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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PAST AND PRESENT

Research · August 2015

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.1452.9763

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 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PAST AND PRESENT
Syed Robayet Ferdous1
Md. Rajab Ali2

ABSTRACT
It is patently true that nuclear weapons and human beings cannot co-exist and both of them
are now placed in an uneasy juxtaposition. One represents the technology of annihilation; the other
represents the sum total of human achievement – past, present and potential future. It should not be a
difficult choice, but many of us on the planet seem to be voting against ourselves by our ignorance,
apathy and denial. Everyone has the same challenge to educate and advocate for a new nuclear policy
that will move the world away from the nuclear precipice. In such a situation to achieve a new and
human-centric nuclear policy will require major national efforts within nuclear weapons states, and a
major global campaign to bring pressure to bear upon these states from without. The article has
discovered that nuclear weapons currently divide humanity, but the recognition of their danger could
be a force for uniting humanity for their elimination. This would be a great achievement not only for
its expression of common human purpose, but also for the resources it would free for meeting basic
human needs. At the end, the article recommended for a new nuclear policy aimed at eliminating
nuclear weapons as the top priority on the global agenda.

INTRODUCTION
Nuclear proliferation is a term now used to describe the spread of ‘nuclear weapons’1, fissile
materials, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information to nations that are not
recognized as ‘nuclear weapon States’ by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Nuclear proliferation,
the present pivotal problem, is destabilizing international or regional relations or infringe upon the
national sovereignty of states. Martin van Crevelt argues that nuclear weapons make people caution
and careful, whether or not they are superpowers. In each region where superpowers have been
introduced, they have in effect abolished large-scale interstate conflict.2 However, this does not mean
an end to all war. Nuclear states occasionally attack non-nuclear ones, as Panama and Lebanon know.
Non-nuclear states sometimes feel able to attack nuclear ones, too, if they calculate that their target
will accept a moderate loss. Thus in 1973 Syria and Egypt attempted to relieve Israel of the Sinai and
Golan, and in 1982 Argentina tried to grab the Falklands. Non-Sates, which are immune to the

1
Assistant Professor, Department of Law & Justice, Southeast University, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
2
Senior Lecturer, Department of Law, North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
1
nuclear threat, will fight anyone: the Mujaheddin against the Soviet Union, the Vietcong against
America. But the spread of nuclear peace does seem to mean that the “softwar” of deterrence has
proliferated in step with the “hardwar” of nuclear weaponry. Some strategists dismiss fears that
“rogue regimes” will ignore the logic of deterrence as thinly disguised racism. Nuclear proliferation3
may not necessarily put a complete stop to large wars between states. If the Americans were able to
ignore Russian nuclear weapons in planning a conventional defense of Europe, then similar acts of
denial would surely be possible elsewhere. And deterrence may not always work. Its chances of
working may be improved if nuclear weapons, too, retreat from the physical world in to virtual world,
losing some immediacy but little power. The Indian and Pakistan deterrents are already more notional
than numerical. Britain and France might move the same way, and in America there is talk of “virtual
abolition”, in which the know-how is treated as the arsenal. An opposite process of “virtual
proliferation” is already going on. States such as Canada, Belgium and Japan are technically able to
proliferate with ease. They could, if they wished to, just pull out of the NPT and use their plutonium,
computing power and aerospace industries to go nuclear. It would take less than a year if they wanted
to do it. By 2030, technically advanced countries might be permanently perched days from a bomb,
even though they had never tried to proliferate.4

METHODOLOGY
There was no data collection in order to establish this issue as because it is nearly impossible
to analyze empirically. However, it is a conceptual analysis on western nuclear weapon states and
third world non nuclear weapon states. Most of the concepts plunk to analyses the non-proliferation
treaty (NPT) endorsed by the UN General Assembly with General Assembly Resolution 2373
(XXII), a variety of other regional treaty i.e. Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty-1967, Outer
Space Treaty- 1967, Partial Test Ban Treaty-1963, various agency like International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). The other source relied on text books, magazine, journals, and comment from a
number of resource people who are expert in this segment. Albeit, it is on the basis of secondary
evidence, starting point of the substantiation, it is also interpreted various practical viewpoint. This
study merely upholds the indistinct of the contemporary existing issue across the world.

