles from Kaiserslautern. Two of
sumed, of course, that the Seventh Army the infantry divisions of the XX Corps,
at that point would still be involved in their regiments motorized on organic
the West Wall, but in any event, Patch transport supplemented by trucks from
apparently accepted the agreement with supporting units, mopped u p behind the
the same good grace earlier accorded the armor, while the 26th Division com-
Supreme Commander’s proposal. pleted its onerous task of rolling u p West
To General Patton’s subordinates, the Wall fortifications, then turned eastward
authority gained at Lunéville meant in a drive that converged with a north-
pressure and more pressure. Why, Patton eastward thrust from Saarlautern by the
railed to his X I I Corps commander, Gen- 65th Division.54
eral Eddy, had the 11th Armored Di- In the XII Corps, the 4th Armored
vision failed to push through the 89th Division on 18 and 1 9 March failed to
Division’s Moselle bridgehead on the regain its earlier momentum, partly be-
17th? Nor was there any excuse for the cause the division had to divert forces to
4th Armored Division to pause for any clear Bad Kreuznach and partly because
time at all at the Nahe River. “The heat the Germans with their backs not far
is on,” General Eddy told his own sub- from the Rhine stiffened. In the two
ordinates, “like I never saw before.” 52
It took another day before the effects 53Sylvan Diary, entry of 9 Mar. 45.
54During the 65th Division’s attack on 18 March,
50 Seventh Army Report, p. 720. See also General an aidman in the 259th Infantry, Pfc. Frederick C.
Devers’s personal diary, lent to OCMH (hereafter Murphy, continued to minister to his comarades
cited as Devers Diary); Patton, War As I Knew It, although wounded in one shoulder. Even after
pp. 262 and 265. setting off a mine that severed one of his feet, he
51 Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 265. crawled about to help other wounded around him
52 Msg, XIII Corps to 5th Div, and Telecon, CG until at last he set off a second mine that killed
XII Corps to CG 5th Div, both in 5th Div G–3 him. He was awarded the Medal of Honor post-
Jnl, 17 Mar 45; Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 264. humously.
T H E SAAR-PALATINATE 259
days, the 4th Armored advanced just over as American planes wreaked havoc from
ten miles beyond the Nahe. the air, hardly any semblance of organi-
It remained for the newly committed zation remained in German ranks. It was
11th Armored Division on the XII Corps less withdrawal than it was sauve qui
right wing to register the more spectacu- peut. Camouflage, antiaircraft security,
lar gains. Following its disappointing dispersal—those were fancy terms from
showing in the Eifel, the 11th Armored some other war, without meaning in this
had a new commander, Brig. Gen. maelstrom of flight. Highways were lit-
Holmes E. Dager. Under Dager’s com- tered with wrecked and burning vehicles
mand, the division on 18 March raced and the corpses of men and animals.
twenty miles to the Nahe River at Kirn. Roadblocks at defiles and on the edges
T h e next day the armor streaked another of towns and villages might halt the in-
nineteen miles to the southeast, reaching exorable onflow of tanks and half-tracks
a point as far east as Kaiserslautern.55 temporarily, but the pauses were brief
When combined with the drive of the and in the long run meaningless. Impro-
12th Armored Division on the north vised white flags flying from almost every
wing of the XX Corps, the 11th house and building along the way added
Armored’s rapid thrusts tied a noose a final note of dejection to the scene.
around what remained of the enemy’s Yet German commanders, still denied
XIII and LXXX Corps. As the efforts of the authority they begged to withdraw
those two corps to withdraw across the behind the Rhine, continued to build up
Nahe and form a new defensive line went new lines and to shift units here and
for naught, the infantry divisions follow- there—mainly on paper. As night came
ing the American armor mopped u p the on the 19th, the Seventh Army’s General
remnants of the 2d Panzer Division and Felber might point to a new line running
three volks grenadier divisions. Little southwest from Mainz in front of the
more than the headquarters of the two cities of Alzey and Kaiserslautern, but
corps escaped. Felber himself would have been among
From all indications, the Germans in the first to admit that it was less a line
the Seventh Army and on the right wing than a proliferation of improvisations.56
of the First Army (Hahm’s LXXXII T o the most optimistic German, the
Corps) were destined for annihilation. end was near. Events on 20 March un-
As American armored spearheads ap- derscored the fact. In late afternoon con-
peared without warning, seemingly over tingents of the 90th Division, on the left
every hill and around every curve, and wing of the XII Corps, arrived on high
ground overlooking Mainz and the
55 When a rocket from a Panzerfaust hit a tank Rhine. A short while later troops of the
of the 41st Tank Battalion, wounding the platoon 4th Armored Division fought their way
sergeant and prompting others of the crew to into Worms and began to clear a path
abandon the vehicle, the bow gunner, Pfc. Herbert
H. Burr, stayed inside and drove the tank into the through the city to the Rhine. Both the
town of Doermoschel. Rounding a turn, he en- 10th and 12th Armored Divisions of the
countered an enemy 88. Alone, unable to fire while XX Corps still had to emerge from the
driving, Burr headed directly toward the muzzle of
the 88, forcing the crew to flee and overrunning 56See MS # B–082 (Beyer) and other manu-
the piece. He was awarded the Medal of Honor. scripts previously cited for this chapter.
260 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
wooded hills of the Pfaelzer Bergland ring on 17 March to pull back units
onto the Rhine plain, but they would be threatened with encirclement, the First
on the plain by nightfall of the 20th. Army’s General Foertsch authorized
Tacit admission from the Germans withdrawal by stages of his westernmost
that the campaign for the Saar-Palatinate troops, those of General Kniess’s
was almost over came late in the day LXXXV Corps. Over a period of three
with long-delayed approval for the Sev- days, units of the corps were to peel back
enth Army withdrawal. That night on from west to east, redeploying to block
ferries, rafts, small boats, almost anything the main highway leading northeast
that floated, General Felber, his head- through the Kaiserslautern Gap.
quarters, and headquarters of Oriola’s Unfortunately for Foertsch’s plan, the
XIII Corps began to make their way principal threat to the Kaiserslautern
across the Rhine. General Beyer’sLXXX Gap came not from west or southwest
Corps stayed behind, taking over all com- but from northwest where Walker’s XX
bat troops and being transferred to the Corps was pouring unchecked through
First Army in an effort to forestall fur- General Hahm’s LXXXII Corps. T h e
ther American advances directly into the 10th Armored Division’s arrival at
rear of the First Army. 57 Kaiserslautern itself on 20 March meant
not only that the gap was compromised
Thrust to the Rhine by a force well in the rear of Kniess’s
formations but also that the only way out
As the breakthrough of General for both Kniess’s troops and those of the
Walker’s XX Corps developed in the di- adjacent XIII SS Corps was through the
rection of Kaiserslautern, concern had Pfaelzer Forest.
mounted in the First Army lest those As Kniess’s withdrawal progressed, it
units in the West Wall around Saar- had the effect of opening a path through
bruecken and Zweibruecken be trapped. the West Wall for the left wing of the
Once Kaiserslautern fell, the only routes American Seventh Army. Despite a
of withdrawal left to those troops led stubborn rear guard, the 63d Division
through the Haardt Mountains south of of General Milburn’s XXI Corps broke
Kaiserslautern. Covered by a dense wood, through the main belt of fortifications
the Pfaelzer Forest, the region was near St. Ingbert late on 19 March. Had
crossed laterally by only one main high- events moved according to plan, Milburn
way, by a secondary highway close be- then would have sent an armored column
hind the West Wall, and by a few minor northward to link with Walker’s X X
roads and trails. T h e natural difficulties Corps near St. Wendel; but so swift had
posed by these twisting, poorly surfaced been the advance of Walker’s troops that
routes already had been heightened by a all worthwhile objectives in Milburn’s
mass of wrecked vehicles as American sector beyond the West Wall already had
fighter pilots relentlessly preyed on hap- fallen. Milburn and his XXI Corps had
less targets. achieved a penetration but had no place
Using the authority granted by Kessel- to go.
57 MSS # B–831 (Felber); # B–123 (Gersdorff); T h e Seventh Army commander, Gen-
# B–600 (Paul Hausser). eral Patch, seized on the situation to pro-
T H E SAAR-PALATINATE 261
vide a boost for his army’s main effort, Division’s advance picked u p accord-
the attack of the XV Corps through ingly. 59
Zweibruecken toward the Kaiserslautern T h e German problem was to get the
Gap. In two days of hammering at Gen- survivors of both theLXXXV Corps and
eral Simon’sXIII SS Corps, the divisions the XIII SS Corps through the Pfaelzer
of the XV Corps still had opened no hole Forest despite three dire threats: one
through the West Wall for armored ex- from the closely following troops of the
ploitation.58 Send a combat command, American Seventh Army; another from
Patch directed the XV Corps com- the 10th Armored Division of Walker’s
mander, General Haislip, to move XX Corps, which at Kaiserslautern was
through the 63d Division’s gap and come in a position to swing south and south-
in on the rear of the West Wall defenders east through the Pfaelzer Forest and cut
facing the XV Corps. the escape routes; and a third from the
That the Americans would exploit the Argus-eyed fighter bombers of the XII
withdrawal was too obvious to escape Tactical Air Command.
the First Army commander, General It was the last that was most apparent
Foertsch. During the night of the 19th, to the rank and file of the retreating
he extended the authority to withdraw Germans. Since speed was imperative, the
to the west wing of the XIII SS Corps. men had to move by day as well as by
Thus, hardly had the American combat night, virtually inviting attack from the
command begun to move early on 20 air. Since almost everybody, including
March to exploit the 63d Division’s pen- the troops of the motorized 17th SS Pan-
etration when the 45th Division of the zer Grenadier Division, had to use either
XV Corps also advanced past the last the main east-west highway through the
pillboxes of the West Wall near Zwei- forest or the secondary road close behind
bruecken. During the night of the 20th, the West Wall, American fighter pilots
the rest of the SS corps also began to pull had only to aim their bombs, their can-
back, and the momentum of the 3d non, and their machine guns in the gen-
eral direction of those roads to be assured
of hitting some target. An acute gasoline
58For no lack of effort, as exemplified by heroic
actions of two members of the 45th Division. On shortage added to the German difficul-
18 March when eight men of the 180th Infantry ties. Almost every foot of the two roads
were wounded while attacking a troublesome pill- soon became clogged with abandoned,
box, the company commander, Capt. Jack L.
Treadwell, went forward alone. Armed with a
damaged, or wrecked vehicles, guns, and
submachine gun and hand grenades, he charged equipment.60
the pillbox, captured 4 Germans in it, and went T h e destruction in the Pfaelzer Forest
on to reduce singlehandedly five other pillboxes
and to capture 14 more prisoners. In three days,
was in keeping with the pattern almost
culminating on the 18th, Cpl. Edward G. Wilkin, everywhere. So long a target of both ar-
157th Infantry, did much the same for his com- tillery and aircraft, the drab towns and
pany. He too reduced six pillboxes singlehandedly,
killed at least 9 Germans, wounded 13, and took
cities in and close to the West Wall were
13 prisoner. Captain Treadwell received the Medal
of Honor. Corporal Wilkin was awarded the Medal 59For the German story, see MS # B–238 (Wolf
of Honor posthumously; he was killed in a subse- Hauser).
quent action before his special act of valor could 60MSS # B–507 (Petersen); # B–238 (Wolf
be officially recognized. Hauser).
262 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
a shambles. “It is difficult to describe from the provisional head of the French
the destruction,’’ wrote the 45th Di- state, General Charles de Gaulle, de
vision commander, General Frederick. Lattre was determined to acquire a zone
“Scarcely a man-made thing exists in our along the Rhine north of the Lauter in
wake; it is even difficult to find buildings order to assure a Rhine crossing site for
suitable for CP’s: this is the scorched the final drive into Germany.62
earth.” 61In Zweibruecken, with the en- As the Algerians matched and some-
tire business district razed, only about times exceeded the strides of the Ameri-
5,000 people of a normal population of can units of the VI Corps and reached
37,000 remained, and they were hiding the Lauter along a ten-mile front, de
in cellars and caves. Fires burned un- Lattre had no difficulty pressing his ambi-
controlled, neither water nor fire-fighting tion on the 6th Army Group commander,
equipment available to quench them. No General Devers. Using the 3d Algerian
local government existed. Thousands of Division and a combat group from the
released slave laborers and German sol- 5th French Armored Division, again to
diers who had changed into civilian be attached to the VI Corps, the French
clothes complicated the issue for military were to continue northward some twelve
government officials. In more than one miles beyond the Lauter River, thereby
city, particularly Homburg, looting and gaining limited Rhine River frontage
pillage were rampant. inside Germany.63
Running the gantlet of American T h e adjustment meant that the West
fighter aircraft through the Pfaelzer Wall assault by the four American di-
Forest, the amorphous mass of retreating visions of the VI Corps was to be con-
Germans faced still a fourth American centrated in a zone less than twenty miles
threat-General Brooks’s VI Corps, wide. Since the German XC Corps had
which had followed closely the German only: the remnants of two volks grenadier
withdrawal from northeastern Alsace and divisions and an infantry training di-
on 19 March had begun to assault the vision to defend against both Americans
West Wall on either side of Wissem- and French, a breakthrough of the forti-
bourg. There General Petersen’s XC fications was but a matter of time. Yet
Corps was charged with holding the for- just as had been the case in the zones of
tifications and denying access to the flat- the XXI Corps and the XV Corps, it was
lands along the Rhine. less the hard fighting of the VI Corps
In the Seventh Army’s original plan, that would determine when the West
the attached 3d Algerian Division on the Wall would be pierced than it was the
right wing of the VI Corps along the
Rhine was to have been pinched out 62De Lattre discussed the matter with de Caulle
after it reached the Lauter River at the in Paris shortly before the Seventh Army’s offen-
German frontier. T h e planners had not sive began. See Marshal Jean de Lattre de Tassigny,
Histoire de la Première Armée Française (Paris:
reckoned with the aspirations of the Librarie Plon, 1949). pp. 407–14.
French and their First Army commander, 63Ibid.; Devers Diary, entry of 18 Mar 45; Ltr,
General de Lattre. Assured of support CG 6th AGp to CG’s SUSA and First French Army,
sub: Creation of Groupement Monsabert and Mod-
ification of Letter of Instructions Number 11,
61 Seventh Army Report, p. 738. SUSA Oral Instructions file, 19 Mar 45.
T H E SAAR-PALATINATE 263
rampaging thrusts of the Third Army’s and when the 42d Division, in the moun-
XX Corps in the German rear. tains on the left wing of the VI Corps,
T h e divisions of the VI Corps had launched a full-scale assault against the
been probing the pillbox belt less than West Wall late the next day, the attack
twenty-four hours when General Walker, struck a vacuum. Soon after dawn the
leaving the task of gaining the Rhine to next morning, 22 March, a regiment of
the 12th Armored Division and of ac- the 42d cut the secondary highway
tually capturing Kaiserslautern to an through the Pfaelzer Forest. A column of
infantry unit, turned the 10th Armored the 10th Armored had moved astride the
Division south and southeast into the main highway through the woods and
Pfaelzer Forest. By nightfall of 20 March, emerged on the Rhine flatlands at Lan-
two of the 10th Armored’s columns stood dau. Any Germans who got out of the
only a few hundred yards from the main forest would have to do so by threading
highway through the forest, one almost at a way off the roads individually or in
the city of Pirmasens on the western small groups.
edge, the other not far from the eastern By nightfall of 22 March the Germans
edge. A third was nearing Neustadt, far- west of the Rhine could measure the
ther north beyond the fringe of the time left to them in hours. In the West
forest. The 12th Armored meanwhile Wall on either side of Wissembourg,
was approaching the Rhine near Lud- Germans of Petersen’s XC Corps con-
wigshafen. Not only were the withdrawal tinued to fight in the pillboxes in a man-
routes through the Pfaelzer Forest about ner that belied the futility of their
to be compromised but a swift strike mission. A breakthrough by the 14th
down the Rhine plain from Neustadt Armored Division (Maj. Gen. AlbertC.
and Ludwigshafen against the last escape Smith) would nevertheless come soon.
sites for crossing the Rhine appeared in Both at Neustadt and at Landau, rem-
the offing. nants of two divisions of the XIII SS
In desperation the Luftwaffe during Corps, including the 17th Panzer Grena-
20 March sent approximately 300 planes dier Division, had held through the day,
of various types, including jet-propelled but early in the evening the defense
Messerschmitt 262’s, to attack the Third collapsed. General Beyer’s LXXX Corps,
Army’s columns, but to little avail. Casu- transferred from the Seventh Army to
alties on the American side were minor. plug the hole from the north alongside
Antiaircraft units, getting a rare oppor- the Rhine, had hardly anything left to
tunity to do the job for which they were prevent the 12th Armored Division from
trained, shot down twenty-five German driving southward from Ludwigshafen
planes. Pilots of the XIX Tactical Air toward Speyer. By nightfall of the 22d, a
Command claimed another eight.64 column of the 12th Armored stood only
In the face of the 10th Armored Di- six miles from Speyer.
vision’s drive, the word to the western- To forestall a second Remagen, the
most units of the XC Corps to begin Germans by 19 March had blown all
falling back went out late on the 20th, Rhine bridges from Ludwigshafen north-
ward. Of three that remained upstream,
64Figures are from TUSA AAR. the southernmost, at Maximiliansau, was
264 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
u p to the Rhine, General Eddy had in- gave the Germans additional time to
tended to put the 5th Division in corps recover from the debacle in the Saar-
reserve. With that in mind, the division Palatinate and prepare a Rhine defense.
commander, General Irwin, called a con- Furthermore, Field Marshal Mont-
ference of his unit commanders, but be- gomery’s Rhine crossing was scheduled
fore the meeting could begin early on 21 to begin during the night of 23 March.
March, Irwin himself received a sum- If Patton was to beat Montgomery across,
mons to appear at corps headquarters. he had to move by the night of the 22d.
When he returned, his manner and When General Eddy in midmorning
opening remarks alerted his commanders of 22 March told General Irwin that Pat-
to startling news. Conqueror of twenty- ton insisted on a crossing that night,
two rivers in France, Belgium, and Ger- Irwin protested that it would be impossi-
many, the 5th Division was to challenge ble to make a “well-planned and ordered
the mightiest of them all—the Rhine.5 crossing” by that time. On the other
While the 90th Division made a feint hand, Irwin added, he would be able “to
behind a smoke screen at Mainz, General get some sort of bridgehead.” 6Some sort
Irwin explained, the 5th Division was to of bridgehead was all General Patton was.
launch a surprise night crossing at Op- after.
penheim. Perhaps the most startling During late morning of the 22d the
news of all was the timing. Although commander of the 5th Division’s 11th
Irwin personally believed Patton would Infantry, Col. Paul J. Black, was at his
not order the crossing before the 23d, 3d Battalion’s command post in the town
the division was to be prepared to go of Nierstein, a mile downstream from
within a few hours that same night, 21 Oppenheim, when word came from Gen-
March. eral Irwin. T h e 11th Infantry was to
T h e magnitude of the task of bringing cross the Rhine that night at 2200.
assault boats, bridging, and other engi- Allotted about 500 boats manned by
neer equipment from depots far in the the 204th Engineer Battalion, the 11th
rear was argument enough for delaying Infantry was to employ two battalions
the crossing at least until the 23d. Yet in the assault wave, the 3d crossing at
hardly had General Bradley on the 19th Nierstein, the 1st at Oppenheim. Al-
told Patton to cross when convoys started though an impressive artillery group-
forward with this equipment from stocks ment of thirteen battalions stood ready
carefully maintained in Lorraine since to fire on call, they were to eschew pre-
the preceding fall. Although another day paratory concentrations in quest of sur-
would pass before tactical advances in prise. Observation for the artillery was
the Saar-Palatinate opened direct routes excellent: hills on the west bank of the
for the convoys, the Third Army com- Rhine overlook an expanse of generally
mander would listen to no voices cau- flat ground stretching more than ten
tioning delay. Each day, even each hour, miles beyond the river. The ground is
crisscrossed by small canals and drainage
5 Irwin Diary, 20–21 Mar 45, as cited in Dyer,
XII Corps, p. 364; Conf Notes, 5th Div G–3 Jnl
file, 21 Mar 45; XII Corps AAR, Mar 45; XII Corps 6 Quotations are from Irwin Diary, as cited in
Opnl Dir 92, 21 Mar 45. Dyer, XII Corps, p. 364.
268 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
ditches. T h e width of the Rhine at this With each plane making two flights each
point ranges from 800 to 1,200 feet. half hour, a battalion could be airlifted
Once the 11th Infantry and its sister every two hours. Although the 5th Di-
regiments had secured a bridgehead, the vision commander, General Irwin, pro-
4th Armored Division was to exploit to tested, fearing heavy losses from
the northeast, bypassing Frankfurt-am- antiaircraft fire, General Patton went so
Main and gaining a bridgehead over the far as to order a practice flight. Appear-
Main River east of Frankfurt at Hanau. ance of German planes over the crossing
From that point the XII Corps was to sites eventually would prompt cancel-
drive northward toward a juncture with lation, but Patton remained convinced
the First Army in the Lahn River valley. the idea was “extremely good.” 9
T h e 6th Armored, 89th, and 90th Di- Troops of the 11th Infantry could dis-
visions also were available.7 cern few indications that the Germans
Despite the haste involved in the would seriously contest the assault. An
timing of the assault, a force of 7,500 occasional cluster of shells from artillery
engineers made elaborate preparations and mortars fell in the streets of Nier-
for supporting the infantry and bridging stein and Oppenheim, reminder enough
the Rhine. Early assault waves were to that an enemy with the power to kill
transport bulldozers and air compressors still peopled the far bank, but neither
so that work could begin immediately on American artillery observers nor aircraft
cutting ramps for dukws and preparing pilots could find lucrative targets.
bridge and ferry sites. Although first Only two days had passed since Field
waves were to paddle across in assault Marshal Kesselring had given his bless-
boats, reinforcements were t o cross in ing to withdrawal of the Seventh Army
dukws and—as at Remagen—LCVP’s behind the Rhine, and German com-
manned by Naval Unit 2 of the U.S. manders were as intent at the moment on
Navy. With the aid of searchlights re-establishing some semblance of organi-
mounted on tanks, bridge building was zation in their fleeing remnants as on
to begin soon after the first infantrymen actually manning a defensive line.
reached the far shore.8 Charged with holding more than fifty
As the troops prepared for the cross- miles of the Rhine from Wiesbaden, op-
ing, the Third Army commander enter- posite Mainz, to Mannheim, the Seventh
tained a suggestion from his chief of Army commander, General Felber, had
artillery, Brig. Gen. Edward T. Williams, only one regular corps headquarters, the
to speed build-up of reinforcements by XIII Corps (General von Oriola), and
a novel method. Williams urged as- headquarters of the local military dis-
sembling approximately a hundred artil- trict, Wehrkreis XII. Heretofore engaged
lery liaison planes to carry one soldier solely in recruiting, training, and rear
each to landing fields on the east bank. area defense, the Wehrkreis headquarters
7 TUSA Opnl Dir, 22 Mar 45; XX Corps FO 17, was summarily upgraded to become the
22 Mar 45. XII Corps, though Felber had no di-
8 Conf Notes, 5th Div G–3 Jnl file, 21 Mar 45; visions to go w i t ht h e advancement. In
P. H. Timothy, The Rhine Crossing, student
thesis prepared at the Engineer School, Fort Bel- 8 Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 267; XII Corps
voir, Va., 1946; AAR’s of engineer units. G–3 to 5th Div G–3, 5th Div G–3 Jnl, Mar 45.
T H E RHINE CROSSINGS IN T H E SOUTH 269
the entire Seventh Army he possessed ence at Remagen and all previous deal-
only four divisions still organized as ings with General Patton indicated
such. otherwise. An immediate attack held par-
Two of those divisions were little ticular concern for General Felber, since
more than remnants grouped around of three sites along the upper Rhine the
their surviving staffs. A third, the 559th Germans considered most suitable for
Volks Grenadier Division, still had about crossing attempts, one was in the Seventh
60 percent of its normal strength, since Army sector—at Oppenheim. Yet be-
some battalions had arrived too late for cause of the accidental site where fleeing
active commitment in the counterattack troops had reassembled after crossing the
role planned west of the Rhine. All three Rhine, the bulk of the Seventh Army’s
divisions were under the XIII Corps, the formations, the three so-called divisions
559th near Mannheim, the other two under the XIII Corps, were well south
extending the line to the north. T h e of Oppenheim.
fourth division, the 159th Volks Grena- Despite a promise from the army
dier, though severely depleted and dis- group commander to bring up more
organized, Felber had earmarked as an trainees, convalescents, stragglers, any-
army reserve. body to swell the ranks, Felber knew that
Thus the provisional XII Corps, the only hope of thwarting an immediate
charged with the Wiesbaden-Oppenheim crossing at Oppenheim lay with his own
sector, had no divisional unit, only rear reserve, the 159th Volks Grenadier Di-
echelon security detachments, hastily vision. A visit to that command revealed
equipped students and cadres from near- only two weak infantry regiments of two
by training schools, and convalescent battalions each and two light artillery
companies. Neither headquarters of the batteries, plus a few odds and ends.
XII Corps nor Felber himself knew To complicate matters further, Gen-
much about the numerical strength of eral Felber had lost all communication
these conglomerate forces, but their and contact with the First Army to the
fighting abilities clearly were limited. Al- south, some of whose units still were
though efforts were under way to rally fighting on the west bank. To the north
the residue of other divisions, including contact existed with the LXXXIX Corps,
the 2d Panzer, and organize them under which had withdrawn several days earlier
division staffs as small task forces, it behind the Rhine. On the theory that
would be some days before those efforts this corps, holding the sector opposite
produced results.10 Koblenz, would be drawn into the fight-
While Felber and other German com- ing against American units breaking out
manders might hope the Americans of the Remagen bridgehead, O B WEST
would pause for a systematic build-up had transferred it to Army Group B .
before jumping the Rhine, the experi- T h e chances of repelling a blow at
10For the German story, see MSS # B–831 (Fel-
Oppenheim, should it come right away,
ber); # A-893, The Final Phase of the War, (Gen- were pathetically meager.
eralmajor Freiherr von Gersdorff); and # B–392,
Historical Report on the Campaign “Central Ger-
many” From 22 Until 31 March 1945 (General-
T h e moon shone with disturbing
leutnant Graf Ralph von Oriola). brightness as men of the 11th Infantry’s
270 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
3d Battalion crept down to the Rhine have been expected—begin to fall. Some
at Nierstein a few minutes before 2200 fifty rounds, for example, including oc-
the night of 22 March. Half an hour be- casional shells from self-propelled guns,
hind schedule, the leading assault boats fell before daylight on Oppenheim.
carrying men of Company K pushed out Soon after dawn twelve German planes
into the stream. Not a sign of protest strafed and bombed the crossing sites, the
arose from the opposite shore. first of a series of aerial raids, usually
First to touch down on the east bank by only one or two planes, that were to
was an assault boat carrying a platoon persist throughout the day of 23 March.
leader, eight men, and Company K’s Damage was negligible. Two men in a
commander, 1st Lt. Irven Jacobs. T h e battalion command post in Oppenheim
rest of the company arrived safely mo- were wounded and an ammunition truck
ments later. Seven surprised Germans was set ablaze, but otherwise the only
promptly surrendered and obligingly casualty of the German strikes was Gen-
paddled themselves across the river with- eral Patton’s scheme to transport infantry
out escort. 11 reinforcements across the river in artil-
Leading the 1st Battalion’s assault a lery liaison planes. American pilots who
few hundred years upstream at Oppen- flew cover most of the day claimed nine-
heim, men of Companies A and B were teen German planes destroyed.
less fortunate. T h e assault boats were in Success of the assault crossing assured,
midstream when German machine gun- American commanders concentrated on
ners opened fire. T h e infantrymen and quick and heavy reinforcement and on
their engineer colleagues had no choice putting as much distance as possible
but to paddle straight into the teeth of between the forward troops and the river.
the fire. Most of them made it, but a A deep bridgehead was important be-
fierce skirmish went on for half an hour cause of a lack of dominating high
before the last German defender gave in. ground on which to anchor defense of
For all the noise and apparent ferocity the bridgehead and because of the ab-
of the defense, the German gunners im- sence of a reasonably good road network
posed few losses on the attackers. In the short of the town of Grossgerau, six and
assault crossing of the Rhine, the entire a half miles beyond the river.12
11th Infantry incurred only twenty By daylight (23 March) the second
casualties. of the 5th Division’s regiments was
By midnight all troops of the 11th across, and by early afternoon the third.
Infantry were across and ready to drive A fourth regiment attached from the
on the first tier of villages beyond the 90th Division then followed. During the
river, and men of a second regiment had morning attached tanks and tank de-
begun their trek to the assault boats. stroyers began to move across by ferry
Only at that point did the first hostile and LCVP. A class 40 treadway bridge
artillery fire—a smattering of what might opened in late afternoon. Engineers
speeded traffic to the crossing sites by
11 Unless otherwise noted, the tactical story is tearing down fences bordering the main
from official unit records, combat interviews, and
the unofficial 5th Division history. Although few, 12Combat interview with Lt Col Randolph C.
the combat interviews are particularly valuable. Dickens, 5th Div G–3.
T H E RHINE CROSSINGS IN THE SOUTH 271
REINFORCEMENTS
OF THE 5TH cross the Rhine in an LCVP.
DIVISION
highway and widening the road to ac- shot until it reached a small airstrip
commodate three lanes of one-way traffic. There almost a hundred Germans coun-
T h e leading infantry battalions fanned terattacked with fury, but when the
out from the crossing sites against vary- coming of daylight exposed their posi-
ing degrees of resistance. Advancing tions to American riflemen and machine
northeast along the main road toward gunners, they began surrendering en
Grossgerau, the 11th Infantry’s 1st Bat- masse.
talion was pinned down in flare-illumi- Seldom did the Germans employ weap-
nated open fields short of the first village ons heavier than rifles, machine guns,
until platoon leaders and squad sergeants machine pistols, and Panzerfausts, except
rallied the men and led them forward, for occasional mortars and one or two
employing intense marching fire. “Walk- self-propelled guns. With those they
ing death,” the men called it. At the staged demonstrations sometimes dis-
same time the 3d Battalion, attacking turbingly noisy but seldom inflicting
more directly north, raised scarcely a casualties. A battalion of the 10th In-
272 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
ready had moved into the bridgehead veal the event to the world. Thus the
and from sharpshooting riflemen and announcement came at a time calculated
machine gunners soon either dispersed to take some of the luster from news of
the enemy or induced surrender. Montgomery’s crossing.
T h e 159th Volks Grenadier Division Some officers of the Third Army’s staff
apparently never got into the fight in drew added delight from the fact that the
strength. A subsidiary thrust against a British Broadcasting Corporation the
village on the southeast edge of the next day played without change a pre-
bridgehead caused some concern when recorded speech by Prime Minister
it struck moments after a battalion of the Churchill, praising the British for the
90th Division had relieved a battalion of first assault crossing of the Rhine in mod-
the 10th Infantry, but nothing more de- ern history. That distinction everybody
veloped. A battalion of the 10th Infantry, knew by this time belonged not to the
moving up for a dawn attack, bumped 21 Army Group but to the Third
into a German column moving down a Army. 15
road and may have been responsible.
T h e Germans fled in disorder. T h e VIII Corps in the Rhine Gorge
Even before the defeat of the counter-
attacks put a final seal on success of the As if to furnish incontrovertible proof
Rhine crossing, the 12th Army Group for General Bradley’s boast that Ameri-
commander, General Bradley, released can troops could cross the Rhine at will,
news of the feat to the press and radio. the Third Army was readying two more
American forces, Bradley announced, assault crossings of the river even as
were capable of crossing the Rhine at Montgomery’s 21 Army Group jumped
practically any point without aerial the lower Rhine. Ordered on 21 March,
bombardment and without airborne shortly after Patton approved plans of
troops. I n fact, he went on, the Third the XII Corps for crossing at Oppen-
Army had crossed the night of 22 March heim, the new crossings actually reflected
without even so much as an artillery a concern for success of the Oppenheim
preparation. 14 maneuver and of the subsequent crossing
Both the nature and the timing of of the Main River that was intrinsic in
Bradley’s announcement were aimed at the original decision to go at Oppen-
needling Field Marshal Montgomery, heim.16
whose 21 Army Group was then crossing Responsibility for both new Rhine
the Rhine after an extensive aerial and crossings fell to General Middleton’s
artillery bombardment and with the help VIII Corps, its boundaries adjusted and
of two airborne divisions. Although Gen- its forces augmented following capture
eral Patton had informed Bradley of his of Koblenz. Before daylight on 25 March,
coup at the Rhine early on the 23d, he the 87th Division was to cross near Bop-
had asked him to keep the news secret;
shortly before midnight he telephoned 15Gay Diary, entry of 24 Mar 45; Bradley, A
again, this time enjoining Bradley to re- Soldier’s Story, pp. 521–22; Patton, War A s I Knew
It, p. 273.
16 For date of the order, see Gay Diary, entry of
14Gay Diary, entry of 23 Mar 45. 21 Mar 45.
274 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
pard, a few miles upstream from turesque towns and villages. These usu-
Koblenz. Slightly more than twenty-four ally stand at the mouths of sinuous
hours later, in the early hours of 26 cross-valleys where narrow, twisting
March, the 89th Division—transferred roads provide the only way out of the
from the XII Corps—was to cross near gorge for vehicles.
St. Goar, eight miles farther upstream.17 So sharply constricted, the Rhine itself
After establishing a firm hold on the is swift and treacherous, its banks in
east bank in the angle formed by con- many places revetted aginst erosion with
fluence of the Lahn River with the stone walls fifteen feet high. Here, just
Rhine, the 87th Division on the left was upstream from St. Goar, stands the
to be prepared to exploit to the east, Lorelei, the big rock atop which sits the
northeast (toward juncture with First legendary siren who lures river pilots to
Army troops from the Remagen bridge- their deaths on outcroppings below.
head), or southeast (toward the rear of Here in feudal times lived the river
any enemy that might be defending the barons who exacted toll from shippers
Main River), T h e 89th Division was forced to pass beneath their castles on the
earmarked for driving in only one direc- heights. Here still stood the fabled castles
tion, southeast. T h e two divisions were, on the Rhine.
in effect, to begin clearing a pocket that A more unlikely spot for an assault
was expected to develop between the crossing no one could have chosen. This
First Army and the XII Corps. very fact, General Patton claimed later,
Terrain, everybody recognized, posed aided the crossings.18 Whether infantry-
a special challenge. T h e sector assigned men who braved the tricky currents and
to the VIII Corps, from Koblenz up- the precipitous cliffs would agree is an-
stream to Bingen, embraced the storied other matter.
Rhine gorge. There the river has sheared Certainly General Hoehne's LXXXIX
a deep canyon between the Hunsrueck Corps, defending the Rhine gorge, was
Mountains on the west and the Taunus relatively better prepared for its job
on the east. Rising 300 to 400 feet, the than were those Germans on the low
sides of the canyon are clifflike, some- ground opposite Oppenheim; that prep-
times with rock face exposed, other times aration was attributable less to expected
with terraced vineyards clinging to the attack than to the simple fact that the
slopes. Between river and cliff there usu- LXXXIX Corps had had almost a week
ally is room only for a highway and behind the Rhine. Hoehne's corps would
railroad, though here and there industri- have been considerably better prepared
ous German hands through the years had not Field Marshal Kesselring or-
have foraged enough space to erect pic- dered transfer on the eve of the Ameri-
can assault of the 6th SS Mountain
17Unless otherwise noted, the story of these Division, still a fairly creditable unit
crossings is from official unit records and combat
interviews. The interviews for both divisions are
with the equivalent of two infantry regi-
sketchy. The unofficial history of the 87th Division ments and two light artillery battalions.
is noted in Chapter V; for the 89th, see the 89th Kesselring sent the divisions to the south-
Infantry Division Historical Board, The 89th Divi-
sion 1942–1945 (Washington: Infantry Journal
Press, 1947). 18 Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 275.
T H E R H I N E CROSSINGS I N THE SOUTH 275
east toward Wiesbaden, probably in re- east bank, the men “let loose a little hell
action to the Oppenheim crossing, not of their own.”
from any sense of complacency about the A few hundred yards downstream lead-
Rhine gorge. ing companies of another battalion
Transfer of the SS mountain division moved out on time, apparently unde-
left General Hoehne with what remained tected, but hardly had they touched
of the 276th Volks Grenadier Division down when German flares flooded the
(some 400 infantrymen and 10 light river with light. Men of the follow-up
howitzers), a few corps headquarters company drew heavy fire, and at both
troops, a conglomerate collection of this site and the one at Rhens the swift
Volkssturm, two companies of police, current snatched assault boats down-
and an antiaircraft brigade. T h e antiair- stream before they could return for sub-
craft troops were armed mainly with sequent waves. Reluctance of engineers
multiple-barrel 20-mm. pieces, most of to leave cover on the east bank to paddle
them lacking prime movers 19 . another load of infantrymen across the
On the 87th Division’s left (north) exposed river added to the problem. All
wing, it would have been hard to con- attempts at organized crossing by waves
vince anybody in the 347th Infantry that broke down: men simply crossed when-
the Rhine gorge afforded advantages of ever they found an empty boat. After
any kind for an assault crossing. At one daylight an attempt to obscure German
battalion’s crossing site at Rhens, “all observation by smoke failed when damp
hell broke loose” from the German-held air in the gorge prevented the smoke
east bank at five minutes before mid- from rising much above the surface of
night, 24 March, six minutes before the the water. In early afternoon the 347th
first wave of assault boats was to have Infantry’s reserve battalion still had been
pushed into the stream.20Fire from ma- unable to cross when the assistant di-
chine guns, mortars, 20-mm. antiaircraft vision Commander, Brig. Gen. John L.
guns, and some artillery punished the McKee, acting in the temporary absence
launching site. Almost an hour passed of the division commander, ordered fur-
before the companies could reorganize ther attempts at the site abandoned.
sufficiently for a second try. Possibly be- Upstream at Boppard, two battalions
cause few of the defenders had the of the 345th Infantry had experiences
stomach for a sustained fight, the second more in keeping with Patton’s theory
try at an assault proceeded with little that crossing in the inhospitable Rhine
reaction from the Germans. Once on the gorge eased the burden of the assault.
Although patrols sent in advance of the
main crossings to take out enemy strong-
19 MS # B–584, Defensive Actions Fought by the points drew heavy fire, the assault itself
LXXXIX Infantry Corps on the Rhine Front Be- provoked little reaction. T h e leading
tween 18 March 1945 and 29March 1945 (General
der Infanterie Gustav Hoehne). Hoehne’s recollec-
companies made it in twelve minutes,
tion of dates should be reconciled with dates and and engineers were back with most of
events as established from American records. the assault boats in eight more. In con-
20 This and subsequent quotations are from com-
bat interview with Maj H. J. Withors, ExecO 1st
trast to 7 men killed and 110wounded
Bn, 347th Inf, et al. in the battalion of the 347th Infantry
276 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
that crossed at Rhens, one of the bat- and continued enemy fire at Boppard
talions at Boppard lost 1 man killed and meant he had to go it alone.
17 wounded. In midafternoon General T h e experiences of both assault regi-
McKee made u p for the lack of a reserve ments of the 89th Division turned out to
with the 347th Infantry opposite Rhens be similar to those of the 347th Infantry.
by sending a battalion of his reserve regi- Time and places were different (0200,
ment to cross at Boppard and advance 26 March, at St. Goar and Oberwesel),
downstream to help the other regiment. and the details varied, but early discov-
For neither assault regiment was the ery by the Germans, the flares, erratic
going easy once the men got ashore, but smoke screens, and the seemingly omni-
both made steady progress nevertheless. present 20-mm. antiaircraft guns were
Machine guns and 20-mm. antiaircraft the same,
guns were the main obstacles, particu- As at Rhens, for example, a battalion
larly the antiaircraft pieces, which were of the 354th Infantry at St. Goar came
strikingly effective against ground troops. under intense German fire even before
Although plunging fire is seldom so launching its assault boats. Flares and
deadly as grazing fire, the spewing of flame from a gasoline-soaked barge s e t
these guns was painful even when it came afire in midstream by German tracers lit
from positions high u p the cliffs. the entire gorge. Into the very maw of
By late afternoon the 345th Infantry the resistance men of the leading com-
had a firm hold on high ground lying panies paddled their frail craft. Many
inside a d e e p curve of the Rhine opposite boats sank, sometimes carrying men to
Boppard, and the 347th had a similar their deaths. Others, their occupants
grasp on high ground and the town of wounded, careened downstream, helpless
Oberlahnstein at the juncture of the in the swift current. A round from an
Lahn and the Rhine. Probably reflecting antiaircraft gun exploded in Company
the presence of the 276th Infantry Di- E’s command boat, killing both the com-
vision around Oberlahnstein, the only pany commander, Capt. Paul O. Wof-
counterattack of the day—and that of ford, and his first sergeant.
little concern—struck a battalion of the Although their ranks were riddled, the
347th Infantry. T h e worst obviously two leading companies reached the east
over with the assault crossing itself, Gen- bank and systematically set about clear-
eral McKee readied his reserve regiment ing the town of St. Goarshausen. Most
to extend the attack to the east early the of the 89th Division’s casualties (29
next morning. killed, 146 missing, 102 wounded) were
Throughout the morning of 25 March sustained by the 354th Infantry.
the 89th Division commander, General Perhaps the most unusual feature of
Finley, watched progress of the 87th’s the 353d Infantry’s crossing upstream at
attack with the hope that part of his Oberwesel was the use of dukws for
division might use the Boppard crossing ferrying reinforcements even before the
site and sideslip back into its own zone, crossing sites were free of small arms fire.
thereby obviating another direct am- Word had it that an anxious, deter-
phibious assault. As the day wore on, he mined, division commander, General
reluctantly concluded that congestion Finley, personally prevailed upon engi-
THE RHINE CROSSINGS IN T H E SOUTH 277
neers at the river to put the “ducks” of the 87th Division’s site at Boppard.
the 453d Amphibious Truck Company There a bridge was already in place.
to early use. Capable of carrying eighteen In midafternoon the first of the two
infantrymen at once, the dukws speeded task forces began to cross at Boppard.
reinforcement. They also made less noise Almost coincidentally, resistance op-
than power-propelled assault boats, and posite both St. Goar and Oberwesel be-
when noise more often than not invited ban to crumble, revealing how brittle
enemy shelling, that made a difference. and shallow was the defense. In late after-
Having organized two light task forces noon, following a strike by a squadron
for exploiting the crossings, General Fin- of P–51 Mustangs, riflemen of the 354th
ley was eager to get them into the fight. Infantry carried rocky heights near the
When by noon he determined that both Lorelei, eliminating the last direct fire
regimental bridgeheads still were too from the St. Goar crossing site. A few
confined for exploitation, he arranged to minutes later they raised an American
fall back on his earlier hope of using flag atop the Lorelei.
RAISING
THE AMERICAN
FLAGATOPTHE LORELEIoverlooking the Rhine gorge.
T H E RHINE CROSSINGS I N THE SOUTH 279
As night fell on 26 March, report after stopped after midnight only after half
report reaching the VIII Corps com- encircling Darmstadt and reaching a
mander, General Middleton, indicated point more than fifteen miles from the
that the enemy’s Rhine defense every- Oppenheim crossing site.21
where was collapsing. Fighter pilots told T h e spectacular start of the armor
of German vehicles trying to withdraw prompted the German Seventh Army’s
bumper-to-bumper down roads clogged General Felber to abandon defense of
with soldiers retreating on foot. Shortly Darmstadt. “In order to avoid the un-
before dark the 87th Division’s 345th In- necessary annihilation of the few forces
fantry broke away from the Rhine cliffs committed for the defense of the city,”
for a five-mile gain. Even more encour- Felber rationalized later. 22 Felber’s ac-
aging news came from other units to the tion enabled the 4th Armored Division’s
north and south. From the north an reserve combat command to move in
armored column emerging from the First with little difficulty the next day.
Army’s Remagen bridgehead down the On 25 March the explosion became a
Ruhr-Frankfurt autobahn seized Lim- general eruption. Leaving the jobs of
burg on the Lahn River and was pointed mopping up and expanding the base of
across the VIII Corps front toward Wies- the bridgehead to infantry divisions, the
baden. T o the south the Oppenheim XII Corps commander, General Eddy,
bridgehead too exploded. Reacting to ordered the 6th Armored Division into
the obvious implications of these devel- the bridgehead to strike directly north-
opments but lacking an armored division east for a crossing of the Main River be-
to exploit them, General Middleton told tween Frankfurt and Hanau. Combat
the 6th Cavalry Group to divide into Commands A and B of the 4th Armored
light armored task forces and head east Division also headed for the Main, one
the next day. at Hanau, the other fifteen miles up-
What might well become the last big stream at Aschaffenburg.
pursuit of the war appeared to be Having earlier missed an opportunity
starting. at the Moselle, men and commanders in
both combat commands seemed obsessed
T o the Main River and Frankfurt with one thought: get a bridge. In both
cases the obsession paid off. Held u p
T h e first explosion from the Oppen- along a main highway by 20-mm. flak
heim bridgehead came during the after- guns, CCA left a platoon each of tanks
noon of 24 March soon after Combat and infantry to deal with the opposition,
Command A arrived as vanguard of the then continued the advance over back
4th Armored Division. T h e armor roads and trails. A mile upstream from
headed southeast to swing around the Hanau, the combat command found a
city of Darmstadt before setting out on railway bridge to which an appendage
the main axis of attack to the northeast. had been added for vehicular traffic. At
Once started, CCA’s tankers and armored
infantrymen appeared loath to halt. 21In addition to official records, see a series of
helpful combat interviews on the 4th Armored
Taking advantage of a bright moonlit Division.
night, the combat command finally 22 MS # B–381 (Felber).
280 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
the last moment the Germans set off the day. In early afternoon the combat
demolitions. Although they effectively command reached the Main at Frank-
blocked the railway portion of the furt’s southern suburb of Sachsenhausen.
bridge, the appendage, though damaged, There General Grow’s armor also found
still hung in place. While supporting a bridge still standing, although too dam-
artillery placed time fire over the bridge aged by demolitions for vehicles to use.
to deny the Germans a second chance, a A company of armored infantry crossed
company of armored infantry got ready quickly to secure a few buildings at the
to cross. Despite mines and booby traps north end of the bridge.
that killed six men and wounded more What the demolitions had failed to
than ten, the infantry made it. About the accomplish, German self-propelled guns
same time, Combat Command B at inside Frankfurt and big stationary anti-
Aschaffenburg took a railway bridge aircraft pieces on the periphery of the
intact . city tried to redeem. Almost any move-
German efforts to dislodge the attack- ment in the vicinity of the bridge was
ers were relatively feeble at Aschaffen- sufficient to bring down a rain of deadly
burg but caused considerable concern shelling, much of it airbursts from the
near Hanau, where only two companies antiaircraft pieces. A battalion of the 5th
of armored infantry were yet across the Division’s 11th Infantry nevertheless
river and where the damaged bridge had dashed across the bridge soon after night-
so deteriorated that neither tanks nor fall and began to expand the slim hold-
additional foot troops could cross. Not ings of the armored infantrymen on the
long before dark a train bearing German north bank.
troops and four 150-mm. railway guns All through the next day the German
arrived in the town opposite the bridge. shelling continued to be so intense that
Although the troops apparently were engineers had no success trying to repair
surprised to find Americans in the town, the bridge to enable tanks and tank de-
they quickly set out to drive them into stroyers to cross. During lulls in the
the river. Men of both sides soon were enemy fire, more infantrymen of the 5th
so intermingled that for a while Ameri- Division nevertheless managed to reach
can artillery dared not risk firing on the the north bank and get on with the task
German guns. Fighting raged at close of clearing the rubble-strewn city, where
quarters until well after dark when police and some civilians along with a
American engineers completed a tread- hodgepodge of military defenders tried
way bridge and a third company of in vain to deny the inevitable.
armored infantrymen joined the fray. By
midnight the Americans were in firm The Hammelburg Mission
control of the town.
Early the next morning, 26 March, the News of the crossing of the Main at
6th Armored Division’s Combat Com- Aschaffenburg had in the meantime ex-
mand A dashed through a large forest cited the Third Army commander. Gen-
south of Frankfurt, bypassing the sprawl- eral Patton saw in it an opportunity for
ing Rhine-Main Airport, which infantry a foray deep into German territory to
of the 5th Division would clear later in liberate hundreds of American prisoners
T H E RHINE CROSSINGS IN T H E S O U T H 281
of war from an enclosure near Hammel- Stiller told both General Hoge and Col-
burg, some thirty-five miles to the north- onel Abrams that he wanted to go along
east. A successful thrust to Hammelburg “only because General Patton’s son-in-
would outdo a similar raid executed a law [Lt.] Colonel Wohn K.] Waters, was
month earlier by General Douglas Mac- in the prison camp.” 23
Arthur’s forces in the Philippine Islands, Captain Baum’s mission was to pro-
while possibly concealing from the Ger- ceed as rapidly as possible to the prisoner-
mans the Third Army’s pending change of-war camp two miles south of
of direction to the north. Hammelburg. (Map 4 ) He was to load
T h e man whose troops would have to all vehicles to capacity with liberated
carry out the foray was the 4th Armored prisoners for the return trip and to give
Division commander, General Hoge, one the remaining prisoners a choice either
of the heroes of Remagen who only a of accompanying the task force on foot
few days earlier had assumed command or making their way on their own to
of the division when General Gaffey American lines.
moved u p to a corps. Both Hoge and the As Baum’s little task force began to
XII Corps commander, General Eddy, move shortly after midnight, 25 March,
deplored Patton’s scheme. When they small arms fire in the first few towns in-
failed to talk him out of it, General Eddy flicted a number of casualties; but in
insisted on sending a small armored task general the Germans along the route
force instead of diverting an entire com- were too surprised to fight back. It was
bat command as Patton suggested. T h e still dark when at Lohr, just past the
change further upset Hoge, as it did the midpoint of the journey, the task force
commander of CCB, Lt. Col. Creighton stumbled on a column of German ve-
W. Abrams, whose command received 23Quotation is from a letter from Abrams to
the assignment. Both Hoge and Abrams OCMH, 13 Sep 67; see also comments by General
believed a small task force would be Hoge on the draft MS for this volume. General
Patton later denied to newsmen that he had known
destroyed, but they failed to convince his son-in-law was at Hammelburg and told Waters
Eddy. the same thing. See letter, Waters to Editor, Army
T o make the thrust, Colonel Abrams Magazine, 2 5 June 1965, commenting on an article
in the magazine by Martin Blumenson, “The Ham-
created a task force built around a com- melburg Affair.” See also letter, Waters to OCMH,
pany each of CCB’s 10th Armored In- 9 June 1967. Patton unquestionably knew that
fantry and 37th Tank Battalions. Because Waters had been shifted westward from a prisoner-
of-war camp in Poland just over a month before,
of the illness of the infantry battalion for the word had come to him from Moscow by
commander, the infantry S–3, Capt. way of SHAEF. (See Gay Diary, entry of 9 Febru-
Abraham J. Baum, took command. Basic ary 1945.) Other sources for this account of the
Hammelburg action are as follows: Combat inter-
armament consisted of 10 medium and 6 view with Baum; 4th Armored Division, Notes on
light tanks, 27 half-tracks, and 3 self- Task Force Baum, 10April 1945 (loaned by Brig.
propelled 105-mm. assault guns. Gen. Hal C. Pattison, formerly Executive Officer,
Combat Command A); Patton, War As I Knew It,
Strength totaled 293 officers and men, pages 275, 280–81: Capt. Kenneth Koyen, T h e
and Maj. Alexander Stiller, one of Pat- Fourth Armored Division from the Beach to Ba-
ton’s aides, as well. Although Stiller out- varia (Munich, Germany, 1946). pages 117–42 in
the first edition, pages 181–206 in the second; Dyer,
ranked Baum, the understanding was XII Corps, page 388; the article by Blumenson: and
clear that Baum was in full command. Toland, The Lust 100 days, pages 287–99.
282 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
M. Finnemann
MAP 4
hicles heading west. Not even pausing in the men spotted a German liaison plane
the advance, the American tankers hovering near the column.
opened fire, destroying twelve German To Baum and his men the plane
vehicles with a loss of one medium tank. spelled trouble-an airborne Paul Re-
Outside Lohr they destroyed a German vere alerting the German command
locomotive, and just before dawn at against the thrust—but it actually mat-
Gemuenden, three-fourths of the way to tered little, for the alarm already had
Hammelburg, they shot u p seven more. been sounded. In advancing toward
On the outskirts of Gemuenden, de- Lohr, Task Force Baum had passed
fending Germans destroyed two more of within two miles of headquarters of the
Baum’s tanks and blew u p a bridge over Seventh Army, which had escaped from
a small stream, forcing a detour to the Darmstadt and Aschaffenburg only steps
north. It was well into the day of 26 ahead of the 4th Armored Division col-
March when, a few miles from Hammel- umns. For want of anything better, the
burg, the task force liberated about 700 staff quickly alerted headquarters of the
Russian soldiers, to whom they entrusted local Wehrkreis 24.
some 200 Germans captured in the
course of the journey. A short while later 24 MS # A-893 (Gersdorff).
