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4) Nuclear Terror Research - Copy

4) Nuclear Terror Research - Copy

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The Nuclear Bible: Nuclear Scholars & White Papers
 
Intro:
The following scholarly whitepapers, research papers, think tanks papers, and journal articles cover the topics of Nuclear Terrorand Pakistan in-depth. The plan is clear; terrorists WILL acquire nuclear weapons. Whether they make it, steal it, find it or buy it, they willacquire one. If these papers are to be believed, nuclear terror is written in stone, and once one nuke goes off another will follow.
A Few Educated Guesses:Nuke # 1:
 The NFL Super Bowl XLV , Arlington (Dallas), Texas, USA (February 6, 2011) 
Nuke # 2:
 Washington D.C., USA (February 9, 2011, March 9, 2011 (Ash Wednesday), or the 9
th
of a month yet to be determined.
Date:
August 1997
Source:
Institute For Science And International Security, Kevin O'Neill
Title/Headline:
 
The Nuclear Terrorist Threat  
Abstract: The proliferation of nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices to terrorist groups is perhaps one of the mostfrightening threats to U.S. security.
Nuclear materials, technologies and know-how are more widely available today than ever before.Small quantities of both fissile materials and highly radioactive materials, sufficient to manufacture a radiological dispersal device, areactively traded on the black market.
Although terrorist groups are not suspected of actually acquiring such materials in largequantities, it is difficult to know for sure. A nuclear detonation by a terrorist group would likely result in an unprecedentednumber of casualties.
In contrast, a radiological dispersal attack would probably be less violent, but
 
could significantly contaminate anurban center, causing economic and social disruption.
Both types of attacks would have significant psychological impacts on the entirepopulation.
Whether terrorists could make nuclear weapons has been addressed by many governmental and nongovernmental groups. Thefundamental conclusion is that terrorists would find obtaining the wherewithal to make nuclear weapons a difficult task 
. Nonetheless,terrorist organizations could over time develop such a capability, if they can obtain sufficient fissile material, likely through theft.Experts and governments officials have long acknowledged that a sub-national terrorist group could gather the technical skills andinformation needed to manufacture a nuclear weapon, given access to the necessary materials.
In the mid-1970s, the CongressionalOffice of 
 
Technology Asses
sment (OTA) concluded that ―a small group of people, none of whom have
 
ever had access to the classifiedliterature, could possibly design and build a crude nuclear
 
device.‖
 
In order to manufacture a crude nuclear weapon,
a terroristorganization needs to possess specialized expertise in areas such as high explosives, propellants, electronics, nuclear physics,chemistry and engineering.
Knowledge of the physical and chemical properties of plutonium or
 
highly enriched uranium (HEU) isessential. The terrorist group also must obtain detailed design
 
drawings of weapons components and of the final assembled device.
 
In thepast, such information was difficult to come by in the open literature.
Today, according to Defense Department and EnergyDepartment officials, important and useful information about the design and assembly of nuclear weapons or weapons componentscan be found on internet sites and World Wide Web pages.
Given this anonymity, the internet can function as an instantaneous, globalclearinghouse of information and provide a useful first source for terrorist groups, which otherwise would have to search the publicliterature in more conspicuous ways. Terrorists bent on assembling a nuclear explosive must acquire sufficient quantities of 
 
plutonium orHEU that is in a weapons-usable form. Depending on the quantity and form of material that it initially acquires,
a subnational terroristgroup may need to convert fissile materials from one form to another, requiring expertise in chemistry and access to necessarychemicals and equipment.
 
Much of the world's less-protected stocks of fissile material cannot be used directly in nuclear weapons.
By one recent estimate, over 700 tonnes of plutonium is
 
contained in highly radioactive spent nuclear reactor fuel that has been dischargedfrom
 
commercial nuclear power reactors.4 Before this plutonium could be used in nuclear weapons, it
 
would have to be separated from theremaining uranium, cladding and fission products in a
 
laboratory or reprocessing facility.
It is highly unlikely that a subnationalterrorist group would be able to gain access to such facilities or carry out such activities without being detected.
The detonation of acrude nuclear device by a terrorist group would be devastating.
 