2
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The main aims and objectives behind the study, to know the present scenario of nuclear
propagation in the contemporary world and how it has been increasing in the name of border security
or meet the crying need of energy. It is also focus the propensity of nuclear proliferation in order to
self-defense of their respective states from the neighbors countries, regardless of UN attempts to
prevent proliferation. Burning example, as Iran and Israel has been continuing nuclear proliferation.
Notwithstanding the above fact, however, the specific objectives on the following issues have also
been considered in this article:
• Discrimination of the nuclear proliferation between western and third world particularly
Muslim mid-east countries.
• How is devastating economy in the name of nuclear explosion and the aftermath of such
propagation, for example Soviet Union;
• What is the possibility of a crude nuclear device falling into the hands of national and
international terrorists and what types of weapon proliferated;
• Is there any actual diminished of nuclear weapon as people expected after the end of cold
war?
• What is the status of the conventional weapon? Whether it is legitimate tools as a defense for
state or inhuman weapon ; and
• What are the control mechanisms of such nuclear proliferation? To what extent these have
been achieved?

LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

This article is not written by the primary evidence and there is no set of questionnaire or a written list
of questions to be answered by a large number of people to provide information for a survey or
report. It is limited only with the UN and its special agency’s treaty, convention, agreements and an
individual act done by individual states. The information is back up Second World War to date.
Besides, lack of proper automation and modernization in the concerned offices/locations would make
the process of gathering information on the subject increasingly difficult.

3
JUSTIFYING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
With the demise of communism in the Soviet Union and in the end of cold war, concern over
the threat of a nuclear confrontation has shifted to other nations, primarily those of the Third World.5
In 1974, India became the sixth nation to test a nuclear device. In 1979, Israel in collaboration with
South Africa, have tested a nuclear device in the name of border security and protection as like
U.S.A. and former Soviet Union. In case of Middle East, Western nations suspected that Islamic
states, especially Iran, Syria, Libya and Algeria, are now following in Iraq’s footsteps. And in Asia,
after years of having been suspected of possessing nuclear weaponry, Pakistan finally admitted to it
in 1992. The fear of western nations alike United States is that, a nuclear device in the hands of an
irrational, militaristic dictator in Syria, Pakistan or other Third World state could be used to threaten
neighboring enemies, the United Sates, or one of its allies. They are concerned, too, with the
possibility of a crude nuclear device falling into the hands of terrorists, who could then detonate it or
use it as a form of blackmail. Western nations are convinced that if these regional enemies obtain
such destructive weapons, they will inevitably use them. If this were to occur, many analyses believe
it would lay the groundwork for the next world war, most likely between Arab nations and the West.
IN the eye of United Sates, Third World regimes far more radical and unpredictable than any of the
eight present members of the nuclear club.6 But many third World nations suspected of developing
nuclear weapons assert that they should be allowed to obtain them for the same reason the United
States and Russia have them: to defend their territories as best they can. As Iran stated in 1991, “
since Israel continues to possess nuclear weapons, we, the Muslims, must cooperate to produce an
atomic bomb, regardless of UN attempts to prevent proliferation”.7 The East contended that
nonproliferation efforts by primarily Western nations amount to hypocritical discrimination against
the Third world and the Arab world in particular. The Arabs argue that their nations are victims of a
double standard: the West condones the ownership of nuclear weapons technology and materials by
the United States, Russia and others but denies it to Arab states. Arab states assert that they, too,
would never use the weapons, but would merely have them to deter their enemies.8

DRASTIC PROLIFERATION
Economic disorder within the former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapon complex-comprising
facilities and trained personnel for producing and storing special nuclear materials, and for designing
and fabricating nuclear weapons and components-creates a potential source of nuclear proliferation
outside the commonwealth9 unlike any previously faced by the nonproliferation regime. Nuclear

