KAS International Reports 02/2011

2|11 2|11
KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 2|11

INTERNATIONAL REPORTS SAARC – 25 Years of
Regional Integration in
South Asia
Tomislav Delinić
ASEAN and G20 –

Indonesia’s Foreign Policy
Perspectives
Winfried Weck
Immigration Country
Norway – Demographic
Trends and Political
Concepts
Norbert Beckmann-Dierkes /
Johann C. Fuhrmann
After the Presidential

Elections in Côte d’Ivoire –
Can the Political Crisis Be
Resolved by Diplomacy?
Klaus D. Loetzer / Anja Casper
People with Low Expecta-

tions are Seldom Disappoin-
ted – Climate Summit in
Cancún Did not Fail, but
Was it Successful Enough?
Frank Priess
Republic of Moldova at
the End of an Election
Marathon?
Holger Dix
KAS
INTER N A T I O N A L R E P O R T S
2|11
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Editor:
Dr. Gerhard Wahlers
Editorial Team:
Frank Spengler
Hans-Hartwig Blomeier
Dr. Stefan Friedrich
Dr. Hardy Ostry
Jens Paulus
Dr. Helmut Reifeld
Editor-in-chief:
Stefan Burgdörfer
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Content
4 | EDITORIAL
7 | SAARC – 25 YEARS OF REGIONAL

INTEGRATION IN SOUTH ASIA
Tomislav Delinić
22 | ASEAN AND G20 – INDONESIA’S

FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVES
Winfried Weck
36 | IMMIGRATION COUNTRY NORWAY –

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND POLITICAL
CONCEPTS
Norbert Beckmann-Dierkes /
Johann C. Fuhrmann
49 | AF TER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE – CAN THE POLITICAL
CRISIS STILL BE RESOLVED BY DIPLOMACY?
77 | PEOPLE WITH LOW EXPECTATIONS ARE

SELDOM DISAPPOINTED – CLIMATE SUMMIT
IN CANCÚN DID NOT FAIL, BUT WAS IT
SUCCESSFUL ENOUGH?
Frank Priess
93 | REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AT THE END OF AN

ELECTION MARATHON? A NEW VERSION OF
THE ALLIANCE FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION,
AND MORE UNCERTAINTY
Holger Dix
4 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 2|2011
Editorial
Dear Readers,
“Paradise in flames!” was one of the many, sometimes

rather inapt headlines to recent articles on the Jasmine
Revolution in Tunisia. Clearly the country was hardly a
paradise. Nevertheless, over the years Tunisia has taken
some positive steps in terms of development thanks
to its moderate, Europe-oriented policies. Even the civil
uprisings experienced by its larger neighbour Algeria in the
early nineties failed to shake the country’s position as the
Maghreb’s anchor. It has enjoyed solid economic growth
for years, its illiteracy levels are amongst the lowest on the
continent and equal status of men and women has been
implemented and guaranteed under law. These develop-
ments have been driven by a middle-class which is much
larger than that of many other countries in the region.
But at the end of the day this was not enough. The most-
repeated words during the demonstrations in Tunisia
were “dignity” and “freedom”. The lesson to be learned
from the events in Tunisia – and those in the rest of the
region – is that economic development and growth cannot
be separated in the long term from the safeguarding and
granting of human rights, especially political rights.
Mohammed Bouaziz, a Tunisian greengrocer, suffered

continual harassment at the hands of the security forces.
He felt that he had lost his personal freedom, and
eventually took the desperate step of setting himself on
fire. This was the beginning of the uprisings that have since
engulfed large parts of North Africa and the Middle East.
After Bouaziz’s death more and more people, disenchanted
with the economic and social situation, came together to
form a movement which only gradually took on political
overtones. This movement soon reached the capital Tunis,
driven mainly by young, college-educated Tunisians.
Their goals were initially very diverse and remain so to
some extent, but in order to disseminate their ideas and
2|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 5
organise protest rallies they used the internet, in particular

Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Their pressure forced
President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali to step down.
Just a few weeks earlier hardly anyone would have

predicted that stable Tunisia, with its well-developed
economic and social structures, would undergo this kind of
revolution. Events in the country have belied the conviction
held by many autocrats in the region, and shared by many
western political representatives, that first of all there
must be economic and social reform and then personal and
political rights will follow. This is a misapprehension, for
economic and political freedoms are mutually dependent.
Irrespective of their economic situation, Tunisia’s young
people, bound together by their internet networks, have
demonstrated that they are no longer prepared to accept
state repression at the hands of the police and security
forces.
What began in Tunisia is now spreading like wildfire across

the whole region. Promises of political reform are no
longer enough for the demonstrators in Algeria and Egypt,
Jordan and Yemen. Whatever differences there may be
between the countries and their political structures, first
and foremost the people are protesting against the ruling
establishment. “Go away” is written on the placards, a
sentiment directed at each and every autocratic leader.
These same placards are being waved in Egypt, where 82

year old Hosni Mubarak has been ruling the country for
three decades, more recently preparing his son, Gamal,
to take over the dynastic succession. Once again we see
that economic progress is proving to be no substitute
for democratic progress. Despite considerable economic
growth in recent years, the social chasm between rich and
poor has grown ever wider. Here too, young people with
few prospects in life are now connected with the world and
each other through the internet, and they no longer want
to wait for promises of change or political placebos.
The message from the people on the streets in the Maghreb

and the Mashreq is clear: we want to live with dignity. Of
course this includes attaining a certain level of prosperity
and social security, but it also involves personal freedom
and a say in political decision-making, both long-awaited
by the people of the region. There is no doubt that a rocky
road lies ahead. Many countries which sweep away their
governing parties go on to re-organise themselves totally
and rebuild their structures from scratch. Along with
establishing new constitutional bodies, first steps have to
be taken towards democracy. And decisions must be made
on how to deal with the Muslim Brotherhoods which are
an ever-present factor. In the midst of all the euphoria we
should not forget the fragility engendered by these times
of change – a slide into chaos and anarchy is still a serious
possibility.
The countries of the region are facing tremendous

challenges. It falls to political foundations to play their
part in the social and political change process. The Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung is aware of its responsibilities in this
respect and sees this as one of its key areas of focus over
the coming years.
Dr. Gerhard Wahlers

Deputy Secretary-General
SAARC – 25 Years of Regional

Integration in South Asia
Tomislav Delinić
Even well-informed political observers have to admit

that hardly anyone would cite SAARC, the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation, as a role model for
regional cooperation when examining different forms of
political or economic regional integration. Such a discussion
would first of all focus on the European Union, ASEAN in
South East Asia and Mercosur or NAFTA in the Americas.
SAARC is overshadowed by these organisations and some Tomislav Delinić is
observers may have never even heard of it. But although Head of the Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung’s
this regional association is of many years’ standing, having SAARC Regional
existed at least as long as Mercosur and NAFTA, can it be Project in New Delhi,
deemed to be equally successful? In the eyes of the world India.
it has enjoyed comparatively few real successes since it

was founded in 1985. The Charter signed by the founders
of SAARC (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka) promises much and bears many
similarities to the founding charters of the other regional
associations mentioned above. But even regional observers
criticise SAARC for having good intentions but achieving
few practical results. Since it was established, there have
been scores of meetings – unlike the other organisations,
held mostly at top government level – and a host of agree-
ments have been signed. But analysts believe there has
been a shortage of concrete successes leading to closer
cooperation between the member countries.
Afghanistan, one of South Asia’s main regional headaches,

has been a member of SAARC since 2007. The other
member countries point to Afghanistan as one example
of how South Asia might be able to take on responsibility
for itself. The last summit meeting of SAARC government
heads was peppered with wake-up calls and declarations
of intent designed to show that SAARC had not given up
on itself.1 The media’s take on the situation is that “It’s

time to walk the talk”, and they expect the regions two
biggest players, India and Pakistan, to step up to the plate.
The smouldering conflict between the two regional nuclear
powers hangs like the Sword of Damocles over South Asia’s
efforts to promote stability in the region and to bring its
players closer together. More cooperation and agreement is
needed if the successes of other regional alliances around
the world are to be emulated.
Any assessment of SAARC’s develop- However, it is not appropriate to measure

ment needs to take into account the SAARC’s development solely by the usual
difficult starting position, the regional
situation and the complicated back- criteria. Any assessment needs to take
drop to the organisation’s formation. into account the difficult starting position,
the regional situation and the complicated
backdrop to the organisation’s formation. Only then
can the agreements be viewed not just as an immense
symbolic success for a crisis-ridden region but also as a
strong cornerstone for the challenges to come. So how
does SAARC work, what difficulties did and do its member
countries still face, does SAARC have a future and what
opportunities will result from further regional cooperation?
An Alliance of Contrasts and Commonalities
South Asia’s constellation is certainly not a simple one.

India, Pakistan and the other raft of SAARC member states
comprising Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, the
Maldives and Sri Lanka are worlds apart on questions
of population, territory, military power, technological
development, infrastructure and political influence. These
countries are either in actual fact small nations or they
are wrongly perceived as such by the rest of the world.
Bangladesh, with a population of 160 million, is one of the
biggest countries in the world, and even Nepal’s population
of almost 29 million is larger than that of most EU member
states.2 The SAARC region, with its almost 1.5 billion
1 | Cf. Dipu Moni, “Saarc now deliberates more on action,” The

Daily Star, May 27, 2010, in: http://thedailystar.net/new
Design/news-details.php?nid=140263 (accessed December
14, 2010).
2 | Cf. Fischer-Weltalmanach, “Nepal”, http://www.weltalmanach.de/
staat/staat_detail.php?staat=nepal and “Bangladesch”,
http://www.weltalmanach.de/staat/staat_detail.php?fwa_
id=banglade (both accessed December 13, 2010).
inhabitants, makes up a considerable proportion of the

world’s population, and in any case its position on the
border with China places it at the heart of a vibrant world
region.3
India is the dominant player, due to its territorial size, large

population, the current rapid pace of economic growth, its
position as a nuclear power and its recent appointment
as a non-permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council. In this way, the country’s remarkable
growth could act as an anchor for the whole region and
make a positive contribution to its development. This is
certainly much-needed, as despite India’s impressive
success, South Asia as a whole is plagued by extreme
poverty, mega-urbanisation, immense disparities between
rich and poor and fundamental problems in the areas of
infrastructure, energy and the environment. On top of this
there are also high levels of internal conflicts and political
instability within the region.
But outside of these problems, the SAARC member states

have things which bind them. South Asia has a long and
closely-interwoven history. Its individual countries are
actually closer to each other in terms of culture, ethnicity
and religion than might be suspected in light of the
political developments of recent years. Almost the entire
region was also part of the British Empire. There are
often cross-border similarities in traditions,
languages and customs. Could these form The South Asian countries are united
a basis for a common South Asian identity? by the fact that today all SAARC coun-
tries are being run according to basic
The countries of the region are also united democratic principles.
by the fact that today, after years of turmoil,
internal disputes, military conflicts and political upheaval,
all SAARC countries are being run according to democratic
principles. This could be an important step on the path to
closer regional cooperation.4
3 | Cf. ibid., “SAARC: 14. Gipfeltreffen in Neu-Delhi,”

http://www.weltalmanach.de/suche/suche.php?search=saarc
(accessed December 13, 2010).
4 | In their inaugural addresses at the 16th SAARC summit in
Thimphu/Bhutan, the heads of the member states stressed
the region’s democratic progress, cf. http://saarc-sec.org/
Sixteenth-SAARC-Summit/75 (accessed December 17, 2010).
India – the Region’s Heavyweight
On closer inspection, India’s position of prominence is

shown to be one of the many hurdles standing in the way
of South Asia’s integration. Its neighbours often view India
as both a saviour and as part of the problem. In terms of its
geographical size, its demographic and economic potential
and its political weight, the country towers
India fears that its neighbours will join above the other countries in the region. Other
together to oppose the country’s inte- regional alliances have not had to deal with
rests, particularly in light of the role of
Pakistan and China. such a constellation, or only in a more limited
way. Even Indonesia’s prominent position in
ASEAN is much less of an issue. In turn, India fears that
its neighbours will join together to oppose the country’s
interests, particularly in light of the role of Pakistan and
China’s involvement in the region.
There is also another factor which puts India more and more
in the spotlight – India borders every other SAARC country,
but the other SAARC states do not share any mutual borders
except with India. Afghanistan and Pakistan are exceptions
in that they either border India or only have geographical
access to the other SAARC members through India.
So even in terms of geography, it is almost impossible to get

past India. Particularly the smaller member states such as
Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh have felt the effects of this
for a long time, as their borders are separated from each
other by just a few kilometres of Indian corridor. Without
the cooperation of both sides, and particularly without the
cooperation of India, there has been no possibility of trade,
border crossings, energy agreements or other initiatives.
In practice, these kinds of complications have often meant
exchanges between SAARC countries grinding to a halt.
The political restraint displayed by all the member countries

towards their neighbours is a logical consequence of not
only this constellation, but also of the centuries-long
upheavals in South Asia, particularly the many conflicts
which have broken out since the subcontinent was parti-
tioned in 1947. And the after-effects of three wars between
India and Pakistan and numerous regional and domestic
conflicts, civil wars and political upheavals within the
countries of the region can still be felt.
A more positive evaluation of SAARC can, therefore, be

achieved by assessing South Asia’s relative efforts at
cooperation rather than by enumerating the concrete steps
taken towards integration. SAARC was formed despite the
many obstacles put in its path and the strong nationalist
forces which were expressly set in motion to counter the
idea of increased cooperation on a regional level. And this
happened in the middle of the 1980s, a time
which was characterized by antagonism and The special relationships between India
antipathy between the SAARC countries. The and the Soviet Union and between
Pakistan and the USA are examples of
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the special the difficult circumstances surrounding
relationship between India and the Soviet any increased South Asian cooperation.
Union after the signing of the Friendship
Treaty, and the parallel “special” relationship between
Pakistan and the USA are just a few examples of the
difficult circumstances surrounding any increased South
Asian cooperation in the run-up to SAARC’s creation.
How SAARC Was Established
An initiative by Bangladesh led to seven parties signing

the SAARC Charter on 8th December 1985, following on
from a series of co-ordinating meetings. The tensions in
the region were clearly mirrored in the final document,
which categorically excludes controversial bilateral issues
from the SAARC remit and stipulates that all decisions
must be unanimous. Still today many commentators view
these sections as a reason why SAARC in practice has
often not been able to act in the face of disputes between
the region’s two major players, India and Pakistan. If
bilateral issues had been included in the Charter, this could
possibly have been used as a means for the smaller SAARC
nations to act as a mediator between India and Pakistan.5
As a result, the South Asian association focused its initial
activities on areas such as agriculture, health, the fight
against poverty and for food security, in many cases with
quite considerable success. A number of committees were
set up to tackle the problems they had jointly identified.
The structure created by the SAARC Charter formed a

solid and strongly-institutionalized base for the alliance.
Four levels of decision-making were established, with
5 | Cf. Partha S. Ghosh, SAARC: Institutionalization and Regional

Political Processes, (New Delhi, 2009), 4 et seq.
implementation then taking place at the lower levels. The

highest level comprises summit meetings of the Heads of
State and Prime Ministers. The SAARC Charter stipulates
that the highest representatives of the member states
should meet at least once a year to discuss and make
decisions on current issues. These meetings rotate around
the member countries, with the 2010 summit having
been held in Bhutan and the 2011 summit heading to
the Maldives. Many commentators criticized the summits
as being more of a PR exercise, and indeed they have
so far resulted in rather few concrete actions. But on
the other hand these meetings can be seen as one of
SAARC’s greatest successes – whereas most of the world’s
associations for cooperation work mainly at committee
level, SAARC regularly gathers together all the leaders
of its member states, with the notable inclusion of India
and Pakistan. Searching the internet using the key word
‘SAARC’ turns up results which almost exclusively refer
to high-level meetings between the two neighbours. After
the Mumbai attacks in 2008, high-level representatives
of India and Pakistan met for the first time at the 2009
SAARC Congress in Colombo. SAARC summits have often
provided a framework for the two sides to hold discussions
and resolve disputes – something which is important for
the alliance and for the whole region.
Already in the more-distant past SAARC summits have

often provided a platform for bilateral discussions, even
if these talks often tended to take place out
The discussion of bilateral disputes has of the public gaze behind closed doors. The
in fact turned out to be one of SAARC’s important thing was that these meetings
greatest successes. Regular meetings
within the framework of the association took place at all. It is ironic that the one
have brought about this significant side- thing which the Charter clearly outlawed –
effect.
the discussion of bilateral disputes – has in
fact turned out to be one of SAARC’s greatest successes.
The issues are not tackled by SAARC itself, but the regular
meetings between the member states political leaders
within the framework of the association have brought
about this significant side-effect.6
6 | It should however be noted that some SAARC summits were

cancelled because of the refusal of some participants to sit
down together.
SAARC as a Platform for

South Asian Development
This strength pervades the other levels. Even though

SAARC’s critics accuse it of achieving little in the way of
tangible results, it cannot be denied that the member
states involvement in a tight network of committees,
boards and organisations has proven to be one of the
association’s major strong points. In view of the difficult
circumstances which reigned at the time of the associa-
tion’s establishment, it is a significant step forward that the
region’s players will at least sit down together and enter
into discussions.
Alongside the summits, the Council of Ministers provides

another level for political action. Ministers from various
departments meet several times a year in order to draw
up political plans, assess the effects of previous actions,
identify new areas for cooperation and if necessary decide
upon new methods and mechanisms.7 These meetings were
originally intended for the countries’ foreign ministers, but
other ministries are increasingly being included. So, for
instance, in summer 2010 the SAARC interior ministers
gathered to discuss the establishment of an Interpol-type
police structure to tackle cross-border terrorist networks,
human trafficking, drug trafficking and smuggling within
the region.8
Resolutions passed at the summits and by the Council

of Ministers are then administered and implemented by
“Standing Committees” (consisting of high-level repre-
sentatives of the relevant ministry), the “SAARC Secre-
tariat”, “Technical Committees” and their offshoot, “Action
Committees”. Meetings are scheduled at regular intervals,
as required. Another of SAARC’s strengths is the fact
that decision-makers and specialists from the individual
countries come together regularly in these committees
in order to discuss their problems, ideas and possible
solutions – at least in theory.
7 | Cf. Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional

Cooperation (Dhaka, 1985), Article IV, 2.
8 | Diplomatic Correspondent, “SAARC police proposed,” The
Daily Star, June 27, 2010, in: http://www.thedailystar.net/
newDesign/news-details.php?nid=144341 (accessed
December 15, 2010).
There is one major criticism of SAARC which should not be

ignored. Within a very short time-span, a plethora of insti-
tutions, initiatives, bodies and committees have sprung
up within the organisation, with different remits ranging
from biotechnology and forestry to coastal
Outside observers, including not only management and meteorological cooper-
the citizens of South Asia who are trying ation. There is no doubt that close consul-
to identify with SAARC, are finding it in-
creasingly difficult to get a handle on tation between partner countries cannot hurt.
the alliance’s huge range of activities. But the phrase “less is more” would seem to
apply here. Outside observers, including not
only the citizens of South Asia who are trying to identify
with SAARC, but also the region’s well-informed politicians,
are finding it increasingly difficult to get a handle on the
alliance’s wide range of activities.9 The fact that the SAARC
summit host country sets the agenda for the conference
has just intensified this explosion of issues tackled by the
regional association and the plethora of largely institution-
alized actions taken.
The members could have benefited from concentrating

their resources and energies on the region’s economic
integration. But the SAARC countries have long shied
away from internal trade liberalisation as long as other
regional alliances have made this their focus and achieved
significant results in just a short time.10 The region’s
political framework did not initially allow for this kind of
cooperation.
From SAPTA to SAFTA –

En Route to a Free Trade Zone?
However, the members of SAARC gradually felt their way

towards putting the issue of economic cooperation on
the association’s agenda. The SAARC Preferential Trading
Arrangement (SAPTA) was signed in 1993 and entered into
force in 1995 with a view to paving the way for increased
economic integration in the region, as trade between
member states was practically non-existent, apart from
a tiny amount of foreign trade. Alongside the agreement
to increase cooperation in the area of customs tariffs and
9 | Cf. Nischal Pandey, Regional Cooperation in South Asia:

A Nepalese Perspective (Kathmandu, 2005), 4.
10 | Cf. Muchkund Dubey, “Looking Ahead”, in: Dipankar Banerjee
and N. Manoharan (eds.), SAARC Towards Greater Connectivity
(New Delhi: Anshah, 2008), 242.
duties, SAPTA established the important goal of providing

more support for the least developed member states.11
Although four rounds of trade liberalisation negotiations
were concluded under SAPTA, the agreement had little real
effect on increasing trade between SAARC nations. But
SAPTA was successful in one respect: the agreement ope-
ned the doors to future progress. SAPTA helped to focus
the alliance’s political leaders on the need for greater
economic cooperation in order to achieve real economic
integration.
Following on from this, SAFTA, the South By signing the SAFTA agreement the
Asian Free Trade Area agreement, was signed governments committed to follow a
concrete road map towards facilitating
at the 2004 Summit of Foreign Ministers in the cross-border movement of goods.
Islamabad and entered into force on January
1, 2006. By signing this agreement, the governments of
the member nations committed to follow a concrete road
map towards facilitating the cross-border movement of
goods (with the perspective to abolish all customs duties
by 2015), to harmonising product testing procedures (still
a major barrier to trading between the SAARC countries)
and to increased cooperation on the question of cross-
border transport infrastructures. The issue of support for
the least developed member states, a question which had
already been tackled within SAPTA, was also brought into
the SAFTA agreement: Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives
and Nepal were awarded special conditions and conces-
sions in meeting the deadlines set out by SAFTA.
So what has been achieved after four years of this free

trade agreement? Many critics say “not much”. The
agreement might have produced better results if it had set
tighter deadlines, created a fund for the less developed
member nations, drawn up a concrete plan for abolishing
the non-tariff trade barriers which were such a stumbling
block to trade and initiated a clearly-defined cooperation
on infrastructure projects.12 But as it was, any real results
for intra-SAARC trade remained limited. Trade between
the majority of SAARC nations is still negligible,13 and the
11 | Cf. Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Agreement

(SAPTA), (Dhaka, 1993), 5.
12 | Cf. Dubey, n. 10, 244 et seq.
13 | India is again an exception, having directly or indirectly the
largest share in the balance of trade of most SAARC nations.
More details: “Making SAFTA more effective” (New Delhi, 2010).
day-to-day operations of businesses in South Asia are still

hampered by non-tariff barriers, transport problems and
visa complications. It is hardly surprising that many local
businesspeople prefer to engage in projects
Foreign companies shy away from in- with South East Asia, China, America and
vesting in South Asia, even in India, Europe rather than in investments and trade
because of the many hurdles they have
to face. This has a detrimental effect on with their neighbours. The reverse is also
the whole region. true – Indian businesses are often keen to
take advantage of the excellent opportunities for importers
within the European single market, but foreign companies
shy away from investing in South Asia, even in India,
because of the many hurdles they have to face. This has a
detrimental effect on the entire region.
Liberalisation, Cooperation and

a Look Towards the East
There is great potential for increased cooperation and

liberalisation within the countries of South Asia. But there
is a need to better understand the benefits of a free single
market. Even the smaller countries have in the past been
reticent on the question of abolishing duties, as this revenue
has always made up a significant, even substantial, part
of their income. They are also afraid that their domestic
markets will be flooded with Indian goods, resulting in
the collapse of their local manufacturing industries. Other
regional organisations have shown that a single market
may have this effect, but it is by no means inevitable.
The example of Europe shows us how the principle of
investment in structurally-weaker member states in the
end brings benefits for all parties involved.
The crucial factor in all this is that the trading partners

feel they can trust each other’s words and actions. There
seems to have been a resurgence of this trust, at least
among some South Asian countries. In the last few months
India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan have moved closer
on the issue of transit regulations for goods and passenger
transportation and on the use of deep-sea ports. This is
a remarkable and significant step which has been a long
time in the making.14 Although trucks and containers still
14 | Cf. Dipu Moni, “Transit to benefit four countries,” The Daily