T H E RHINE CROSSINGS IN THE SOUTH 283
It was not this alert but mere chance half-tracks, others formed to march
that actually was responsible for the alongside.
troubles that began to beset Task Force Well after dark Task Force Baum—
Baum. In midafternoon, as the task force reduced to about 110 men and only four
sought to bypass the town of Hammel- of its medium tanks—started the return
burg, a German assault gun battalion journey. By that time Germans rallied
that had arrived only minutes before by an unidentified major home on leave
opened fire. 25It took two hours of hard in Hammelburg were ready. A round
fighting and the loss of three more me- from a Panzerfaust knocked out Baum’s
dium tanks, three jeeps, and seven half- leading tank a scant fifty yards from the
tracks, including one loaded with prisoner-of-war enclosure. All hope of
precious gasoline, for the American col- the physically unfit’s accompanying the
umn to force a way through. The Ger- task force faded. They returned under a
mans’ loss of three assault guns and three white flag to the enclosure.
ammunition carriers was small consola- Seeking to avoid the apparent German
tion for the American losses and the strength near Hammelburg, Captain
delay. Baum turned the task force to the south-
When at last Task Force Baum ap- west; but at the village of Hessdorf, five
proached the prisoner-of-war enclosure, miles away, another contingent of Ger-
the tankers mistook Yugoslav prisoners mans equipped with Panzerfausts lay in
for Germans and opened fire. At the re- wait. There Baum lost two light tanks
quest of the camp commandant, three and one more medium.26
U.S. officers volunteered to go with a Retiring to a nearby hill to reorganize,
German officer under a makeshift Ameri- Baum found the gasoline in his remain-
can flag to have the fire lifted. One of ing vehicles dangerously low. He di-
the Americans was Colonel Waters, Pat- rected the men to siphon the fuel from
ton’s son-in-law, captured two years eight of the half-tracks, then to destroy
earlier in North Africa. As the group them. He placed the seriously wounded
marched beyond the enclosure, a Ger- men in a building marked with a red
man soldier in a nearby barnyard fired cross, then readied the rest of the force,
one round from a rifle, wounding which included some sixty-five of the
Colonel Waters. liberated prisoners, for another try at
While the other officers were taking the return journey.
Colonel Waters back to the compound, They had yet to move out when, just
the tanks of Task Force Baum broke the before daylight (27 March), a dozen
wire enclosure. The pandemonium of German tanks supplemented by assault
liberation took over. T h e number of guns opened fire. Under cover of this
prisoners far exceeded any previous esti- fire, two companies of German infantry
mate: 4,700, of whom 1,400 were Ameri- attacked. In rapid succession, one after
can officers. While as many as possible another of Baum’s tanks and other ve-
climbed aboard the remaining tanks and
26 One of the American prisoners who started the
return journey with Task Force Baum, Lyle J.
Bouck, Jr., has provided considerable detail on
25Ibid. these events in a letter to OCMH, 8 March 1968.
284 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
Mannheim. Two other units that went ninety stationary antiaircraft pieces
by the names of the 246th and 352d around Mannheim.
Volks Grenadier Divisions, extending T h e new American assault against the
the line northward, were Kampfgruppen Rhine would begin before any major
of about 400 men each. When the U.S. realignment of German forces in re-
4th Armored Division had broken out sponse to the Oppenheim breakout oc-
from the Oppenheim bridgehead on 24 curred; but before the first day of the
March, the northernmost 352d Division new attack came to an end, Oriola’sXIII
had had to fall back.32 Corps was destined to be transferred to
Like almost all German commanders the First Army. That was a logical move
in the vicinity, General von Oriola ex- since the American breakout had effec-
pected the American armor to turn tively split the Seventh Army and since
southeast to cut in behind the Odenwald the First Army appeared seriously threat-
and trap the adjacent First Army or at ened should the Americans turn south-
least to expand the Oppenheim bridge- east or south.
head southward as far as Mannheim and General Foertsch’s First Army had es-
the Neckar River. Two major north- caped across the Rhine in slightly better
south highways, the Darmstadt-Mann- shape than had the Seventh Army, but
heim autobahn on the Rhine flats and still was in no condition to pose any real
the Bergstrasse, the latter forming a di- challenge. It had three corps head-
viding line between the Odenwald hills quarters and the skeletons of. twelve
and the Rhine lowlands, invited a turn divisions, though two of the latter were
to the south. In a feeble effort to forestall en route to the Seventh Army the night
such a move. Oriola turned the retreat- of 25 March and three others were in
ing remnants of the 352d Division to such a condition that General Foertsch
face northward astride the highways. had sent them to the rear in hope some-
Defense of the Rhine itself north and how of reconstituting them. That left
south of Worms was left to the 246th and seven, few of which were anything more
559th Volks Grenadier Divisions, whose than regimental-size Kampfgruppen. To
numbers permitted only “very sparse’’ provide an army reserve, Foertsch
occupation of the east bank and no depth counted on the 17th SS Panzer Grena-
at all. 33 T h e lack of depth was particu- dier Division, whose troops got behind
larly disturbing because of the exposed the Rhine only late on the 25th and
nature of the defensive positions on the would require at least a day or two to
Rhine flats. T h e only corps reserve of reorganize.34
any kind was an assault gun brigade that To know the status and locations of
still had five guns. Artillery consisted of the major units in the German XIII
six understrength battalions, plus some Corps is to possess the basic ingredients
of the story of the Rhine crossing by the
32 The German account is drawn primarily from Seventh Army XV Corps. In the zone of
MS # B–392 (Oriola). See also MSS # A–893
(Gersdorff) and # B–348, Report on the Combat the 45th Division, north of Worms,
Engagements Within the Framework of the First where the weak Kampfgruppe called
Army During the Period from 24 March to 8 May
1945 (Generalmajor Wolf Hauser). The First Army story is from MS # B–348
34
33 MS # B–392 (Oriola). (Hauser).
THE RHINE CROSSINGS IN T H E SOUTH 287
246th Volks Grenadier Division barred undetected. The hope proved vain. Al-
the way, it was a case of fierce initial though the first wave got almost across
opposition from small arms, machine before the Germans came to life, the far
guns, mortars, and small caliber antiair- bank at that point seemed to erupt with
craft pieces, then a collapse. In the zone fire. T h e infantrymen had to come
of the 3d Division, where the 559th Volks ashore with rifles and submachine guns
Grenadier Division had 60 percent of blazing. For the better part of an hour a
normal strength and where the big (up fight raged, while succeeding waves of
to 128-mm.) antiaircraft guns protecting boats took a fierce pounding. In the
Mannheim were in effective range, it was 180th Infantry’s sector more than half
different . the assault boats in the second and third
Vigilant German pickets opposite the waves were lost, but once the first flush
3d Division, perhaps alerted by feigned of resistance was over, men of the 45th
crossing attempts to the south near Division began to push rapidly east-
Speyer, detected movement on the ward.
American-held west bank well before the About the only opposition that devel-
H-hour of 0230. T h e Germans opened oped from then on came in the villages.
fire, primarily with mortars and antiair- Planes that kept a constant vigil over
craft guns, seriously hampering Ameri- the battlefield all day helped eliminate
can engineers who were trying to move this resistance, by nightfall contact had
assault boats to the water’s edge and to been established with contingents of the
shave the steep revetted banks for the Third Army on the left, and forward
amphibious vehicles that were to come troops were across the Darmstadt-Mann-
later. Surprise compromised, American heim autobahn, a good eight miles be-
artillery opened a drumbeat of fire. In yond the Rhine.
thirty-eight minutes the artillery ex- T h e 3d Division, the effect of its ar-
pended more than 10,000rounds, “paint- tillery preparation dissipated, lagged be-
ing the skyline a lurid red.” 35 hind. One problem was an incessant
Despite the light from a burning barn chatter of machine gun and antiaircraft
that illuminated the crossing site, little fire from an island in an offshoot of the
German fire fell as the first wave of Rhine southeast of Worms. Despite a
infantrymen pushed into the stream. smoke screen laid at the crossing sites,
T h e artillery support had done its job the fire hampered follow-up operations
well. T h e first wave of “storm boats” until well after midday when a battalion
(metal pontons propelled by 50-hp. out- of the 15th Infantry cleared the island
board motors) took less than a minute after an amphibious assault against the
to cross the thousand feet of water. Only enemy’s rear. Elsewhere the main re-
then, as the artillery desisted, did enemy sistance centered in the villages and in
fire begin to fall in disturbing volume. every cluster of houses. At two of the
In the 45th Division sector, supporting villages the Germans of the 559th Volks
artillery held its fire, for the hope was Grenadier Division crowned their op-
that the crossing preparations had gone position with counterattacks supported
35 Taggart,ed., History of the Third Division,
by self-propelled guns and mobile 20-
p. 339. mm. flakwagons.
288 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
INFANTRY
OF THE 3D DIVISION
climb the east bunk of the Rhine.
Here and in the 45th Division sector fragments before the crossing, and two
amphibious tanks that crossed the Rhine others sank after fragments punctured
close behind the infantry assault waves their canvas during the crossing. All
were put to good use. These were, “DD” fourteen DD tanks assigned to the 45th
(duplex drive) tanks, M4 mediums Division crossed safely.
equipped with twin propellers for pro- As night came, troops of the 3d Di-
pulsion in the water and with a normal vision still had to pick their way through
track drive for overland. An accordion- some two miles of thick forest before
like canvas skirt enabled the tank to reaching the autobahn, and on the south
float. Of twenty-one DD tanks supporting flank heavy fire from the antiaircraft
the 3d Division, fifteen made it across guns ringing Mannheim still proved
the river. Of the six that failed, one was troublesome. Indications nevertheless
destroyed by shellfire before crossing, were developing that the 559th Yolks
one stuck in the mud at the water’s edge, Grenadier Division at last was giving up
the canvas on two was badly torn by shell and that the XV Corps would be ready
T H E RHINE CROSSINGS IN T H E SOUTH 289
early the next morning, 27 March, to assault crossing at this stage is mainly
make the most of it. Already both a conjectural. He probably disdained any
treadway bridge and a heavy ponton thought that the Germans could seri-
bridge were supplementing dukws, rafts, ously interfere with a new crossing. Pat-
and ferries serving the 3d Division, and ton also wanted to get on with the task
bridges were nearing completion behind of building permanent rail and highway
the 45th Division. All artillery normally bridges across the Rhine to speed his
supporting the four assault regiments army’s advance. Mainz with its network
was across, and the Seventh Army com- of roads and railways and its central lo-
mander, General Patch, had ordered cation in relation to the army bound-
transfer of the 12th Armored Division aries was the logical spot for the
to the XV Corps for exploitation. Dur- bridges; and an assault crossing appeared
ing the crossing operations more than the quickest way to free the east bank
2,500 Germans had surrendered, while of Germans.37
XV Corps casualties reflected more noise Patton’s original plan was to send a
than effect in the day’s German fire. regiment from the already established
Losses totaled 42 killed and 151 VIII Corps bridgehead southeastward
wounded. 36 along the Rhine’s east bank to support
the new assault crossing by seizing high
The XX Corps in the Rhine-Main Arc ground overlooking the crossing site.
The 80th Division of the XX Corps then
By nightfall of 26 March General was to cross at Mainz. Eddy’s XII Corps
Bradley’s 12th Army Group had estab- was to continue its drive to cross the
lished four solid bridgeheads across the Main River east of Frankfurt, where-
Rhine—the First Army’s at Remagen, upon all three corps were to head for
the Third Army’s VIII Corps along the the same objective, the town of Giessen
Rhine gorge and XII Corps at Oppen- and juncture with the First Army. “I
heim, and the Seventh Army’s XV Corps told each Corps Commander that I ex-
at Worms. A fifth was pending, for the pected him to get there first,” Patton
Third Army’s General Patton still had recalled later, “so as to produce a proper
one corps on the Rhine’s west bank that feeling of rivalry.” 38
he chose to send across by assault rather Somewhere along the line, Patton did
than by staging through either of his away with the preliminary thrust to take
already established bridgeheads. He the high ground overlooking the 80th
wanted General Walker’s XX Corps to Division crossing site. T h e reason went
cross between his other two corps at unrecorded, but it may have been be-
Mainz. cause of the explosive dash of an armored
Just why Patton chose to make another
37Patton, W a r As I Knew It, p. 274; Gay Diary,
36 The 3d Division lost 29 killed, 131 wounded; entry of 26 Mar 45. See also XX Corps, T h e As-
the 45th, 13 killed, 20 wounded. Casualty figures sault Crossing of the Rhine and Into Germany
are from XV Corps G–1 Report, 26 March 1945. (a printed operational report), p. 3, and The XX
Some of the day’s casualties, particularly men Corps Association, XX Corps—Its History and
listed as missing, may not have been reflected until Service in World War II (no date), an unofficial
the next day’s report, but in any case XV Corps unit history.
losses probably were less than 250. 38 Patton, W a r As I Knew It, p. 274.
290 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
DUPLEX-DRIVE
TANK
WITH SKIRTFOLDED
division from the First Army bridgehead Patton did approve, but it was well
that looked for awhile as if it would into the next day, 27 March, before the
carry to Wiesbaden, across the Rhine armored force could start its drive; al-
from Mainz. In late afternoon of 26 though a bridge had been captured, the
March, the 12th Army Group chief of Germans had blown it after only four
staff, Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen, tele- tanks had crossed. When units of Mid-
phoned the news that the armor had dleton’s VIII Corps broke out of their
seized a bridge intact over the Lahn bridgehead early on the 27th, their col-
River at Limburg, less than twenty miles umns quickly became entangled in those
from Wiesbaden. If the Third Army ap- of the combat command. T h e objective
proved, a combat command was prepared soon ceased to be getting the armor to
to cut across the front of the VIII Corps Wiesbaden; it became instead getting it
and capture Wiesbaden.39 out of Middleton’s way.’ With the XX
39 Gay Diary, entry of 26 Mar 45; Patton, War
Corps scheduled to launch its crossing of
As I Knew It, pp. 276–77. the Rhine before daylight the next morn-
THE RHINE CROSSINGS IN THE SOUTH 291
DUPLEX-DRIVE ENTERS
TANK THE WATER
ing, chanceswere the attackers would while another regiment, having crossed
find no friendly forces either in Wies- into the XII Corps bridgehead, was to
baden or along the Rhine opposite jump the Main River three miles up-
Mainz. stream from the Rhine opposite Hoch-
Details of the XX Corps plan were heim. Forces from the two bridgeheads
worked out not by Patton but by his then were to converge to clear the angle
chief of staff, General Gay, while Patton or arc formed by the confluence of the
was in the XII Corps bridgehead setting Main and the Rhine. Aside from the
up Task Force Baum.40 The 80th Di- obvious advantages of dividing the op-
vision (General McBride) was to send position with two crossings, the decision
one regiment across the Rhine at Mainz to jump the Main as well as the Rhine
hinged on a desire to make full use of
existing stocks of bridging equipment;
the stocks were insufficient for two Rhine
40Gay Diary, entry of 26 Mar 45. bridges but would suffice for one over
292 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
the Rhine and another over the narrower the provisional XII Corps on 25 March,
Main. 41 he inherited only one divisional unit, the
T h e Germans remaining in the Rhine- weak, almost ineffectual 159th Infantry
Main arc would give the XX Corps com- Division, which was still south of the
mander, General Walker, and his staff Main River. He had promise of three
little pause. Even a cautious G–2 could others, of which only one, the skeleton
find reason to believe that but one di- of an infantry division sent from the
visional unit and a hodgepodge of lesser First Army, actually arrived. T h e other
forces defended there, and the estimate two were the 11th Panzer Division, fast
of even one divisional unit was actually becoming the fire horse of the front now
in error. T o the Germans it was quite that the 9th Panzer Division had vir-
apparent that Wiesbaden and the sur- tually expired at Cologne, and the 6th
rounding sector were soon to be either SS Mountain Division, the latter ordered
captured or encircled; the Americans in out of the lines of the LXXXIX Corps
the bridgeheads both north and south just before the U.S. VIII Corps estab-
of the city would see to that. With this lished a bridgehead across the Rhine
in prospect, no one on the scene would gorge; but both would become involved
have been willing to leave sizable forces with units breaking out of the VIII
in the threatened arc—even had they Corps bridgehead before they could
been available. reach General Kniess’s sector.
T h e same provisional XII Corps that Responsible for defending the Main
had come to grief in the Oppenheim River around Frankfurt and Hanau as
bridgehead had borne responsibility for well as the Rhine opposite Mainz, Gen-
this part of the front as well until mid- eral Kniess had to focus his attention on
day 25 March, when General Kniess and the Main River cities, since American
the staff of his LXXXV Corps arrived. armor was already racing toward them
Theirs was a thankless, hopeless task; from the Oppenheim bridgehead. When
indeed, part of the staff had trouble even a request to OB WEST for permission
getting to the scene. Having been sent to withdraw from the Rhine-Main arc
northward by Army Group G, the staff drew the usual blunt refusal, Kniess and
found American armor pouring out of the Seventh Army commander, General
the Oppenheim bridgehead and had to Felber, resorted to what Felber’s chief of
make a long detour to the east to avoid staff termed “the well tested method” of
it, not to mention having the usual diffi- withdrawing most of the troops from the
culty with ubiquitous American fighter- arc, leaving a weak shell in place to main-
bombers that circumscribed almost all tain a semblance of defense.43
movement in daylight.42 By that move Felber and Kniess wrote
When General Kniess took over from off the Rhine-Main arc and laid plans
for a new defensive line extending north
41 XX Corps, The Assault Crossing of the Rhine,
from Frankfurt. Just what troops were
p. 3.
42 For the German story, see MSS # A-893 left in the arc by nightfall of 27 March
(Gersdorff). # B–831 (Felber), and # B–324, neither of them probably knew for sure;
Rhine-Main (Maj. Hans H. Krueger of the
L X X X V Corps staff, with comments by Gen
Kniess). 43 MS # A-893 (Gersdorff).
THE RHINE CROSSINGS IN THE SOUTH 293
but as of two days before, there had been man fireworks, mainly small arms and
available to defend almost twenty-five 20-mm. antiaircraft fire. Once the troops
miles of Rhine-Main frontage only three were ashore, the Germans mounted two
infantry replacement battalions with small counterattacks, which like the fire
some engineer support, two artillery bat- on the river produced more tumult than
talions, and scattered antiaircraft detach- effect. By the end of the day contingents
ments. of a follow-up regiment had cleared
T h e connivance with Kniess to aban- Wiesbaden and more than 900Germans
don the Rhine-Main arc was one of had thrown u p their hands; the 317th
General Felber’s last acts as commander Infantry had lost not a man killed and
of the Seventh Army. Somebody had to only five wounded. One of the more
pay for the failure—however inevitable noteworthy events of the day was capture
—to prevent the American crossing of of a warehouse with 4,000 cases of cham-
the Rhine at Oppenheim. That some- pagne.
body was the army commander. Late on T h e 319th Infantry meanwhile en-
26 March, Felber relinquished his com- countered less clamor along the Main
mand to General der Infanterie Hans opposite Hochheim but took a few more
von Obstfelder, a former interim com- losses—3 men killed, 3 missing, 16
mander of the First Army. General wounded; there too it looked more like
Kneiss, the LXXXV Corps commander, theatrics staged by condottierei than
unable to do anything about either the genuine battle. By early afternoon the
armored spearheads spreading from Op- 319th had linked its bridgehead solidly
penheim or American crossings into the with that of the 317th, and bridge con-
Rhine-Main arc, would follow Felber struction was proceeding apace with
into Hitler’s doghouse only three days scarcely a round of German shellfire to
later. interfere.44
T h e Third Army’s third major Rhine
It was a noisy little war the 80th Di- bridgehead came easy. Even those who
vision staged at Mainz and a few miles believed their audacious army com-
away on the Main River before daylight mander might have spared his troops a
on 28 March, but few, on the American third assault crossing by using one of the
side at least, were hurt. Following a half- bridgeheads previously established could
hour artillery preparation, men of the find little quarrel with the outcome.
317th Infantry pushed out in assault
boats at 0100 from slips and docks of the 44 This account is based primarily on official rec-
Mainz waterfront, despite a blaze of Ger- ords of the 80th Division and its regiments.
CHAPTER XIV
of the Rhine in the 21 Army Group zone. maintaining a chemical smoke screen for
T h e Second Army had 11 divisions (3 of ten days along a no-mile front. Hardly
them armored, 2 airborne) and 6 any detail went unnoticed. T o make
brigades (including 4 armored and 1 room for mammoth trucks bringing the
Commando). T h e Ninth Army also had big landing craft to the water, bulldozers
11 divisions (3 of them armored). T h e shoved buildings aside. Railheads were
First Canadian Army had 8 divisions 9. pushed forward, new roads constructed.
Given a target date of 24 March and Civilians for several miles west of the
the code name PLUNDER,the 21 Army Rhine were evacuated. In the Ninth
Group’s crossing of the Rhine was to Army, engineers went so far as to borrow
rival D-day in Normandy in terms not chemical heating pads from hospital
only of number of troops involved but units to wrap around outboard motors
also in build-up of supplies, transport, of assault craft to assure a ready start
and special equipment, in amount of in the early spring chill.10
supporting firepower, in complexity of Along the 21 Army Group’s front, the
deception plans, and in general elabora- width of the Rhine varied from 900to
tion. A sampling of statistics provides a 1,500 feet. In March, the current seldom
ready index to the immensity of what exceeds five miles per hour and the
probably was the most elaborate assault depth is never less than nine feet, thus
river crossing operation of all time. T h e meeting conditions for employing both
British alone marshaled 60,000 tons of small and medium-size assault and land-
ammunition, 30,000 tons of engineer ing craft. Banks of mixed sand and
stores, and 28,000 tons of other com- gravel are suitable for launching assault
modities, all in addition to normal daily craft, but dikes rising twelve to fifteen
requirements. T h e Ninth Army built feet above the surrounding ground and
u p another 138,000 tons of supplies. standing as much as two miles from the
More than 37,000 British engineers were main channel of the river pose an engi-
to participate, and 22,000 American. In- neering obstacle and provide a ready
cluding attached Canadian units, the line of defense.
British had 3,411 artillery pieces, anti- The land on both sides of the Rhine
tank and antiaircraft guns, and rocket is low and flat, creased by numerous
projectors; the American, 2,070. T h e creeks, canals, and drainage ditches. Run-
Ninth Army alone issued over 800,000 ning on an east-west course and emptying
maps. into the Rhine just south of Wesel, the
Both armies made extensive efforts to Lippe River and the generally parallel
conceal their build-up, devising elabo- Lippe-Seiten Canal split the zone that
rate schemes of camouflage, creating Montgomery had chosen for the assault.
dummy installations and equipment, in- T h e river would serve along part of its
tensifying patrolling and artillery fire in course as a boundary between American
sectors not scheduled for assault, and and British forces. One to four miles
beyond the Rhine runs the Ruhr-Wesel-
9 The 21 Army Group in mid-March contained
1,703 Dutch, 5,982 Czechs, 6,696 Belgians, 14,915 10Conquer: T h e Story of Ninth Army, pp. 199–
Poles, 182,136 Canadians, 328,919 Americans, and 245; Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp.
744,361 British, for a total strength of 1,284,712. 248-55; Stacey, T h e Victory Campaign, p. 533.
298 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
Arnhem rail line, along the most of its the roadnet there to get into position for
length built on fill, with highways pass- a thrust eastward to come in behind the
ing through culverts underneath. In the Ruhr from the north. The Ninth Army
sector assigned the Ninth Army, the was to move once Montgomery deemed
railroad becomes two lines, not quite a the bridgehead secure enough for bridges
mile apart. Like the dikes, the railroads at Wesel and for a main road north of
might serve a defender well, as might the Lippe to be turned over permanently
numerous towns, hamlets, settlements, to the Ninth Army.11
and scattered buildings dotting the land- As of 9 March, when Montgomery is-
scape. This is not the urban complex sued his basic order, plans for using the
that is the Ruhr a few miles away—in- two airborne divisions that were attached
deed, extensive fields and hundreds of to the Second Army and headquarters of
patches of deciduous woods ranging from the XVIII Airborne Corps that con-
small woodlots to forests four to seven trolled them still were indefinite. Mont-
miles across provide a rural atmosphere gomery directed only that they make an
—but the man-made structures are suf- airborne attack in support of the Second
ficient to afford a determined defender Army’s assault, that they be called on to
many a solid strongpoint. In winter and conduct independent operations for no
at the beginning of spring it was a drab, longer than ten days, and that as soon as
dull landscape, a study in shades of grey possible one of the airborne divisions—
in which the technicolor of exploding British-was to pass to control of the
shells looked out of place. Second Army, the other—American—to
Extending eleven miles south from the the Ninth Army.12
Lippe River, the Ninth Army’s assault Despite the vagueness, Allied com-
zone contained good roads leading east manders had long planned to augment
and northeast only on either flank, but the major crossing of the Rhine with an
that of the British afforded a spider web airborne attack designed to eliminate
of highways leading northwest, north, enemy artillery and to block movement
and northeast. The concentration of against the bridgehead. T h e Supreme
roads made readily apparent why the Commander himself had expressed per-
Second Army’s attack constituted Field sonal interest in it. Since August of the
Marshal Montgomery’s main effort. preceding year planning had proceeded
While the Ninth Army with its assault off and on, and in February the First
corps blocked to the southeast to seal off Allied Airborne Army (General Brere-
the Ruhr, the British were to expand the ton) had published a broad outline plan.
center of the bridgehead and prepare for Called Operation VARSITY, the plan in-
a deep strike northeastward across the volved participation by three airborne
north German plain. Once crossing sites divisions, but when a survey revealed
were available downstream from Rees, insufficient airport facilities and trans-
the Canadians were to drive swiftly port aircraft for such a force, it was
northward to trap any German forces scaled down to a two-division effort. It
remaining in the Netherlands., T h e
1121 AGp, M–579, 9 Mar 45, Orders for the Battle
Ninth Army was to send a corps through of the Rhine, SHAEF SGS file, 381—PLUNDER, I.
the British sector, taking advantage of 12 Ibid.
T H E RHINE CROSSINGS IN T H E NORTH 299
was to be made by the XVIII Airborne dennes and required intensive training
Corps under General Ridgway, employ- to integrate individual replacements. A
ing the British 6th Airborne Division new table of organization and equipment
and the U.S. 17th.13 for airborne divisions, which the U.S.
The job of transporting the airborne War Department had ordered to go into
troops went to the U.S. IX Troop Car- effect on 1 March, complicated the task.
rier Command (Maj. Gen. Paul L. Wil- Since the new table allowed only one
liams), with the 38 and 46 Groups of glider infantry regiment, the division
the Royal Air Force attached, all old had to inactivate one regiment and ab-
hands at that sort of task. The Royal Air sorb the men from it in other units.
Force 2d Tactical Air Force (Air Chief Converting the glider field artillery bat-
Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham) was to talions from two firing batteries to three
provide air cover, escort, and tactical left the division short one battalion, for
support. which a replacement was to arrive only
As with the ground assault, prepara- ten days before the target date.
tion for the airborne attack involved a Men of the 17th Airborne Division
prodigious amount of planning and also had to learn to operate two previ-
work. While detailed planning pro- ously untried weapons-the 57-mm. and
ceeded, hundreds of construction engi- 75-mm. recoilless rifles. Only recently
neers and civilian workers began brought to the European theater by ord-
expanding runways of Continental air- nance specialists from Washington, a
fields that normally accommodated only hundred of the rifles were distributed
tactical aircraft. Having seen no combat among the four U.S. airborne divisions
since the Normandy invasion, the British in the theater. Not only in lack of recoil
6th Airborne Division was at full were the weapons revolutionary but also
strength, while the U.S. 17th Airborne in weight. The 57-mm. rifle weighed only
Division had fought hard in the Ar- 45 pounds and could be fired from the
shoulder. The 75-mm. rifle weighed 114
13 Unless otherwise noted, material on airborne pounds (as compared to 3,400 pounds
planning is from Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton for the standard 75-mm. gun and car-
Diaries (New York: William Morrow and Com- riage) and was fired from a machine gun
pany, 1946), Part VI; Matthew B. Ridgway, Sum-
mary of Ground Forces Participation in Operation tripod. In the 17th Airborne Division,
VARSITY,25 April 1945, XVIII Corps Operation the 57-mm. rifles were distributed di-
VARSITYReport; First Allied Airborne Army, Op- rectly to the parachute battalions, with
eration VARSITY,19 May 1945; “Mission Accom-
plished,” A Summary of Military Operations of the special crews trained to man them, while
XVIII Corps (Airborne) in the European Theatre the 75-mm. pieces went to the antitank
of Operations, 1944–1945. published in Schwerin, battalion.14
Germany (no date) by the XVIII Corps (Air-
borne); Operation VARSITY, the Historical Report Even a hasty glance at a map of the 21
of the 17th Airborne Division; and other official Army Group’s zone would reveal that the
records of the First Allied Airborne Army and the focus for any major attempt to cross the
XVIII Airborne Corps. See also Historical Division,
Research Studies Institute, Air University, USAF
Historical Study No. 97, Dr. John C. Warren, Air- 14For technical data on recoilless rifles, see TM
borne Operations in World War II, European 9–314; for development, see Green, Thomson, and
Theater, published at Maxwell Air Force Base, Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning Mu-
Alabama, September 1956. nitions for War, pp. 330–31.
300 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
Rhine would be the city of Wesel (popu- The object was to seal off the Ruhr from
lation, 24,000) with its roads and rail the rest of Germany by destroying rail
network. Thus the assignment given to bridges and viaducts and attacking canal
the XVIII Airborne Corps was logical: traffic along a broad arc extending from
to seize high ground crowned by the Bremen near the North Sea south and
Diersfordter Forst northwest of Wesel, southwest around the periphery of the
thereby denying the enemy dominant ob- Ruhr to the Rhine south of the indus-
servation on both the Wesel and Xanten trial region. West of this line attacks
crossing sites and blocking major high- were directed at communications centers,
ways leading both north and northwest rail yards, industry, and similar targets.
from Wesel. From mid-February to 21 March Al-
The objective was concentrated, ad- lied air forces concentrated on this task
mirably suited to capture and retention whenever any planes could be spared
by two airborne divisions. At the same from other operations. Against the trans-
time, it was little over a mile from the portation system within the Ruhr alone,
projected Rhine crossing sites. Although Allied bombardiers directed 31,635 tons
the distance augured well for early of bombs. Heavy and medium bombers
linkup with the ground forces, it also made 1,792 sorties against 17 rail bridges
dictated that if the airborne troops and viaducts along the arc encompassing
dropped before or coincident with the the Ruhr. By 21 March, according to
ground assault, which was normal prac- aerial reports, 10 of the bridges were
tice, the ground troops would have to destroyed and 5 others too damaged to
forgo all but the shallowest artillery use. After completing the job of helping
support. Further, the ground troops the Canadian First Army and the U.S.
needed to begin their attack in darkness, Ninth Army to reach the Rhine, fighters
whereas experience had shown daylight and fighter-bombers of the British 2d
best for an airborne attack. Tactical Air Force and the U.S. XXIX
The Second British Army commander, Tactical Air Command (General Nu-
General Dempsey, suggested the solu- gent) joined the Ruhr campaign. Most
tion. The paratroopers and glidermen of the 7,311 sorties flown by these pilots
were to delay their assault until British between 11 and 21 March were directed
infantry had gained a footing beyond the against the rail and road systems of the
river. It seemed a simple solution, but Ruhr.
nobody had ever done it that way before. In the last three days before the 21
Army Group’s assault, the heavy bomb-
Interdiction From the Air ers of the Eighth Air Force concentrated
on enemy airfields and barracks, with
Not as an integral part of Operation particular attention to fields known to
PLUNDERbut as a general preliminary harbor jet aircraft. The heavies flew
to assault across the Rhine, Allied air 3,859 sorties. During the same period
forces since mid-February had been con- 2,000 medium bombers of the U.S. 9th
ducting a heavy bombing program called Bombardment Division hit communica-
“Interdiction of Northwest Germany.” 15 tions centers, rail yards, and flak posi-
16Craven and Cate, AAF III, 771–73. tions. Heavies of the Royal Air Force
T H E RHINE CROSSINGS I N T H E NORTH 301
T o hundreds of waiting units went the The commandos had little trouble touch-
code words, “Two if by sea,” which ing down, then moving quietly overland
meant the British were coming. toward the city. Halting less than a mile
Around 1800 on the same day, normal outside, they waited while some 200
British harassing artillery fires against planes of the Royal Air Force Bomber
German positions near Rees began to Command pounded their objective for
build in intensity. By 2100 the shelling fifteen minutes with more than a thou-
had reached a crescendo as assault waves sand tons of bombs. When the com-
of a division of the Second British Army’s mandos moved in after midnight, the
30 Corps (Lt. Gen. Brian G. Horrocks) city was a mound of rubble, though Ger-
entered the river southeast of Rees. man defenders were still much in evi-
(Map XI) In less than seven minutes dence. Here stood a conglomerate force,
the British assault craft touched down the Wesel Division, organized around
on the far bank against no more than a nucleus of antiaircraft artillery units.
sporadic opposition. Paratroopers of the T h e tenacity of the resistance belied the
II Parachute Corps (General der Fall- division’s heterogeneity and loose organi-
schirmtruppen Eugen Meindl) were on zation. It would be well into the day of
hand, but the artillery had kept them 24 March before the commandos could
down. In a matter of a few hours a col- deem Wesel secure and dawn the next
umn of British infantry had reached the day before all resistance collapsed.
outskirts of Rees. Among the German casualties was the
While recognizing that this probably division commander, Generalmajor
was not the main assault, the German Friedrich Deutsch, killed in the fighting.
army group commander, General Blasko- At 0100 (24 March) a mammoth ar-
witz, directed the 15th Panzer Grenadier tillery preparation for the main assault
Division from his reserve to counter- had begun. A division of the British 12
attack at Rees in hope of throwing back Corps (Lt. Gen. Sir Neil M. Ritchie)
the first group before the main assault prepared to cross the river an hour later
could begin.23 Since the British attack northwest of Xanten. A division of the
was designed primarily to draw German U.S. Ninth Army was to make a simul-
attention away from the Wesel sector, taneous assault across the Rhine north of
the German reaction demonstrated that Rheinberg, to be followed an hour later
the first phase of the Rhine crossing was by another division east and southeast of
a success. Rheinberg.
An hour after the first troops began
to cross, a British Commando brigade Operation Flashpoint
paddled stealthily across the river at a
point about two miles west of Wesel. T o General Anderson’s XVI Corps, a
fledgling among American corps with
23 German material is from MSS # B–414 (Geyer)
and # E 1 9 8 (Luettwitz). Unless otherwise noted,
combat experience only in the drive
the account of British and Canadian operations is from the Roer to the Rhine, fell the as-
from Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic; Stacey, signment of directing the. Ninth Army’s
T h e Victory Campaign; and Headquarters, British
Army of the Rhine, Battlefield Tour, Operation
assault crossing, called Operation FLASH-
PLUNDER. POINT. The two divisions selected to
304 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
make the crossing were, on the other T h e Ninth Army’s usual ally in the
hand, veterans of combat in the Euro- sky, General Nugent’s XXIX Tactical
pean theater since the preceding June— Air Command, joined other Allied air
the 30th and 79th Divisions. Backing units in the pre-D-day interdiction pro-
them u p were the 8th Armored and the gram and was to expend part of its effort
35th and 75th Divisions. T h e Ninth on 24 March in support of the big air-
Army in addition still contained the borne attack, Operation VARSITY.Yet
XIII and XIX Corps with a total of six enough planes were left over to provide
divisions. T h e army commander, Gen- armed reconnaissance in support of the
eral Simpson, directed the XIII Corps to Ninth Army and to assign a fighter-
continue to defend along the Rhine bomber group to work directly with each
south of the crossing sites while the XIX of the two assault infantry divisions.
Corps assembled for early commitment East of the Rhine, German defense of
in the bridgehead. the approximately eight miles of front
With five divisions, Anderson’s XVI destined for assault by the XVI Corps
Corps already was considerably larger was split between two corps of the First
than a normal corps and was beefed up Parachute Army. The LXXXVI Corps
further with supporting units, In addi- under General der Infanterie Erich
tion to regular XVI Corps artillery Straube had a primary task of holding
(Brig. Gen. Charles C. Brown), attached Wesel but was also responsible for the
in general support were the 34th Field sector from the Lippe River to a point
Artillery Brigade (Brig. Gen. John F. on the Rhine southwest of Dinslaken.
Uncles) with 13 battalions of medium, T h e 180th Division of this corps would
heavy, and superheavy pieces and the face the American 30th Division and
XIX Corps artillery headquarters (Brig. part of the 79th. T h e parachute army’s
Gen. George D. Shea) with 11 battalions. weakest command, the LXIII Corps,
Also attached were a tank destroyer under General der Infanterie Erich
group with 6 battalions, 6 separate tank Abraham, bore responsibility for the re-
battalions, 3 engineer combat groups, 2 maining two miles plus additional front-
antiaircraft artillery groups, a smoke age as far south as the army group
generator battalion, a chemical (4.2-inch boundary in line with the Ruhr River
mortar) battalion, and a host of smaller south of Duisburg. T h e northernmost
units, including the assigned naval unit of Abraham’s corps, a makeshift
contingent. These raised the strength of formation called the Hamburg Divi-
the corps to 120,000 men, more an army sion, would face part of the 79th Divi-
than a corps, supported by an impressive sion, while the 2d Parachute Division
54 field artillery battalions. Artillery held the southern portion of the corps
units of the XIII Corps and of one zone . 25
infantry division of that corps were to
is from official records of the XVI Corps and its
participate in the preparation fires and divisions, from extensive combat interviews, and
to answer calls for supporting fire as from three unofficial unit histories: Hewitt. Work-
needed.24 horse of the Western Front; History of the XVI
Corps; and Conquer: T h e Story of the Ninth Army.
25 MS # B–414 (Geyer); XVI Corps intelligence
24Unless otherwise noted, the Ninth Army’s story reports.
T H E RHINE CROSSINGS IN T H E N O R T H 305
A three-quarter moon dimly lit the of the village of Buederich, near the
landscape and a providential west wind confluence of the Lippe with the Rhine;
was blowing the long-maintained smoke the 117th Infantry in the center at the
screen toward the enemy as engineers village of Wallach; and the 120th In-
and infantrymen began to move storm fantry two miles to the southeast near a
and assault boats to the river’s edge soon big bend in the river just northeast of
after midnight on 24 March. Accom- Rheinberg. Each regiment used one bat-
panied by General Simpson, the Su- talion in the assault. Each assault bat-
preme Commander himself mingled and talion was organized into four waves with
talked with the troops. T h e men were, two-minute intervals between waves.
General Eisenhower wrote later, “re- Each battalion had 54 storm boats (7
markably eager to finish the job.” 26 men and a crew of 2) powered by 55-hp.
At 0100 as General Eisenhower and motors and 30 double assault boats (14
General Simpson moved to an observa- men and a crew of 3 ) driven by 22-hp.
tion post in a church tower, the 2,070 motors. Machine guns firing tracer bul-
artillery pieces supporting the XVI lets guided the first wave, while colored
Corps opened fire in a thunderstorm of aircraft landing lights would show the
sound. T h e earth trembled as one way for those who followed.
deafening explosion after another As the men awaited the signal to push
merged into a constant, ear-pounding into the stream, occasional German
cacophony. Every minute for sixty min- mortar fire fell, though with little effect.
utes, more than a thousand shells ranging Only after the boats raced out onto the
in weight from 25 to 325 pounds crashed water and disappeared in swirls of gray
to earth beyond the Rhine. During the smoke did any German shells find a
hour-long preparation, the artillerymen target. They knocked out two of the
fired a total of 65,261 rounds. 27 At the 119th Infantry’s storm boats, killing one
same time 1,500 heavy bombers were man and wounding three. That was all.
attacking a dozen airfields within range In a matter of minutes, the bottoms of
of the crossing sites. Against the back- the boats in the first wave were scraping
drop of violence, infantrymen and engi- on the far bank, the men leaping from
neers took their places in storm and the craft and running toward the big
double assault boats, while other engi- dike. Only at one point, where men of
neers hoisted big pontons close to the Company G, 120th Infantry, landed a
water to begin their job of building few hundred yards from their planned
bridges the moment the west bank was crossing site, was there fire from dug-in
free of the first assault waves. Germans on the dike, and Company G
All three regiments of the 30th Di- quickly silenced that without loss. Every-
vision participated in the assault—the where else the Germans were mute. Al-
119th Infantry on the left, just southeast though the artillery had scored few hits
on the dike, the German defenders were
26Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 389; History blinded by the smoke and thoroughly
of the XVI Corps, p. 40. cowed by the shelling.
27In the next four hours, they doubled this figure “There was no real fight to it,” noted
for a total of 131,450 rounds. See Conquer: The
Story of the Ninth Army, p. 243. 1st Lt. Whitney O. Refvem, commander
306 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
of the 117th Infantry’s Company B. “The 0300 at points east and southeast of
artillery had done the job for us.” 28 Rheinberg.
T h e artillery was timed perfectly, the It was because of the southeastward
lieutenant observed, lifting only mo- curvature of the Rhine that the 79th
ments before the assault boats reached Division’s attack came an hour later than
the east bank. Two rounds of white that of the 30th Division, thus affording
phosphorus served as the signal that the men of the 30th a chance to overcome the
artillery was passing on to more distant handicap and also avoiding the risk of
targets. exposed inner flanks for both divisions.29
Nor was there appreciable opposition For the Germans opposite the 79th Di-
to the crossing of succeeding waves, vision, it meant two hours of artillery
which normally could have been ex- punishment instead of one.
pected to attract heavier shelling, T h e T h e 79th Division commander, Gen-
answer again was to be found in the eral Wyche, chose to make his crossing
mammoth artillery preparation, which with two regiments side-by-side, each
had silenced at least some German guns regiment using one battalion in the as-
and apparently had cut all telephone sault. Unlike the 30th Division, which
wires: since few forward observers had used only storm boats for the first wave,
radios, they had no way to call for fire. reserving the slower assault boats for
Daylight was at hand before the first subsequent crossings, the assault units of
German shelling in appreciable amounts the 79th Division mixed the two. They
struck the crossing sites. overcame the difference in speed by
There could be no question from the giving the assault boats a head start.30
first that the 30th Division had staged Although the hour’s delay afforded the
a strikingly successful crossing of the 79th Division additional artillery prep-
sprawling Rhine. Within two hours of aration, it also added an element of con-
the jump-off, the first line of settlements fusion, for by 0300 the west wind had
east of the river was in hand, all three decreased, allowing nature’s fog and
regiments had at least two battalions man’s smoke to cling closely to the water
across, and a platoon of DD tanks had and to both banks of the river. Except
arrived to help the center regiment. In for a smattering of small arms fire, the
the assault crossing total casualties among Germans opposed the crossing no more
all three regiments were even less than effectively than they had that of the 30th
for the one regiment that had made the Division; but the difficulty of holding
Third Army’s surprise crossing twenty- course in the fog and smoke scattered and
eight hours earlier at Oppenheim. intermingled the units on the east bank.
T h e British had crossed with similar T h e men in some boats lost direction
ease near Xanten and had quickly altogether and returned to the west bank.
pushed a thousand yards beyond the Thinking they had landed on the enemy
Rhine. It remained for the 79th Division 29Combat interview with General Wyche, CG
to execute the last amphibious phase of 79th Division.
the big assault, to cross the Rhine at 30In addition to the usual records and combat
interviews, the 79th Division prepared a special
report, Rhine Crossing by the 79th Infantry Di-
28Combat interview with Lieutenant Refvem. vision.
T H E RHINE CROSSINGS I N T H E NORTH 307
side of the river, men in one boat raced fantry, on the south, also reached the
ashore in a skirmish line, only to meet first rail line quickly, then swung south-
other Americans coming down to the east to build up a flank defense along a
water to load. canal that leads eastward from a man-
Yet in the absence of serious enemy made inlet forming the harbor of the
reaction, the confusion was short-lived. Rhine town of Walsum.
Within forty-five minutes both assault Seldom did the Germans offer more
battalions had assembled and begun their than perfunctory defense. One explana-
drives to the east. Like the men of the tion was that the 79th Division had
30th Division, those of the 79th at- struck on the seam between the 180th
tributed much of their easy success to Division and the Hamburg Division,
the artillery preparation. The fire lifted which was also the boundary between
only after the first boats were three- Straube’s LXXXVI Corps and Abra-
fourths of the way across the river. ham’s LXIIl Corps. Another was the
Prisoners said “they had never encount- limited number of trained men available
ered anything like it, and it completely to the Germans. Still another, obviously,
stunned, scared, and shook them.” 31 was the weight of the Allied artillery
Well before daylight, two battalions bombardment. In those cases where the
were ashore in each regimental sector, Germans did stand to fight, the Ameri-
and again there could be no question of can regiments brought to bear a weapon
the extent of the success. For both di- they had borrowed from their enemy—
visions of the XVI Corps, detailed plan- the Panzerfaust. Both regiments had
ning, rehearsal on sand tables and on equipped their assault battalions with
rear area rivers; careful attention to de- 200 of these one-shot German antitank
ception, and intimate co-ordination with rockets. The blast effect of the weapons
a powerful artillery arm had produced against buildings more often than not
remarkable results. Together the two di- convinced even die-hard occupants to
visions had crossed one of the most im- surrender.
posing water obstacles in western Europe So irresolute and spotty was resistance
at a cost of thirty-one casualties. in front of the 79th Division that not
once during the day of 24 March did
T h e Drive to the Railroads the division call on the fighter-bomber
group that was assigned in support. Nor
Success continued to crown the attack was the weight of armor—often crucial
as the men drove eastward. Even before in a bridgehead battle—necessary; the
the second battalion of the 79th Di- fact that medium tanks and tank destroy-
vision’s 315th Infantry had begun to ers did not arrive in the bridgehead
cross the river, the leading battalion until midafternoon mattered little. By
swept past the first railroad to the out- nightfall the 79th Division held a bridge-
skirts of Dinslaken, a city of 25,000 al- head more than three miles wide and
most two miles from the crossing site. deep, securely anchored on canal lines
The leading battalion of the 313th In- on both north and south, embracing
31Combat interview with Lt Col Norman King,
Dinslaken, and in the north extending
Asst G–2, XVI Corps. well beyond the second railroad. The di-
308 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
vision reserve, the 314th Infantry, was P. Purdue, determined to attempt a deep
on hand, along with supporting tank and probe past the second railroad into open
tank destroyer battalions. More than 700 farm country beyond. By midafternoon
prisoners were on their way to the rear, a company of medium tanks, brought
and American casualties were few. T h e across the Rhine on Bailey rafts, and a
313th Infantry, for example, lost 1 man platoon of tank destroyers, transported
killed and 11 wounded.32 to the east bank by LCM’s, were on their
For the 30th Division, striking into way to join the battalion.
the center of the enemy’s 180th Division, One rifle company was loading on the
most gains were harder to come by, but tanks to start the drive when, without
they came nevertheless. T h e 119th In- warning, a heavy concentration of
fantry, on the north, ran into its first artillery fire began to fall. T h e men
real trouble in midmorning at a highway scrambled for cover, then realized in
underpass at the first railroad. It took the consternation that the fire had come from
help of light tanks, ferried across the the west. It was “friendly” fire. A quick
Rhine in LCM’s, to force a way past. T h e check revealed no error on the part of
117th Infantry had similar trouble at artillery units supporting the 30th. Di-
another underpass farther to the south, vision. T h e fault lay with the neighbor-
where an antitank piece blocked efforts ing 79th whose troops had spotted the
to fill a crater that barred the road; sup- 3d Battalion’s assembly and thought it a
porting artillery eventually eliminated German force preparing to counter-
the German gun. By the end of the day attack.
both regiments had passed beyond the T h e 30th Division commander, Gen-
second railroad, while a two-company eral Hobbs, was quick on the telephone
task force had cleared troublesome anti- to his counterpart in the 79th Division,
aircraft pieces from a spit of land north General Wyche. Since the interdivision
of the Lippe-Seiten Canal and had boundary was a readily recognizable
reached the Lippe River across from canal line, Hobbs could see no excuse
Wesel. for the error. He needed no artillery
In the zone of the third regiment, the assistance, he said caustically. “We have
120th Infantry, on the south, the most battalions to spare to fire into anything
exciting development occurred. There, in our zone.” 33
when the 3d Battalion under Maj. Chris The fire fortunately caused only minor
McCullough soon after midday took the casualties. Quickly re-forming, Major
village of Moellen, astride the first rail- McCullough’s battalion and his attached
road, patrols ranging eastward reported tanks and tank destroyers soon found
they found almost n o Germans. Al- the patrol reports were accurate. T h e
though the battalion already was consid- column swept swiftly eastward, picking
erably ahead of the rest of the regiment, up forty docile Germans on the way,
the regimental commander, Col. Branner and halted for the night in open country
a mile beyond the Dinslaken-Wesel high-
32No total figure is available for the 315th In- way. Although this position was only
fantry, though losses were considerably higher,
since one battalion incurred 38 casualties and 33Telecon, Hobbs to Wyche, Both Div G–8 Jnl
another 30. file, 23–25 Mar 45.
T H E R H I N E CROSSINGS IN T H E N O R T H 309
three miles beyond the easternmost curve of the 79th were clearing Dinslaken
of the Rhine and generally on line with when shortly before 1000 on 24 March
advance contingents of the 79th Division, the steady drone of hundreds of aircraft
it was well forward of other units of the motors began to emerge from the west.
30th Division and six miles beyond the For two hours and thirty-two minutes
Rhine as it ran through the division’s the deep, throbbing hum of the motors
sector. McCullough’s battalion thus had was to continue. Since no pathfinder
reached the limit of effective direct sup- planes came in advance, even the first
port artillery fire. glimpse of planes gave the impression of
Although thus forced to halt, Major the coming of a vast air armada. T h e
McCullough and his superiors were con- great train was composed of 889 escorting
vinced they had achieved a breakthrough fighters, 1,696 transport planes, and 1,348
of the German positions. A 105-mm. ar- gliders, bringing to the battlefield 2 1,680
tillery battalion, General Hobbs prom- paratroopers and glidermen, followed
ised, would be on hand to support a closely by 240 four-engine Liberator
swift advance the next day. bombers of the U.S. Eighth Air Force
As a result of ingenious advance p r e p dropping582 tons of supplies.
34 Another
arations by supporting engineers and of 2,153 fighter aircraft either maintained
a continuing smoke screen that ham- a protective umbrella over the target area
pered German observation, a treadway or ranged far over Germany in quest of
bridge was opened to traffic at 1600. T h e any German plane that might seek to
bridge later was damaged when a Bailey interfere. None did. In addition, 2,596
raft loaded with a tank crashed into it, heavy bombers (660 of them from the
but not before the 118th Field Artillery Fifteenth Air Force in Italy) and 821
Battalion had crossed. T h e bridge was medium bombers attacked airfields,
back in service soon after midnight. bridges, marshaling areas, and other tar-
This bridge and the quick advance of gets throughout Germany.
Major McCullough’s battalion made the
30th Division’s position as night fell on 34Statistics from Report by the Supreme Com-
the first day even more promising than mander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the
Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary
that of the 79th Division. In the latter’s Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945 (Washington,
sector, artillery fire and airbursts from 1946) (hereafter cited as Eisenhower, Report), p.
big antiaircraft pieces delayed bridge 100, and John C. Warren, Airborne Operations in
World War II, European Theater, pp. 228–29. The
construction and, though resistance was total number of troops, aircraft, and gliders ex-
light, n o indication of a clear break- ceeded the total for the first day in Operation
through had developed. T h e 30th Di- MARKET (about 20,000 troops, 1,545 transport
planes, and 478 gliders), though additional troops
vision had taken 1,500 prisoners, more landing after D-day made MARKETthe larger op-
than double the number taken by the eration. Unless otherwise noted, the account of
VARSITYis based on the two sources cited and on
79th. the following: First Allied Airborne Army, Opera-
tion VARSITY; 17th Airborne Division, Operation
Operation Varsity VARSITY;journals and other official records of the
division: XVIII Airborne Corps, Operation VARSITY;
and two combat interviews with officers of the divi-
Troops of the 30th Division were sion. The unit history of the XVIII Airborne
fighting at the first railroad and those Corps, “Mission Accomplished,” is sketchy.
310 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
northwest on the other side of the wood dominates it, two German tanks emerged
in a field near the town of Diersfordt.37 from the castle and headed down a nar-
Because this flight arrived close behind row forest road toward the waiting para-
the air and artillery antiflak program, it troopers. An aptly placed antitank
received little antiaircraft fire, but the grenade induced the crew of the lead
drop pattern was widely dispersed none- tank to surrender, whereupon a tank
theless. T h e paratroopers coalesced into hunter team armed with a 57-mm. re-
two relatively equal groups, one under coilless rifle set the second afire with a
the regimental commander, Col. Edson direct hit, the first instance of successful
D. Raff, the other under the battalion combat use of the new weapon.
commander, Maj. Paul F. Smith. Resistance in Diersfordt, it soon de-
While Major Smith's group was de- veloped, meant the castle. While two
stroying several antiaircraft positions, companies laid down a base of fire from
Colonel Raff's men disposed of a nest of the edge of the forest against turrets and
machine guns and dug-in infantry and upper windows, Company G entered and
began to work southward through the began to clean out the castle, room by
forest toward the assigned regimental ob- room. Two hours later, at 1500, those
jective, relatively high ground along the Germans who remained capitulated.
fringe of the wood near Diersfordt. Among the 300 prisoners were several
Spotting a battery of five 150-mm. ar- senior officers of General Straube's
tillery pieces firing from a clearing, Raff LXXXVI Corps and of the 84th Infantry
and his force detoured to eliminate it. Division.
They captured both the German artil- By nightfall the 507th Parachute In-
lerymen and the guns and spiked the fantry had consolidated along the woods
guns with thermite grenades. By the time line near Diersfordt and patrols had
Raff's paratroopers reached the vicinity established contact with the 1st Com-
of Diersfordt, they had killed about 55 mando Brigade in Wesel. T e n 75-mm.
Germans, wounded 40, and captured pack howitzers of the 464th Parachute
300, including a colonel. Field Artillery Battalion were tied in to
T h e other two battalions of the 507th the position.
Parachute Infantry had in the meantime Second of the 17th Airborne Division's
landed successfully on the assigned drop regiments to drop, the 513th Parachute
zone. As one of these, the 3d, got ready Infantry incurred intense antiaircraft fire
to attack Diersfordt and a castle that from an enemy n o longer deterred by the
Allied bombardment. All three bat-
37 A stick of paratroopers landing together in a talions of the regiment landed more than
field came under sharp fire from German riflemen
and a machine gunner even as the paratroopers
a mile from their assigned drop zones
struggled to free themselves from their harnesses. inside the sector of the 6th Airborne
One man, Pvt. George J. Peters, charged the ma- Division north of Wesel near the town
chine gun, seventy-five yards away. Halfway to the
gun, German fire knocked him down, but he
of Hamminkeln. Heavy small arms fire
struggled to his feet to continue the charge. followed the paratroopers to the ground.
