Hirohito, the Emperor's Army and Pearl Harbor

Author(s): Saki Dockrill

Source: Review of International Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Oct., 1992), pp. 319-333
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097309 .
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Review of International Studies (1992), 18, 319 333 Printed inGreat Britain

Hirohito, the Emperor's Army and

Pearl Harbor*
SAKI DOCKRILL

The death of Hirohito on 7 January 1989 provided the Japanese with an opportunity
of reappraising the Showa era, as Hirohito's reign is called in the Japanese calendar.
This lasted for sixty-two years, which the press described as years of 'turmoil and
drastic changes.'1. While the role of the Emperor and, to a greater degree, the role
of the military in imperial Japan have been long-running themes for historians,
intellectuals, and journalists, Hirohito's death certainly encouraged the publication
of a large number of books, including reprints of works about the Pacific War,
from semi-official histories, the memoirs of some of the leading decision makers
and a series of histories of Japan from 1868 to 1945.2 Television programmes
showed for two full days panel discussions by historians and documentary films of
the Showa era?a series of bloody wars in China and eventually with the Americans,
the British and the other Allied powers, leading to unconditional surrender and
occupation.3
Domestic reactions varied from indifference to a sense of relief, while there were
those who felt that they could for the first time bury their memories of a tragic and
confused period. Some felt sorry for the man who had reigned during Japan's
most difficult period of international relations, while others admired the Emperor's
pacifism. There was also a section of the population and some intellectuals who
were critical about the role of the emperor in prewar politics. A simple and important
question was why he allowed Japan to become bogged down in a fifteen-years'
war in China and subsequently in the Pacific in December 1941? The Emperor's
legal position under the old (Meiji) constitution remains controversial. Yokota
Kichisabur?, a supreme court judge, concluded in 1949 that as the Emperor was
deeply involved in the preparation for, and the outbreak of, the Pacific War and that,

*
The original draft of this article was first presented at the Military History Seminar, at the Institute of
Historical Research, University of London, in December 1990. The revised and second draft of this
article was presented at the British International History Annual Conference, BISA, Durham in
September 1991. The author is very grateful to the IHR seminar and the audience at Durham for their
helpful advice. The research was made possible by the John M. Olin Foundation, Department of
Yale University
History, and by the MacArthur Foundation, Department of War Studies, King's
College London.
1
Asahi Shimbun (daily newspaper) (hereafter cited as Asahi) 7 January 1989; ainichi Shimbun (daily
newspaper), 7 January 1989; Asahi Evening News, 1 January 1989.
2
For instance, eight volumes of Taihei yo senso e no michi (The Road to the Pacific War) originally
published in 1962-3 were re-designed and re-printed in 1988 (Tokyo) Sugiyama memo edited by the
Imperial Army General Staff (which was originally published in 1967) (Tokyo, 1989); See also the
interesting study of the Japanese Emperor by Thomas Crump, The Death of an Emperor (Oxford and
New York, 1991).
3 was in Tokyo
The author at the time of the death of Hirohito.

319
320 Saki Dockrill

as he had approved the decision, he could not escape his responsibility for that war.4
Some argue that even if the emperor was legally immune from all responsibility, he
did have moral obligations to the Japanese and to the populations of conquered
countries who suffered from Japanese military aggression during the war.5 Others
believe that the Emperor was manipulated by politicians and the military during the
period.6
In fact, Hirohito wanted to abdicate at least three times as a means of atoning for
the nation's responsibility for the war?first, on 29 August, 1945, when Hirohito put
this case strongly to Marquis Kido K?'ichi (the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal),
second, inNovember 1948, when the Tokyo war tribunal imposed death sentences on
seven of the leaders of the war-time Japan, notably General Toj? Hideki, and finally,
when the Emperor repeated his offer to abdicate in the aftermath of Japan's signature
of the peace treaty in September 1951.7 However, to admit his responsibility
his desire
was frustrated by various Japanese advisors?court officials and political leaders?by
the American policy of preserving the throne for the sake of the stability of occupied
Japan, and probably by the Emperor's own personality which did not resist too
strenuously the combined opposition of internal and external opinion to his proposed
abdication. He was instead persuaded to remain on the throne as a symbol of Japan.
In the aftermath of Hirohito's demise, a leading Japanese newspaper wrote that:

the death of Hirohito should not be regarded as the end of Japanese debates about
responsibility for the war and that Japan should realize that no other nation but Japan needs
to reflect upon Japan's sins in the past.8