Star, August 9, 2010, in: http://www.thedailystar.net/new
Design/news-details.php?nid=150000 (accessed December
15, 2010).
have to be fully unloaded and reloaded at borders, causing

considerable expense and even financial losses due to
the time required, in future cross-border trade could be
speeded up significantly.
A major catalyst for this new rapprochement can also

be found in the policies of India and its Prime Minister,
Manmohan Singh, who has spoken of the Indian willingness
to take on more asymmetric responsibility within SAARC.15
This is an important signal for the region after SAARC has
been through a further weak phase in which the many
bilateral agreements between individual member states
seem to render the regional association increasingly
obsolete.
The “Look East” strategy of some South Asian With its economic dynamism and glo-
nations could also be viewed as competition bal recognition, ASEAN exerts a strong
pull on the countries of South Asia,
for SAARC. With its economic dynamics and especially India. But there is a crucial
global recognition, ASEAN in particular exerts difference between ASEAN and SAARC.
a strong pull on the countries of South Asia,
especially India.16 But trying to compare ASEAN’s success
with SAARC’s development is a little like trying to compare
apples and oranges. Along with the previously-mentioned
problems inherent in the closer and faster integration of
South Asia, there is a crucial difference between these
two organisations. The example of ASEAN highlights the
importance of a clear political commitment to economic
cooperation and eventual liberalisation and the need to
take consistent steps in this direction. For the reasons
previously discussed, SAARC was not able to achieve this in
its early stages and later on also missed its opportunity. As
a result South Asia is increasingly feeling its way towards
the East, trying to build contacts with adjoining countries.
“Sub-regional integration” is the key phrase which lies

behind the formation of organizations such as BIMST-EC
in 1997. In the framework of this “Bay of Bengal Initiative
for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation”,
15 | Cf. Nihal Rodrigo, “SAARC in Perspective,” in: Dipankar

Banerjee and N. Manoharan (eds.), SAARC Towards Greater
Connectivity (New Delhi: Anshah, 2008), 6.
16 | More on India-ASEAN relations at IPCS Special Report, № 72,
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, May 2009, in:
http://ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR72-Final.pdf (accessed
January 10, 2011).
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand, joined later

by Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan, set similar goals to those
of the SAARC Charter. Its aims are political and economic
cooperation. Observers see great potential in the BIMST-EC
project, if only because, unlike SAARC, the organisation
includes Thailand and Myanmar but does not include the
crisis-ridden countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan.17
So do these sub-regional integration initiatives really

constitute serious competition for SAARC? Regional inte-
gration always hits a barrier when the question of common
identity is raised. Do the BIMST-EC countries actually have
anything in common other than their interest in economic
development, profit and prosperity? In contrast with SAARC
and the deeply-rooted sense of history of South Asia, the
answer has to be a resounding no.
External Interest in SAARC is Growing
The trend towards deeper bilateral agreements and the

desire to join other multilateral organisations is paradoxi-
cally taking place at a time when interest in SAARC in Asia,
but also world-wide, is growing. Since 2005 Australia,
China, the European Union, Iran, Japan, South-Korea,
Mauritius, Myanmar and the USA have all been granted
observer status.18 This allows them to take part in the
inaugural and closing sessions of summits and the oppor-
tunity to make proposals on the development of SAARC
and show its own interests for possible future
Observers recently sent representati- cooperation. The observers recently sent
ves to the SAARC summits, and even (often high-ranking) representatives to the
China is showing increased interest in
membership of a South Asian regional SAARC summits, and even China is showing
association. increased interest in membership of a South
Asian regional association. However, Nepal’s proposal in
early 2010 to convert China’s observer status into full
membership was vetoed by India. Some commentators
from the smaller SAARC nations see China’s membership
as a possible way of balancing out India’s strength within
17 | Cf. Yogendra Singh, “BIMSTEC: Need to Move beyond the

Linkage Syndrome,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies,
December 15, 2008, in: http://ipcs.org/article/southeast-
asia/bimstec-need-to-move-beyond-the-linkage-syndrome-
2753.html (accessed December 15, 2010).
18 | Cf. SAARC Secretariat, http://saarc-sec.org/Cooperation-with-
Observers/13 (accessed December 15, 2010).
SAARC,19 and also view China’s massive growth as a

possible way of giving impetus to the economic integration
process. What is more, many people feel the sheer size of
such an alliance would raise its credibility in the eyes of
the world.
But this is not likely to happen in the near future. SAARC

will have to rely on its present configuration to resolve the
existing challenges and questions of the imbalance between
India and its other members, the disputes between India
and Pakistan and its stuttering progress towards economic
integration. But the increased external interest in SAARC
should be a pointer for South Asia to realise that the bodies
created have more potential than the member states think
themselves. Or do Europe, the USA, China and the other
observers see more in SAARC than there really is?
A Need to Focus on Core Issues
So what is in store for SAARC? In South Asia there are

currently three different opinions on SAARC: the project
will be given up due to indifference or ignorance; it is a
failure; or it is a good idea with great potential but also
with a lot of problems. Hardly anyone would
claim that SAARC is going well in every Despite extremely difficult political cir-
respect, and it’s true that tangible results are cumstances, SAARC has managed to
create situations, institutions and fo-
few and far between. But there have been rums where Heads of State shake each
successes: over the last 25 years, despite others’ hands.
extremely difficult political circumstances,
SAARC has managed to create situations, institutions and
forums where Heads of State have had to shake each
others’ hands and go into talks together. SAARC has tackled
important topics for the region such as a social charter,
development agreements and even the sensitive subject
of fighting terrorism and has achieved some good results.
The food and development banks are important steps in
the right direction. Exchanges in the areas of civil society
and science have become one of the pillars of South Asian
integration efforts.
19 | Comments made to the author during the conference “Nepal’s

Foreign Policy: The Way ahead” on November 22, 2010 in
Kathmandu.
One thing is true of all this: SAARC should not lose its
direction by getting involved in too many areas at once.
Political signals and the political will for clear progress
towards economic integration are what will tip the scales
in favour of successful regional cooperation in South Asia.
Activities in hundreds of other areas cannot compensate
for failure in the question of economic liberalisation.
All the SAARC countries are showing In some respects SAARC’s prospects have
positive economic developments. The never looked better. For the first time in
potential for foreign investors is huge,
and South Asian integration is also its history, the governments of its member
coming to the forefront on a political states are being run on democratic principles.
level.
All the SAARC countries are showing positive
economic developments. And international interest in
South Asia has never been stronger: the potential for
foreign investors is immense, and South Asian integration
is also coming to the forefront on a political level. The
regional players should focus on these developments and
not trip themselves up by making independent bilateral
agreements. But there will not be a closer integration
without achieving more stability in the region, beginning
with Afghanistan and progressing to the domestic conflicts
which plague almost all of South Asia’s young democ-
racies. India should take a particular interest in this – if
the regional heavyweight wants to progress further on the
path to growth it needs to make sure there is stability and
peace in its own back yard. Its smaller neighbours also
offer interesting potential in the area of energy production
and resources. For India, a country which currently has
negligible levels of trade with other South Asian nations,
the region offers immense potential for growth. It would
not be a case of reinventing the wheel if India were to
invest heavily in its neighbours in order to develop strong
consumer markets, for the European Union has already
shown that this can work successfully.
However, the European project would have never succeeded

without trust and respect for the perceptions of its partners,
especially the smaller ones. As South Asia’s major player,
India needs to prove that it is the driving force behind
integration and act to push forward the development of
the whole region, if it is really serious about forging closer
ties. The difficult starting position should not be used as an
excuse, for if we look at Europe’s situation after the Second
World War and even during the 1950s, it did not exactly
inspire any more confidence than the position of South
Asia in the 21st century. Yet the European project has been
successful – for large and small members alike – thanks
to its strong convictions and the development of measures
designed to build trust.
In this respect SAARC has a long road ahead. The obvious

problems have to be addressed, while at the same time its
successes should be celebrated. The opportunity is there
to build a successful common future – now it is a matter
of grasping it.
Article current as at December 17, 2010.

ASEAN and G20 –

Indonesia’s Foreign
Policy Perspectives
Winfried Weck
Winfried Weck is Repre-
sentative of the Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung for
Indonesia and East
Indonesia’s acceptance into the G20 has opened up new
Timor.
avenues for the country’s participation in international
processes and development. Indonesia is also taking over
the presidency of ASEAN this year. After President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono was able to make his voice heard at
the 2009 G20 Summits in London and Pittsburgh with a
number of interesting initiatives, including the reform of
international financial institutions, Indonesia is now keen
to position itself as a mouthpiece for ASEAN countries
and as a representative of developing nations within the
G20. The country has made the headlines recently as host
to a number of high profile events, including the 2008
Climate Change Conference in Bali, aimed at updating the
Kyoto Protocol, and the 2009 World Ocean Conference in
Menado/Sulawesi 2009, and will continue in this vein with
the organisation of the 2013 APEC Summit. For this reason
Indonesia has already taken over the 2011 ASEAN Chair-
manship and will host the annual summit in autumn 2011.1
So what are now the priorities for Indonesian foreign policy?

Should the country concentrate on ASEAN, which adopted
its charter2 in 2008 and which from 2015 will take a first
decisive step towards becoming a community of states? Or
is concentrating on cooperation with the powerful G20 a
better alternative to focusing on the somewhat indecisive
ASEAN? Will Indonesia’s foreign policy be appreciated by
1 | Indonesia was actually meant to take over the ASEAN presi-

dency in 2013 but requested the presidency in 2011 at the
Summit in Hanoi in April 2010 in order to be able to better
prepare for the APEC Summit.
2 | In 2008 Indonesia ratified the charter as the last member
country to do so.
its own people and, if so, how? Isn’t the strong sense of
national identity, not only amongst Indonesians, but also
amongst nearly all the other peoples who come under the
umbrella of ASEAN, fundamentally at odds with integration
policies along European lines? What does Indonesia actually
get out of its regional cooperation in ASEAN? These are
the kinds of questions that are dominating foreign policy
debates in Indonesia, not only amongst experts, but also
amongst all levels of the population as a whole.
ASEAN – The Rocky Road from a Club for

Autocrats to an Effective Community of States
To understand Indonesia’s political stance towards ASEAN,

as well as that of all the other member countries, it is
necessary to take ASEAN internal sensitivities into conside
ration. All too often ASEAN is compared to the European
Union in an international context and it is not
unusual for these comparisons to emanate The objectives behind the founding
from the EU or ASEAN themselves. However, of ASEAN are in no way comparable
with those of the process of European
the objectives behind the founding of ASEAN unification.
are in no way comparable with those of the
process of European unification. The idea of creating peace
and prosperity through integration and shared sovereignty
have until recently never been a subject for discussion
within the ASEAN political framework.
ASEAN was founded on August 8, 1967 by Indonesia,

Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. The aim
of these relatively young countries was to create a loose
network, without a legal basis under international law, to
promote economic cooperation, to avoid conflicts between
member states and to develop strategies against possible
threats from outside. From the very beginning ASEAN
played a central role in Indonesia’s foreign policy under
the then still young President Suharto, who was anxious
to clearly distance himself from the anti-West rhetoric and
policies of his predecessor Sukarno. So in addition to the
Vietnam War, the fact that ASEAN tended towards anti-
communism from the very beginning and saw itself as a
protection organisation for its member countries against
the People’s Republic of China, is down to the influence of
Indonesia.3 And yet for the original ASEAN members it

amounted to little more than an informal “cozy club of
authoritarian regimes”4, for whom conflict resolution was
less important than avoiding conflict amongst themselves
in the first place. This can be seen in the fact that the first
ASEAN summit in Bali in February 1976 only took place
nine years after its formation5 and in the following 27 years
only 8 further summits were organised. Even the arrival of
new members such as Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995,
Myanmar and Laos in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999 did not
lead to any significant change in ASEAN’s self-image.
This type of non-binding cooperation was not some kind of

compromise, but was something that all the participating
governments were specifically striving for.
Indonesia was particularly wary of Jakarta for instance was constantly afraid of
even the smallest efforts to create a having to enter into any agreement within the
common market. Even today there is
the fear that the home market could be framework of ASEAN with the aim of forming
flooded with cheaper imported goods. some kind of permanent structure or which
might have been considered to be a measure
designed to promote integration. Indonesia was particu-
larly wary of even the smallest efforts to create a common
market. Even today there is the fear that the home market
could be flooded with cheaper imported goods from other
highly competitive ASEAN member states.6
However much Indonesia’s role in ASEAN has always

restricted and slowed the possible better utilization of
their common economic potential, Indonesia still considers
ASEAN as a means to create a regional political identity.
After various attempts at creating some kind of foreign
and security policy integration in Southeast Asia had
3 | Cf. Preamble of the Bangkok Declaration: “…the countries

share a primary responsibility to ensure (…) their stability
and security from external interference in any form or from
propaganda (…).”
4 | Foreign policy expert Dewi Fortuna Anwar of the Indonesian
Institute of Science LIPI at a KAS conference in Bandung in
February 2010.
5 | At the Bali Summit in 1976 the position of ASEAN General
Secretary was also created.
6 | This is equally true of the free-trade zone ACFTA (ASEAN-
China Free Trade Agreement) created at the beginning of
2010. In April 2010 Indonesia tried to negotiate the removal
of customs duty on a total of 228 of their domestic products
(incl. shoes, textile goods but also popcorn), but to no avail.
failed7, ASEAN created the Southeast Asian Zone for

Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, at the
height of the Vietnam War, with Indonesia as the driving
force. Indonesia’s overwhelming desire to see a zone of
neutrality within the region was the result of a number
of inter-related factors. The most important reason was
that Indonesia had been created from a former Dutch
colony and so had no links to those classic colonial powers
Great Britain and France, unlike the whole
of the Southeast Asian mainland, with the Since its formation, territorial integrity
exception of Thailand. Since its formation, has been a fundamental hallmark of the
nation’s self-identity and the highest
territorial integrity has been a fundamental national goal of Indonesia.
hallmark of the nation’s self-identity and the
highest national goal of the Indonesian Republic. Political
leaders in Indonesia have always considered the country’s
political independence as the most important way of
protecting this integrity.8 For this reason they were always
very careful about not allowing themselves to come under
the influence of the Soviet Union or the USA.9 Added to
this was the fear of an all-too-powerful People’s Republic
of China, which had developed into a regional power after
the Cultural Revolution.
However, in the first 20 years ZOPFAN lacked a common

political strategy. Some of the member states like the
Philippines and Singapore had too many links to the super-
powers so that for them independence along Indonesian
lines was out of the question. The compromises within the
1971 ZOPFAN Declaration in Kuala Lumpur showed that
the aim of ZOPFAN was to turn the region as a whole into
a zone of neutrality rather than each individual country.
7 | The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) military

alliance, created in 1954 on the initiative of the USA along
the lines of NATO was dissolved in 1977. Four years earlier
the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), formed in 1966, a
union of Southeast Asian states, Australia and New Zealand,
suffered a similar fate.
8 | It was no coincidence that the 1955 conference aimed at the
founding of non-aligned states took place in Bandung (Island
of Java, Indonesia).
9 | The country’s founder Sukarno moved too far down the
socialist path, leading to a coup and the takeover of power
by Suharto. Even today terms like communist, socialist and
even social are seen in an extremely negative light by a large
part of Indonesia’s population.
It was only with the end of the Cold War and the hope
of a new world order at the beginning of the 1990s that
the somewhat sleepy ASEAN started to show more signs
of life. However, this newly discernable dynamism within
ASEAN is in no way proactively driven but is almost entirely
reactive. Even the “shot in the arm” afforded by its new
members Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia did not
lead to any fundamental change in its traditionally passive
behaviour and especially not that of Indonesia. It took the
massive economic and financial crisis of 1997 to make
them wake up to the realisation that they needed closer
economic cooperation and to accelerate the formation of
the AFTA free-trade zone, for which 15 years had originally
been scheduled.10
The truly historic and decisive moment for the future

development of ASEAN came at the 13th ASEAN summit
in Singapore in November 2007. There the member states
signed a charter that had been two years in the making
and which gave ASEAN a legally binding status for the
first time and so made it subject to international law.11
The Charter came into effect on December 15, 2008
after Indonesia had ratified it as the last ASEAN member
country to do so on October 21, 2008. It created the legal
basis for a community of states promoting cooperation
on security, economic and socio-cultural
The Charter has a high symbolic value in issues12, to be established by the year 2015.
terms of reflecting ASEAN’s new found This community is committed to democracy,
self-image. However, it seems highly
unlikely that it will be implemented as the rule of law and good government as well
envisaged. as human rights and basic civil liberties,
rejects unconstitutional changes in government and plans
the creation of an ASEAN human rights body.13 There is no
doubt that the Charter has a high symbolic value in terms
of reflecting ASEAN’s new found self-image. However,
it seems highly unlikely that it will be implemented as
10 | At the 4th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 1992 the ASEAN

Free Trade Area (AFTA) was set up with import duties
between zero and five per cent for the period 1993 to 2008.
However, AFTA only came into force on January 1, 2003.
11 | Cf. Art. 1 ASEAN Charter, http://www.aseansec.org/21069.pdf
(accessed January 10, 2011).
12 | ASEAN Security Community (ASC), ASEAN Economic Commu-
nity (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).
13 | Cf. Art. 14 ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Human Rights Body,
http://www.aseansec.org/21069.pdf (accessed January 10,
2011).
envisaged, and it is largely dependent upon the will of the

individual member states. The instruments which ASEAN
uses to achieve its own goals and objectives have not really
evolved and remain very weak.14 This fact leads indirectly to
the somewhat provocative question as to whether ASEAN
shouldn’t indeed be compared to the European Union.
Comparing ASEAN and the EU: a Clash of Ideas
First things first: what is most apparent is not so much

what they have in common but the differences between
them. From the very beginning the European Union was
conceived as a community of values, while ASEAN has done
its best for decades to avoid even discussing a common set
of values, let alone implementing them. This was never
really their intention, for in contrast to the European
Union, with its clear commitment to an anti-Eastern Bloc,
pro-West/transatlantic community of values, ASEAN’s
main objective was to reduce the influence of both blocs
and superpowers and that of China on the Southeast Asian
region as much as possible.
The (lack of) common values are a result of the highly

different forms of government in both organisations. The
European Union is a club for democracies and being a plura-
listic, democratic, constitutional state is a basic prerequisite
of membership. Only the actual day-to-day
organisation of the democratic system is left ASEAN consisted in the beginning
to each individual country (representative or only of countries with non-democratic
governments, and that is still predomi-
direct, parliamentary or presidential, federal nantly the case today.
or central democracy, majority or proporti-
onal representation-based elections, etc.). ASEAN, on the
other hand, consisted in the beginning only of countries
with non-democratic governments, and that is still
predominantly the case today. Members include communist
countries such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the
self-confessed military dictatorship of Myanmar, authori-
tarian single or multiparty states such as Singapore and
Malaysia, a kingdom regularly beset by government crises
and military coups in Thailand and the absolute Sultanate
of Brunei Darussalam. Against this political cacophony,
14 | Cf. Art. 20 ASEAN Charter, http://www.aseansec.org/21069.

pdf (accessed January 10, 2011), Decisions should be made
on the basis of consultation and consensus.
the most developed democracies of Indonesia and, to a

lesser extent, the Philippines can only make themselves
heard because of their importance and their size.
While the Europeans work together in The very different nature of these two
an often confrontational, but predomi- membership groupings has led to funda-
nantly constructive way, ASEAN mem-
bers work according to a code of con- mental differences within both the EC/
duct they call the Asian way. EU and ASEAN as to how members should
deal with each other. While the Europeans
seek to resolve problems by working together in an often
confrontational, but also predominantly constructive way,
and through the systematic creation of interdependencies
in nearly every political sphere, ASEAN members work
according to a code of conduct they like to call the Asian
way15 and which is made up of three basic parts:
▪▪strict non-interference in the internal affairs of other

member states;
▪▪a common duty to respect national sovereignty and
identity and territorial integrity;
▪▪avoidance of the creation of sub-ASEAN institutions
which could lead to a sharing of national sovereignty at
community level.
All ASEAN cooperation is therefore non-binding in character.

The final aspect of this comparison may have long-term
effects on cooperation within the ASEAN region and
beyond and therefore needs to be looked at in more detail:
if we take the geographical location, the current population
size and the political and economic influence of individual
EU member states into consideration, then the history of
European integration can be seen as a permanent process
of balancing out, especially between the larger member
states. The EC was originally made up of three countries of
roughly the same size (Italy, France and West Germany)
and three smaller countries (Belgium, the Netherlands
and Luxembourg). When Great Britain joined the EC the
club of three big countries became a club of four, and this
balance of power was to be fundamentally important to
the development of Community processes. After German
reunification this balance was completely thrown out of
kilter. Almost overnight one of the members of the club of
four (also the strongest economically) suddenly enjoyed a
15 | Established in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1976.

substantial growth in physical size and, more importantly,

an almost 20 million increase in population. Compared to
Great Britain, France and Italy, who each had between 50
and 60 million inhabitants, Germany now had 80 million
and was therefore primus inter pares, a situation that even
Germany’s closest EU partner, France, found difficult to
deal with. It was therefore vital to reinstate the balance
of power and this led to urgent steps towards expansion
and to spreading the integration process beyond the
existing economic community.16 The more integration and
sharing of national sovereignty, the greater the checks
and balances and the building of trust between members:
this is the historical lesson that can be learned from the
Maastricht Treaty.
If we were to look at ASEAN from the viewpoint of those

key issues mentioned above, then it can be seen that of
the approx. 575 million people in the ASEAN region 240
million, or around 40 per cent, come from Indonesia alone.
There is then a significant gap to the Philip-
pines and Vietnam (each with approx. 90 Until now differences in size, and
to 95 million inhabitants) and Thailand (70 especially the vastness of Indonesia
were of no real significance in the way
million). Until now these differences in size, ASEAN was run.
and especially the vastness of Indonesia,
both in terms of population and geography17, were of no
real significance in the way ASEAN was run. However,
under the terms of the new Charter this situation could
change drastically. If the ASEAN member states really
want to build a community of nations along the lines of the
European Union then it will soon become apparent who is
in the driving seat and who should be considered more as
passengers. The Charter sensibly allows for a two-speed
process in certain areas so that more progressive member
states can move more quickly towards integration.
But which group will Indonesia belong to? Official govern-

ment rhetoric suggests that they naturally see Indonesia
assuming the role of leader on the basis of the size of
their country in comparison to other member states, as
mentioned above. But what if the other countries do not
16 | Refers to the second and third pillars of European Union.