Knocked down again, he crawled close enough to After a short but sharp fire fight, they
the gun to eliminate it with hand grenades before
dying from his wounds. Private Peters was awarded were able to assemble by battalions and
the Medal of Honor posthumously, fight their way southward to their as-
312 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
TROOPS
GLIDER AFTERLANDING
NEARWESEL
signed zones. In the process the para- Although the 513th’ssupporting ar-
troopers destroyed two German tanks, a tillery, the 466th Parachute Field Ar-
self-propelled gun, and two batteries of tillery Battalion, landed on the correct
88's. While one battalion dug in on the drop zone southwest of Hamminkeln,
landing zone, another cleared the woods enemy fire there was even heavier than
north of Diersfordt and a third moved to that encountered by the infantry. A num-
the little Issel River, which marked the ber of key men, including all the officers
eastern extremity of the planned D-day of one battery, were killed or wounded
objective line.38 on the drop zone. T h e artillerymen
nevertheless managed to assemble some
38As Company E was advancing, Germans in a
complex of buildings opened fire with automatic
weapons, rifles, and four field pieces. T h e lead neared the buildings, but the others went on to
platoon was pinned to the ground until a runner, overrun the position. They captured more than
Pfc. Stuart S. Stryker, rose in full view of the zoo Germans and rescued three captive American
enemy, rallied the men, and led a charge on the airmen. Private Stryker was awarded the Medal of
buildings. German fire cut Stryker down as he Honor posthumously.
T H E RHINE CROSSINGS I N T H E NORTH 313
of their howitzers within half an hour, day. In the process they had virtually
enabling them to place direct fire on the eliminated the artillery and service ele-
Germans and gradually to eliminate the ments of the enemy’s 84th Infantry Di-
opposition. By noon they had captured vision. Except for a surrounded pocket
ten German 76-mm. pieces and were in north of Diersfordt made u p mainly of
position to provide supporting fire for remnants of the 1053d Infantry, the
the 513th Parachute Infantry. enemy division had ceased to function as
It remained for the glider echelons, a tactical organization.89 T h e 17th Air-
including service elements of the di- borne Division claimed 2,000 prisoners,
vision, to better the record for accuracy the 6th Airborne Division, another
in landing. At least go percent of the 1,500.
gliders descended on the proper landing Linkup with British ground troops
zones north and northeast of Wesel in an was firm by nightfall, and as early as
eastward-oriented angle formed by the midafternoon the XVIII Airborne Corps
Issel River and the Issel Canal. Although commander, General Ridgway, joined
German fire was in some cases intense, the 17th Airborne Division commander,
destroying some of the gliders even after General Miley, beyond the Rhine. By
they had landed safely, men of the 194th late afternoon supplies were moving
Glider Infantry within two hours of across the Rhine in dukws in such vol-
landing had swept to the river and the ume as to eliminate the need for addi-
canal and most of the howitzers of the tional supply by air.
division’s two glider field artillery bat- Yet for all the success of Operation
talions were in position to support them. VARSITY, the question remained whether
One of the infantry battalions knocked under the prevailing circumstances an
out two German tanks en route to its airborne attack had been necessary or
objective along the river, then accounted was even justified. It unquestionably
for two more in repulsing small counter- aided British ground troops, but at a cost
attacks after the men had dug in. to the 17th Airborne Division alone dur-
T h e British 6th Airborne Division ing the first day’s operations of 159 men
encountered similar difficulty with flak killed, 522 wounded, and 840 missing
and enemy ground fire but also moved (though 600of the missing subsequently
swiftly to seize D-day objectives. By 1300 turned up to fight again) . T h e I X Troop
the town of Hamminkeln was in British Carrier Command alone lost 41 killed,
hands along with several bridges over the 153 wounded, 163 missing. 40 T h e air-
Issel River east and northeast of the borne assault also cost over 50 gliders
town. and 44 transport aircraft destroyed, 332
Operation VARSITY, the airborne phase 39Intelligence Sum for period 241800 to 242359,
of the big Rhine assault, was an impres- XVIII Airborne Corps, and Sitrep 4, 24 Mar 45,
sive success. All airborne troops were XVIII Airborne Corps.
40Figures are from 17th Airborne Division His-
on the ground by 1230, along with 109 tory, 15 April 1943–16 September 1945, and Warren,
tons of ammunition, 695 vehicles, and Airborne Operations in World War II, p. 229. First-
113 artillery pieces; and in a matter of day losses of the two US. infantry divisions that
crossed the Rhine on 24 March by amphibious
hours, both Americans and British had assault were 41 killed, 450 wounded, 7 missing. See
seized all objectives assigned for the first Conquer: The Story of the Ninth Army, p. 247.
314 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
damaged. In the low-level supply mission had crossed the river. Contingents of the
flown directly after the assault by 240 7th Parachute Division of General
Liberators of the Eighth Air Force, 15 Meindl’s II Parachute Corps still held
aircraft were lost.41 onto high ground commanding the cross-
In view of the weak condition of Ger- ing sites, thereby preventing bridge
man units east of the Rhine and the construction and hindering all reinforce-
particular vulnerability of airborne ment. German paratroopers also clung
troops in and immediately following the tenaciously to a town northwest of Rees,
descent, some overbearing need for the cutting off and surrounding small groups
special capability of airborne divisions of British troops that had gotten into
would be required to justify their use. the buildings. It would be well into the
Although the objectives assigned the di- morning of the 25th before a relief force
visions were legitimate, they were objec- of Canadian infantry could set the situa-
tives that ground troops alone under tion right.
existing circumstances should have been Despite this tenacity, the condition of
able to take without undue difficulty and the II Parachute Corps at nightfall on 24
probably with considerably fewer casual- March actually was precarious. T h e col-
ties. Participation by paratroopers and lapse of the 84th Division of the neigh-
glidermen gave appreciably no more boring LXXXVI Corps under the
depth to the bridgehead at Wesel than impact of the Allied airborne attack ex-
that achieved by infantrymen of the 30th posed the left flank of the corps. When
Division. Nor did the airborne attack the counterattack by the 15th Panzer
speed bridge construction (as the XVIII Grenadier Division failed to shake the
Airborne Corps commander subse- British around Rees, General Meindl
quently claimed) ,42 for not until 0915 would have no choice but to pull back
the next day, 25 March, did engineers the paratroopers forming his left wing
start work on bridges at Wesel. A tread- along the Rhine and face them to the
way bridge had been opened to traffic east. T h e German situation at Rees,
behind the 30th Division seventeen Meindl concluded, was “hopeless.” 43
hours before that. The Germans thus faced likely dis-
aster at three points: Rees, Wesel, and
At the End of D-Day south of the Lippe River where the U.S.
XVI Corps was close to a clean break-
As night fell on 24 March, only on through. All that was available to ward
the extreme left of the forces involved in off all three threats was the XLVII Pan-
the 21 Army Group’s Rhine crossing was zer Corps with its lone remaining unit,
there concern for Allied success. There, the 116th Panzer Division. Although the
near Rees, twelve British and Canadian Army Group H commander, General
battalions supported by thirty DD tanks Blaskowitz, earlier had considered using
41 Statistics on glider and aircraft losses vary
the panzer corps to oppose any Allied
slightly. See Eisenhower, Report, p. 100; Mont- airborne attack, he believed now that
gomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 257; Brereton, the greatest danger, despite the psycho-
T h e Brereton Diaries, p p . 406–07; and Warren, Air-
borne Operations in World War II, pp. 228–29. 43MS # B–674 (Meindl); MS # B–198 (Leutt-
42XVIII Airborne Corps, Operation VARSITY. witz); Stacey, The Victory Campaign, pp. 537–38.
T H E RHINE CROSSINGS IN T H E NORTH 315
logical impact of the airborne assault, he ordered both regiments to form mo-
was posed by the Americans south of the bile task forces built around an attached
Lippe. Already, early in the day, in a tank destroyer battalion and two tank
local measure the commander of the battalions and strike for deep objectives.
L X I I I Corps, General Abraham, had or- A task force from the 117th Infantry on
dered his 2d Parachute Division on his the left was to drive nine miles to
south wing, untouched by the American Dorsten, a road and rail center on the
crossings, to move against the U.S. 79th south bank of the Lippe-Seiten Canal;
Division. At 1400, Blaskowitz released another from the 120th Infantry was to
the XLVII Panzer Corps from army seize Kirchhellen, six miles to the east
group reserve and ordered the com- on a main highway leading from Dorsten
mander, General von Luettwitz, to send into the Ruhr.
the 116th Panzer Division south of the Although General Hobbs had in mind
Lippe to halt the U.S. 30th Division.44 sharp, rapid thrusts designed to shake
Located near the Dutch-German loose from the opposition and break into
border, the 116th Panzer Division would the clear, he was reckoning without the
have to make a long, circuitous march to problems of terrain and limited roadnet
avoid the area of Allied airborne land- the two task forces would encounter. For
ings. This meant that additional fuel approximately five miles the attacking
would have to be found before the di- columns would have to pass through
vision could depart; it meant also, in dense stretches of woods crossed only by
view of Allied fighter-bombers, a move narrow dirt roads and trails. In that kind
by night. To General Luettwitz it was of country a few strategically placed road-
apparent that the main body of the pan- blocks manned by a handful of resolute
zer division could get started only after defenders could impose telling delays.
nightfall the next day, 25 March. Would Slowed by the inevitable problems of
this be in time to stop a breakout from assembling diverse units, the first of the
the American bridgehead? task forces, that of the 120th Infantry,
began to attack only at 1600. Almost
T h e Try for a Breakout from the outset the tankers and infantry-
men had to fight for every little gain.
On 25 March the idea of breakout was T h e Germans suffered—they lost four
strong in the mind of the 30th Division half-tracks armed with multiple-barrel
commander, General Hobbs. Delaying 20-mm. antiaircraft guns, two 75-mm.
the morning’s attack to allow the last of guns, three 105-mm. pieces, and several
his divisional artillery to take position motor vehicles, including an ammuni-
east of the Rhine, Hobbs at 0900 sent tion truck that caught fire and set a patch
two regiments two miles to the east to of the forest ablaze—but they imposed
seize high ground marked by an incom- the delay they wanted. Night was falling
plete section of autobahn. When little when interrogation of prisoners revealed
opposition developed except dispirited the story: the task force was no longer
remnants of the 180th Infantry Division, fighting Volkssturm nor even disconso-
44MS # B–198 (Luettwitz); 79th Division combat late survivors of the 180th Division; the
interviews. prisoners were from the 60th Panzer
316 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
Grenadier Regiment, 116th Panzer Di- forcements from the 2d Parachute Di-
vision. vision, albeit a depleted force, had
T h e 117th Infantry’s task force, de- introduced a touch of serious combat.
layed when trucks hauling the infantry Although a regiment of the 35th Division
bogged down on trails churned to mud (General Baade) had entered the line
by tank treads, had not even reached during the day between the 79th and
its line of departure when word came of 30th Divisions, presaging arrival of the
the portentous prisoner identifications. rest of the division the next day, the 35th
T h e news was not to be taken lightly, for Division too was scheduled to peel off to
men of the 30th Division had learned the southeast to block toward the Ruhr.
respect for the 116th Panzer Division T h e 30th Division on the third day,
long ago in the hedgerows of Normandy. 26 March, made some impressive gains,
Not until well after dark did the division despite continuing problems with nar-
commander, General Hobbs, decide to row, muddy forest trails and despite an
proceed with the attack; and the objec- enemy bearing no resemblance to the
tive he assigned for the night was de- one who first had opposed the Rhine
signed merely to bring the second task crossing. One battalion of the 119th In-
force abreast of the positions gained by fantry reached Gahlen, another canal
the first. When the men dug in shortly town midway between Huenxe and
after midnight, they were still seven Dorsten, but there became so involved in
miles short of Dorsten, those of the other a fight that a second battalion had to
task force still more than four miles from come to its aid. T h e 117th Infantry
Kirchhellen. Furthermore, before day- reached open ground just over three and
light another battalion of the 117th In- and a half miles from Dorsten but had
fantry, providing flank protection for the trouble holding the position because of
task forces by attacking the town of fire from tanks in a nearby town and
Huenxe on the Lippe-Seiten Canal, woodlot and from 128-mm. antiaircraft
brought in a new batch of prisoners. guns emplaced in concrete near an air-
These, it turned out, were from the pan- field.
zer division’s second grenadier regiment. T h e 120th Infantry had the roughest
Although the evidence pointed to im- going of all at first, but in the end
pending commitment of the entire 116th crowned the day with a strikingly suc-
Panzer Division, General Hobbs deter- cessful maneuver. Continuing through
mined to try again for his breakout be- the woods toward Kirchhellen, the regi-
fore the enemy armor could make its ment’s 2d Battalion first had to disperse
full weight felt. Since the mission of the a counterattack by a company of the
79th Division was to wheel south and 116th Panzer Division’s grenadiers sup-
southeast to the Rhein-Herne Canal to ported by five tanks. From that point it
block toward the Ruhr industrial area, was a slow, yard-by-yard advance until
all hope of early breakout rested with just before nightfall when the men
the 30th Division. Merely to accomplish reached the edge of the woods to look
the relatively limited flank protection down on the airfield from which antiair-
mission was causing the 79th some diffi- craft guns were harassing the neighbor-
culty; during the day, arrival of rein- ing 117th Infantry. Waiting for darkness,
T H E RHINE CROSSINGS IN T H E N O R T H 317
the regimental commander, Colonel Pur- Army commander, General Simpson. Be-
due, committed a fresh battalion. As hind the lines, Simpson held not only
soon as preliminary artillery fire began two more divisions belonging to General
to fall the assault companies rushed for- Anderson’s XVI Corps but also the en-
ward, vacating the foxholes at the line of tire XIX Corps and, potentially, the
departure, while the reserve company XIII Corps, with no place to commit
remained well back of the line. When the them. Late on the 26th General Ander-
enemy’s counterbarrage began, it fell on son ordered the 8th Armored Division to
empty foxholes. T h e assault companies move through Hobbs’s infantry in search
dashed downhill to clear the airfield in of the maneuver room the Ninth Army
less than an hour. Not a man was lost. needed. 46
These were impressive gains, but they
were not breakout. By nightfall of 26 How To Bring the Ninth Army’s Power
March the enemy’s 116th Panzer Di- To Bear
vision had clearly thwarted immediate
breakout and, though incapable of de- T h e inability of the 30th Division to
cisive counterattack, was strong enough break into the open was but one aspect
to hold an attacker to limited gains. Only of the problem facing the Ninth Army,
a small advance guard of the panzer di- the decision to commit the 8th Armored
vision had been on hand to cause trouble Division but one possibility for solving
for the 120th Infantry the night of 25 it. T h e core of the problem lay in the
March, but the bulk of the division’s way operations had developed in the
infantry and some tanks had arrived by British bridgehead and its effect on use
daylight of the 26th. T h e remainder of of bridges at Wesel and on maneuver
the division entered the line that eve- room to be made available to the Ninth
ning, whereupon responsibility for the Army north of the Lippe River and canal
sector south of the Lippe passed to the complex.
XLVII Panzer Corps. With the responsi- Pressed back to the north and the
bility came a second divisional unit, the northwest, the paratroopers of Meindl’s
190th Infantry Division, rushed from the II Parachute Corps, reinforced by the
Netherlands to take up positions south of 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, sharply
the panzer division. It was a makeshift restricted British and Canadian gains
division equipped with little heavy fire and by their opposition also slowed
support, including only one artillery bat- bridge construction near Xanten and
talion and few antitank weapons . 45 Rees. In the British sector, by nightfall
Faced with this situation, the 30th Di- of 26 March, only the XVIII Airborne
vision’s General Hobbs would have been Corps, driving eastward along the north
content with more leisurely attacks that bank of the Lippe, had made progress
would afford his tired infantry battalions comparable to that of the American
a chance to rest, but pressure forbreak- troops to the south.
out had begun to build from the Ninth Lacking adequate bridges downstream,
45 MS # B–198 (Luettwitz). 4630th Div G–3 Jnl file, 26–28 Mar 45.
318 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
the British transferred the bulk of their risk of overcrowding and concentrate the
cross-river traffic to Wesel, where a tread- XIX Corps in the bridgehead. Once
way bridge and a 25-ton ponton bridge bridges could be built over the Lippe
had been completed by Ninth Army en- the XIX Corps was to cross, thereby by-
gineers and where a floating Bailey passing the bottleneck of Wesel, and
bridge was nearing completion. Al- launch a drive alongside the XVIII Air-
though the Ninth Army had running borne Corps to cut in behind those Ger-
rights on these bridges for five out of mans holding up the 30th Division.
each twenty-four hours, the time was Attending the meeting at Simpson’s
insufficient for a major build-up; and request, the XVIII Airborne Corps com-
once beyond the Rhine at Wesel, there mander, General Ridgway, promptly dis-
was no place to go. Under Field Marshal couraged the plan. While acknowledging
Montgomery’s plan of operations, the that to avoid Wesel would be helpful,
XVIII Airborne Corps was to sideslip Ridgway still doubted that the crowded
to the north to make room for the Ninth roads north of the Lippe could yet sup-
Army’s XIX Corps, but because of lack port any contingent of the Ninth Army.
of progress by British units to the north- He held out hope nevertheless that if the
east, the airborne troops could not yet XVIII Airborne Corps continued to ad-
make the shift. vance at its current pace for about two
T o the Ninth Army’s General Simpson more days, there then might be room for
it was frustrating to have to fight some portion of the Ninth Army.
doggedly forward in frontal attacks In the end, General Simpson deferred
against opposition that could be dealt a decision while couching an appeal in
with summarily if only he could bring strong terms to the Second British Army
additional power to bear. Ninth Army commander, General Dempsey, and to
engineers had by this time put in enough Field Marshal Montgomery for exclu-
bridges-one 25-ton ponton and three sive use at the earliest possible date of
treadway bridges were carrying traffic the Wesel bridges and the main highway
and two floating Bailey bridges were al- leading east out of Wesel along the north
most finished-to support considerably bank of the Lippe. If he could have these
larger forces than the three infantry di- facilities, Simpson said, he could utilize
visions already in the XVI Corps bridge- both the XIX Corps and the XIII
head, but so constricted was the Corps.47
bridgehead-eleven miles wide and no- That commitment of the 8th Armored
where more than thirteen miles deep— Division (General Devine) in quest of a
that to commit even the 8th Armored breakthrough south of the Lippe was no
Division was to invite congestion. Nor solution to Simpson’s problem was dem-
was there any possibility for maneuver onstrated early on 28 March. Although
unless the armored division could the fatigued infantrymen of the 30th Di-
achieve a really deep penetration. vision had fought through the night of
T h e makeshift solution General Simp- the 26th and the day of the 27th to open
son proposed, as revealed to his as-
sembled corps commanders during the 47The account of the meeting is from Conquer:
afternoon of 27 March, was to take the The Story of the Ninth Army, pp. 260–61.
T H E RHINE CROSSINGS I N T H E N O R T H 319
a route for the armor, they failed to do expanding corridor for employment of
more than dent the positions of the portions of the Ninth Army north of the
enemy’s 116th Panzer Division. Dense Lippe River. Beginning early on the
forest and poor roads, when combined morning of 30 March, the routes leading
with determined resistance from German east from Wesel were to pass to the Ninth
tanks and antiaircraft guns, prevented Army, thus enabling General Simpson to
the armor from gaining more than three begin moving forces north of the Lippe
miles. When the fighting died down with even before gaining full control of the
the coming of night on 28 March, the Wesel bridges. Those bridges were to
Germans still held Dorsten. Prospects of pass to the Ninth Army early the next
a breakout faded. morning, 31 March, though with run-
It was a different story north of the ning rights to the British for five hours
Lippe. There, in fulfillment of the out of each twenty-four.
promise foreseen by General Ridgway, Operation PLUNDER was over. Four
paratroopers of the 17th Airborne Di- Allied armies were across the last great
vision’s 513th Parachute Infantry in mid- barrier to the heartland of Germany and
afternoon of 28 March mounted had either begun to exploit or were
Churchill tanks of the British 6th Guards poised to begin the last deep thrusts.
Armoured Brigade.48 With scarcely a Only the First Canadian Army on the
pause, they raced seventeen miles beyond north flank and the First French Army
Dorsten. As the commander of the on the south had yet to establish their
enemy’s XLVII Panzer Corps, General own bridgeheads. T h e Canadians already
Luettwitz, was quick to note, the spectac- were building u p through the British
ular advance outflanked the positions of bridgehead, and the French were pre-
his corps, including those of the 116th paring to cross in their own right before
Panzer Division.49 the month of March was out.
On this same date, 28 March, Field Whether at this stage of the war elab-
Marshal Montgomery issued a new direc- orate preparation and support on the
tive to govern operations across the north scale marshaled by the 21 Army Group
German plain to the Elbe River, deep was necessary or even justified for forcing
inside Germany. I n the process, he the Rhine would forever remain conjec-
spelled out a new policy for use of the ture. T h e entire production might have
Rhine bridges at Wesel and provided an been avoided, for example, had Mont-
gomery allowed Simpson’s Ninth Army
to jump the Rhine in a surprise assault
back in the first week of March. Yet in
the jubilation of the success that ac-
48Culminating a series of gallant acts, T. Sgt.
Clinton M. Hedrick, 194th Glider Infantry, entered companied Operation PLUNDER, few but
a castle at Lembeck, seven miles north of Dorsten, the most carping critics would continue
on 2 8 March to accept surrender of the German to belabor the point.
garrison. T h e Germans instead opened fire with a
self-propelled gun. Mortally wounded, Sergeant “My dear General,” Prime Minister
Hedrick rained such a fire on the Germans that Churchill had said to the Supreme Com-
his colleagues were able to escape. He was awarded
the Medal of Honor posthumously.
mander as he watched Allied power un-
49 MS # B–198 (Luettwitz). leashed against the Rhine on 24 March,
320 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
“the German is whipped. We’ve got him. five long years before had known the
He is all through.” 50 nadir of Dunkerque, the pyrotechnics of
To a man and to a nation that almost 23 and 24 March were sweet and just and
good and right.
50Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 390.
CHAPTER XV
ing, de Latere proudly answered that he process coming upon a column of the
would begin before daylight the next 10th U.S. Armored Division deep within
morning. Devers promptly approved. the assigned French zone. It was an error
By 0230 on 31 March, infantrymen of on the part of the American armor—
the 3d Algerian Division at Speyer had American commanders had entertained
found only a single rubber assault boat. no idea of depriving the French of their
Undaunted, the Algerians began to opportunity for an assault crossing of
shuttle silently across the Rhine, ten men the Rhine—but to General de Lattre the
at a time. Shortly before daybreak when presence of the U.S. unit justified the
they had located four more rubber boats haste of the French crossing. A 24-hour
to speed the shuttle, the Germans awoke delay, he reckoned, would have con-
to the crossing and began to shell the demned the French to a passive role in
site. The enemy was too late; already an the invasion of Germany. 4
entire infantry company was across. Hav- To speed the taking of Karlsruhe, de
ing made even Patton's surprise crossing Lattre would make a third Rhine cross-
at Oppenheim look like a deliberate, set- ing on 2 April midway between Ger-
piece assault, the French were on the east mersheim and Karlsruhe and even' a
bank to stay. fourth some days later,5 but the main
A few miles upstream at Germersheim, crossings at Germersheim and Speyer in
a more conventional crossing fared less effect marked the end of the passage of
well. Because of confusion at hastily all three Allied army groups to the east
chosen embarkation points, the first wave bank of the Rhine.
of the 2d Moroccan Division pushed into
the river only after daylight had come An Awesome Power
and the first impact of an artillery p r e p
aration had dissipated. In that wave, only By the end of March the great river
three of some twenty storm boats barrier was a challenge only to bridge-
equipped with outboard motors survived building engineers. A tatterdemalion
German small arms and mortar fire and German Army on the brink of total de-
made it to the east bank. While thirty feat lay exposed to a mighty Allied force
men from the three boats hung on of almost four and a half million men,
grimly, French artillery encased the including ninety divisions, twenty-five of
minuscule bridgehead in fire until sub- which were armored, five airborne.6 As
sequent waves, still taking heavy losses,
could build up. By nightfall the bulk of
two battalions was across and a foothold 4 De Lattre, Histoire de la Premiére Armée
Française, p. 449. See also below, ch. XVIII.
assured. 5The third crossing was at Leimersheim, the
T h e next day, 1April-Easter Sunday fourth at Strasbourg. For details of the fourth
—General Brooks of the neighboring VI crossing, see below, ch. XVIII.
6 Of the divisions, 61 were American, 12 British,
Corps gave permission for French ve- 11 French, 5 Canadian, and 1 Polish. One British
hicles to cross an American bridge at division would arrive from Italy before V–E Day
Mannheim. Before the day was out, to bring the total force under .General Eisenhower
to 91 divisions, plus several independent brigades.
French reconnaissance units had pushed See SHAEF G–3 War Room Daily Sums, 2 Apr
eighteen miles beyond the Rhine, in the and 9 May 45.
A T T H E END OF MARCH 323
the multiple drives beyond the Rhine
began, Montgomery’s 21 Army Group
controlled thirty divisions. Included
were twelve U.S. divisions in the Ninth
Army and a new Canadian corps with
two Canadian divisions and an armored
brigade. T h e Canadian corps had arrived
during the month of March from Italy as
a result of a decision made at the Malta
Conference to reinforce British forces
for the final thrust into Germany. 7
Bradley’s 12th Army Group had thirty-
four divisions, including six in its new
army, the Fifteenth, under General
Gerow. Although the Fifteenth Army
had become operational in early Jan-
uary, the headquarters heretofore had
handled only rear echelon assignments,
including control of the 66th Infantry
Division, which was containing German
holdouts in Brittany ports. The Fifteenth
Army now was to move forward to as- GEROW
GENERAL
sume a holding mission along the Rhine,
facing the Ruhr, then later was to relieve
the other armies of the 12th Army Group aced only occasionally by the sporadic
of occupation duties as they drove deep activity of German jet fighters. Antiair-
into Germany. craft fire from the flak-heavy Ruhr
Devers’s 6th Army Group had twelve noticeably decreased, apparently indi-
U.S. and eleven French divisions, al- cating German ammunition shortages.
though two of the latter were unavail- Continuing a long-range program against
able for the drive beyond the Rhine, oil supplies, American strategic bombers
since one was holding the Alpine front of the Eighth Air Force during March
facing Italy and another was containing directed 36,000 tons of bombs against
Germans along the Gironde estuary in refineries and storage depots. Communi-
southwestern France. T h e remaining cations centers, railroads, factories, jet
three divisions of the total of ninety were aircraft plants, and submarine pens also
U.S. airborne divisions under control of continued to take a pounding. Raids al-
the First Allied Airborne Army. most always involved more than a thou-
Allied air power, its declining losses sand bombers, with losses seldom
readily replaceable, remained every- exceeding five aircraft, though on 18
where overwhelmingly dominant, men- March, in one of the largest daylight
raids of the war on Berlin, German jet
7 Stacey, T h e Victory Campaign, p. 529; Mont- planes shot down 24 bombers and 5
gomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 247. fighters, while flak damaged more than
324 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
half the 1,200 bombers, 16 of which had 1943, and may have caused as many as
to crash-land behind Russian lines. 135,000 civilian deaths.10
Heavies of the Royal Air Force also During the first two weeks of April,
continued their destructive campaign; at the Luftwaffe would make feeble efforts
one point, on 12 March, they established with thin remnants of conventional and
a new record for tonnage in a single jet fighter forces but would succeed in
strategic attack by dropping 4,899 tons bringing down only eighteen American
from 1,107 aircraft on Dortmund. Close bombers. At the same time Allied air
co-ordination was often achieved with commanders would consider the strategic
heavy bombers of the Fifteenth Air Force air war at an end. As early as 7 April the
in Italy. Despite occasional bad weather, British would discontinue area strikes
the campaign in the air was so successful against German cities, and on 16 April
that by the end of March the strategic the chief of the United States Strategic
air forces were almost out of targets.8 Air Forces in Europe, General Carl
T h e big raid on Berlin on 18 March Spaatz, would declare the strategic air
was part of a program begun the preced- war won. T h e big bombers would still
ing month after the Combined Chiefs of make a few raids aimed at rail junctions,
Staff at Malta decided to send the stra- marshaling yards, or other targets of di-
tegic air forces of Britain and the United rect concern to the ground armies.11
States against major transportation cen-
ters in eastern Germany through which T h e Logistical Backbone
the Germans might funnel reinforce-
ments for the Russian front. “There was On the ground, as the prospect of un-
also a hope that heavy air raids would qualified pursuit warfare loomed, there
increase the panic and confusion already stood behind the awesome power of Al-
prevalent in those cities, which were lied armies a logistical establishment
thoroughly frightened by the sudden geared to demands that, had they been
Russian advance and full of refugees.” 9 made during the pursuit across France
T h e raids quickly produced charges, the preceding summer, would have been
particularly in the American press, of preposterous. For example, no longer did
terror bombing. Although American air the Allied armies have to depend on
officers pointed out that they were not makeshift facilities at the invasion
bombing cities indiscriminately but at- beaches or on minor ports far behind the
tacking transportation facilities inside fighting lines. Antwerp, one of Europe’s
the cities, severe criticism would persist great ports, lying only a little over a
even into the postwar period. Of particu- hundred miles behind the front, alone
lar horror was a Royal Air Force raid on handled 558,000 tons of supplies in
Dresden the night of 13 February, fol- March. In the south, Marseille and sub-
lowed on the next two days by U.S.
attacks. These raids created a firestorm 10This figure is higher than that of the combined
like that which had gutted Hamburg in total of deaths (110,000) in the atomic bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Craven and Cate,
AAF III, 724–31; David Irving, The Destruction of
8 Craven and Cate, AAF III, 736–55. Dresden (London: William Kimber, 1963).
9 lbid., p. 725. 11 Craven and Cate, AAF III, 753–54.
A T T H E END OF MARCH 325
sidiary ports handled 575,500 tons in at Koblenz, while on the 1st of April
March, making the 6th Army Group engineers opened another as far as Mainz.
virtually independent of the lines of com- On 7 April the 1056th Port Construction
munication serving the other Allied and Repair Group, having worked
forces. 12 around the clock for ten days, would
While there were occasional delays in open a 1,753-foot rail bridge over the
discharging ships in all the ports, moving Rhine near Wesel. A second rail bridge
the supplies to inland depots was the over the Rhine at Mainz was opened six
major problem, attributable in part to a days later and others, at Mannheim and
perennial shortage of transportation but Karlsruhe, before the month of April
in the main to an inadequate system of was out. All single-tracked, the bridges
depots echeloned in depth. T h e problem were inevitable bottlenecks; their exist-
would be intensified as the pursuit east ence nevertheless would enable the rail-
of the Rhine increased demands for ways by mid-April to equal the tonnage
transport close behind the front. carried beyond the Rhine by truck trans-
An extensive program of pipeline con- port and by the end of the war to handle
struction helped ease the burden on three-fourths of the total tonnage. This
transport. By the end of March a line record was accomplished despite short-
from Antwerp was operating as far as ages of locomotives and rolling stock and
Wesel on the Rhine, another from Cher- frustrating delays in unloading freight
bourg as far as Thionville in Lorraine, cars at their destinations.
and a third from Marseille almost to the Taking a cue from the Red Ball Ex-
Saar River. To relieve congestion on the press truck route that had sped highway
Rhine bridges, pipelines were laid across traffic behind the armies the preceding
the river at four points soon after the year, the Transportation Corps in Janu-
crossings, and gasoline delivered by rail- ary had inaugurated an express rail serv-
way tank cars was pumped across. Three ice for high priority freight. A train of
of the pipelines were later tied in with twenty cars, labeled the “Toot Sweet
the main arteries from the ports. At the Express” (a play on the French phrase
time of the Rhine crossings, gasoline tout de suite), left Cherbourg each day,
stocks in both the Communications Zone picked up additional cars and split into
and the armies themselves were the high- two sections at Paris, then ran to Verdun
est they had ever been. Only in the last and Namur and later as far as Bad Kreuz-
days of April would deliveries fall short nach and Liège. Beginning in March a
of daily consumption, and never would similar service, originating in Liège, de-
gasoline exercise the tyranny over opera- livered perishable foods to railheads close
tions that it had in France and Belgium behind the First and Ninth Armies—the
in 1944. “Meat Ball Express.”
Rail reconstruction also proceeded Motor transport meanwhile increased
swiftly. By the end of March a line was to an unprecedented tempo. In contrast
open to the Rhine at Wesel and another to the improvisation of the Red Ball and
other express routes the preceding sum-
12 The section on logistics is based on Ruppen- mer, the Communications Zone had pre-
thal, Logistical Support of the Armies II . pared detailed plans to marshal three-
326 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
BRIDGEAT WESEL
THERHINERAILROAD
fourths of the motor transport under its change cold rations for hot. In addition
control for direct support of the pursuit to these trucks, the armies themselves
beyond the Rhine. Under a three-phase had about forty truck companies each,
plan called “XYZ,” more than 4,000 supplemented by provisional companies
trucks, most of them either 10-ton trac- made u p of the organic transportation
tor-semitrailer combinations or 10-ton from field artillery and antiaircraft units.
diesels, eventually were to deliver u p to Building roads and bridges occupied
15,000 tons a day to forward depots. thousands of engineers, whose numbers
Trucks received detailed maintenance were augmented b y civilians and prison-
before every run, and some of the con- ers of war and sometimes by men from
voys carried their own mechanics and uncommitted combat units. Engineers
packets of most commonly needed spare assigned to the armies did most of the
parts. O n one route serving the Seventh work, constructing, for example, 52 of
Army, drivers could pause at rest stops the 57 highway bridges built over the
called “GI Diners,” where they might ex- Rhine. Just over half of the bridges were
AT THE END OF MARCH 327
FRANKLIND. ROOSEVELT
MEMORIALBRIDGEAT MAINZ.Construction proceeded
day and night.
fixed wooden pile; of 26 treadway and ers of war. During April approximately
heavy ponton bridges, most would be 40,000 casualties were removed from the
phased out by early May. combat zone by air, and in the closing
Air transport also contributed far days of the war one sky train after an-
more than it had the preceding summer, other carried Recovered Allied Military
both because airfields were plentiful and Personnel (RAMPS) westward. T h e
because few planes were withdrawn for Third Army alone evacuated 135,000
airborne training or operations. During men in the last month by air.
the second week of April, more than All these efforts added u p to a s u p
6,200 sorties were flown—a peak—and ply situation in which the Communi-
more than 15,000 tons of supplies (most- cations Zone and the support services in
ly gasoline) set down on forward fields. the armies could take justifiable pride,
On return flights the big transport craft and this done with a theaterwide division
evacuated casualties or liberated prison- slice of only about 26,000 men, a figure
328 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
PONTONBRIDGEACROSS
THE RHINESERVING
SEVENTHARMY
usually considered minimal, Some short- notonous diet of emergency rations, but
ages persisted, particularly in spare parts so fast was he moving that he would
for vehicles and weapons, and forward have had little time for more substantia1
supply officers were sometimes reduced fare in any case. What was more impor-
to nervous fretting and fuming, but tant, he always ate, and many a time he
minor shortages were fairly characteristic could relieve the monotony with “liber-
of supply in a highly mobile situation ated” eggs or other produce from a farm-
and rarely affected operations. Although yard.
fewer combat losses of tanks, vehicles, Decisions at the T o p
and equipment and reduced expenditure
of ammunition—both features of pursuit Meanwhile, a variety of decisions had
warfare-helped, the credit in general been or were being made at both theater
belonged to a sound logistical apparatus and intergovernmental levels that, while
expertly administered. T h e infantryman not affecting the actual conduct of tacti-
or the tanker might complain of a mo- cal operations, nevertheless produced an
AT THE END OF MARCH 329
impact on the armies and the fighting the Germans no out. In view of the con-
men in them. These decisions ranged trol over the armed forces and the popu-
from President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s lace exercised by the Nazi apparatus and
“unconditional surrender” formula, of clarifying statements issued from time
enunciated long months before at the to time by the Allied governments, the
Casablanca Conference, to a so-called opinion would appear to be more specu-
nonfraternization policy and SHAEF’s lative than conclusive. It clearly was no
definition of the difference between loot barrier to the surrender of German
and legitimate booty, almost as difficult soldiers, individually or sometimes en
as the nonfraternization policy to admin- masse, nor to the nation as a whole when
ister. the Hitler mystique ceased to exist. More
The policy of unconditional surren- likely it was, as Winston Churchill,
der, some thought at the time and after, among others, once put it, that the Ger-
prolonged the war because it afforded man people continued to fight not out
330 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
of fear of Allied victory but out of fear seeking to govern a conquered popula-
of conquest by the Soviet Army.13 tion by indirect means to carry out pro-
Imposed at the intergovernmental hibitions against soldiers accompanying
level, the nonfraternization policy had Germans in the street, conversing with
been proclaimed the previous Septem- them in public, or even shaking hands
ber, the day after the first American with them. Few Germans could have
patrols crossed the German frontier, but been unaware of the policy, but when it
only with the rapid sweep through the was enforced it probably caused more re-
Rhineland had it come to affect more sentment than remorse.
than a few U.S. units. Under the terms The nonfraternization program may
of General Eisenhower’s directive, all have served other objectives—security
fraternization with the German popula- and protecting the lives of individual Al-
tion was forbidden. There was to be no lied soldiers, though the German popula-
“mingling with Germans upon terms of tion in any case provoked few major
friendliness, familiarity, or intimacy, in- incidents. While some civilians on occa-
dividually or in groups in official or un- sion took up arms beside their soldiers
official dealings.” 14It was, in the words and in isolated instances sniped or en-
of an official British historian, an attempt gaged in other acts of violence against
“to send the whole German people to individual soldiers, the people for the
Coventry largely in order to express dis- most part were “passive, lethargic, nega-
gust for the bestialities of Nazism.” 15 tive, disciplined, docile, deferential, co-
The policy soon broke down, perhaps operative, obedient.” 17They hung out
inevitably, though it would remain offi- white sheets from upper windows of their
cially in force for several months after homes as the troops approached, then in
the fighting ended. Given the generally general conformed to the dictates of the
friendly disposition of the young, healthy tactical commanders and later of the mil-
American—and Allied—soldier, strict itary government officials. German chil-
enforcement of such a rule, particularly dren quickly learned the trade that had
in regard to children and women, proved long been an art in the liberated coun-
impossible.16Nor was it practical when tries of begging for chewing gum and
candy, and “frauleins” reacted to the
13For a detailed discussion of the subject as it shouts from passing columns —“schlafen
related to SHAEF, see Pogue, T h e Supreme Com- mit?” either with haughty disdain or with
mand, pp. 339–43. a European woman’s sly appreciation at
14Ltr, SHAEF, 12 Sep 44, sub: Policy, Relation-
ship Between Allied Occupation Troops and In- masculine approval. There was one nota-
habitants of Germany. ble exception. The night of 24 March
15F. S. V. Donnison, C.B.E., Civil Affairs and Nazis or Nazi sympathizers murdered the
Military Government, North- West Europe 1944–
1946 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, man appointed by the Allies to be burgo-
1961), p. 374. master of Aachen.
16Oliver J. Fredericksen, T h e American Military On the first of April, Hitler issued a
Occupation of Germany 1945–1953 (Germany: T h e
Stars and Stripes, 1953). for the Historical Division,
Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe: Historical Di- 17Historical Division, European Command, Op-
vision, European Command, Fraternization with erations From Late March to Mid-July 1945, in a
the Germans in World War II, in a multivolume multivolume MS series, United States Military Gov-
MS series, Occupation Forces in Europe, 1945–46. ernment in Germany, p. 20.
AT THE END OF MARCH 331
those in support and service echelons. tember. Another special force known as
Combat soldiers complained that they the ALSOSmission, seeking information
moved too fast and had to travel too light on German developments in nuclear fis-
to have any opportunity for mailing sion, had determined the preceding No-
booty home, while soldiers behind the vember from German scientists and
front protested that the combat troops documents taken in Strasbourg that the
had purloined the valuable prizes before Germans still were a long way from pro-
others could get to them. Except for ducing an atomic bomb.21
pistols (Lugers and P-38 Walthers, par- As with looting, some American sol-
ticularly, were premium prizes) , which diers achieved personal gain in black
were more readily come upon by the in- market currency. Although the official
fantryman or tank crewman, one argu- exchange for all Allied troops was the
ment probably canceled out the other. Allied military mark, soldiers presum-
Wine and schnapps in reasonable ably could get regular German marks in
amounts continued to be ready prizes legitimate dealings as change (though
for anybody wherever found. They could how this was possible under the non-
be made to disappear, with not unpleas- fraternization policy, no one bothered
ant results, before any overly conscien- to explain), and finance officers even
tious investigating officer could check to made some official disbursements in
see where they came from. German ve- German marks. Thus there was at first
hicles also continued to find their way no regulation prohibiting a soldier from
into American hands, though some divi- exchanging German marks for military
sion commanders prohibited them or marks of or below the 100-mark denomi-
else insisted on rigid inspection of their nation (the largest bill disbursed in
serviceability lest they delay the col- military marks) or from transmitting
umns. And there were few platoons that these or large amounts of military marks
did not soon have a handsome civilian to his credit back home.
radio set, one that might be “traded up” Only after it became obvious that
as new towns were taken. black market dealings were imposing a
T o locate and then prevent looting heavy drain both on Army funds and on
and destruction of important industrial goods-food, cigarettes, PX rations, and
facilities, research establishments, banks, other items—did the European theater’s
museums, galleries, and German rec- fiscal director, in April, order finance
ords, each Allied army carried special officers neither to receive nor to disburse
intelligence teams. In American armies, German marks. By that time substantial
these included teams from the technical amounts of Allied military marks had
services, plus special groups known as found their way into the economy, and
“T-forces” designated to search for items this move alone would be insufficient to
of scientific value. The latter were espe- eliminate the black market.
cially alert for materials related to Ger-
man research in rockets, which had led
to the second of Hitler’s V-weapons, the 21Boris T. Pash, The Alsos Mission (New York:
Award House, 1969); Samuel A. Goudsmit, ALSOS
V–2 supersonic rocket that had begun to (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1964); Con-
bombard England the preceding Sep- quer: The Story of the Ninth Army, pp. 284–85.
A T T H E END OF MARCH 333
Although another regulation prohib- pillage, and kill. Although many Ameri-
ited a soldier from transmitting to the cans suspected that crying rape was a
United States more than his normal pay German woman’s way of getting back at
and allowances unless the excess was cer- the conqueror and although some sol-
tified by his personnel officer as legiti- diers undoubtedly interpreted lack of
mately obtained, that too would not halt resistance as seduction, the military
all dealings. Since gambling was al- courts generally held that even where
lowed, what personnel officer could physical force was not proved, the vic-
question, unless the sum to be trans- tim had submitted through fear.23
mitted were extraordinarily high, that Although any incidence of crimes of
it came from lucky dice? The problem violence or misbehavior before the ene-
remained to be settled after the end of my was serious, the total for the entire
the fighting, and then only after the war in Europe represented only .53 of 1
Russians had flooded the economy with percent of the total number of Ameri-
Allied military marks, making the situa- cans who served in the theater. Seventy
tion worse.22 soldiers were executed, one for deser-
The more serious crimes—desertion, tion, the others for murder, rape, or
misbehavior before the enemy, murder, rape associated with murder.24
rape, and assault with intent to commit As March came to an end, the war
rape—sharply increased in March and was in many ways unrecognizable as the
would continue to do so through the same war of those grim days of frozen,
rapid drive across Germany. The up- snow-drenched foxholes and yard-by-
swing in cases of rape was particularly yard advances along the German fron-
marked; 32 men were brought to trial tier. Spring was finally more than a
in January and February, 128 in March, promise, while more often than not, the
and 259 in April. The pattern dupli- war revolved about villages, towns, or
cated the experience of the previous cities, so that most men had a roof over
year during the race across France. In their heads at night. Companies vied
great measure it could be attributed to with battalion and regimental headquar-
the larger number of troops in Ger- ters for a town’s choicest villa for a com-
many, to lessened control and supervi- mand post, whereupon interpreters
sion by officers in mobile warfare, and might dispatch the inhabitants with an
possibly to the soldier’s knowledge that unceremonious “Alle Einwohner,
he would be moving on rapidly and thus ‘raus!” Sometimes electricity and water
was less likely to be apprehended for still functioned, and many a grimy in-
the crime. Then too, the soldiers came fantryman luxuriated in a tub of hot,
as arms-bearing conquerors of a popula- soapy water while his comrades impa-
tion that long had been propagandized
to believe that Allied troops would rape,
23Fraternization with the Germans in World War
II, pp. 80–82.
24 Office of the Judge Advocate General, U.S.
22 Walter Rundell, Jr., Black Market Money Forces, European Theater, History Branch Office
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, of the Judge Advocate General With the United
1964), provides an authoritative account of these States Forces European Theater 18 July 1942–1
activities, based on official Army records. November 1945, MS in OCMH.
334 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
tiently awaited their turn. Farther to more as the final campaign unfolded,
the rear, units had time to renovate they evolved primarily into guidelines
shower facilities in clubs, schools, or fac- for the occupation. While some dramatic
tories. Short passes to Paris or the Rivi- features, such as a possible air-landing
era, begun the preceding fall, continued in Berlin, remained to the end, ECLIPSE
for a fortunate few, while for a magic dealt mainly with more prosaic matters
smattering, those longest in combat, such as armistice terms, disarmament,
there was leave in the United States that displaced persons, prisoners of war, and
would not end before the war did. German courts. 25 In conformitywith
As in the old days, copies of the sol- the nature of the advance into Germany
dier newspaper, Stars& Stripes,and the and the likelihood that final surrender
weekly magazine, Yank, continued to would come only after the entire coun-
reach the front, though often several try was occupied, SHAEF decreed in Ap-
days late, along with pocket-sized edi- ril that no formal transition to ECLIPSE
tions of U.S. magazines and paperback was to take place, but that ECLIPSEcon-
books. Blue-uniformed American girls ditions were presumed to be in effectin
who had smiled their way indefatigably those areas progressively overrun.
through Britain, France, and Belgium, Another factor no longer disturbing
continued to dispense doughnuts and the staffs and commanders was a formerly
coffee from Red Cross clubmobiles. Re- critical shortage of infantry replace-
flecting the improvement in the logis- ments, or reinforcements, as by decree
tical situation over the preceding sum- for morale purposes they had come to be
mer, the supply of cigarettes—still is- known. Various methods adopted dur-
sued free to front-line soldiers—was ing the preceding winter when the prob-
usually ample, though other post ex- lem had become acute during the
change rations reaching the combat Ardennes fighting had by March pro-
troops were meager. The combat soldier duced creditable results, including an
would continue to complain, not with- extensive retraining program for troops
out considerable justification, that suc- culled from U.S. Army Air Forces and
cessive echelons to the rear shortstopped service units, though the Air Forces, in
the choicer items. particular, was accused of channeling
Some higher staff levels were already into this program only its misfits.
planning for redeployment to the United One aspect of the program was the
States or to the Pacific theater, while appearance in March of fifty-three pla-
others continued to work on plans to be toons of Negro troops, men who had
used in the event of German surrender. volunteered, often taking reductions in
Begun before D-day in France and orig- grade in the process, to leave their service
inally given the code name TALISMAN, units for the front. In the 12th Army
these plans now were known, following Group the platoons were attached to a
a presumed compromise of security, as number of veteran divisions, usually one
Operation ECLIPSE.Constantly altered to a regiment, to serve under a white
and adjusted, the plans at first had been
25For details, see the SHAEF file on Operation
oriented toward the possibility of sud- ECLIPSE. For a convenient summary see Frederick-
den German collapse, but more and sen, The American Military Occupation, pp. 2–5.
AT T H E END OF MARCH 335
DESTRUCTION
IN THE HEART
OF WUERZBURG
out Hitler’s knowledge had sent emis- of the German command in Italy made
saries to Sweden and Switzerland to make contact with Allied agents in Switzer-
contact with Allied representatives and land, but negotiations led nowhere until
discuss a negotiated peace, but neither the last week of the war.31
had been able to establish fruitful con- Either in the bomb-damaged Reich
nections. On 25 January the Chief of the Chancellery or, increasingly, in the
Army General Staff, Generaloberst Heinz Fuehrerbunker fifty feet under the gar-
Guderian, had urged peace in the west den of the chancellery, Adolf Hitler trod
so that what was left of the German a narrow path between acknowledging
armies could be concentrated against the defeat and believing in a miracle, be-
Russians; it earned him only an accusa- tween sanity and insanity. In February
tion of “high treason” from his only with difficulty had subordinates
Fuehrer.30 In early April representatives
31For this story, see Ernest F. Fisher, Cassino to
30 Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: the Alps, a volume in preparation for the series
E. P. Dutton & Co.. Inc. 1952). pp. 401–02, 404–05. UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
A T THE END OF MARCH 337
talked him out of denouncing the most devoid of central direction from
Geneva Convention, ordering all cap- Berlin. T h e old order to stand fast, no-
tured airmen shot, and resorting to gas where to give any ground even in quest
warfare. While his nation fell apart, he of reinforcements for other sectors, was
spent long, tedious hours arguing trivial still in effect—the only “strategy.” Such
details (promotion policy for officers, decisions as Hitler did make were usu-
whether to cut down trees in the Tier- ally based on colored daily briefings by
garten to make an aircraft landing strip) Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, chief of the
or, without regard for realities, lecturing Armed Forces Operations Staff (Wehr-
and raging at the presumed perversities machtfuehrungsstab) , who by this time
of his underlings (“I am lied to on all had learned how to phrase his remarks
sides. I can rely on no one. They all to avoid inciting the Fuehrer to rage.
betray me.”) On 19 March, seeming at In any case, the once powerful high com-
last to accept the inevitability of defeat mand was reduced to the spectacle of
and having determined to bring the en- pondering tactical and administrative
tire temple crashing down with him, he trivialities—when, for example, five tank
directed a scorched earth policy designed destroyers, the only available reserve,
to turn Germany into a wasteland, an might be readied for commitment against
order circumvented only by the subter- the Oppenheim bridgehead, or whether
fuge of Albert Speer. Yet in the curious to send liaison officers to some part of
little world of delusion he had con- the front or another to get the facts on
structed about himself, the Fuehrer only the situation.
a few days later could share the en- Nor was there much more direction at
thusiastic belief of his propaganda chief, the level of the Commander in Chief
Josef Goebbels, that in the same way the West, Field Marshal Kesselring, for what
death of the Czarina had saved Frederick could he do? New to his post, the fieId
the Great in 1762, some miracle would marshal “felt like a concert pianist who is
happen to set the tenpins of the Third asked to play a Beethoven sonata . . .
Reich upright again. Somehow the on an ancient, rickety, and out-of-tune
Grand Alliance between east and west instrument.” 33 Kesselring, who four
was going to fall apart and the Western times during the first six weeks of his
Allies would come obsequiously begging command spoke frankly with Hitler
to long-suffering Germany to be allowed about the situation in the west, appar-
to join the holy war against bolshevism.32 ently was one of the few military men
T h e fighting in the west was now al- who retained the Fuehrer’s trust. Each
time he found Hitler “understanding,”
32 Hitler’s last days have been adequately docu-
mented in a number o f works, all of which have
appreciative of the fact “that the situa-
drawn on the surviving fragments of the Fuehrer tion in the west had deteriorated too far
Conferences. See, for example, Pogue, The Supreme to be effectively remedied.” At a meeting
Command; Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third
Reich; Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny
on 15 March Hitler promised an infantry
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947); and division to be transferred from Denmark,
Felix Gilbert, Hitler Directs His War (New York: but that was all except for a nebulous
Oxford University Press, 1950). See also Toland,
The Last 100 Days, and Cornelius Ryan, The Last
Battle (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1966). 33Kesselring, A Soldier’s Record, p. 305.
338 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
plan to find enough men somehow to that bridgehead would be east of the
create new units. Kesselring’s lasting im- Ruhr, in a position to swing against his
pression was that Hitler “was literally rear. Goaded by General Blumentritt,
obsessed with the idea of some miracu- who on 28 March arrived from the
lous salvation, that he clung to it like a Twenty-fifth Army to take the badly
drowning man to a straw.’’ 34 wounded General Schlemm’s place in
Probably not even Kesselring knew command of the First Parachute Army,
the true strength of the German forces Blaskowitz went over Field Marshal
remaining in the west, but something of Kesselring’s head with what the Com-
their condition could be gleaned from mander in Chief West called a “super-
the fact that the Allied armies, since the erogatory account” of the situation.
February beginning of the battle for the As a result of Army Group B’s prob-
Rhineland, had taken more than 250,000 lems, Blaskowitz indicated, the situation
prisoners. These, together with killed in Army Group H would soon become
and wounded, the SHAEF intelligence critical. He wanted authority to with-
staff estimated, amounted to the strength draw his entire force behind the Weser
of more than 20 full divisions. Although River, some 125 miles east of the Rhine.
the German order of battle showed over Abandoning his two southernmost corps
60 divisions in the west, some were little (Luettwitz’s XLVII Panzer Corps and
more than divisional staffs, others only Abraham’s LXIII Corps) to fight on in
Kumpfgruppen, and probably none at the Ruhr with Army Group B , Blumen-
anywhere near full strength. They repre- tritt would withdraw the rest of the First
sented, according to Allied estimates, the Parachute Army across some fifty miles
equivalent of only 26 complete divisions, of generally flat terrain to the first logical
in marked contrast to Eisenhower’s go delaying position, the Teutoburger
full-strength divisions.35 Wald, a range of low hills extending
Partly because German units in the northwest from the eastern fringe of the
north had been afforded a brief respite Ruhr, there to cover withdrawal of the
behind the Rhine before the Allies Twenty-fifth Army from the Nether-
crossed and partly because the Twenty- lands.36
fifth Army in the Netherlands had yet This report and request angered both
to be directly engaged, Army Group H Hitler and Kesselring, the former not
under General Blaskowitz was in better only because of its inherent defeatism
shape than the other two army groups. but because it contained none of the
Yet Blaskowitz saw no hope of stemming psychological niceties to which he had
the 21 Army Group’s drive from the become accustomed. Although Kessel-
bridgeheads. Noting developments o p ring wanted Blaskowitz replaced, Hitler
posite Remagen in the adjacent sector of settled instead for sending a former com-
Field Marshal Model’s Army Group B , mander of Army Group H , General
Blaskowitz thought it only a matter of a
day or so before American forces from 36Kesselring A Soldier’s Record, pp. 302–03;
MSS # B–414 (Geyer); # B–354, Battles Fought
34 Ibid., pp. 311–12. by the First Parachute Army Between 28 March
35SHAEF Intelligence Sum 53, week ending 25 and 9 April 1945 (General der Infanterie Guenther
Mar 45. Blumentritt).