4
materials, sensitive non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons, the talents of skilled bomb builders,
and even entire nuclear weapons could conceivably find their way onto world markets. Those
markets have a demonstrated willingness to pay lavish prices for such materials and technologies,
which could tempt Soviet enterprises and individuals strapped for hard currency.10 If systematic
disintegration of the nuclear weapon production and custodial systems begins to take place, the world
could see a diaspora of military technology not seen since the Nazi rocket scientists emigrated from
Germany after World War II11 and already there have been several instances of attempts to sell fissile
materials on the international black market.12
At times mainly two types of weapons are proliferated: so-called weapons of mass destruction
(nuclear, chemical and biological) and conventional weapons.
Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD): It appears that the end of the cold war has not diminished
the significance attached to nuclear weapons, as many had hopped.13 Indeed, the incentives for states
to acquire nuclear weapons would appear to have increased in post-cold war period14 as the majority
of the nuclear weapons that are perceived to cause the problem are still in place.15 WMD is being
increased for state security, for the guarantee of extended deterrence provided by the superpowers
under ‘nuclear umbrella’16 and the instability caused by the breakdown of superpowers alliance. All
types of chemical and biological weapons are injurious and caused unaccepted suffering17 and the
best example is the war between Iraq and Iran in 1980.18 Chemical and biological weapons CBW) are
always considered to be illegitimate weapons of war. In the aftermath of First World War, it was
agreed in 1925 Gas Protocol of Geneva Convention that nerve gas would not be used in the future
because the injuries and sufferings it caused were unacceptable.19 During the Cold War, attention
centered primarily on the CBW of the superpowers, but in fact, more ominous developments
occurred outsides of the superpower relationship. One of premium technology in this group is
directed-energy technology. It encompasses technologies such as high-energy lasers, particle-beams
(both charged and neutral) and high power microwaves, which are capable of transmitting significant
quantities of energy through the atmosphere or space and concentrating the energy on a target.20
Conventional Weapons: Unlike WMD conventional weapons are considered legitimate tools of
defense and statehood. During the Cold War, these weapons were regarded as a premier tool of
superpower diplomacy and supplied freely to key allies and neutral states. Conventional weapons
proliferation is being recognized as one of the factors fueling inter-ethnic conflict. Although rarely
the sole cause of such conflicts, the transfer of conventional weapons and particularly the easy
availability of light weapons has prolonged and intensified existing inter-ethnic conflicts and helped

5
to ignite new conflicts.21 At present, these weapons are controversial and forcing their way to the
international agenda as ‘inhumane weapons’.

PROLIFERATION AS INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM

Despite the efforts to outlaw nuclear weapons, some states are seeking nuclear weapons and
regard them as the only effective guarantor of their security. This is particularly true for the category
of states which have recently been labeled ‘rough’, a reference to the nature of the regimes and their
rejection of many of the values underpinning the international system. The end of the Cold War has
created a false sense of security, largely attributable to inertia and poor leadership creating following
danger of nukes-
• the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other state actors. The more states in possession of
nuclear weapons, the more likely they are to proliferate further and to be used. The spread of
nuclear weapons dramatically increases problems of control, as was demonstrated by the case of
Pakistan’s A. Q. Khan.
• the proliferation of nuclear weapons to extremist organizations. This is a danger that cannot be
ruled out. Nuclear weapons in the hands of an extremist organization, such as al Qaeda, pose
substantial danger to all countries, including the major nuclear weapons states.
• the use of a nuclear weapon by an extremist organization against a state. The actual use of a
nuclear weapon by an extremist organization against a state could result in destruction
comparable to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with added widespread security and economic
implications. Questions would arise about the viability of the world economy, human rights and
democratic processes in the face of such attack.
• the use of a nuclear weapon by a nuclear weapons state against another state. Such use would be
devastating and could trigger a nuclear war. It would end the taboo on the use of nuclear
weapons that has existed since 1945.
• an all-out nuclear war, initiated either intentionally or accidentally. The danger of an all-out
nuclear war is always with us. It would be insane, but it could happen. Just as states stumbled
into World War I, they could stumble again, by accident or miscalculation, into an all-out nuclear
war.