Although the actual yield of such a device is highly variable, the OTA
concluded that ―a clever 
 
and competent group could design and construct a device which would produce a significant
 
nuclear yield (ie., ayield
much
greater than the yield of an equal mass of high explosive)
 
(emphasis in original).
Beyond the immediate physical damagecaused by a nuclear terrorist attack, the psychological, economic and sociological impacts of such an attack would be devastating.
Unlike natural disasters, a nuclear attack may occur without warning, leaving little chance for
 
preparation.
An attack in an urban areawould not only kill large numbers of people, it also could render the area virtually uninhabitable for a long period of time.
 Survivors may have to be
 
relocated; hospitals and shelters would quickly become filled with displaced persons, many of 
 
them injured orsuffering from radiation exposure.
The trauma of such an attack would leave lasting psychological and emotional scars on thesurvivors
. The clean up task would no doubt
 
rival even the largest efforts undertaken following comparable natural disasters, such as
 
hurricanes,
and would require long-term commitments from local, state and federal relief programs. The proliferation of nuclearweapons or radiological dispersal devices to terrorist groups is perhaps one of the most frightening threats to U.S. security.
Nuclear
 
materials, technologies and know-how are more widely available today than ever before. Small quantities of both fissile materials andhighly radioactive materials, sufficient to manufacture a radiological dispersal device, are actively traded on the black market.
Althoughterrorist groups are not known to have actually acquired such materials, it is difficult to know for sure.
A nuclear detonation by aterrorist group would likely result in an unprecedented number
 
of casualties. In contrast, a radiological dispersal attack would probably beless violent, but
 
could significantly contaminate an urban center, causing economic and social disruption. Both
 
types of attacks would havesignificant psychological impacts on the affected population. Opinions on terrorism are changing. In the past, analysts have regardednuclear terrorism
 
as unlikely, given the international backlash against such an attack.
Today, a new breed of terrorists, motivated byreligious rather than political goals, seem less concerned with creating large numbers of casualties. Such groups might use nuclearweapons if given the chance
(O‘Neill, 1997).
Date:
October 1, 2001
Source:
CDI (Center For Defense Information), B. G. Blair
Title/Headline:
What If The Terrorists Go Nuclear?
Abstract:
 
As the United States proceeds with its war on terrorism, one of the darkest clouds hanging over the campaign is thequestion of whether the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 horrors could strike again, this time with nuclear weapons.
It seems doubtfulthat U.S. intelligence can definitively answer this question. Absent perfect foresight, one can nonetheless outline some of the
plausiblethreats and identify the range of U.S. responses that could reduce the exposure of citizens and troops to nuclear attack.
 
The mostaccessible nuclear device for any terrorist would be a radiological dispersion bomb. This so-called 'dirty bomb' would consist of waste by-products from nuclear reactors wrapped in conventional explosives, which upon detonation would spew deadlyradioactive particles into the environment
. This is an expedient weapon, in that radioactive waste material is relatively easy to obtain.Radioactive waste is widely found throughout the world, and in general is not as well guarded as actual nuclear weapons.
In the UnitedStates, radioactive waste is located at more than 70 commercial nuclear power sites, in 31 states. Enormous quantities also existoverseas
 
in Europe and Japan in particular. Tons of wastes are transported long distances, including between continents (Japanto Europe and back). In Russia, security for nuclear waste is especially poor, and the potential for diversion and actual use byIslamic radicals has been shown to be very real indeed.
In 1996, Islamic rebels from the break-away province of Chechnya planted, butdid not detonate, such a device in Moscow's Izmailovo park to demonstrate Russia's vulnerability.
This dirty bomb consisted of a deadlybrew of dynamite and one of the highly radioactive by-products of nuclear fission
 
