Norman-The Black Attack January/February (Nuke War)

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YOU AIN’T SAFE ON THESE STREETS

NIGGA!
You can call this argument HOT OFF DA PRESS. The modern age is committed to a
disavowal of, and escape from, tragedy, The triumph of Socratic reason manifests in our
attempt to order life and renounce death and suffereing. This requires the construction of
an ideal real in opposition to the the apparent world of chaos and violence. Enter the
Affirmative. In the modern drive toward certainty and security and, in an attempting at
resolving disorder and insecurity, the AC labors to mold the world to make it fit an
idealized image of order. Paul Saurette professor at Johns Hopkins furthers. 1

Nietzsche suggests therefore, that to understand the development of our modern

conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence
of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-socratic
Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which
honoured tragedy and completion. Life was understood as a contest in
which both the joyful and ordered and chaotic and suffering aspects of life
were accepted and affirmed and as inescapable aspects of human existence.
However Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social
foundation which would soften the tragedy of life. An alternate foundation
that promised mastery and control not through acceptance of the tragic
life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the
problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very
experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason.
The Socratic Will to Truth is charecterised by the attempt to understand
and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian [chaotic] elements of
existence and privileging an idealized Apollonian [joyful] order. As life is
inescapably compromised of both order and disorder, however the promise
of control throughout Socratic reason is only possible by creating a Real
World of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an Apparent
World of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is
contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and ignored
in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this
dichotomized model led to the emergence of a uniquely modern
understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the
imperfection of the Apparent world. This outlook created a modern notion
of responsibility in which the Dionysian [chaotic] elements of life could be
understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something is to
blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment.
According to Nietzsche ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomization by employing the Apparent World
as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Through this redirection, the real
1
Saurette, Paul, Professor of Political Theory at JHU 1996. [I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them’: Nietzsche, Arendt and the
Crisis of the Will to Order in international Relations Theory, Journal of International Studies, Vol. 25 No. 1 pp.1-28]

Hoe this ain't punch, I'm sippin' on some syzurp

I roll a fat joint and do my fingers like scissors
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world has transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical

escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired,
always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect
knowledge and action. Unable to accept the Dinoysian [chaotic] suffering
inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately
searches for the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in
short absence of suffering. This escape is possibly only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the
Real World. The will to order, then is the aggressive need increasingly to order the apparent world in line with the
ressentiment engenders a need actively to
precepts of the moral Truth of the Real World. First
mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal also
asserts that a ‘truer’, more complete knowledge of the Real World must be
established, creating an ever-increasing Will to Truth. This self-
perpetuating movement creates an interpretive structure within which
everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth
of the Real World.

The Aff is only another breaking news story warning us of the chaos which surrounds us
and compelling us toward resolving that chaos by some form of action. Unfortunately,
our attempts at securing the world are damned to fail. It is not a coincidence that breaking
new occurs every fifteen minutes because international politics ARE unpredictable, and
the affirmative attempting to order them is problematic. The uncomfortable yet
irresistible truth is that human life is dangerous. Rather than coming to terms with this
condition, the Aff encourages us to combat this with hollow actions that don’t deal with
this truth, they merely delay it. At issue here is not just life but what makes life worth
living. A negative ballot is the only way to reclaim the joy from the affirmative’s world
of paranoia. James Der Derian 2elaborates:
Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbe’s and Marx’s interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His
[the key]method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security,
but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have
been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might
yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship
of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for
Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this
paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible
security from the most radical other of life, terror of death which, once
generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities
seeking security from alien others—who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of
differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying, into a fearful sameness. The will to power then
should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It
can, in its negative form,
produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading in
Nietzsche’s view to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive
will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values
and meanings—including self preservation—are produced which affirm
life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears
2
James Der Derian The value of Security:Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, Baudrillard. On Security. Ed Ronnie Lipschultz
1998.

Hoe this ain't punch, I'm sippin' on some syzurp

I roll a fat joint and do my fingers like scissors
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endemic to life, for life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war. But the denial of this
permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality
or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this
suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective
resentment of difference—that which is not us, not certain, not predictable.
Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for
protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic
affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the
casually sustainable. In the Gay Science, Nietzsche asks of the reader: Look isn’t our need for knowledge precisely this
need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer
disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not
the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security? The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to
produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest
protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything
true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by,
the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. A safe life requires safe
truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil and evil
provokes hostility—recycling the desire for security. The influence of
timidity, as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate
affirmative values to the necessities of security:” they feat change, transitoriness: this
expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences. The unknowable which cannot be
contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world.
Trust, the good, and other common values come to rely upon an artificial
strength: the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust,
to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god. For Nietzsche,
of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods. This powerful nexus of fear, of
external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the
security imperative. The point of Nietzsche’s critical genealogy is to show
that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative—and the western
metaphysics that perpetuate it—have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life
persists. Nietzsche’s worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse
danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls thorugh conformity and
The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes
rules through passivity.
at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox—all that makes a free life
worthwhile. How comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown
the more solemnities of every kind have decreased? And has the world not
lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? In
Nietzsche’s lament, in his deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the celebration
of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet
fearsome age. Dismissive of utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society;
he looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of new philosophers who would restore a reverence for fear and
[we must]holds up the notion of indifference to
reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche
and contempt for security. Yet Nietzsche would clearly see these as [these are] opportune
times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a force for the affirmation of
difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from
the calculation of risks and benefits.