17 | At 5,100 km Indonesia is almost as long as the distance
between New York and Los Angeles and covers three time
zones.
want to be led by the giant archipelago next door? After

all, border disputes within ASEAN states have been smoul-
dering for decades. Indonesia has been fighting constant
diplomatic battles over the treatment of Indonesian
migrant workers, especially with Singapore
Everybody in the region is very aware of and Malaysia. And emotions continue to
Indonesia’s sense of national identity. run high on both sides in the Malaysian-
Most of the smaller ASEAN states are
worried about a possible Indonesian Indonesian dispute over who stole whose
hegemony. language (Indonesian and Malaysian are
almost identical). Everybody in the region is very aware
of Indonesia’s sense of national identity, which in recent
times has once again bordered on xenophobia. Most of
the smaller ASEAN states are worried about a possible
Indonesian hegemony. ASEAN lacks the kind of set up
and mechanisms that help to allay similar fears amongst
smaller members of the European Union and to maintain
the balance of power, which is to say a grouping of similar-
sized countries that keep each other in check and a process
of integration aimed at achieving interdependencies.
Future Options: ASEAN + ?
The general feeling amongst ASEAN member states seems

to be that ASEAN has no alternative but to look for ways
to face up to today’s challenges. The solution that seems
to offer the most likelihood of success in tackling current
problems, especially for want of better alternatives, lies
in cooperation between ASEAN countries. This concept of
“ASEAN+” has seen various initiatives put forward in recent
years as a consequence of participation in a bewildering
number of dialogue and cooperation platforms between
ASEAN and third parties. With the help of the group known
as the ASEAN Dialogue Partners18, the “ASEAN+3” process
was developed in 1997 (also APT: ASEAN Plus Three), a
dialogue platform between ASEAN, China, South Korea
and Japan aimed at improving cooperation in 20 different
areas, including crime prevention, tourism, security and
health. China and India have become new members of the
security platform established in 1976 as part of the ASEAN
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). ASEAN is now
18 | The official ASEAN Dialogue Partners are Australia (first

Dialogue Partner 1974), China, India, USA, Russia, EU,
Canada, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. The UNDP
also has Dialogue Partner status.
trying to persuade the other two APT partners, Japan and

South Korea, to also join TAC. It is hoped that Russia will
join in 2011. In 2009 President Obama showed an interest
in the USA also signing up. The term “ASEAN+8” is already
being considered for this expanded TAC grouping.19 It is
also worth mentioning the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the ASEAN Cooperation
Dialogue (ACD).
An analysis of ASEAN’s external contacts would suggest

that it is trying to fix or at least conceal the shortfalls
inherent in its own systems through a confusing number of
platforms, (pseudo) organisations and discussion forums
between ASEAN and other players. However
this “head in the sand” policy will not be ASEAN must now be prepared to take
enough in the long term to make ASEAN a further decisive step beyond the
“ASEAN+” concept and allow full
capable of meeting global challenges ahead. member status to new, economically
As a result ASEAN must now be prepared strong democracies from the region.
to take a further decisive step beyond the
“ASEAN+” concept and allow full member status to new,
economically strong democracies from the region such
as South Korean and Japan, but also Australia and New
Zealand. This would have the effect of balancing out
Indonesia’s exceptional status and help to strengthen
democratic processes throughout the whole ASEAN region.
The idea of a cautious expansion of ASEAN, which until
now has only been floating around in the region as a kind
of desirable political utopia, could quickly gain momentum
if, after 2015, the ASEAN member states actually seriously
opt to go down the integration and community route within
certain political areas. Anyhow, as early as 2005 the first
East Asian Summit took place in Kuala Lumpur, with the par-
ticipation of the ASEAN+3-countries together with India,
Australia and New Zealand.
Political and economic necessity may also play a part in the

successful implementation of this kind of expansion option
in the mid-term. The European unification process didn’t
come about because a few European countries suddenly
became aware of how much they liked each other, but
because the tragedy of the Second World War and the initial
19 | ASEAN + Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea,

New Zealand, Russia and the USA.
establishing of blocs made it necessary for the Europeans

to find new ways to ensure that there would be peace,
at least amongst themselves. Maintaining peace was and
still is the main objective of European Union. In Southeast
Asia there has so far been no similar external or internal
necessity to integrate, which may well be the main cause
of ASEAN’s relative weakness. However, you do not need
a profound knowledge of the region to recognise that the
superpower China will be the biggest factor putting pressure
on the whole of the East and Southeast Asia region to act.
Whether individual countries will be able to withstand this
political and economic pressure is debatable. An expanded
ASEAN would create an economic and security area on a
par with both China and the European Union.
The Dilemma Between Wanting To and Having To
At the Hanoi Summit in April 2010 all the countries’ leaders

expressed their agreement with the Charter and especially
with the creation of an economic union by 2015. “There is
a growing realisation among the leaders that the size of
the market matters”, claims Sanchita Basu Das, an analyst
from the ASEAN Study Centre in the Institute of South
East Asian Studies, Singapore.20 The question is: are these
positive signs just playing lip service or have the politicians
understood the global challenges and accepted there is no
really serious alternative to integration, union and the loss
of a certain amount of national sovereignty in
The member states must choose be- certain clearly-defined political areas? Only
tween a comfortable ASEAN with no then can the weaknesses inherent in the
institutional importance or an ASEAN
regional power with an important po- Charter be overcome, such as the fact that
litical and economic role on the world in addition to the traditional decision-making
stage.
process (principle of unanimity) there are no
new proposals on how to settle differences of opinion or
disputes.21 The ASEAN union now stands at a crossroads.
Its members must choose between a comfortable ASEAN
with no institutional importance or an ASEAN regional
power with an important political and economic role on the
world stage.
20 | Sanchita Basu Das, in: the Business Times, April 21, 2010, 19.
21 | The original idea to set up an ASEAN court to settle disputes
was not pursued. The consensus principle and independent
arbitration proceedings in individual cases remain the sole
means of settlement. The latest arbitration issue concerned
the ASEAN Summit.
It is still unclear as to what Indonesia will do next. If we

believe the official statements on the Foreign Ministry
website then Indonesia wants to be one of those countries
pushing through the Charter and the development of
further cooperation: “Indonesia and ASEAN share the view
that the development of regional architectures not only
needs to recognize the significance of ASEAN as a driving
force, but also must be carried out with a view to strength-
ening efforts towards ASEAN Community-building. At the
same time, efforts at ASEAN Community-building must
also be implemented within each ASEAN member country’s
domestic conditions so as to elevate ASEAN Centrality.”22
The Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa wants to leave us
in no doubt as to Indonesia’s good will: “Indonesia will
be chairing ASEAN in 2011 and this is a good opportunity
along the line for us to be part of the effort to help shape
our regional architecture. For us, sooner is
better than later.”23 However, ASEAN would Indonesia’s policy of “promoting a
not be ASEAN and Indonesia would not be dynamic equilibrance” is very much
open to interpretation.
one of its most influential members if the
there wasn’t a qualification to this: “But at the same
time, we are very much aware that this is about comfort
levels, we must proceed as they said in ASEAN language:
at the best comfortable rate for all.”24 This policy of
“promoting a dynamic equilibrance”25, as it is known in the
Indonesian government’s phrasebook, is very much open
to interpretation.
At this point it is also worth mentioning the significant

fact that the whole ASEAN process on Indonesia’s side (as
for all the other member states) will be carried out and
developed by relevant internal ministries, even though
until now this has been the exclusive domain of the Foreign
Ministry. As far as Indonesia is concerned, ASEAN is part of
foreign policy. As a result Jakarta has until today been able
to avoid the dilemma of claiming on the one hand to want
to be one of the driving forces of the ASEAN process, while
22 | Website of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Indonesia:

http://www.deplu.go.id/pages/news.aspx?IDP=3104&1=en
23 | Lilian Budianto, “ASEAN presence a prerequisite in any future
Asia Pacific community”, in: Jakarta Post, May 1, 2010, 3
24 | Ibid.
25 | “U.S. and China vie to win over Jakarta,” in: International
Herald Tribune, November 10, 2010, 1.
on the other hand, and despite rhetoric to the contrary,

pursuing a completely opposite policy, driven by nationalism
and protectionism, designed to limit and put a brake on
all efforts to develop ASEAN into a serious political and
economic community of values. Many local experts have
either been very critical of Indonesia’s claim to be leaders
in the ASEAN process or simply don’t take it seriously.
The World and Indonesia: An Inside View of a

Heterogeneous Island Kingdom
Indonesia is well aware of its growing international

importance, and this new-found self-confidence has been
boosted by its membership of the G20. Here this nation
with the fourth biggest population in the world no longer
holds a cautious or watching brief but adopts positions
and takes initiatives. It is no accident that the Yudhoyono
government claims to consider the G20 as the
As the only G20 country from the institution most likely to succeed in creating
ASEAN group, Indonesia is taking the global economic processes and preventing
opportunity to represent the whole
region and is trying to position itself future global economic and financial crises.
as the defender of interests for all As the only G20 country from the ASEAN
developing nations.
group, Indonesia is taking the opportunity to
represent the whole Southeast Asian region and is trying
to position itself at the same time as the mouthpiece and
defender of interests for all developing nations. In concrete
terms the Indonesian government is particularly keen
to see the inclusion of non-G20 states in internationally
coordinated G20 activities, above all in order to avoid
beggar-thy-neighbour situations arising.
Membership of the decision-makers club at a time when

the development of ASEAN seems to be showing no signs
of growth has raised the question among experts as to
whether G20 membership is more important for Indonesia
than being in ASEAN and whether Indonesia’s commitment
to the G20 may spell the end of its involvement in ASEAN
in the long run. Surprisingly, even foreign policy experts
seem to be ignoring the fact that the G20, as a worldwide
forum for the coordination of economic policies, cannot be
considered in any way similar to a community of states
like ASEAN, as both institutions have completely different
functions.
Indonesian economic experts like to point out that, at a

time of world economic stagnation, only China, India
and Indonesia have achieved above-average economic
growth. Indonesia is still expected to report over 6 per
cent economic growth for 2010. At the same time the
Indonesian economy proved to be less vulnerable during
the latest financial crisis than the big export/import
nations. Many Indonesians from the educated classes are
aware of this. Today you can sense a noticeable feeling
of national pride, especially amongst those in government
positions and political life. The general feeling seems to be
that Indonesia does not need any outside help, especially
not from the West.
Amongst the wider population people are not really aware

of what is happening in the G20. National print and
broadcast media only give very rudimentary accounts of
G20 meetings, if they bother to report them at all. Only a
very small part of the population is aware that their own
country is a member of G20. This is also basically true of
people’s awareness of the ASEAN process, even if there is
a higher level of awareness of ASEAN itself as a result of
its 40-year existence.
However, it is not only experts who believe that Indonesian

foreign and ASEAN policies should be better explained
to the people. Above all it is important that Indonesia’s
involvement in ASEAN is not presented as an end in itself
but must clearly answer the question as to cui bono with
policies for the benefit of the people.26 This politically-
driven push for an effective ASEAN community is therefore
especially necessary, as nationalism in Indonesia as well as
in neighbouring countries may be viewed positively in light
of their colonial past and still relatively recent sovereignty,
and especially while prejudices towards direct neighbours
still prevail amongst opinion-formers on all sides.
26 | According to Evi Fitriani of the Department of International

Relations of the Universitas Indonesia: “Community building
is a long process that requires the participation of not only
elites but also the common people at the grass-root level.
Without the involvement of the people, the ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC), ASEAN Political and Security Community
(APSC) and ASEAN Social and Cultural Community (ASSC)
are likely to remain empty political slogans.” Asia Views,
Vol. IV, № 6, October/November 2010, 6.
Immigration country
Norway – Demographic
trends and political
concepts
Norbert Beckmann-
Norbert Beckmann-Dierkes / Johann C. Fuhrmann
Dierkes, Team Europe
and North America of
the Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, is responsible
for Central and Eastern Per capita income, education levels, life expectancy: for
Europe. He lives in many years Norway has been the number one country in
Norway.
United Nations development studies.1 In the latest Human
Development Report 2010 Norway was once again top of
the list. And with its second place in the recent study by
the World Economic Forum (WEF), Norway is also seen as
one of the leading countries for gender equality.2 With such
positive social factors in its favour it is hardly surprising
that immigration numbers into Norway have been climbing
significantly in recent years – for many migrants Norway is
Johann C. Fuhrmann, the land of their dreams.
Team Europe and
North America, studied
Migration and integration are global social phenomena:
International Politics
at the London School today there are an estimated 200 million migrants world-
of Economics and wide, a fraction of whom – more than half a million – live in
Sciences Po in Paris.
Norway. The “Campaign for Expulsion”, started by the Swiss
People’s Party, the debate over the deportation of Roma
and Sinti peoples in France, the success of Geert Wilders
and the liberal-right Party for Freedom in the Netherlands
and the latest debates in Germany on integration underline
the fact that immigration is now a permanent feature on
the European political agenda.
Experiences with immigration and the way in which it is

handled differ from country to country. In this respect,
1 | Cf. United Nations 2010, Human Development Index,

http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete.pdf
2 | Cf. World Economic Forum 2010, The Gender Gap Report,
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gendergap/rankings2010.pdf
the example of Norway seems especially remarkable. The

number of immigrants in Norway has risen dramatically
in a short space of time: since 1970 the total has risen
nearly tenfold. What is also unusual is the high proportion
of refugees among these immigrants. At the beginning
of 2010 3.1 per cent of the Norwegian population had
a refugee background. At the same time, the latest
election successes by the Progress Party (FrP), show that
immigration has now also become a part of the political
agenda. What trends are we seeing? How do you become
a Norwegian? And how is the increase in immigration
reflected in Norwegian politics?
The Reversal of History:

from Emigration to Immigration
A hundred years ago the big issue was emigration out of

Norway, not immigration into it. At the beginning of the
19th century it was estimated that a million
Norwegians had already left their Scandina- At the beginning of the 19th century it
vian homes to move to the United States. The was estimated that a million Norwegi-
ans had already left their Scandinavian
desire to buy fertile agricultural land and an homes to move to the United States.
active campaign by the Americans to attract
immigrants were deciding factors during this migration
period. But as with the passengers on the Mayflower,
religious freedom also played its part, at least initially:
like many migrants, Cleng Peerson, a Norwegian-American
pioneer, actively tried to persuade his fellow-countrymen
to move to America. Together with Knud Olsen, Peerson
travelled to America in 1821 on behalf of a Quaker religious
community in Stavanger in order to look into immigration
possibilities. Handbooks and periodicals were produced to
try to persuade other Norwegians to make the journey.
Probably the most famous of these publications was Ole
Rynning’s “Sandfaerdige Beretning om Amerika” (True
Account of America), which appeared in Norway in 1838
and gave an idealised account of the life of exiled Norwe-
gians in America.
The call for new migrants fell on receptive ears in Norway at

this time: the economic situation there was getting worse,
agricultural land was becoming more and more scarce
and the introduction of new technology into agriculture
meant there were now too many agricultural workers. The
political situation in the USA made this country seem even

more attractive for immigrants, with the Homestead Act
of 1863 allowing every person who was at least 21 years
old to settle and work a piece of land (up to 160 acres).
Many Norwegian immigrants into the USA were particularly
attracted to Minnesota and North Dakota. This wave of
emigration reached its high point in the 1860s when ten to
fifteen per cent of the population of Norway moved out. It
wasn’t until after the end of the Great Depression that the
number of emigrants finally tailed off.
By exploiting its gas and oil reserves Norway has seen

enormous economic growth in a relatively short space
of time. It has grown from one of the poorest western
European countries, with an economy built primarily on
shipping, fishing, agriculture and forestry, into one of the
richest countries in the World. Today the private service
sector accounts for 35 per cent of mainland GDP in Norway.
For a long time Norway was seen as having
Today eleven per cent of the population a relatively homogenous ethnic and religious
is either an immigrant or has an immi society. A high birth-rate and large numbers
grant background. Thirty five per cent
of immigrants living in Norway now of immigrants led to the population of Norway
have Norwegian citizenship. more than doubling between 1900 and 2010,
growing from 2.21 million to 4.9 million.
While there were only 59,000 immigrants living in Norway
in 19703, this number has increased nearly tenfold to over
550,000 within the space of a few decades. Today eleven
per cent of the population is either an immigrant or has an
immigrant background. Thirty five per cent of immigrants
living in Norway now have Norwegian citizenship.
Norway has experienced specific influxes of immigrants

due to war and displacement, including Jews from eastern
Europe at the beginning of the 20th century and refugees
from Hungary in the 1950s. However, as with many other
European countries, the real growth in immigrant numbers
began in the 60s and 70s. It was mostly migrant workers
from Asia, and from Pakistan in particular, who came
to Norway. This wave of immigration continued into the
1970s and as a result people with a Pakistani immigrant
background now represent the largest non-European
3 | Cf. Vebjørn Aalandslid, “A Comparison of the Labour Market

Integration of Immigrants and Refugees in Canada and
Norway”, Statistics Norway Reports 2009/31, 30.
immigrant group in the country. Today over 30,000 people

with Pakistani roots live in Norway. However, with around
45,000 people or 0.9 per cent of the population it is the
Poles who represent the largest immigrant group overall.
Since the European Union expanded eastwards in 2004 the
number of Polish immigrants has risen significantly. Manual
and skilled workers are particularly drawn to Norway as
wages are significantly higher than in their homeland.
More and more of these workers are choosing to move
to Norway and take up Norwegian citizenship. Other
large groups of immigrants come from Sweden (approx.
29,000), Iraq (approx. 25,000), Somalia (approx. 24,000),
Germany (approx. 21,000) and Vietnam (approx. 20,000).
The capital has a particularly multi-cultural society.

According to Statistics Norway (Statistisk sentralbyra)
160,500 people in Oslo have an immigrant background.
Out of a population of 587,000 this amounts to 27 per
cent. There is also a high percentage of people with
an immigrant background in Drammen (22 per cent),
Lørenskog (19 per cent) and Skedsmo (18 per cent).
Approximately 15 per cent or more live in Stavanger,
Askim, As, Træna, Rælingen, Moos and Bærum. In 2009
Oslo had the highest net immigration (6,200) followed
by Rogaland and Hordaland (4,200 each) and Akershus
(3,600).
Norway is a member of the Schengen Area 24 per cent of non-Scandinavian immi-

which allows the free movement of people grants between 1990 and 2008 were
refugees, 24 per cent were migrant
within the countries known as the Schengen workers and 11 per cent moved to get
countries. Norway is also a signatory country educational qualifications.
of the Dublin Regulation which regulates
asylum applications within signatory countries at the
European level. Of non-Scandinavian immigrants between
1990 and 2008, 24 per cent were refugees, 24 per cent
were migrant workers and 11 per cent moved to get
educational qualifications.4
4 | Cf. Statistics Norway 2010, Immigration and immigrant,

http://ssb.no/innvandring_en (accessed January 10, 2011).
Current Trends
In 2009 there were 65,200 new immigrants and 26,550

emigrants. The net immigration figure of 38,650 was below
that of the previous year but was still the third highest
ever recorded.5 Once again Poles accounted for the largest
group of new immigrants (10,500), although the actual
number of Polish immigrants was significantly down on
the previous year (13,000), followed by Swedes (6,000)
and immigrants from Lithuania (3,200). Twice as many
immigrants came from Estonia as in the previous year
(1,100). There were also fewer Germans moving to Norway
than before: only 2,800 compared to 4,300 the previous
year. The number of refugees from Eritrea (1,700) and
Afghanistan (1,400) was double that of 2008. The number
of immigrants from Africa stood at approx. 3,000 per
year at the turn of the millennium, went up to 4,000 and
reached 5,150 in 2009. The number of immigrants from
Asia fluctuated between 6,000 and 9,000 for a number of
years and reached 10,300 in 2008 and 11,100 in 2009.
Immigration from North and South America remained at
around 1,500 to 2,000 over the last twenty years but rose
slightly in 2008 and 2009 to 2,400.
As there was a fall in demand for workers in autumn

2008 and early 2009 as a result of the financial crisis,
fewer work permits were issued to immigrants from the
European Economic Area, according to the
The biggest number of skilled workers OECD.6 The number of work permits issued
from outside the European Economic to skilled workers from developing countries
Area came from India, followed by Rus-
sia, China, the USA and the Philippines. was also reduced. In May 2009 Norway
revoked the Transitional Arrangements which
it had agreed with the eight central and eastern European
countries that joined the EU in 2004. The biggest number
of skilled workers from outside the European Economic
Area came from India, followed by Russia, China, the USA
and the Philippines.
5 | Cf. Statistics Norway 2010, High immigration and emigration

2009, May 6, 2010, http://ssb.no/english/subjects/02/02/20/
innvutv_en (accessed January 10, 2011).
6 | Cf. OECD 2010, “Recent changes in migration movements
and policies”, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/17/456294
32.pdf (accessed January 10, 2011).
Alongside the high number of immigrants, 2009 also saw a

large number of people leaving the country. 26,550 people
left Norway, of whom 18,400 were foreigners. According
to Statistics Norway this represented the largest number
of foreign immigrants to leave Norway ever recorded,
3,200 more than the previous year and 6,000 more on
average than over the previous twenty years. The trend
towards higher emigration and lower immigration of Poles
and Germans began towards the end of 2008, at the start
of the financial crisis, and continued strongly in the early
part of 2009. For the first time the Poles were the largest
group to emigrate (3,600), followed by Swedes (3,100).
The financial crisis and economic factors in general were
the biggest influence on people’s decision to emigrate.
For Norwegians themselves there were other factors in
addition to moving for work that also played a role (for
instance moving abroad to study).
The total number of asylum seekers within the OECD as a

whole has risen since 2006. In 2008 the USA was the most
important host country with 39,400 asylum seekers being
allowed in, followed by France, Canada,
the United Kingdom and Italy, where the Based on the size of their populations,
total number of asylum seekers accepted Norway, Sweden and Switzerland were
the most popular host countries for
exceeded 30,000.7 However, based on the asylum seekers in 2008.
size of their populations, Norway, Sweden
and Switzerland were the most popular host countries.
The number of people seeking asylum in Norway has
grown significantly and reached almost 14,500 in 2008.
Preliminary estimates for 2009 suggest that more than
17,200 applications were made, despite the reduction in
the number of applicants from Iraq. The majority of appli-
cations for asylum in 2009 came from people from Afghan-
istan, Eritrea and Somalia. In July 2009 the government
introduced measures to bring Norway’s asylum laws into
line with those of other European countries. The aim is to
reduce the number of asylum seekers who don’t actually
need any protection and to bring down the current number
of immigrants, which is currently relatively high compared
to other EU countries.
7 | Cf. OECD 2010, “International Migration Outlook – SOPEMI

2010”, 20.
How Do You Become a Norwegian?
According to the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration

(Utlendingsdirektoratet/UDI) the following conditions need
to be met to qualify for Norwegian citizenship:
▪▪Proven or established identity

▪▪Minimum 12 years old (and agreement of parents prior
to 18th birthday)
▪▪Place of residence in Norway and with intention to
maintain this residence
▪▪Fulfilment of the requirements for the issuing of a
permanent residency permit (people with a work or
residency permit in accordance with EWR/EFTA regula-
tions are exempted)
▪▪A total of 7 years residency in Norway in the previous 10
years.
▪▪Of good moral standing
▪▪Loss or relinquishment of previous citizenship8
Unlike in the USA, being born in Norway is not enough

to become Norwegian. It is also necessary for one of the
parents to have Norwegian citizenship. Since September 1,
2006 it is no longer necessary for the father of a child to be
married to the mother. Since 2006 children under the age
of 18 who have been adopted by Norwegian parents have
automatically been given Norwegian citizenship. Since
September 1, 2008 it has been necessary to demonstrate
sufficient command of the language, something which may
be achieved by taking a three-hundred-hour language
course.
In 2009 citizenship was conferred on 11,400 foreigners. The

biggest group of new citizens came from Somalia (1,700),
followed by former citizens of Iraq (1,270) and Afghanistan
(860). Around half of those given citizenship came from
Asia. The second biggest group were the Africans with 25
per cent. Citizens of other European countries made up 21
per cent of those who were given Norwegian citizenship
in 2009. Since 1977 approx. 225,000 people have been
8 | Cf. Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, “Citizenship”, April

15, 2010, http://udi.no/Global/upload/Publikasjoner/Fakta
Ark/Faktaark_Statsborgerskap_Citizenship_EN.pdf (accessed
January 10, 2011).
given citizenship, of whom more than 70 per cent are of

European origin.
On January 1, 2010 a new immigration law came into

effect. Separate work and residency permits were replaced
with a single residency permit which incorporates a general
work permit. The new law also introduced
new criteria for families to join existing The new law also introduced new crite-
immigrants in the country. These include strict ria for families to join existing immi
grants in the country. These include
requirements on proof of income (financial strict requirements on proof of income.
support) and a prerequisite of four years
work experience and/or education in Norway. In the case
of family immigration there is a fundamental requirement
for the person already living in Norway to prove they have
sufficient income during the year prior to the arrival of the
rest of the family. In addition it must be shown that an
appropriate level of income will also be available in the
following year. A new rule was introduced whereby the
person already living in Norway is not allowed to claim any
social benefits during the year prior to the family’s arrival.
However, there are some exceptions to the experience
requirements, especially for family members from the
European Economic Area and for migrant workers. People
from the European Economic Area (with the exception
of Romania and Bulgaria) since January 1, 2010 do not
need either a residency or work permit, they only need to
register upon their arrival in Norway (for instance with the
police) and obtain an open-ended registration certificate.
Migration and Integration as Political Issues
Integration and migration issues are getting more and

more media coverage these days, especially in relation to
the large number of refugees that Norway has accepted in
recent years. Before the new immigration law of January
1, 2010 came into force, further measures were introduced
designed in part to protect the country’s own workers,
but also to protect the migrants themselves. In order to
limit the exploitation of foreign workers and to protect
Norwegian workers, Norway introduced new measures in
2008 to counter social dumping. These included an increase
in inspections together with sanctions for infringements,
stricter recruitment laws and the introduction of ID cards
for workers in the construction sector. At the same time,
an action plan aimed at combating poverty and promoting

participation in the employment market was set in motion.
Measures to help the victims of human trafficking were
also introduced. Victims of human trafficking who are
prepared to act as witnesses in court receive certificates
of exemption. The aim of these measures is to stop illegal
immigration into Norway. Since September 2009 foreigners
who return to developing countries of their own free-will
receive special support. At the same time the country
continues to try to attract highly-qualified people from
other countries. It is now possible for qualified foreigners
to apply for a stay of up to one year in Norway to learn
Norwegian or to obtain further qualifications. At the
same time as they are studying they can also undertake
part-time work.
The Progress Party (FrP) enjoyed considerable success in

the elections to the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) which
were held on September 14, 2009 with their demands for a
limit on immigration and the expulsion of foreign criminals.
With 22.9 per cent of the vote, the FrP was the second
biggest faction. This serves to underline the fact that
immigration has now become an important issue among the
public. The latest OECD report on migration quotes several
studies that suggest that 70 per cent of the Norwegian
people would like to see stricter controls on and/or reduced
levels of immigration. This figure of 70 per
Many communities are reluctant to ac- cent puts Norway at the top of the statistics
cept any more refugees, claiming that in the report alongside Germany, the United
it is no longer possible to guarantee
a reasonable proportion of foreigners Kingdom and the Netherlands.9 Other
relative to the number of local people. statistics suggest that there is only a small
majority in favour of stricter immigration
controls.10 However, even in this survey, 36 per cent of
those questioned see immigrants as a potential source of
social problems. Many communities and small villages are
reluctant to accept any more refugees, claiming that it is
no longer possible to guarantee a reasonable proportion of
foreigners relative to the number of local people. The FrP
has to a certain extent taken a populist stance in the debate
by, for example, encouraging members of parliament not
to accept any more refugees in their constituencies.
9 | Cf. OECD 2010, n. 7, 118.