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INTERNATIONAL CONTROL MECHANISM
The superpower and its allies are in great concern to the sight of proliferated nuclear weapons
in some specific states particularly in ‘rough states’. Iran, South Korea, Libya are in the black listed
in this category. Especially America wants to stop these states for getting possession of nuclear
weapons and this tendency proceeds to adopt ‘the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons’.
Treaties on Non-Proliferation: The most important international agreement limiting nuclear arms,
regarded as the greatest possible danger and hazard,22 since the nuclear age began23 through adoption
of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 1957 to decrease chance of accidental war by increasing
necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.24
Truman’s administration first proposed the ‘Baruch Plan’25 stating the verifiable dismantlement and
destruction of the US nuclear arsenal after all governments had corporate successfully to accomplish
two things: (a) the establishment of an ‘international atomic development authority’ which would
actually own and control all military-applicable nuclear materials and activities, and (b) the creation
of a system of automatic sanctions, which not even the UN Security Council could veto, and which
would proportionately punish states attempting to acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons or
fissile materials. But Baruch Plan failed as consequence of Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’26
proposal before UN General Assembly under which program thousands of scientists from around the
world were educated in nuclear science and then dispatched them home, where many later pursued
secret weapons programs in their home country.27 However after creation of Eisenhower’s proposed
“International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)” in 1957,28 the UN General Assembly endorsed the
NPT with General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII), and in July 1968, the NPT opened for
signature and finally entered into force in March 1970. Other method of impeding nuclear
proliferation is the first nuclear-free zone, created in Antarctica by treaty in 195929 to denuclearize
zone in central Europe;30 the 1967 Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty;31 the 1967 Outer Space
treaty32 and the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty.33 The ‘Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production And Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) And Toxin Weapons And
on their Destruction’ was signed in 1972 and came into force in 1975. In 1980, 51 states signed the
‘Convention on Prohibitions or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which may
be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effect’ as an instrument of the
international human rights regulating the use, and in some cases transfer of specific conventional
weapons. Up to the year 2003, five protocols are adhered to the Convention having at present 90
signatory states including those who have not signed the Ottawa Convention like China, Israel,

7
Pakistan, the Russian Federation and the USA. ‘The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’ was
signed in 1996 by 71 states, including 5 nuclear states. Up to the year 2004, 107 countries signed this
treaty, establishing CTBTO, an organization for provision oversight, including 321 seismic, infra-
acoustic and hydro-acoustic observatory station throughout the world, which can detect the waves
caused by nuclear explosions.
The NPT is the cornerstone of the international effort to halt the proliferation, or spread, of nuclear
weapons having 189 signatory members.34 The treaty distinguishes between nuclear-weapon states
(NWS)35 and non-nuclear-weapon (NNWS) states. It identifies five nuclear-weapon states: China,
France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Paragraph one to three of the
preamble expresses the importance of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Paragraphs
four and five state the need of and confidence in the safeguards system of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Paragraphs six and seven declare the goal of sharing peaceful uses of nuclear energy
and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The need for further progress toward nuclear
disarmament is emphasized in paragraphs eight and nine. The last paragraph of the preamble
reaffirms the principle of the United Nations Charter regarding the use of force in international
relation. The key articles of the treaty are I36 and II37 that absolute forbids proliferation. The NPT has
three distinguished qualities—
• non-proliferation: Under Article II of NPT the NNWS parties agree not to receive,
manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons;
• disarmament: Article VI of NPT elaborates to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control;
• peaceful use of nuclear energy: Under Article IV38 of NPT countries that have signed the
treaty as NNWS and maintained that status have an unbroken record of not building nuclear
weapons. However North Korea violated39 and later withdrew from the NPT and tested a
nuclear device. Iran has been accused of seeking to develop a nuclear weapons capability, and
Libya pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program before abandoning it in December
2003. Unfortunately 13 states have an enrichment capability.40
Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguard measures applied by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). Operation of nuclear facilities must have to declare detailed accounting