A T THE END OF MARCH 339
for the coup de grâce against Germany. tarily and take the city. Since the closest
For the more immediate task, encircling Allied troops were still 275 miles from
the Ruhr, the long-approved stratagem Berlin, the Red Army apparently would
of cutting off the industrial region by get there first.
converging thrusts of the First and Ninth Once Berlin ceased to be an objective,
Armies remained unchanged; but for the it was relatively easy to find justification
final thrust beyond the Ruhr, Eisen- for shifting the Allied main effort from
hower signaled a major change in plan the north to the center, from Mont-
that for a time ruffled British-American gomery’s 21 Army Group to Bradley’s
command relations and raised the issue 12th. With the addition of the Fifteenth
of the extent that military decision Army to handle mop-up and occupation
should be influenced by political consid- duties, the 12th Army Group was the
erations. 39 stronger force and could be strengthened
As early as September 1944, General even more by transferring the Ninth
Eisenhower had outlined his intention to Army back to Bradley’s command once
proceed from the Ruhr to the German the Ruhr was encircled. T h e 12th Army
capital, Berlin, long considered—perhaps Group was also in a position to capitalize
theoretically or symbolically—the final quickly on the surprise bonus of the
objective in the war against Germany. Rhine crossings at Remagen and Oppen-
T h e 21 Army Group, assisted by an heim, and, by its location in the center,
American army, was to make the main was the logical candidate both for link-
effort. Yet at the same time, General ing with the Russians to split Germany
Eisenhower introduced a reservation. in two and for seizing the Leipzig-
Recognizing that the Russians might al- Dresden area, one of the last major in-
ready have taken Berlin by the time dustrial complexes that would be left to
Allied armies fanned out across Ger- the Germans after loss of the Ruhr and
many, he suggested that the 21 Army Silesia.
Group might take Hannover and the As further justification for a shift in
north German ports, the 12th Army main effort, some members of the
Group the Leipzig-Dresden industrial SHAEF staff pointed to the possibility
complex of central Germany, and the of a last-ditch Nazi hold-out position ru-
6th Army Group the industrial cities of mored to be under construction in the
southern Germany. Alps-a National Redoubt. T h e rumors
By late March 1945 the Red Army had gained substance the preceding fall
had yet to reach Berlin. In the bridge- and of late had been fed by planted in-
head across the Oder River some thirty formation from the Nazi propaganda
miles from the capital, the Russians had chief, Dr. Goebbels. Although some in-
paused, presumably to regroup and bring fluential Germans had earnestly espoused
up supplies. There seemed little doubt the idea of a redoubt, it did not, in fact,
that they would renew the drive momen- exist; and although many in Allied—par-
ticularly British—command and intelli-
gence circles discounted it entirely, the
39This section is based on the annotated account
of these events in Pogue, T h e Supreme Command,
possibility of some form of last-ditch re-
pp. 434–36, 441–47. sistance in the Alps was a factor—though
A T T H E END OF MARCH 341
40On this subject, see a detailed survey by Rodney 41Memo by JCS, CCS 805/2, 30 Mar 45, cited in
G. Minott, The Fortress That Never Was (New Pogue, T h e Supreme Command, p. 442.
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964) See also 42 Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 931, 1 Apr 45,
below, ch. XVIII. cited in Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 443.
342 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
make a main effort with the 12th Army armies, in the meantime, had launched
Group through central Germany to link the breakout drives from their bridge-
with the Russians—that the Allied heads over the Rhine.
CHAPTER XVI
1 See above, ch. XI. 2 12th AGp Ltr of Instrs 18, 25 Mar 45.
REDUCING T H E R U H R 345
lute; neither was anybody prepared for his superiors, but they could provide no
an impending German collapse. Close by reinforcement without stripping General
the Rhine a combat command of the 9th Bayerlein’sLIII Corps in the north. This
Armored Division crossed the Wied Field Marshal Model at Army Group B
River with little difficulty and advanced refused to sanction because of his per-
four miles, while the 2d Division’s 38th sisting belief that the breakout attack
Infantry, alongside the armor, covered would be directed northward. Nor would
more than eight miles in three days to the Fifteenth Army commander approve
establish a second bridgehead over the a shift to the south. Even though Zangen
Wied four miles deep. Both armor and disagreed with Model’s estimate of the
infantry could readily have advanced direction the breakout would take, he
even farther with little more effort. thought it would be directed not to the
Huebner’s V Corps quite clearly could southeast but east-northeast generally
break out at will. from the center of the bridgehead. Fur-
Having anticipated fairly firm resist- thermore, as of 24 March, the north wing
ance at the start of the breakout, General had already been weakened by orders
Hodges had planned the First Army’s from Field Marshal Kesselring at O B
main effort to be made by Van Fleet’s WEST. In response to General Patton’s
III Corps, directed southeastward toward surprise crossing of the Rhine at Oppen-
the Lahn at Limburg; the V Corps would heim, Kesselring had ordered Army
mop up the east bank of the Rhine Group B to release the Fifteenth Army’s
down to the Lahn, and there be pinched strongest unit, the 11th Panzer Division,
out by Van Fleet’s advance and shifted to go to the aid of Army Group G at
into army reserve. T h e experience of Oppenheim.4
the V Corps in its limited objective With the loss of the 11th Panzer Di-
attacks changed the plan. To take ad- vision, there were few reinforcements
vantage of the apparent soft spot, Hodges that either Zangen or Model might have
shifted the intercorps boundary to swing sent in any case. Already Model had
the III Corps northeastward short of drained the Fifth Panzer Army, which
Limburg, aim Huebner’s V Corps at was holding the east bank of the Rhine
Limburg, and provide General Huebner along the face of the Ruhr, to a danger-
with a zone of advance to the northeast ously low level, and in all of Army Group
for what seemed to be a fast-developing B there remained only some sixty-five
breakout operation.3 tanks, fifty of which already were fighting
T h e soft spot represented all that was along the northern periphery of the
left of General Hitzfeld’s LXVII Corps, bridgehead. Otherwise there was avail-
southernmost of the three corps under able behind the front only “a confused
General von Zangen’s Fifteenth Army. army of stragglers,” and even though
That Hitzfeld was down to tattered re- commanders constantly gathered and
mains of some five or six infantry di-
visions and had no armor was known to 4The German story is based primarily on MS
# B–593 (Wagener) and MS # B–848, Fifteenth
Army, 23 November 1944–30 March 1945 (Zangen).
3 See FUSA Report of Operations, 23 February- See also MS # B–409, L I I I Infantry Corps 23–29
8 March 1945, pp. 38–41. March 1945 (Bayerlein).
346 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
committed these men, they did so only American First Army that neither com-
to see them “slip away again.”5 mander would discern, even after the
Obsessed with the idea that the Ameri- assault began, that the Allied main thrust
cans would strike north, Field Marshal was directed not to the east or even
Model based his only hope of preventing northeast but to the southeast toward
a breakout on a strong defense along the the Lahn.6
natural barrier of the Sieg River and Five infantry and two armored divi-
subsequent counterattack into the flank sions opened the First Army breakout
of any northward penetration. General drive before daylight on 25 March. Aim-
von Zangen counted instead on a hope ing first for the road center of Alten-
that when the Americans struck east- kirchen, then for crossings of the Dill
ward, as he expected, against Puechler’s River more than forty-five miles east of
LXXIV Corps in the center, Bayerlein’s the Rhine, General Collins’s VII Corps
LIII Corps and Hitzfeld’s LXVII Corps used an infantry division, the 78th, to
could maintain contact with Puechler’s hold that part of the Sieg River line
flanks to present a cohesive front long already captured while another, the 1st,
enough to enable Bayerlein’s armor to protected the corps north flank by attack-
mount a counterattack from the north. ing eastward along the river. (Map XII)
Somehow managing to ignore bigger At the same time, the 3d Armored Di-
American gains southward across the vision attacked through positions of a
Wied River, Zangen took the limited third infantry division, the 104th, due
objective attacks of the U.S. VII and III east toward Altenkirchen, while the in-
Corps as proof of his theory that the fantry mopped up bypassed resistance.
breakout would be directed east-north- T h e Germans at many points made a
east. When he pressed Army Group B real fight of it that morning. Reflecting
with that presumed evidence, he detected the German concentration near the
a weakening in Model’s position. T h e northern periphery of the bridgehead,
army group commander nevertheless the 1st Division and the two northern
continued to believe that the location of columns of the armor had the worst of it.
his greatest strength in the north was There a newly arrived Kampfgruppe of
advisable, since he might counterattack the Panzer Lehr Division—all that was
from the north into the flank of either left of the division—and contingents of
a northward or an eastward drive. the 11th Panzer Division that had not
yet departed for the Army Group G sec-
T h e Breakout Offensive tor fought with old-time fury: German
artillery fire from north of the Sieg was
Even if Model and Zangen were not so heavy at some places that it reminded
actually aware of it at the time, they were veterans of hectic days in the Siegfried
soon to realize that they were balancing Line. Steep, wooded hills and gorgelike
one vain hope against another. Indeed, draws and valleys added to the difficulty,
so weak were the Germans everywhere but in the end, American power was
and so powerful all three corps of the
6In MS # B–858, Zangen justifies his prediction
of a threat to east-northeast on his reading of how
5Quotations are from MS # B–593 (Wagener). the American attack actually developed.
REDUCING T H E R U H R 347
simply too overwhelming. In sparkling short of Koblenz. From there good roads
clear skies, fighter-bombers of the XIX led almost due east to Limburg. T h e 2d
Tactical Air Command time after time Division’s 23d Infantry meanwhile car-
struck German formations with particu- ried the advance on the armor’s left,
lar attention to tanks and assault guns. losing two men killed and fifteen
Supporting artillery fired 632 missions. wounded in exchange for gains of more
One Tiger tank and a self-propelled gun than five miles. T h e promise of the
fell victim to an American T26 (Persh- earlier limited objective attacks in this
ing) , one of the experimental tanks in sector clearly was to be fulfilled.
the 3d Armored Division. By midday During the course of this advance,
the armor was through the enemy’s main soon after midday, the 23d Infantry’s
line, and when night came stood twelve Company G gained a crossing of the
miles beyond its line of departure, half little Sayn River, only to face a clifflike
the distance toAltenkirchen. 7 stretch of wooded high ground beyond.
General Van Fleet’s III Corps in the Tired from the morning’s fight, hot in a
center, also driving toward eventual wool uniform baked by a brilliant spring
crossings of the Dill River but with a sun, the company Commander deplored
southeastward orientation at first in or- the thought of walking with heavy equip-
der to help the advance of the V Corps, ment u p the winding road ahead. “Climb
withheld its armor on the first day. on the tanks,” he ordered his men. They
There too resistance was strongest in the responded by enthusiastically clambering
north, where the 9th Division brushed aboard two platoons of attached medium
against the remnants of the resurrected tanks. You did not ride, the men knew,
9th Panzer Division, the only force of until the resistance had begun to col-
any appreciable power left to General lapse.
Puechler’s LXXIV Corps. The 9th Events the next morning, 26 March,
gained almost four miles through densely proved the men and their company com-
wooded, sharply convoluted terrain, mander right, to the immense pleasure
while the 99th Division on the right of the army commander, General
picked up more than five miles. An Hodges, and his guests of the day, Gen-
order from the army commander, Gen- erals Eisenhower and Bradley.8 T h e day
eral Hodges, to get the 7th Armored before, the Third Army’s 4th Armored
Division into the fore the next day ar- Division had broken out of the Oppen-
rived moments after General Van Fleet heim bridgehead and seized bridges over
himself had made the same decision and the Main River at Hanau and Aschaffen-
alerted the armor for the move. burg, and the VIII Corps had begun
In the V Corps, headed for Limburg jumping the Rhine gorge at Boppard.
on the Lahn, the 9th Armored Division Before daylight on the 26th, the Seventh
continued its thrust down the east bank Army had begun to cross the Rhine near
of the Rhine, coming to a halt only after Worms, and British and American units
an advance of over eight miles to the north of the Ruhr were straining to
Rhine town of Vallendar, a few miles achieve a breakout. With those develop-
7 Unless otherwise noted, the tactical story is
from official unit records and combat interviews. 8 Sylvan Diary, entry of 26 Mar 45.
348 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
ments as a backdrop, Hodges was elated units, struggled to keep up. T h e III
when news of his three-pronged armored Corps on 26 March captured 17,482 Ger-
advance began to come in. mans, more than 12,500 taken by the
Despite an early morning counter- armored division. Several hundred of
attack by infantry supported by assault these prisoners represented the rear
guns, apparently designed to allow rem- echelon of the 11th Panzer Division,
nants of the Panzer Lehr Division to pull caught as they moved diagonally across
back behind the Sieg River, the 3d the front en route to commitment with
Armored Division in General Collins’s Army Group G.
VII Corps raced eastward in great T h e story was much the same with
bounds. With a motorized combat team the 9th Armored Division of the V
of the 104th Division attached, the armor Corps. Once calls to higher headquarters
bypassed Altenkirchen, leaving that road straightened out the brief run-in with
center for reserves to clear. After taking the 7th Armored Division on the auto-
high ground outside Hachenburg, half bahn, the 9th Armored drove eastward
the distance from the original bridge- toward Limburg against almost no op-
head to the objectives on the Dill River, position. Although remnants of General
it coiled for the night. At those points Hitzfeld’s L X V I I Corps fled ahead of the
where the Germans elected to make a armor, in most cases their flight served
stand, mainly along the north flank, merely to augment the prisoners of the
planes of the 48th Fighter-Bomber adjacent III Corps.
Group in close co-ordination with the In midafternoon Combat Command
armor swooped down to take out tanks B found a bridge intact over the Lahn
and self-propelled guns. In late afternoon River and got four tanks across before
such organized units as still opposed the the Germans could ignite the prepared
advance began to peel back across the demolition and blow the span. Dis-
Sieg. mounted armored infantrymen then
In the III Corps the time proved fully made their way across on the rubble and
propitious for committing armor. After systematically began to clear Limburg of
an early delay caused by craters blown scattered small arms resistance, aug-
in the roads and by mines, demolished mented occasionally by fire from Panzer-
bridges, and a mix-up with the V Corps fausts. Although most of the town was
over running rights on the autobahn, the in hand soon after dark, the division
7th Armored Division broke loose to commander, General Leonard, post-
roam almost at will southeastward to- poned a continuation of the drive be-
ward Weilburg on the Lahn River. By yond the river to cut in behind those
road measurement some units of the di- Germans opposing the Third Army’s
vision advanced over thirty miles. When VIII Corps until he could get a treadway
night came the 7th Armored Division bridge built across the Lahn.
held high ground overlooking Weilburg,
while infantry of the 9th and 99th Di- Collapse of the L X X X I X Corps
visions, advancing on attached tanks and
tank destroyers and by shuttle in trucks On 27 March, as General Leonard
borrowed from artillery antiaircraft prepared to send his reserve combat com-
REDUCING T H E R U H R 349
mand southeastward along the autobahn, It was too little too late. In an attack
the German LXXXIX Corps, having that started shortly after midday on 27
fought vainly to prevent crossings of the March, the 9th Armored Division’s CCR
Rhine gorge, had fallen back from the sliced quickly through the hasty defenses
Rhine to a line not quite midway be- on the autobahn and reached its objec-
tween the river and the autobahn. This tive of Idstein, fifteen miles to the south-
was the corps, commanded by General east, before dark.
Hoehne, that only shortly before the Pressed hard from the west by the on-
American VIII Corps attacked had been coming VIII Corps and faced with this
transferred to Army Group B’s Fifteenth sizable American force to his rear, the
Army; in the confusion of events, no commander of the LXXXIX Corps, Gen-
contact had ever been established with eral Hoehne, finally managed in late
the army headquarters and little with afternoon to establish radio contact with
headquarters of the army group. This Field Marshal Kesselring at OB WEST.
was the corps, too, that had lost the 6th T o Hoehne’s request that he be allowed
SS Mountain Division at the order of to withdraw east of the autobahn, Kessel-
Field Marshal Kesselring only hours be- ring gave a decisive no.
fore the VIII Corps attacked. Like the It made little difference. Having al-
incoming 11th Panzer Division, the ready lost communications with what-
mountain division, its 6,000 men repre- ever remained of the 6th SS Mountain
senting a still creditable fighting unit, Division, Hoehne during the morning
was supposed to be used to counterattack learned from his one surviving division,
Patton’s crossing at Oppenheim.9 the 276th Infantry Division, that collapse
Receiving the news of American armor was imminent. Hoehne took it upon
racing toward the Lahn, Kesselring had himself to order withdrawal. His own
quickly reconsidered and reassigned the headquarters was under hostile fire from
mountain division to the LXXXIX reconnaissance cars and infantry when,
Corps to be committed to hold the line with a group of some thirty of his staff,
of the Lahn around Limburg. Because he headed east. “Corps HQ” he was to
the division had no gasoline, the men note later in something of an understate-
had to march on foot, arriving at the ment, “was n o longer in a position to
southern edge of Limburg late on the exercise effective command.” 11
26th only after American armor had What was left of General Brenner’s
already entered. With additional units 6th SS Mountain Division —some 2,000
of the division that arrived during the men—meanwhile continued to hold out
night, the commander, Generalmajor west of the autobahn and from time to
Karl Brenner, built up a line facing time during the next two days set u p
north astride the autobahn.10 roadblocks on the autobahn, even after
forward units of the VIII Corps had
9 See above, ch. XIII. moved well to the east and the 9th
10MSS # B–584 (Hoehne) and # B–715, 6 SS Armored’s CCR had gone back north of
Geb Div “Nord,” During the Defensive Combat in the Lahn. During the night of 30 March
the Area Koblenz-Eltville and Limburg-Diez, East
of the Rhine, 19 March–3 April 1945 (General der
Waffen SS Karl Brenner). 11 MS # B–584 (Hoehne).
350 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
Brenner and his force would begin an the process the army commander, Gen-
attempt to infiltrate back to German eral von Zangen, lost contact with almost
everybody but his own staff and the
lines, an odyssey destined to end three
days later, on 2 April, when the rem- headquarters of one of his corps, Gen-
nants, including General Brenner, wereeral Puechler’sLXXIV Corps, which had
finally rounded up. been utterly crushed by the breakout
During the course of their peregrina-
offensive. Unable to reach the Fifteenth
Army headquarters by radio or tele-
tions, the SS troops captured an Ameri-
phone, Field Marshal Model at Army
can field hospital, where they obtained
Group B was fast coming to the conclu-
critically needed gasoline and transpor-
tation. Although they treated the hos-sion that Zangen had been captured.14
pital personnel correctly, a rumor that Since he was unable to contact Zangen,
they had murdered the staff and raped Model dealt directly with the com-
mander of the LIII Corps, General Bay-
the nurses accounted, General Patton re-
ported later, for the fervor with which
erlein, ordering him to pull back behind
American troops hunted them down. the Sieg, relinquish the line of the Sieg
Some 500 were killed before a last 800to contingents of the Fifth Panzer Army,
surrendered. 12 and prepare for a counterattack into the
The collapse of the LXXXIX Corps American flank in the direction of Lim-
severed the last tenuous link between burg. To Bayerlein, knowing how weak
Army Groups B and G, and there was were the remnants of his corps, a coun-
nothing the Germans could do about it.terattack seemed “impossible and en-
The only reserve even remotely avail- tireIy hopeless . . . insane,” but he
able, the remains of the 11th Panzer dutifully began preparations. 15
Division, would be swept u p in the gen- T h e pace of the American drive on
eral American advance and ripped to this same day, 27 March, supplied any
pieces with no chance of mounting a affirmation Bayerlein might have needed
counterattack. Only the division com- that counterattack would be in vain.
mander and the reconnaissance battalion
While occupied with the thrust south of
even reached their destination with the Lahn River, the 9th Armored Di-
Army Group G. 13 vision of the V Corps made no further
eastward advance. In the VII Corps, on
A T u r n to the North the north wing of the First Army, the 3d
Armored Division gained an impressive
Even without that collapse, the two twenty-two miles to jump the Dill River
army groups soon would have been sep- in two places. At the same time, the 7th
arated, for the American First Army’s Armored Division of the III Corps also
breakthrough of the positions of the crossed the Dill, seizing four bridges in-
Fifteenth Army opposite the Remagen tact. Fog in morning and afternoon and
bridgehead on 26 March was total. I n a low overcast the rest of the day pre-
vented air support, but the armored boundaries, Bradley turned the First
columns had little need of it. They were Army northward toward Paderborn,
roaming the enemy’s rear areas, every- leaving the Third Army oriented north-
where catching the Germans by surprise, east on Kassel to protect the First Army
and finding them unprepared to defend right flank; anticipating a rapid drive, he
with more than an occasional roadblock rejected a proposal from the First Allied
covered by a smattering of small arms Airborne Army for an airborne attack to
fire or perhaps a Panzerfaust or a lone sieze Kassel. (Map XIII) The new Fif-
self-propelled gun that could be quickly teenth Army was to take over defense of
put to flight. Only on the First Army the Rhine’s west bank so that all the
left flank, where the 1st Division con- First Army divisions could cross the
tinued to sweep up to the south bank river to man the ever-lengthening front
of the Sieg, was there any real resistance, facing the Ruhr.16
and it was more a reminder that there Within the First Army, General Col-
were sizable German forces beyond the lins’s VII Corps from its position on the
Sieg covering the Ruhr than it was an inside of the wheel was the obvious
immediate problem. choice for making the main thrust t o
The next day, 28 March, the armor Paderborn, despite the continuing sensi-
of the VII Corps again set the pace, tive reaction of the Germans on the left
driving another twenty-one miles and flank. T h e other two corps were to con-
seizing the little cultural center of Mar- tinue northeastward to protect Collins’s
burg on the upper reaches of the Lahn. right flank.
T h e town’s thirteenth century cathedral A task force, commanded by Lt. Col.
and its university, founded in 1527, Walter B. Richardson and built around
showed no scar from twentieth century a medium tank battalion that included
battle. En route, the 3d Armored Di- three of the new Pershing tanks, led the
vision overran several German hospitals 3d Armored Division advance on 29
with more than 5,600 soldier patients, March. T h e orders: “Just go like hell!” 17
took another 10,000 prisoners, so many Although the objective—Paderborn—
they could not all be processed during lay more than sixty miles away, Richard-
the day, and sent scores of liberated for- son was determined to make it before
eign laborers coursing happily toward calling a halt.
the west. T h e V Corps meanwhile took Crashing through some roadblocks, by-
a day to reorganize, while the armor of passing others, occasionally shooting u p
the III Corps kept almost abreast, ad- the landscape, everywhere encountering
vancing thirteen miles, capturing Gies- dismayed Germans who obviously had no
sen, and dispersing a fairly persistent inkling that American troops were near,
delaying force before seizing crossings Task Force Richardson plunged rapidly
over the Lahn. forward, hardly missing the tactical air
To the 12th Army Group commander, support that a hazy, overcast day denied.
General Bradley, the time had arrived to Follow-up units, supply troops, liaison
begin the great wheel to the north de-
1612th AGp Ltr of Instrs 19, 28 Mar 45.
signed to join with the Ninth Army to 17 Toland in The Last 100 Days, pages 309–11,
encircle the Ruhr. Redrawing army provides a vivid account of this day’s action.
352 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
officers, and messengers probably did miles short of Paderborn. There they
more actual fighting than did the leading fought the rest of the day and much of
force, since German stragglers and by- the night against at least two tanks and
passed groups often recovered from their more than 200 Germans, most of whom
first bewilderment to fight back. T h e employed Panzerfaust antitank weapons
longest delay for Richardson’s column with suicidal fervor.
developed in Brilon, twenty-five miles Coming up on Richardson’s right, an-
short of Paderborn, where, as Richard- other task force commanded by Col.
son and an advance guard pushed on, John C. Welborn tried to bypass the
someone among the tank crews discov- town by a secondary road. Dusk was a p
ered a warehouse filled with champagne. proaching when small arms fire from
When the tanks finally caught u p with either side of the road and round after
their commander, the actions of many of round from tanks and self-propelled guns
of the crewmen provided disconcerting cut the column. One of those who dived
evidence of their find. for cover in a ditch was the 3d Armored
Task Force Richardson at last halted Division commander, General Rose, on
around midnight fifteen miles short of his way forward to supervise the final
Paderborn. T h e decision to stop was assault on Paderborn with his aide and a
based on about equal parts of concern small party traveling in jeeps and an
for exhausted troops and a report that armored car.
tanks from an SS panzer replacement Hardly had Rose finished sending a
training center were in the Sennelager radio message to his command post to
maneuver area near Paderborn. Al- dispatch another task force to take out
though still short of the objective, Rich- this nest of opposition when four Ger-
ardson and his men had covered forty-five man tanks appeared, coming u p the road
miles at a cost of no casualty more severe from the rear. In the early evening dark-
than the headaches some men suffered ness, Rose and his party tried to escape
from too much champagne. by racing past the tanks, but one of the
tanks suddenly swerved, pinning Rose’s
T h e next day, 30 March, the com- jeep against a tree. A German stand-
plexion of the battle abruptly changed. ing in the turret motioned with a burp
Hardly had Task Force Richardson re- gun. Rose, his aide, Maj. Robert Bell-
sumed the advance when the point inger, and his driver, Tech. 5 Glen H.
bumped into a defensive line hastily Shaunce, dismounted. They had no
manned during the night by students choice but to surrender.
from an SS panzer reconnaissance train- Standing in front of the tank, Bel-
ing battalion and an SS tank training linger and Shaunce unbuckled their pis-
and replacement regiment, banded to- tol belts and let them drop. Rose started
gether with support from an SS tank either to do the same or to remove his
replacement battalion of approximately pistol from its holster. T h e German in
sixty Tiger and Panther tanks into a the turret quickly swung his burp gun,
unit named SS Ersatzbrigade Westfalen. and a spout of flame split the darkness.
By midafternoon Richardson’s men had Rose pitched forward. Bellinger and
forced their way into a town only six Shaunce dived for a ditch and, in the
REDUCING T H E RUHR 353
Army sans combat troops soon after the upon a daring scheme to escape and
American breakthrough, the LXVI make his way back into the Ruhr. Or-
Corps under Generalleutnant Hermann ganizing his men and more than a hun-
Floerke.20 dred remaining vehicles into small
Zangen ordered both corps to collect groups, he ordered them to thread their
stragglers (the roads were jammed with way in the darkness into the gaps, march
them), security troops, ambulatory hos- with the Americans for several miles to
pital patients, whatever, to build a line a road junction, then turn to the west as
across the corridor near Giessen; when the Americans continued northward.
American armor overran that position Zangen and almost his entire force es-
before any barrier could be raised, he caped. Only one truckload of troops and
ordered the line built south of Marburg. a motorcyclist failed. They made the mis-
Again the American columns overran take of calling out in their native tongue
the position. to the lead vehicle in an American serial
Hardly had Zangen dutifully desig- that came u p behind them.
nated a third line, this time along the
Lahn River north of Marburg, when T h e Thrust From Winterberg
word reached him that American armor
already had jumped the Lahn and by- In pinning much of their hope for a
passed his headquarters town of Bieden- successful attack from Winterberg on
kopf on both east and west. (This was striking before American infantry could
on 29 March, the day of the 3d Armored consolidate behind the armored spear-
Division’s explosive advance toward heads, German commanders failed to
Paderborn behind Task Force Richard- give proper consideration to the speed of
son.) T h e third line obviously had been the infantry units. Conscious of insuf-
compromised even before Zangen desig- ficient infantry strength in the old-style
nated it, and his headquarters was cut “heavy” armored divisions, of which the
off not only from the army group but 3d Armored was one, General Rose and
also from the two remaining corps com- the VII Corps commander, General Col-
mands. lins, had long practiced attaching an
Only a step ahead of American tanks, entire infantry regiment to the armor in
Zangen herded his headquarters staff and breakthrough situations. As the 3d
attached units out of Biedenkopf into a Armored had rolled toward Paderborn,
nearby forest. There, as night came, he the 104th Division’s 414th Infantry had
and his men hid, warily eyeing tanks gone along, some men mounted on the
and vehicles of the 3d Armored Division armored division’s tanks, tank destroyers,
driving past. and half-tracks, others in the regiment’s
When sentries reported large gaps in own vehicles. These “doughs” (short for
the American column, Zangen seized doughboys), as the tank crewmen called
them, were not to mop u p resistance but
20 T h e Fifteenth Army story is from MSS # B- to help the tankers if the going got
848 (Zangen) and # B–382, Report Covering the sticky.
Activities of the Staff of the LXVI Armeekorps
During March and April 1945 (Generalleutnant
Close behind the armor and its at-
Hermann Floerke). tached infantry came the rest of the
REDUCING T H E RUHR 355
104th Division, mounted on its own ve- Infantry Division, moved from Denmark
hicles, those of its artillery and attached in accord with Hitler’s earlier promise.
antiaircraft battalion, trucks furnished Meanwhile, the 9th Armored Division
by the First Army quartermaster, and of General Huebner’s V Corps also
the battalions of tanks and tank destroy- reached the Eder River downstream from
ers that by that stage of the war had for the dam and forced a crossing. Infantry
so long been constantly attached that the divisions followed the armor closely in
division looked upon them almost as both corps, providing strength close at
permanent fixtures. Motorized and sup- hand either to knife into the flank of any
ported in this manner, an infantry di- complementing German thrust that
vision could move almost with the speed might be launched toward the Eder-See
of an armored division, particularly from Kassel or to furnish reinforcement
when following in the wake of armor. for the VII Corps.
Thus the infantry was quickly available In their hope for a complementary
to mop up and to provide depth to the thrust from Kassel, the Germans were
armored spearheads. doomed to disappointment. There
T o the Germans at Winterberg, simply was no German unit at Kassel
chances of success appeared brighter be- strong enough to launch an attack. For
cause a distance of only about fifteen lack of co-ordination, the incoming 166th
miles separated Winterberg from their Infantry Division, which might have
objective, the elongated Eder-See, a nar- formed the nucleus for an attack, had
row corridor through which apparently already been committed futilely two days
only forward elements of one armored earlier and cut up in an engagement with
division had passed. They were reckon- the U.S. III Corps. Although Field Mar-
ing without the 104th Division. They shal Model had counted on the SS
were reckoning, too, without the speed Ersatzbrigade Westfalen to assist a drive
of the other two corps of the First Army. from Kassel, he had not known how
By nightfall of 30 March, the 7th locked in combat this makeshift force was
Armored Division of General Van Fleet’s with the 3d Armored Division spear-
III Corps had come u p close along the heads just outside Paderborn.
right flank of the VII Corps to seize a For the Americans, rumor after rumor
dam at the east end of the Eder-See and passed on by German stragglers and
several bridges over lower reaches of the civilians during the 30th had pointed to
reservoir and of the river downstream a concentration of German tanks and
from the dam.21 This the troops of the infantry at Winterberg, massing for a
III Corps had accomplished despite breakout attempt that night. T o guard
meeting a fresh German unit, the 166th against it, the 104th Division com-
mander, General Allen, ordered his regi-
21In the course of the 7th Armored Division’s ments to occupy key towns and road
advance on 29 March, S. Sgt. Robert H. Dietz, 38th
Armored Infantry Battalion, charged alone against
junctions along the corps left flank facing
defenders of two bridges at the town of Kirchhain. Winterberg. He also sent a mobile task
He had secured one bridge and disconnected force racing through the night over roads
demolition charges from the second when German
fire cut him down. He was awarded the Medal of bypassing Winterberg to defend Brilon,
Honor posthumously. which, aside from having provided
356 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
escape from encirclement, opted to delay room developed and as the Wesel bridges
hitting the two towns until additional passed to the Ninth Army, also was to
troops arrived. move north of the Lippe and drive north-
T h e thrust from Winterberg had thus eastward on Muenster, twenty miles
far been little more than a nuisance raid. north of Hamm. In the process, the
XVIII Airborne Corps was to be re-
Breakthrough North of the R u h r lieved, British units within the corps
passing to the British Second Army and
Even as the Germans in the Ruhr first General Gillem assuming control of the
prepared to launch the weak beginning U.S. 17th Airborne Division.24
of their attempt to force a corridor to Alerted in advance to the orders, a
the outside, their plight was about to be combat command of the 2d Armored Di-
compounded by developments along the vision, reinforced by an attached infan-
northern edge of the Ruhr. There, on 28 try regiment, began to cross the Rhine
March, troops of the XVIII Airborne into the crowded rear areas of the XVI
Corps had scored a rapid gain to Haltern, Corps early on 2 8 March. From there
on the north bank of the Lippe River the armor was to cross the Lippe, by-
more than twenty-five miles east of the passing the bottleneck of Wesel, and
Rhine, opening the way for the break- start its eastward thrust even before the
through that the 30th Division and the Wesel bridges passed to the Ninth
8th Armored Division of General Ander- Army’s control.
son’s XVI Corps had sought in vain Although the rapid advance of the
south of the Lippe. On the same date XVIII Airborne Corps and pending com-
Field Marshal Montgomery had an- mitment of’ the XIX Corps north of the
nounced his new policy, to be put into Lippe at this point obviated the necessity
effect on the 31st, for use of the Rhine of a breakthrough south of the river, the
bridges at Wesel and the roadnet north division that earlier had, been assigned
of the Lippe that insured a way for Gen- the goal, the 8th Armored, continued to
eral Simpson to bring more of his power- attack. T h e armor was to take the long-
ful Ninth Army to bear. sought objective alongside the Lippe, the
O n the 29th Simpson published his town of Dorsten, needed as a bridge site
plan for the breakout drive to the east. to serve the XIX Corps, then was to con-
While Anderson’s XVI Corps swung tinue eastward to cross upper reaches of
southeastward to build u p along the the Lippe. Both the 8th Armored and
Rhein–Herne Canal on the northern the 30th Divisions then were to pass
fringe of the Ruhr, General McLain’s from control of the XVI Corps to that
XIX Corps, moving north of the Lippe of the XIX Corps.
River, was to take over the main effort. Renewing the attack on 29 March, the
With two armored and three infantry di- 8th Armored Division found the enemy’s
visions, McLain’s corps was to drive first 116th Panzer Division, which as part of
to Hamm, at the northeastern tip of the General Luettwitz’s XLVIIPanzer Corps
Ruhr, then go on to link with the First
24 Conquer: The Story of the Ninth Army, pages
Army at Paderborn. General Gillem’s 264–66, provides a convenient summary of these
XIII Corps, meanwhile, as maneuver orders.
358 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
had thwarted a breakout from the Rhine burger Wald, then behind the Weser
bridgehead, still making a fight of it. By River.25So swift and deep was the Amer-
nightfall the American armor claimed ican thrust, irreparably splitting the
Dorsten, but it had been a plodding fight First Parachute Army down the middle,
against an enemy helped by marshy that the end result was bound to be
ground, woods, and deadly nests of big much the same as the withdrawal
antiaircraft guns in concrete emplace- Blaskowitz and Blumentritt had recom-
ments. Given the wooded nature of the mended.
terrain east of Dorsten, there was no With the means at hand, no hope
evidence but that the same kind of slow, existed of counterattacking southward
dogged advance might be in the offing into the American flank, as Hitler’s
for days. emissary, General Student, would him-
T h e story was far different north of self discover upon his arrival. Those
the Lippe. There reconnaissance forces contingents of the parachute army north
of the 2d Armored Division had moved of the breakthrough had no choice but
out of Haltern before midnight on the to fall back toward the Teutoburger
29th with every indication of a swift Wald—indeed, they would be hard put
sweep eastward. Not long after daylight to keep ahead of American and British
the next morning, 30 March, the main troops. All communications with the
columns reached the Dortmund–Ems First Parachute Army and Army Group
Canal, paused while engineers built H having been severed, Luettwitz’s
bridges, then resumed the advance in X L V I I Panzer Corps and Abraham’s
late afternoon. All through the night L X I I I Corps south of the breakthrough
of the 30th and the next day the armor appealed for orders to Field Marshal
rolled, while the 83d Division, mounted Model at Army Group B. Just as Blas-
on trucks belonging to the corps artil- kowitz earlier had urged, Model told
lery, followed closely. In the process the both corps to form a new line facing
tanks cut two major rail lines leading north behind the Rhein–Herne Canal
north and northeast from Hamm, leav- and, farther east, behind the Lippe
ing only one railroad open to the Ger- River. These two corps, brigaded under
mans in the Ruhr. I n late afternoon of Luettwitz’s headquarters as Gruppe von
the 31st the armor also cut the Ruhr- Luettwitz, then would comprise the de-
Berlin autobahn near Beckum, north- fense for the northern face of the Ruhr.26
east of Hamm, just under forty miles For a day or so Field Marshal Kessel-
beyond the original line of departure. ring would fuss and fret over Model’s
To the top German commanders presumption in absorbing the two
north of the Ruhr–Blaskowitz of Army corps, though he would inevitably be
Group H and Blumentritt, the new forced to accept it. Thus, by the first day
commander of the First Parachute Army of April, the lineup of units around the
—the American breakthrough north of
the Lippe mocked the standfast orders
that Hitler and Kesselring had so re-
25See above, ch. XV.
cently issued when denying Blaskowitz’s 26MS # B–354 (Blumentritt); MS # B–593
appeal to withdraw, first to the Teuto- (Wagener).
REDUCING T H E R U H R 359
perimeter of the Ruhr was basically vision to turn southeast toward Lipp-
complete: in the north and turning the stadt. Before daylight the next morning,
northeastern corner short of Lippstadt, 1 April—Easter Sunday—a task force
some twenty miles up the Lippe from commanded by Lt. Col. Matthew W.
Hamm, Gruppe von Luettwitz; begin- Kane, including a battalion of 3d Ar-
ning at the Moehne Reservoir on the mored tanks transporting “doughs”
upper reaches of the Ruhr River, Zan- from the 414th Infantry, turned from
gen’s Fifteenth Army, which faced east the fight at Paderborn toward Lippstadt.
and southeast, to a point on the Sieg Neither force encountered serious oppo-
River near Siegen; facing south along sition; fire came mainly from small arms,
the Sieg and west along the Rhine, though there were a few rounds from
Harpe’s Fifth Panzer Army. As this line- flak guns, whose dispirited crews quickly
up took shape, the time left before the fled or surrendered. By noon pilots of
Germans in the Ruhr would be fully artillery liaison planes from the 2d and
encircled could be measured in hours. 3d Armored Divisions could see leading
Late on 31 March, as the Ninth Ar- ground troops of both divisions. About
my’s 2d Armored Division was cutting 1300 the two columns came together,
the autobahn near Beckum, the army amid cheers and ribald jokes, on the
commander, General Simpson, received eastern fringe of Lippstadt.
a troubled telephone call. It was from T h e Ruhr industrial area was encom-
Joe Collins, commander of the First passed. Trapped in a pocket measuring
Army’s VII Corps. His 3d Armored Di- some 30 miles by 75 miles were the
vision, Collins said, had stirred u p a fury headquarters and supporting troops of
of opposition from fanatic SS troops near Army Group B, all of the Fifth Panzer
Paderborn. It might take days to elimi- Army, the bulk of the Fifteenth Army,
nate the resistance and continue north and two corps of the First Parachute
to the army group boundary to estab- Army, a total of 7 corps and 19 divi-
lish contact with the Ninth Army, there- sions. American intelligence officers es-
by sealing the circle around the Ruhr. timated that the force consisted of some
Furthermore, he went on, the Germans 150,000 men. They were, events soon
inside the pocket already had begun to would disclose, far too conservative.
strike at the rear of the 3d Armored Di-
vision in what prisoners reported was the Making Motions at Breakout
beginning of a major effort to break out
of the Ruhr. Although the trap was closed the Ger-
Collins asked Simpson to turn a com- man command, with commendable bra-
bat command of his 2d Armored Divi- vado but little else, was making bellicose
sion southeast toward Lippstadt, midway but empty motions and issuing pretty
between Beckum and Paderborn. Col- but illusory orders aimed at opening a
lins, for his part, would divert a force corridor into the Ruhr Pocket. While
from the 3d Armored to meet the com- General von Zangen’s Fifteenth Army,
bat command halfway. using Bayerlein’s L I I I Corps, renewed its
General Simpson promptly ordered a attack from Winterberg, Field Marshal
combat command of the 2d Armored Di- Kesselring tried to mobilize a force near
360 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
Kassel strong enough to push a way had not arrived, enough troops and ar-
through from the east.27 tillery and a few tanks of the 3d Panzer
T o command the attack, Hitler sanc- Grenadier and Panzer Lehr Divisions
tioned using headquarters of the Elev- were on hand to send a column against
enth Army, a staff that in happier times each of the two key towns, Medebach
had compiled a good record on the Rus- and Hallenberg.
sian front. Only recently reconstituted, About 150 panzer grenadiers with four
the staff was to be subordinated directly tanks struck Medebach before dawn on
to O B W E S T . T h e commander was to 1 April. In the first flush of the attack,
be General Hitzfeld, heretofore com- they gained a toehold in the western
mander of the Fifteenth Army’s L X V I I fringes of the town, but a battalion of
Corps, which had escaped entrapment the 104th Division’s 415th Infantry held
in the Ruhr. fast. Organic 57-mm. antitank guns
General Hitzfeld was to have his own knocked out one German tank; a ba-
L X V I I Corps, General Floerke’s L X V I zooka accounted for another. T h e other
Corps, and a provisional corps head- two and those panzer grenadiers not
quarters created from the staff of the killed or captured hastily retreated.
local Wehrkreis. This force looked solid At Hallenberg the Panzer Lehr attack
enough on paper; in reality, it signified never got going; it ran head on into an
little. Its strongest component was to be attack by the 9th Division, hurriedly
the SS Ersatzbrigade Westfalen, which transferred from the adjacent III Corps
late on 1 April finally relinquished Pader- to strike the supected base of the Ger-
born to the American 3d Armored Divi- man breakout offensive. Men of the 39th
sion and fell back with possibly as many Infantry, attacking u p the road from
as forty tanks and assault guns still fit to Hallenberg toward Winterberg, never
fight. There were in addition two surviv- even knew a German attack was in prog-
ing battalions of the ill-starred 166th ress. T h e drive, the regiment reported,
Infantry Division, stragglers, Volks- encountered “moderate resistance.”
sturm, hospital returnees, and about “Here,” the LIII Corps commander,
twenty tanks from a factory at Kassel. Bayerlein, was to note later, “the enemy
With those odds and ends Hitzfeld was seemed to form a point of main effort.”29
not only to break into the Ruhr but was With arrival of part of the 176th Di-
also to build a solid line against further vision later in the day, the Germans at
eastward advance along the Weser River. Winterberg launched another thrust
Hitzfeld’s force was only beginning to early on 2 April. While the Panzer Lehr
assemble when, before daylight on 1 to the southeast and the 176th to the
April, the Germans at Winterberg re- northeast held the shoulders, the 3d
newed their heretofore feeble attempts Panzer Grenadier Division was to make
to push eastward to the Eder-See.28 Al- the main effort, again through Mede-
though the 176th Infantry Division still bach.
Medebach was not to be had. Al-
27See MS # B–581, Eleventh Army, 1–23 April though the panzer grenadiers this time
1945 (Oberst Fritz Estor).
28 M S # B–593 (Wagener); MS # B–396 (Bayer- 28Quotations are from VII Corps AAR, Apr 45;
lein). MS # B–396 (Bayerlein).
REDUCING T H E R U H R 361
infiltrated around the town in the dark- moved the 1st Division to clean out
ness to hit from both east and west, the woods and villages close behind the
men of the 415th Infantry again held positions of the 3d Armored Division.31
fast, killing 30 Germans and capturing With three infantry divisions thus in
61. T h e defending battalion itself lost 2 place to hold that part of the corps left
dead and e wounded. Part of the force flank, any danger that a thrust in no
infiltrating around the town machine greater strength than that launched by
gunned an artillery battery supporting Bayerlein’s LIII Corps might succeed
the 415th but melted away when the had passed. Bayerlein’s weak force
artillerymen hastily formed a skirmish would be hard put even to hold defen-
line and returned the fire. sive positions on wooded hills west of
T h e German attack beaten back by Winterberg.
midmorning, the 104th Division com- As for the Eleventh Army and the
mander, General Allen, ordered the proposed strike from the vicinity of Kas-
415th Infantry to make a counterthrust, sel, it had become apparent early to the
driving from Medebach and along an- army commander, General Hitzfeld,
other road from the northeast toward that the entire scheme had been from the
Winterberg. When night came, men of first no more than a fantasy. T h e Ameri-
the 415th were locked in close combat cans were already exerting pressure to-
with remnants of the German force in ward the east and obviously soon would
woods several miles west of Medebach. break into the open and jump the
T h e Panzer Lehr Division, mean- Weser. Hitzfeld had scarcely enough
while, had failed to do its job of holding men to irritate such a thrust when it
the southern shoulder of the German at- came, let alone launch an
tack. Despite steep hillsides and dense By radio Hitzfeld appealed on 3 April
woods, a battalion of the 9th Division’s to Field Marshal Kesselring to cancel
39th Infantry pushed into Winterberg the attack. Kesselring waited to reply
just as day was breaking. In the town until the next day when he could visit
itself, the Germans offered no fight in Hitzfeld’s headquarters. A firsthand
deference to several hospitals in the look then made the situation all too
town and to hordes of refugees seeking clear. Kesselring canceled the order but,
cover there.30 T h e most severe fighting probably for the record, directed a sub-
occurred in midmorning at a village
southwest of Winterberg where infantry 31In an attack on 30 March near the town of
Eisern, S . Sgt. George Peterson and 1st Lt. Walter
of the Panzer Lehr supported by a few J. Will, both of Company K of the 1st Division’s
self-propelled guns launched what men 18th Infantry, displayed extraordinary heroism.
Although wounded, Sergeant Peterson singlehand-
of the 9th Division’s 60th Infantry took edly knocked out three German machine gun
to be a counterattack. T h e Germans held positions, then fell before enemy fire as he tried to
the village briefly until a battalion of rescue a wounded comrade. Lieutenant Will
rescued three of his wounded men from exposed
the 39th Infantry came in on their rear positions, incurring a painful wound himself in
from Winterberg. the process, then led his platoon in an attack in
Farther north, General Collins had which he personally eliminated three machine gun
positions before receiving mortal wounds. Both
were awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously.
30 MS # B–396 (Bayerlein). 32MS # B–581 (Estor).
362 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
stitute thrust southward into spearheads the Ruhr after establishing a Rhine
of the U.S. Third Army. Like the thrust bridgehead for the Ninth Army, Ander-
to relieve the Ruhr Pocket, that one too, son’s XVI Corps had three infantry di-
Kesselring and Hitzfeld both must have visions in the line. Two were fighting
known, would never come off in any ap- among the houses, apartments, shops,
preciable strength. and factories on the fringe of the Ruhr
along the north bank of the Rhein-
The Ruhr Pocket Herne Canal.
On 2 April, after representatives of
Upon the collapse of Bayerlein’s the First and Ninth Armies established
counterattack from Winterberg, Field the Ruhr River as the dividing line be-
Marshal Model and his staff inside the tween them, General Simpson also gave
Ruhr Pocket retained little hope of as- General McLain’s XIX Corps a role in
sistance from the outside.33 The Elev- the reduction of the Ruhr, but coupled
enth Army they deemed too weak to it with a continuing drive to the east.
break through. Because the T w e l f t h Along with General Gillem’s XIII Corps,
Army was not even to be activated until a portion of the XIX Corps was to drive
2 April, they saw no chance of help from east, while two divisions attacked south-
that quarter, no matter what faith Hit- west from the vicinity of Hamm and
ler still might have in it. Their only Lippstadt toward the Ruhr River.
possibility of escape, most believed, was In the First Army, General Hodges
to break out southward, where the gave the job of renewing the drive east
Americans seemed to be weakest. Even to Collins’s VII Corps and Huebner’s V
that depended on gaining a respite from Corps. Van Fleet’s III Corps, pinched
the fighting, which would come only if out of a lineup at the Eder reservoir, was
the Americans, while concentrating their to take over from Collins along that part
power in the continuing drive to the of the periphery of the Ruhr Pocket
east, should try to contain the pocket facing generally west, while headquarters
rather than to erase it. of Ridgway’s XVIII Airborne Corps, its
Under this condition, plans for an- job in Operation VARSITY over, shifted
other try at breakout never passed the to the First Army and assumed com-
talking stage. Even while completing the mand of those units facing northward
encirclement of the Ruhr, American along the Sieg River. T h e attack to
commanders, rich in resources, had been clear the pocket thus was to be, in es-
adjusting their units in order to move sence, a converging attack by the equiv-
on to the east and at the same time re- alent of four corps. 34
duce the Ruhr. Splitting the pocket at the Ruhr
By 1 April when the pincers around River gave almost all the heavily built
the pocket snapped shut, Simpson’s up industrial district to the Ninth
Ninth Army had one corps already en- Army. There the landscape is so urban-
gaged, in effect, in reducing the pocket. ized that one city, grimy from the smoke
Having wheeled southeastward against of steel mill and blast furnace, blends
34For General Bradley’s orders, see 12th AGp
33 MS # B–593 (Wagener). Ltr of Instrs 20, 4 Apr 45.
REDUCING T H E R U H R 363
R.Clinton
MAP 5
almost imperceptibly into another— that of the Ninth Army. It was a sector
Duisburg, Essen, Gelsenkirchen, Bo- of rugged terrain—steep hills and gorge-
chum, Dortmund. If the Germans had like valleys—at least 80 percent forested
had sufficient strength, the fighting —a region known as the Sauerland.
there could have become a plodding, T h e two corps of the Ninth Army be-
block-by-block campaign. gan to attack in earnest on 4 April, the
South of the Ruhr River, the First day the Ninth Army passed to control
Army sector had no such concentration of the 12th Army Group. (Map 5) As
of industrial districts, though there the drive to clear the pocket began, no
were major cities—Duesseldorf, Wupper- pattern emerged in the German defense
tal, the eastern suburbs of Cologne— north of the Ruhr River. As might have
but it was about three times the size of been expected the Germans made a con-
364 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
INFANTRYMEN
OF THE 79THDIVISION
CROSS THE CANAL
RHEIN-HERNE
test of it behind the water obstacle of posed the 75th and 95th Divisions stiffly,
the Rhein–Herne Canal, but once that sometimes counterattacking with a fer-
established position was broken, one vor belying their lost cause. A combat
city or town might be stoutly defended, command of the 8th Armored Division
another abandoned without a fight. forestalled a sharp fight for Soest by
It took a regiment of the 95th Divi- making a quick 25-mile end run around
sion four days to clear Hamm, while the city, so threatening contingents of
contingents of the 17th Airborne Divi- the 116th Panzer Division with encircle-
sion, given a sector alongside the Rhine, ment that the Germans withdrew. At
walked into Duisburg almost without many small towns the burgomaster came
firing a shot. T h e 79th Division and out with a white flag; at others, the Ger-
other units of the 17th Airborne found mans fought until overwhelmed. T h e
no resistance in Essen, site of the great presence of SS troops more often than
Krupp steel works, while at Dortmund, not made the difference.
for no apparent reason, the Germans op- South of the Ruhr River, where the
REDUCING THE R U H R 365
inhospitable terrain—laced by a limited position almost always centered around
roadnet passing through dense woods a roadblock covered by infantry sup-
and narrow defiles and dotted with ported either by a few tanks and assault
seemingly countless bridges over deep- guns or by antiaircraft pieces, usually
cut streams-lent itself admirably to de- 20-mm. “flakwagons.” At one point the
fense, resistance followed more conven- Germans delayed the 7th Armored Di-
tional delaying tactics. T h e III Corps vision by blanketing a valley with a
began to attack on 5 April, the XVIII dense smoke screen.36
Airborne Corps the next day. During Beginning on 7 April days of overcast
the first few days, the Germans defended and light rain gave way to warm sunny
in some degree almost every town and weather, enabling planes of the IX and
village and most ridge and stream lines, XXIX Tactical Air Commands to aid
particularly in the vicinity of Siegen, the mop-up. North of the Ruhr River,
where several tank-supported counter- the aircraft could make few contribu-
attacks were apparently designed to keep tions other than those against isolated
the 8th Division from breaking into a strongpoints, both because that part of
fairly open corridor leading through the the pocket shrank fairly rapidly and be-
Sauerland, and near Winterberg, where cause pilots now were forbidden to hit
the Germans had concentrated for their a usual primary target, railroad rolling
attempt at breakout; but as they were stock (the Allies soon would need all
pushed back some four to six miles each boxcars they could get). Although the
day, their numbers and their resolution ban also applied to planes of the IX
decreased. 35 Tactical Air Command south of the
By 11 April the Germans were sel- Ruhr River, the area there was vast
dom defending ridges or wooded areas; enough to provide other targets, par-
resistance centered only in towns and ticularly columns of foot troops and
villages along main roads. Sometimes horse-drawn and motor vehicles retreat-
bridges were left intact even when pre- ing or shifting positions.
pared for demolition. At Wuppertal, an In the Ninth Army’s sector, notably
S–2 of the 78th Division used the civilian in the zone of the XVI Corps, artillery
telephone system to try to talk the mayor operating for the first time with unra-
into surrender, but in vain. At other tioned ammunition supplies more than
places both the 78th and 99th Divisions made u p for the restrictions on aircraft.
had greater success by using tank- Artillery in support of the XVI Corps
mounted public address systems to de- alone fired 259,061 rounds in fourteen
mand surrender. In those later days op- days. Both artillery and air units had to
observe the Ruhr River scrupulously as
35Helping a platoon of the 8th Division’s 13th
Infantry defend a house in the town of Birken
against a local German spoiling attack on 3 April, 36On the first day of the 7th Armored Division’s
Pfc. Walter C. Wetzel threw himself on two attack, 5 April, Cpl. Thomas J. Kelly, a medical
grenades that the Germans heaved through a aidman in the 48th Armored Infantry Battalion,
window. Taking the full force of the explosions, made ten trips across ground exposed to heavy
he died while saving his comrades from injury. German fire to rescue and evacuate casualties of
He was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumous- the company to which he was attached. Corporal
ly. Kelly was awarded the Medal of Honor.
366 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
a “no fire” line lest, in the converging scores of small, isolated buildings often
attack, they hit friendly troops. untouched by bombs.