10 | Cf. Statistics Norway 2010, “Appreciate immigrants’ contri-
bution to working life”, http://ssb.no/english/subjects/00/01/
30/innvhold_en (accessed December 13, 2010).
The new immigration law that came into effect in January

2010, together with the other new measures enacted,
shows that the red-red coalition government under Social
Democrat Jens Stoltenberg has taken the immigration
issue to heart. It is almost certain that the political
measures introduced by the government are aimed at
reducing the influence of the FrP. It seems obvious that
the government does not want to leave the
issue of immigration in the hands of the FrP, Asylum seekers from certain coun-
who might then enjoy even greater electoral tries, including Serbia, Macedonia and
Montenegro, are interviewed and then
success. The new legislation is designed to expelled by the police if there is no evi-
limit immigration and to deport immigrants dence that they need protection.
who do not have residency permits. In 2010
a large number of illegal immigrants were deported. By
mid-September 4,042 people had already been expelled
from Norway. On September 11 a group of 71 people were
flown back to Serbia under police escort.11 Stoltenberg
expressed his hope that this spectacular forced expulsion
would lead to more illegal immigrants leaving the country
of their own free will. Just as effective was the introduction
of a 48-hour rule for asylum seekers from certain countries,
including Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. People from
these countries are interviewed and then expelled by the
police if there is no evidence that they need protection.
The effect of this new rule was that by mid-September
2010 Sweden had accepted 4,000 asylum seekers from
Serbia while Norway had only taken in 178.
For most people from non-European countries the road to

the Norwegian “paradise” has become generally longer and
rockier. Norwegians are significantly more open to migrants
from European countries than they are to people coming
from developing countries. This is partly because the latter
group tends to include asylum seekers who are not so
well-educated and who often do not take up employment.
However, there is a significant difference between income
levels of Norwegians and western immigrants on the one
hand and non-western immigrants on the other. 15 per
cent of immigrants from Africa were unemployed in the
third quarter of 2010, while the figure was only 3.6 per cent
11 | Cf. Rolleiv Solholm, “More illegal immigrants expelled,” The

Norway Post, September 12, 2010, in: http://norwaypost.no/
news/more-illegal-immigrants-expelled.html (accessed
December 13, 2010).
for western Europeans.12 The OECD report on migration

described the situation of many foreign workers in Norway
as difficult: compared to local Norwegians they are over
twice as likely to be unemployed. In August 2010 7.9 per
cent of immigrants were unemployed while only 2.3 per
cent of the rest of the population were without work.13 This
discrepancy shows that Norway cannot be held up as a
perfect example of successful immigration, despite its high
standard of living. The reality of the uneven distribution
of wealth in Norway is mirrored by the domestic situation
of many non-western immigrants. In 2008 17 per cent of
them lived in homes of less than 50 m² – the figure for
Norwegians was 4 per cent. More than half of non-western
immigrants lived in households of more than two people
in which not everybody had their own room. The Høyre
party put forward several proposals how to avoid discrimi-
nation and encourage participation in the job market. At
their annual conference in May 2010 there
In order to reduce potential disadvan- was support for a proposal to introduce new
tages for applicants whose name might regulations on the job application process.
suggest an immigrant background, the
Høyre party is considering the idea of In order to reduce potential disadvantages
making job applications anonymous. for applicants whose name might suggest
an immigrant background, they are consid-
ering the idea of making job applications anonymous, so
there would be no name or photo included.14 The debate
over reducing immigration numbers has been fuelled
recently by the high proportion of immigrants appearing
in crime statistics and the fact that some schools in big
cities (especially in Oslo) have more foreign students than
Norwegian ones.
Conflicts that are not addressed can only become worse.

In this respect it is good that the immigration issue is now
being debated in Norway. It is important that this debate
is carried out objectively. Warnings by the FrP that Norway
is threatened by Islamization do not reflect reality. Only
one immigrant in three comes from a predominantly
12 | Cf. Statistics Norway 2010, “Still growth in immigrant unem-

ployment,” November 4, 2010, http://ssb.no/english/subjects/
06/03/innvarbl_en (accessed December 13, 2010).
13 | Ibid.
14 | Cf. Fiona Weber-Steinhaus and Andreas M. Klein, “Erna Solberg
als Vorsitzende von Høyre bestätigt”, KAS-Länderbericht,
May 11, 2010, in: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_19599-
1522-1-30.pdf (accessed December 22, 2010).
Islamic country, as shown in statistics from the Norwegian

Christian Intercultural Association and Statistics Norway.15
Immigration policies have become a permanent part
of the political agenda and it is highly likely that these
issues will play an important role in the elections in 2013.
On the immigration issue, Høyre is adopting a liberal-
conservative stance. So far all conservative parties have
ruled out any cooperation with the FrP. If Høyre are not
able to get the FrP to move away from their extreme right,
populist position, it is unlikely that they will be able to
work together at government level in the future. In any
case, if it came to a multi-party coalition, it is more than
questionable whether it would be possible to achieve a
political consensus between potential coalition partners
like the Christian Democratic Party (KrF), the Liberal Party
(Venstre) and the FrP. The polemical debate in France has
highlighted the risks that can arise when the migration
issue is used as a political football. It remains to be hoped
that discussions in Norway develop into a serious debate to
which Høyre and the Christian Democratic Party can make
constructive contributions.
It has so far not been possible to achieve a comprehensive

harmonisation of immigration policies within the European
Union or the Schengen Area: quotas, targeted immigration
policies, differing legislation according to employment
groups, large-scale or only minimal legalisation – all
of these things are going on within Europe without any
underlying agreement between the various countries and
based upon each country’s individual needs, the prevailing
political mood or economic constraints. The
majority of Schengen countries are tending Obviously it is important and necessary
towards making job-based migration easier to have measures in place to control
immigration, but exaggerated security
but are making it more difficult to qualify policies can lead to an increase in ille-
for asylum or for families to join existing gal immigration.
immigrants. As we have seen, this is also the
case in Norway, although it has to be said that, until now,
the country has accepted more than its fair share of asylum
seekers. Obviously it is important and necessary to have
measures in place to control immigration, but exaggerated
15 | Cf. Statistics Norway 2009, “Members of religious and life

stance communities outside the Church of Norway 2006-
2009,” http://ssb.no/english/subjects/07/02/10/trosamf_en/
arkiv/tab-2009-12-09-02-en(accessed January 10, 2011).
security policies can in fact lead to an increase in illegal

immigration. Norway is not being invaded by immigrants,
but there is a significant gap between the superficial
discussions on the topic that have so far taken place and
reality. In Germany, where the government has recently
introduced measures to recognise foreign qualifications,
the lack of skilled workers cost the economy fifteen billion
euros in 2009 alone, according to the Federal Ministry
of Economics and Technology. Further serious debate on
these issues is required – a debate which should ideally be
Europe-wide.
After the Presidential

Elections in Côte d’Ivoire
Can the Political Crisis Still Be
Resolved by Diplomacy?
It’s time to come back down to earth. After a five-year

delay, the first round of the Côte d’Ivoire’s presidential
elections finally went off peacefully and without technical
hitches on October 31, 2010, leading many people to think
that the country had taken a miraculous turn for the better.
But they were soon to be disillusioned. After the run-offs
on November 28, both candidates have been sworn in as
President and they have both named their Prime Ministers Klaus D. Loetzer is
and cabinets. head of the Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung’s
Regional Programme
Laurent Gbagbo, 65, is the socialist leader of the FPI and has “Political Dialogue
been the incumbent president since the disputed elections West Africa” in
Cotonou, Benin.
held in 2000. He entered the second ballot as candidate
for the LMP coalition. As the incumbent President, he has
control over the country’s institutions such as its fiscal
authority and state television. And most importantly, he
has the backing of the country’s armed forces and police.
He is still presiding over the country from his presidential
palace, but he is internationally isolated. Côte d’Ivoire
has been suspended by the Economic Community of West
African States (CEDEAO) and the Central Bank of West Anja Casper worked
African States (BCEAO), based in Dakar. Senegal has for the Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung
frozen Gbagbo’s access to the Central Bank’s funds. in Benin from 2008
to 2010. She is now
Ex-Premier Ouattara1, 67, an internationally-recognized working in the
European and Inter-
economist and president of the RDR entered the run-offs as national Cooperation
the candidate for the RHDP coalition2, an alliance of parties Department in Berlin.
which came together to fight the elections and which sees
1 | Prime Minister 1990-1993 under Félix Houphouët-Boigny.

2 | Rally of Houphouetists for Democracy and Peace.
itself as the natural successor to the nation’s founder and

long-serving president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny.3 The
PDCI, led by former president Bédié4, which came third
in the first round of voting also joined this coalition. Bédié
was able to mobilise the majority of his supporters to
vote for Ouattara in the second ballot, thus
Ouattara was recognized as the victor ensuring Ouattara’s victory. However, there
by the whole international community, was not sufficient solidarity amongst the
including the UN Security Council. He
also had the support of the Central RHDP parties for them to agree on a joint
Bank of West African States. candidate for the first round. Ouattara was
recognized as the victor by the whole inter-
national community, including the UN Security Council. He
also had the support of the Central Bank of West African
States (BCEAO), of which he is a former head, and as a
result has a certain amount of control over the country’s
state finances. He is running his government from the
Hôtel du Golf, guarded by UN peacekeepers5.
Fig. 1
Presidential elections, 1st ballot October 31, 2010
Ouattara Gbagbo Bédié Ouattara Gbagbo Bédié

RDR FPI PDCI RDR FPI PDCI
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
32,8 38,3 25,2 % 32,8 38,3 25,2
CEI CC
Ouattara Gbagbo Ouattara Gbagbo
RHDP LMP RHDP LMP
Source: CEI (confirmed by CC), http://ceici.org/elections/docs/
EPR_31102010_RESUL_PROVI_CEI_03112010_A4.pdf (accessed
50
December 14, 2010).
40
Abbr.: CEI – Commission Électorale Indépendante (Independent
Electoral Commission), CC – Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional
30
Council), RHDP – Rassemblement des Houphouétistes pour la
20
Démocratie et la Paix, LMP – La Majorité Présidentielle, FPI –
Front Populaire Ivoirien, RDR – Rassemblement des Républicains,
10
PDCI – Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire
0
3 | In office45,9
54,1 from 1960 to
%his death51,5
48,6 in 1993.
4 | In office from 1993 to 1999 (coup).
CEI CC
5 | UN peacekeeping mission UNOCI (United Nations Operation
in Côte d’Ivoire).
15
10
5
0
Fig. 2
32,838,3 25,2 % 32,8 38,3 25,2
Presidential elections, 2nd ballot November 28, 2010
CEI CC
Ouattara Gbagbo Ouattara Gbagbo
RHDP LMP RHDP LMP
50
40
30
20
10
0
54,1 45,9 % 48,6 51,5
CEI CC
Source: CC, http://news.abidjan.net/h/382101.html (accessed

December 14, 2010).
With two rival presidents being declared after the second

ballot, Côte d’Ivoire has politically fallen way behind in
terms of the progress that was hoped for after the end of
the 2007 civil war. The process which was set in motion at
this point, which included preparation for the elections by
agreeing a register of voters and an amicable resolution
of the thorny problem of citizenship, had awakened high
hopes, but more among the international community than
among the Ivorians themselves. Otherwise
we would not have seen the mass hoarding The people had no confidence in the
of food and petrol that broke out even before elections going off peacefully, but no-
one imagined quite how bad it was
the first round of voting, and even more so going to be.
in the lead-up to the second ballot. It is clear
that the people had no confidence in the elections going
off peacefully, but no-one imagined quite how bad it was
going to be. Andreas Mehler, political analyst and expert on
West Africa, and Director of the GIGA Institute of African
Studies, writes in this respect: “Over the last three-and-
a-half years, a power sharing deal between Gbagbo and
ex-rebel leader Guillaume Soro has brought a period of
relative peace, but has not proven to be the hoped-for
overall solution. This power sharing arrangement was
clearly only meant for a transitional period”.6 In any case,
Mehler continues, hardly anyone was asking the question:
“A transition is fine, but where is it leading?”
6 | Andreas Mehler, “Côte d’Ivoire: kein Ausweg durch Macht-

teilung,” GIGA Focus Afrika, № 10/2010 , 1, in: http://giga-
hamburg.de/giga-focus/afrika (accessed December 16, 2010).
Escalation of Violence Reminiscent of Civil War
In light of the current political stalemate, the situation

in Côte d’Ivoire is very tense. Despite an official curfew,
official sources report that 60 people have been killed and
several hundreds injured.7 Every day there are reports
of fresh atrocities, not just coming from the Ouattara
camp but also from credible sources such as the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay. She places the
blame for the nightly killings and abductions on Liberian
and Angolan mercenaries, supported by Gbagbo’s elite
Garde Républicaine. Gbagbo for his part has
Gbagbo’s security forces have blocka- publicly demanded the withdrawal of UNOCI
ded the temporary offices of Alassane peacekeeping troops and supporting French
Ouattara at the UNOCI-guarded Hôtel
du Golf. UN patrols have been shot at. units from the country, on the grounds that
they are partisan. As a result his security
forces have blockaded the temporary offices of Alassane
Ouattara at the UNOCI-guarded Hôtel du Golf. UN patrols
have been shot at and armed students supporting Gbagbo,
the Jeunes Patriotes, have been threatening UNOCI staff at
night in their homes. If this continues, the position of the
UN’s blue berets will become increasingly precarious, and
increasing their ranks with 500 more soldiers (as agreed
on December 20 by the UN Security Council) will do little
to improve matters.
The international community headed by the UN – the EU,

USA, African organisations such as the African Union (AU),
the West African Economic Community CEDEAO and the
West African Central Bank BCEAO – all oppose Gbagbo and
support Ouattara as the Côte d’Ivoire’s lawfully elected
president. The AU’s attempts at mediation through South
Africa’s former president Thabo Mbeki and more recently
through AU Commission President Jean Ping have been
fruitless. The EU and USA have imposed limited sanctions
in the form of travel bans for Gbagbo and his close
supporters, but all these actions just seem to make Gbagbo
and his camp all the more determined to stand firm.
The danger that “the side which loses the elections will
become radicalized”8, which Mehler refers to in his article,
materialized just two weeks after the elections. The paradox
7 | Copy deadline of this issue: December 22, 2010.

8 | Mehler, n. 6, 6.
is that the Majorité Présidentielle (LMP) does not see itself

as the loser, although this would seem to be true at first
glance. On closer inspection it becomes more complicated.
Among a total population of around 21 million, only approx.
5.78 million are eligible to vote because
almost half of the Côte d’Ivoire population The Gbagbo camp knows that they ma-
are minors. This soon puts any electoral nipulated the election results, but they
believe this manipulation is morally
majority into perspective. The Gbagbo camp justified, indeed imperative.
seems keen to lay particular emphasis on
this, irrespective of other factors. This is where the danger
lies: they know that they manipulated the election results,
but they believe this manipulation is morally justified,
indeed imperative, because they are convinced that they
have a majority. They ignore the fact that many people
who were excluded from voting because of questions over
their ancestry were supporters of Ouattara. With this
conviction, and of course with the backing of the army, the
Gbagbo camp feels ready to stand against the whole world.
Parallels with Zimbabwe’s Dictator, Mugabe?
Other factors are at play here. One is the idée fixe of libe-
ration from its ex-colonial master, France. In this respect
Gbagbo is at one with another dictator who lost an election
but who has clung to power against the wishes of the
international community: Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe,
another socialist. He has used the same rhetoric to bring
about the economic destruction of his country. This has
been going on in Zimbabwe for more than ten years and it
is still not over, although the people are literally at a point
of economic collapse, as is shown by the widespread return
of bartering. There are other parallels: Alassane Ouattara
(winner of the 2010 elections) is to Gbagbo what ex-leader
of the opposition MDC (Movement for Democratic Change),
Morgan Tsvangirai (winner of the 2008 elections), is to
Mugabe. In both cases, the political opponent is seen as
an agent of the West who defends foreign interests above
the true interests of the people. Another parallel which
Mugabe and Gbagbo would never mention is nevertheless
very obvious. This is the question of tangible interests – in
both cases the leader and his henchmen have amassed
great wealth through corruption, abused human rights,
and once they lose their grip on power they can expect to
face charges at the International Court of Justice.
It is tempting to draw a parallel from the situation in

Zimbabwe as to how long the current situation can continue
in Côte d’Ivoire. The start of the crisis in Zimbabwe can be
traced back to the turn of the century 1999/2000, so it has
been going on for more than ten years. However, it should
not be assumed that the present crisis in Côte d’Ivoire
will also last that long. Zimbabwe has a totally different
historical background, involving a war of liberation and
the attainment of independence in 1980. In Zimbabwe
the “Securocrats”, the commanders of the security forces
such as the army, police and secret service, wield the true
power and Mugabe knows he can rely on them. They of
course have their own internal disputes, but they would
never defect to the Tsvangirai camp because
In Côte d’Ivoire the elite Garde Répu- of their view of themselves as revolutionaries
blicaine guarantees Gbagbo’s hold on and armed fighters in the war of liberation. In
power. But their loyalty will not neces-
sarily last forever. Côte d’Ivoire the security forces, particularly
the elite Garde Républicaine, also known as
the Gard Présidentielle, also guarantee Gbagbo’s hold on
power. But this is as far as the comparison goes, because,
with the possible exception of the Garde Républicaine,
their loyalty will not necessarily last forever and there is no
similarity with Zimbabwe’s totally different situation and
history.
Up until 2002 the Ivorian army was dominated by the

north. Gbagbo deliberately changed this, filling the critical
command posts and higher ranks of officers with his own
appointments. In November 2010 the Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung’s regional programme “Political Dialogue West
Africa” (PDWA) based in Cotonou organised a congress
of regional army officers, which included two participants
from Côte d’Ivoire. These participants have remained in
contact with their colleagues from Benin, who think it
possible that there could at some point be a coup against
Gbagbo. This would be likely to involve much bloodshed
and could cost Gbagbo and others their lives. The question
is, how could this situation arise?
Gbagbo Usurps Power with the Help of the

Constitutional Council
Laurent Gbagbo, the incumbent president until the

elections, is closely linked to the political destiny of Côte
d’Ivoire. During the presidency of the nation’s founder
and first president Félix Houphouët-Boigny, this socialist
student leader spent long periods in prison as punishment
for his criticism of the one-party regime. Proud of his
peasant roots, Gbagbo stood in the 1990 presidential
elections for the first time, but won less than 20 per cent
of the vote. After the disputed elections of 2000, when
allegedly only 37 per cent of the population cast their
vote,9 Gbagbo refused to hand over power. His desire for
power is bolstered by his ambitious wife Simone, who was
also active in the socialist student movement and who, it
is claimed, is not only the power behind the throne but
was also implicated in war crimes during
the Ivorian civil war. She is also accused of When his mandate ran out in 2005,
being involved in the murder of a journalist Gbagbo postponed the elections eight
times, and a few weeks before the
who was investigating corruption in Côte vote he explicitly stated that he would
d’Ivoire.10 When his mandate ran out in 2005, never hand over power.
Gbagbo postponed the elections eight times,
and a few weeks before the vote he explicitly stated that
he would never hand over power to Houphouët-Boigny’s
successors. In August 2009, so as not to leave anything
to chance or to the democratic will of the people, Gbagbo
appointed his party crony Paul Yao N’Dré to the post of
president of the Ivorian Constitutional Council. According
to electoral law, the Constitutional Council has the final say
on matters relating to electoral protests and announces
and confirms the official result of the elections.
This appointment of Paul Yao N’Dré to President of the

Constitutional Council meant that President Gbagbo had a
fellow party member ensconced in the most crucial strategic
position when it came to the elections. The appointment
9 | The circumstances are contested. There was violent rioting

after first General Robert Gueï, and then Laurent Gbagbo
announced themselves victors before all the votes had been
counted. It is therefore possible that the count was stopped
before all the votes were counted.
10 | Cf. e.g.: france24.com, “Affaire Kieffer – Simone Gbagbo
entendue par des juges français à Abidjan,” http://f24.my/
f2kVtl (accessed December 14, 2010).
came under fire from all the opposition parties, who felt it
strongly compromised the neutrality of the election process.
Nevertheless, the appointment was in fact constitutional,
as the previous incumbent had reached the end of his term.
It was repeatedly argued that Paul Yao N’Dré should be
appointed as a political counterweight to the Independent
Electoral Commission (CEI), which was dominated by the
opposition and of which the Chairman, Youssouf Bakayoko,
is a member of the PDCI. They may have had a point,
but Gbagbo went on to change the configuration of the
Electoral Commission so that it was politically biased.11 In
early 2010 he dissolved the CEI Electoral Commission, with
Bakayoko only then taking over as Chairman, and Gbagbo
could have dissolved the Commission again if he thought
Bakayoko was too partisan.
Once Bakayoko announced Ouattara’s victory with 54 per

cent of the vote on the night of Wednesday to Thursday
after the elections, the Gbagbo camp weighed
The current situation in Côte d’Ivoire in. The final decision lay with Gbagbo’s crony
highlights the serious shortcomings in N’Dré. The current situation in Côte d’Ivoire
many of Africa’s constitutional demo-
cracies. The weakness of their institu- highlights the serious shortcomings in
tions means that many African nations many of Africa’s constitutional democracies.
only have a democratic facade.
Constitutional bodies such as the CEI and
the Constitutional Council are defined by
their Chairmen, who also influence the public perception
of these institutions, rather than being meaningful as
independent organs of a constitutional state. The weakness
of their institutions means that many African nations only
have a democratic facade. It was also clearly a mistake to
make political appointments to key institutions such as the
CC and CEI, but the proposal that the electoral process
should be depoliticized by appointing independent experts
was rejected by all parties in the lead-up to the elections.
At the end of the day, all sides were hoping to gain an
advantage by exercising influence on these bodies.
11 | As happened in the Pretoria Agreement, upon which the

2007 Ouagadougou Agreement was based. Cf. Radio France
Internationale (RFI), “L’accord de Pretoria du 6 avril 2005,”
http://rfi.fr/actufr/articles/064/article_35315.asp (accessed
January 10, 2011).
Table 1
Electoral data
1st ballot 2nd ballot

October 31, 2010 12 November 28, 2010 13
Population (2008)14 approx. 20 million
Regions 19 15
No. of Voting Stations 19,854 20,073
Eligible Voters 5,784,490 5,780,490
absolute per cent

1st ballot 2nd ballot 1st ballot 2nd ballot
Votes Cast 4,843,445 4,689,366 83.73 81.12
Invalid Votes 225,624 99,147 4.66 2.11
Sources: Election results of the CEI 12, 131415
Electoral Complaints: Arithmetic Rather

Than Vote Checking
Even before the election results were announced, the

Gbagbo camp had challenged the legitimacy of the voting
in four northern regions,16 which were controlled by the
Forces Nouvelles, and on the Thursday morning they
submitted an official complaint to the Constitutional Council.
At 3 pm that same day Yao N’Dré cancelled the results of
the Electoral Commission, annulled all votes in the seven
northern provinces and declared Gbagbo to be the winner.
This was all the more surprising in that there had been no
time for any kind of vote checking. They simply worked on
the arithmetic and annulled enough votes in the northern
provinces until Gbagbo had a mathematical majority
of more than 50 per cent. This corresponded to around
600,000 votes or approximately 13 per cent of votes cast.
12 | Cf. Overview with detailed election results, Commission