The mindset to adopt is to do nothing. This ontological disarmament in the face of

dangerous others is the only means to real peace, which cannot exist physically but only

Hoe this ain't punch, I'm sippin' on some syzurp

I roll a fat joint and do my fingers like scissors
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in the mind. I would rather die than promote the affirmative’s futile search for certainty.
Living life is more important than averting some danger to our feaux sense of security.
Your ballot is a remote control, turn off DA BREAKING NEWS. Nietzsche 3writes:

The means to real peace.— No government admits any more that it keeps an army to
satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the army is supposed to
serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-
defense. But this implies one’s own morality and the neighbor’s
immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and
conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the
reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies
the desire for conquest just as much as does our own state, and who, for his part, also
keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who
would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward
victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other:
they presuppose their neighbor’s bad disposition and their own good
disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and
worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because, as
I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile
disposition and act. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of
self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. And perhaps the
great day will come when people, distinguished by wars and victories and
by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the
heaviest sacrifices for these things, will exclaim of its own free will, “We break the
sword," and will smash its entire military establishment down to its lowest
foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one had been the best-armed,
out of a height of feeling—that is the means to real peace, which must
always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it
now exists in all countries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts
neither oneself nor one’s neighbor and, half from hatred, half from fear,
does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather
perish than make oneself hated and feared—this must someday become the
highest maxim for every single commonwealth. Our liberal representatives,
as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain
when they work for a “gradual decrease of the military burden." Rather, only
when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest
who alone can help here. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at
once, by a stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes
from a cloud—and from up high.

LINKS
HEG-My opponent valuing the preservation of US hegemony is exacerbating the
problem. It links right into the mindset Der Derian talks about. “We are the US, our view

3
Nietzsche. The anti-christ, Human All Too Human. Aphorism #284 1878

Hoe this ain't punch, I'm sippin' on some syzurp

I roll a fat joint and do my fingers like scissors
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is the right one, now support us as we attempt to conquer all that which we feel is wrong
in the name of security.” This is allowing for a negative will to power or the fear-driven
desire for protection from the unknown, insofar as we can’t ever know what will happen
with nuclear weapons since they are an invention of man in every sense of the word
invention.
Generic Aff Link-The affirmative is linking into this mindset by acting on an unknown
threat to security. Valuing our security above affirmative values. The aff is a clear
example of a negative Will to Power, the fear-driven desire for protection from the
unknown, which is extremely problematic.

<Case Specific Links>

IMPACT
The terminal impact of the negative orientation toward life, and a negative will to power
is the the inability to live life to its fullest. Instead, the affirmative holds life in contempt
for its pains, never understanding that life is suffering, starvation, and dying. The desire
to seek redemption from life through the creation of a future moral order annihilates life
in the present. This is the worst possible danger: our existence becomes a dreary
perpetuation of biological life, devoid of meaning, waiting only for passive death.
Friedrich Nietzsche 4states:

This the world was made to appear, at every instant, as a successful

solution of God’s own tensions, as an ever new vision projected by that
grand sufferer for whom illusion is the only possible mode of redemption.
Yet in its essential traits it already prefigured that spirit of deep distrust
and defiance which, later on, was to resist to the bitter end any moral
interpretation of existence whatsoever. It is here that one could find a
pessimism situated beyond good and evil a philosophy which dared place
ethics among the deceptions. Morality became a mere fabrication for
purposes of gulling: at best, an artistic fiction, at worst, an outrageous
imposture. The furious, vindictive hatred of life implicit in that system of
ideas and values that in order to be consistent with a system of this sort was
forced to abominate art. From the very first Christianity spelled life
loathing itself, and that loathing was simply disguised, tricked out, with
notions of an other and better life. A hatred of the world, a curse on the
affective urges, a fear of beauty and sensuality, a transcendence rigged up
to slander moral existence, a yearning for extinction. This whole cluster of
distortions had always stuck me as being the most sinister form the will to
destruction can take, a sign of profound sickness exhaustion, biological
etiolation. And since according to ethics life will always be in the wrong, it
followed that one must smother it under a load of contempt, security, and
constant negation; must view it as an object not only unworthy of our
desire BUT ABSOLUTELY WORTHLESS IN ITSELF.As for morality,
could it be anything but a will to deny life, a secret instinct of destruction,
the beginning of the end? and for that very reason, the supreme danger?
4
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, Translated Golffing 1956 p. 9-11

Hoe this ain't punch, I'm sippin' on some syzurp

I roll a fat joint and do my fingers like scissors
Norman-The Black Attack January/February (Nuke War)
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Hoe this ain't punch, I'm sippin' on some syzurp

I roll a fat joint and do my fingers like scissors