8
records of all movement and transactions involving nuclear materials. Sometime IAEA uses
surveillance cameras and instrument. IAEA relies on—
• material accountancy: this includes sampling and analysis of nuclear materials, on-site
inspection, review and verification of operating records, tracking all inward and outward
transfer and the flow of materials in any nuclear facility;
• physical security: restricting access to nuclear materials at the site;
• containment and surveillance: use of seals, automatic cameras and other instruments to detect
unreported movement or tampering with nuclear materials, as well as spot checks on-site.
To strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system41 a program was initiated in 1993 and the
IAEA Board of Governors 1997 agreed to adopt a model protocol that includes the following
additional elements—
• the IAEA is to be authorized considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related
activities like R & D, production of uranium and thorium and nuclear-related imports and
exports;
• inspectors of IAEA will have more rights of access to any suspect location at short notice and
to deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities;
• states must ensure IAEA inspectors automatic visa renewal and readily communication with
IAEA headquarters;
• further evaluation safeguards for each state considering state situation and nuclear materials it
has.
As of January 2006, 86 countries have brought Additional Protocol into force. The IAEA is now
applying the measures of the Additional Protocol in Taiwan and China.42 But a more accurate
measure of the non-proliferation regime’s success is its ability to deter determined countries from
pursuit of the bomb, although the record is disappointing. Since the mid-1960s to 2008, non-NPT
members Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea have all joined the original nuclear
club of five. Brazil and Argentina reportedly came very close to a nuclear-weapons capability but
retreated from their program in 1990.43 In addition, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Taiwan, all parties
to the NPT, are actively pursuing nuclear weapons. The present regime has also failed to prevent
nations from acquiring the materials to opt for nuclear weapons at a time of their choosing. Belgium,
Germany, Japan and Switzerland are all stockpilling large quantities of plutonium and bomb-grade
uranium having the means and technical power to turn them into bombs. Although having
constraints, Japan and Germany have active civilian nuclear programs with military overtones. NPT
9
also failed to stop the flow of nuclear-bomb materials and technology; from 1985 to 2005, US
assisted France; Us, Canada and UK assisted India; Germany, UK, US and Israel assisted South
Africa; France and US assisted Israel; France, West Germany and former Soviet Union assisted Iran;
former Soviet Union alone assisted Libya, Syria, Iraq and Cuba. The NPT’s loopholes, technical
defects and absence of policing mechanism more effective than IAEA’s safeguard are responsible for
this failure. Ashok Kapur rightly says, ‘The NPT is the Berlin Wall of nuclear affairs. Although its
downfall is not imminent, the system of atomic apartheid embodied in the treaty has been unraveling
for some time. In a modern and open world where walls are crumbling, the NPT is an anachronism. It
is in force in a technical sense but without force as a regulatory regime among those determined to
defy it. The regime works best where it is needed least, and it does not work at all where it is needed
most’.44
Although limiting the spread of nuclear weapons is a major challenge for better effectiveness of NPT
and active application of IAEA the following actions are to be considered-
• most developed nuclear science and technology can be applied for peaceful purposes in
accordance with global non-proliferation objectives;
• plutonium disposition will required from sustained and stable support from most developed
countries over many years;
• global partnership to pursue peaceful nuclear programs from a non-nuclear perspective;
• research and development policy having measures of taking to enhance weapon and
surveillance technology; create new technologies to safeguard new nuclear production
complex; evaluate the nuclear arsenal for safety, security and reliability; update weapons
systems to maintain their capabilities; deliver advanced robotics systems to monitor
proliferation activities, clean up hazardous sites, and disassemble old munitions.
Additional Protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors in1997 having been equipped with
the following key elements-

• The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related

activities, including R & D, production of uranium and thorium, and nuclear-related imports
and exports.
• IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access. This will include any suspect location, it
can be at short notice (e.g., two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and
remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.

10
 • States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa
renewal and can communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters.
• Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of its
particular situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has. This will involve greater judgment
on the part of IAEA and the development of effective methodologies which reassure NPT
States.

As of 9 October 2008, 127 countries near to 9th October of 2008 have signed this protocol, and 88
have brought them into force45 including in Taiwan.46 Non-signatory states are Egypt, which says it
will not sign until Israel accepts comprehensive IAEA safeguards,47 and Brazil, which opposes
making the protocol a requirement for international cooperation on enrichment and reprocessing48 but
has not ruled out signing.49