In the course of the advance almost During the course of the attack, com-
every division overran a number of mili- mand adjustments took place in both
tary hospitals, and several units liberated the First and Ninth Armies. T h e 5th
prisoner-of-war camps. At Waldbroel, Division joined the attack of the III
not far north of the Sieg River, the 78th Corps on 9 April, releasing the 9th Divi-
Division freed 71 hospitalized American sion for a rest; arrival of the 13th Ar-
soldiers, only 2 of whom were able to mored Division (Maj. Gen. John B. Wo-
walk. At Hemer the 7th Armored Divi- gan) on 9 April provided an armored
sion rescued 23,302 prisoners of war, component for the XVIII Airborne
most of them Russians, living under ap- Corps. North of the Ruhr, the 194th
palling conditions of filth, disease, and Glider Infantry Regiment of the 17th
hunger. T h e only Americans, a group Airborne Division reinforced the XIX
of 99, were in fair condition, having Corps, while the remainder of the divi-
been assigned to the camp only a few sion went to the XVI Corps. To control
days. Among the others, deaths were the glider infantry, the 15th Cavalry
averaging more than a hundred a day.37 Group, the 8th Armored Division, and
T h e advance also freed thousands of the 95th Division, while the rest of the
forced laborers. In Hagen alone, 16,000; XIX Corps participated in the Ninth
in Wuppertal, 30,000. Almost every- Army’s continuing drive to the east, the
where the sudden release of these people corps commander, General McLain,
on the countryside produced incidents grouped them on 7 April into a task
of looting and terrorizing. In the III force under the 95th Division com-
Corps liberated slave laborers so con- mander, General Twaddle. As the two
gested the roads that the corps com- divergent attacks put the two contin-
mander ordered them restricted to their gents of the XIX Corps ever farther
compounds. Finding food and transpor- apart—180 miles by 8 April—General
tation for them and for thousands of Simpson transferred operational control
German prisoners harried quartermas- of Task Force Twaddle to Anderson’s
ters and transportation officers alike. XVI Corps.38
In the cities, block after block of rub- In the First Army, the commanders
ble attested to the destructive profi- of both corps tried hard to speed the
ciency of Allied bombers, although the advance by shaking loose their armored
effect on German production had been divisions, but it was 12 April before the
less real than apparent. Machines and 7th Armored Division of the III Corps
facilities were in many cases intact or could move out in front of neighboring
could be put into operation after rela- infantry divisions, and the 13th Armored
tively minor repairs. Many plants had Division of the XVIII Airborne Corps
been moved to protected locations or never did achieve a lightning advance.
their operations decentralized into Committed on 10April to pass through
troops of the 97th Division (Brig. Gen.
37 See 7th Armd and 78th Div AAR’s, Apr 45. 38See NUSA Ltr of Instrs, 8 Apr 45.
REDUCING T H E R U H R 367
Milton B. Halsey), the 13th Armored east of Cologne where the division was
was to drive rapidly along relatively flat to change direction to the northeast. By
terrain close by the Rhine to a point that time the infantry divisions that the
east of Cologne, then turn northeast to armor was to have assisted by trapping
get in behind those Germans fighting the enemy in front of them were al-
against the 8th, 78th, and 86th (Maj. ready practically on top of the armor’s
Gen. Harris M. Melasky) Divisions, final objectives.40
deep in the Sauerland. This was the ar- Early on the 14th General Ridgway
mored division’s baptism of fire; only changed his instructions, telling the ar-
two of its combat commands and little mor to continue north generally along
of the division trains had arrived by the Rhine. Even then bad luck contin-
jump-off time early on 10 April, and ued to plague the division as the com-
both men and equipment were worn mander, General Wogan, having gone
out from two road marches totaling forward to speed removal of a road-
more than 260 miles with no time be- block, was seriously wounded by rifle
tween for rest or servicing equipment. fire. T h e former commander of the III
One combat command was down to 50 Corps, General Millikin, took his place.
percent of normal strength in medium Driving past what had been the ar-
tanks. mored division’s objectives and going
Pressed by General Hodges to speed another ten miles to the north, a battal-
the mop-up in order to release units ion of the 8th Division’s 13th Infantry
to reinforce the drive to the east, the late on 14 April reached the Ruhr River
corps commander, General Ridgway, at Hattingen, southeast of Essen. Jubi-
would approve no pause before the at- lantly, the men shouted across the river
tack; but Ridgway himself, in effect, to men of the 79th Division’s 313th In-
slowed the attack in advance by order- fantry. On the north bank the last of
ing the division to “destroy” German the Ninth Army’s forces had closed to
forces encountered. 39 Although the or- the river, signaling elimination of that
der ran contrary to armored doctrine, part of the Ruhr Pocket. T h e 13th In-
the division commander, General Wo- fantry’s thrust meant that the pocket
gan, and his subordinates took it liter- south of the river was split into two en-
ally. claves, the larger to the west embracing
Hardly had the advance begun when the cities of Duesseldorf and Wuppertal.
communications among various com- For the next two days there would
ponents of the division broke down and still be an occasional sharp engagement
some units lost their way. A stream held in the Ruhr Pocket. but for the most
u p the columns as tanks and infantry
deployed to “destroy” the enemy. (Gen- 40In an attack by the 97th Division’s 386th In-
eral Ridgway specifically changed the fantry on 12 April, Pfc. Joe R. Hastings time after
time braved heavy German fire to put his light
order on the 12th.) Not until late on 13 machine gun in a position to support his com-
April did leading troops reach the point pany’s riflemen. At one point he advanced directly
against an enemy position, firing his machine gun
from the hip. Killed four days later, Private
39 XVIII Airborne Corps Opnl Instrs 7, 091600 Hastings was awarded the Medal of Honor post-
Apr 45, found in 8th Div G–3 Jnl file, 9–11 Apr 45. humously.
368 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
RUSSIAN
PRISONERS
LIBERATED
BY THE NINTHARMY
part a new phase of the battle had be- drive to the east by pinning down eight-
gun. It was a time for mass surrenders, een American divisions (four were west
a full and final collapse. of the Rhine).41
When news of continuing American
“The predominant color was white.’’ advances to the east came on 7 April,
this rationale was no longer valid. Field
T h e question of when and how to Marshal Model’s chief of staff, General-
surrender had been before German major Karl Wagener, urged Model to
staffs and commanders in the Ruhr since spare his troops and the civilians in the
the American pincers closed on Easter Ruhr further fighting by asking Hitler’s
Sunday, particularly so since failure of approval to surrender. This Model de-
the breakout attempts at Winterberg. clined to do. In the first place, permis-
Yet the belief among most of the staff sion hardly would be granted. Further-
of Army Group B was that the fight was 41MS # B–593 (Wagener). For this period, see
worthwhile because it was holding up the also MS # B–614 (Zangen).
REDUCING THE RUHR 369
more, Model himself could not recon- creed on 15 April, were to be discharged
cile surrender with the demands he had from the army immediately, provided
put on his officers and troops through with discharge papers, and allowed to go
the years. Yet news both within and home (the order, thousands were to dis-
without the Ruhr Pocket was so utterly cover, lacked American concurrence) .
devoid of hope that Model continued As of two days later, 17 April, when am-
to struggle with his conscience for a munition and supplies presumably
solution. Every life saved was another would be exhausted, all remaining non-
life capable of taking up the struggle to combatant troops were to be free to sur-
rebuild Germany. He at last decided, in render, while combat soldiers were to be
effect, simply to dissolve Army Group afforded a choice either of fighting in
B by order. There could be no formal organized goups in an attempt to get out
surrender of a command that had ceased of the pocket or of trying to make their
to exist. way, either in uniform or civilian clothes
All youths and older men, Model de- but in any case without arms, back to
370 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
their homes. T h e latter was a veiled au- liberated slave laborers milled about,
thority to surrender. cheering, laughing, and shouting, glum
Even before this order was issued, German civilians, incredulity stamped
sharply increasing numbers of German on their faces, watched silently or
troops had begun to capitulate. Ameri- sought to ingratiate themselves with the
can divisions that in the first few days conquerors by insisting that they had
of April were taking 300, 500, or even never been Nazis, that they were happy
1,000 prisoners a day, by 11 April and the Americans had come. There were
the days following were capturing in al- no Nazis, no ex-Nazis, not even any Nazi
most all cases 2,000 and sometimes as sympathizers any more.
many as 5,000. Many a German walked T h e prisoner-of-war list read like an
mile after mile before finding an Ameri- order of battle, and with the command-
can not too occupied with other duties ers usually came their staffs and remain-
to bother to accept his surrender. A man ing troops: Bayerlein of the L I I I Corps,
from the 78th Division’s 310th Infantry Luettwitz of the XLVII Panzer Corps,
started out of Wuppertal with 68 pris- Waldenburg of the 116th Panzer Divi-
oners and discovered, upon arrival at the sion, Denkert of the 3 d Panzer Grena-
regimental stockade, that he had 1,200. dier, Lange of the 183d Volks Grenadier,
T h e most famous individual to commanders of the 180th, 190th, and
emerge from the Ruhr was taken early. 338th Infantry Divisions, and the final
O n 10 April, a patrol from the 194th remnants of the 9th Panzer Division.
Glider Infantry found Franz von Papen, Paratroopers of the 17th Airborne Divi-
the German chancellor before Hitler’s sion apprehended the commander of the
rise to power, at his estate near Hirsch- Fifth Panzer Army, General Harpe, as
berg, not far from the eastern periphery he tried to cross a bridge over the Ruhr
of the Ruhr Pocket. River in an effort to make his way to
On the 13th, having lost all control German positions in the Netherlands.
over subordinate units, the commander T h e commander of the XVIII Airborne
of the Fifteenth Army, General von Corps, General Ridgway, sent his aide
Zangen, surrendered along with his staff under a white flag to headquarters of
to the 7th Armored Division, as did Army Group B to try to persuade Field
General Koechling of the LXXXI Marshal Model to surrender himself and
Corps. T h e commander and all that re- the entire command. Model refused.
mained of the once mighty Panzer Lehr T h e flow of prisoners continued on
Division surrendered on 15 April to the the 17th—young men, old men, arro-
99th Division. gant SS troops, dejected infantrymen,
On 16 April an all-out rush to give up paunchy reservists, female nurses and
began. People displayed handkerchiefs, technicians, teen-age members of the
bed sheets, table linen, shirts, anything Hitler Youth, stiffly correct, monocled
to show intent to surrender. “The pre- Prussians, enough to gladden the heart
dominant color,” noted the 78th Divi- of a Hollywood casting director. In ev-
sion’s historian, “was white.” 42 While ery conceivable manner, too, they pre-
sented themselves to their captors: most
Lightning, p. 227.
42 plodding wearily on foot; some in civil-
REDUCING T H E RUHR 371
PRISONERS
OF WAR IN THE RUHRPOCKET
Field Marshal Model asked his chief of As the battle ended, one of the strag-
staff on one of those last days. “What is glers was the commanding general of
there left to a commander in defeat?” Army Group B, Field Marshal Model.
Model paused, then answered his own Having ordered his staff to disperse,
question. Model himself repaired with his aide
“In ancient times,” he said, “they took and two other officers to a forest north
poison.” 43 of Duesseldorf.
On 18 April all but a few stragglers T o those who knew the field marshal
gave up, all resistance at an end. Some intimately, it was a certainty that he
Germans were captured-more
317,000 would never surrender. He had long
than the Russians took at Stalingrad, been critical of Field Marshal Friedrich
more even than the total of Germans Paulus for capitulating at Stalingrad.
and Italians taken at the end of the cam- “A field marshal,” he had said then,
paign in North Africa. Thousands more, “does not become a prisoner. Such a
of whom there was no record, had per- thing is just not possible.”
ished in the fighting. During the afternoon of 21 April,
T h e mop-up cost units of the Ninth Model asked his aide to accompany him
Army 341 killed, 121 missing, and not and walked deeper into the forest, away
quite 2,000 wounded. T h e First Army from the other two officers. There he
losses probably were about three times shot himself. 45
as high.44
Army. T h e LXXXIX Corps, headquar- against the northern flank of the one
ters included, simply disintegrated. Al- fairly cohesive defensive force left to the
though the staff of the LXXXV Corps new commander of the Seventh Army,
eventually would make its way to safety, General von Obstfelder. There stood
neither the headquarters nor any of its the LXXXII Corps (Hahm) with rem-
subordinate units would be able to do nants of three divisional formations,
anything to stop the American armor's charged with holding the line of the
headlong dash toward Kassel. As did Main and containing the bridgeheads
Hodges' First Army, Patton’s Third at Hanau and Aschaffenburg. 2
Army would profit from the great gap During those two days, General von
created between Army Groups B and Obstfelder was trying to piece together
G.1 an armored force to counterattack into
Under terms of the shift to the north- the 4th Armored Division flank. As a
east, the 6th Armored Division of the nucleus he had a new unit, Panzer Bri-
XX Corps was to head for Kassel while gade Thueringen, a training group with
the 4th Armored Division of the XII a tank battalion, an assault gun battal-
Corps passed through the northern ion, and a panzer grenadier regiment.
reaches of the Fulda Gap, a narrow H e hoped to join that force with the
divide between two clusters of wooded reconnaissance battalion of the 11th
hills known as the Vogels Berg and the Panzer Division, the only part of the
Hohe Rhoen, and then turned eastward. division to reach the Seventh Army
T h e 11th Armored Division, committed after leaving Army Group B. H e counted
29 March on the right wing of the XII too on some forty new tanks scheduled
Corps, headed directly for the Fulda to arrive momentarily by rail.
Gap. In all three cases infantry divisions H e would never see the tanks. On
were to follow closely for the usual the 29th they reached an unloading
mop-up. point near Bad Hersfeld, some thirty
For both the 4th and 6th Armored miles south of Kassel, at about the same
Divisions, the attacks on the next two time as a column of the 4th Armored
days, 29 and 30 March, were little more Division. T h e American tanks opened
than road marches. For the 11th Ar- fire. Less than a dozen of the German
mored Division, committed through the tanks got away.3
Main bridgehead at Hanau, it was much When news of this debacle reached
the same, but not until the armor, with Obstfelder, he used it as an excuse to
the help of infantrymen of the 26th call off his embryonic plan for counter-
Division, had expanded the bridgehead attack. It would be futile in any case,
through great stretches of woods to the he reasoned, now that the 4th Armored
east and northeast. This newly created Division flank was protected by an in-
wing of the XII Corps was brushing fantry and another armored division.
1 See MSS # A–893 (GersdorK) and # B–703,
Besides, Obstfelder was sharply con-
The Fighting o f Heeresgruppe G in the West- scious of the necessity for sending some
The Final Battle in Central and Southern Ger- force northward to build a line behind
many Until Capitulation, 22 March 1945–6 May
1945 (Oberst Horst Wilutzky, Opns Officer, Army 2M S # A–893 (Gersdorff).
Group G ) . 3 Ibid. See also 4th Armd Div AAR, Mar 45.
SWEEP TO THE ELBE 375
the Werra River, a tributary of the We- mandant) for the city of Fulda, a grow-
ser, and making some effort, as the high ing practice when a city was about to
command in Berlin insisted, to establish be bypassed or surrounded. All these
contact with the Eleventh Army, there- combat commanders usually had for a
by sealing the great gap that had opened city’s defense were stragglers, Volks-
between Army Groups B and G. sturm, and any fixed antiaircraft instal-
Relieving General Kniess from com- lations that might exist.
mand of the LXXXV Corps for his fail- To the south of the zone was General
ure to hold the Rhine-Main arc, Obst- Hahm’s LXXXII Corps with its three
felder gave the command—for what it makeshift divisions. General Hahm
was worth—to General der Panzertrup- would face not only the right wing of
pen Smilo Freiherr von Luettwitz and the Third Army but also the left wing
sent the corps to positions behind the of General Patch’s U.S. Seventh Army.
Werra in front of the city of Eisenach.4 Throughout the Seventh Army zone,
T h e only appreciable strength available signal and supply services had broken
to the new commander was the recon- down. For communications, command-
naissance battalion of the 11th Panzer ers frequently used the civilian tele-
Division, beefed u p with odd collections phone network; for supplies, they
of artillery, troops with five tanks from scrounged from army, Luftwaffe, or SS
an armored training center, and strag- installations. T h e troops were sometimes
glers. General von Luettwitz did succeed shocked at what they found in those
in establishing tenuous contact with depots—in one, 95,000 pairs of fur-lined
contingents of the Eleventh Army at boots, something the men had been beg-
Kassel, but it lasted only briefly. ging for the preceding winter in the
I n the center of the Seventh Army’s mud and snow of the West Wall. To
zone, Obstfelder had to use the XII meet gasoline needs, the units appropri-
Corps, the upgraded Wehrkreis head- ated the hoarded stocks of Nazi party
quarters that had been called to oppose officials. “Flight fuel,” the troops bitterly
the Oppenheim crossing. Led by Gen- called it.
eraloberst Herbert Osterkamp, the As German commanders made their
corps had little other than Panzer Bri- arrangements, dutifully drawing tidy
gade Thueringen, which was to absorb boundary lines and spotting units on
stragglers from the 2d Panzer Division operations maps as if it all had some
and assume that once-proud division’s meaning, the armor of the XX Corps
name. Recognizing that Osterkamp had and the XII Corps drove relentlessly
insufficient strength to do more along toward the northeast. So heavy was the
his 35-mile front than delay the Ameri- collection of American armor that Gen-
cans temporarily, Obstfelder designated eral von Obstfelder reckoned the drive
a “combat commander” (Kampfkom- to be either a race to beat the Russians
to Berlin or an Allied main effort to
4Not to be confused with the commander of the link with the Russians and split Ger-
XLVII Panzer Corps. For the LXXXV Corps, see many in two.5
MS # B–617, Combat Report of the LXXXV
Corps (General der Panzertruppen Smilo Freiherr
von Luettwitz). 5 MS # A-893 (Gersdorff).
376 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
WHITEFLAGSHANGABOVE
A DESERTED
STREET
teries of 88’s knocked out seven tanks small city. 7 It had been constructed as
and four half-tracks. Yet civilian authori- a headquarters for the Armed Forces
ties surrendered Gotha without a fight High Command (OKW) during tense
on the morning of 4 April (men of a days preceding the Czechoslovakian
small military garrison were discovered crisis in 1938, but never used. In recent
later masquerading as patients in the city weeks the Reichsfuehrer SS, Heinrich
hospitals), and CCA moved on in the Himmler, had ordered the facilities ex-
afternoon to take Ohrdruf. (Map XIV) panded as a possible retreat for Hitler
They found at least part of what they and his entire entourage, to be presented
had been expecting in Ohrdruf—an to the Fuehrer for his birthday on 20
immense underground communications
center set in deep concrete tunnels, with
radio facilities, cables, and telephone 7Koyen, The Fourth Armored Division,p. 115;CCA, 4th Armd
switchboards large enough to serve a Div, AAR, Apr 45.
378 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
April; but work had hardly begun be- that the men under him fought back;
fore the Americans arrived. 8 otherwise there might be only token
T h e men of the 4th Armored Divi- opposition or none at all, a weary ac-
sion unknowingly had missed by hours ceptance of the inevitable.
a chance to capture important live prey During the last day of March and the
at Ohrdruf. Less than twenty-four hours first two of April, General Brenner and
earlier, Field Marshal Kesselring and the survivors of his 6th SS Mountain
headquarters of O B WEST had fled Division, bypassed in the swift American
the town. 9 drive, tried to fight their way out to the
T h e 4th Armored found something east, in the process capturing an Ameri-
else at Ohrdruf. On the fringe of the can field hospital.11 On 2 April one bat-
town, the soldiers came upon the first talion of the 26th Division was sufficient
of the notorious concentration camps to to clear Fulda; at Kassel, the entire 80th
be uncovered by the advancing Allied Division had to fight fiercely for the
armies. Small by the standards of others better part of four days before a defiant
to be discovered later, the camp never- German garrison surrendered on 4
theless contained enough horror to April. On several occasions at Kassel the
make the American soldier and even his Germans counterattacked sharply with
Supreme Commander, General Eisen- infantry supported by as many as ten
hower, pale. Patton, when he saw it, tanks, apparently drawn from the big
vomited. Forced by the XX Corps com- Henschel tank works in the city. As at
mander, General Walker, to tour the other industrial cities, fixed antiaircraft
camp, the burgomaster of Ohrdruf and batteries firing deadly flak bolstered the
his wife went home and hanged them- defense.
selves.10 On the south flank of the XII Corps,
Elsewhere in the Third Army during the 2d Cavalry Group on 2 April en-
those first days of April there were some- tered Bad Orb, liberating 6,500 Allied
times fierce engagements with die-hard prisoners of war, half of them Ameri-
defenders, other times unopposed ad- cans. Farther east, a battalion of the
vances sweeping u p docile Germans left 11th Armored Division overran a Wal-
behind in the rapid thrusts of the armor. ther small arms factory, finding enough
In most cases the nature of the defense pistols-including many of one of the
depended not so much on the number war’s most prized souvenirs, the P38—
of troops available as on the character to equip almost every man in the divi-
of the local commander. If a true Nazi, sion.
thoroughly indoctrinated, he saw to it As the Third Army paused, General
Patton inserted Middleton’s VIII Corps
8General Bruce C. Clarke (USA, Ret.), The back into the lineup between the XX
Command, Control and Communications National Corps on the left and the X I I Corps on
System of Germany During World War II (Menlo the right, again juggling divisions in
Park, Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, 1963), pp.
11, 18. the process. While some units completed
9 MS # C–020 (Schramm). mop-up of rear areas, others made local
10See Koyen, pp. 115–16; Patton, War A s I
Knew It, pp. 292–94; see also Toland, The Last
100 Days, p. 371. 11See above, ch. XVI.
SWEEP TO THE ELBE 379
84th Divisions of General Gillem’s XIII and 6th Armored Divisions, plus the
Corps, forming the army’s left wing, 76th and 80th Infantry Divisions; Mid-
reached a great westward loop of the dleton’s VIII Corps in the center, the
Weser River near Minden, almost due 65th, 87th, and 89th Divisions; and
west of the metropolis of Hannover. T h e Eddy’s XII Corps, the 11th Armored,
2d Armored Division of General Mc- 26th, and 90th Divisions, plus a new-
Lain’s XIX Corps, having run into de- comer to the front, the 71st (Maj. Gen.
laying action by remnants of the First Willard G. Wyman). Another new di-
Parachute Army in the Teutoburger vision, the 70th (Maj. Gen. Allison J.
Wald, would arrive at the Weser later in Barnett), was mopping u p rear areas
the day near Hameln (Hamelin), the and providing security for bridges over
town which the Pied Piper reputedly rid the Rhine.
of rats and children. Mopping u p resis- That portion of central Germany fac-
tance in the Teutoburger Wald, the 30th ing the 12th Army Group provided two
Division was soon to press forward be- ready avenues leading eastward, one on
hind the armor. Even though part of the either side of the storied Harz Moun-
Ninth Army was helping to reduce the tains. Once a stronghold of paganism,
Ruhr Pocket, General Simpson still in more modern times a tourist retreat,
could provide for the eastward drive the Harz, rising higher than 3,000 feet,
these four divisions plus the 102d, which served as anchor for the boundary be-
had begun to cross the Rhine, and the tween the First and Ninth Armies. T h e
83d, recently relieved from the fight for Ninth Army on the north could advance
the Ruhr. across low, rolling country providing
T h e forces of General Hodges’ First ready access to Magdeburg on the Elbe,
Army that would be available for the while south of the Harz the First Army
eastward thrust once regrouping had and the north wing of the Third could
been completed consisted of the 3d utilize the wide Thueringen Plain for
Armored, 1st, and 104th Divisions in their drives on Leipzig and Chemnitz.
Collins’s VII Corps on the left and the T h e Third Army’s right wing would
9th Armored, 2d, and 69th Divisions find the terrain less hospitable; here,
in Huebner’s V Corps on the right. extending southeastward from the vi-
T h e First Army was to take over Kassel cinity of Eisenach, stands the Thuer-
from the Third Army once the city was inger Wald, a spinelike range of forested
clear, broadening the frontage for the mountains with many heights above
First Army’s main effort to approxi- 3,000 feet.
mately thirty miles. Having already jumped the Fulda and
As the Third Army paused, its for- Werra Rivers, the Third Army faced no
ward line formed an east-facing arc from more formidable water obstacles. Both
Muehlhausen in the north, through the First and Ninth Armies still had to
Gotha and Ohrdruf, back to Meiningen get across the Weser, which, like the
in the south. Following the shuffle of Rhine and Elbe, is a sprawling water-
divisions to bring headquarters of the way, and the First Army’s right wing
VIII Corps back into action, Walker’s would have to cross lower reaches of
XX Corps on the left had both the 4th the Werra River as well,
SWEEP TO THE ELBE 381
GERMAN
PRISONERS
HEADFOR THE REARas American armor advances.
Eleventh Army and Army Group G’s At the same time the 4th Armored
Seventh Army for the day’s most note- Division, bypassing Jena and the battle-
worthy advance. In rapid strides, Gen- field where Napoleon had defeated the
eral Grow’s armor drove fifty miles, Prussians in 1806, picked up momentum
halting for the night only after seizing to reach points flanking the autobahn
bridges intact across the Saale River more than five miles beyond Jena. While
north of Jena. the 80th Division’s 318th
Infantry cleared
T h e next day the 6th Armored Di- stubborn defenders from Erfurt, the city of
vision advanced another fifteen miles Weimar capitulated as a flight of fighter-
and crossed the Weisse Elster River near bombers hovered overhead to give weight
the city of Zeitz. This time the advance to a surrender ultimatum. The defenders of
was markedly difficult; the armor was Jena, other men of the 80th Division dis-
brushing against the southern end of a covered as night fell, would elect to fight.
broad belt of fixed antiaircraft defenses The city would be in hand nevertheless be-
forming a semicircle before Leipzig. fore another day had passed.
GERMAN CIVILIANS, forced to disinter victims of a concentration camp f r o m a
mass grave, carry t h e m through the streets for reburial.
384 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
In the course of the day’s advance, into the lead, only one more day to reach
the 4th Armored Division’s CCB uncov- the Mulde. By nightfall of the 13th
ered one of Nazi Germany’s largest con- General Hoge’s combat commands had
centration camps northwest of Weimar seized four bridges intact across the
at Buchenwald. Aside from the horror river and carved out holdings large
that was common to all the camps, this enough to protect the bridges. Middle-
one merited special notoriety because ton’s VIII Corps, with no armor to
the commandant’s wife, Ilse Koch, col- spearhead the advance, would make it
lected the tattooed skin of prisoners to to the Mulde on the 17th. Eddy’s XII
make ornaments and lamp shades. Corps meanwhile had taken the city of
Also on 12 April Patton’s superiors, Coburg on the 11th after a night of
Eisenhower and Bradley, visited the unceasing artillery fire and a hovering
Third Army commander. After touring aerial threat similar to that at Weimar,
the treasure cave at Merkers and the and on the 14th entered Bayreuth at the
concentration camp at Ohrdruf, they southeastern tip of the Thueringer
retired in the evening to Patton’s com- Wald. There the XII Corps too paused
mand trailer, where General Eisenhower to await a new order turning the entire
confided that Patton was to stop his Third Army to the southeast.
victorious armor short of the objective
of Chemnitz. Pending detailed arrange- A Bridgehead to Nowhere
ments for meeting the Russians, the
Third Army was to halt at the Mulde On the other flank of the 12th Army
River, ten miles west of Chemnitz, Group’s new drive, in the meantime,
roughly on a north-south line with that General Simpson’s Ninth Army was un-
part of the Elbe River to be reached by der no obligation to pause until its di-
the Ninth Army. T h e First Army, too, visions had crossed the Weser River and
was to halt at the Mulde. Eisenhower reached a point as far to the east as the
had made u p his mind to make no Third Army’s starting line east of Ohr-
attempt to take Berlin.18 druf. Imbued with a sense of urgency
Before the three commanders went to because the army group’s orders indi-
sleep, they learned the news that during cated that the eventual goal was Berlin,
the day had shocked their nation and units of both the XIII Corps on the left
the world. T h e Commander in Chief, and the XIX Corps attacked with a
Mr. Roosevelt, was dead.19 special fervor.20
Despite unusual efforts to seize a
It took General Walker’s XX Corps, bridge intact across the 255-foot width
with the 4th Armored Division moving of the Weser, nobody succeeded. With
the assistance of the attached 119th In-
fantry of the 30th Division, a combat
command of the 2d Armored Divi-
and staffs of Wehkreise VI and XI, plus the Weser late on the 7th, reached the
some naval troops in the downstream Leine on the 8th. There the infantry
sector near Bremen.24 crossed on a bridge seized intact by the
While the Germans thus played at 11th Cavalry Group northwest of Hann-
shuffling essentially paper commands, over. I n the process the division cap-
the 2d Armored Division of the XIX tured a German soldier who was carrying
Corps dealt in tangibles called power a map of Hannover’s defenses. These,
and speed. Long anxious to be turned the map revealed, were concentrated in
loose toward Berlin, the division com- the southwest and south. Before daylight
mander, General White, had directed on 10April, the men of the 84th moved
his operations officer to prepare a plan against the city from the northwest and
even before the division crossed the north, clearing it by midafternoon. Acres
Rhine. His army commander, General of rubble from Allied bombing and
Simpson, was equally enthusiastic. Judg- thousands of foreign laborers made
ing from the eager way the men in the overly exuberant by looted liquor posed
tanks and the half-tracks took off from more problems than did the Germans.
the Weser, the zeal of their commanders As with the Third Army, the word to
had passed down the line without resume the eastward drive reached units
diminution. of the Ninth Army on the 9th. General
It took the armor just one day (6 White’s armor in the center of the XIX
April) to traverse the eighteen miles Corps the next day made about twenty
from the Weser to the little Leine River. miles, despite a brief but violent en-
T h e Leine was a phase line established counter with sixty-seven big antiaircraft
by General Bradley as a means of con- guns arrayed to protect the Hermann
trol to release his three horses—the Goering Steel Works southwest of
First, Third, and Ninth Armies—from Braunschweig. While the 83d Division
the starting gate at the same time. Al- continued eastward on the right wing
though obligated to pause along the of the corps, dropping off a regiment to
Leine until given the starting signal, the deal with that part of the Harz Moun-
eager 2d Armored made a point of seiz- tains in the Ninth Army’s zone, the 2d
ing bridges intact across both the Leine Armored Division’s Combat Command
and another river ten miles farther east B on 11 April broke free.
before coming to a full halt the next T h e men of CCB and their com-
day, 7 April. mander, Brig. Gen. Sidney R. Hinds,
T h e two infantry divisions of the were imbued with one thought: get a
XIX Corps—the 30th and 83d—mean- bridge across the Elbe. Overtaking flee-
while made their way to the Leine. To ing German columns, sweeping aside
the north the 84th Division of the XIII the defenders of roadblocks with blasts
Corps, having completed a bridge over from the cannon of their tanks, surpris-
ing Volkssturm defenders who could but
24 This force was first commanded by General gape in bewilderment and then throw
Student and called Army Student, but four days down their newly acquired arms, the
later Student and Blumentritt exchanged com- tanks and half-tracks of CCB drove re-
mands. MSS # B–354 (Blumentritt) and # B–414
(Geyer). lentlessly eastward.
SWEEP TO T H E ELBE 387
I n late afternoon an attached con- swarmed toward a bridge that still stood,
tingent of the division’s reconnaissance the Germans destroyed it.
squadron raced into a western suburb T h e 30th Division meanwhile cleared
of Magdeburg, startling civilian shop- Braunschweig after a fight with flak
pers. After dark a column of tanks guns on the western approaches, and
commanded by Maj. James F. Hollings- the 84th and 102d Divisions advanced
worth made a run for a bridge across in the wake of the armor of the XIII
the Elbe southeast of Magdeburg at Corps. But the most important news
Schoenebeck, but the Germans who had after night fell on the 12th again came
been fleeing suddenly turned to fight. from the 2d Armored Division. Using
Although Hollingsworth’s tanks got dukws hastily brought forward, two bat-
within a few feet of the bridge, they at talions of armored infantry slipped
last had to fall back in the face of quietly across the sprawling Elbe at
determined German fire. Before a new Westerhausen, just south of Magdeburg.
attack with infantry could reach the Not a shot sounded from the far shore.
bridge, the Germans demolished it. Not to be outdone, men of the 83d
T h e first news of CCB’s exploits to Division, the Rag T a g Circus, fought
reach headquarters in the rear arrived hard through the 12th to clear a stub-
shortly after 2000 the evening of 11 born contingent of Germans from Barby
April. T h e message was laconic, but it on the Elbe (the 329th Infantry lost 24
said all that needed to be said: “We’re men killed, 5 missing, 35 wounded),
on the Elbe.” During the day, CCB had then in early afternoon of 13 April sent
traveled fifty-seven airline miles, seventy- two battalions of infantrymen across the
three when measured by road. river in assault boats behind a heavy
Making such extensive use of cap- smoke screen. It was “just like a Sunday
tured German vehicles, military and afternoon picnic with no fire of any
civilian, that news correspondents nick- kind.” 25 T h e regimental commander,
named them the “Rag Tag Circus,” Col. Edwin B. Crabill, went up and
men of General Macon’s 83d Division down the west bank, exhorting the men
were only a step behind the armor. Late to get going. “Don’t waste the opportu-
on the 12th, men who themselves pre- nity of a lifetime,” he shouted. “You are
ferred another nickname, the “83d Ar- on your way to Berlin.” 26
mored Division,” reached the Elbe a Colonel Crabill did not know it, nor
few miles upstream from Schoenebeck at did even the Ninth Army commander,
Barby. About the same time, the armor General Simpson, but he and his men
of the XIII Corps, General Oliver's5th were not on their way to Berlin. Their
Armored Division, having pushed past Supreme Commander had already made
and would soon reaffirm the decision
the 84th Division at Hannover, rolled
that was to turn their holdings into a
u p to the Elbe fifty miles downstream
bridgehead
to nowhere.
from Magdeburg at Tangermuende,
only fifty-threemiles from Berlin.As 25 Combat interview with 1st Lt William Stout.
Several interviews deal with this action.
tankers and armored infantrymen 26 Combat interview with Crabill.
RIDEAN ARMORED
INFANTRYMEN CAR I N THE RACETO THE ELBE
SWEEP TO THE ELBE 389
A Flak-Infested Route to the Mulde day the division’s 23d Infantry reached
the Weser. Crossing unopposed in as-
T h e role of the First Army in the sault boats moments after darkness fell,
12th Army Group’s eastward drive rifle companies pushed quickly to a
meanwhile had developed according to towering wooded ridgeline a mile to the
the location of the divisions of the V east. T h e First Army had gained a
and VII Corps when the attack to seal bridgehead only a day behind the Ninth
off the Ruhr came to an end. In General Army.
Collins’s VII Corps on the left, the 3d O n the 7th, a battalion of the 104th
Armored Division took the lead. Start- Division used the 2d Division’s bridge to
ing to drive eastward on 5 April, the provide a first crossing of the Weser for
division encountered stubborn resistance the VII Corps, followed later by assault
at numerous roadblocks the next day crossings by other contingents of the
from remnants of the Ersatzbrigade 104th and by units of the 1st Division
Westfalen, which had proved such a per- on the north wing of the corps. Only in-
sistent foe near Paderborn, and reached termittent and generally ineffective ma-
the Weser on 7 April only to find all chine gun fire posed any threat to the
bridges destroyed. crossings. T h e 2d Division meanwhile
I n General Huebner’s V Corps, the extended its bridgehead to a depth of
2d and 69th Infantry Divisions headed six miles against resistance no more for-
the advance. Ordered first to relieve midable than that posed by a hastily
troops of the Third Army in Kassel, the formed battalion including men im-
69th Division began its eastward drive as pressed from mental hospitals. By night-
darkness was approaching on the 5th. fall of the 7th, concern that the enemy
In a region of wooded hills in an angle might have formed a solid position any-
formed by confluence of the Fulda and where along the Weser had been dis-
Werra Rivers, which meet at the town pelled.
of Hann-Muenden to form the Weser, T h e fact was just as apparent to the
the division almost immediately ran into German commander, General Hitzfeld,
those Germans that constituted the best as to his adversaries. Without bothering
of General Hitzfeld’s Eleventh Army, to seek approval from OB W E S T , Hitz-
the LXVII Corps. Nowhere did they give feld told his units to begin a step-by-step
in without a fight. Not until late on the withdrawal to the Leine River, thirteen
7th was Hann-Muenden cleared and miles east of the Weser, there to try
were crossings gained over the Werra again to make a stand. He then compro-
there and upstream. mised that position immediately by de-
It was the happy chance of the 2d claring the east-bank university town of
Division in the meantime to strike the Goettingen an open city because of
weakest part of the Eleventh Army de- thousands of hospitalized soldiers there.
fense before the Weser. Little more Hardly were his orders disseminated
than the garrison of a training center when Hitzfeld relinquished command of
at Hofgeismar, ten miles from the river, the Eleventh Army to General Lucht,
barred the way. There the Germans on who as commander of the LXVI Corps
5 April fought tenaciously, but the next had narrowly escaped capture in March
390 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
CROSSING
OF THE WESER BY MENOF THE 1STINFANTRY
RIVER DIVISION
when his command post west of the ing with Hitler’s grandiose scheme for
Rhine had been overrun.27This was no a counteroffensive from the Harz
prejudicial relief of Hitzfeld; Lucht had Mountains to relieve Army Group B in
been earmarked all along to command the Ruhr, all available troops were to
the Eleventh Army but had been un- withdraw into the Harz, where they
available earlier. General Hitzfeld re- were to turn the wooded region into a
turned to command of the LXVIl fortress to be held until General
C orps.28 Wenck’s hastily forming Twelfth Army
General Lucht had been in his post could arrive to start the counteroffen-
only a few hours on 8 April when new sive. To gain time to prepare the Harz
orders arrived from his commander in for defense, the Eleventh Army was to
chief, Field Marshal Kesselring. In keep- defend the Leine River “under all cir-
cumstances.” 29
27See above, ch. X.
28 M S # B–581 (Estor). 29I b i d . See also MS # B–606 (Reichhelm).
SWEEP TO THE ELBE 391
How impossible to execute was the thing right again. All contingents of
latter, if not the first, part of the order Lucht’s Eleventh Army except Hitz-
was amply demonstrated within the day feld’s LXVII Corps tried to reach the
as men of the 2d Division seized a mountains on the 10th. Hitzfeld’s corps
bridge intact across the Leine outside drew an equally impossible assignment
Goettingen and pushed rapidly beyond of building a line from the Harz east-
the undefended university town. T h e ward to Halle, in order to keep the
69th Division too crossed the Leine, American forces from turning north-
though without benefit of a bridge. On eastward behind the Harz and thereby
the 9th both divisions drove more than denying the T w e l f t h Army its destina-
ten miles to the east. T h e 2d Division tion. Although the German generals in-
occupied Duderstadt, east of Goettin- volved admitted to themselves the futil-
gen, liberating 600 Allied prisoners of ity of it all, they somehow were able to
war, including a hundred Americans close their minds to reality and try to
(another 44 had died within the last bring it
month from malnutrition) ; the 69th As General Collins set the 1st Divi-
captured Heiligenstadt, a few miles to sion to sweeping the mountains system-
the southwest. atically from the west, to be joined a
A day behind the V Corps in crossing few days later by the 9th Division, the
the Weser, General Collins of the VII 3d Armored Division and infantrymen
Corps made u p the time by committing of the 104th continued eastward. Sel-
his armor early on 9 April. Resistance dom was there more opposition than oc-
in rolling wooded country along the left casional delaying actions except when
wing was occasionally strong; at one some column turned north toward the
point a dozen Mark V and Tiger Royal Harz. In those instances, the Germans
tanks knocked out five of the 3d Ar- reacted with determination, sometimes
mored Division’s Shermans, but as night employing small coveys of tanks or self-
came the armor held a bridgehead over propelled guns.
the Leine at Northeim. O n the 11th the armor swept into
For the First Army, there was to be Nordhausen, uncovering more grisly, al-
no pause at the Leine, because the ar- most unbelievable evidence of Nazi
rival of its divisions there coincided with bestiality in another concentration
General Bradley’s release of all restric- camp. Here is how a sergeant from the
tions on eastward movement, effective 329th Medical Battalion saw it:
on the 10th. In the VII Corps,the 3d Rows upon rows of skin-coveredskeletons
Armored Division continued to pace the met our eyes. Men lay as they had starved,
drive, while General Huebner commit- discolored, and lying in indescribable hu-
ted the 9th Armored Division to take man filth. Their striped coats and prison
the lead in the V Corps. numbers hung to their frames as a last
token or symbol of those who enslaved and
For the Germans,
the object was to killed them . . . One girl in particular I
try to get as many men as possibleinto noticed; I would say she was about seven-
the Harz Mountains, to hold there in teen years old. She lay there where she had
keeping with the myth that the T w e l f t h
Army soon would arrive to set every- 30MS # B–581 (Estor).
392 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
fallen, gangrened and naked. In my own point the armor turned northeast, head-
thoughts I choked up—couldn’t quite un- ing for the Elbe at Dessau, while the
derstand how and why war could do these 104th Division began a march on Halle.
things . . . We went downstairs into a filth
indescribable, accompanied by a horrible
Although the men in the tanks noted
dead-rot stench. There in beds of crude increased resistance on 13 April, par-
wood I saw men too weak to move dead ticularly in volume of antitank fire,
comrades from their side. One hunched- they advanced another twenty-three
down French boy was huddled up against miles and established bridgeheads over
a dead comrade, as if to keep warm . . . the Saale River a few miles northwest
There were others, in dark cellar rooms, of Halle. Another day would pass before
lying in disease and filth, being eaten away
by diarrhea and malnutrition. It was like
the portent of the increased resistance
stepping into the Dark Ages to walk into would be revealed.
one of these cellar-cells and seek out the During the first two days after the 9th
living. 31 Armored Division was committed on 10
Outside Nordhausen men of the April, the V Corps made similar prog-
104th Division found large under- ress. On the third day, 12 April, the ar-
ground factories, one for manufacturing mor got a rude shock. Just over five
V–2 rockets. Scientific teams later miles from the Saale River, a task force
shipped a hundred of the rockets to the forming the division’s north column
United States for study, along with sci- suddenly came under heavy fire from
entific data found buried in an aban- fixed antiaircraft guns. T h e guns were
doned mine a few miles away.32 as deadly against tanks as against the air-
Near the V-weapon factory was a planes they had been designed to com-
slave labor camp with a capacity of bat. Only after losing nine tanks did the
30,000. Indisputable evidence showed task force succeed in knocking out the
that n o workers ever left camp and fac- big pieces.
tory alive; if they became too weak to Like the Third Army’s 6th Armored
work, they were simply left to die and Division, which on this same day at
their remains disposed of in crematory Zeitz had bumped into a nest of the
ovens. Suvivors testified that 150 bodies fixed antiaircraft pieces, the 9th Ar-
a day were cremated.33 mored Division had come u p against
Pausing briefly at Nordhausen to one of the most concentrated belts of
await arrival of gasoline and oil, the flak guns in all Germany. T h e belt
tankers of the 3d Armored Division re- formed a great arc extending from Bit-
terfeld, northeast of Halle, southwest-
sumed their advance early on 12 April,
entering Sangerhausen, twenty-two ward to encompass Halle, Merseburg,
and Weissenfels on the Saale River, then
miles to the east, by midday. From that
southeastward to Zeitz. Although Leip-
zig stood behind the center of the arc,
the Germans had not created the ring of
steel to protect the city but to defend a
31Sgt. Ragene Farris, as quoted in Hoegh and number of synthetic oil refineries and
Doyle, Timberwolf Tracks, pp. 330–31.
32See McGovern, CROSSBOW and OVERCAST.
industrial plants related to them: nitro-
33104th Div AAR, Apr 45. gen, explosives, hydrogen, and synthetic
SWEEP T O T H E ELBE 393
rubber.34 Near Merseburg, for example, resent the outer defenses of Leipzig, the
was Germany’s largest synthetic rubber V Corps commander, General Huebner,
plant, second largest synthetic oil refin- directed the 9th Armored Division to
ery, and a big hydrogen plant.35 shift southeast to bypass Leipzig and
T h e build-up in antiaircraft defenses gain the Mulde River, thirteen miles
had begun in May 1944, with assign- beyond the city. While the 2d Division
ment to the area of a flak division with took over the drive on Leipzig from the
headquarters in Leipzig. Beginning with west, the 69th was to follow the armor,
374 guns ranging in caliber from 75- then come in on the city from south
mm. to 128-mm., the defenses had been and southeast.
increased by the spring of 1945 to pos- Having stirred u p a fury of resistance
sibly a thousand pieces.36 Grouped in at Weissenfels on the Saale, the armor
batteries varying from 12 to 36 guns, on 13 April backed away, crossed the
the weapons were particularly effective river on a bridge taken intact southwest
against ground targets in the Leipzig of the town, then before the day was out
area because relatively flat terrain af- crossed the Weisse Elster River near
forded excellent observation and fields Zeitz. Two days later CCR on the south
of fire. wing broke free of the flak belt and
Although the concentrated belt of dashed all the way to the Mulde, twenty
flak was well known to Allied airmen miles southeast of Leipzig. Having
as a notorious “flak alley,” nobody had seized two bridges intact, CCR the next
reported the concentration to the day, 16 April, crossed, captured Colditz,
ground troops that now had to face the and released 1,800 Allied prisoners of
guns. Allied air forces had detailed plot- war, including several ranking British
tings of the locations of the batteries, officers.
but it took three days for the 9th Ar- T h e 69th Division’s 271st Infantry
mored Division’s urgent requests for meanwhile cleared a determined gar-
information to produce results. Slave rison of 1,500 from Weissenfels on the
laborers and occasionally a German civil- 13th and 14th, in the process crossing
ian sometimes helped the troops to spot the Saale in assault boats. T h e 2d Divi-
the guns before they opened fire, but too sion on the 15th took Merseburg and
often the first warning was the sharp neighboring industrial towns with their
crack of shells exploding in a rain of large synthetic oil and rubber plants. To
deadly fragments. avoid observed fire from antiaircraft
Since the flak guns appeared to rep- batteries, one regiment that night crossed
the S a l e over a damaged railroad
34British Air Ministry, T h e Rise and Fall of the
bridge, the start of a series of night at-
German Air Force (1933 to 1945) (London, 1948), tacks designed to circumvent the big
p. 355. flak guns. Advancing by night, the men
35V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 430. could get close enough to the guns to
36This figure is an estimate based on reports of
American units involved and on a letter from Dr. bring accurate artillery fire On them.
Arenz, Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Frei- Since the gun crews were unaccustomed
burg, Germany, to USAREUR Historical Division,
31 October 1966, in response to a query by the
to ground combat, the stratagem was
author. Copy in OCMH. usually sufficient to prompt them to flee,
394 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
the war, both the 2d and 69th Divisions in a sturdy stone base of the Battle of
made measured advances toward Leip- the Nations monument. Through much
zig. Only on the 18th did the two divi- of 19 April, tanks, tank destroyers, and
sions break into the city. In the south artillery employing direct fire pounded
and southeast, the 69th Division found Poncet’s position. Because the Germans
resistance at times determined, partic- held seventeen American prisoners, the
ularly around the city hall and Napo- 69th Division commander, General
leon Platz, the site of a monument Reinhardt, declined to use flame throw-
(Voelkerschlachtsdenkmal—Battle of the ers.
Nations Memorial) commemorating Na- In midafternoon, a German-born
poleon’s defeat in 1813 in the Battle American captain went under a white
of Leipzig. Approaching from the west, flag to the monument where for nine
men of the 2d Division encountered hours he argued to convince Poncet to
their first real fight at the bridges over surrender. At long last, past midnight,
the Weisse Elster, which were defended Poncet finally agreed.39
by Volkssturm and a sprinkling of regu- By this time a special control force
lars who were behind overturned trol- formed from artillery battalions of the
ley cars filled with stones. Whether on V Corps already was arriving to admin-
order of Poncet, Grolman, or otherwise, ister Leipzig, and first contingents of
the bridges stood. the 2d and 69th Divisions were on their
As men of the 2d Division settled way to join the corps armor at the Mulde
down for the night on the east bank of River. In keeping with General Eisen-
the Weisse Elster, a police major ap- hower’s decision not to go to Berlin, the
proached with word that General von pending assignment for these troops was
Grolman wanted to surrender the city. to await contact with the Russians.
A rifle company commander accompa-
nied him to police headquarters, but A Short New War
there discovered that Grolman, still beg-
ging Poncet in vain by telephone to sur- While this kind of fairly typical pur-
render, controlled only the police.38 suit warfare took place in the First Ar-
Although General von Grolman re- my’s V Corps and throughout the Third
turned with the U.S. officer to American Army, what seemed by contrast to be al-
lines to confer further with higher com- most a new war had suddenly erupted a
manders, the negotiations had no effect few miles to the north. In the Harz
on Colonel von Poncet and the Ger- Mountains, at Halle, on the roads to
mans at Napoleon Platz. As resistance Dessau, and in the bridgeheads over the
in the city hall collapsed early on the Elbe, men of the First and Ninth Ar-
19th (inside, the mayor, his deputy, and mies who had been engaged in what ap-
their families were suicides), Colonel peared to be an end-the-war pursuit
von Poncet and about 150 men holed u p suddenly found themselves fighting a
determined though ill-equipped foe.
38Details of this episode are in Charles B. Mac- T h e combat was as senseless as it was
Donald, C o m p a n y C o m m a n d e r (Washington: In-
fantry Journal Press, 1947). pp. 241–55. See also 39Toland, The Last 100 Days, pages 394–96,
MS # B–478 (Grolman). provides details.
396 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
unexpected. T h e Germans could hope few assault guns per division, and little
to accomplish nothing other than to in- artillery, Filled with spirited young men
sure a warrior’s death for more men on led by experienced officers who had been
both sides and, by slowing the Ameri- instructors at the schools, the divisions
can drive, expose more of their people would make up in esprit something of
and their land to the mercy of the Rus- what they lacked in training and equip-
sians, whom they all feared. ment. 40
T h e new war in all cases could be laid One unit, Division Potsdam, was lost
directly or indirectly to a new force, the to General Wenck from the first. While
inchoate Twelfth Army, which Hitler being formed from army schools in the
absurdly counted on to sweep to the vicinity of the Harz Mountains, it had
Harz, then to the Ruhr, thus gaining been trapped by the rapid American
time in the west while some nebulous drive. Three other divisions would be
something happened to wrench victory insufficiently organized for commitment
from defeat in the east. T h e Twelfth for more than a week. Two more, along
Army made its presence felt first against with one of the corps headquarters,
the 2d Armored Division’s little bridge- were under orders from OKW to assem-
head on the east bank of the Elbe. ble west of the Elbe north of the Ameri-
Hardly had the army commander- can zone of attack with the aim of driv-
designate, General Wenck, reached his ing south by way of Braunschweig to
command post on 12 April in a panzer the Harz while the main body of the
training school at Rosslau, across the Twelfth Army drove west. General
Elbe from Dessau, when word arrived Wenck thus had immediately available
from the combat commander of Magde- at the Elbe only three divisions plus
burg that Americans had crossed the some small miscellaneous units.
river nearby. While the artillery under Under orders from OKW before
the combat commander, including Mag- Wenck’s arival, the commanders of two
deburg’s fixed antiaircraft pieces, opened divisions, Scharnhorst and Ulrich von
fire on the American crossing site, Hutten, had committed their units as
Wenck tried to discover what force he they became available to hold a bridge-
could send to attack the bridgehead. head west of the Elbe around Dessau
His new command, Wenck found, whence the Twelfth Army might start
was to consist of four corps headquar- its drive to the Harz. T h e third division
ters, to be withdrawn from the east, and was holding the east bank of the Elbe
nine divisions. In most cases named af- far to the north of Magdeburg.
ter heroic figures from German history, To counter the 2d Armored Divi-
the divisions were formed primarily of sion’s bridgehead south of Magdeburg,
young men from army schools, particu- Wenck had to depend for the moment
larly officer training schools, and from on Volkssturm and a miscellany with-
the Reich labor service. They were in
varying stages of mobilization. Although 40Information on the Twelfth Army is from MS
food and ammunition were ample, most # B–606 (Reichhelm) and MS # B–394, Report
on the 12th Army, compiled for Historical Divi-
of the divisions would have no tanks; sion, U.S. Army (General der Panzertruppen Wal-
all would have little transport, only a ter Wenck).