Electorale Independante, http://ceici.org/elections/docs/
EPR_31102010_RESUL_PROVI_CEI_03112010_A4.pdf
13 | Cf. electoral data with a detailed breakdown of results,
Commission Electorale Independante, http://ceici.org/
elections/docs/EPR2010_2T_RESULTATS_VALEURS_0212
2010.pdf (accessed December 14, 2010).
14 | Cf. other key data: “Die Côte d’Ivoire in Stichpunkten,”
http://kas.de/wf/de/71.6530 (accessed December 14, 2010).
15 | Plus city of Abidjan and diaspora (mainly Paris).
16 | (1) Vallée du Bandama (Bouaké), (2) Savanes (Korhogo),
(3) Worodougou (Séguéla) and (4) Denguelé (Odienné).
If they had only annulled the votes in the four provinces

they had initially complained about, Ouattara would still
have retained his majority. This was said publicly by the
real hero of the Ivorian election drama, the undaunted
United Nations Special Representative for Côte d’Ivoire
and Head of the UNOCI peacekeeping mission, the South
Korean Youn-jin Choi.17 The votes of expatriate Ivorians
living in France were also summarily declared to be invalid.
Another argument made by the Constitutional Council

against the legitimacy of the results announced by the
CEI was that the Electoral Commission did not announce
the result within the legally-required time period. But
this breach of electoral rules was actually caused by
the Gbagbo camp. As all parties are represented in the
independent Electoral Commission, Gbagbo’s fellow
party members were able to delay the announcement
of the election results. In the event of disputed results,
the CEI normally makes a decision based on consensus.
This resulted in the CEI’s results announcement being
highly dramatic. To comply with electoral law, the election
results must be announced no later than three days after
the voting stations have closed, so the latest possible
time was midnight on Wednesday. The first
Just as the CEI representative was attempt was made on Tuesday evening at
about to announce the first results, the Electoral Commission’s office in front of
Gbagbo supporters physically preven-
ted him from reading. On live TV they live national (RTI) and international (RFI,
snatched the list of results from his BBC, CNN, Radio24) TV cameras. Just as the
hand.
CEI representative was about to announce
the first results, Gbagbo supporters within the Electoral
Commission intervened and physically prevented him from
reading out the results. On live TV they snatched the list of
results from his hand, while the Garde Républicaine security
forces simply looked on. Indeed, rather than protecting the
CEI representative, they went on to clear the building of
observers, journalists and TV cameras. This marked the
end of the independent Electoral Commission which over
the preceding months had managed to successfully defend
itself against Gbagbo’s influence. The independent Electoral
Commission could only remain “independent” as long as it
gave President Gbagbo the results he wanted, as happened
17 | Cf. “YJ Choi (ONUCI): ‘Pourquoi j’ai certifié les résultats du

scrutin’”, in: Abidjan.net (Le Patriote), http://news.abidjan.
net/h/382148.html?n=382148 (accessed December 11, 2010).
in the first round. By Monday evening the Gbagbo camp

knew the election result and knew that their candidate had
lost. So now they were using every means at their disposal
to prevent the announcement of this result. However, the
incident at the results announcement made
it clear that the CEI had not allowed itself The fact that Gbagbo’s supporters only
to fall totally under Gbagbo’s control. The managed to prevent the announce-
ment at the very last minute did not
fact that Gbagbo’s supporters only managed detract from the CEI’s results, which
to prevent the announcement at the very have been accepted as legitimate by
the international community.
last minute, and on live TV, just showed the
public that the Gbagbo camp wanted to stop
the announcement and did not in any way detract from the
CEI’s results, which have been accepted as legitimate by
the international community including the UN and AU.
International Observers Declare

the Elections Democratic
At the instigation of the UN Representative, the interna-

tional community pressed for the election results to be
announced quickly, in order to improve the precarious
security situation and speed up the transfer of power to
Ouattara. The elections were declared to be transparent
and fair by the UN, by observers from the West African
Economic Community CEDEAO led by Prof. Théodore Holo,
President of the Benin Supreme Court, and above all by
the 120-member EU observer mission led by the Romanian
MEP Christian Preda. At a press conference, Holo stated:
“One or two irregularities do not mean that the legitimacy
of the whole election has been compromised.”18 Particularly
in view of Ouattara’s clear victory, we could add. The Carter
Center in the USA also repeatedly called for an immediate
announcement of the election results.
A few hours after the expiry of the deadline, the results

were announced by CEI Chairman Youssouf Bakayoko
outside the CEI’s offices at the Hôtel du Golf, in front of the
international press but in the absence of RTI, the Ivorian
state television. The hotel, which was now the headquarters
18 | “Présidentielle/Observation de la mission de la CEDEAO –

Pr Holo Théodore (Chef de mission) ‘Deux ou trois incidents
ne peuvent pas invalider ces élections,’” in: IVOIRTV.net,
http://ivoirtv.net/index.php/news/54-politique/545 (accessed
January 10, 2011).
of President Ouattara, was guarded by heavily-armed UN

peacekeeping units. Here too, the UNOCI Chief Youn-jin
Choi played a decisive role. He deployed 150 blue berets
to make sure Bakayoko was safely escorted to the Hôtel
du Golf. But his continuing interventions incurred the
wrath of incumbent President Gbagbo, who threatened to
declare him persona non grata as a result
The involvement of the UN Special Re- of his interference in his host country’s
presentative and the role of the UN in internal affairs. The involvement of the UN
the conflict has been hotly debated. Was
it legitimate for Choi to speak out so Special Representative and the role of the
plainly in favour of Ouattara’s victory? UN in the conflict has since then been hotly
debated. Was it legitimate for Choi to speak
out so plainly in favour of Ouattara’s victory? Choi’s special
role was based on the 2005 Pretoria Agreement.19 As a
signatory, Laurent Gbagbo agreed to the special role of
external institutions and gave away some of Côte d’Ivoire’s
sovereignty. But this was a conditio sine qua non, the
only way to break the stalemate. After the signing of the
Ouagadougou Agreement in July 2007, the UN Security
Council passed a resolution, article 6 of which gave the
UN Special Representative the power to decide whether
all stages of the election process had been carried out in
accordance with democratic principles.20 He was given this
mandate for good reason, as was later to become clear. A
common thread in all of Laurent Gbagbo’s actions is the
desire to renege on previous agreements.
Despite all his threats, so far Gbagbo has not taken action
against Youn-jin Choi, but after the results announcement
he imposed an immediate ban on all foreign TV and radio
stations broadcasting from the Côte d’Ivoire. Since then,
the people have been treated to socialist-style misleading
and one-sided government propaganda by the state TV
and radio broadcaster RTI, who also came to Gbagbo’s
aid during the election campaign. Only people with
internet access still have a chance of getting independent
information.
19 | Cf. n. 11.
20 | Cf. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1765 (2007),
in: http://undemocracy.com/S-RES-1765.pdf (accessed
January 10, 2011).
Exclusion of Northern Voters
The manoeuvres of the Gbagbo camp meant that voters

across the whole north of the country were excluded. As a
result, the attempt to start a process of unification in order
to close the gap between north and south – something
which had been a goal of these elections – suffered a major
setback. A driver from the north comments: “The Gbagbo
camp has shown us that the Forces Nouvelles were right.
I never really understood why we were fighting. We were
told we were being attacked from outside. But now we can
see that we were fighting for the north’s rights.”21
After the first round had gone off largely In the week following the run-offs,
peacefully, tensions between rival supporters significant violence broke out. After
Gbagbo had been declared victor by
increased in the lead-up to the second ballot. the Constitutional Council, the situation
Even early on there were deaths and injuries escalated sharply.
in the north and west of the country, but also
particularly in the densely-populated southern areas of the
country’s economic hub, Abidjan. Tensions increased still
further in the week following the run-offs and significant
violence broke out. On the Thursday after Gbagbo had been
declared victor by the Constitutional Council, the situation
escalated sharply and the military sealed off all land, air
and sea borders for four days. Public statements by politi-
cians of both sides just served to inflame the situation,
although both leaders called on their supporters to remain
calm and renounce violence. The deteriorating situation
aroused anxiety among the population of neighbouring
countries such as Burkina Faso. They remembered only too
well the civil war years of 2002 and 2003 when thousands
of Ivorian refugees had flooded over the border. At the
moment there are more than three million immigrants
from Burkina Faso living in Côte d’Ivoire, who could flee
back to their homeland if there is trouble. According to the
UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 4,500 people
have already fled to Liberia and Guinea (Conakry).
The events in Côte d’Ivoire have provided further proof

that in the short-to-medium term “winner takes all”
elections cannot be seen as lasting political solutions in
21 | “Le sentiment d’exclusion se renforce dans le Nord ivoirien,”

Abidjan.net (Reuters), http://news.abidjan.net/h/382913.
html?n=382913 (accessed December 11, 2010).
African multi-ethnic states22 with serious political conflicts

(Zimbabwe is another example). On the contrary, these
types of elections often just serve to exacerbate the
problems and before, during and to some extent after the
ballots lead to increased numbers of refugees, increased
violence including deaths and injuries and, in the case of
Zimbabwe and elsewhere, instances of torture. This is also
attended by (additional) curbs on freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly.
Economic Fall-Out and Political Instability
The political turbulence which has pervaded the country

since the announcement of the “double” election victories
of 28 November is more than just the result of a disputed
presidential ballot. The elections were supposed to finally
create a positive direction for the country. For the last 17
years it has been in a phase of political instability, which
looks like it is going to continue for the foreseeable future.
Côte d’Ivoire was once the driving force of the West African
economy and the region’s most stable nation. The country
prospered after gaining independence in 1960 and foreign
companies, particularly from France, queued up to be
part of its nascent industrialization. Côte d’Ivoire profited
from the high prices which could be achieved in the world
market for its main export goods, cocoa and coffee. This
prosperity soon attracted an influx of immigrants from
neighbouring Sahel countries, particularly Burkina Faso
and Guinea. Founding father and President
The collapse of raw materials prices on Félix Houphouët-Boigny argued that people
the world markets in the mid-80s trig- should have the right to own the land which
gered a deep economic crisis. Despite
this, more and more immigrants flood they cultivated. But the collapse of raw
in Côte d’Ivoire. materials prices on the world markets in
the mid-80s ushered in the end of the Ivorian economic
miracle and triggered a deep economic crisis. Despite this,
more and more immigrants continued to flood in and soon
were made scapegoats for all the country’s economic and
social problems, resulting in their exclusion from Ivorian
society. This was accompanied by a change in the national
consciousness: previously a true Ivorian was considered
to be someone who was involved in building the country,
22 | In the sense of states with many different ethnic groups, as

in the majority of African countries.
but now it was all tied up with the question of origins and
ancestry and in terms of citizenship it became a political
concept. This, despite the fact that today around one
quarter of the population has foreign roots.
When President Félix Houphouët-Boigny died at the age of

88 in December 1993, after 33 years in office, there was
a power vacuum. Boigny had run the country with an iron
hand and his state party, the PDCI, had kept tight control
of the country’s administrative institutions. Opposition
parties were allowed to exist after 1990, but they had no
real effect. After Boigny’s death, the precarious economic
situation was heightened by a political crisis caused by the
uncertainty over the President’s successor. The collapse of
the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War played its part in
the resulting implosion of the one party system.
The law states that in the event of the death of the incum-
bent President, the President of the National Assembly
should take over as transitional head of government until
such time as new elections are held. In this way, Henri
Konan Bédié succeeded the state’s founder
to become the second President of Côte Boigny had ruled the country in an
d’Ivoire. However, many people would have authoritarian fashion for thirty years
without a prime minister. But when
liked to see the economist and technocrat the economy became more precarious
Ouattara at the nation’s helm. Ouattara had he turned to Ouattara.
been Prime Minister of Côte d’Ivoire since
1990 and enjoyed Boigny’s total confidence. Boigny had
ruled the country in an authoritarian fashion for thirty
years without a prime minister, but when the economy
became more precarious he turned to Ouattara, who
had studied economics in the USA and spent many years
working at the IMF, to consolidate the nation’s stricken
finances. As a result he was viewed by Boigny’s supporters
as the “well-deserved and popular” successor. For his part,
Ouattara still denies today that he had his sights on being
Houphouët-Boigny’s successor at that time.
Ivoirité: From Electoral Manipulation to a Coup
Henrie Konan Bédié, the constitutional successor, was

aware of the PDCI’s loss of power and Ouattara’s enormous
popularity. He tried to hang onto power by making the
question of Ivorian nationality and ancestry a campaign
issue, and the racist concept of Ivoirité can to a large

extent be traced back to Bédié. The word appeared for the
first time in the revised election legislation of 1994. Bédié,
the instigator of this revision, stipulated that all candidates
for the presidential elections to be held in 1995 had to
comply with the Ivoirité clause which required not only the
candidate himself but also both his parents to have been
born in Côte d’Ivoire. In this way Bédié was able to prevent
his fiercest rival, Prime Minister Ouattara, from standing
as a candidate because it was said that one of his parents
came from Burkina Faso. Ouattara himself has always
denied this, but his objection was not recognised by the
Constitutional Court and he was excluded from the 1995
elections. Laurent Gbagbo, founder of the underground FPI
in 1982 – the first opposition party to come out against the
PDCI – and who had spent some years in exile in France,
criticized Bédié’s decision and joined with other opposition
parties to boycott the election, making Bédié’s victory in
1995 a mere formality.
The 1995 presidential elections made it obvious that the

political landscape in Côte d’Ivoire had been dominated
by the same people for many years: firstly Henri Konan
Bédié, who admittedly became President in a constitutional
fashion but who never actually had to go to the people.
Then Laurent Gbagbo, who for more than 30 years had
personified the fundamental opposition to the PDCI state
party and who had argued vehemently for a
In 2010 Outarra has been recognized multi-party system. At one time he had been
by the international community as the prepared to boycott the elections and hence
legitimate victor. But there are still
questions about the role he played in give up what could have been a very real
the political unrest at the turn of the chance of being elected to the presidency in
new century.
1995. But after ten years in power he has
also thrown his democratic principles overboard. And finally
Ouatarra, the technocrat, who as far back as 1993, was
considered by many to be Boigny’s legitimate successor.
Now in 2010 he has in fact been recognized by the inter-
national community as the legitimate victor, but there are
still questions about his political entanglements and the
role he played in the political unrest at the turn of the new
century. His opponents accuse him of using the concept
of Ivoirité, which was originally used as a weapon against
him, to drum up support from the people of the north.
In the two-hour TV debate between the two candidates
held on November 25, 2010, Gbagbo constantly threw the

accusation in Ouatarra’s face: “You are responsible for all
the catastrophes in Côte d’Ivoire!”23
A second aspect of Ivoirité was that it enabled Bédié to

exploit the country’s economic crisis by making immigrants
responsible for all the economic difficulties. But Bédié
underestimated the consequences of the concept of
Ivoirité. After the 1995 elections, this manipulation of the
question of identity led to growing discrimination against
large sections of the population, who responded with
increasing unrest. The immigrants – who mainly lived in
the north – were no longer prepared to put
up with being disparaged and deprived of President Bédié’s hold on the country’s
their rights as citizens. Many of them were leadership was slipping, and the resul-
ting political instability led to a coup in
not allowed to vote or buy land, although December 1999.
they had been born in the country. President
Bédié’s hold on the country’s leadership was slipping, and
the resulting political instability led to a coup in December
1999. It is ironic that Bédié, who had once used the idea
of Ivoirité to help him become President, should now be
driven out of office because of this discrimination which
he set in motion against the immigrants in the north,
and which even helped one of these immigrants to win a
majority.
The 2000 Presidential Elections:

Gbagbo Hits the Finishing Line
Towards the end of 1999 the country was getting ready

for the presidential elections to be held in 2000. Ouattara
wanted to stand once again, so in summer 1999 he
returned to Côte d’Ivoire. He was elected President of
the RDR founded by Djeni Kobina and became the party’s
new figurehead. He reiterated his claim that his parents
were both Ivorians and submitted his candidacy papers
to the electoral bodies. The state expressed doubts about
the authenticity of these papers and began proceedings
against him for forging documents. He was found guilty
and a warrant for his arrest was issued while he was out of
the country. This led to growing unrest, with the situation
23 | “Présidentielle en Côte d`Ivoire: débat télévisé courtois entre

les deux finalistes,” in: Abidjan.net (RFI), http://news.abidjan.
net/h/381174.html (accessed December 14, 2010).
quickly escalating in the space of a few weeks. Before 2002,

most members of the armed forces had been northerners
and as such had suffered from the discrimination which
had been directed at them for so many years. They rose
up against Bédié. General Gueï, who came from the west
and who had been a close confidant of Boigny, took over
provisional leadership of the country. Bédié fled abroad and
Ouattara returned, knowing that he could rely on Gueï’s
support. In the lead-up to the elections it now looked as
though Gbagbo and the FPI, who had consistently spoken
out against the concept of Ivoirité and discrimination
against immigrants, would now stand in direct opposition
to Ouattara and the RDR. Ouattara’s popularity had not
diminished during his long absence. Gbagbo and Gueï, who
was also a candidate, were only too aware of this fact.
The General increasingly distanced himself from Ouattara,
whose role in the December 1999 coup is still unclear. It
was also thanks to the efforts of Gueï that the Constitu-
tional Court once again accused the RDR and Ouattara of
making false statements.
History repeated itself when interim president Gueï gained

a mandate via referendum to change the electoral regula-
tions, once again making it a requirement that both parents
of presidential candidates must be born in the Côte d’Ivoire.
Just as in 1995, Ouattara was not allowed to stand. This
time Gbagbo did not protest for he knew that his political
opponent was very popular and he and Gueï
Gbagbo emerged as the victor in 2000, both saw him as their strongest rival. Bédié
but the elections were marked by vi- was also prevented from standing on flimsy
olent protests. More than 300 people
were killed. procedural grounds. Gbagbo emerged as
the victor in 2000, but the elections were
marked by violent protests after first Gueï, then Gbagbo
was announced as the winner. The supporters of the RDR,
whose candidate Ouattara had been excluded from the
vote, reacted particularly violently. More than 300 people
were killed. The CEI finally announced Gbagbo to be the
official winner with almost 60 per cent of the vote, with a
turnout of 37 per cent, according to the CEI. The results
were widely questioned, but the RDR’s demand that the
elections should be rerun was ignored.
Fig. 3
Division of Côte d’Ivoire
Zone de Confiance (buffer zone)
Dialogue of National Reconciliation Ends

in Civil War
Gueï initially refused to accept the result, but then fled

to the north of the country. Gbagbo, realizing he was in a
precarious position, joined with Gueï, Bédié and Ouattara
to start a dialogue for national reconciliation. In 2002
Ouattara was officially granted Ivorian citizenship by the
Constitutional Court. A few weeks later, the unrest which
had been simmering for two years escalated further and
on September 19, 2002 a coup attempt led to civil war, in
the course of which Gueï was killed and Ouattara fled the
country. Ouattara’s role was again brought into question:
although he accused Gbagbo of inciting unrest by arresting
several RDR members who came from the north, the
uprising by the northern-dominated army was difficult to
explain.
But the coup attempt by sections of the army did not lead
to Gbagbo being forced from office. He was still there at
the start of the civil war which lasted until 2007 and which
led to the country being divided into the rebel-controlled
north and the government-controlled south.
The civil war in Côte d’Ivoire should not be simplified by

describing it as a conflict between the Muslim north and
the Christian-Animist south. The religious divide is more
readily explained by the fact that most immigrants who
were denied their rights as citizens because of the concept

of Ivoirité came from the Muslim countries of the Sahel
and hence are Muslims. So the civil war was not a religious
conflict, as in Nigeria for example.
The Ouagadougou Agreement provided In March 2007 the Ouagadougou Agreement,

for a government of national unity which which was mediated by the President of
would bring together the countries
different power bases. Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, brought
an end to a civil war which had led to the
displacement of 1.7 million refugees and the division of
the country.24 It was the last in a long series to resolve
the conflict. The Ouagadougou Agreement provided for a
government of national unity which would bring together
all the countries different power bases. Guillaume Soro, the
rebel leader from the north, was appointed Prime Minister.
He was not able to stand in the 2010 elections as he was
under the legally-stipulated age of 40 years. A few months
later, in June 2007, the militias began to disarm and the
buffer zone between north and south was dismantled.
After the Ouagadougou Agreement, preparations were

set in motion for the presidential elections which had
been overdue since 2005. It soon became clear that the
planned timeframe of ten months was much too short
because of two delicate issues. First of all, the accuracy
of the electoral register had to be ensured in order to
avoid renewed conflicts on the question of nationality. An
accurate electoral register was an indispensable condition
for peaceful elections, particularly as the 2002 register
excluded many voters and was therefore hotly disputed.
But the fact that many Ivorians do not possess any proof of
ancestry meant that clarifying the identity of many people
was a political, rather than practical, issue. The question of
identity has still not been clearly dealt with, as more than
40,000 entries in the electoral register were rejected.
Another important factor was the disarmament of the

former rebel troops in the north and their integration into
the armed forces, which proved to be a long and difficult
process. Complications with voter registration and rebel
disarmament were the two most common causes of the
eight election postponements.
24 | Cf. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, “Das Abkommen von Ouaga-

dougou – Dem Frieden ein Stück näher,” http://kas.de/wf/
de/71.6533 (accessed December 15, 2010).
This explains why the process of preparation was so

important for holding peaceful elections. But for a long
time it looked as if the country’s politicians, particularly
President Gbagbo, had no real interest in holding elections
and in the end only scheduled them as a result of external
pressure. Since 2007, Gbagbo has headed up a government
of national unity. By constantly postponing the elections he
has succeeded in holding onto power for ten years and
expanding his party from its initial urban roots into more
rural areas. The other parties involved in government also
benefited from having access to power and resources.
Political declarations and justifications for postponing the
elections often appeared half-hearted, as each side knew
that after the elections one of them would have to give up
their sinecure.
It finally became clear that elections could no longer be

avoided and that President Gbagbo could now only play for
time. He dissolved his government and the independent
Election Commission (CEI) in February 2010, knowing
their reformulation would delay the elections by another
few weeks. Gbagbo had from the start few opportunities
to influence the CEI because it had remained neutral
and independent through working with the UN and other
international organisations. It is also a requirement that all
parties send representatives to the CEI. So dissolving and
reforming the CEI was not a strategic coup on Gbagbo’s
part which would secure his grip on power. Instead, as
previously discussed, the key was his appointment of party
crony Yao N’Dré as head of the Constitutional Council.
The First Round of the Presidential Elections –

the Côte d’Ivoire Miracle
When set against the Côte d’Ivoire’s recent history, the

run-up, the ballot itself on October 31, 2010 and the
immediate aftermath of the first round could be described
as “The Côte d’Ivoire Miracle”.25 For the most part
25 | For more detail on this and following cf. Klaus D. Loetzer,

“Côte d’Ivoire: Seit fünf Jahren überfällige Präsidentschafts-
wahlen verlaufen friedlich,” KAS-Länderbericht, November 5,
2010, http://kas.de/westafrika/de/publications/21041
(accessed December 10, 2010); cf. also detailed online
chronology at http://kas.de/westafrika/de/pages/9708
campaigning went off peacefully, apart from election

posters being defaced and one or two ill-chosen slogans
which Gbagbo used against Ouattara (“Alassane is a liar!”)
and Bédié against Ouattara (“The one who suddenly got
rich!”). Gbagbo not only made use of the state radio and TV
broadcasters to help his campaign but also used the state
bus company to transport his supporters. Campaigning
ended in Abidjan with Gbagbo and Ouattara holding
impressive mass rallies of supporters. When
Ouattara was way ahead of all the other we assess the campaigns, it is clear that
candidates in terms of content, topics Alassane Ouattara was way ahead of all the
covered, presentation, organisation
and the use of audio-visual media. other candidates in terms of content, topics
In contrast, Bédié seemed tired. covered, presentation, organisation and the
use of audio-visual media. In contrast, the
76 year-old Bédié seemed tired. When his advisers tried to
spur him on, his retort was “On n’a pas fait campagne!”26,
adding the argument that, “I achieved much more between
1993 and 1999 than Gbagbo has since 2000”27 He was
the only one out of the fourteen candidates not to take
part in a TV presentation, and he refused to print T-shirts,
that essential ingredient of all African election campaigns.
He also failed to put up any election posters, while the
other candidates’ photos and slogans were on every street
corner.
On the actual day of the election there were no reports

of any particular incidents. The international election
observers, particularly the EU who had already been in the
country for four weeks, confirmed that the election had
gone off in a democratic fashion, with transparency and
fairness.
Fourteen presidential candidates stood in the first round,

including one woman.28 Gulliaume Soro, General Secretary
of Forces Nouvelles (FN), the political arm of the former
northern rebels who had been Prime Minister under
President Gbagbo since 2007, was not allowed to stand
as he was only 39 years old (the minimum age for presi-
dential candidates is 40). The other eleven candidates had
no real chance against the political heavyweights Gbagbo,
26 | “We are not campaigning!”