CONCLUTION WITH SOME RECOMMENDATION

Some steps are already in progress for reducing nuclear dangers. Such as-
• extending key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991
• taking steps to increase the warning and decision times for the launch of all nuclear-armed
ballistic missiles, thereby reducing risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks;
• discarding any existing operational plans for massive attacks that still remain from the Cold
War days;
• undertaking negotiations toward developing cooperative multilateral ballistic-missile defense
and early warning systems, as proposed by Presidents Bush and Putin at their 2002 Moscow
summit meeting;
• dramatically accelerating work to provide the highest possible standards of security for
nuclear weapons, as well as for nuclear materials everywhere in the world, to prevent
terrorists from acquiring a nuclear bomb;
• starting a dialogue, including within NATO and with Russia, on consolidating the nuclear
weapons designed for forward deployment to enhance their security, and as a first step toward
careful accounting for them and their eventual elimination;
• strengthening the means of monitoring compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) as a counter to the global spread of advanced technologies;
11
 • adopting a process for bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into effect,
which would strengthen the NPT and aid international monitoring of nuclear activities;
• the obligation for good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament in Article VI of the
1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty;
• the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, which stated, “There exists
an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”
• the pledge in the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament agreed to unanimously at the
2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: “An unequivocal undertaking by the
nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to
nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.
NPT's dual and double-standard character (favoring NWS and disfavoring NNWS) must have to be
stopped immediately. Each state must be considered equally and respectfully for banning nuclear
weapons. It is not just that developed state should possess nuclear weapons for own survival and
existence while other should have not. No discrimination among countries on race and religion
should have to be prevailed on possessing nukes. Every man and woman should go ahead to stop
nukes at once for the best of their next generations. Otherwise the beautiful world will be vanished in
a second.

12
References:
1
Nuclear weapons are defined to include nuclear warheads for missiles, or nuclear bombs.
2
Martin van Creveldt, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict”, Free Press, 1993.
3
Proliferation: The continued increase in the number of nuclear weapons. Horizontal proliferation refers to the spread of
nuclear weapons to other nations while vertical proliferation refers to the upgrading of nuclear weapons technology
within the arsenals of acknowledged nuclear weapons states.
4
“On Not Being the Duke of Sung”, The Economist, June 10, 1995. Also see page, 34, Annual Edition of “World Politics
96/97”, Dushkin Publishing Group, and Connecticut 06437.
5
Developing nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America.
6
George J. Church, Time, December 16, 1991.
7
Statement of Iran’s vice-president Sayed Ataollah Mohajerani in 1991.
8
David L. Bender & Bruno Leone, page 13-14, “Nuclear Proliferation: Opposing Viewpoints”, Green haven Press, 1992.
9
Zimmerman, P. 1994, “Proliferation: Bronze Medal Technology is Enough”, Orbis, vol. 38(1), Winter, pp. 67-82.
10
Potter, W. C. 1995, “ Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Leakage From the Post-Soviet Sates”, Arms
Control Today, vol. 25 (8), October, pp. 9-16.
11
Ashton B. Carter, Arms Control Today, January/February 1992.
12
Van Ham, P. 1994, ‘Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s: Power, Politics and Policies’ London: Royal
Institute for International Affairs.
13
Woollacott, M. 1996, “How the World Grew to Love the Bomb”, Guardian Weekly, 11 February, p. 10.
14
Carpenter, T. G. 1992, “A New Proliferation Policy”, The National Interest, Summer, pp. 63-72.
15
Dean, J. 1994, “The Final Stage of Nuclear Arms Control”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 17 (4), pp. 31-52.
16
Rafferty, K. 1996, ‘US Key to Keeping Japan Non-Nuclear’, The Guardian, 1 March, p. 11.
17
Best, G. 1994, “ War and Law since 1945, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
18
Black, R. M. and Pearson, G. S. 1993, “Unequivocal Evidence”, Chemistry in Britain, July, pp. 584-7.ss
19
Best, G. 1994, “ War and Law since 1945, Oxford: Clarendon Press, page.296.
20
Hotz, Beam Policy Reversal, 110 Av. Week and Space Tech. 7 (May 7, 1979).
21
Goose, S.D. and Smyth, S. (1994), “ Arming Genocide In Rwanda”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 73 (5), September/October,
pp. 86-96. See also Hartung, W.D. (1995) “ U.S. Conventional Arms Transfers: Promoting Stability or Fueling
Conflicts?” Arms Control Today, vol. 25(9), November, pp. 9-13. See also Spear, J. (1994) “ On the Desirability and
Feasibility of Arms Transfer Regime Formation”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 15(3), December, pp. 84 -111.
22
“Text of President Kennedy’s News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Affairs”, ‘New York Times’ (Western ed.),
p. 4, col. 7, March 22, 1963.
23
Message from President L.B. Johnson to the Senate on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 9,
1968; 62 A.J.I.L. 954 (1968)
24
Hearing on the Arms Control and Disarmaments before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess.
At 28 (1968)
25
See Department of State, 1 Documents on Disarmament: 1945-1956 (Pub. No. 7008). The Baruch Plan: Statement by
the by US Representative (Baruch) to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1956, pp. 7-16 (1960). For the best
account of the origin of the Baruch Plan, see Department of State (Pub. No. 2702), The International Control of Atomic
Energy: Growth of a Policy (1946). Also see Department of State (Pub. No. 3161), The International Control of Atomic
Energy: Policy at the Crossroads (1948); (Pub. No. 2498), The Acheson-Lilienthal Report (1946)
26
UN General Assembly, 8th Sess., Official Records 443 (1953).
27
Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz (2007). ‘How you helped build Pakistan’s bomb’, Asia Times Online. Retrieved
on 2007-11-30.
28
International Atomic Energy Agency Statutes, 1956, 8 US Treaties 1093; T.I.A.S., No. 3873; 276 UN Treaty Series 3
(1956); 51 A.J.I.L. 466 (1957). For analysis of the Statutes, see Bechhoefer and Stein, “Atoms for Peace: The New
International Atomic Energy Agency”, 55 Mich. Law Rev., 747 (1957); Firmage, “Anarchy or Order: The Nth Country
Problem and the International Rule of Law”, 29 Missouri Law Rev. 11 (1964); Stoessinger, “The International Atomic
Energy Agency: The First Phase”, 13 Int. Organization 394 (1959).
29
The Antractic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 US Treaties (1961) 794; T.I.A.S., No. 4780; 402 UN Treaty Series 71 (1959);
54 A.J.I.L. 477 (1960).
30
See Address by the Polish Foreign Minister (Rapacki) to the General Assembly, Oct. 2, 1957, in Documents on
Disarmament: 1957-1959, at 889; Note and Memorandum from the Polish Foreign Minister (Rapacki) to the American
Ambassador (Bean), Feb. 14, 1958, at 944; News Conference Remarks by the Polish Foreign Minister (Rpacki)
Regarding an Atom-Free Zone in Central Europe, Nov. 4, 1958, at 1217.