Cesium
. Extreme versions of such gamma-rayemitting bombs, such as a dynamite-laden casket of spent fuel from a nuclear power plant, would not kill quite as many people as died onSept. 11.
A worst-case calculation for an explosion in downtown Manhattan during noontime: more than 2,000 deaths and manythousands more suffering from radiation poisoning. Treatment of those exposed would be greatly hampered by inadequate medicalfacilities and training. The United States has only a single hospital emergency room dedicated to treating patients exposed toradiation hazards, at Oak Ridge, Tenn.
A credible threat to explode such a bomb in a U.S. city could have a powerful impact on theconduct of U.S. foreign and military policy, and could possibly have a paralyzing effect. Not only would the potential loss of life beconsiderable, but also the prospect of mass evacuation of dense urban centers would loom large in the minds of policy-makers
. A terroristattack on a commercial nuclear power plant with a commercial jet or heavy munitions could have a similar affect to a radiologicalbomb, and cause for greater casualties. If such an attack were to cause either a meltdown of the reactor core (similar to theChernobyl disaster), or a dispersal of the spent fuel waste on the site, extensive casualties could be expected
. In such an instance, thepower plant would be the source of the radiological contamination, and the plane or armament would be the explosive mechanism forspreading lethal radiation over large areas.
The threat from radiological dispersion dims in comparison to the possibility thatterrorists could build or obtain an actual atomic bomb. An explosion of even low yield could kill hundreds of thousands of people.A relatively small bomb, say 15-kilotons, detonated in Manhattan could immediately kill upwards of 100,000 inhabitants, followedby a comparable number of deaths in the lingering aftermath
. Fortunately, bomb-grade nuclear fissile material (highly enricheduranium or plutonium) is relatively heavily guarded in most, if not all, nuclear weapon states. Nonetheless, the possibility of diversionremains.
Massive quantities of fissile material exist around the world. Sophisticated terrorists could fairly readily design andfabricate a workable atomic bomb once they manage to acquire the precious deadly ingredients (the Hiroshima bomb which used asimple gun-barrel design is the prime example).Pakistan:
 
Another potential source of diversion is the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, estimated to number around 30-50 atomic bombswith explosive yields ranging from 1 to 15 kilotons
. The weapons are probably assembled at Wah (50 miles from Afghanistan), and arestored primarily at Sargodha near a missile complex close to the border with India and only about 250 miles from Afghanistan.
Pakistan'smilitary government is walking a tightrope between pressure from the Bush administration on one side and anti-American Islamicmilitants on the other.
Growing street opposition from the latter could certainly de-stabilize or even topple the regime, and in the midst of such dissolution, the weakening of nuclear security would inevitably occur.
The ranks of government and military personnel are alsofairly riddled with sympathizers of the radical Islamic faction, posing a distinct risk of insiders colluding to spirit away a bomb ortwo for bin Laden or other terrorists.
In any case, control over Pakistan's arsenal could all too readily buckle in a serious crisis inside thecountry.
Pakistani weapons are believed to lack sophisticated locks and other safeguards to prevent their unauthorized use. Loosenukes in the region would have unpredictable consequences, almost all of which would militate against the U.S. cause, not tomention the safety of U.S. forces dispatched there.
With such a panoply of possible threats, there are a number of actions that could betaken in the near term to shore up nuclear security.
The Pakistani situation, in particular, deserves careful monitoring
 
usingsurveillance and intelligence assets in the region. The U.S. government could urge Pakistani authorities to further consolidateand/or disable their nuclear devices, and beef up security around storage sites
 
and even offer security equipment and guards.
In
 
fact, the U.S. government should be prepared to provide arsenal security even without Islamabad's permission if emergency circumstancesdictate.
The U.S. government also could begin drawing up contingency plans to 'rescue' the arsenal if the need arises. U.S. SpecialOperations forces should be kept on high alert for quick, covert insertion to the sites to disable or even re-locate weapons toprevent their capture by unauthorized persons.
It must be noted, however, that inserting commandos on short notice to gain control overthe arsenal would put them in considerable jeopardy, and disarming the weapons could be dangerous indeed.
Pakistani weapons arebelieved to have quite primitive safety devices
 
they almost certainly lack the "one-point" safety design of U.S. weapons
 
whichmeans that a Pakistani nuclear weapon could more easily detonate if subjected to conventional firefights between soldiers usinggrenades or similar munitions. Therefore, it would be highly desirable for nuclear experts from the Department of Energy toaccompany any military troops in such a scenario
. DoE nuclear response teams, known as Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST),are formed in a crisis from nearly 1,000 highly trained and knowledgeable individuals, and could be dispatched to the region to assist inlocating and disarming any weapons.
The teams and their equipment, some on alert staging out of Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada,know the design of Pakistani weapons (based on defector reports), and could x-ray the weapons and devise a disabling procedureon the spot. Compared to the military's commandos, these experienced civilian teams would stand a better chance of blowing upthe triggering mechanisms on Pakistani weapons without causing the bomb to go off.
Another option for response in a crisis would befor such a joint military-civilian insertion mission to link up with a Russian counterpart to conduct search and disable missions together inthe region. The mutual benefits would be considerable, and such a joint U.S.-Russian operation would have lasting positive effects onfuture cooperation.
Nuclear Terror Within The United States:
 