27 | Jeune Afrique, November 13-17, 2010, 26.
28 | For an overview see http://kas.de/wf/de/71.6539 (accessed
December 10, 2010).
Bédié and Ouattara. Put together, they only won around

four per cent of the vote, the same per centage as the
invalid votes, which were very high at 4.66 per cent. This
was put down to insufficient voter training programmes,
but it should be noted that the UN and other international
bodies, with the help of Ivorian NGOs, carried out compre-
hensive voter training during the run-up to the elections.
And in the second ballot the amount of invalid votes halved
to 2.11 per cent.
The extremely high voter turnout of 83.7 per cent can only
be described as sensational. This was partly due to the fact
that voters had gone so long without being able to exercise
their right, for example it would have been the first time
that a 29-year-old had ever voted. As the population of
Côte d’Ivoire is very young (see chart), there was a high
proportion of first-time voters. It was also clear that the
population, particularly the young, had high hopes of using
their vote to bring the country back together and create a
better economic future. So the candidates’ main campaign
topics were youth unemployment and the anticipated
peace dividend.
As none of the candidates won an absolute majority in the

first round, the Ivorians were obliged to go to the polls
for the second time in four weeks, after this democratic
right had been denied them eight times in the previous
five years. The elections had been constantly postponed
because of the sensitive and time-consuming process of
voter identification and because of the lack
of progress in disarming the ex-militia and Gbagbo was largely held responsible
soldiers of the Forces Nouvelles. But more for postponing the elections, with his
critics accusing him of delaying the
recently the politicians themselves have vote in order to guarantee his own
been increasingly blamed for the failure to reelection.
hold elections. Since the 2007 Agreement of
Ouagadougou, all the main political players had been repre-
sented in Prime Minister Soro’s government, including the
ex-rebels. In this kind of all-party government, elections
would inevitably lead to at least one side losing their
political sinecures. But President Gbagbo was largely held
responsible for postponing the elections, with his critics
accusing him of delaying the vote in order to guarantee his
own reelection.
Opposition Unable to Unite Round

a Single Candidate
By coming third in the first ballot, Henri Konan Bédié of

the PDCI took on the mantle of kingmaker.29 Everything
hung on which candidate he told his supporters to vote for
in the second ballot. This was to all intents and purposes
a foregone conclusion, as the PDCI and RDR had joined
together with two smaller parties in 2007 to form the RHDP
party coalition. However, this coalition had not managed
to unite around a single candidate. As a result, Bédié,
Ouattara and Albert T. Mabri of the RHDP-allied UDPCI30
all stood as candidates, but this latter
Bédié and Ouattara formed an elec- 48-year-old came fourth with only 2.57 per
toral pact in October, in which they cent of the vote. Against this backdrop, Bédié
agreed that whichever one of them
came first in the second ballot, that and Ouattara formed another electoral pact
candidate would then benefit from the in early October 2010 in Yamoussoukro, at
other’s votes.
the graveside of Houphouët-Boigny, in which
they agreed that whichever one of them came first in the
second ballot, that candidate would then benefit from the
other’s votes. After seeing the results of the second ballot,
we can assume that the majority of Bédié’s supporters
followed his wishes. The slightly lower turnout of approx.
81.13 compared to 83.7 in the first round suggests that
it was mainly PDCI supporters who stayed away in the
second round, and particularly those who felt could not
in all conscience vote for Ouattara, as Bédié and Ouattara
had been bitter enemies after Félix Houphouët-Boigny’s
death on the question of the president’s successor. This
was why Bédié dreamed up the political concept of Ivoirité
in 1994, unaware just how politically explosive this would
prove to be. The concept took on a momentum of its own
and in the end led to the outbreak of civil war.
Of the 19 regions in Côte d’Ivoire, Ouattara won five in the

north, Gbagbo won the eleven central regions and Bédié
won only three, two on the central plateau and one in the
29 | Even before the provisional election result had been announ-

ced by the CEI, the PDCI had called for a recount in their
strongholds, alleging irregularities. The Constitutional Council
disregarded this demand for procedural reasons, claiming
that the complaint was not presented formally to the Consti-
tutional Council after the official announcement of the election
results.
30 | Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire.
south west.31 One third of voters live in Abidjan (approx.

3.6 million inhabitants in 2008), a city which is divided into
ten quartiers. Of these, Gbagbo won seven and Ouattara
three (Treichville, Adjamé und Abobo). Bédié was also
the loser here: he was unable to win a single quartier in
Abidjan, and indeed lost votes to Gbagbo.32 The Gbagbo
camp’s belief that Ouattara could only win votes in the
north was also proven to be false, though admittedly the
majority of the population of the three quartiers which he
won, particularly Treichville, had moved there from the
north. As both factions had a lot of support in Abidjan,
the city became the main flashpoint for confrontations
between the hostile camps. The Gbagbo-loyalist security
forces kept a particularly high profile in the three quartiers
previously mentioned.
The Current Situation and Outlook
The behaviour of the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces

(FDS), in particular that of the army and Garde Répub-
licaine, will be critical in determining how these power
issues play out. After an army uprising resulted in a failed
coup attempt in 2002, Gbagbo dissolved the armed forces
and rebuilt them with the help of Angola. New appoint-
ments were made, as in the past many officers, particularly
lower-ranking officers, had been northerners. In 2004 he
appointed his close supporter, General Philippe Mangou, to
Chief of Staff, thus ensuring that a key position was held
by one of his people. Gbagbo told his officers: “If I fall,
you fall with me!” which, along with other rumours that
are circulating, gives the impression that the army, like
the political establishment, are not solidly behind Gbagbo.
However, the regular armed forces only con- Gbagbo could let the division of the
trol the south of the country, with the military country become permanent, as most
of the economically-important goods,
arm of the ex-rebel Forces Nouvelles, the jobs and tax-generating industries are
Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles (FAFN) located in the south.
still holding sway in the north. Gbagbo could
let the division of the country become permanent, as most
of the economically-important goods, jobs and tax-gene
rating industries are located in the south. Agricultural
31 | Cf. map on RFI site at: http://rfi.my/hqpLxw (accessed

December 10, 2010).
32 | Cf. Jeune Afrique, November 13-17, 2010, 24.
products such as natural rubber, pineapples, palm oil,

cocoa, coffee and wood, along with the ports, industrial
operations, the trade and services sector, and oil and gas
reserves for future extraction are all located along the
coast, as is the case in neighbouring Ghana. The north
only has a small amount of gold, diamonds and agricultural
products such as pineapples, etc, but no export goods such
as wood, cocoa or coffee.
A lasting political solution can only be achieved domesti-

cally. Support from other African countries could be helpful,
even essential. It is important to find “an African-led inter-
national mechanism” in order to implement the foreign,
particularly western demands for “good governance,
democracy and the rule of law”, with “the power to back
up fine words with firm action”.33 This could be in the form
of military intervention by the AU, which however does
not necessarily mean foreign soldiers on Ivorian soil. A
possible solution could be interaction between the armed
forces of neighbouring countries. The Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung’s PDWA has created a good foundation for this
with its network of senior army officers from West African
French-speaking nations.
It is essential that foreign troops such as UN peace-

keepers and their French support contingent maintain
their neutrality, otherwise they will quickly be viewed as
occupying troops with all the attendant security problems
for their soldiers and staff. It remains to be seen to
what extent the boundaries of neutrality have already
been exceeded. In any case, the Gbagbo camp has been
exploiting a supposed bias on the part of UNOCI against his
political opponent Ouattara.
Four Possible Scenarios
In conclusion, we can briefly outline four scenarios which

are currently under discussion.34 The first two scenarios
33 | Simon Tisdall: “Ivory Coast crisis exposes hollowness of

west’s fine words,” guardian.co.uk, December 19, 2010, in:
http://guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/19/ivory-coast-united-
nations-france (accessed December 21, 2010).
34 | Cf. “Pour mettre fin au bras de fer autour du fauteuil
présidentiel: Voici les 4 schémas qui s’imposent à Gbagbo et
Ouattara,” in: Abidjan.net (L’Inter), http://news.abidjan.net/
h/384222.html (accessed December 22, 2010).
depend on the individual behaviour of one of the two

protagonists, whereas in scenarios three and four they
have to work together, something which is hard to imagine
in light of their past history and individual egotism.
1. Gbagbo Relinquishes Power
The first scenario is that Gbagbo recognizes Ouattara’s

victory and gives in to international pressure. This would
be based on acceptance of the election result by the
independent CEI. This unexpected relinquishment would
have the advantage of freeing Côte d’Ivoire from the
political and diplomatic isolation which it has found itself in
since December 2, 2010. This particularly relates to actions
and measures which depend on international organisations
and institutions, such as budget support from the World
Bank in 2011, including obtaining the famous Completion
Points for the HIPC initiative, which should be gained by
the end of March 2011. If the present situation continues,
then these important international support actions remain
in balance.
2. Ouattara Relinquishes Power
In the second scenario, Ouattara is the one If Ouattara is the one to act by relin-
to act by relinquishing the sovereign power quishing the sovereign power invested
in him by the voters, the international
invested in him by the voters. In light of his community would be taken aback.
election victory, this would be a kind of “denial
of power”. It is not clear how the international community
would react to this. They would certainly be taken aback,
but would be forced to accept a victory by Gbagbo which
did not happen, with the resultant lifting of isolation and
sanctions. This would be immensely damaging to the
meaning and credibility of democratic procedures such as
elections.
3. A Zimbabwe-Style Power Sharing Agreement
In the third scenario, the two men agree to share power.

Under the terms of the Zimbabwe Agreement, they would
share power by one becoming President and the other
Prime Minister. However, the power sharing is not working
in Zimbabwe and it has the structural disadvantage that
under the constitution the President wields more power
than the Prime Minister. Some constitutional amend-

ments were made under the terms of the “Global Power
Agreement” (GPA), but Mugabe has simply ignored them,
resulting in fruitless disputes over interpretation. But the
security forces play a decisive role, and they are normally
loyal to the President. And the egos of the two Ivorian
protagonists make this scenario unworkable.
4. The Congo Agreement
The fourth scenario involves a kind of power sharing based

on presidential and vice-presidential roles. However, the
question as to who becomes President and who “only” Vice-
President means that such a scenario is doomed to fail. On
top of this, the Ivorian Constitution of August 1, 2000 would
have to be amended, and as the example of Zimbabwe has
shown, even amendments which are made in writing are
still not respected. It would also be necessary to hold a
referendum before constitutional changes could be made.
The more time goes by, the less possi- At the moment it is quite unclear how the
bility there seems to be of a solution situation in Côte d’Ivoire is going to evolve.
which allows both protagonists to
save face, something which is crucially The more time goes by, the less possibility
important in West African culture. there seems to be of a solution which allows
both protagonists to save face, something
which is crucially important in West African culture. The
chance of a peaceful and diplomatic solution is fading with
every day that passes. If Côte d’Ivoire were once again to
sink into civil war, the difficult political consolidation which
has taken place since 2002 would be set back years, if
not decades. This would also have a devastating effect
on neighbouring countries. For one thing, the widespread
hope that Côte d’Ivoire would once again become the
region’s economic driver would be dashed. Many refugees
would return to their homes in the Sahel. And many
other African countries with illegitimate governments and
presidents who are just taking their first steps in political
consolidation could point to another example of how the
democratic process has led to undemocratic governance.
Then there would be very few beacons of democracy left
in West Africa.
People with Low Expectations

are Seldom Disappointed
Climate Summit in Cancún did not fail,
but Was it Successful Enough?
Frank Priess
It is always difficult to measure results against expectations

whose origins are not clearly defined. We know this from
international stock markets and the assessments of
analysts, and the same can be said of international confer-
ences. It is all too easy for everybody to say that the UN
Climate Conference COP16 in Cancún, Mexico, exceeded
expectations because almost everybody involved, inclu
ding the hosts Mexico, took the opportunity in the months Frank Priess is
leading up to the conference to systematically lower expec- Resident Represen-
tative of the Konrad-
tations. Brasil’s President Ignacio Lula da Silva perhaps Adenauer-Stiftung in
made this abundantly clear when he said at the beginning Mexico.
of December: “No big leader is going, only environment
ministers at best. We don't even know if foreign ministers
are going. So there won't be any progress.”
The first thing people gave up on was the hope of cemen

ting some kind of binding climate treaty out there on the
Caribbean coast. The necessary preconditions were not in
place to achieve this kind of agreement, as a successor to
the Kyoto Protocol, according to a statement by Mexico’s
Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa in mid-October. In fact
this wasn’t even really necessary, as the Protocol was set
to run until 2012. For Espinosa the conference was now
more about discussing a number of measures in the areas
of “mitigación, adaptación, financiación y tecnología”.
This was a clever strategy, as all the participants in the

climate process were still feeling the effects of the compre-
hensive failure in Copenhagen. The UN had seemed to be
on the brink of a disaster, the European Union had felt

marginalised, the new “superpowers” had flexed their
muscles in a negative way, and the USA and China had
been pilloried by environmental activists as the bogeymen.
A very unsatisfactory experience for everyone concerned,
so there was good reason for people to want Cancún to
achieve at least something.
And it did achieve something. “Cancún”, according to Green-

peace spokesman Wendel Trio, “saved the negotiation
process, but not the climate.” The main objective of COP16
was to re-establish the trust that had been lost in Copen-
hagen, and in this respect it was successful. Christiana
Figueres, Executive Secretary of the CMNUCC (Convención
Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático,
in English UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change), went as far as to suggest that the
conference had offered a “beacon of hope” and seen a
“historic agreement” take place. “Against all
“We are very pleased that the UN pro- expectations common sense has prevailed”
cess has been saved.” (Connie Hede- claimed World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)
gaard, EU Commissioner for Climate
Action) climate expert Regine Günther in Spiegel
magazine. “We are very pleased that the UN
process has been saved”, said EU Climate Commissioner
Connie Hedegaard. And German Federal Climate Minister
Norbert Röttgen summed up the conference: “I believe that
this has been a real success.” The international community
had shown that it was capable of serious negotiation, he
said.
Others were not so complimentary. A reader survey carried

out by the international opinion-former The Economist
suggested that 57 per cent of readers considered the
climate summit to have been a failure. “The outcome of
Cancún is not going to keep global warming below two
degrees”, said Hubert Weiger, chairman of the League
for the environment and Nature Conservation (BUND),
the German Branch of Friends of the Earth. It also did
not alter the lip service paid by the government. And the
Mayor of Mexico’s capital, Marcelo Ebrard, commenting on
the outcome of the conference, said: “I believe that the
announcements coming out of Cancún are just a repeat of
Copenhagen. I’m not saying that no progress was made,
there were some interesting aspects, but in general it

didn’t achieve what we hoped it would.” His city would,
however, proceed on its own, as he had agreed with other
mayors at a large city conference in the run-up to Cancún.
The Problem is that Nothing is Binding
The Cancún Agreement, in the tradition of the Copenhagen

Accord, did at least specifically recognise, for the first time
in an UN document, the necessity of having a so-called
“two degree target”, signed by China and the USA. This was
progress, especially for the USA, where there are still a lot
of (even politically influential) people who still have their
doubts about man’s influence on climate change. Those
island nations like Fiji, the Cook Islands, the Maldives and
Tuvalu, who have the most to fear from a rise in sea levels,
would have liked to have seen an even more ambitious
target being set. They had campaigned for a maximum
1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels. Nothing binding
came out of the Agreement, however, and there were also
no long-term reduction goals or even targets for specific
energy-intensive sectors such as agriculture, sea and air
travel. Negotiations on these issues were deferred and
now everybody is pinning their hopes on COP17 in Durban,
South Africa, at the end of 2011.
The proposal that by 2020 the industrialised nations should

reduce their emissions by 25 to 40 per cent compared to
1990 levels remains just that: a non-binding
proposal, at least for all those countries that Emerging nations like Brazil, China and
did not sign the Kyoto Protocol. Emerging India will not be required to reduce
their emissions. And yet, China is the
nations like Brazil, China and India will not be world’s biggest polluter.
required to reduce their emissions. They are
only expected to “limit the pace of their emission growth.”
And yet, China is the world’s biggest polluter, and those
other emerging nations India and Russia are numbers
three and four in the league, ahead of Japan and Germany.
In 2014 the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
will announce how much emissions must be reduced by
to achieve the “two degree target”, and then we will be
able to evaluate just how valuable the resolutions made at
Cancún really were.
The future progress reports that countries are supposed

to give to the UN every two years are also non-binding.
Internationally-funded climate actions will be monitored,
but all other measures will only be subject to national
scrutiny.
The future of the Kyoto Protocol, which expires in

December 2012, remains in suspense. Cancún created
some breathing space to achieve an extension to Kyoto by
the time the conference in South Africa comes around. In
Cancún Japan, Russia and Australia were not prepared to
agree to an extension to the Protocol. They argue that it
makes no sense if the two biggest “polluters”, the USA and
China, who are together responsible for 42.2 per cent of
emissions, are not bound by it.
The Kyoto Protocol is also key to the issue of carbon

trading, an important source of income for financing
climate change measures, especially in developing nations.
In a recent study the World Bank concluded that between
70 and 100 billion dollars will need to change hands every
year until 2050 in order to pay for adaptation measures
designed to reduce climate change. The poorest developing
nations alone would require 26 billion dollars per year. The
Protocol provides for such an adaptation fund, paid for by
carbon trading (CDM – Clean Development Mechanism), so
a failure to extend the Protocol could have direct financial
consequences. The World Bank calculates that in 2009
alone certificates for the equivalent of 8.7 billion tonnes of
CO² were traded. Of a total of 103 billion euros traded on
the carbon market, the European Union alone accounted
for 89 billion.
In developing nations there is still a Although the adaptation fund goes back
need to create institutions which can as far as the 2001 Climate Summit held in
deal effectively with carbon trading
issues. Marrakesh, it only really started to work after
the Bali Summit in 2007. Volumes should
amount to around 360 million dollars by 2012 – Spain,
Germany and Sweden have also made additional funds
available. In the meantime projects in Senegal, Pakistan
and the Solomon Islands have been certified for financing
by the fund. 22 million dollars will be made available, a
modest start. In developing nations in particular there is
still a need to create institutions which can deal effectively
with carbon trading issues. Those private enterprises that

are involved need some kind of certainty in the planning
process, which they don’t really have as things stand at
the moment. This is also the case with other aspects of
national and international energy policy. If, after the failure
of Cancún to secure a binding agreement, a legally binding
treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol is adopted in Durban,
then the ratification process among signatory nations
could still take years to be completed. The result could be
an international patchwork of legal provisions, something
particularly feared by business leaders, according to a
survey by the consultancy firm Accenture which was
published in Spiegel magazine. A possible alternative
would be a system of import duties aimed at reducing
unfair competition both nationally and regionally.
Different Interests
As far as the USA is concerned, hopes that The U.S. President’s room for mano-
Barack Obama might be able to achieve more euvre at home appears to be limited,
despite his good intentions. He failed
on environmental policy than his predecessor to get his energy and climate policy bill
and be more open to internationally-binding through the Senate.
agreements appear to have been dashed.
The U.S. President’s room for manoeuvre at home appears
to be limited, despite his good intentions. He failed to get
his energy and climate policy bill through the Senate in
summer, and the new majority there suggests that this
will not change. Cancún chief negotiator Todd Stern did
however reiterate Obama’s promise from Copenhagen to
reduce the emission of greenhouse gases by 17 per cent
in comparison to 2005 by the year 2020. On the subject
of the main sticking points of the Kyoto Protocol he made
it clear that his country did not sign the Protocol and so
would not be adopting a position on whether it made sense
for it to continue. According to Stern, “That is for the Kyoto
signatories to decide.” However, in the run-up to COP16
some discreet negotiations aimed at reconciling differ-
ences of opinion do appear to have taken place, not least
with China. Analysts such as Daniel Weiss from the Center
for American Progress doubt, however, that this will lead
to a change in approach before the presidential elections
in 2012.
The position of developing and emerging nations is clear:

they do not want any limitations to be placed on their future
growth and argue that it is the industrialized nations which
have brought the world’s climate to the brink of disaster.
This is basically the point Hu Tao of the Policy Research
Center for Environment and Economy was making on
December 7th, 2010 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung:
“Why am I only allowed to produce around four tonnes of
CO² per year while you Europeans can produce over 12
tonnes? And an American 22 tonnes? Why do you have
that right and I don’t?” He said Europeans were prepared
to do more than North Americans – “America should sign
the Kyoto Protocol” – but this was by no means enough.
They should be more flexible, especially on the issue of
technology transfer. However, these arguments fail to
recognise that China’s CO² emissions, according to the
International Energy Agency, are already above the world
average and by 2020 will probably have already reached
European levels. China’s emission levels are currently twice
the size of their share of the world’s economy. However it
is hoped that China will aim to double its spending on the
environment in its current five year plan to 2015 compared
to the previous plan. The biggest problems will be the
country’s inefficient energy production and the reliance on
coal.
The Europeans haven’t really changed their position since

Copenhagen. They are proposing to reduce their green-
house gas emissions by 20 per cent compared to 1990
by the year 2020. If other important countries or country
groupings agree to do the same, then the EU
Germany is even more ambitious: its Commission has a mandate to increase this
aim is a 40 per cent reduction by 2020. goal to an ambitious 30 per cent, but they
By the end of 2009 they had already
achieved a 29 per cent reduction. were not in a position to exercise this option
in Cancún. Germany is even more ambitious:
its aim is a 40 per cent reduction by 2020, as stated in
the coalition agreement between the Christian Democrats
and the Liberal Party, with the help of an ambitious energy
programme. According to Environment Minister Norbert
Röttgen they had already achieved a 29 per cent reduction
by the end of 2009. The target for 2020 is therefore quite
realistic.
However, the EU and its member states have made it clear

that there will not be any further unilateral concessions.
Industry is already struggling under the burden of high
energy prices and a switch to using more renewable energy
resources and the necessary legislative changes to ensure
that this happens will only make matters worse. Even
Germany will only be able to continue down its chosen
path if there is a worldwide binding climate treaty in place
by 2020, according to energy analysts. There is a danger
that, if Germany or the EU should place the burden of costs
for low carbon emission technology on the economy, then
energy-intensive sectors may choose to move abroad. The
head of the Federation of German Industries (BDI), Werner
Schnappauf, talking about the outcome of the conference,
claimed that “The EU will be able to raise its greenhouse
gas reduction target to 30 per cent only if all other indus-
trialised and emerging nations also commit to ambitious
reduction targets and emission limits. Otherwise we will
lose modern production facilities and jobs in Europe and
Germany”. Also, if some countries make unilateral conces-
sions, other countries may be tempted not to make as
much effort to reduce their own emissions.
Who Pays What to Whom and by When?
Mexico’s proposal to establish a “Green Fund” in addition

to the funds from the Adaptation Fund incorporated in the
Kyoto Protocol had fallen on deaf ears in Copenhagen.
Now the Green Fund turned out to be one of
the most concrete outcomes of COP16. 30 Those countries that are most in need
billion dollars are to be invested in climate of investment are the ones that have
done the least to contribute to climate
protection in developing nations between change. So for many this is a question
2010 and 2012 and it is planned that there of “historical fairness”.
will be an annual investment of 100 billion
dollars by 2020. The moral behind all this is that it is
generally accepted that those countries that are most
in need of investment are the ones that have done the
least to contribute to climate change. So for many this is a
question of “historical fairness”, which is not an easy issue
to deal with.
What is not clear, however, is from whom and how this

money is going to be sourced and exactly how these
funds will be administered. The World Bank should at
least temporarily take on the role of treasurer for the first

three years, with distribution policies being monitored by
a committee made up of industrialised and developing
nations with equal numbers of votes.
Now, of course, everybody has started to do the maths.