13
 31
UN. Doc. A/C. 1/946 (1967). The US and UK signed Protocol II providing that both states would respect the treaty’s
aims not to use or to threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties.
32
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, T.I.A.S., No. 6347 (1967); 61 A.J.I.L. 644 (1967). See Larson, Disarmament
and Soviet policy, 1964-1968 (1969), at 145-147, for an analysis of Soviet Strategy on the treaty.
33
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 US
Treaties (1963) 1313; T.I.A.S., No. 5433; 480 UN Treaty Series 43 (1963); 57 A.J.I.L. 1026 91963).
34
Department of States, US Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 21, part 1 [1970], pp. 483-494).
35
Nuclear-Weapon States are defined as those states which have manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.
36
Article I “ each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and
not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.”
37
Article II “ each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and
not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
38
Article IV: 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty
to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity
with Article I and II of this Treaty.
39
The DPRK never came into compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement and was cited repeatedly for these
violations, which are tantamount to violations of NPT Article III. See
http://www.iaea.org/Newscenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/dprk.pdf and
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2003/med-advise_048.shtml.
40
Daniel Dombey. “Director General’s Interview on Iran and DPRK”, Financial Times, 19 February 2007. Retrieved on
2006-05-04.
41
For the Safeguard Document, see IAEA, GC (IX) 1294 (1965). For an analysis of the background and context of the
both IAEA and US Safeguard system, see the statement of Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Ex-Chairman of the Atomic Energy.
42
Additional Protocols to Nuclear safeguards Agreements.
43
David L. Bender and Bruno Leone, ‘Nuclear Proliferation’, 1992, Greenhaven Press Inc., p.63.
44
Ashok Kapur, ‘The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist’, July/August 1990. See also note 43 above.
45
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html
46
Additional Protocols to Nuclear Safeguards Agreements
47
NTI Egypt Profile
48
When Nuclear Sheriffs Quarrel, The Economist, 30 October 2008.
49
Remarks With Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, 5 October 2004

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