SWEEP TO THE ELBE 397
drawn from the local defense force o f came a deluge of shells that wrecked
Magdeburg. T o supplement these, he everything.
ordered Division Schmnhorst to ready Giving up on that site, the 2d Armored
one battalion to counterattack the Division commander, General White, di-
bridgehead in conjunction with a mixed rected the three infantry battalions to
force of assault guns drawn from an as- move after nightfall—in effect, to attack
sault gun training school, and a few -upstream approximately three miles to
tanks.41 a point opposite the bridge earlier de-
Before daylight on 13 April, a battal- molished by the Germans at Schoene-
ion of the 30th Division’s 119th Infantry beck. As daylight approached, Company
crossed into the 2d Armored Division’s L, 119th Infantry, and portions of a
bridgehead, bringing the strength there battalion of the 41st Armored Infantry
to three battalions; but no antitank guns, were inside Elbenau, not quite two miles
tanks, or tank destroyers made it across. from the river, while the other battalion
(See Map X V , inset.) So shallow was the of armored infantry had cleared some
water near both banks of the river that 250 Germans from the riverside village
supporting engineers despaired of oper- of Gruenewalde. Other units were dig-
ating vehicular ferries and concentrated ging in on open ground to form the
instead on bridging the river. Construc- wings of a bridgehead. T h a t was the
tion was slow in the dark, and sporadic situation when, in the dissipating dark-
German shelling interfered. With the ness, a battalion of Division Scharnhorst
coming of daylight the shelling increased, supported by Assault Gun Training School
much of it deadly air bursts from big Burg with approximately eight tanks and as-
antiaircraft pieces at Magdeburg. Al- sault guns began to attack.
though supporting artillery tried con- Catching the American infantrymen
stantly to neutralize the fire and engi- in the process of establishing their
neers laid out smoke pots to screen the bridgehead and still without antitank de-
site, neither effort had apparent effect. fense other than bazookas, the Germans
Call after call went back for fighter- rapidly cut off the 119th Infantry’s Com-
bombers to strike the artillery positions, pany L in Elbenau and began systematic-
but so far behind had airfields fallen in ally to reduce the defenders in the open,
the race across Germany that the Elbe foxhole by foxhole. In the confusion, a
was almost beyond range of tactical air- score of Americans surrendered. T h e
craft. None showed up. Germans put them in front of their
Despite the shelling, engineers by mid- tanks, forcing them at gunpoint to shield
day of the 13th had advanced their pon- their continuing advance. T h e bridge-
tons and treadway tracking to within head began to go to pieces.
twenty-five yards of the far shore. Then Five miles upstream, out of range of
the enemy’s artillery and antiaircraft
guns at Magdeburg, men of the 83d Di-
41 The German sources make no mention of vision were having little difficulty in
tanks but in the extensive combat interviews their bridgehead opposite Barby. No
available on the ensuing action, so many American
witnesses speak of tanks that their presence can
sooner had two battalions of the 329th
hardly be doubted. Infantry crossed in midafternoon of the
398 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
13th than engineers began to ferry sup- Set free in a swift current, the ferry
porting vehicles across, while other engi- careened downstream.
neers went to work on a treadway bridge To General Hinds, this was the end.
that was completed by nightfall. They Aware of the 83d Division’s successful
named the bridge after their new Com- crossing and the plan to send CCR into
mander in Chief, President Harry S. that bridgehead and acutely conscious of
Truman, and called it the “Gateway to the crisis in his own bridgehead, the fail-
Berlin.” Although four small counter- ure to get tanks across, and the lack of
attacks struck the bridgehead during the air support, General Hinds gave the or-
day of the 14th, the presence of attached der to withdraw.
tanks and tank destroyers enabled the Returning to the west bank, Hinds
infantrymen to disperse them readily. reported his decision to his division
Remarking the contrast between the headquarters where, in the absence of
fortunes of the two bridgeheads, General General White, he talked with the chief
White early on the 14th ordered his re- of staff. General White later concurred
serve combat command into the 83d’s in the order, as did the corps commander,
bridgehead to attack down the river’s General McLain.
right bank and relieve the beleaguered By late afternoon, most of the sur-
men at Gruenewalde and Elbenau. CCR viving infantrymen had made their way
moved out early in the afternoon, but back to safety except for the men of
hardly had the attack begun when word Company L, cut off and hiding in cellars
came to call it off. in Elbenau. These men finally learned
So desperate had matters become in of the withdrawal when their artillery
CCB’s little bridgehead that one of the forward observer established radio con-
armored infantry battalion commanders tact with an artillery observation plane.
in midmorning returned to the west T h e forward observer called for a
bank to report his battalion lost. He had blanket of artillery fire on Elbenau to
seen his companies overrun, many men catch the Germans in the open. When
surrendering. T h e CCB commander, the fire lifted, some sixty men made a
General Hinds, himself went into the break for the river. As tanks and tank
bridgehead to survey the situation. destroyers fired from the west bank to
Engineers at the river had in the mean- cover their withdrawal, fighter-bombers
time been constructing a ferry and an- of the XXIX Tactical Air Command
choring a guide cable for it to the east with auxiliary fuel tanks in place of
bank. Although the water at this site bombs finally arrived to strafe German
positions. Most of the sixty men returned
also was shallow close to the west bank,
safely.
they coped with it by hauling rubble into
Through the night and the next day
the river to create a loading ramp. At other survivors trickled back from the
noon a ferry carrying a bulldozer to be east bank, including one group of 30.
used to shave the east bank began to Final losses totaled 330; of those only 4
cross, but as the ferry neared the far were known dead and 20 wounded, an
shore a concentration of German anti- indication that many had been captured.
aircraft artillery fire severed the cable. Although the fighting in the bridgehead
SWEEP TO THE ELBE 399
obviously had been severe, reports of the Elbe River bridgehead to include
eyewitnesses revealed that the confusion Potsdam [a suburb of Berlin].” On the
caused when the Germans struck before 15th General Simpson flew to General
the defenders were organized had as Bradley’s headquarters to present it. Al-
much to do with the loss of the bridge- though Bradley listened closely as Gen-
head as did anything else. eral Simpson’s G–3, Colonel Mead,
Word of the 83d Division’s success at disclosed the plan, he said he would have
the Elbe had in the meantime flashed u p to telephone General Eisenhower for a
the chain of command to General Eisen- decision. Overhearing Bradley’s end of
hower. When General Bradley gave him the conversation, Simpson soon had his
the news by telephone, the Supreme answer.
Commander was moved by the turn of “All right, Ike,” Bradley said, “that’s
events to reconsider his decision not to what I thought. I’ll tell him. Goodbye.”
go to Berlin. How many casualties, he There was to be no drive on Berlin.43
asked Bradley, might it cost to drive
through and capture Berlin? Bradley esti- TWOmore combat assignments re-
mated 100,000.42 mained for the Ninth Army. One was
T h e men inside the Elbe bridgehead to reduce Magdeburg, where the combat
were confident the drive on Berlin would commander refused an ultimatum to sur-
be resumed momentarily. While the in- render. After a strike by 350 medium
fantry with help of the 2d Armored’s bombers of the 9th Bombardment Di-
CCR extended the bridgehead to a depth vision during the afternoon of 17 April,
of about five miles, the 320th Infantry the 30th Division and parts of the 2d
(attached from the 35th Division to Armored began a systematic reduction
make u p for a regiment of the 83d left of the city. T h e next day, as the last
behind in the Harz) attacked southeast resistance faded, at least one American
across the Saale River to clear Germans commander, General Bradley, was
from the angle formed by confluence pleased that the Germans demolished the
of the Saale and the Elbe so that a second last bridge over the Elbe, for it spared
bridge could be constructed over the him from putting men across to create
Elbe nearby. Although an occasional another bridgehead to nowhere.44
German plane harassed the bridgehead, T h e second assignment was to defeat
American fighter-bombers extending an incursion into the zone o f the XIII
their range with auxiliary fuel tanks in Corps from the north and to clear a
place of bombs were active much of the newly assigned sector along the Elbe that
day, artillery and armored support were originally had been a British responsi-
plentiful, and nobody doubted the 83d bility, a two-faceted task which the XIII
Division’s ability to break out of the Corps aptly named Operation KAPUT.
bridgehead at will. According to orders of OKW, two of
T h e Ninth Army staff already had a the newly formed divisions of Wenck’s
plan for driving to Berlin, couched be- Twelfth Army were to have attacked
hind the euphemistic phrase, “to enlarge
43Quotations are from comments on the draft
MS of this volume by Mead.
42Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 535. 44Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 539.
400 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
southward into the Ninth Army’s flank on 15 April when the British identified
to gain the Harz Mountains, but because a portion of the division in a counter-
one division got tied down in a fight with attack at Uelzen. Before daylight the
the British, only the other showed up. next day, a force estimated at a thousand
That was Panzer Division von Clause- men and thirty tanks cut the main supply
witz, formed from staff and students of route of the XIII Corps near General
a panzer training school off the Ninth Gillem’s command post at Kloetze, 36
Army’s flank near Uelzen. At full miles southeast of Uelzen. For four more
strength in men, the division had at least days, contingents of the new panzer di-
fifty tanks and additional armor that in- vision turned up at various points in the
cluded experimental and antiquated rear of the corps, involving at one time
equipment found at the school. 45 or another in the fight to erase them
Conditions favoring employment of contingents of all three divisions in the
German forces against the Ninth Army’s corps, including the 5th Armored Di-
flank had begun to develop around 15 vision and a newly assigned division, the
April when the S Corps of the adjacent 29th. Telephone communications and
British Second Army swung north at motor messenger service between t h e
Uelzen in keeping with a British main XIII Corps and the Ninth Army were
effort toward Hamburg. A 60-mile disrupted for two days. Half in jest, half
stretch of the Ninth Army’s north flank in earnest, service troops complained that
from Uelzen to the Elbe was thus left it was safer on the front line at the Elbe
exposed except for British cavalry pa- than in the rear echelon.
trols and a screen maintained by the In most cases the German thrusts were
11th Cavalry Group. stopped well short of the corps south
T h e XIII Corps already had been hav- boundary, although portions of one col-
ing trouble in its rear areas as a result umn did get into the zone of the XIX
of bypassed Germans who holed u p in Corps, where contingents of the 2d
some of the vast expanses of woodland Armored Division wiped them out. T h e
in the corps zone and refused to give up. most persistent of all the enemy groups
Astride the Wesergebirge on the east hid in a forest near Kloetze. A chemical
bank of the Weser, the 102d Division mortar battalion tried in vain to burn
fought for two days against more than the Germans out with white phosphorus
2,000 Germans who had coalesced in the shells. A regiment of the 29th Division
wooded highland. Farther east on 13 and supported by 155-mm. and 8-inch pieces
14 April contingents of both the 84th was required to “give Kloetze Forest a
and 102d Divisions fought to eliminate real hair cut” and eliminate the force. 46
two other pockets of resistance, one of Although more troublesome than seri-
which encompassed eight tanks. ous, the German forays delayed for a day
T h e first indication of the presence of a start on a new assignment handed the
Panzer Division von Clausewitz emerged XIII Corps to assume responsibility for
the vast triangle of uncleared territory
45MS # B–606 (Reichhelm). Tank strength is north of the Ninth Army’s boundary
based on prisoner-of-war statements in XIII Corps
G–2 Periodic Reports and on numbers destroyed 46 Quotation is from XIII Corps G–2 Periodic
in ensuing actions. Rpt, 20 Apr 45.
SWEEP TO THE ELBE 401
between Uelzen and the Elbe. When the Except for a task force on the extreme
attack finally began on the 21st, the 5th south wing of the division, which came
Armored Division encountered and de- within range of fixed antiaircraft guns
stroyed the last of Panzer Division von near Bitterfeld at the northeastern tip
Clausewitz. All together, American of the flak belt encompassing Leipzig,
forces had knocked out forty-seven tanks seldom did the columns encounter enemy
and more than a dozen assault guns. shelling. T h e main obstacles were towed
T h e sweep north of the former army antitank guns and Panzerfausts. Some-
boundary gained rapidly on the 22d. By times the Germans turned Panzerfausts
24 April the new assignment was com- against deployed armored infantrymen,
pleted, with the Ninth Army holding the firing them in batteries like mortars. T h e
line of the Elbe to a point near Dannen- going posed problems for rear echelons
berg, thirty miles downstream from of the division too; no infantry division
Wittenberge. of the VII Corps was available for mop-
up, and these youthful Germans revealed
T h e brush of the First Army’s VII no inclination to surrender simply be-
Corps with General Wenck’s Twelfth cause armored columns had passed them
Army began in earnest on 14 April, the by. After Koethen was cleared in a fight
day after the 3d Armored Division had that lasted twenty-four hours, so many
seized bridgeheads over the Saale River Germans infiltrated back into the city
northwest of Halle. Heading for Dessau, that another twelve hours of fighting en-
where the Mulde River flows into the sued before Koethen was finally secure.
Elbe, the 3d Armored hit positions of As the armor drew up to Dessau, a wide
Division Scharnhorst and Division Ul- swath of forest south of the city served
rich von Hutten, which were striving to as a base for German raids and counter-
hold a bridgehead west of the Elbe as a attacks.
base for the Twelfth Army drive to the Bypassing defended towns, one task
Harz. force fought through a portion of the
Roadblocks now were more numerous, forest to reach the Mulde River at a
more stoutly defended, and the larger demolished autobahn bridge just two
towns, such as Koethen, eleven miles miles southeast of Dessau on 15 April.
from Dessau, could be taken only after Although infantrymen scrambled across
slow house-to-house fighting. One com- the wreckage to form a small bridgehead,
bat command reached Koethen at night- difficult approaches and occasional shell-
fall on the 14th; it was nightfall the next ing delayed building a bridge until, on
day before tanks and half-tracks could 16 April, the same stop order that had
move on. Although planes of the I X halted the Ninth Army the day before
Tactical Air Command were overhead at the Elbe prompted the division com-
much of the time, their help generally mander, General Hickey, to pull back
was limited to strafing because, like the bridgehead.
planes of the XXIX Tactical Air Com- As part of the armored division swept
mand in support of the Ninth Army, they the west bank of the Mulde southward
had to carry auxiliary fuel tanks in place in the direction of the First Army’s V
of bombs. Corps, the attack on Dessau began early
402 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
on 21 April. It took two days of house- in the city’s hospitals, to confine his de-
to-house fighting to clear the city and fense to the southern third of the city.
another day to erase a hold-out position For three more days, through the 19th,
along a railroad leading across the Elbe the 104th Division’s 414th Infantry
to Rosslau. Although the ultimate fate of fought for Halle, killing or capturing
two divisions, Scharnhorst and Ulrich unorganized three- to five-man groups in
von Hutten, had been inevitable from almost every building, while the divi-
the first, the two hastily formed units sion’s other regiments turned east to
had forced upon the armor of the VII conquer Bitterfeld and reach the Mulde
Corps ten days of unpleasant anticlimax River.
to the war. T h e other German holdout was in
T h e 104th Division, in the meantime, the Harz Mountains, unattainable goal
also had a hard fight. At Halle a die-hard of General Wenck’s Twelfth Army. As
combat commander, Generalleutnant many as 70,000 Germans had congre-
Anton Rathke, was determined to hold gated there for a last stand under the
out as long as possible with about 4,000 aegis of General Lucht’s Eleventh Army.
men, including troops from a communi- It was with some surprise that those
cations school, a sprinkling of SS, and Germans found themselves under im-
antiaircraft gunners who were part of mediate attack, since they had hoped the
the Leipzig defense belt.47 An aerial Americans might merely contain them
bombardment of leaflets demanding sur- and drive on to the east. T h e Germans
render and urging civilians to convince were reckoning without the plethora of
the troops to spare the city brought no power available to American com-
immediate response. manders. 48
All bridges over the Saale on the city’s T h e 1st Division pierced the western
western boundary having been destroyed, fringe of the Harz as early as 11 April.
General Allen sent his units to cross the (Map 6) On the same day the 330th
3d Armored Division’s tactical bridges Infantry, left behind when the 83d Di-
and strike the city from the north. A vision drove for the Elbe as part of the
house-to-house fight was well under way Ninth Army, began to attack along the
when on 16 April Count Felix von northern fringe, and later was supported
Luckner, who had gained renown as a by a combat command of the 8th Ar-
sea-raider in World War I, came into mored Division. On 13 April the 9th
American lines to negotiate. While Gen- Division joined the VII Corps to sweep
eral Rathke refused to surrender, Luck- the eastern end of the Harz from a
ner said, he did agree, in order to spare starting position northeast of Nord-
civilians and Allied and German patients hausen.
Many of the ingredients for a grim
47MS # B–219. Activity of the German XLVIII stuggle to the death were present in the
Panzerkorps in the American Campaign Against
Central Germany (General der Panzertruppen
Harz—a trapped enemy, harsh, sharply
Max Freiherr von Edelsheim). Halle came under etched terrain cloaked by dense woods,
Edelsheim’s command as his headquarters moved
from the Eastern Front to become part of the 48Kesselring, in A Soldier’s Record, pages 314–
Twelfth Army only a few days before the 104th 15, gives undue credit to the holdout in the Harz
Division’s attack. for delaying American advance eastward.
SWEEP T O THE ELBE 403
R Clinton
MAP 6
caves, mines, and winding roads that was there the steadfast determination to
could be readily blocked at defiles, fight to the end usually associated with
stream crossings, and almost anywhere a trapped foe. Theirs was a lost cause;
else within the woods. Some of the fight- the end of the war was at hand; the men
ing conformed to the inhospitable set- represented less an army than a conglom-
ting, but most of it failed to follow the eration; and few other than the young
form. Since the Germans lacked appreci- newcomers of Division Potsdam saw
able strength in mortars and artillery, much point in dying at that stage of the
the lethal tree bursts that often charac- denouement.
terize forest fighting were missing. Nor Further, the Eleventh Army com-
404 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
mander, General Lucht, doubted his as- During the first few days German in-
signment. T h e Harz had no prepared fantrymen sometimes used the conceal-
defenses, no stockpiled supplies, and he ment of the woods to infiltrate back into
had no faith in the fancy that the hastily towns and villages. In some cases they
created Twelfth Army could break laid mines or erected log barriers behind
through the powerful American units American columns, and occasionally they
that had flowed around the Harz. Lucht counterattacked with perhaps as many as
refused to consider a scorched earth a hundred men; but in general they car-
policy to prolong a hopeless defense. As ried on a delaying action on a large scale.
a soldier, he deemed it a matter of honor When pressed, the Germans either with-
to follow his orders and fight, but he drew or surrendered.
determined in the process to spare his Some 200 men holding the Brocken,
troops and the civilian population as at 3,747 feet the highest point in the
muchashe could.
49 Harz, proved an exception. Here stood
T h e Harz was above all a network of a radio station, the Eleventh Army’s only
roadblocks, the barriers limited in size means of communication with OB
only by the energy of those who con- WEST. Here the Germans held on 18
structed them, for on every hand there April against an assault by the 330th
were trees enough and more. On the Infantry that followed a bombardment
most logical routes for American advance by planes of the IX Tactical Air Com-
—those from the west taken by the 1st mand’s 365th and 404th Groups, but the
Division—the Germans backed u p the resistance collapsed the next day when
roadblocks with the few tanks they pressed from the other side of the hill by
possessed (judging from the numbers a company of the 1st Division’s 26th
ultimately knocked out, probably fewer Infantry,
than twenty-five). So long as a chance Reflecting the nature of the fighting,
to hold the position existed, the tanks the 1st Division during the first few days
remained, but when American infantry- took about 200 prisoners a day, while
men flanked the defenses through the the 9th Division, which was in effect
woods or advanced under cover of artil- cutting across the enemy’s rear, averaged
lery fire or of their own tanks, the Ger- a thousand. On the 16th, the 1st Di-
mans at the last moment usually vision’s prisoner total rose to a thousand;
withdrew. It was 15 April, fifth day of the 9th Division took 2,000. Those fig-
the fight, before men of the 1st Division ures almost doubled on the 18th as many
caught u p with more than one or two Germans took to the mountain roads for
German tanks. On that date they a flight to nowhere and as American
knocked out four, plus three self-pro- fighter planes made one strafing run after
pelled guns. Two days later they ac- another.
counted for ten more. In a small Some idea of the quandary of German
counterattack at the town of Altenau, the units seeking to avoid capture was ap-
Germans employed a captured U.S. light parent in the peregrinations of the
tank. Eleventh Army command post: one day
in the town of Braunlage, the next in a
49MS # B–581 (Estor). limestone quarry, another in a forester’s
SWEEP T O T H E ELBE 405
Germans who might have defended cen- nothing else halted the Americans at the
tral Germany were trapped in the Ruhr. Elbe and the Mulde. 53
Although American supply lines at the What taking Berlin might have ac-
conclusion of the drive were taut, they complished to speed the end of a war
were nowhere near a breaking point. already tumbling to a conclusion or to
T h e essentials—food, gasoline, ammuni- insure a postwar world more favorable
tion-were ample. Only forward airfields for Allied policies was another matter;
were lacking, and captured German but it would probably have been little,
fields could have been put into shape since prestige was about all that was at
quickly had close air support been essen- stake. A question remained, too, of what
tial. While the Twelfth Army had given the Russians might have done upon ar-
a new complexion to the fighting for a riving at the prize of the German capital
few days, Wenck’s troops in the long run to find an American force already there,
were no more than a nuisance. Even contrary to Eisenhower’s word to Stalin.
though the Twelfth Army imposed some That General Eisenhower halted his
hurt (having averaged 80 casualties a troops at a time when they were capable
day in early stages of the drive, the VII of continuing, in the process sparing
Corps in five days of increased resistance them casualties not worth additional
averaged 260 casualties a day) its com- prestige which the powerful Allied force
mitment in no sense threatened to halt had no need of, made his decision to halt
or even seriously delay the offensive. Nor all the more judicious.54
did the Germans have other than 53On this point, see General Simpson’s letter to
Wenck’s troops to pit against the Ameri- the editor in T h e New York Times Book Review,
can drive. 12 June 1966.
54In addition to sources previously cited dealing
T h e American armies, the Ninth in with this decision, see General Walter Bedell
particular, could have continued their Smith, Eisenhower’s Six Great Decisions (New
offensive some fifty more miles at least York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1956), pp. 181–
86, and Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower and
to the fringe of Berlin. T h e decision of Berlin, 1945-The Decision to Halt at the Elbe
the Supreme Allied Commander and (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1967).
CHAPTER XVIII
SHAEF was thinking instead of a broad thrust into the Alps still might be
arclike sweep by the Seventh Army’s needed.9
left wing deep inside Germany to the
vicinity of Nuremberg and Bayreuth, T h e First Phase Beyond the Rhine
thereby continuing to protect the 12th
Army Group’s flank, thence southeast As these plans gradually took shape,
down the valley of the Danube to Linz General Patch’s Seventh Army was con-
in Austria. T w o days later General Ei- tinuing the assignment of protecting the
senhower directed General Devers to be- 12th Army Group flank. Having crossed
gin the thrust as soon as troops and sup- the Rhine at Worms and established
plies were available.7 breakout conditions in the bridgehead
T h e next day, 3 April, the SHAEF by nightfall of 27 March, General Hais-
G–3, General Bull, read the special re- lip’s XV Corps was the logical choice
port on the redoubt prepared by the for the main role on the left. (Map
Seventh Army’s Colonel Quinn. While X V ) T h e corps was to drive some fifty
referring it to the SHAEF G–2 for com- miles from the Main River northeast
ment, Bull suggested expanding the 6th through the Spessart Mountains to the
Army Group operations into the Alps of Hohe Rhoen. To protect Haislip’s flank
western Austria. When the commander and to prepare a way for the expected
of Allied forces approaching the Alps turn to the southeast, General Patch
from the Italian side, Field Marshal Sir planned to commit General Milburn’s
Harold R.L.G. Alexander, indicated he XXI Corps in the center to drive east
would welcome such a drive, General through the Odenwald, General
Eisenhower approved it.8 Brooks’s VI Corps on the right to attack
Although SHAEF intelligence a few southeast across a plateau known as the
days later concluded that no positive Kraichgau Gate between the Odenwald
evidence existed of German strategy and the Black Forest. With ten infantry
based on a National Redoubt, the pos- and three armored divisions, the Sev-
sibility that the German armed forces enth Army had enough strength for all
would continue to resist unless Hitler three thrusts.
died or was overthrown was real, in While the 3d and 45th Divisions
which case the Alps appeared the logical passed through rear elements of the
place for a final stand. Since troops from Third Army in the Oppenheim bridge-
the Eastern, Western, and Italian fronts head to reach jump-off positions being
might converge there, the contemplated vacated by Third Army units along the
Main near Aschaffenburg, the 12th Ar-
7Ibid. See also, Eisenhower to AGp CG’s, SCAF
mored Division on 28 March pushed
261, 2 Apr 45, in SHAEF SCAF Cable files. into the OdenwaId as a vanguard of the
8 Memo, Operations in Austria, 4 Apr 45, GCT/ XXI Corps. To open a route for the VI
370-68/Plans, SHAEF SGS Post-OVERLORDPlan-
ning, IV; Memo re Evaluation of SUSA Study of
Corps,the 44th Division drove south
German National Redoubt, 3 Apr 45, SHAEF G–3, from the Worms bridgehead to reduce
Ops file 175; Eisenhower to SACMED, SCAF 267, Mannheim. Although surrender negotia-
6 Apr 45. in SHAEF SCAF Cahle files; SACMED
to Eisenhower, NAF 915, 9 Apr 45, OPD IN files, 9 SeeJIC SHAEF (45) 13 (Final), T h e National
1–30 Apr 45. Redoubt, 10 Apr 45, in SHAEF JIC Rpts.
410 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
tions conducted with the city’s acting commander, who had hanged several
burgomaster went awry when German German soldiers and civilians for advo-
troops shelled American parliamentaries cating surrender, gave himself up.
with mortars, the Germans pulled out T h e rest of the 45th Division mean-
during the night of 28 March, and men while had advanced twenty-five miles to
of the 44th Division moved in the next the northeast of Aschaffenburg. T h e 3d
day. Since Mannheim lies on both banks Division, having crossed the Main up-
of the Neckar River, occupying the city stream from Aschaffenburg early on 30
provided a bonus of a bridgehead over March without opposition, traversed the
the Neckar. wooded ground lying in a great south-
In the main thrust by the XV Corps, ward loop of the Main to reach the river
the 45th Division crossed the Main a second time twenty miles to the north-
River on 28 March on the railroad east. Against neither division was re-
bridge, just south of Aschaffenburg, that sistance determined. Most delays were
had been taken earlier by the 4th Ar- attributable to the densely wooded hill
mored Division—the place where Task country and its winding roads, some-
Force Baum had begun its ill-fated times a defended town, and occasion-
foray to Hammelburg. In the three days ally a roadblock. “Sixty-one minute
since Task Force Baum had passed, Gen- roadblocks,” some German civilians
eral Hahm had sent one of the three called them derisively—the American
divisions constituting his LXXXII soldiers would laugh at them for sixty
Corps to contain the little bridgehead. minutes, then tear them down in one.10
T h e 45th Division thus had to fight Committed on the 2d of April, gen-
hard to break out. erally along the boundary between the
T h e firmest resistance was on the left, two infantry divisions, the 14th Ar-
from the fringes of Aschaffenburg, mored Division also reached the Main
where a combat commander took seri- for the second time, and on the 3d
ously orders from OKW to fight to the seized Lohr, where Task Force Baum
end. There occurred one of the few in- earlier had shot up a column of Ger-
stances in Germany where civilians in man vehicles. T h e Germans fought all
large numbers joined actively in the night in Lohr, but as elsewhere, it was
fighting, sometimes lining rooftops to no more than a last-ditch stand by con-
drop grenades on U.S. troops below. glomerate units often lacking communi-
German ranks also were heavy with Hit- cations with higher command.
ler Youth, boys who had hardly begun As the gap between Army Group B
to shave. and Army Group G facilitated the Third
To spare his own men, the 45th Divi- Army’s drive on Kassel and the subse-
sion commander, General Frederick, di- quent thrust across central Germany by
rected his 157th Infantry to clear Aschaf- the First and Third Armies, so it also
fenburg systematically, making maxi- markedly influenced the campaign of
mum use of artillery and aerial bom- the American Seventh Army. Constant
bardment. For six days men of the 157th efforts to close the gap to the north had
fought from house to house until at last, 10Taggert, History of the Third Infantry Divi-
on the morning of 3 April, the combat sion, p. 346.
T H E MYTH OF T H E REDOUBT 411
the effect of pulling Army Group G’s posal. T h e only hope for establishing a
Seventh Army, including Hahm’s cohesive defense, Hausser believed, was
LXXXIl Corps on the south wing, to relinquish control of the area north
gradually northward, in the process cre- of the Main River, turning the Seventh
ating a gap within Army Group G be- Army over to direct control of the Com-
tween the First and Seventh Armies.11 mander in Chief West, with whom
To OKW’s continuing insistence that Hausser himself had lost communica-
the Seventh Army close the gap to the tions; Army Group G with the First and
north, the army group commander, Gen- Nineteenth Armies might then with-
eral Hausser, replied with a counterpro- draw into southern Germany. For his
trouble in arriving at this solution,
11 SeeMS # B–703, The Final Battle in Central Hausser paid with his job. O n 2 April
and Southern Germany Until Capitulation, 22 Mar his replacement, General der Infanterie
45–6 May 45 (Oberst Horst Wilutzky, CofS, AGP
G). Friedrich Schulz, reported from the
412 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
12MS # B–583, Report on the Position, Mission, 13For German operations in this period, see MSS
and General Measures of Heeresgruppe ‘G’ in # B–173, X I I I Corps, 21 March-a May 1945
April 1945 (General der Infanterie Friedrich (Major W. Gaebelin); # B–392 (Oriola); # B–348
Schulz). (Wolf Hauser).
T H E MYTH OF T H E REDOUBT 413
following close behind the armor forced line southwest along the Jagst and south
them onto the defensive. By 30 March along the Neckar River to Heilbronn. 14
the armor had emerged from the Oden- With American armor on the east bank
wald into relatively open country. of the Tauber by nightfall of 31 March,
T h e next day, as General von Oriola the northern part of the new line was
visited the command post of one of his under immediate threat. Indeed, except
makeshift divisions, a staff officer rushed at Koenigshofen, where 400 years earlier
in with news that American tanks were the Peasants’ War had come to a bloody
approaching. They closed in before end, both the 12th Armored Division
Oriola could get away. T h e general sur- and the infantry of the XXI Corps (the
rendered. 4th and 42d Divisions) took the Tauber
By nightfall of the 31st, the 12th in stride. At Koenigshofen an SS anti-
Armored Division had reached the aircraft replacement regiment that in-
Tauber River, a tributary of the Main cluded a battalion of mobile 88-mm. guns
almost sixty miles beyond the Rhine and fought for the better part of two days
little more than a day’s run at the pace against a contingent of the 12th Armored
the tanks had been traveling from the Division and two battalions of the 4th
corps objective of Wuerzburg on a sec- Division’s 22d Infantry, but late on 2
ond big southward loop of the Main. April the town was cleared.
Although some indications of stiffening On the same day the bulk of all three
redstance were apparent along the Tau- divisions of the XXI Corps drew u p to
ber, they were nothing to excite concern. the Main River along the big loop em-
T h e resistance reflected efforts by bracing Wuerzburg, and a battalion of
Army Group G to bring the headlong the 4th Division’s 8th Infantry crossed
retreat of the First Army’s right wing to the river nine miles southeast of Wuerz-
an end, peg the front on fairly defensible burg at the southern end of the loop.
river lines, and shore up the widening General Simon and the XIII SS Corps
gap between the First and Seventh now tried desperately to establish a new
Armies. Assuming command of Wehr- line from Koenigshofen to the Main, but
kreis XIII and its replacement and train- the odds against building a firm position
ing troops, General Hausser in one of were high. In addition to the shortages
his last acts before his relief put them of troops and transport, so numerous and
under command of headquarters of the persistent were American planes that no
XIII SS Corps, pulled that headquarters German unit could move with impunity
from the First Army’s south wing, and during daylight.
charged the commander, General Simon, General Simon had, too, that contin-
with building a new line along the ually nagging problem of an open flank.
Tauber and across a narrow land bridge Although responsibility for defending
between the Tauber and the Jagst River. the Main River lay with the Seventh
Commanded now by Generalleutnant
Max Bork, the troops that had comprised 14In addition to sources previously cited, see
the south wing of the XIII Corps and MS # B–737, Employment of the XIII SS Army
Corps Between the Rhine and the Alps (SS
thus had escaped the thrust of the 12th Obersturmbannfuehrer Ekkehard Albert, CofS.
Armored Division were to extend the XIII SS Corps).
414 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
to find a bridge over the Neckar, to trace battled salient at Crailsheim was not
CCA’s path to Crailsheim, while the worth the effort to hold it. As night fell
Seventh Army commander, General on 11 April and as German commanders
Patch, released a regiment of the 44th watched in relieved incredulity, the last
Division (Maj. Gen. William F. Dean) of the armor pulled back.
from his reserve to help. T h e commander Bitter from the first, the fighting for
of the VI Corps, General Brooks, can- Heilbronn had continued heavy. Al-
celed the plan to drive west on Heil- though three of the 100th Division’s bat-
bronn, substituting a shallower envelop- talions eventually crossed into the little
ment to the northwest against the Jagst bridgehead north of the city to push
line. south into a melange of factories on the
A contingent of CCB finally got northern outskirts, the going always was
through with a few supply trucks early slow. Since the crossing site remained
on the 9th, but to travel the road to under German fire, engineers still had
Crailsheim remained a task for the fear- no hope of putting in a bridge. Without
less and the strong. Before night fell on close fire support, the infantrymen de-
the 9th, sixty C–47’s of the IX Troop pended upon artillery on the west bank
Carrier Command flew to a captured air- of the Neckar, but fire was difficult to ad-
field just outside the city to deliver sup- just in the confined factory district. Pro-
plies and remove a growing number of tected from shelling by sturdy buildings,
wounded. While the C–47’s were on the the Germans seldom surrendered except
field, German planes bombed and strafed at the point of a rifle, though many of
them, though with little effect. T h e the Hitler Youth had had enough after
strikes were part of some 100 sorties only a brief flurry of fanatic resistance.
flown against the VI Corps on 9 April, At one. point, in response to intense
most in the vicinity of Crailsheim. Only mortar fire, a platoon of Hitler Youth
those few veterans of the corps who had soldiers ran screaming into American
fought long months ago in Italy could lines to surrender while their officers
recall a day when German air had been shot at them to make them stop.
so active. During the night of 5 April, a bat-
On the 10th, as C–47’s flew another talion of the 397th Infantry crossed the
resupply mission to Crailsheim, that part Neckar south of Heilbronn and found
of CCA defending the city repulsed one resistance at that point just as deter-
more counterattack by a second Alpine mined. There engineers had nearly
regiment. Demolished bridges mean- completed a bridge during the afternoon
while frustrated the bulk of CCA in the of the 7th when German artillery found
effort to make a limited envelopment of
the range. Although the engineers at last
the enemy’s Jagst line. T h e armor had
to settle for a route northwestward that succeeded early the next morning, less
before the end of the day provided con- than a company of tanks and two pla-
tact with the 63d Division along upper toons of tank destroyers had crossed be-
reaches of the Jagst but no envelopment fore German shells again knocked out
of enemy positions. the bridge. Two days later much the
To American commanders. the em- same thing. happened to a heavy ponton
418 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
ferry after it had transported only a few Although a contingent of armor at last
more tanks and destroyers across. established contact with the 100th Di-
Not until 12 April was the rubble of vision near Heilbronn on 14 April, the
Heilbronn cleared of Germans and a panzer grenadiers had left.
bridge built across the Neckar. I n nine General Foertsch’s hasty but surpris-
days of fighting, the 100th Division lost ingly strong position along the Jagst-
85 men killed and probably three times Neckar crescent had required eleven days
that number wounded. In the process, of often heavy fighting to reduce. I n view
men of the 100th captured 1,500 Ger- of the determined resistance, American
mans.17 casualties were relatively light, a daily
T h e 63d Division, aided in later stages average for the VI Corps of approxi-
by tanks of the 10th Armored Division, mately 230. Yet that number was almost
had in the meantime kept u p constant double the number of casualties the corps
pressure against the enemy’s line along suffered in the pursuit up to the two
the Jagst River, driving southwestward rivers.
from the vicinity of the Jagst-Tauber
land bridge in hope of trapping the 17th To the Hohe Rhoen and Schweinfurt
SS Panzer Grenadier Division near the
confluence of the Jagst and the Neckar. 18 On the right wing of the First Army
and the left of the Seventh Army, the
Germans had been able to achieve no
17Within a company of the 100th Division’s such reprieve from slashing strokes of
398th Infantry, sent north to reinforce the little
bridgehead established by contingents of the 10th other portions of the U.S. Seventh Army.
Armored Division near the juncture of the Jagst General Hahm’s LXXXIl Corps was
and Neckar, Pfc. Mike Colalillo on 7 April dis- powerless to do more than delay Gen-
played extraordinary courage in the face of heavy
German fire. His company pinned down, Colalillo eral Haislip’s XV Corps briefly at occa-
climbed on a supporting tank and opened fire sional towns and roadblocks as Haislip’s
with a machine gun mounted on the turret; when armor and infantry marched side by side
ammunition was exhausted, he grabbed a subma-
chine gun and continued forward on foot. He to clear the Hohe Rhoen and protect
alone killed or wounded twenty-five Germans. He the 12th Army Group’s south flank.
was awarded the Medal of Honor. Having come too late on the scene to
18In fighting along the Jagst River on 6 April,
a forward observer of the 63d Division’s 861st build a firm position behind the Tauber
Field Artillery Battalion, 1st Lt. James E. Robin- River, General Simon’s XIII SS Corps
son, Jr., took charge when the commander of the was also powerless to stop General Mil-
infantry company he was supporting was killed.
Despite a serious wound in the throat from a burn’s XXI Corps at the Main River
shell fragment, he led twenty-three surviving mem- near Wuerzburg.
bers of the company to capture a defended town. In the XV Corps, CCB experienced
Only then, when the wound had so weakened him
that he could no longer speak, did Lieutenant the 14th Armored Division’s only major
Robinson turn from the attack and walk almost fight, at Gemuenden, at the confluence of
two miles to an aid station; there he collapsed and
died from his wound. On the same day, S. Sgt.
the Fraenkische Saale River and the
John R. Crews of the same division’s 253d Infantry Main. With the help of fighter-bombers
charged alone against a German machine gun that
poured flanking fire on his company. In hand-to-
hand fighting, he eliminated the machine gun and and Lieutenant Robinson were awarded the Medal
a supporting automatic rifle. Both Sergeant Crews of Honor, the latter posthumously.
T H E M Y T H OF T H E R E D O U B T 419
A TANK DIVISION
OF THE 14TH ARMORED enters the prisoner-of-war camp at
Hammelburg.
of the XII Tactical Air Command, which ored division; “I frame it, for my chil-
set many of the houses aflame, the armor dren and grandchildren.” 19
cleared the town in an overnight attack. On 7 April, the 14th Armored’s CCA
T h e next day, 6 April, CCB’s tanks lib- in conjunction with a regiment of the
erated some 4,000 Allied prisoners of 3d Division took Bad Neustadt on the
war at Hammelburg. Only 75 Americans, Fraenkische Saale only a few miles from
most of them wounded—including Gen- the Thueringer Wald and the boundary
eral Patton’s son-in-law, Colonel Waters with the Third Army, while the rest of
—remained in the camp, the rest having the 3d Division and the 45th advanced
been marched to the east as an aftermath almost unimpeded over narrow, winding
of the raid by Task Force Baum.
19Capt. Joseph Carter, The History of the 14th
“I have this?” asked an ecstatic Serb, Armored Division (privately printed, no pagina-
clutching a shoulder patch of the arm- tion).
420 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
clusion for which his predecessor had Germany. As early as 4 April, General
been relieved—the army group should Devers had placed broad though definite
relinquish the Seventh Army to direct restrictions on any advances except for
control of the Commander in Chief West the northeastward drive of the XV and
and fall back to the south and southeast. XXI Corps. Faced with increasing re-
Devoid of communications to Field Mar- sponsibilities for securing rear areas and
shal Kesselring, Schulz recommended this performing occupation functions, Devers
step directly to OKW but received no considered his strength too limited for
reaction until 9 April, after the U.S. XV an all-out thrust. T h e First French Army
Corps had established contact with the was particularly weak, still having to
Third Army, thus cutting off the keep some troops on the west bank of
LXXXII Corps from the rest of the Sev- the Rhine facing the Black Forest and
enth Army. Ordering Schulz to make others to contain the enemy along the
Hahm’s corps a part of Foertsch’s First French-Italian frontier and in ports
Army, O K W tacitly approved Army along the French coast. This left to
Group G’s relinquishing the Seventh Patch’s Seventh Army a disproportionate
Army. share of the 6th Army Group front,
Although OKW still granted no au- some 120 miles, more than double the
thority for Army Group G to withdraw width of army sectors in the 12th Army
to the south and southeast, the American Group. T h e scattered but nonetheless
thrusts already had forced the bulk of troublesome resistance the Germans con-
the First Army in those directions. Only tinued to muster, in contrast to a virtual
Hahm’s LXXXII Corps had a choice, collapse in front of parts of the 12th
and that was either to conform or be Army Group, gave substance to Devers’s
trapped against the Thueringer Wald. concern.21
Both General Haislip’s XV Corps and Only with arrival of the Ninth Army
General Milburn’s XXI Corps had to at the Elbe and unqualified success of
turn south and southeast at this point or the 12th Army Group’s drive assured did
be pinched out at the Thueringer Wald General Eisenhower act to bolster the
by the Third Army’s southeastward 6th Army Group and reduce the width
drive. They began their turns on 11 of its zone. O n 15 April he issued a
April, the XV Corps aiming toward Bam- directive to govern remaining operations
berg and Nuremberg, the XXI Corps for the defeat of Germany. While Mont-
toward Ansbach, southwest of Nurem- gomery’s 21 Army Group drove north-
berg. Two days later, the enemy’s defense east to the Baltic Sea near Luebeck and
at Heilbronn and along the Jagst River cleared the German littoral and the
having been broken, General Brooks’s Netherlands, the 12th Army Group was
VI Corps turned south into the Loewen- to hold with two armies along the Elbe-
stein Hills southeast of Heilbronn. Mulde line and send the Third Army
Although these moves marked the end southeast down the valley of the Danube
of the Seventh Army’s northeastward River into Austria to Salzburg for
thrust to protect the flank of the 12th eventual linkup with the Russians. T h e
Army Group, they represented no un- 21See entries in Devers and Seventh Army Diaries
restricted shift to the drive into southern for this period.
422 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
6th Army Group was to drive south and Third Army boundary, should become a
southeast into western Austria, making part of the Third Army and that General
its main effort at first on the right wing Patch should receive a new armored di-
of the Seventh Army to trap the enemy vision.
Nineteenth Army in the Black Forest.22 T h e Supreme Commander’s instruc-
For the offensive into southern Ger- tions for the offensive were in line with
many and Austria, General Eisenhower General Devers’s original plan, which the
shifted the boundary between the 6th 6th Army Group commander had had to
and 12th Army Groups west to Wuerz- forgo in order to protect the 12th Army
burg. From there the boundary ran Group flank. T h e right wing of the
southeast, splitting the Austrian frontier Seventh Army (General Brooks’s VI
midway between Munich and Salzburg Corps) was to make the main effort u p
and reducing by about fifty miles the the valley of the Neckar River past Stutt-
width of the 6th Army Group zone. gart to Huebingen, thence south to Lake
While the Third Army was to be brought Constance (Bodensee) and the Swiss
u p to 15 divisions, the 6th Army Group frontier. T h e German Nineteenth Army
was to be afforded unrestricted use of 2 thus trapped in the Black Forest, the VI
divisions that had been assigned for Corps was to assist the First French
some weeks but had been earmarked as Army in clearing the forest while the
a SHAEF reserve. French and American other two corps of the Seventh Army con-
divisions to be employed in southern tinued south and southeast across the
Germany were to total 34. In addition Danube and into Austria.23
Eisenhower offered use of the First Allied
Airborne Army should Devers want it, Nuremberg and the Drive to the Danube
and specifically reserved a new airborne
division, the 13th, for a possible airborne Even as these plans and orders were
assault to speed the main effort south of being formulated, General Haislip’s XV
Stuttgart. Corps had been making its turn from
Flying to headquarters of the 12th northeast to southeast, heading first for
Army Group on 16 April, General De- Bamberg at the meeting of the Main and
vers conferred with Generals Bradley and Regnitz Rivers, then for Nuremberg,
Patton. Rather than effect a time-con- scene of annual rallies of the Nazi party
suming relief of those Seventh Army and thus a shrine of National Socialism.
divisions already engaged in what was to Because what remained of General
become the Third Army zone, Devers Hahm’s LXXXII Corps was retreating
and Patton agreed that they should con- precipitately to avoid entrapment, the
tinue to attack but should shift their first of the objectives, Bamberg, fell on
axes of advance to the southeast. T h e 13 April to contingents of the 3d and
shift would carry them in time into the 45th Divisions after only a day of fighting
Seventh Army’s altered zone. They later against local defense forces.
agreed that the 14th Armored Division, German commanders were acutely
which was committed close to the former conscious of their lack of troops in this
22SCAF 281, FWD 19226, in SHAEF SGS Post- 236th AGp Ltr of Instrs 14, 16 Apr 45, in
OVERLORDPlanning file, 381, IV. SHAEF SGS Post-OVERLORDPlanning file, 381, IV.
T H E MYTH OF T H E REDOUBT 423
sector. 24What was in effect a transfer of Wilhelm Keitel, forbade its use. Such
little more than a corps headquarters was the dream world in which Hitler and
from Seventh Army to First would hardly OKW were living that Keitel was saving
eliminate a gap that the U.S. Third the fuel for the future strategic employ-
Army's right wing astride the Thuer- ment of jet fighters that presumably were
inger Wald and now the U.S. Seventh to save the dying Third Reich.25
Army's left wing marching alongside Because of this delay, the remnants of
were constantly recreating. Although the two divisions arrived too late for
Field Marshal Kesselring with head- fighting at Bamberg. They contributed
quarters of O B WEST arrived in the instead to a stanch defense of Nurem-
south on 10April and ordered General berg, already almost obliterated by Allied
Schulz to bring the German Seventh bombs.
Army back under the aegis of Army Like all major German cities, Nurem-
Group G, that by itself would accomplish berg had a ring of fixed antiaircraft guns.
little more than to pin the onus for the These and their crews constituted the
whole problem on one man, Schulz. core of the defense. T h e commander and
General Schulz tried a desperate solu- staff of an otherwise defunct 9th Volks
tion. Since an Allied breakthrough on Grenadier Division, operating under
the right soon would sever all communi- General Simon's XIII SS Corps, were in
cations, however roundabout, with Ger- charge. To the northwest, blocking the
man forces east of the Elbe River and U.S. XXI Corps, whence the Germans
with Berlin, Schulz decided to bolster expected the main blow on Nuremberg
his right even at the expense of a break- to come, was the 2d Mountain Division.
through on his left on the seam between To the east of the city, trying to shore
the First and Nineteenth Armies, since up the faltering LXXXII Corps, went
those armies could withdraw in the face the 17th SS Panzer Grenadiers, minus
of heavy attack without dire results. Al- one regiment, which was committed in-
though aware that strong Allied attacks side the city. Within Nuremberg in
soon would hit that seam, Schulz pulled addition were several Luftwaffe and
out the remains of the 2d Mountain and Volkssturm battalions and a regiment
17th SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions for provided by Wehrkreis XIII. Available
transfer to the gap between the First and a few miles northeast of the city was
Seventh Armies. He would rob Peter to Gruppe Grufenwoehr, composed of two
pay Paul, then face the consequences of battalions of infantry and thirty-five
the theft as best he could when the day tanks of various types gleaned from fac-
of reckoning came. tories in Nuremberg and from a panzer
Lack of gasoline delayed the transfer. training center whence the force drew
After making a strong case for his needs, its name.26
General Schulz finally obtained some Under a buzzing canopy of aircraft of
gasoline from a Luftwaffe depot, but the XII Tactical Air Command, the 3d
before he could bring much of it for-
ward, the head of OKW, Field Marshal 25 MS # B–703 (Wilutzky).
26German material is from MSS # B–703
(Wilutzky); # B–348 (Wolf Hauser) and # B–737
24 See MS # B–703 (Wilutzky). (Albert).
424 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
and 45th Divisions in two days spanned attack on the 15th, Gruppe Grafenwoehr
the thirty miles from Bamberg to the struck the 94th Cavalry Reconnaissance
outskirts of Nuremberg and began an Squadron, but reinforcements rushed
assault on the city on 16 April. T h e 3d from the reserve combat command
Division moved in from the north, the helped bring the strike to a standstill.
45th from east and southeast. T h e 106th Within two days Gruppe Grafenwoehr
Cavalry Group at the same time swept had ceased to exit.
around the city to block exits to the It was a grueling fight for Nuremberg,
south, while the 42d Division of the made all the more difficult by deadly
neighboring XXI Corps advanced on the antiaircraft fire directed against the men
western suburb of Fuerth. on the ground. Once the ring of flak
T h e Germans wasted their few avail- guns was broken, the fight developed into
able tanks on the 14th Armored Division the slow, often costly, business of clear-
northeast of Nuremberg. In a counter- ing one crumbling building after an-
T H E MYTH OF T H E REDOUBT 425
other, one more heap of rubble, one the river two days later on a bridge
more cellar, defeating one more seized intact at Dillingen. General Mil-
futile though dangerous counterattack burn’s infantry divisions, the 4th and
launched by a few men, a squad, a pla- 63d, made it on the 25th. Relinquishing
toon.27 Allthe while fighter-bombers and the 14th Armored Division to the Third
artillery kept pounding an already Army, Haislip’s XV Corps used two in-
ruined metropolis. fantry divisions, the 42d (transferred
Late on 19 April the 3d Division’s from the XXI Corps during the fight
30th Infantry penetrated medieval walls for Nuremberg) and the 45th, also to
to enter the old town in the heart of the reach the Danube on the 25th. I n the
city. Before daylight the next morning, process the two divisions moved south-
the Nazi gauleiter, who had vowed in a westward from Nuremberg to get out of
message to Hitler to fight to the death, the zone that was to be transferred to
directed a final, fanatic counterattack. the Third Army.
Except for a few Germans who had to T h e Third Army too benefited from
be rooted from the rubble, that ended the collapse of the German First Army
the fight. T h e gauleiter himself was right wing; the collapse reopened a gap
found dead in a cellar. T h e shrine of between the First and Seventh Armies
nazism fell, ironically, on 2 0 April, Hit- into which the Third Army in its new
ler’s birthday. drive to the southeast could plunge. Be-
With the collapse of the defenses at cause of the regrouping maneuver that
Nuremberg, the First Army right wing left the VIII Corps and five divisions in
gave way. In the same manner that one place along the Mulde River for transfer
pushing against a closed door hurtles to the First Army and brought the III
forward when the door suddenly opens, Corps and six divisions from completed
both Haislip’s XV Corps and Milburn’s assignments in the Ruhr, the Third
XXI Corps plunged some fifty miles to Army was ready to exploit the gap with
the Danube. Launching a drive from full force on 23 April, though the drive
Feuchtwangen, southwest of Nuremberg, actually began as early as the 19th.
on 20 April, the 12th Armored Division Before the new drive started the XII
of the XXI Corps got there first, crossing Corps commander, General Eddy, be-
cause of high blood pressure, relin-
37 For gallantry in singlehandedly defeating one quished command to the former
of these counterattacks on 17 April, 1st Lt. Frank commander of the 5th Division, General
Burke of the 3d Division’s 15th Infantry received
the Medal of Honor. The next day, 18 April, Irwin. Under the new leader, the XII
Capt. Michael J. Daly of the same regiment fought Corps began on 19 April to edge south-
alone in four separate engagements, killing fifteen
Germans, knocking out three machine guns, and
eastward from an earlier stopping point
inspiring his company to advance. He also was at Bayreuth, while the I I I and XX Corps
awarded the Medal of Honor. On the same day, continued shifting zones. Contingents of
Pvt. Joseph F. Merrell of the same regiment
launched a one-man assault against two German
General Walker’s XX Corps from new
machine gun positions, eliminated them despite positions in the center of the Third
a serious wound in the stomach, then fell before Army began to advance the next day.
a burst from a German machine pistol. Private
Merrell was awarded the Medal of Honor post-
Although General Van Fleet’s III Corps
humously. was not to assume control of the 14th
426 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
Armored Division until 23 April, the and cities did war seem to have any place.
fact that the division was continuing to There the streets were dead, sometimes
attack as a part of the Seventh Army block after block of rubble, or else owed
meant that the front on what would their survival to great white flags of
become the Third Army’s right wing was surrender hanging from every building.
also moving forward. Almost everywhere during late April,
By the time the III Corps officially front lines had ceased to exist, so that
took over on the right wing the night of nobody knew when or where the fighting
22 April, forward troops of the III and might erupt—at the next hill, ridge,
XX Corps were south and southeast of village, stream, wherever a group of
Nuremberg, only forty miles from the Germans with a will to fight took a stand.
Danube, while contingents of the XII Sometimes the Germans would let infan-
Corps were well south of a highway that try and tanks pass unmolested, then turn
leads east from Nuremberg to Pilsen, sudden, unanticipated wrath on artillery
Czechoslovakia. Although resistance to and supply units bringing u p the rear.
the heretofore measured advance had Other times men who had dug in to
at some points been stanch, no question fight would for some inexplicable reason
existed that all three corps could advance throw away their weapons to raise hands
almost at will as they threw full strength high in surrender. Everybody knew that
into the fight. the war was over, yet somehow, at one
When the attack began in earnest on isolated spot or another, the war still
24 April, many of the units General Pat- went on, real enough for the moment
ton had received in exchange for the and sometimes deadly for those involved.
VIII Corps were relative newcomers to While awaiting arrival of an assigned
battle—the 13th Armored, 65th, 71st, armored division, General Walker’s XX
86th, and 97th Divisions—but in the Corps in the Third Army center used
pursuit warfare that the times demanded, the 3d Cavalry Group to reach the
their inexperience scarcely showed. As in Danube first. Gaining the river southwest
the battle-tested divisions, infantrymen of Regensburg early in the afternoon of
clung precariously to anything that 24 April, the cavalry opened the way for
moved by motor—tanks, tank destroyers, assault crossings by the 65th and 71st
trailers, ready at the first sound of enemy Divisions the following night. On the
fire to jump from their perches and as- army’s right wing around Ingolstadt,
sume the age-old mode of infantry attack. three divisions of the III Corps—14th
Corps artillery often was left far behind, Armored, 86th, and 99th—reached the
its trucks mobilized to shuttle infantry- Danube in early afternoon on 26 April.
men forward. Everywhere captured Ger- Paced by the 11th Armored Division,
man vehicles dotted the columns. the XII Corps meanwhile advanced
T h e countryside of the Fraenkische down a narrow corridor between the
Highland was strikingly beautiful with Danube and the Czechoslovakian fron-
spring. Here a cluster of daffodils, there tier. Guarding the corps right flank, the
a farmer turning a damp furrow, cows 26th Division reached the Danube on
grazing in green fields. Only in the towns the 26th.