The first steps to mitigate the possibility of nuclear terrorism would be serious andrapid effort to build intelligence capabilities that might warn of a potential attack, and as explained above, to take actions aimed atshoring up possible sources of nuclear material
. In the meantime, increased monitoring at ports also must continue and be intensified,despite the negative ramifications on international trade. Inspection of containers up to Sept. 11 has been rather cursory, and infrequent.
This is changing, just as already the U.S. government and airlines are scrambling to beef up airline and airport security. Some of the additional security measures would include those exported to Russia under the Nunn-Lugar program.
A prime example is thetransfer of nuclear materials detectors to Russia, which were then emplaced at strategic border crossings, ports and airports to detectdiversion.
The U.S. government might consider the use of such equipment at similar American locations, particularly ports, as amethod to detect and intercept materials being smuggled into the country. In addition, there are a number of methods to increasesecurity around nuclear power plants that already are being discussed by U.S. authorities and nuclear plant operators, such asexpanding the perimeters of restricted airspace.
Such measures should be implemented as rapidly as possible. Finally, NEST operationswould go into effect if a credible threat of a dirty bomb or a full-fledged nuclear weapon were to manifest itself.
If the informationavailable would allow the U.S. teams to locate the city affected, hundreds of team members would fan out along a matrix of thethreat region to detect the bomb. Carrying gamma- and neutron-detectors inside carrying cases to preserve secrecy, the NESTmembers would cover the suspect area on foot, in vans and helicopters
 
going in and out of buildings hoping to register the tell-tale signals of a hidden bomb.
Once found, the bomb is x-rayed, "sniffed" and otherwise analyzed to determine its characteristics.
Obviously, intelligence that helps localize the bomb is the main key to success. Just as obviously, intelligence of such quality isseldom available
 
as proven on Sept. 11. Such a search could be truly looking for a needle in a haystack, as detection normallywould succeed only if the detectors come within a few feet or so of the hidden bomb.
Disabling a bomb is easy by comparison. Aradiological bomb might be surrounded by a tent enclosure several tens of feet in height and width, then filled with a special foam tocontain the deadly radioactive material (such as Cesium 137) if the bomb explodes during further defusing attempts. For a nuclear device, aset of options for disabling the weapon are available including using explosives to wreck the bomb's wiring to prevent the triggering of thenuclear detonators.
Because of the difficulty inherent in finding a nuclear weapon once it entered the country, near-term U.S.response efforts would be best focused on prevention and intervention to secure possible sources of nuclear terrorism
(Blair, 2001).
Date:
July, 2002
Source:
Parliamentary Office Of Science And Technology
Title/Headline:
 
Nuclear Terrorism
 
Abstract:
 
Recent reports of alleged terrorist plans to build a ‗dirty bomb‘ have heightened longstanding concerns about nuclear
terrorism.
This briefing outlines possible forms of attack, such as:
Detonation of a nuclear weapon. Attacks involving radioactivematerials. Attacks on nuclear facilities
. The detonation of a nuclear weapon, although extremely difficult for terrorists to accomplish,could have devastating consequences. Terrorists might attempt either to steal a nuclear weapon or construct their own device from illegallyacquired nuclear material.
There are over 30,000 nuclear weapons worldwide, more than 90% of which belong to the USA or Russia.
 Nuclear weapons are held under high security, although standards vary internationally and the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) hasvoiced concerns about internal security at Russian weapons complexes.
There is no evidence to date that any terrorist group hasacquired nuclear weapons or enough nuclear material to construct one
– 
although there is evidence that both Aum Shinrikyo andAl Qaida have attempted to d
o so. The yield of a nuclear weapon constructed or stolen by terrorists could range from only a few tonnes tomany thousands of tonnes. However, even a low yield device could have significant consequences. Attacks involving radioactive materialsRadiological attacks involve dispersal of radioactive material but not a nuclear explosion. They pose fewer technical difficulties thandeploying a nuclear weapon. Many radioactive materials are easier to acquire than nuclear materials and are used extensively in manycountries, in medicine, industry, agriculture and research. Alternatively terrorists might set off a dirty bomb, using conventional explosivesto disperse radioactive material over a wide area.
To date, no terrorist group has detonated a dirty bomb.
The effects are hard topredict, as they would depend on factors such as weather conditions and the type of material used. People could be exposed toradioactivity, not only from the initial dust cloud, but also from particles that settled on the ground and buildings or entered water or food

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