Europe’s chief negotiator Artur Runge-Metzger pointed
out in his interim accounts that the European Union has
already paid out 2.2 billion of the 7 billion euros which
had been earmarked for climate protection
Environment groups are afraid that for the period 2010 to 2012. Around one
new pledges may be calculated using billion of this had been invested in measures
existing funds. There may be some
simple reclassification of funds within to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 735
development budgets. million in adaptation measures and 562
million in reforestation programmes, among other things.
Environment groups everywhere are afraid that new
pledges may be calculated using existing funds, that there
may be some simple reclassification of funds within devel-
opment budgets, not to mention creative book-keeping
where private investment is involved.
Progress in Forest Protection
Forest protection was another subject for debate in

Cancún and here again there were some partial successes.
According to UN studies, deforestation is still responsible
for 18 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions. Here the
buzzword is REDD (reducing emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation). Behind this idea lies the principle
that those who protect the tropical rainforest and demon-
strably help to reduce the destruction of forests should in
future be financially compensated. So forest protection as
a service to the environment should also be economically
worthwhile.
There are some tricky questions too, such as who exactly

should profit and how, and what kind of monitoring system
is required. It is also important to ensure that species-
rich primary forest is not simply replaced by monotonous
plantation trees. Also, many threatened areas lie in regions
which have limited governmental controls. However, some
countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, are having some
success with this programme and are trying to improve
the necessary mechanisms. One very important goal is
to ensure that foreign donors get a guarantee that funds

donated will in fact be used for their intended purpose.
It may also be possible to establish standards, based on
practical examples that can then be incorporated into
the binding regulations of the relevant UN mechanisms.
Not for nothing did Brazil rank first in the Germanwatch
Climate Risk Index, especially in light of recent successes
in combating the destruction of the tropical rainforest.
For many environmental protection groups this whole

mechanism goes against the grain, for example this was
part of Bolivia’s argument at Cancún. They are afraid that
this will encourage the privatisation of forests and could
lead to the illegal acquisition of forest land. In their opinion
the biggest sufferers would be the indigenous peoples
who live in and from the forests. Their participation in any
decision-making process on forest protection and the need
for a higher degree of transparency are generally seen as
the minimum requirements of REDD policy.
At the End it Just Came Down

to the “Dissenters”
Right up until the very end representatives The normal negotiating process obvi-
from the 194 nations had struggled with the ously is such that the two weeks of ne-
gotiations are merely seen as a lead up
wording of the final declaration, something to a dramatic showdown. Cancún was
which is quite normal for mega-conferences. no exception to this.
The normal negotiating process obviously is
such that the two weeks of negotiations are merely seen as
a lead up to a dramatic showdown, while behind the scenes
the ever-growing spectre of total failure lurks ominously.
Cancún was no exception to this, with an agreement
amongst the key players only being reached right at the
last minute.
Only Bolivia fought to the very end against the solutions

that were finally adopted – too little had been done
according to their delegate, Pablo Solón Romo, who had
sorely tried the patience of the other delegates. He had
even gone as far as to describe the climate policies of the
industrialised nations as “genocide”. Bolivia saw itself as
the mouthpiece of the La Vía Campesina initiative, which
was founded in 1993 to represent small and medium-sized
agricultural producers and which now coordinates the
activities of 148 organisations in 69 countries. As part of

the so-called “People’s Agreement” in Cochabamba in April
Bolivia supported a call for developed countries to agree to
a binding reduction of their CO² emissions of 50 per cent
by 2017. A substantially larger “adaptation fund” should
then be administered by COP with significant funds going
to developing nations. Forest protection policies like REDD
were rejected by La Vía Campesina.
To the surprise of many observers, in the end the Bolivians

found themselves in an isolated position with their extreme
stance on issues. Even their fellow ALBA members
(Allianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de América) from
Cuba, Venezuela and Ecuador sided with the rest of the
international community, who one by one had given their
agreement to the protocol. In the end the conference
President glossed over Bolivia’s objections. To applause
from other delegates Patricia Espinosa declared that
“consensus does not necessarily have to mean unanimity”,
in reaction to Bolivia’s attempt to stop an agreement
being reached at the conference and to exercise a kind
of quasi veto. La Paz had clearly gambled on too strong
an end-game. At 3.30 in the morning of December 11
the result of the conference finally became official. The
Bolivians, however, immediately announced that they
would challenge the validity of the resolutions before the
UN court and the outcome is far from certain.
Many people have started to seriously question whether

these mega-events with tens of thousands of participants
are really the ideal vehicle for making real progress,
especially when at the end it comes down to a handful of
genuine “negotiators”. There were 6,300 national and UN
delegates at Cancún, while 15,000 representatives from
around 300 national and international non-governmental
organisations completed the line-up. While pictures and
descriptions of conference dynamics can help to position
topics firmly in the media spotlight, many reporters and
some media formats failed to grasp the complexity of some
of the issues, with the result that we saw the usual narrow
focus, black and white portrayals and the search for scape-
goats when the political decisions sometimes fell short of
expectations, especially when those expectations had been
dramatised by NGOs with vested interests.
Praise for the Hosts
Mexico was highly-praised for the way it hosted the event,

as was Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa who acted as
conference president. Many participants felt that much
of the conference’s success was due to Mexico’s skilful
management of the event, its consistently constructive
and confidence-building attitude and the way it did not
shy away from the spotlight. UN General Secretary Ban
Ki Moon also added his own words of praise. Mexico, with
its rather low international profile, was happy to receive
this recognition, as the country is still constantly compared
to the much more high-profile Brazil. It was good for this
country which is so stricken by drug-related violence to
finally hit the international headlines for positive reasons.
During his inaugural speech at COP16 on November 29,

President Felipe Calderón spoke out against the “false
dilemma” of seeing growth and climate protection as
opposites. “It is totally possible to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases while not only maintaining economic
growth but also generating new forms of productivity,
growth and job creation in a wave of green development,
green growth and sustainability”. Calderón told the repre-
sentatives of 194 nations that the fight against poverty
would be afforded the highest priority. The
President had already written in the Konrad- In Mexico, without climate protection
Adenauer-Stiftung’s publication Die Politische measures the anticipated cost of envi-
ronmental damage would be six per
Meinung that the cost of doing nothing is cent of GDP.
higher than the cost of targeted action. In
the case of Mexico, without climate protection measures
the anticipated cost of environmental damage would be six
per cent of GDP until mid-century, while the ongoing costs
of environmental mitigation measures would only reach
0.56 per cent.
The President has declared climate protection to be one of

his priorities. He has consistently taken advantage of inter-
national summits to remind the international community
of their collective responsibilities, most recently at the
G20 summit in Toronto, and before that at the summit
of African leaders in the Ugandan capital, Kampala and
at the opening of the Bonn climate talks in mid-2010,
alongside German Chancellor Angela Merkel. In Bonn the
President said that the current economic difficulties should

not divert the world’s attention from a set of problems
which it only has one chance at resolving. Foreign Minister
Espinosa conducted intensive shuttle diplomacy in order to
get agreement on common policies, at least within Latin
America. In July she also visited key countries in Asia to
discuss their support for Cancún.
The Example of Mexico, an Emerging Nation
Mexico has consistently placed itself in the middle, on the

one hand warning the industrialised nations that they need
to redouble their efforts towards reducing greenhouse gases
and at the same time speaking out in favour of concrete
commitments on the part of the emerging and developing
nations. The country took the lead by committing to a
30 per cent reduction in its own greenhouse emissions
by 2020. Mexico also continues to advocate international
emissions trading and a second phase of the Kyoto Protocol.
However, the country is only responsible for 1.6 per cent of
worldwide CO² emissions – even an ambitious programme
with a focus on renewable energies would be no more than
a drop in the ocean in world climate terms.
The Mexican government has drawn up a Special Climate

Change Programme (PECC) for the period 2009 to 2012,
where the country’s particular vulnerability is analysed.
According to this programme, 15 per cent of the nation’s
territory and 68.2 per cent of the population are at increased
risk, while over 70 per cent of GDP could be
Mexico’s location between two oceans, affected. More than twenty million Mexicans
along with its climatic and hydrological live in areas which are affected by tropical
conditions, means that the subject of
climate protection has now taken cen- storms. The country’s geographic location
tre-stage. between two oceans, along with its climatic
and hydrological conditions, means that the long-neglected
subject of climate protection has now taken centre-stage.
Special “Risk Atlases” will detail vulnerability levels until
2012, and the programme will include the responsibilities
of the federal states and launch a Programme of Environ-
mental Reform.
The road ahead is shown by a draft bill proposed by PAN

Senator Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez. Central to this is a stable
legal framework for innovation in the areas of renewable
energy, energy-saving and CO² reduction, and he sets a

clear target of reducing CO² by 52 million tonnes by the
year 2012. He suggests setting up a Climate Commission
with wide-ranging authority in order to implement these
measures. Material resources could be streamlined using
a kind of national Green Fund which would also accept
international contributions. In addition, a national register
of emissions should be set up and a market created for
emissions trading, with clear sanctions being applied in the
case of any violations. Energy efficiency and the efficient
use of resources must also be significantly increased for
the sake of sustainable development. But at the same
time Mexico needs considerable assistance if they are to
improve their own monitoring systems.
Natural Disasters Help to Raise Awareness
Extreme climate situations in recent times have helped to

focus public opinion in the country on the issue of climate
change, and awareness of environmental issues is growing.
Every year more than 500 people lose their lives in Mexico
as a result of natural disasters, while over a million people
lose all their worldly goods, and infrastructure damage runs
into the billions. In 2010 hurricane Alex laid waste to the
north of the country and the industrial city of Monterrey.
The emergency services have recorded a There have been alternating floods
significant increase in such events over the and widespread droughts with devas-
tating consequences. Scientific studies
last ten years. Rainfall has become much point to ever more dramatic changes.
more irregular and therefore harder to
predict than before. There have been alternating floods and
widespread droughts with devastating consequences for
agriculture. Scientific studies point to ever more dramatic
changes and suggest that sustained temperature rises will
have a significant impact on Mexico’s biodiversity and not
least on the country’s tropical rainforests. A study entitled
The Economics of Climate Change in Latin America and the
Caribbean, published by the UN Economic Commission for
Latin America and The Caribbean (CEPAL) at the end of
2009, estimated the annual costs of natural disasters in
the region to have already reached 8.6 billion dollars, and
they are growing steadily.
Awareness of environmental issues in the country is still

not that widespread. Mexican car buyers can tell you
exactly how powerful a car’s engine is, but they can’t tell
you anything about environmental standards. Subsidised,
cheap petrol has done a lot to ensure that the well-to-
do classes in the county opt for prestigious cars whose
average consumption is above 15 litres. Supermarkets
give away mountains of plastic carrier bags free of charge,
while Mexicans would only choose to make even the
shortest journey on foot in exceptional cases.
In residential areas of the capital, Water wastage is legendary: in residential

around 40 per cent of the water doesn’t areas of the capital, which increasingly have
even reach the 22 million inhabitants.
Moreover, only a fraction of used wa- to put up with restricted water supplies
ter is repurified. during dry spells, around 40 per cent of the
water doesn’t even reach the 22 million inhabitants. It
has to be pumped over long distances, and much of it is
simply lost along the way. Decision-makers see no political
benefit in investing in the country’s ailing infrastructure.
Only a fraction of used water is repurified. Massive subsi
dies on water prices, as with electricity, do nothing to help
to encourage people to use this precious commodity spa-
ringly. Having your car washed every morning by one of
the household staff is still the norm in Mexico’s “better”
areas, as is hosing down the pavements.
A Somewhat Quiet Protagonist
At the same time Mexico, with its still substantial but quickly
declining reserves of non-renewable energy resources,
especially oil, is particularly interested in the development
and use of renewable energy and is open to ideas on the
subject of energy conversion. The urgency of the debate
is also due to the fact that Mexico still derives 40 per
cent of budget revenue from the sale of oil. This is also
its biggest source of foreign currency revenue, far more
than the amount sent home by Mexicans living abroad or
income from tourism. This is without taking income from
the activities of organised crime into account.
As a result of various taboos in connection with the

state-run energy concern PEMEX, the Calderón govern-
ment’s first attempt at energy reform right at the
beginning of its six-year term, has achieved far less than
is needed and is crying out for a reform of the reform.

This debate has taken on new immediacy following BP’s
oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico and the sinking of the
Deepwater Horizon platform. Mexico’s shallow oil deposits,
such as those of its most important oilfield Cantarell, can
be extracted cheaply but are starting to run drastically low.
To develop new oilfields they would need to use exactly
that deep sea drilling technology which is now attracting
so much criticism.
According to experts, Mexico has huge potential to exploit

water and wind power as well as bio-fuels. Especially the
south of the country and the state of Oaxaca, with its high
levels of thermal activity on the narrow strip between the
Pacific and the Caribbean, seem to offer the guarantee of
excellent results. The north of the country, with its huge
areas of desert and semi-desert, has huge
potential for generating solar energy, and Wind energy and solar installations
Mexican politicians are already investigating have the additional advantage of being
able to supply smaller communities
this technology in the USA and Europe. directly without the need to be con-
Wind energy and solar installations have nected to the national grid.
the additional advantage of being able to
supply smaller communities directly without the need to be
connected to the national grid, and there are a lot of these
communities. In trying to achieve a sensible balance of
energy supplies Mexico does not want to discount nuclear
power as an option, and the Laguna Verde power station
currently makes a significant contribution to the country’s
energy security. The picture is completed by the substantial
uranium deposits, which however require significant levels
of investment to extract.
On the other hand they are a bit more reticent about

producing bio-fuels, as there is a fear that traditional food
production, especially maize, could be threatened, which
would have a significant impact on the poorest sections
of the population. While agriculture only produces four
per cent of the country’s GDP, it provides 15 per cent of
the active population with jobs. Climate-sensitive maize is
grown on 50 per cent of Mexico’s agricultural land. A recent
report by the World Bank concluded: “The climate expecta-
tions for Mexico in 2020 suggest a moderate reduction in
the area of land on which maize can be cultivated and a
growth in those areas where it cannot.”
Mexico’s problems and the potential solutions are not

untypical of many developing nations. Its readiness to
play a constructive part internationally, to recognize and
accept its own responsibilities and to act as a mediator
between developed and developing nations was clear for
all to see in Cancún. Mexico’s belief in multilateralism and
the UN has existed for decades. In spite of its size, with
112 million inhabitants and a GDP that almost places it
amongst the top ten countries in the world, Mexico does
not always see the need to be at the forefront. This is seen
as a good thing by many observers on the international
stage. Climate protection is a good example here of how a
“quiet protagonist” can still achieve success.
Republic of Moldova at
the End of an Election
Marathon?
A New Version of the Alliance for European
Integration, and More Uncertainty
Holger Dix
The parties which have come together to form the Alliance

for European Integration (AIE) were able to clinch the early
parliamentary elections held on November 28, 2010, and
thus avoided the Communist Party’s return to power. But
the elections did not pull the country out of the depths of
its political and constitutional crisis. Once again the vote
failed to produce the majority needed to elect a President,
and further early elections are looming, just like in July Dr. Holger Dix is Resi-
2009 and November 2010. dent Representative of
the Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung in Bucharest,
A Constant Search for Identity in charge of the KAS
offices in Romania and
the Republic of Moldova.
Since it was founded in 1991, the Republic of Moldova has
been on a search for its political and geopolitical identity1
which has been characterized by constantly changing
directions and ongoing political crises. Up to 2000 there
was a phase of political instability; then during the first
four years of the Communist Party’s return to government
there was a phase of political stability and rapprochement
to Russia (up to 2005). The Communist government then
forged closer ties with the European Union, while at the
same time becoming increasingly repressive. Later, the
Communists were overturned by the Alliance for European
Integration with correspondingly pro-European policies.
Since 2009 there has been an ongoing political crisis
marked by several elections which have failed to produce
a clear result.
1 | For more detail see: Dan Dungaciu, Moldova ante portas

(Bukarest, 2005).
The real nature of the political protagonists also remains

shrouded in mystery. The Communist Party comes across
as extremely capitalistic in the way it looks after its
supporters, democratic forces are under suspicion of being
influenced by the oligarchs and their interests, and voci-
ferous anti-Communists have become the lackeys of the
Communist Party (PCRM). The nation’s unity is also highly
precarious. The founding of the Republic of Moldova sparked
a brief armed conflict, resulting in the more industrialized,
Russian-speaking region of Transnistria breaking away to
form its own separatist government, which is however
not internationally recognized. The ongoing conflict with
Transnistria means the Moldovan government has lost
control of part of its territory, which limits its ability to act
and is a stumbling block to hopes of European integration.
Another region, the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia
also broke away in 1990, first of all to form the unrecog-
nized independent Gagauzian Socialist Republic, then since
1994 as an autonomous region recognized by the Republic
of Moldova with its own Parliament and government.
Negotiations on an Association Agree- The country has also been characterized by

ment with the EU, which should also constant changes of direction with regard
include a comprehensive free trade
agreement, have commenced and are to ties with the European Union and Russia,
successfully moving forward. which in hindsight seem to be more influenced
by pragmatism than ideals. At present there
is a widespread desire among the people and across parties
to move closer to the EU. The current government led by
Prime Minister Vlad Filat and Foreign Minister Iurie Leancă
has intensified relations with the EU since assuming office.
Negotiations on an Association Agreement, which should
also include a comprehensive free trade agreement, have
commenced and are successfully moving forward.2 The
new government also lifted travel restrictions on Romania,
which had been introduced by the PCRM government as
a result of the unrest in April 2009. Shortly before the
November 2010 parliamentary elections Prime Minister
Filat signed a border treaty with Romania.
2 | See statements by the incumbent Foreign Minister Natalia

German and EU Ambassador Dirk Schübel on the occasion of
the KAS conference “Republik Moldaus Zukunft in der Euro-
päischen Union. Stand und Perspektiven der Annäherung”
(The future of the Republic of Moldova in the European Union:
State and perspectives of the rapprochement) on November
16, 2010 in Chișinău. Audio file at: http://kas.de/moldawien/
de/publications/21313 (accessed December 21, 2010).
On the other hand, almost 20 years after the Republic of

Moldova declared its independence, Russia still exerts a
strong influence on the country, something which can take
the form of cooperation and partnership or of
peremptory intervention, depending on the Russia basically views the Republic of
attitude of the Moldovan government. Russia Moldova as belonging to an exclusive
zone of influence which also includes
basically views the Republic of Moldova as the other former Soviet states.
belonging to an exclusive zone of influence
which also includes the other former Soviet states. This
influence is leveraged by the Transnistrian conflict,
economic relations, energy supplies, Russia’s opinion-
forming impact on the media, the Russian Orthodox
Church and the country’s Russian minority.3 Russia works
closely with the government in Tiraspol, providing political,
financial, economic and military support. Any Moldovan
actions against Transnistria spark a reaction from Russia,
as in March 2006 when the Moldovan government blocked
exports by Transnistrian companies which were not regis-
tered in Chișinău. Russia countered by blocking imports
of Moldovan wine. Russia still has troops and equipment
stationed in Transnistria, despite having agreed to their
withdrawal at the 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul. Russia
is also still an important export market for Moldova and
exploits its position as a key market in order to when
necessary exert pressure on the Moldovan government,
most recently through another import ban on Moldovan
wine as a reaction to the announcement made by interim
President Mihai Ghimpu that June 28 should be a day
commemorating the Soviet occupation.
A Fragmented Political Landscape and

Unstable Alliances
The Republic of Moldova’s political landscape is charac-

terized by a large number of parties, many of which are
very short-lived.4 Since independence, a total of 104
parties have been registered. If we exclude those parties
which have just changed their names, we are still left with
77 different groupings which have fought to win the vote
3 | Cf. Radu Vrabie, “Relationship of the Republic of Moldova

with the Russian Federation,” in: Foreign Policy Association
and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (eds.), The Foreign Policy of the
Republic of Moldova (1998-2008) (Chișinău 2010), 99-112.
4 | Cf. Igor Volnitchi, Istoria Partidelor din Republica Moldova
(Chișinău: 2010).
of the country’s 2.9 million-strong electorate over the last

20 years. Recent parties with the most realistic prospects
of getting into Parliament have been the Democratic Party
of Moldova, the Liberal Party, the Alliance Our Moldova, the
Liberal Democratic Party and the Party of Communists of
the Republic of Moldova (PCRM).
The PDM describes itself as social-de- The precursor to the Democratic Party of
mocratic and centre-left, is a member of Moldova, the “Movement for a Prosperous
Socialist International and has signed
a partnership agreement with the Uni- and Democratic Moldova” (MpMDP), was
ted Russia party. founded in 1997 and then was renamed the
Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) in April 2000. The
party describes itself as social-democratic and centre-left,
is a member of Socialist International and has signed a
partnership agreement with the United Russia party. The
PDM won seats in Parliament in 1998 as part of an electoral
bloc, but in the early elections of 2001 the party failed to
meet the election threshold, gaining only five per cent of the
vote. They had earlier been involved in raising this threshold
from four to six per cent.5 In the 2005 parliamentary elec-
tions the PDM once again formed an electoral bloc and
won eight seats in Parliament. As an independent faction,
the party joined with the Christian Democrats (PPCD) and
Social Liberal Party to support the presidency of Communist
candidate Vladimir Voronin, in order to avoid a political
stalemate. In 2007 there was internal conflict between the
party leaders Dumitru Diacov and Vlad Filat, leading to the
latter leaving the PDM and founding the Liberal Democratic
Party of Moldova (PLDM). In the parliamentary elections
held in April 2009 the PDM only won two per cent of the
vote and therefore failed to gain any seats in Parliament.
Support for the party increased when former Speaker of

the Moldovan Parliament Marian Lupu defected from the
Communist Party to join the PDM shortly before the July
2009 parliamentary elections. However, the political costs
of Lupu’s defection were high for the PDM’s old guard.
Lupu successfully pushed through his appointment as
party leader, along with the top five places on the party list
for “his” candidates. The elections in July 2009 resulted in
13 MPs taking their seats in Parliament, with Marian Lupu
being nominated as candidate for the presidency of the
Alliance for European Integration (AIE).
5 | Ibid., 88 et sqq.
The Liberal Party (PL) was founded in 1993 as the Party

of Reform. It had no electoral success until 2005, when
it benefited from the decision made by the Christian
Democrats and the Social Liberal Party after the 2005
elections to support the presidential bid of Communist
candidate Voronin, a decision which caused disaffection
among their voters. The party then selected the 27-year-old
lawyer Dorin Chirtoacă to be their candidate for the mayoral
elections in Moldova’s capital, Chișinău. This selection was
particularly popular among the city’s young, reform-minded
population, and in 2007 Chirtoacă was
indeed elected mayor by a clear majority. In The Liberal Party is particularly strong
the April 2009 parliamentary elections the PL amongst pro-Romanian voters and its
political objectives are distinctly liberal.
became at a stroke the strongest opposition On a European level they align them-
party, winning 15 seats. In the July elections selves with the European Liberals.
the party further increased its share of
the vote, but still only held 15 seats. The Liberal Party
is particularly strong amongst pro-Romanian voters and
its political objectives are distinctly liberal. On a European
level they align themselves with the European Liberals.
The Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM) was

formed only recently, in December 2007. They are led by
the current Prime Minister, Vlat Filat, who organised and
financed the party right from the beginning and then led
them to success in the April 2009 parliamentary elections.
With 15 seats, and in combination with the PL, the PLDM
became the strongest opposition group. In July 2009
they increased their seats to 18. Immediately after the
party was founded, the PLDM tried to forge ties with the
European People’s Party and applied for affiliation, which
will lead to it being granted observer status.
The Alliance Our Moldova Party (AMN) was founded in 1997

under the name “Civic Alliance for Reforms”. In 2001, as
the “Party of Social Democracy” it took part in the parlia-
mentary elections as part of an electoral alliance and won
19 seats in Parliament. The alliance was dissolved after the
elections and the Party of Social Democracy became the
Social-Democratic Alliance of Moldova (ASDM). In 2003 the
ASDM merged with the Liberal Party and the Independents’
Alliance to form the new Alliance Our Moldova (AMN).
In the 2005 elections the party joined forces with the
PDM and the Social Liberal Party to form the Electoral
Bloc Democratic Moldova (BMD), winning 34 seats and

becoming the strongest faction after the Communists.
The party stood alone at the local elections in 2007 and
became the country’s second political party, despite a few
internal problems. However, they were unable to maintain
this position in the parliamentary elections in April 2009,
winning only 11 seats because of the emergence of two
new parties in the centre-right spectrum, the Liberal Party
and the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova. In the 2009
elections the party only won 7 seats. The AMN has observer
status within the Liberal International.
The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM)