T H E MYTH OF T H E REDOUBT 427
T h e Drive on Stuttgart the town of Hechingen, fifty miles
southwest of the city, where German
For the Allied main effort—a sweep scientists reportedly were conducting
by the VI Corps up the valley of the nuclear experiments. T h e ALSOSmission
Neckar River, thence across the Danube wanted to capture the scientists and their
to the Austrian frontier—General Patch research data before they fell into French
in the meantime had been employing hands. 29
three infantry divisions and the 10th As General Devers issued his instruc-
Armored Division in an attack that was tions formally on 16 April, the VI Corps
supposed to be co-ordinated closely with had completed a reorientation to the
a subsidiary thrust by the First French south following the unexpectedly sharp
Army against Stuttgart. Under the 6th fight for Heilbronn and the Jagst-Neckar
Army Group’s plan, the French attack crescent. Although the Germans had
had to be timed carefully lest a prema- pulled out the 2d Mountain and 17th
ture advance prompt the German SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions from this
Nineteenth Army to pull out before the sector, a general collapse of remaining
VI Corps could bypass Stuttgart and troops in Beyer’s LXXX Corps and
block major highways south of the city Bork’s XIII Corps was yet to develop.
leading out of the Black Forest. Although T h e French meanwhile had been
the French were to capture Stuttgart, making gains that to their commander,
they were then to afford Seventh Army General de Lattre, appeared to war-
troops running rights on the main high- rant unilaterally superseding General
ways through the city to help speed the Devers’s instructions. Having quickly
Seventh Army’s continuing advance captured Karlsruhe (4 April) and
across the Danube into Austria. T h e 13th Pforzheim (8 April) and having cleared
Airborne Division (Maj. Gen. Elbridge a crescent formed by confluence of the
G. Chapman) was tentatively scheduled Enz River with the Neckar just over 10
for an airdrop thirty miles south of miles from Stuttgart, de Lattre had
Stuttgart to seize an airfield and create staged a dramatic maneuver. Once an
an airhead to block German escape armored division had swept quickly u p
routes. 28 the east bank of the Rhine to a point
Another reason Devers wanted to put opposite Strasbourg, de Lattre on 15
American forces east and south of April sent a corps across the Rhine there
Stuttgart before the French attacked and launched an advance eastward along
was the presence in the 6th Army Group a highway splitting the Black Forest.
at the time of the special ALSOSintelli- Other French troops were at the same
gence mission, which sought data on time driving south along roads in the
German developments in nuclear fission. eastern fringe of the forest. As General
T h e ALSOSgroup was to accompany the Devers issued his directive on 16 April,
VI Corps in the drive to cut roads south the citizens of Strasbourg were ringing
of Stuttgart and then make a dash for their church bells to celebrate the city’s
relief from German artillery fire, and
28See 6th AGp Ltr of Instrs 14, 16 Apr 45, and
Warren, Airborne Operations in World War II,
European Theater, p. 201. 29 Pash, The ALSOS Mission, ch. XXI.
428 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
A greater threat to the two German Grimmeiss himself at last fell captive to
corps then arose from the Americans. the French near the Swiss border.33
After three days of short advances by Faced with a fait accompli, General
the 63d and 100th Divisions through Devers on the 20th legitimatized the
minefields and roadblocks in the Loe- French foray into the Seventh Army’s
wenstein Hills southeast of Heilbronn zone by a change in the interarmy bound-
and at Schwaebisch Hall to the east, the ary, whereupon a French column the
10th Armored Division on the 19th next day pushed down the valley of the
suddenly broke free. In rapid strides the Neckar by way of Esslingen, enveloped
armor swept southward more than thirty Stuttgart, and broke into the northeast-
miles, passing to the east of Stuttgart, ern fringe of the city early in the after-
while men of the 44th Division followed noon. Other columns entered a few
closely to mop u p and protect the flanks hours later from south, west, and north-
of the penetration. T h e next day the west. T h e following day, 22 April,
tank columns continued to Kirchheim, Stuttgart was clear.
in the hill country of the Swabian High- I n an imaginative, aggressive maneu-
land fourteen miles southeast of Stutt- ver, de Lattre’s First French Army in
gart, there cutting the autobahn leading twelve days had swept the northern half
from Stuttgart to Ulm. Because of that of the Black Forest, trapped the bulk of
thrust and the earlier drive by the the LXlV Corps, and seized Stuttgart, in
French, the projected airborne assault the process taking some 28,000 prisoners
south of Stuttgart was canceled.32 at a cost of 175 French troops killed, 510
By this time the French had reached wounded. Whether more Germans might
a point only ten miles southwest of have been captured had de Lattre con-
Kirchheim, leaving to the Germans in formed to General Dever’s plan could
and around Stuttgart only one main only be surmised. Devers and his staff
road as a route of escape. Although the believed the bag would have been big-
commander of the LXXX Corps, Gen- ger. 34
eral Beyer, tried to arrange with his At the same time the French had se-
opposite in the LXIV Corps, General riously jeopardized the ALSOSmission’s
Grimmeiss, for a combined breakout intended foray to seize German scientists
attempt, Grirnmeiss’s troops were too and nuclear research data at Hechingen,
closely engaged. T h e bulk of Beyer’s southwest of Stuttgart. This the Ameri-
LXXX Corps the night of the 20th cans had circumvented by directing the
pulled out alone through the narrow ALSOSgroup and an escort of motorized
gap, while General Grimmeiss and combat engineers to circle back to the
remnants of his LXIV Corps the next northwest of Stuttgart and drive south
day tried to infiltrate southward through into the French sector to Freudenstadt in
French positions. Few made it. After order to come on Hechingen from the
wandering for twelve days and nights,
33MS # B–598 (Grimmeiss); MS # B–320
(Beyer). See also de Lattre, Histoire de la Première
Armée Française, p. 557n.
32 SUSA Diary, entry of 20 Apr 45; Warren, Air- 34De Lattre, Histoire de la Première Armée Fran-
borne Operations in World War II, p. 201. çaise, p. 539; Hq, 6th AGp, Hisotry, p. 273.
430 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
west. With the ALSOS military com- and give the French a role in entering
mander, Col. Boris T. Pash, employing Austria.
36
considerable bluff, the group made its General de Lattre also saw Stuttgart
way successfully through the French sec- and the Black Forest as primary goals,
tor, then on 22 April pushed beyond as demonstrated on 17 April when he
forward French positions and moved sent half his force against Stuttgart, half
swiftly to Hechingen, where it found the to clear the southern part of the Black
German research center hidden in a cave Forest. Yet all along de Lattre had his
and captured the scientists in the town.35 eyes on a third goal: Ulm, and, in the
process, Sigmaringen.
A French Incursion to Ulm “The true maneuver,” de Lattre had
told one of his subordinates as early as
Aside from Stuttgart, two other specific 15 April, “is to march at full speed [tam-
objectives in that part of Germany held bour battant] in order to be in Ulm by
special attraction for General de Lattre 25 April,” 37
and the French. One was the town of In terms of the original interarmy
Sigmaringen, on the Danube River not boundary, Ulm lay forty-four miles east
quite fifty miles south of Stuttgart. There of the French zone. While the 10th Ar-
Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, Pierre mored Division bypassed the city to the
Laval, and others of the collaborationist west, the 44th Division was to capture it.
Vichy government had come after fleeing Although the change in boundary or-
France the preceding August and had dered on the 20th extended the French
set up a government-in-exile. T h e other zone southeastward from Rottweil to Sig-
was the imperial city of Ulm, also on the maringen, and by any logical extension
Danube roughly the same distance south- provided the French some forty miles
east of Stuttgart, scene of Napoleon’s of the Austrian frontier east of Lake
triumph over the Austrians in 1805. Constance, the adjustment still left Ulm
As General Devers had drawn the in- fully forty miles outside the French zone.
terarmy boundary in his original instruc- De Lattre refused to be deterred. Late
tions for the offensive, neither of those on 20 April he directed the commander
objectives had fallen in the French zone. of the corps that was attacking Stuttgart
Running southwestward from the vicin- to divert an armored division southeast-
ity of Stuttgart to Rottweil on upper ward toward Rottweil and the Danube
reaches of the Neckar, thence almost due with the aim of eventually swinging back
south to the Swiss frontier west of Lake to the northeast astride the Danube
Constance, the boundary reflected Dev- through Sigmaringen to Ulm.
ers’s view that the first task for the General de Lattre would note later
French was to dispense with the German that there were other reasons for the
Nineteenth Army in Stuttgart and the French to drive on Ulm than reawak-
Black Forest. That accomplished, Dev- ening the memory of past glory. T h e
ers’s order made clear, the boundary was drive was, he would argue, a logical ex-
to be adjusted to swing to the southeast
36See 6th AGp Ltr of Instrs No. 14, 16 Apr 45.
37De Lattre, Histoire de la Première Armée Fran-
35 Pash, The ALSOS Mission, ch. XXI. çaise, p. 544.
T H E MYTH OF T H E REDOUBT 431
the city from the southwest along the maintain a French garrison in Stuttgart,
north bank of the Danube. By nightfall institute a military government, and tell
most resistance was at an end, and the the Americans that the French intended
French were free to unfurl their tricolor, to hold and administer all territory con-
as Napoleon had done, above the city’s quered by French troops until the inter-
old fort. ested governments had fixed a French
Mission accomplished, General de Lat- zone of occupation. 44
tre at last promised to take his troops In passing the word to General Devers,
inside the French boundary.42 de Lattre added that Stuttgart was avail-
able nonetheless to all needs of the 6th
T h e “Stuttgart Incident” Army Group. T o Devers, use of Stuttgart
was no longer the issue: the issue was a
I n Stuttgart, in the meantime, Gen- direct violation of orders by a subordi-
eral Devers’s patience with the French nate, a situation he found “intoler-
had been undergoing an even more se- able.” 45 Tales emanating from the city
vere test. While according the French the of wanton rape and looting further
honor of capturing Stuttgart, General strengthened his resolve. After report-
Devers had planned from the first to use ing the matter to General Eisenhower
main roads through the city to support on 26 April, Devers reiterated his order
the Seventh Army. Disturbed by the to relinquish the city and told the 100th
presence of thousands of liberated, de- Division to move in.
liriously happy foreign laborers in Stutt- As American troops began to arrive,
gart, including 20,000 French deportees, the local French commander treated
he decided on 22 April that the Seventh them amicably but declined to evacuate
Army’s needs could be better served by the city. While informing de Gaulle of
placing the city in the U.S. zone. This this development, de Lattre again noti-
he ordered, effective the next day.43 fied General Devers that because of con-
T o a sensitive General de Lattre, re- trary instructions from his government,
moving his troops after their achieve- he was unable to comply with the 6th
ment in capturing Stuttgart was an Army Group’s order.46
affront. While protesting to General Dev- General Devers himself went into
ers, he reported the situation to the chief Stuttgart on the 27th to check the tales
of the French Provisional Government, of rape and looting. T h e reports, he
General de Gaulle. De Gaulle replied found, had been exaggerated. Rather
promptly and firmly. De Lattre was to than 50,000 rape cases, as rumored, there
had been fewer than 2,000: and most of
42 SUSA Diary, entry of 24 Apr 45. See also Brief
those, as well as considerable looting and
of Events Having to Do With the Advance on Ulm “misbehavior,” were attributable to for-
by First French Army, 26 Apr 45, in SHAEF SGS
Post-OVERLORDPlanning file, 381, IV, and com-
ments by General Morris on the draft MS for this 44De Lattre, Histoire de la Premiére Armée Fran-
volume. çaise, pp. 569–70.
436th AGp Msg BX 13260, 22 Apr 45, as found 45Devers to Eisenhower, B–13494, 26 Apr 45, in
in Hq, 6th AGp, History, p. 269; 6th AGp TWX, SHAEF SGS Post-OVERLORD Planning file, 381, IV.
23 Apr 45, in SHAEF SGS POST-OVERLORD Planning 46De Lattre, Histoire de la Première Armée Fran-
file, 381, IV; Seventh Army Report, pp. 803–04. çaise, p. 570.
T H E MYTH OF T H E REDOUBT 433
eign laborers and Germans themselves. General de Gaulle, when the French
Conditions were, in any event, markedly Army was to carry out only the political
improved. Deciding that the city was wishes of the French Government, then
too badly damaged to be of use to the the command structure would have to be
6th Army Group, Devers readjusted the rearranged. De Gaulle in reply expressed
interarmy boundary, giving Stuttgart— the wish that situations of this nature
“and the conditions there,” he noted would not arise and suggested that they
wryly—back to the French. 47 could be avoided if the Allies would con-
T h e Supreme Commander, for his sult the French on matters involving
part, protested officially to General de French interests.
Gaulle. “Under the circumstances,” Gen- There the matter rested. It would be
eral Eisenhower wrote, “I must of course finally settled early in May when the
accept the situation, as I myself am un- Allies at last agreed on a French zone of
willing to take any action which would occupation and a French role in the con-
reduce the effectiveness of the military trol machinery for Germany.
effort against Germany . . . .” H e pro-
tested nevertheless that the issuance of From the Danube Into Austria
direct orders to the First French Army
counter to operational orders given In reaching Lake Constance on 21
through the military chain of command April, the First French Army had failed
violated the understanding with the to snare the commander of the Nine-
United States Government under which teenth Army, General Brandenberger,
the United States had armed and and his staff. T h e French had neverthe-
equipped French divisions to serve under less trapped most of Brandenberger’s re-
the Combined Chiefs of Staff. H e had maining troops, the entire XVIII SS
no choice, he concluded, but to refer the Panzer Corps, in the southern half of
matter to the Combined Chiefs.48 the Black Forest. (Map XVI) Beginning
In reply General de Gaulle put the the night of the 24th, the Germans tried
blame on a lack of agreement and liaison to break out to the southeast, giving rise
between France and the Allied govern- to violent combat, but when French air
ments relating to war policy in general and artillery pummeled them mercilessly
and the postwar occupation in particular. by day, the Germans quickly weakened.
As for arms for French troops, he noted, Only individuals and small groups es-
those had been furnished under lend- caped, leaving some 27,000 to wend their
lease, for which French services had been way into prisoner-of-war enclosures. By
given in return. 27 April the Black Forest was calm. 49
When news of the incident reached T h e demise of the XVIII SS Panzer
Washington, President Truman was Corps left the Nineteenth Army with the
shocked. If the time had come, he wrote remnants of two corps, that part of the
LXIV Corps that had avoided the French
47Devers Diary, 27 Apr 45. See also SUSA Diary, near Stuttgart ( O B WEST assigned a new
entry of 25 Apr 45. corps commander) and General Beyer’s
48Aspects of the incident at higher levels are dis-
cussed and annotated in P o p e , T h e Supreme 49See de Lattre, Histoire de la Première Armée
Command, pp, 459–61. Française, pp. 561–67.
434 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
LXXX Corps, the latter minus some tained remains of the 11th Panzer Divi-
2,000 men trapped in the Swabian High- sion, to move to the First Army to cover
land by the 10th Armored Division’s the gap by defending the Danube along
crossing of the Danube and left to the the Austrian frontier near Passau, lack
103d Division to mop up. Also under of gasoline again prevented compliance.
the Nineteenth Army was a force of little Two days later Kesselring formally rec-
more than division size deceptively called ognized the split between the First and
the “Twenty-fourth Army.” These were Seventh Armies by removing the Seventh
mainly headquarters troops fleshed out Army from Army Group G’s control
with Volkssturm and frontier battalions and placing it directly under his own
that had manned posts along the Swiss command. 52 So disorganized were the
border to discourage any Allied plan to German defenders along the seam be-
enter Germany by way of neutral Switz- tween the armies that the U.S. XII
erland. T h e Twenty-fourth Army had Corps in a week took from the sector
escaped the French trap by crossing Lake more than 25,000 prisoners.
Constance by boat.50 Forced behind the Danube and pat-
As for General Foertsch’s First Army, ently incapable of preventing Allied
all corps headquarters and most divi- troops from crossing wherever they
sional formations—such as they were— chose, the Germans in the south at last
got across the Danube a step ahead of were as disorganized and impotent as
their pursuers, but all inevitably lost those who had tried to stem the eastward
large numbers of men in the process. surge of the 12th Army Group. They
During the week ending 26 April, each still might muster an occasional counter-
of the U.S. Seventh Army’s three corps attack, sometimes in as much as battalion
averaged well over a thousand prisoners strength, and they might yet delay Allied
a day. advance at strategic points, particularly
T h e Third Army’s southeastward turn in cities, but the end was near. As some-
had created an unremediable rupture one at General Eisenhower’s head-
between the German First and Seventh quarters put it, the Allied forces now
Armies, throwing the Seventh Army back were engaged in “the disarming, by
against the Czechoslovakian frontier battle, of the German armies.”53
where General von Obstfelder and his One American crossing of the Danube
staff could do little but await eventual after another quickly eliminated that
capitulation.51 Although Kesselring at river as a factor in the operation. T h e
OB WEST ordered a counterattack into 12th Armored Division (XXI Corps)
the Third Army’s eastern flank, the mea- crossed over a captured bridge at Dillin-
ger forces available for commitment had gen on the 22d; the 10th Armored and
no fuel. When on the 26th Kesselring 44th Divisions (VI Corps) over three
ordered the LXXXV Corps, which con- captured bridges near Ehingen on the
50 MSS# B–102 and # B–103, Twenty-fourth 23d. After the 42d Division had captured
Army, 17 Oct 1944–5 May 1945 (General der In- Donauwoerth on the 25th both the 42d
fanterie Hans Schmidt). See also MS # B–191, T h e and 45th Divisions (XV Corps) made
L X I V Army Corps in the Time from 21.IV.45 to
5.V.45 (Generalleutnant Helmuth Friebe). 52MS # B–703 (Wilutzky).
51 MS # A-893 (Gersdorff). 53As quoted in Seventh Army Report, p. 805.
T H E MYTH OF T H E REDOUBT 435
assault crossings near that old city before Armored Division (Maj. Gen. Orlando
daylight on the 26th. At the same time, Ward), only on 28 April.
the 65th and 71st Divisions (XX Corps) T h e assault spread rapidly through
crossed on either side of Regensburg, in the picturesque Bavarian villages and
the process prompting the combat com- countryside, If the villagers displayed
mander of the old south-bank fortress white flags and no one fired, the columns
city (Napoleon had known it as Ratis- raced rapidly on. If the Germans made
bon) to flee, leaving to a retired general a stand, tanks, artillery, and planes tore
the ignominy of surrender without fight. the houses to bits. T h e message appar-
T h e 103d Division (VI Corps) crossed ently got through, for time after time
northeast of Ulm at daylight on the civilians prevailed upon the German sol-
26th; and finally, the 86th Division (III diery to leave.
Corps) , after capturing Ingolstadt, made A pattern of no resistance in cities,
an assault crossing the night of the 26th. too, began to emerge. Before attacking
(Advancing southeast between the Dan- Memmingen, just east of the Iller River
ube and the Czechoslovakian border, the midway between Ulm and the Austrian
XII Corps would face a crossing of the frontier, the 10th Armored Division sent
river only after reaching the Austrian ahead burgomasters of towns already
frontier.) captured to warn that only white flags
Only one new component of appreci- and absence of resistance could spare the
able size joined the German order of city from destruction. T h e stratagem
battle, a Division Nibelungen, originally worked; on 26 April, nobody fought
intended but readied too late for General back in Memmingen.
Wenck’s Twelfth Army on the Elbe. At Landsberg, site of another of the
Committed on 27 April in the path of incredibly bestial Nazi concentration
the U.S. III Corps southeast of Ingol- camps, a garrison of almost a hundred
stadt, the division was almost at full Hungarian troops lined up in parade-
strength in men, but some 40 percent ground formation to surrender. Men of
lacked weapons. Aside from a few pre- the 103d Division, occupying the town
World War II tanks, the heaviest weapon in the wake of the tanks of the 10th Ar-
on hand was the Panzerfaust. I n a matter mored Division, claimed as a souvenir
of only three days, the division ceased a bronze plaque on a building commem-
to exist.54 orating the spot where Hitler had been
As the drive toward the Austrian bor- imprisoned following the abortive Mun-
der began, the now familiar pattern of ich Putsch in 1923 and where he had
an armored division out front, followed dictated the bible of the National Social-
by infantry divisions for the mop-up, ist movement, Mein Kampf.
quickly developed everywhere except in In Augsburg, on the Lech River mid-
General Haislip’s XV Corps. Having re- way between Ulm and Munich, arose
linquished his armor to the incoming III the first tangible evidence of an active
Corps, Haislip would be able to commit German underground resistance organi-
the replacement, the inexperienced 20th zation. As the 3d Division approached
54MS # B–348 (Wolf Hauser): III Corps AAR,
the city on 27 April, word came from an
Apr 45. adjacent unit that two civilians had ar-
436 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
rived to arrange surrender and avoid tion camps, Dachau. Delirious with joy,
destruction. Despite shelling from anti- some of the pitiful survivors of the camp
aircraft batteries ringing the city, the rushed the electrically charged wire
division commander, General O’Daniel, enclosure and died in their moment of
put a moratorium on artillery fire pend- liberation. Others hunted down their
ing further developments. wardens, many of whom had changed
Within Augsburg the combat com- into prison garb to hide among the in-
mander, Generalmajor Franz Fehn, in- mates, and beat them to death with
tended to fight, but he refused to stones, clubs, fists. More than 30,000
sanction demolishing bridges and over- prisoners clinging precariously to life,
passes. H e also early began to evacuate and great piles of grotesque, starved
German soldiers from the city’s hospitals cadavers crammed the camp. At the cre-
and distributed several hundred tons of matorium was the usual grim evidence
military rations to the civilian popula- of the efficiency of Nazi extermination
tion. methods.
Small underground groups, none yet Leaving to medics the task of trying
aware of the existence of others, mean- to save the typhus-infested inmates, the
while prepared to stage a coup. Members 42d and 45th Divisions pushed on to join
of one group calling itself the “Freedom a four-division assault against Munich
Party of Augsburg” reached one of the stage-managed by General Haislip’s XV
American regiments by telephone with Corps. With the 20th Armored and 42d
word that the city wanted to surrender. and 45th Divisions approaching the city
Others who counseled surrender spread from the northwest and north, the Sev-
the word that the authorities had already enth Army’s General Patch altered corps
capitulated and that everybody should boundaries to put the 3d Division, which
display white flags. A civilian patrol was approaching from Augsburg in a
reached one of the American columns position to swing to the south of Munich,
to lead a battalion commander and a temporarily under Haislip’s command.
small group to a bunker shared by Gen- Anxious to have a hand in seizing the
eral Fehn and civilian functionaries of prize, the 12th Armored Division of the
the city. Given five minutes to surrender, neighboring XXI Corps sent its recon-
General Fehn marched dutifully out to naissance troops on an unauthorized
view a city already fluttering with white foray toward the city from the southwest.
flags.55 As at Augsburg, a delegation of civil-
Munich, capital of Bavaria, Germany’s ians bought word that residents of Mun-
third city and another shrine of nazism, ich were trying to prevail on military
was next. En route, contingents of the leaders to spare the city. During the
42d and 45th Divisions overpowered night of 27 April, a variety of groups
some 300 SS guards and unveiled another ranging from sincere anti-Nazi under-
of Germany’s most notorious concentra- ground workers to war-weary burghers
and common opportunists rose in a series
55 Seventh Army Report, pp. 828–30; MS # B– of unconnected revolts. At the center of
186, Report by 407 Replacement Division About
the Construction and Organization of the Donau-
the uprising were three platoons of
Iller Defense (Generalmajor Franz Fehn). troops from Wehrkreis VII, reinforced
T H E MYTH OF T H E REDOUBT 437
by contingents from a panzer replace- late commitment of the III Corps. Be-
ment battalion stationed in a nearby fore armor could begin to exploit from
town and little groups of dissident in- the bridgeheads, heavy rains set in. T h e
fantrymen. As street fighting broke out, 13th Armored Division of the XX Corps
the insurgents captured the Nazi gaulei- nevertheless crossed the Isar River near
ter of Bavaria and the Munich radio sta- Landau on the 29th, then two days later
tion, but they failed to seize military reached the Inn River where it forms
and Nazi party headquarters. the Austrian border around Braunau.
Bolstered by SS troops from a caserne T h e 14th Armored Division of the III
in the northern fringe of the city, troops Corps took Landshut on the Isar on 30
loyal to the Nazis fought back. They April, then caught u p with its neighbor
failed to squelch the rebellion in Munich to reach the Inn the next day. Advanc-
entirely, for the insurgents managed to ing down the corridor between the Dan-
save the city’s bridges and to provide ube and Czechoslovakia, the 11th Ar-
considerable assistance when the Ameri- mored Division of the XII Corps put
cans arrived forty-eight hours later. Nei- patrols across the Austrian frontier near
ther could the insurgents claim victory. Passau as early as the 26th.
Although some units of the 3d and 42d Both here and in the zone of the Sev-
Divisions reached the center of the city enth Army a feature of the advance was
before midday on 30 April to the wel- the liberation of thousands of American
come of small groups of civilians waving and Allied prisoners of war. At long last
both white flags of surrender and Ba- the Germans had abandoned all efforts
varian flags of celebration, other con- to march the prisoners out of reach of
tingents had to clear stubborn nests of the rampaging Allied columns.
resistance, and the 45th Division faced While these thrusts were getting under
a determined fight for the SS caserne. way, the Supreme Commander, General
For most of the day it was a question of Eisenhower, reaffirmed final objectives
pouring in heavy artillery fire, attacking for the Third Army and the 6th Army
behind smoke screens across city streets, Group.
56 Asbefore, the goal of the Third
dodging deadly fire from antiaircraft Army was to link with the Russians in-
guns or persistent machine guns—all the side Austria, in the process seizing Salz-
usual accouterments the men had come burg and thus blocking passes leading
to expect in clearing rubble-strewn Ger- from Salzburg into the Austrian Tirol.
man cities. Even as a big white streamer T h e 6th Army Group was to capture all
flew from the highest building in Mun- other routes into the Alps-that at Bre-
ich, troops of the 45th Division were genz at the eastern end of Lake Con-
fighting from room to room in the SS stance leading into the Vorarlberg,
caserne to dislodge die-hard defenders. others in the vicinity of Fuessen and
By nightfall of 30 April, it was finally Garmisch-Partenkirchen leading to Lan-
over. deck and Innsbruck, and that at Kuf-
Those two corps of the Third Army stein, in the valley of the Inn River,
that had crossed the Danube meanwhile
56See SCAF 316, 27 Apr 45, as reproduced in Hq,
were running a day or so behind the 6th AGp, History, pp. 286–87. The 6th Army Group
Seventh Army, primarily because of the received the instructions orally on the 25th.
438 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
Pass and specifically assigned Landeck swered. Men of the 44th Division had
and the pass to the Seventh Army. In an reached the town late the day before.61
ill-disguised artifice not lost on General Unconcerned with this kind of inter-
de Lattre, the 6th Army Group directed necine rivalry, tanks of the 10thArmored
a change in the map co-ordinates given Division on the left wing of the VI Corps
in earlier communications to designate during the last days of April had cleared
the town of Hoefen. T h e new co-ordi- Oberammergau, site in less troubled
nates referred not to the town called days of the world-renowned Passion Play,
Hoefen that was located south of Fuessen and entered the twin resort towns of
but instead to another, smaller town by Garmisch-Partenkirchen. Heading u p
the same name not quite seven miles to winding roads dominated by towering
the northwest. T h e effect was to deny the white peaks, one column of armor on
French not only the Fern Pass but the the 30th crossed the Austrian border to
Oberjoch Pass as well.60 the southwest and established contact
Since American troops already blocked with troops of the 44th Division. Aiming
the limited roadnet, General de Lattre for the Isar River and the Mittenwald
had no choice but to accede to Devers’s Pass leading to Innsbruck, another col-
order and abandon the cherished goal of umn could make no such headway be-
linking with the Allied troops in Italy. cause of one obstacle after another—a
He had begun to reconcile himself to the deep crater in the road, a demolished
inevitable when word came that the bridge over a gorge, two minefields, 250
Americans were having trouble getting officer candidates defending a defile with
through the Fern Pass. At the suggestion machine guns and Panzerfausts, another
of the corps commander, de Lattre seized blown bridge over a cascading mountain
upon the idea of a raid south from Im- stream. T h e job of the final drive into
menstadt over a snow-blocked back road Austria at this point would pass to in-
leading u p the imposing massif of the fantry of the 103d Division as it did at
Arlberg to the Arlberg Pass and the town the Fern Pass to the 44th Division.
of St. Anton. If the Americans still had T h e Seventh Army’s other two corps
not made is to Landeck, he intended to meanwhile ran several days behind in
beat them to it by the back door, going their drive to reach the frontier because
from St. Anton to Landeck and the Resia they had to make wider swings to the
Pass. southeast than did the VI Corps. T h e
Hastily equipped with skis, a rein- presence of towering mountains short of
forced platoon began an arduous twenty- the border between the Isar and Inn
mile trek through the snow on 5 May. Rivers, denying the XXI Corps ready
Reaching the Arlberg Pass during the access to the objective of the Inn valley,
afternoon of the 6th, the commander further complicated the thrust.
placed a telephone call over the civilian Seeking a natural approach into the
network to Landeck. To the French Inn valley, the XXI Corps commander,
officer’s chagrin, an American voice an-
61De Lattre, Histoire de la Première Armée Fran-
çaise, pp. 580–81; 44th Div AAR, 1–10 May 45. The
60Hq, 6th AGp, History, p. 272; de Lattre, His- 44th Division’s action is covered in Chapter XIX
toire d e la Première Armée Française, p, 576. below.
440 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
TANKS
OF THE 20TH DIVISION
ARMORED FORD THE INN RIVERen route to Salzburg.
General Milburn, sent his 12th Armored to speed the closing of all Alpine passes
Division down the Munich-Salzburg to eliminate even a remote possibility
autobahn toward the Inn near Rosen- of the Germans’ forming a National Re-
heim, thirty miles southeast of Munich. doubt. With concurrence of the Third
That threw Milburn’s armor into the Army’s General Patton, who needed to
natural line of advance of General Hais- bring more infantry divisions forward
lip’s XV Corps, conqueror of Munich. before he could begin a push on Salz-
Without some adjustment in boundaries burg, General Devers on the first day of
and objectives, converging drives of the May asked General Eisenhower to alter
XXI Corps into the southeastern tip of the interarmy group boundary to give
Germany and of the right wing of the Salzburg to the 6th Army Group. Dis-
Third Army on Salzburg soon would playing a measure of disdain for normal
pinch out the XV Corps. security precautions, Devers negotiated
At the same time, from General Ei- the change by radio, telephone, and liai-
senhower’s headquarters came pressure son plane in a day, then ordered Hais-
T H E MYTH OF T H E REDOUBT 441
PARATROOPERS
OF THE 101ST DIVISION
AIRBORNE APPROACH
BERCHTESGADEN
lip’s XV Corps to drive swiftly for Salz- was the advance that artillery and even
burg. 62 tanks were left behind. Rubber-tired
If any chance still existed for the Ger- reconnaissance cars and jeeps, capable of
mans remaining in southeastern Ger- greater speed than tanks, often took the
many to enter the Alps for a final stand, lead.
Eisenhower’s decision killed it, so swiftly It was not even pursuit warfare any
did both the XV and XXI Corps ad- more; it was more a motor march under
vance. Bavaria seemed to be one endless tactical conditions. Unseasonable cold
array of white flags, and those towns and and heavy rain, often mixed with snow,
villages that failed to conform usually gave more concern than did the enemy.
fell in line after only a few bursts of Even had the weather made tactical air
machine gun fire. In many cases, so rapid support possible, nobody needed it any
more. T h e main roads were clogged with
62Hq, 6th AGp, History, p. 318; Seventh Army Germans—entire units—trying to sur-
Report, p. 852. render. T h e 106th Cavalry Group in a
442 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
hasty ceremony accepted surrender of an “are trying to get into the town.” 63
entire Hungarian division, 8,000 strong. Motorized troops of the 3d Division got
At the music shrine of Salzburg, a there first, in late afternoon of 4 May.
delegation of military and civilian func- T h e last temple of nazism still standing
tionaries offered surrender to the same in an area of American responsibility
cavalry group. No sooner had that hap- had fallen.
pened early on 4 May than General Patch Capture of Salzburg and Berchtes-
authorized General Haislip’s XV Corps gaden, sealing the last passes leading into
to turn to the southwest and come on the Austrian Alps, spelled an absolute
Hider’s mountain retreat at Berchtes- end to any possibility of a National Re-
gaden from the rear. T h e order failed doubt. T o the men of the 6th Army
to halt units of the XXI Corps, in whose Group and the Third Army, the feat
sector the town lay; and while the 3d was hardly necessary to convince them
Division of the XV Corps approached that the end of the war was near. Even
from the rear, grounded paratroopers of if there was to be no formal surrender
the 101st Airborne Division and recently of the German nation, or even if the
attached men of the 2d French Armored forces of Army Group G made no formal
surrender, the time was at hand when
Division, old allies of the Seventh Army,
every square inch of territory in which
sped toward the objective from the the remains of the Wehrmacht might
northwest. hide would be overrun in a matter of
It was congestion, not resistance, that days, perhaps even in hours.
slowed entry into Berchtesgaden. “Every-
body and his brother,” said one message, 63 Seventh Army Report, p. 855.
CHAPTER XIX
Goetterdaemmerung
Although the Germans had no formal to Hitler by telephone while an air at-
plans for a National Redoubt, Adolf tack raged over the city. As it had been
Hitler had intended leaving Berlin on written in the stars, the miracle Goebbels
20 April, his fifty-sixth birthday, to con- had been awaiting to save the Third
tinue the fight from southern Germany. Reich, as in an earlier day another had
By mid-April the bulk of the ministerial saved Frederick the Great, had come to
staffs already had abandoned the capital pass.
in a frantic exodus to the south, though “My Fuehrer!” Goebbels exclaimed.
Hitler himself began to procrastinate. “I congratulate you! Roosevelt is dead.” 1
While conscious of the difficulty of hold- T h e events that followed-among
ing Berlin indefinitely, he persisted in other reverses, Vienna fell that day to the
the self-delusion that time remained, and Russians-hardly confirmed Goebbels’s
even that his armies might achieve a expectations of deliverance from the
spectacular victory before Berlin. enemies of the Reich. Hitler nevertheless
T h e atmosphere in the Fuehrerbunker used the President’s death to exhort his
beneath the ruined city ranged alter- troops to supreme effort. In an order of
nately from despair to blind hope. One the day on 15 April, he proclaimed: “At
moment Hitler railed that the German the moment when fate has removed the
people had failed him; they deserved the greatest war criminal of all time from the
cruel fate they would suffer at the hands earth, the turning point of this war shall
of the conqueror from the east. T h e next be decided.”
moment it was his generals—incompe- As the military high command and the
tent, negligent, spineless; they were fools, party hierarchy gathered in the bunker
fatheads. Yet when a general occasionally to pay obeisance to the leader on his
dared to speak the truth, to reveal that birthday, Hitler repeatedly professed
the end was near, Hitler seized on some faith that the Russians were about to
new scheme designed to set everything incur their worst defeat in front of Ber-
right again—previously uncommitted lin. Even though the generals warned
(and untrained) Luftwaffe and naval that Russians and Western Allies soon
troops thrown into the line, a counter- would link to cut all escape routes to the
attack here, a shift of forces there. south, he declined to leave the capital.
T h e early moments of 13 April Should the linkup occur, he decreed, the
brought news that elated many of Hit-
1Toland, The Last 100 Days, p. 377. For details
ler’s coterie, if not the Fuehrer himself. and documentation of events during the last days
Goebbels, the propagandist, reported it of Berlin, see sources cited in ch. XV.
444 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
front was to be divided into two com- Army turn its back on the Allies at the
mands, to be headed in the north by Elbe and come to the relief of Berlin.
Grossadmiral Karl Doenitz, the naval That Hitler ordered, along with a drive
chief; in the south by someone else, per- on Berlin from the south by the Ninth
haps Kesselring or the Luftwaffe’s Her- Army, already threatened by Russian en-
mann Goering. circlement. Keitel and Jodl were to direct
Hitler then sanctioned the departure the converging attack. When the strata-
of various commanders and party leaders gem inevitably failed, continued Russian
from Berlin. which most were happy to advances forced the remnants of OKW
leave in desperate hope of saving their to displace farther and farther to the
skins or at least postponing the end. T h e north.
SS chief, Himmler, scurried north to con- Learning on the 23d of Hitler’s de-
tinue peace negotiations he had recently cision to stay in Berlin, Reichsmarshal
opened in secret with Count Folke Bern- Goering, whom Hitler long ago had
adotte, head of the Swedish Red Cross. designated to be his successor, believed
Doenitz too moved north. In a truck the time had come for him to take over
caravan loaded with luxuries, Goering and try to salvage something by peace
turned south. Foreign Minister von Rib- negotiations. From Berchtesgaden, he
bentrop also got out, as did most of the radioed Hitler for instructions, noting
staff officers and clerks of OKW and that if he received no answer by late
OKH, though Keitel and Jodl remained evening, he would assume that Hitler
with a small staff in a western suburb had lost freedom of action, whereupon
to keep OKW functioning. T h e faithful he would take control.
Goebbels was invited to move with his That same evening, in the north, Hein-
wife and children into the bunker, to rich Himmler was usurping the powers
which Hitler’s mistress, Eva Braun, al- of dictatorship without even asking. Con-
ready had repaired. cluding his negotiations with Count
T h e next day, 21 April, Hitler hit on Bernadotte, Himmler signed a letter to
a new scheme to set everything right. General Eisenhower. Germany, he wrote,
From the north an SS corps was to coun- was willing to surrender to the Western
terattack to break through Russian Powers while continuing to fight the
columns and relieve the city. Yet twenty- Russians until the Allies themselves were
four hours later even Hitler had to ad- ready to assume responsibility for the
mit that this offered no hope. At the campaign against bolshevism.
daily situation conference, he exploded Goering’s message threw Hitler into
in what may have been the greatest of another rage, as would the news of
many notable rages. This was the end. Himmler’s act when it reached the
Everybody had deserted him; lies, cor-
bunker several days later by way of a
ruption, cowardice, treason. They had
left him no choice but to remain in Ber- monitored broadcast of the BBC. Ac-
lin to direct the defense of the capital cusing Goering of “high treason,” Hitler
himself and die. demanded his resignation from command
Then hope stirred again as General of the Luftwaffe and from the Nazi party.
Jodl proposed that Wenck’s Tweflth Before dawn the next day, the heir-
GOETTERDAEMMERUNG 445
twenty to forty miles where their forward as the exchanges proceeded, to negotiate
troops were located, serious clashes might on recognition signals. At Eisenhower’s
ensue, resulting not only in casualties request, the Red Army’s Chief of Staff
but possibly in postwar recrimination. suggested as an over-all recognition sig-
T h e problem for the air forces had nal, red rockets for Soviet troops, green
long been acute. As early as the preced- rockets for Allied. Eisenhower con-
ing November, U.S. fighters attacking curred. T o a Russian proposal that So-
what they identified as a German column viet tanks be identified by a white stripe
in Yugoslavia had killed, the Soviets encircling the turret, Allied tanks by two
charged, several Russian soldiers, includ- white stripes, and that both place a white
ing a lieutenant general. Despite the in- cross atop the turret, General Eisen-
cident, efforts to establish effective hower suggested instead that to avoid a
co-ordination with the Russians by means delay in operations while putting on new
of a flexible bomb line had been basically markings, the Soviet troops be ac-
unproductive until March 1945, when quainted with existing Allied markings.
the Russians at last agreed to a bomb T h e Russians agreed, and by 21 April
line 2 0 0 miles short of forward Russian identification arrangements were com-
positions. T h e line was not to be violated plete.4
by Allied planes except on 24-hour General Eisenhower also proposed ex-
notice, which the Russians might veto. changing liaison officers, which the Rus-
Although the Western Allies and the sians neither refused nor encouraged,
Russians had sealed an agreement on and asked the Russians for details of
zones of occupation at the Yalta Confer- their operational plan while expanding
ence, no one pretended that the demarca- on his own, which, to the chagrin of the
tion lines corresponded with military British, he had revealed broadly not
requirements, though the Russians from quite a month before. Repeating the
time to time expressed concern about intent stated earlier to stop his central
Allied intentions to withdraw from the forces on the Elbe-Mulde line, Eisen-
Soviet zone once hostilities ceased. In a hower noted that the line could be
series of exchanges lasting past mid- changed to embrace upper reaches of the
April, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Elbe should the Russians want him to go
General Eisenhower, and the Red Army’s as far as Dresden. His northern forces,
Chief of Staff finally agreed that the he made clear, were to cross lower reaches
armies from east and west were to con- of the Elbe and advance to the Baltic
tinue to advance until contact was im- Sea a t the base of the Jutland peninsula,
minent or linkup achieved. At that point while forces in the south drove down the
adjustments might be made at the level valley of the Danube into Austria.
of army group to deal with any remain- T h e Russians responded with unusual
ing opposition while establishing a com- alacrity. Agreeing to the line of the Elbe-
mon boundary along some well-defined
geographical feature,
Since the arrangement did little to 4 U.S. Military Mission to War Dept, 14 Apr;
Eisenhower to U.S. Military Mission, 17 Apr; and
forestall the possibility of Allied-Soviet U.S. Military Mission to SHAEF, 21 Apr; all in
clashes, General Eisenhower began, even OPD IN file 1–30 Apr 45.
GOETTERDAEMMERUNG 447
Mulde as a common stopping place, they (those of the 69th Division east of Leip-
noted that the Soviet armies, in addition zig; the 2d Division southeast of Leipzig;
to taking Berlin, intended to clear the the 6th Armored and 76th Divisions near
east bank of the Elbe north and south of Rochlitz, northwest of Chemnitz; and
Berlin and most of Czechoslovakia, at the 87th and 89th Divisions west of
least as far as the Vltava (Moldau) Chemnitz) might be retained; but an-
River, which runs through Prague. other message from the Russians early
Co-ordination with the Russians on the 24th changed that.8
would come none too soon for com- Beginning at noon that day, the Rus-
manders of units that were hourly antici- sians revealed, they were to start an ad-
pating contact. General Hodges of the vance on Chemnitz by way of Dresden.
First Army, for example, spent much of During the advance, their air force would
the morning of 21 April trying to get refrain from bombing or strafing west of
instructions from SHAEF on procedures the line of the Mulde as far south as
to be followed, only to obtain little guid- Rochlitz, thence along a railroad from
ance other than to “treat them nicely.” 5 Rochlitz to Chemnitz, then to Prague.
It was past midday when confirmation General Eisenhower promptly ordered
from the Russians on recognition signals all bridgeheads across the Mulde with-
arrived and word went out to subordi- drawn as far south as Rochlitz with only
nate units. 6 outposts to protect bridges and small
As finally determined, whoever made patrols to make contact with the Russians
the first contact was to pass word up the remaining on the east bank. Patrols were
chain of command immediately to to venture no more than five miles be-
SHAEF, meanwhile making arrange- yond the Mulde.
ments for a meeting of senior American Excitement among First and Ninth
and Russian field commanders. T o the Army units was mounting all along the
vexation of the small army of excited line. Rumor piled upon rumor; one false
war correspondents, no news story was to report followed another. Russian radio
be cleared until after simultaneous an- traffic cutting in on American channels
nouncement of the event by the govern- convinced almost everybody that contact
ments in Washington, London, and was near. Word was on the 23d that a
Moscow. 7 staff sergeant in the 6th Armored Di-
First word was that bridgeheads al- vision actually had talked by radio with
ready established over the Elbe (the 83d the Russians. Unit after unit reported
Division’s at Barby) and the Mulde flares to the east, attaching to them vary-
ing interpretations. A battalion of the
69th Division on 23 April reported sight-
5Sylvan Diary, entry of 21 Apr 45. See also Gay ing a Russian tank with a white stripe
Diary for the same day. around the turret, then had to admit
6 to AGp Comdrs, FWD 19604, 21 Apr
Eisenhower
45, in SHAEF SGS 322.01–1, Liaison with the Rus-
sians.
7Eisenhower to AGp Comdrs, FWD 19624, 21
Apr 45, and Eisenhower to CCS, FWD 19737, 23 8 U.S. Military Mission to Eisenhower, MX 24032,
Apr 45, both in SHAEF SGS 322.01–1, Liaison with 24 Apr 45, in SHAEF SGS 373.5, Bomb-line, Liai-
the Russians. son, and Co-ordination of Fronts. I.
448 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
that it was actually a grassy hummock dutifully awaited approval from higher
with a clothesline stretched across it.9 command before setting out. There were
Men of the 84th Division painted signs few other units that did not, in the mean-
of welcome in Russian. T h e division can- time, violate the order on depth of pa-
celed all artillery fire beyond the Elbe trols. Some patrols of the 2d Division
lest it hit Russian troops, but rescinded probed in vain u p to seven miles beyond
the order when German soldiers on the the Mulde. One from the 104th Di-
east bank began blatantly to sunbathe. vision’s reconnaissance troop, composed
At General Hodges’ command post, a of three men under 1st Lt. Harlan W.
specially outfitted jeep was ready by the Shank, roamed more than twenty miles
23d for presentation to the army com- and reached the Elbe at Torgau late on
mander of the first Russian troops en- April 23d, spent the night in the town
countered. 10 under occasional Russian artillery fire,
After pilots of tactical aircraft reported and finally departed at noon on the 24th
numerous (but erroneous) sightings of after seeing no Russian troops.
Russian columns east of the Elbe, almost Through it all, the men along the line
all divisions sent their frail little artillery of the Mulde still had a war to fight-
observation planes aloft for a look. T h e after a fashion. As late as the 22d, part of
pilot of a plane belonging to the 104th the 69th Division’s 271st Infantry was
Division was convinced of success late on fighting hard to clear the town of Eilen-
the 23d when far beyond the Mulde he berg, astride the Mulde, and after night
spotted a column of troops. Landing, he fell had to repulse a determined counter-
found only Germans with a few British attack by as many as 200 Germans.
prisoners heading west in hope of sur- Company-size counterattacks also hit
rendering. Another pilot from the 104th some units of the 2d Division. Mean-
Division flew fifteen miles east of the while, other German soldiers in small
Elbe beyond the town of Torgau on 24 groups and in large poured into Ameri-
April, where he observed what appeared can lines, eager to surrender. Every di-
to be an artillery duel between Russians vision handled thousands each day, as
and Germans. Although he tried to land well as hundreds of American and Allied
behind Russian lines, antiaircraft fire prisoners released by their captors. At
turned him back. Other units on the 24th the same time hordes of civilians
reported seeing Russian planes over gathered at bridges over the Mulde, terri-
American positions. fied of the Russians, tearfully hopeful of
Although the 83d Division in its refuge within American lines. Although
bridgehead over the Elbe readied a task the official word was to turn back Ger-
force that included tanks, tank destroy- man civilians, many an American soldier
ers, and a company of infantry to probe looked the other way as the refugees tried
eastward to find the Russians, the force to pass, or liberally interpreted the
9 Unless otherwise noted, events during this pe-
proviso that foreign laborers might cross.
riod are from official unit records and from Capt. Unwittingly setting the stage for mo-
William J. Fox, T h e Russian-American Linkup, a mentous events to follow, the burgomas-
historical narrative supported by combat interviews ter of Wurzen, on the Mulde’s east bank
with members of the 69th Division.
10 Sylvan Diary, entry of 23 Apr 45. east of Leipzig, begged permission late
GOETTERDAEMMERUNG 449
M. Finnemann
MAP 7
on the 23d to surrender his town to the of processing both the liberated and the
69th Division’s 273d Infantry. Since the newly captured.
burgomaster’s purpose was to release By the afternoon of 24 April nobody
thousands of American and Allied pris- yet had any definite word of the Rus-
oners and to surrender hundreds of Ger- sians. Nor could anyone know that con-
man troops in the town, and since a trary to the agreement with General
restraining order on bridgeheads over Eisenhower, Russian troops approaching
the Mulde was yet to come, command- that part of the Elbe which runs some
ers up the chain of command sanctioned eighteen to twenty miles east of the
the move. T h e bulk of a battalion Mulde were under orders to halt, not at
crossed the Mulde in early evening into the Mulde but at the Elbe. Word on the
Wurzen to participate in a chaotic night Mulde as a demarcation line had yet to
450 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
pass down the Russian chain of com- took the restriction less seriously. To a
mand. 11 man they entered into a kind of humor-
Frustrated by the prolonged wait, the ous conspiracy to meet the Russians, re-
commander of the 273d Infantry, Col. gardless. As the two patrols left in jeeps
Charles M. Adams, in midafternoon of mounting machine guns early on the
24 April directed 1st Lt. Albert L. Kotze- 25th, no one yet had heard anything
bue of Company G to lead a jeep- more from Lieutenant Kotzebue in
mounted patrol of thirty-five men “to Kue hr en.
contact the Russians.” Lieutenant Kotze- Later in the morning, at Wurzen, the
bue was to go only as far as Kuehren, a 1st Battalion’s S–2, 2d Et. William D.
village four miles beyond the Mulde; but Robertson, awoke from a deep sleep oc-
when he reached Kuehren after encoun- casioned by staying u p the previous night
tering only a few hospitalized Allied to help process the surrendering Ger-
prisoners and hundreds of docile Ger- mans and liberated Allied prisoners in
mans anxious to surrender, he gained the town. With three men, Lieutenant
permission to proceed another three Robertson left by jeep in midmorning to
miles, technically two miles beyond the scout neighboring towns and villages for
five-mile limit. (Map 7) That Kotzebue other Allied prisoners and other Ger-
did, encountering only the usual Ger- mans wanting to surrender. Having no
man groups trying to escape the Rus- radio with him, Lieutenant Robertson
sians, then returned to Kuehren to bed had no intention of contacting the Rus-
down for the night. Although he received sians as he headed eastward.
two messages ordering his patrol to re- In Kuehren, in the meantime, Lieu-
turn before dark, Lieutenant Kotzebue tenant Kotzebue and his men had
ignored them because it was already well awakened to a breakfast prepared by vil-
after dark. lagers eager to please in fear that if the
With no further word from Kotzebue, Americans left, the Russians would come
Colonel Adams that night ordered two with the reign of terror that rumor prom-
more patrols to depart the next morning, ised would follow. Caught u p in the
25 April. T h e orders were the same, “to general expectation that the Russians
contact the Russians,” again within the were on their way, Lieutenant Kotzebue
five-mile limit. Members of one patrol saw no reason why he should not be the
made up of the regiment’s intelligence one to meet them first. His orders, “to
and reconnaissance platoon apparently contact the Russians,” he deemed suf-
accepted the limitation without ques- ficiently broad to warrant continuing to-
tion. Those of another commanded by a ward the east. Leaving his radio jeep in
platoon leader of Company E but ac- Kuehren to serve as a relay point for
companied by the 2d Battalion’s execu- messages, he headed east with the bulk of
tive officer, Maj. Frederick W. Craig, his patrol.
Thus, in midmorning of 25 April, four
separate groups of the 69th Division’s
11 The Russians had acknowledged it to General 273d Infantry were moving eastward.
Eisenhower only on 24 April. See U.S. Military
Mission to Eisenhower, MX 24032, 24 Apr 45, op.
Only one, the intelligence and recon-
cit. naissance platoon, was concerned enough
GOETTERDAEMMERUNG 451
with the five-mile restriction to comply yards north of Strehla. Seeing uniformed
with it.12 figures on the east bank milling about
Encountering dispirited German sol- the wreckage of a column of vehicles
diers, jubilant American and Allied close to the remains of a tactical bridge,
prisoners, apprehensive German civil- Lieutenant Kotzebue raised his binocu-
ians, and exuberant, sometimes intoxi- lars. Again there could be no doubt.
cated foreign laborers, Lieutenant They were Russians. T h e rays of the sun
Kotzebue and his men advanced almost reflecting off medals on their chests con-
due east through the town of Dahlen vinced him.
toward the Elbe in the vicinity of Strehla, At the lieutenant’s direction, his
a few miles northwest of Riesa, some driver fired two green signal flares. Al-
seventeen miles southeast of Torgau. It though the figures on the far bank gave
was almost noon as the jeeps slowed to no answering signal, they began to walk
enter the farming village of Leckwitz, toward the edge of the river. As Kotze-
less than two miles from the Elbe. bue’s driver fired another flare for good
Far down the main street, the men measure, the Polish laborer shouted
spotted a horseman just as he turned his identity across the water.
mount into a courtyard and passed from Using a hand grenade, Lieutenant
view. At a glance, the man’s costume Kotzebue blasted the moorings of a sail-
seemed unusual. Could it be? Was this boat and with five of his men rowed
it? across the Elbe. A major and two other
Spinning forward, the jeeps came to a Russians, one a photographer, met them.
halt at the entrance to the courtyard. T h e meeting was at first restrained, but
Inside, among a crowd of foreign labor- as Kotzebue explained who he was, the
ers, was the horseman. There could be Kussians relaxed.
no doubt. He was a Russian soldier. Minutes later, Lt. Col. Alexander T.
T h e time was 1130 on 25 April, the Gardiev, commander of the 175th Rifle
setting inauspicious, but the moment Regiment, arrived. Making clear that he
historic: the first contact between Allied intended to take the Americans to meet
armies from the west, Soviet armies from his division commander, he suggested
the east. that the men return to the west bank of
Through Russian-speaking Tech. 5 the Elbe and proceed northward to a
Stephen A. Kowalski, Lieutenant Kotze- hand-operated cable ferry opposite the
bue asked directions to the soldier’s com- village of Kreinitz. There the Russians
mander; but the Russian was suspicious would meet them again, presumably at
and reserved. Waving his arm to the east, the pleasure of two motion-picture
he suggested that one of the foreign cameramen who by that time also had
laborers, a Pole, could lead them better arrived on the scene.
than he. With that, he galloped away. Returning to the west bank, Kotzebue
Taking the Pole as a guide the patrol sent one of his jeeps accompanied by his
continued to the Elbe, a few hundred second-in-command back to Kuehren
with a message to be transmitted by radio
12The story of all patrols is based on detailed
combat interviews in Fox, The Russian-American
to headquarters of the 273d Infantry.
Linkup. Making a mistake he would come to rue,
452 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
the lieutenant gave the wrong map co- visions to rush to the 69th’s command
ordinates for his location. post. To speed confirmation, Reinhardt
Lieutenant Kotzebue signed his mes- directed Adams to cancel arrangements
sage at 1330. His regimental commander, for a personal meeting with the Rus-
Colonel Adams, received it not quite sians pending a flight by the division G–
two hours later: “Mission accomplished. 3 in an artillery spotter plane to the site
Making arrangements for meeting be. Lieutenant Kotzebue had specified.
tween CO’s. Present location (8717). N o T h e results of the flight further con-
casualties.” fused the issue. Taking along an inter-
Hardly had Colonel Adams tele- preter in a second plane, the G–3 flew
phoned that information to the division’s to Riesa, which marked the co-ordinates
chief of staff when the division com- Kotzebue had mistakenly given. Antiair-
mander, General Reinhardt, picked up craft fire at Riesa turned both planes
the phone. Reinhardt was irate. As late back.
as that morning he had been at Adams’s
command post where he had reiterated On two occasions, in late morning and
the order that patrols were to go no more early afternoon of 25 April, Colonel
than five miles beyond the Mulde. If Adams ordered Major Craig and the 47-
Kotzebue was where the map co-ordi- man patrol from the 273d Infantry’s 2d
nates indicated, he was far beyond the Battalion to advance no farther. Both
Mulde at the Elbe itself on the fringe of times he qualified the order with au-
the town of Riesa. thority “to scout out the area” near
General Reinhardt’s first reaction was where the patrol was located. Both times
to clamp a blackout on the news until Major Craig used this authority to justify
Colonel Adams could verify it by a continuing toward the east.
meeting with the Russians himself. On Craig and the men with him, like
second thought he telephoned the V Lieutenant Kotzebue and his men, were
Corps commander, General Huebner, caught u p in the elation of the moment.
who reacted much as had Reinhardt but Abroad in what was technically enemy
passed the word to General Hodges at territory, they were welcomed by jubi-
First Army. Hodges passed it on to Gen- lant foreign laborers and Allied prison-
eral Bradley at 12th Army Group, who ers as liberators, by the German populace
took it calmly. and soldiers as saviors from some ephem-
Mollified by this reaction near the eral dread called “the Russians are
top and rationalizing that Lieutenant coming.” Only occasionally did a Ger-
Kotzebue might not have known of the man soldier display any inclination to
five-mile restriction, General Reinhardt fight. One word and white flags appeared
still was reluctant to publicize the con- in the villages as if by magic.
tact without some confirmation. Time Craig had another incentive to con-
for proof was short, for despite all efforts tinue. With him was a historian, Capt.
to contain the news, rumors of a meet- William J. Fox, operating out of head-
ing with the Russians were rife through- quarters of the V Corps. Rationalizing
out the division, and correspondents that he was not subject to the five-mile
already were deserting neighboring di- restriction, Fox insisted that if Craig felt
GOETTERDAEMMERUNG 453
with him. They were from the 173d sians as living proof of contact. H e
Rifle Regiment. ordered them brought to his head-
Shortly after 1800, Lieutenant Rob- quarters, where they successfully ran a
ertson and his overloaded jeep arrived gantlet of war correspondents and pho-
at the 1st Battalion command post in tographers who had almost inundated
Wurzen. As soon as he could convince the 273d Infantry command post.
his battalion commander that the Rus- When the division commander, Gen-
sians were genuine soldiers, not released eral Reinhardt, learned of the new de-
prisoners, word passed u p the line to velopment, he was more irate than ever.
regiment . T h e corps commander obviously was
To Colonel Adams this development getting the impression that nobody in
was more startling than the others. He the 69th Division followed orders, and
had ordered no patrol from the 1st Bat- Reinhardt could hardly blame him.
talion, yet the battalion had four Rus- Reinhardt even toyed briefly with the
456 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
idea of a court-martial for Robertson. stream near Kreinitz. Late on the 26th,
(Someone noted in the 273d Infantry a patrol brought them the news that his-
journal: “Something wrong with an tory had passed them by. On the same
officer who cannot tell 5 miles from 25 day, Lieutenant Shank of the 104th Di-
miles.”) vision, who also had had a close brush
T h e fact that Robertson’s exploit had with history, returned to Torgau, this
produced tangible evidence entitling time actually to meet the Russians he
the 69th Division to the acclaim of first had failed to wait for long enough two
contact with the Russians apparently had days before.
something to do with Reinhardt’s de- A few problems of co-ordination with
cision to play it straight. Once he him- the Russians remained on the northern
self had talked with the Russians at his and southern portions of the front. T h e
command post, he interrupted the in- British Chiefs of Staff were particularly
evitable toasts and photographs to report concerned lest the Russians intended the
the news to the V Corps commander. Elbe as a stopping point in the north as
General Huebner in turn told Rein- well as the center of the front. A Russian
hardt to proceed with arrangements for drive to the Elbe would jeopardize the
a formal meeting of division command- British drive to the Baltic. Urging Gen-
ers the next day, 26 April, and of corps eral Eisenhower to make the distinction
commanders on the 27th. Since nobody clear, the British Chiefs also pointed out
yet had any specific information on the that by seeking to halt on a well-defined
site of Lieutenant Kotzebue’s meeting, geographical line, Eisenhower might be
the formal linkup celebrations would forgoing remarkable political advantages
be held at Torgau. to be gained by liberating Prague and
General Reinhardt met General Rusa- much of the rest of Czechoslovakia. If
kov, the man of many welcomes, on the possible without detracting from the
east bank opposite Torgau at 1600 on main drives to the Baltic and into Aus-
the 26th. Camaraderie, photographs, tria, they believed the Allies should ex-
toasts, dancing in the street, and a hastily ploit any opportunity to drive deep into
assembled feast with a main dish of fried Czechoslovakia.
eggs were the order of the day. General In the course of passing that view to
Huebner conducted a second ceremony General Eisenhower, General Marshall
on the 27th with his opposite, the com- remarked: “Personally and aside from
mander of the 34th Russian Corps, and all logistic, tactical or strategical im-
General Hodges a third on the 30th with plications I would be loath to hazard
the commander of the First Ukrainian American lives for purely political pur-
Army. T h e American, British, and Soviet poses.” 14 Right or wrong from a politi-
governments officially announced to the cal standpoint, the decision was in
world at 1800 on the 27th that east and keeping with the U.S. military policy
west had met on the Elbe at Torgau. followed generally throughout the
In the meantime, somebody at last
had remembered to do something about
14 Marshallto Eisenhower, W–74256, 28 Apr 45,
Lieutenant Kotzebue, Major Craig, and and Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD 20225, 29 Apr
their men waiting on the east bank up- 45, both in SHAEF cable log.
GOETTERDAEMMERUNG 457
political action, for negotiations with his fury had passed, he drew a will and
the Western Powers. 18 testament appointing Admiral Doenitz
Yet both Keitel and Jodl could persist as head of the German state and Su-
in their belief that more still might be preme Commander of the Armed Forces.
done. Relieving the army group com- Then, before daylight the next morning,
mander north of Berlin, they ordered he married Eva Braun.
General Student, commander of the Field Marshal Keitel finally sent a
First Parachute Army, to fly from the message by radio early on the 30th tell-
Netherlands to assume command. ing of the failure of Wenck’s T w e l f t h
O n the 28th, grim news poured into Army, in effect admitting that all hope
the bunker in a torrent. Italian parti- was gone. Although the message may
sans, Hitler learned, had arrested his never have reached the bunker, Hitler
erstwhile partner, Mussolini, and there apparently already had concluded that
were distressing rumors of army leaders it was time to die. He spent much of the
in Italy negotiating surrender. He morning saying farewells to his staff,
learned too of the uprising in Munich. seemingly unmoved by the news that
On that day also, telephone communica- Russian troops were little more than a
tions with OKW failed. block away, then in midafternoon re-
T h e 29th was grimmer still. Hitler tired with Eva Braun to his suite.
himself would not be notified until the Eva Braun killed herself by biting on
next day, but on the 29th the last thin a cyanide capsule. Hitler shot himself
hope of relieving Berlin evaporated with a pistol. In accordance with prior
when the turnabout attack of General instructions, members of the household
Wenck’s T w e l f t h Army stalled near staff burned the bodies outside the
Potsdam, seventeen miles southwest of bunker.19
the capital. Only some 30,000 men of News of the Fuehrer’s death was slow
the Ninth Army south of Berlin had to emerge. Most likely those in the
escaped Russian encirclement; so ex- bunker delayed in order to await the
hausted were they, so depleted their outcome of a Goebbels-inspired attempt
arms and ammunition, that they would to negotiate the surrender of Berlin in
be of no help to Wenck. exchange for safe passage of those in the
Mussolini and his mistress, Hitler bunker. When the Russians predictably
learned, had been executed the day be- declined any accommodation, word went
fore and strung up by their heels. Yet out at last—more than twenty-four hours
the most crushing blow was the word after the suicide–that Hitler was dead.
that Heinrich Himmler had turned trai- Admiral Doenitz announced it publicly
tor. As with Goering, Hitler expelled by radio that evening, 1 May, in the
Himmler from the party and stripped process giving the impression that Hitler
him of all claim to the succession. When had died a hero’s death.
19T h e evidence that Hitler shot himself appears
18I n addition to sources previously cited for events to be conclusive, despite a report by a former So-
in Berlin, see Magna E. Bauer, MS # B–69, T h e viet intelligence officer that Hitler too bit on a
End of Army Group Weichsel and Twelfth Army, cyanide capsule. See Lev Aleksandrovich Bezymen-
27 April–7 May 1945, prepared in OCMH to com- sky, The Death of Adolf Hitler (New York: Har-
plement this volume. court, Brace & World, 1968).
460 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
T h a t same day Goebbels and his wife, next day, 19 April, opposite Lauenberg,
after poisoning their six children, ar- some thirty miles upstream from Ham-
ranged their own deaths at the hands of burg. Another corps in the center
an SS guard. Three of Hitler’s military reached the Elbe opposite Hamburg
entourage also killed themselves. T h e four days later on the 23d. Both this
others tried to escape. Few made it. corps and another on the left that was
advancing on the great port of Bremen
T h e Drive to the Baltic fought against the essentially makeshift
force, Army Blumentritt, formed in
As these melodramatic events occured, early April as a component of OB
two major Allied offensives were con- NORDWEST, the new command under
tinuing, one by Montgomery’s 21 Army Field Marshal Busch which had been
Group to clear northern Germany and created as the Allied armies threatened
the Netherlands, the other by Devers’s to split the Western Front.21 Strength-
6th Army Group and the T h i r d Army ened by sailors fighting as infantry, the
into Austria. Germans made a stand for a week in
T h e 21 Army Group’s offensive front of Bremen, but by nightfall of 26
evolved from the bridgehead established April the British were in full control of
over the Rhine near Wesel. While the the city.
First Canadian Army on the left drove T h e First Canadian Army at the same
generally north to reach the IJsselmeer time was facing the remains of General
and the North Sea, the Second British Student’s First Parachute Army and the
Army attacked northeast to seize the line Twenty-fifth Army, which was subordi-
of the Elbe from Wittenberge to the sea. nate to O B NEDERLANDER, the new
Those goals achieved, the Canadians command under General Blaskowitz
were to turn west to clear the Nether- who formerly had headed Army Group
lands and east to sweep the littoral from H . Comprising two of the more cohesive
the Dutch border to the estuary of the forces remaining to the German Army
Weser River. T h e British were to at- in the west, the troops drew added
tack across the Elbe to capture Hamburg strength from readily defensible posi-
and make a 45-mile drive to the Baltic tions along one canal or river after an-
in the vicinity of Luebeck.20 other. Contingents of one Canadian
Benefiting much as had the First and corps nevertheless reached the North
Ninth U.S. Armies from the great gap Sea near the northeastern tip of the
created in the German line by encircle- Netherlands on 16 April, thereby split-
ment of Army Group B in the Ruhr, the ting the German front. Another corps
British south wing alongside the Ninth on the 14th took Arnhem on the Neder
Army made the most rapid gains. There Rijn, an objective that had eluded Brit-
the 8 Corps had a four-day brush with ish troops in the preceding September’s
contingents of Wenck’s Twelfth Army big airborne attack, and on the 18th
near Uelzen but reached the Elbe the ended a 40-mile trek to the IJsselmeer.
One corps turned east to clear the
20 Normandy to the Baltic. For
Montgomery,
plans, see pages 261–63; for operations, pages 264–
66. 21See above, ch. XVIII.
GOETTERDAEMMERUNG 461
coast between the Dutch border and the the operation, the Ninth Army provided
Weser, but little reason remained for the administrative and support services.
other to make the planned assault to Under the British plan, the 8 Corps was
erase the Germans trapped in the west- to make an assault crossing of the Elbe,
ern portion of the Netherlands. If the whereupon the 12 Corps and the XVIII
Canadians attacked, the Germans in all Airborne Corps were to cross into the
probability would flood the low-lying bridgehead, the former to mask and
countryside, increasing the suffering of later capture Hamburg, the latter to
a Dutch population already facing a food clear additional bridging sites upstream
shortage that was close to famine. Even and protect the right flank of the 8 Corps
the Nazi high commisssioner in the in a northward drive to the Baltic. 24
Netherlands, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, had T h e rapid deterioration of German
by early April become concerned that a forces everywhere on the Western Front
catastrophe was in the making. Word prompted Field Marshal Montgomery to
that Seyss-Inquart might be amenable to advance the date of the river crossing
a relief operation reached the Canadians two days, to 29 April. It also prompted
in mid-April, resulting in conferences General Ridgway to propose that in-
with the Germans that led to an agree- stead of waiting six or seven days to
ment for the Allies to provide food for cross British bridges, the XVIII Air-
the Dutch by land, sea, and air. Airdrops borne Corps make its own assault cross-
began on 28 April while negotiations ing before daylight on 30 April. T h e
were still going on.22 commander of the Second Army, Gen-
During the conferences, General Eis- eral Dempsey, approved.
enhower’s representative tried to per- General Ridgway’s problem was to
suade Seyss-Inquart to agree either to a get an assault force ready in time.
truce or to unconditional surrender. Although one division, the 8th, had ar-
Seyss-Inquart refused on the grounds rived by nightfall of the 28th from mop-
that it was the duty of the Germans in up operations in the Ruhr, its regiments
the Netherlands to fight until ordered were concentrated near the British cross-
to do otherwise by the German govern- ing site in keeping with the original
ment. As Dutch relief operations got plan. Of the 82d Airborne Division, as-
underway, a lull not unlike a truce sembling near the bridge sites reserved
nevertheless settled over the front.23 for the U.S. corps, only a battalion had
For the British attack across the Elbe arrived by dawn of the 29th, and a full
to reach the Baltic, General Eisenhower regimental combat team was not sched-
provided assistance by General Ridg- uled to arrive until late afternoon of the
way’s XVIII Airborne Corps with three same day, a few hours before the time for
U.S. divisions. Although the corps was the assault. A third division, the 7th
attached to the Second British Army for Armored, was not to complete its move
until the 30th.
23For details and annotation, see Stacey, T h e In the interest of speed and in a belief
Victory Campaign, pp. 581–87, 606–09, and Pogue,
T h e Supreme Command, pp. 457–58. 24This account is based on official records of the
23Pogue, T h e Supreme Command, pp. 458-59; XVIII Airborne Corps and its divisions. See also
Stacey, T h e Victory Campaign, pp. 607–08. Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 269–73.
462 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
M. Finnemann
MAP 8
that resistance would be light, Ridgway prompted the Germans on the far bank
named the airborne division for the as- to seek cover, only an occasional flurry
sault even though at the start only one of small arms fire swept the river.
battalion of the 505th Parachute Infantry T h e paratroopers fanned out against
would be available. To provide a ready sporadic resistance, though artillery fire
follow-up force, he attached four bat- began to fall in heavy volume at the
talions of the 8th Division to the 82d. crossing site. T h e shelling harassed suc-
Following an almost unopposed cross- ceeding waves and hampered engineers
ing by British commandos near Lauen- constructing a heavy ponton bridge, but
burg before daylight on the 29th, the a 1,110-foot bridge was nevertheless
battalion of the 505th’s paratroopers ready for traffic before dark on the first
moved silently in assault boats across the day, fifteen hours after work had begun.
sprawling Elbe at Bleckede, six miles T h e next day, 1 May, the bridgehead
upstream from Lauenburg, at 0100, 30 expanded rapidly. Having crossed a
April. (Map 8) As rain mixed with snow British bridge at Lauenburg, the 6th
GOETTERDAEMMERUNG 463
IN THE AUSTRIAN
ALPS a nest of resistance confronts men of the 103d Division.
British Airborne Division was attached Armored Division to help the 82d were
to General Ridgway’s command to form crossing the river.
the left wing of the corps. Four battalions On 2 May, as news of Hitler’s death
of the 8th Division and an additional spread, the enemy’s will to fight disap
parachute infantry regiment of the 82d peared. I n rare instances was a shot fired.
participated in the day’s attacks amid T h e problem became instead how to
increasing indications that all resistance advance without running down hordes of
was about to collapse. By the end of this German soldiers and civilians who ap-
second day, the American bridgehead was peared to have only one goal: to get out
six miles deep, contact was firm with the of the way of the Russians.
British on the left, and a second bridge With attached armor, the 82d Air-
was in operation eight miles upstream borne Division moved east to Lud-
from Bleckede. Contingents of British wigslust and southeast along the Elbe to
armor to assist the British airborne di- Doemitz to anchor the 21 Army Group’s
vision and a combat command of the 7th right flank on the line General Eisen-
464 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
hower had specified to the Russians, T h e as many German soldiers and civilians as
8th Division drove forty-five miles to possible from the grasp of the Russians.
the northeast to occupy Schwerin. While Aware that agreements between the
British troops before Hamburg began Western Powers and the Soviet Union
negotiations for the fire-gutted city’s sur- precluded his surrendering all to the
render and while a British armored di- Western Allies alone, he believed that
vision entered Luebeck without a fight, the only chance of saving more Germans
the 6th British Airborne Division dashed lay in opening the front in the west while
all the way to Wismar on the Baltic. T h e continuing to fight in the east, mean-
drive sealed off the Jutland peninsula, while trying to arrange piecemeal sur-
trapping German forces in the nation’s renders to the Allies at the level of army
northernmost province and barring the group and below.
way to Denmark. Two hours later the As Doenitz surmised, the way was open
first Russian troops arrived. for such surrenders. Basing their conclu-
sions on indications reaching General
Piecemeal Surrenders Eisenhower’s headquarters in mid-April
that German commanders in Norway,
T h e second of the continuing Allied Denmark, and the larger north German
offensives, a prolongation into Austria of cities might be induced to surrender, the
the drive through southern Germany by Combined Chiefs of Staff on 21 April had
the 6th Army Group and the Third notified the Russians that surrender of
Army, also became closely involved in large formations was a growing possi-
the growing German dissolution. Hardly bility. They suggested that Britain, the
were the first troops across the Austrian Soviet Union, and the U.S. be repre-
frontier when the news broke that on 29 sented on each front in order to observe
April the German command in Italy had negotiations for surrender. T h e Soviets
surrendered. T h e capitulation was eff ec- had promptly agreed.
tive at noon on 2 May and included the Word went out from Doenitz’s head-
Austrian provinces of Vorarlberg, Tirol, quarters during 2 May to commanders
Salzburg, and part of Carinthia (Kaern- facing the Russians in the north to move
ten), the areas into which troops of the as many men as possible behind the
6th Army Group were moving. 25 line Wismar-Schwerin-Ludwigslust-Doe-
O n the same day, 2 May, Admiral mitz and to exploit any opportunity to
Doenitz, new head of the Third Reich, negotiate local surrenders to the Allies. 26
convened his advisers in a headquarters General der Infanterie Kurt von Tip-
established in the extreme north of Ger- pelskirch, commander of the Twenty-
many. Anxious to end the bloodshed, first Army, complied that afternoon, con-
Doenitz just as fervently wanted to save tacting General Gavin, commander of
the 82d Airborne Division, in Lud-
25 See Ernest F. Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, in wigslust. Tippelskirch surrendered his
preparation for the series UNITED STATES
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Unless otherwise command unconditionally, though in
noted, the surrender story is based on Pogue, T h e deference to the Russians, Gavin speci-
Supreme Command, pp. 478-94; Ziemke, Stalingrad
to Berlin, ch. XXI; and Royce L. Thompson, Mili- 26See Bauer, The End of Army Group Weichsel
tary Surrender in the ETO, MS in OCMH. and Twelfth Army.
GOETTERDAEMMERUNG 465
fied that the capitulation was valid only a view to surrendering all German forces
for those troops who passed through remaining in northern Germany. Under
Allied lines.27 instructions from General Eisenhower,
A formal surrender was hardly neces- Montgomery on 4 May accepted the un-
sary in any case. By the afternoon of 2 conditional surrender effective the next
May the bulk of the German troops and day of all Germans in the Netherlands,
their commanders were falling over the Frisian Islands, Helgoland, and all
themselves to get into Allied prisoner-of- other islands, north Germany, and Den-
war enclosures. That the Germans in mark. (Norway, Eisenhower ruled, would
the area north of Berlin were squeezed constitute a political rather than a tac-
into a corridor only some twenty miles tical surrender and thus would have to
wide between Russian and Allied troops await negotiations at which Russian rep-
hardly could have eluded anybody. Great resentatives would be present.) Although
columns of motor vehicles, horse-drawn Montgomery refused to accept with-
carts, foot troops, even tanks, moved in drawal into his zone of German civilians
formation to surrender. Other soldiers or military formations still opposing the
straggled in individually, many with Russians, he agreed to accept individual
their women and children and pitiful soldiers. Since the bulk of those oppos-
collections of personal belongings. To ing the Russians already had entered
the 8th Division alone at Schwerin more Allied lines in any case, the restriction
that 55,000 Germans surrendered that made little difference.
day. General Wenck’s Twelfth Army and
T h e next day, 3 May, Tippelskirch the 30,000 survivors of the Ninth Army
himself entered an enclosure of the 82d meanwhile entered negotiations with the
Airborne Division along with some Ninth U.S. Army on 4 May in hope of
140,000 other Germans of the Twenty- gaining approval for troops and a mass
first Army, while farther north, at of civilians accompanying them to cross
Schwerin, some 155,000, mainly of the the Elbe and surrender. T h e Ninth
Third Panzer Army, including the com- Army’s representatives agreed to accept
mander, General von Manteuffel, sur- the troops so long as they brought their
rendered to the 8th Division. T h e own food, kitchens, and medical facili-
headquarters of the army group con- ties, but forbade the civilians to cross.
trolling these two armies apparently dis- Actually, the Ninth Army’s troops im-
integrated. Having narrowly escaped posed no ban on civilians. On a catwalk
capture when men of the 8th Division spanning the ruins of a railroad bridge,
entered Schwerin, the newly assigned on ferries, boats, and rafts, or by swim-
commander, General Student, went into ming, some 70,000 to 100,000 men of the
hiding but would be apprehended later Ninth and Twelfth Armies got to the
in the month. west bank of the Elbe. 28
As Tippelskirch surrendered on 2
May, Admiral Doenitz was sending emis- 28Details of the negotiations. for the surrender
saries to Field Marshal Montgomery with may be found in Maj. Gen. James E. Moore (Chief
of Staff, Ninth Army), Memorandum for the Com-
manding General, 7 May 1945, copy in OCHM
27 82d Abn Div AAR, Apr-May 45. through courtesy of General Moore.
466 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
In Austria, first indications that Field ters and special troops of the First Army
Marshal Kesselring might be ready to from the line, a first step in projected
surrender his Army Group G and the deployment of General Hodges’ com-
Nineteenth Army developed on 3 May mand to the Pacific. As part of the plan,
when General Devers learned through General Huebner’s V Corps on 2 May
SHAEF that Kesselring had asked the began relieving northernmost units of
German command in Italy to whom he General Irwin’s XII Corps along the
should surrender.29 On the same day Czechoslovakian frontier, a preliminary
Kesselring asked Admiral Doenitz for au- to transfer of the V Corps two days later
thority to surrender, which Doenitz to the Third Army. Irwin’s corps was
granted. thus freed to join the drive on Linz
As Kesselring began his overtures, the down the north bank of the Danube.
war in Austria went on amid an aura of T h e scene was also prepared for an op-
unreality-not really war, yet not quite eration to which General Eisenhower
peace. There were three main drives, that had alerted the Russians a few days
of the French into the Vorarlberg, that earlier, an advance of up to forty miles
of General Patch’s Seventh Army toward inside Czechoslovakia to Karlsbad, Pil-
Landeck and Innsbruck, and that of sen, and Ceské Budejovice.30
General Patton’s Third Army toward Under the new arrangement, Walker’s
Linz. XX Corps was to press from its bridge-
T h e 13th Armored Division of Gen- head over the Inn to the line of the Enns
eral Walker’s XX Corps in the Third River southeast of Linz while the right
Army’s center was the fiirst of Patton’s wing of Irwin’s XII Corps moved along
troops to reach the Austrian frontier in the north bank of the Danube to capture
strength, doing so on the first day of May Linz. Irwin’s left wing meanwhile was
along the Inn River opposite Braunau to attack into the southwestern corner of
(Hitler’s birthplace). T h e next day, as Czechoslovakia toward Klatovy and
divisions of the XX Corps bridged the Ceské Budejovice, while Huebner’s V
Inn at three places, in the process cap- Corps advanced eastward to take Karls-
turing both Braunau and Passau, the bad and Pilsen.
latter at the juncture of the Inn with the The divisions of the XX Corps drew
Danube, a new order and another that only occasional enemy fire as they moved
was pending forced General Patton to swiftly to reach the Enns River on 4 May
alter and broaden his plan of attack. and there awaited the Russians. T h e 1 1 th
T h e first order was the boundary Armored Division of the XII Corps at
change according Salzburg to the Seventh the same time reached a point only a few
Army. T h e change pinched out the III miles north of Linz, where an official of
Corps along that part of the Inn River the city offered to surrender on condition
that flows inside Germany, ending par- that the German garrison be allowed to
ticipation of General Van Fleet’s com- march east against the Russians. T h e
mand in the fighting. T h e second was armor refused that priviso, and a column
based on a plan to withdraw headquar- advanced swiftly the next morning to
29
Hq, 6th AGp, History, p. 320. 30See 12th AGp Ltr of Instrs 22, 4 May 45.
GOETTERDAEMMERUNG 467
find a bridge across the Danube intact, the Vltava northwest of Ceské Budejo-
the city almost devoid of Germans. An- vice when the armor came to a halt.
other column uncovered more evidence On 6 May men of the 2d and 97th
of German atrocities in concentration Divisions and a new unit, the 16th
camps near Mauthausen and Gusen. T h e Armored Division (Brig. Gen. John L.
armor then moved to the Linz-Ceské Pierce), came upon an entirely new
Budejovice highway to join neighbors scene. Early in the day the armor began
of the XX Corps in a watch for the unsuspectingly to pass through the in-
Russians. fantry along the highway leading to Pil-
For the rest of the XII Corps and for sen. Past silent, undefended forts of
the V Corps, the drive into Czechoslo- Czechoslovakia’s western fortifications,
vakia was at first an anticlimax. T h e the “Little Maginot Line,” again un-
fighting was unreal, a comic opera war tested in battle as it was after the Munich
carried on by men who wanted to sur- Pact, the troops burst suddenly from the
render but seemingly had to fire a shot Sudetenland with its apathetic, some-
or two in the process. T h e land, too, was times sullen German sympathizers into a
strange, neither German nor Czech. T h e riotous land of colorful flags and cheer-
little towns near the border, with their ing citizenry.
houses linked by fences and their decor- As if they had stepped across some
ated arches over the gates, had the look unseen barrier, the men found them-
of Slavic villages, but the population was selves in a new land of frenzy and de-
unquestionably hostile. This country was light. War and nonfraternization lay
the disputed Sudetenland. behind. It was Paris all over again, on a
T h e monotony—an occasional burst of lesser scale and with different flags, but
small arms fire along roads, a rocket with the same jubilant faces, the same
from a Panzerfaust at a roadblock, a stray delirium of liberation. Past abandoned
round of artillery fire in fields—was antiaircraft guns that had protected the
broken for the 90th Division on 4 May big Skoda industrial complex on the out-
when out of the wooded hills emerged skirts of the city, the armor raced into
an old foe of the Third Army, the 11th Pilsen. “Nazdar! Nazdar!” the people
Panzer Division. This time the panzers shouted.
were bent not on attack but on surren- Except for the 1st Division, advancing
der. With an odd conglomeration of on Karlsbad, the V Corps had joined the
tanks and other vehicles, the remnants growing list of American units for which
of the division marched with their com- the shooting war was over. It was almost
mander, General von Wietersheim, to over for the 1st Division as well. Karls-
prisoner-of-war cages. bad surrendered by telephone early the
Two days later General Patton sent the next afternoon, the staff of the opposing
4th Armored Division through the 90th Seventh Army the day after that.
in the hope that General Eisenhower In the Tirol, in the meantime, the
would agree to an advance down the Alpine terrain restricted the forces the
valley of the Vltava River to Prague, but Seventh Army could employ in drives on
approval never came. Patrols had ad- Innsbruck and Landeck to two divisions.
vanced as far as Pisek on a tributary of Although only a few Germans resisted,
468 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
they drew added strength from their po- pleted. Further negotiations were under-
sitions in the precipitous, narrow Alpine way when, during the afternoon and
passes. Snow mixed with freezing rain evening of 2 May, Austrian partisans
and great drifts of the preceding winter’s seized control of Innsbruck. Although
snow also slowed the advance. Nor were the partisans begged for American entry
the men and their commanders eager, in lest SS troops counterattack, the 103d
view of the approaching end of the war, Division still had to fight through oc-
to take undue chances. casional German delaying groups to get
Relieving the armor of the VI Corps to the city. During midmorning of 4
before the Mittenwald Pass leading to May, in a driving snowstorm, the Ameri-
Innsbruck, the 103d Division during 1 cans entered.
May established telephone contact with From Innsbruck, General McAuliffe
the German garrison in the Tirolean sent his 411th Infantry hurrying south-
capital, but the lines went out before ward in trucks to gain the Brenner Pass.
surrender negotiations could be com- In hope of speeding the advance over a
GOETTERDAEMMERUNG 469
CZECHOSLOVAKIAN
VILLAGERSWELCOMETANK CREW of the 16th Armored Di-
vision.
treacherous Alpine road, McAuliffe sent France to Germany, joined hands with
the convoy forward the night of 3 May those men who had fought up the long,
with headlights blazing. Without firing mountainous spine of Italy. That the
a shot, the 411th Infantry took the town troops belonged to the VI Corps was
of Brenner just before 0200, 4 May, appropriate, for long ago the VI Corps
while a mounted patrol continued had fought in Italy in a besieged beach-
through the pass and across the Italian head at Anzio.
frontier to Vipiteno, there making con- At the Fern Pass, where men of the
tact at 1051 with reconnaissance troops 44th Division relieved other contingents
of the 88th Infantry Division. A Seventh of the armor of the VI Corps, a 300-man
Army that had invaded Sicily long German detachment stanchly defended
months before, then had left the fighting a serpentine highway blocked by deep
in the Mediterranean to the Fifth Army craters and a landslide. A battalion of
while detouring by way of southern the 71st Infantry began to attack the
470 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
J.F. Smith
MAP 9
position early on 1 May. (Map 9 ) An- in reducing the defenses at the Fern
ticipating difficulty getting through the Pass. As the battalion was moving up,
pass, the division commander, General five Austrian partisans appeared with an
Dean, at the same time sent a reinforced offer to guide the men along a little-
company on a circuitous 40-mile out- known secondary road that would put
flanking maneuver, back almost to the them in rear of the pass. Led by the
Oberjoch Pass, then southwestward u p Austrians, the battalion moved swiftly
the valley of the Lech River to another along a road that cut through forests and
route—more a trail than a road—leading over a steep crest south of the Fern Pass.
across a high mountain range to the T h e men seized the town of Fernstein
vicinity of Imst, some eight miles behind behind the pass, then before dark, came
the Fern Pass. upon the Germans at the pass from the
T h e company was still bucking fresh rear. Resistance collapsed.
snow and old drifts when around midday T h e next day men of the 44th Di-
on 2 May the commander of the 71st vision pushed on foot toward Imst, to
Infantry sent a second battalion to help make contact there with the reinforced
GOETTERDAEMMERUNG 471
company that two days before had begun to the conference room at 1500. At that
the wide outflanking maneuver; but re- time the Ninteenth Army surrendered
sumption of a full-scale advance to Lan- unconditionally, effective at 1800 the
deck and the Resia Pass beyond had to same day. 32
await repair of the road through the A regiment of the 44th Division mean-
Fern Pass and the coming of tanks and while had resumed the advance on
other vehicles. It was this delay that Landeck when in midmorning of the 5th,
prompted the commander of the First the German commander in the region
French Army, General de Lattre, to try suggested a truce pending the outcome
to beat the Americans into Landeck by of Brandenberger’s negotiations. On the
way of the Arlberg Pass. 31 condition that the arrangement include
Unaware that de Lattre had begun a evacuation of Landeck, General Dean
race for Landeck, the 44th Division was agreed, and a battalion of the 44th Di-
in no rush, particularly not in view of vision occupied the town that afternoon,
other developments on 4 May. Through in the process unwittingly thwarting
the division’s lines at Imst that day General de Lattre’s effort to reach Lan-
passed emissaries of General Branden- deck first. Not until two days later, on
berger’s Nineteenth Army on their way the 7th, would anyone bother to proceed
to open negotiations for surrender. Not to the Resia Pass, which de Lattre so
far away, other emissaries on the night of earnestly wanted to attain. At 1900, 7
4 May approached troops of the 3d Di- May, the 44th Division established con-
vision of the XV Corps to begin arrange- tact there with contingents of the 10th
ments for capitulation of General Mountain Division.
Schulz’s Army Group G. In the broader surrender of Army
T h e Nineteenth Army surrendered in Group G, an element of surprise was
keeping with a detailed scenario worked present in that General Devers had an-
out at headquarters of the VI Corps. T h e ticipated, on the basis of Field Marshal
enemy commander, Brandenberger, was Kesselring’s query as to whom he should
to present himself at the Landsrat in surrender, that Kesselring would be sur-
Innsbruck at a specified time on 5 May. rendering his entire command. Kessel-
T h e scenario spelled out how Branden- ring had intended to do that, but the
berger was to be met, that no salutes or new German government had granted
handshakes were to be exchanged, even authority only for Army Group G, not
the times when conferees would stand for those troops oppasing the Russians
and when they would be seated. in Austria and the Balkans, which by
Except that Brandenberger reached Hitler’s order of 24 April were at that
the scene some minutes late, all went point under Kesselring’s command.33
according to plan. Shortly before 1500 Thus it was that the commander of
the VI Corps commander, General the First Army, General Foertsch, repre-
Brooks, afforded Brandenberger and his senting the commander of Army Group
staff a brief period in which to confer G, General Schulz, appeared the night of
privately upon condition that they return
32See AAR’s of VI Corps, 44th and 103d Divs,
May 45, and Seventh Army Report, pp. 848–49.
31See above, ch. XVIII. 33Kesselring, A Soldier’s Record, p . 342.
472 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
cause soldiers of that army faced both soned, to the Twenty-fourth Army. Fail-
French and Americans but that he was ing to take cognizance of the fact that
free to treat alone with Schmidt since Schmidt’s command was attached as a
only French troops faced the Twenty- subordinate unit to Brandenberger’s, he
fourth Army. 35 rationalized that if the Twenty-fourth
By the time General Schmidt’s emis- Army had been included in the surren-
saries returned from contacting the der, it would have been mentioned by
French, Schmidt had learned that Army name. Defying the directive from Devers,
Group G was surrendering to the 6th de Lattre sent a courier to General Bran-
Army Group. Deciding against present- denberger to demand that he send
ing himself to de Lattre, Schmidt sent Schmidt to surrender to the French. I n
instead a letter noting the broader sur- the meantime, he said, the French would
render and suggesting that the French continue to fight.
get in touch on the matter with the 6th Hostilities ostensibly were continuing
Army Group. in the French sector when late on 6 May
Shocked by the “insolence” of General Devers sent a liaison officer to
Schmidt’s letter, General de Lattre de- explain to de Lattre how, even as ne-
manded that General Devers send on to gotiations had been underway with
him any plenipotentiaries from the Brandenberger, a delegation from Army
Twenty-fourth Army who might ap- Group G had arrived to surrender the
proach American forces. H e intended to entire command. De Lattre was still not
continue hostilities, he said, until the to be placated. Ignoring the fact that the
moment German representatives pre- Twenty-fourth Army bore the name of
sented themselves at his headquarters. an army command purely for purposes
General Devers’s chief of staff replied of deception, he pointed out that neither
that Army Group G had surrendered in in the surrender of Army Group G nor
entirety effective at noon on 6 May, in- of the Nineteenth Army had the Twenty-
cluding the troops opposing the French. fourth Army been specifically men-
Devers’s orders were that all troops of tioned. Besides, he maintained, not
the 6th Army Group stop in place and without logic, if the Germans on his
cease fighting immediately, the word to front were included in Army Group G’s
be transmitted without delay to both surrender, then the First French Army
Germans and French. should have been represented at the
De Lattre was not satisfied. If the ceremony.
Nineteenth Army as a part of Army When the liaison officer asked him at
Group G had surrendered individually this point to sign his name to the sur-
with an effective hour different from that render document, de Lattre refused on
for the entire army group, then the same the grounds that General de Gaulle had
conditions should be applied, he rea- named him as an official representative
of the French government to accept the
over-all German surrender and that a
35 The account of this incident is based on de governmental representative should not
Lattre, Histoire de la Première Armée Francaise, affix his signature to an operational
pp. 583-93; Seventh Army Report, pp. 850–51; and
Devers Diary, entry of 13 May 45. document originating in the field. In de-
474 T H E LAST OFFENSIVE
Epilogue
With the lights going on again all over British forces from the Russian zone;
Europe, the United States and its allies arrange for four-power occupation of
on 8 May celebrated V–E (Victory in Berlin and Vienna—these and more.1
Europe) Day. T o the troops in the field, T h e thorniest of all problems with
the end brought a flush of relief but with German forces still under arms was in
it a dulling sense of anticlimax. Czechoslovakia where large German
A myriad of taxing jobs remained be- units continued to fight against the Red
fore Allied troops everywhere could turn Army in hope of withdrawing into
full attention to occupation duties. T h e American lines. Yet once the general sur-
Allies had to disarm and control all Ger- render became effective at 2301 on 8
man forces, many of them sizable, as in May, haven in American lines was denied
Denmark, Norway, and Czechoslovakia, by stipulation of the terms of surrender
and discharge them as quickly as possible signed at Reims. As German troops,
in order to reduce the strain on food many with their families in tow, con-
stocks and facilities. They had to con- tinued to flock toward American posi-
tinue to evacuate Allied prisoners of tions, U.S. divisions assembled them in
war; control, feed, and eventually evacu- “concentration areas” immediately in
ate foreign laborers and other displaced front of their defensive line, there even-
persons: assert authority over the Doenitz tually to turn them over to the Russians.
government and OKW, then disband At Russian insistence, SHAEF also di-
them along with the headquarters of the rected that higher commanders of those
Luftwaffe and the Navy. They had also forces presumed to have been responsible
to collect German records and docu- for continued defense and thus for viola-
ments: arrest ranking German officers tion of the surrender agreement, also be
and others who might be charged with turned over to the Russians even though
war crimes; begin redeploying some units they might have entered American lines
through the Suez Canal to the Pacific, before the deadline. Many was the piti-
others to the United States, both for able scene enacted, for most of the Ger-
projected commitment in the war against mans were desperately fearful of what
Japan; weed out individuals with long the Russians would do to them.2 For
overseas and combat service for early
return to the United States: prepare for 1Greater detail on post-D-day activities may be
disbanding SHAEF and shifting to mili- found in Pogue, The Supreme Command, ch.
XXVI.
tary government in four national zones 2 See AAR’s of 4th Armd and 26th Divs, May
of occupation; withdraw American and 45; V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 465; Gay
EPILOGUE 477
some million and a quarter German of- U.S. 66th Division (Maj. Gen. Herman
ficers and men who became prisoners of F. Kramer). Having earlier assumed the
the Russians after the surrender, the way assignment of containing these garrisons
home would be long and toilsome,3 from the 94th Division, the 66th was one
T h e last days of the war in Czechoslo- of only two U.S. divisions in the Euro-
vakia also brought appeals from Czech pean theater that failed to enter the
partisans and the Czech government-in- enemy’s country before hostilities
exile for Allied units to march to relief ended.5 T h e other, the 13th Airborne
of partisans in Prague. Although the Division, was the only division to see
partisans liberated their capital on 5 no combat.
May, German armor promptly converged Although General Eisenhower’s Su-
on the city. On the basis of the prior preme Headquarters, Allied Expedition-
Soviet request that Allied troops advance ary Force, continued to function until
no farther than the line Karlsbad-Pilsen- 14 July, the combat phase of World War
Ceské Budejovice, Eisenhower declined I I in Europe ended with the final Ger-
to send troops but passed the appeals on man capitulations. T h e campaign from
to the Russians.4 the D-day landings in Normandy on 6
Other than in Czechoslovakia, the sur- June through the surrenders had taken
render of German forces produced few just over eleven months.
problems except those of an adminis- In those eleven months Allied armies
trative and logistical nature. With assis- had driven some 475 to 700 miles from
tance from small U.S. units, British the beaches of Normandy and those of
forces undertook the surrender and evac- the Côte d’Azur to the Baltic, the Elbe,
uation of German troops from Denmark and into Czechoslovakia and Austria.
and Norway; the Canadians, those Ger- From the Dutch coast near the mouth of
mans in the Netherlands. A garrison that the Rhine to the Baltic near Luebeck,
held out on the French coast at Dun- thence south to the Brenner Pass and
kerque surrendered on g May to the westward to the Swiss frontier, the final
Czech Independent Armored Brigade Allied positions encompassed some goo
Group that had been containing them. miles. As of V–E Day General Eisen-
T h e British accepted surrender of Ger- hower had under his command more
man forces in the Channel Islands, also than four and a half million troops,
on 9 May, and the last Germans holding which included 91 divisions and sev-
out along the southwestern coast of eral independent brigades and cavalry
France capitulated to the French on the groups (61 of the divisions were Ameri-
same day. T h e garrisons of Lorient and can), 6 tactical air commands, and 2
St. Nazaire on the coast of Brittany sur- strategic air forces. At peak strength in
rendered on 10 May to troops of the
5 In one of the few instances of the sinking of a
loaded U.S. troopship during World War II, the
Diary, entries of 10 and 11 May 45; SHAEF SGS 66th Division had lost 800 men on Christmas Eve
322.01–1, Liaison with the Russians, passim; and 1944. when a German submarine sank the Belgian
Koyen, T h e Fourth Armored Division (first edi- ship Léopoldville in the English Channel. See Jac-
tion), p. 151. quin Sanders, A Night Before Christmas-The
3Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, ch. XXI. Sinking of the Troopship Léopoldville (New York:
4 See Pogue, T h e Supreme Command, pp. 504–05. MacFadden Books, 1964).
478 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
April, the Allies had 28,000 combat air- In many respects the last offensive had
craft, of which 14,845 were American, been a replay on a grander scale of the
including 5,559 heavy bombers and Allied victory in France. Following the
6,003 fighters. Between D-day and V–E difficult close-in fighting during the fall
Day, a total of 5,412,219 Allied troops of 1944 in the Netherlands, along the
had entered western Europe along with West Wall, and in Alsace and Lorraine,
970,044 vehicles and 18,292,310 tons of which could be likened to the early
supplies. 6 weeks in Normandy, the Germans had
Allied casualties from D-day to V–E counterattacked in the Ardennes as they
Day totaled 766,294. American losses had in Normandy at Mortain, and in the
were 586,628, including 135,576 dead. process so weakened themselves that
T h e British, Canadians, French, and great slashing Allied drives across their
other allies in the west lost approxi- homeland were as inevitable as had been
mately 60,000 dead.7 How many of the the swift Allied thrusts across France and
three million Germans that were killed Belgium. Nor was there anything new in
during the entire war died on the West- Hitler’s adamant refusal to authorize
ern Front is impossible to determine, but withdrawals; he had done the same in
exclusive of prisoners of war, all German France.
casualties in the west from D-day to V–E Being, in effect, a replay, the campaign
Day probably equaled or slightly ex- had produced little that was new in
ceeded Allied losses. More than two mil- American tactics, doctrine, or tech-
lion Germans were captured in the niques. T h e efficacy of the American
west.8 tank-infantry-artillery team, of methods
of air-ground co-operation, of the regi-
6SHAEF G–3 War Room Daily Sum, 11 May 45, mental combat team and combat com-
and AAF Statistical Digest, World War II, p. 156.
7 Department of the Army, Army Battle Casualties mand concepts, and of the “lean”
and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II: Final division with attachments provided as
Report, 7 December 1941–31 December 1946, and needed, the role of the tank as an anti-
SHAEF’s final cumulative casualty report in the
G–3 War Room Daily Summary, 29 May 1945. tank weapon, the general excellence of
8 T h e only specific figures available are from OB American arms and equipment, the
WEST for the period 2 June 1941–10 April 1945 as ability to motorize infantry divisions on
follows: Dead, 80,819; wounded, 265,526; missing,
490,624; total, 836,969. (Of the total, 4,548 casualties short notice—all these had been demon-
were incurred prior to D-day.) See Rpts, Der strated and proved long before. T h e
Heeresarzt i m Oberkommando des Heeres Gen S t campaign merely emphasized the general
d H / G e n Qu, Az.: 1335 c / d (IIb) Nr.: H.A./263/45
g . Kdos. of 14 Apr 45 and 1335 c / d ( I l b ) (no date, efficacy and professionalism of the Ameri-
but before 1945). T h e former is in OCMH X 313, can forces. T h e same shortcomings that
a photostat of a document contained in German had been evident before also were again
armament folder H 17/207; the latter in folder
0 K W / 1 5 6 1 (OKW Wehrniacht Verluste). These
figures are for the field army only, and d o not in- March, and the cut-off date precludes inclusion of
clude the Luftwaffe and Waffen-SS. Since the the losses in the Ruhr Pocket and in other stages
Germans seldom remained in control of the battle- of the fight in central Germany, SHAEF records
field in a position to verify the status of those list 2,057,138 Germans as “prisoners of war” and
missing, a considerable percentage of the missing another four million as “disarmed enemy person-
probably were killed. Time lag in reporting prob- nel,” the former presumably taken before formal
ably precludes these figures’ reflecting the heavy capitulation began, the latter afterward. SHAEF
losses during the Allied drive to the Rhine in G–3 War Room Daily Sum, 23 Jun 45.
EPILOGUE 479
the Ninth Army’s 2d Armored and 83d a disagreement that took place behind
Divisions to the Elbe. the scenes and did nothing to delay the
There were others to be regretted, advancing divisions. De Lattre’s digres-
particularly Patton’s ill-starred foray to sions at Stuttgart, Ulm, and St. Anton
Hammelburg, which was too ambitious took on in the end a character of nothing
for the force assigned and was unfortu- more serious than an opéru buffe. Pat-
nate regardless of whether Patton knew ton’s lamented detour to Hammelburg
his son-in-law was a captive there, T h e was painful and costly to the men
10thArmored Division was overextended involved but had little lasting effect on
at Crailsheim, even for the type of loose- the campaign.
reined warfare that was the order of the On the matters of major controversy
day. Given the nature of the opposition, with the British-Berlin and Prague-
it was unnecessary to go through with the the Supreme Commander could hardly
plan to employ airborne divisions in be faulted. On Berlin, there seemed
conjunction with Montgomery’s Rhine little point in driving deeper into ter-
crossing, since the risks and losses atten- ritory already allocated for Russian
dant on airborne operations hardly could occupation merely for the sake of
be justified under the circumstances. prestige, and since arrangements for
T h e last offensive was nevertheless a Allied access to Berlin during the oc-
brilliant exercise in controlling masses cupation had already been made at
of men and units and in co-ordinating governmental level, dashing to the
the air and all the ground arms-a capital would have had no effect on
demonstration of power never before them. As for Prague, the Supreme Com-
seen, even in the early German cam- mander might have relented on humani-
paigns of World War II or in the tarian grounds, but since the Western
offensives of the Red Army. It was, for Allies had no intention of staying long
all the crumbling nature of the opposi- in Czechoslovakia, the effect on postwar
tion, a logistical tour de force by the most developments could hardly have been
highly motorized and mechanized armies lasting.
the world had ever known. No part of T h e German attempt to stem the last
General Eisenhower’s vast force had to offensive was an exercise in futility.
pause at any point for purely logistical Once the Germans had failed in the
reasons, even while driving in slightly Ardennes, there could be no longer any
more than six weeks over such great doubt that they had lost the war. Had
distances as the 250 miles from the Roer Hitler acquiesced in an early withdrawal
to the Elbe. It was a campaign to be told behind the Rhine, as his field corn-
in superlatives. manders apparently urged, they might
Despite the presence of potentially have prolonged the end; but so empty
abrasive personalities in the Allied com- was the threat of miracle weapons, so
mand—Montgomery, de Lattre, Patton unlikely a démarche between the West-
—no serious interference with the con- ern Allies and the Soviet Union, that
duct of the campaign developed. Mont- prolongation would have been the sole
gomery’s insistence on keeping the result.
Ninth Army and driving on Berlin was T h e only basic matter to be decided
EPILOGUE 481
by the last offensive was not whether the forgiveness probably would have had
Germans would be reduced to total little effect on the outcome.
defeat, but when. Given the stranglehold As the last offensive came to an end,
and almost mystic fascination that Hitler few if any who fought in it could have
and his coterie exercised over the Ger- entertained any doubts as to the right of
man people and the incredible loyalty their cause-they had seen at Buchen-
of German military commanders to a wald, Belsen, Dachau, and at a dozen
regime that long had been discredited, other places, including little Ohrdruf,
perhaps it was inevitable that the end what awful tyranny man can practice on
would come only when the nation was his fellow man. T o erase those cruel
prostrate, almost every square inch of monuments to evil was reason enough
territory under the control of the victors. for it all, from bloody OMAHABeach to
In those circumstances, whether the in- that bridgehead to nowhere over the
vaders insisted on unconditional sur- Elbe.
render or came shouting mercy and
Appendix A
All who were awarded the Medal of Honor for individual actions during
operations described in this volume have been mentioned either in text or foot-
notes. Space limitations precluded similar mention of all who were awarded the
Distinguished Service Cross. T h e following list of recipients of the DSC is as
complete as possible in view of the fact that no single Army file listing DSC
awards was maintained. Ranks are as of the date of the action cited. (P) indi-
cates a posthumous award; * indicates DSC with Oak Leaf Cluster.
views conducted by teams of historical but microfilm copies are available in the
officers working under the European World War II Records Division. T h e
Theater Historical Section. In addition, German manuscripts, numbering more
there are narratives written by the field than two thousand, are filed in the
historians to accompany the interviews World War II Records Division and
and occasionally field notes and impor- have been adequately catalogued and
tant documents collected by the histor- indexed in Guide to Foreign Military
ical officers. T h e footnotes in this volume Studies 1945–54, published in 1954. T h e
should provide an adequate guide to the quality of the manuscripts varies, reflect-
available combat interview material, ing the fact that almost all are based only
which is housed in the historical reports on the memories of the writers, yet they
files in the World War II Records are invaluable in supplementing the
Division. official records, particularly for latter
stages of the war, when many records
Unit Histories were destroyed and many were sparse
and often inaccurate because of the fluid
Soon after the war, almost every divi- and usually retrograde nature of the
sion, some corps, and some regiments German operations.
published unofficial unit histories. Many
of these works are heavy on the side of Published Works
unit pride, but some are genuinely
useful. A brief analysis of each is usually Two previously published volumes in
included in this volume in the footnote the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN
where the work is first cited. In a special WORLD WAR II were of particular
class is Conquer: T h e Story of N i n t h value: Dr. Pogue's T h e Supreme Com-
Army (Washington: Infantry Journal mand and Roland G. Ruppenthal,
Press, 1945), a sober and valuable vol- Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol.
ume. II. In addition to those and unofficial
unit histories, published works of special
German Sources value in preparation of this volume are
as follows:
T h e account of German operations Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower and
has been based primarily on mono- Berlin, 1945–The Decision to Halt at
graphs prepared in OCMH by Mrs. the Elbe. New York: W. W. Norton and
Magna Bauer specifically to complement Co., 1967.
this volume and on a series of manu- Bradley, Omar N. A Soldier's Story.
scripts prepared after the war by former New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1951.
German commanders working under the Brereton, Lt. Gen. Lewis H. T h e
auspices of the U.S. Army. Mrs. Bauer’s Brereton Diaries. New York: William
monographs are based on these manu- Morrow and Co., 1946.
scripts and on official German records Bullock, Alan. Hitler: A Study in
captured or seized by the U.S. Army. Tyranny. New York: The Macmillan
Most of the comtemporary German Co., 1947.
records have been returned to Germany, Butcher, Capt. Harry C. M y Three
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 491
Rpt Report
S–2 Intelligence officer or section of regimental or lower
staff
S–3 Operations officer or section
SACMED Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
SCAF Designates cables from Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Expeditionary Force, to the Combined Chiefs of
Staff
SCR Set complete radio
Seamule 38-foot tug powered by two 143-hp. engines
Sec Section
SGS Secretary, General Staff
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
Sitrep Situation report
S-mine German antipersonnel mine
SS Schutzstaffel (Elite Guard)
Storm boat Metal ponton propelled by 50-hp. outboard motor
Sub Subject
Sum Summary
SUSA Seventh United States Army
T26 See M26.
TAC Tactical Air Command
Tagesstaerke Present for duty strength
TD Tank destroyer
Telecon Telephone conversation
T-forces Special forces designated to search for items of scien-
tific value
TM Technical manual
TOT Time on target, a method of timing artillery fire from
various points to fall on a given target simultane-
ously
Tree burst Explosion of shells against trees, designed to destroy
troops underneath
TUSA Third United States Army
TWX Teletypewriter exchange
USA United States Army
USAF United States Air Force
USAREUR United States Army, Europe
USNR United States Naval Reserve
V–2 German supersonic rocket
Volksdeutsche “Racial Germans” from border areas of adjacent coun-
tries
Volks Grenadier Honorific accorded by Hitler to certain infantry di-
visions
Volkssturm A people’s militia, partially organized in one of the
last steps of German mobilization for total war
VT Variable time (fuze)
Waffen-SS Military arm of the Nazi party
496 THE LAST OFFENSIVE
Military Units—Identification
*For complete listing of symbols in use during the World War II period. see
FM 21–30, dated October 1943, from which these are taken.
BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS 499
Size Symbols
T h e following symbols placed either in boundary lines or
above the rectangle, triangle, o r circle inclosing the identifying
a r m or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:
EXAMPLES
T h e letter or n u m b e r to the left of the symbol indicates the
unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent
unit to which it belongs. Letters or n u m b e r s above or below
boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:
Weapons
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II