was founded in 1994 and declared itself to be the successors
to the Communist Party which was active in Moldova during
Soviet rule. The PCRM first put itself to the vote in the local
elections of 1995. With results ranging from 5 to 15 per
cent it proved that a Communist Party could still attract
support among voters. The direct presidential elections of
1996 led to the PCRM candidate Vladimir Voronin winning
ten per cent of the vote and third place. In
The Communists made their political the 1998 parliamentary elections the PCRM
breakthrough in the early parliamen- won 30 per cent of the vote and 40 of the
tary elections held in 2001, which
were a result of Parliament’s failure to 101 seats. The Communists then made their
elect a President in 2000. political breakthrough in the early parlia-
mentary elections held in 2001, which were
a result of Parliament’s failure to elect a President in 2000.
In these elections the PCRM won 40.07 per cent of the vote
and 71 seats, giving them the majority required to elect
the President. In April 2001 the Parliament made Vladimir
Voronin President of Moldova. The bad blood which arose
between the Moldavian government and Russia as a result
of Voronin’s last-minute rejection of the Russian proposal
for resolution of the Transnistria conflict (the Kozak
Memorandum) cost the PCRM the support of pro-Russian
voters during the 2005 elections. After Russia’s failed
attempt at mediation, Voronin announced that Moldova
would be forging closer ties with the EU. As a result of
this, the 2005 parliamentary elections saw the PCRM once
again become the strongest party with 56 seats, but it fell
just short of the 61 seats required to elect a President.
Voronin could only be re-elected with the support of the
Christian Democrat Party (PPCD), the Democratic Party
and the Social Liberal Party. In the April 2009 elections the
Communists managed to increase their share of the vote

to 49 per cent and 60 seats, but were accused of becoming
increasingly authoritarian and of repressing the opposition.
Controversy over the PCRM’s surprisingly good election
results led to violent public protests which were put down
by repressive government action. This resulted in the Party
losing popular support and the opposition parties closing
ranks.
Disputed Parliamentary Elections in 2009
Two parliamentary elections were held in 2009. Those held

on April 5, 2009 united the political opposition and large
sections of the country’s younger population in the hope
that the Communists would lose power. The opposition tried
to build on the fact that the Communists had been losing
support over the previous few years. But the opposition
parties’ hopes were dashed by the announcement of the
preliminary election results. After 98 per cent of votes had
been counted, it was clear that the Communist Party had
won an absolute majority which would give them the right
to govern alone for the next four years.
The Communists had won just under 50 per cent of the

vote, followed by the Liberal Party led by the Mayor of
Chișinău, Dorin Chirtoacă, with 13 per cent, the Liberal
Democratic Party with 12 per cent and the Alliance Our
Moldova with 10 per cent. With 61 of 101
seats, the Communists were in a position to On April 7, 2009 there was a mass rally
elect a successor to the incumbent President, of young people in Chișinău who pro-
tested against the re-election of the
Vladimir Voronin, who was constitutionally Communists and the developments
barred from seeking another term. On April taking place in their country.
7 there was a mass rally of young people
in Chișinău who protested against the re-election of the
Communists and the developments taking place in their
country. The demonstration went off peacefully at first
but later there was violent rioting which sent shockwaves
through Moldavian society. The Moldavian government and
police were overwhelmed by the situation and seemed
unsure how to deal with it. Political tensions increased, and
the initial failure of the state authorities to act, along with
the lack of a protest culture, the lack of clear goals among
the demonstrators and the probable manipulation of the
protesters led to the occupation and partial destruction
of the Parliament building and Presidential Office. The

government blamed the opposition and foreign influence
(Romania) for the violence. For its part, the opposition
accused the government of using agents provocateurs to
orchestrate the riots. After its initial hesitancy, the state
reacted heavy-handedly.6 Protesters were arrested that
night and in the days that followed, there was
Visa restrictions were instituted against a wave of arrests which included journalists.
Romania, which the Moldavian Presi- Four people died as a result of the riots and
dent accused of being involved in a
coup plot. The Romanian ambassador the subsequent government repression.
was ejected. In contravention of EU agreements, visa
restrictions were instituted against Romania, which the
Moldavian President accused of being involved in a coup
plot. The Romanian ambassador in Chișinău was ejected
and President Voronin called Romania’s efforts to advance
Moldova’s membership of the EU “humiliating”.
The final results of the April 5 elections sufficed to enable

to PCRM to build a new government. But the party was one
seat short of the 61 seats required to elect the President
in Parliament. The PCRM then failed to obtain the one
vote needed from the ranks of the opposition. The three
opposition parties at that time – the Liberal Democratic
Party led by Vlad Filat (PLDM), the Alliance Our Moldova
(AMN) and the Liberal Party (PL) – formed a united front
against the re-election of a President from the ranks of the
PCRM. As a result, new elections were called on July 27,
2009.
Presidential Election System Leads to

Political and Constitutional Crisis
The cause of the political crisis – along with the complicated

election results and the inability of MPs to work with them –
lies in the system for electing the President in Parliament.
Since a constitutional amendment was made in July 2000,
the Republic of Moldova’s system of government is a parlia-
mentary democracy, which followed on from the previous
semi-presidential system. This constitutional amendment
strengthened Parliament and weakened the President,
who was now elected by Parliament rather than by direct
vote. The President has a role which is clearly still much
6 | Cf. Mihnea Berindei and Arielle Thedrel: “Moldavie, La fin de

l’ère Voronine,” politique international 125 (2009), 249-261.
more than just ceremonial, but some of his prerogatives

were taken away, including the right to participate in or
lead cabinet meetings. But the office still carries weight,
as is reflected by the high election threshold in Parliament,
because of the responsibilities it still holds, such as the
right to appoint the Prime Minister (who is then confirmed
by Parliament), the right to initiate legislation and its role
as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Accordingly,
the President is elected by a 3/5 majority (61 seats) out
of the total 101 MPs in Parliament. If the vote produces no
result in the first round, there is a run-off between the top
two candidates. If this also fails to produce an adequate
majority, Parliament is dissolved and new elections are
called.
The very first attempt by Parliament to elect To break the stalemate, some opposition
a President failed in December 2000.7 The members voted for the Communist can-
didate. It was a fateful decision for the
subsequent new elections on February 25, Christian Democrats who never succee-
2001 resulted in the Communists getting ded in winning back the voter’s trust.
back into power with 71 seats. In order to
break the stalemate, some opposition members voted
for the Communist candidate, an action which consigned
them to the political wilderness in the eyes of both many
Western observers and the Moldovan people. It was a
fateful decision for the Christian Democrats under Iurie
Roșca, who never succeeded in winning back the trust
of the people and who have since failed to win a single
parliamentary seat in three attempts.
voting out of the Communists in the

July 2009 Elections
The new elections held on July 29, 2009 led to the Commu-
nist Party being removed from power.8 The campaigns
became increasingly bitter, with both camps (CP and
opposition) laying the blame for the violent unrest of April
2009 with each other. The media was under the strict
control of the Communist Party, but the opposition parties
7 | Cf. Ghenadie Vaculovschi and Norbert Neuhaus, “Dezideratul

reformei constitutionale in republica Moldova,” in: IDRAD
(ed.), Aspecte prioritare (Chișinău: 2010).
8 | See also in particular Hans Martin Sieg, “Machtwechsel in der
Krise,” KAS-Länderbericht, October 7, 2009, http://kas.de/
rumaenien/de/publications/17774 (accessed December 21,
2010).
as a whole (PLDM, PL, PD and AMN) managed to gather

momentum and win 53 seats, meaning that they could
combine in the Alliance for European Integration (AIE) and
form a government.
The PCRM only won 48 seats, and of the parties who had
previously been in Parliament, the Liberal Democrats gained
18 seats, the Liberals 15 and the Alliance Our Moldova 7.
The social-democrat Democratic Party of Moldova won 13
seats and re-entered Parliament. Vlad Filat (leader of the
PLDM) was appointed Prime Minister, with Mihai Gimpu
(leader of the PL) becoming Speaker of the Parliament
and Marian Lupu (leader of the DPM) being selected as
candidate for the Presidency. The main goals of the Alliance
were the reestablishment of the rule of law,
The election result did nothing to re- overcoming the social and economic crisis,
solve the dilemma of achieving the the promotion of decentralisation and local
majority required to elect a President.
The Alliance still needed eight votes autonomy, resolving the Transnistria conflict,
from the PCRM. and European integration.
However, the election result did nothing to resolve the

dilemma of achieving the majority required to elect a
President. The Alliance still needed eight votes from the
PCRM, which failed to materialise in any of the ballots.
Constitutional Debate and a Failed Referendum
This vote led to a debate on the need for constitutional

changes, with proposed solutions ranging from changing
the method of electing the President in Parliament, to the
introduction of direct presidential elections, to compre-
hensive constitutional reform.9 In March the PCRM made
a proposal for a constitutional amendment which retained
the President’s election by Parliament but which sought to
lower the quorum needed for an absolute majority in a
third ballot. In this way the PCRM cleverly appropriated
the simplest and most obvious proposal for reform. But the
governing coalition found it difficult to act on the suggestion
of their political opponents, the more so because there
were doubts about the Communist’s trustworthiness when
it came to a parliamentary vote.
9 | See also Hans Martin Sieg, “Die Republik Moldau in der

Verfassungskrise,” KAS-Länderbericht, April 23, 2010,
http://kas.de/moldawien/de/publications/19419 (accessed
December 21, 2010).
Within the AIE it was the social-democrat Democratic

Party (PDM) who supported the idea of direct presidential
elections. Their popular leader, Marian Lupu, who had been
selected as the coalition’s candidate for the presidency in
December, would have stood a good chance in a direct
election. The prospect of direct presidential elections and
the attendant political upgrading of the office aroused the
interest of the coalition partners to stand as candidates
themselves – including the Prime Minister. The tensions
which already plagued working relationships within the
governing coalition became heightened still more by this
growing rivalry.
Despite these dangers, in the end the coalition scheduled

a referendum on September 5, 2010 with a view to intro-
ducing direct presidential elections. Polls suggested that
the coalition’s proposal met with the approval of 70 per
cent of voters. On the day itself, more than 90 per cent
of voters supported the proposal. Yet the referendum
still failed because voter turnout was slightly under the
required one third of the electorate. In the lead-up to the
referendum the Communist Party had called
for a boycott, and it seems they succeeded Following the failed referendum, the
in persuading their supporters to stay away: incumbent President called new elec-
tions in November 2010 – the third par-
exit polls in Chișinău indicated that it was liamentary elections since April 2009.
mostly only coalition party supporters who
took part in the referendum. Following the failed referen-
dum, the incumbent President dissolved Parliament and
called new elections on November 28, 2010 – the third
parliamentary elections since April 2009.
Setting a Direction for 2010
The governing coalition’s starting position at the parlia-

mentary elections was unclear. In a survey carried out by
the Institute for Public Policy in October/November 2010,
60 per cent of respondents said they thought the country
was heading in the wrong direction. Only 24 per cent were
satisfied with the direction being taken.10 Public approval
of the performance of their political leaders was alarmingly
low. Dissatisfaction among those surveyed was expressed
as follows: almost 74 per cent were unhappy with health
10 | Cf. Institutul Politici Publice (ed.), Barometrul Opinie Publice

(Chișinău: November 2010).
care provision, 85 per cent with the development of the

job market, 78 per cent with the pension system, 80 per
cent with the fight against corruption and 85 per cent
with wage levels.11 The government’s performance under
Prime Minister Vlad Filat was rated by three per cent of
respondents as very good, 20 per cent as quite good, 35
per cent as neither good nor bad, 20 per cent as bad and
10 per cent as very bad.
In actual fact the government of the AIE was out of kilter,

and the basic conditions required for successful governance
were unfavourable. Prime Minister Filat had inherited
from the Communists an economy which was in freefall
with a negative growth rate of -6.5 per cent. The state
institutions were bloated with poorly-trained employees
who were badly paid and largely resistant to reform.12
The new government took over against an international
backdrop of economic crisis in the EU states and a Russia
which was trying to increase its influence in the region.
The repeated failure of Parliament to elect a President had
once again led to the spectre of new elections, making
it difficult for the government to implement any medium-
to-long-term measures. However, the government was
still able to notch up some significant successes, including
reopening talks with the International Monetary Fund and
starting intensive and successful negotiations with the EU
on forging closer ties with Europe and financial support.
The economy was stabilised, and the budget deficit is
expected to be brought down from 6.8 per cent in 2009
to 4-4.5 per cent in 2010. However there was no or very
little progress made in reforming the judiciary and civil
service and in safeguarding economic competitiveness.13
Right from the start the ruling coalition showed signs of
being in a marriage of convenience which clearly shared
common political goals but which did not possess the tools
to ensure sufficient agreement and communication within
the coalition itself.
11 | Results for ‘very unhappy’ and ‘not very happy’ were combined.
Other response options were ‘fairly happy’ and ‘very happy’.
12 | Cf. Expert Grup: Moldova Economic Growth Analysis (Analiza
Creșterii Economice in Moldova), December 2010,
http://expert-grup.org/?en (accessed December 21, 2010).
13 | See also Igor Boţan: “Anul politic 2010” (Political year 2010),
December 31, 2010, in: http://http://e-democracy.md/en/
monitoring/politics/comments/political-year-2010 (accessed
January 3, 2011).
Perhaps also in face of the uncertain prospects of election

success, in June the ruling coalition decided to make
changes to the electoral law which to some extent worked
to the advantage of the smaller parties. This brought suspi-
cions that the changes had been designed to disadvantage
the PCRM. These included lowering the electoral threshold
from six to four per cent and a change in the way the votes
were distributed for parties and alliances which were below
this threshold. Previously these votes had been distributed
on a proportional basis, which favoured the stronger
parties. At the July elections, they were distributed for the
first time equally between all parties which had won seats
in Parliament. The formation of electoral alliances was once
again permitted and candidates with multiple nationalities
were once again allowed to stand for election.
20 parties and 20 independent candidates took part in

the elections. On election night, a clear win was at first
predicted for the Alliance for European Integration. Two
polling institutes had predicted them to be clear victors
with either 65 or 64 seats. One of these institutes (IRES)
even gave the Liberal Democratic Party of Prime Minister
Filat a lead of nearly nine per cent over the Communists. In
the end these projections deviated from the following day’s
official results announced by the electoral authority by as
much as 16 per cent.
Once the official results were in, the The Communist Party was once again
Communist Party (PCRM) was once again the strongest party with 39.3 per cent
of the vote and 42 seats in Parliament.
the strongest party with 39.3 per cent of the
vote and 42 seats in Parliament. The Liberal Democrats
improved markedly on their previous result, gaining
29.4 per cent of the vote and 32 seats, making them the
second most powerful party. The Democratic Party (Social
Democrats) won 12.7 per cent and 15 seats and the
Liberal Party gained 10 per cent and 12 seats. The Alliance
Our Moldova which had previously been members of the
Alliance for European Integration failed to win a single seat
with only 2 per cent of the vote. The Christian Democratic
People’s Party (PPCD) hit a new low with the voters,
winning only 9,054 votes and 0.5 per cent of the vote.
The AIE, whose survival had been in question, won 59

seats, only just missing out on the 61 seats necessary to
elect the President.
Fig. 1
Changes in number of seats won
60 42 32 12 15 0 48 18 15 13 7 60 15 15 0 11
11/2010 7/2009 4/2009

50
40
30
20
10
0
PCRM
PLDM
PL
PDM
AMN
PCRM
PLDM
PL
PDM
AMN
PCRM
PLDM
PL
PDM
AMN
Source: Alegeri parlamentare în Republica Moldovaen, Asociaţia
pentru Democraţie Participativă (ADEPT), http://e-democracy.md/
elections/parliamentary (accessed January 3, 2011).
A comparison with the results of the two elections held in

2009 shows the steady decline of the Communist Party
(PCRM) from 60 seats in April 2009 to 42 in the current
vote. Of note is also the steady increase in seats won by
the Liberal Democrats (PLDM) – in the meantime receiving
support from the European People’s Party – from 15 seats
in April 2009 to the present 32.
Difficulties in Building a Coalition and Other

Uncertain Prospects for the Government
After the elections the possible constellation of the coalition

remained open. One possibility was a continuation of the
AIE, with the PLDM, PDM and PL forming a government.
But it was questionable whether such a coalition was based
on a sufficient level of trust, particularly between PLDM
leader Filat and PDM leader Lupu.
A coalition of the Democratic Party and the Communist

Party was also a possibility and would have provided the
majority required to form a government. The fact that Lupu
had been a member of the PCRM until 2009 was a factor
in favour of such a coalition, as he clearly had no fear of
dealing with the Communists. Besides, in the course of
talks the PCRM had offered Lupu the position of President
and his party the chance to appoint the Prime Minister. A
PDM/PCRM coalition would also have been very much in
Russia’s interest. This fact was highlighted by a visit made
by Sergei Nariskin, Head of the Russian Presidential Admin-
istration, who offered incentives for a PDM/PCMR coalition
in the form of reduced gas prices, the unobstructed export
of Moldovan wine and agricultural products to Russia and
even proposed solutions to the Transnistria conflict.14
The European Union also made its presence known during

the coalition talks. The President of the EU Parliament,
Jerzy Buzek, travelled personally to Chișinău
to show the EU’s interest in the formation The visit of Germany’s Minister of State
of the coalition and demonstrate the good at the Foreign Office during coalition
talks was seen as an expression of the
relationship between the EU and the Republic country’s interest in the formation of a
of Moldova. The German government had pro-European coalition.
already been active throughout 2010 and
sent Werner Hoyer, Minister of State at the Foreign Office,
to Chișinău during the coalition talks, which was seen as a
clear expression of Germany’s interest in the formation of
a pro-European coalition.15
However, neither coalition would have had the number of

votes necessary to elect a President in Parliament. This
majority could only have been achieved by a coalition of
the Communists with the Liberal Democrats, which was
however highly unlikely and quickly ruled out by Prime
Minister Filat. An all-party coalition would have been
possible in theory but would have been dubious from a
14 | Cf. “Republica Moldova: Moscova promite ieftinirea gazelor,

daca PD face alianta cu PCRM,” HotNews.ro, December 11,
2010, in: http://hotnews.ro/stiri-international-8119587-
republica-moldova-moscova-promite-ieftinirea-gazelor-daca-
face-alianta-pcrm (accessed December 23, 2010).
15 | See inter alia “Germania manifestă un interes real pentru
Republica Moldova,” December 22, 2010, Mediafax, in:
http://arena.md/?go=news&n=2294 (accessed December
23, 2010).
democratic point of view, as the government would then

have had no opposition.
After a month of arduous coalition negotiations, the PLDM,

PDM and PL finally agreed to a continuation of the Alliance
for European Integration. The Democratic Party had also
held talks with the Communists up until the
Marian Lupu took over as Interim Presi- coalition agreement was reached, exploiting
dent in December 2010. He became the their strong negotiating position when it
third transitional President within three
days. came to forming a majority.
On December 30, 2010 Marian Lupu was elected Speaker

of the Parliament by the Alliance and took over as Interim
President. After Interim President Ghimpu (until December
28, 2010) and Interim President Vlat Filat, who took over
as Head of State from being Prime Minister when Ghimpu’s
term expired on December 28, Lupu became the third
transitional President within three days. In this role he
gave Vlad Filat the task of building a cabinet and drawing
up a government programme which was approved by
Parliament on January 14, 2011.
The composition of the cabinet shows the dominating

position of the Liberal Democratic Party, which allocates
the Prime Minister and seven other ministers, including
the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Justice and
the Minister of Education. Five ministerial posts (including
Deputy Prime Minister) go to each coalition partner.
According to the agreements among the coalition partners,
the chairman of the Democratic Party Marian Lupu shall be
elected as president. Afterwards, Mihai Ghimpu, chairman
of the Liberal Party, will substitute him chairman of the
parliament.
Whether this coalition is really weatherproof and can offer

a possible end to the country’s political crisis remains to be
seen. The new AIE configuration will only achieve success
if – unlike in the past – all the coalition partners make it
a priority to work towards this success using all their poli-
tical will and skills. The country’s geopolitical, political and
economic situation means there will be no lack of challen-
ges which could rapidly bring the coalition to an end. In
concluding, three of these dangers are mentioned below.
Firstly, the coalition does not have the majority required

to elect a President in Parliament. Failure to do this will
once again result in new parliamentary elections. There
are three possible scenarios for the successful election of
the President:
1. The AIE manages to persuade two Communist Party

MPs to vote for the AIE candidate, Marian Lupu.
2. The AIE unites with the PCRM to elect Lupu as President,
by giving the Communists concessions or by playing on
the PCRM’s well-founded fear that it could lose yet more
seats in early elections.
3. The coalition gets around the election of a President in
Parliament by making renewed efforts to change the
system of voting.
After the history of failed election attempts The deterioration in the coalition’s
in recent years, it is advisable to avoid trying working relationships does not augur
well for the local elections and particu-
to predict how future Presidential elections larly for the election to the important
will play out. position of Mayor of Chișinău.
A second risk factor is the local elections due in summer,

which will doubtless place additional strain on the coalition.
The deterioration in the coalition’s working relationships,
something which was obvious before the parliamentary
elections of November 2010 and the concurrent positioning
for possible direct presidential elections after the refer-
endum, does not augur well for the local elections and
particularly for the election to the important position of
Mayor of Chișinău. All three coalition partners have already
declared that they want their own candidate to stand for
office.
Finally, the financial interests of political protagonists

could also be a stress factor for the coalition. The new
Parliament includes a large number of businesspeople
who, it is hoped, will use their professional experience to
improve conditions for business. But it is also feared that
some of these businesspeople have gone into politics in
order to further their own financial interests, which could
lead to non-political conflicts of interest between coalition
partners.
All these risk factors lead us to fear that the country’s

political crisis is not yet over. Moldova’s Western partners
would be well advised to continue keeping a close eye on
the country’s political evolution and to do what they can
to help promote democracy and good governance, so the
current government will be in office for a full mandate of
four years.

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2|11 2|11

KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 2|11

ASEAN and G20 –

After the Presidential

People with Low Expecta-

The designated contributions do not necessarily

The subscription will be extended for a further

KAS International Reports holds the copyright

7 | SAARC – 25 YEARS OF REGIONAL

22 | ASEAN AND G20 – INDONESIA’S

36 | IMMIGRATION COUNTRY NORWAY –

49 | AF TER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

77 | PEOPLE WITH LOW EXPECTATIONS ARE

93 | REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AT THE END OF AN

“Paradise in flames!” was one of the many, sometimes

Mohammed Bouaziz, a Tunisian greengrocer, suffered

organise protest rallies they used the internet, in particular

Just a few weeks earlier hardly anyone would have

What began in Tunisia is now spreading like wildfire across

These same placards are being waved in Egypt, where 82

The message from the people on the streets in the Maghreb

The countries of the region are facing tremendous

Dr. Gerhard Wahlers

SAARC – 25 Years of Regional

Even well-informed political observers have to admit

it has enjoyed comparatively few real successes since it

Afghanistan, one of South Asia’s main regional headaches,

on itself.1 The media’s take on the situation is that “It’s

Any assessment of SAARC’s develop- However, it is not appropriate to measure

An Alliance of Contrasts and Commonalities

South Asia’s constellation is certainly not a simple one.

1 | Cf. Dipu Moni, “Saarc now deliberates more on action,” The

inhabi­tants, makes up a considerable proportion of the

India is the dominant player, due to its territorial size, large

But outside of these problems, the SAARC member states

3 | Cf. ibid., “SAARC: 14. Gipfeltreffen in Neu-Delhi,”

India – the Region’s Heavyweight

On closer inspection, India’s position of prominence is

So even in terms of geography, it is almost impossible to get

The political restraint displayed by all the member countries

A more positive evaluation of SAARC can, therefore, be

How SAARC Was Established

An initiative by Bangladesh led to seven parties signing

The structure created by the SAARC Charter formed a

5 | Cf. Partha S. Ghosh, SAARC: Institutionalization and Regional

implementation then taking place at the lower levels. The

Already in the more-distant past SAARC summits have

6 | It should however be noted that some SAARC summits were

SAARC as a Platform for

This strength pervades the other levels. Even though

Alongside the summits, the Council of Ministers provides

Resolutions passed at the summits and by the Council

7 | Cf. Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional

There is one major criticism of SAARC which should not be

The members could have benefited from concentrating

From SAPTA to SAFTA –

However, the members of SAARC gradually felt their way

9 | Cf. Nischal Pandey, Regional Cooperation in South Asia:

duties, SAPTA established the important goal of providing

So what has been achieved after four years of this free

11 | Cf. Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Agreement

day-to-day operations of businesses in South Asia are still

Liberalisation, Cooperation and

There is great potential for increased cooperation and

inhabitants, makes up a considerable proportion of the