More recently the Emperor's monologue of eight hours, which was recorded
between March and April 1946 by five court officials, has been published. In this,
Hirohito discussed the events which took place from the assassination of Chang
Two-lin, the war lord of Manchuria by the Kwantung Army in 1928 down to the end
of the Pacific War in August 1945. Hirohito dictated this, without relying on any
memos or notes, and, despite occasional flaws in his memory of events, the record has
confirmed that Hirohito was fairly well briefed by his decision makers about Japan's
national strategies.
This article will first deal with the Emperor's relations with the Japanese Military
Establishment. Secondly, it will try to demonstrate that Hirohito was not absolute
sovereign as was defined under the Meiji Constitution nor did he merely listen to and
accept the advice of his officials, civilian and military, as has been generally accepted
by historians. On the contrary, he did try to influence the crucial decisions made by
4
For instance, see Asahi, 9, 12 and 16 January 1989; D. Irokawa (interview), Asahi Journal, 27 January
1989, pp. 14-6. See also Kisaka in Taiheiyo senso, pp. 16-17; Shin Nihon Bunkagu Kai (New Japan
Literary Association), Han Tennou sei ron (Anti-Emperor Views) (6th edn, Tokyo, 1986).
5
For instance, Asahi, 12 January 1989; K Hayashi, 'Senso Sekinin to wa nanika' (What is the War
Responsibility?) in Bungei-shunju (Tokyo), 67, no. 4 (March 1989), pp. 264?5.
6
This reflects the main stream of Japanese thinking; for instance, Asahi 9, 12 and 16 January 1989;
discussions by critics, writers, and historians on TV (channels 2, 6, 8, 10) on 7 January 1989; S. Oue,
Tennou no guntai (The Emperor's Army) (Tokyo, 1988).
7 as a Symbol),
H. Takahashi, Shocho Tennou (The Emperor pp. 18-59; see also Sukemasa Iriye (who
served at the board of the Chamberlain in the Imperial Household after 1935 and was the Grand
Chamberlain from 1969 until his death in 1985), Iriye Jijucho no shuki (Iriye Grand Chamberlain's
Diaries), entries of 11May and 17August 1948 printed in Asahi, 1 February 1989; and entry of 2 May
1951 (in which Iriye observes that the Emperor finally gave up his plans to abdicate), in Asahi, 3
February 1989.
8
Author's translation, quoted from Asahi, 9 January 1989.
 Hirohito, the Emperor's Army and Pearl Harbor 321

his Governments after 1937, without trying to behave as a dictator, a role which he
always rejected. A final theme is therefore to examine how he tried to exert some influ
ence on policy and why he failed, in the last resort, to avert war in December 1941.

The Emperor and Imperial Japan's military establishment

Under the Meiji

Constitution, (largely modelled on the German Imperial Consti
tution), proclaimed in 1889, the Emperor was the supreme authority in Japan, and
the people were subject to the Emperor. Cabinet ministers were to be appointed by
the Emperor as his assistants, and were responsible to him and not to the Diet for the
conduct of Japan's domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, under article 3, the
Emperor was defined as having a 'Holy Existence' and as such he was immune from
prosecution. Under article 11, the Emperor commanded the Japanese army and navy
and possessed the right of Supreme Command. This was a system of absolute
monarchy, but as a general rule, understood by the leading military/civilian officials
as well as by the Emperor, he was to be a constitutional monarch and was to act only
on the advice of his responsible officials.9
Consequently, under the fiction of the Emperor's approval, the Japanese executive
branch could conclude treaties with foreign nations, declare war, and appoint civilian
and military officers, while the Diet was concerned only with budgetary and legis
lative issues. However, even on these issues, once the government had obtained the
Emperor's approval for a law, the Diet had no power over that law, while the
Emperor was entitled to reject legislation passed by the Diet.
The executive branch was a complex organisation. It comprised: (1) the cabinet
where two active serving officers represented the Army and the Navy Departments as
their respective ministers. (The participation of active service officers was abolished in
1912 but reintroduced in 1936); (2) the General Staff of the Army and of the Navy,
and (3) other elite advisory bodies with direct access to the Emperor, such as (a) the
Genro (a non-constitutional group of senior military/civilian officials who had
contributed to the establishment of the Meiji government), (b) senior statesmen
(represented by ex-prime ministers), (c) the Privy Council (a constitutional body
which was to examine the constitutionality of Japan's treaties with other nations); (d)
court officials such as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain.
The Emperor was the Supreme Commander of the nation's armed forces and
this was laid down in an Imperial Mandate in 1882. The Japanese army came into
existence in December 1870 and originally comprised 10,000 men drawn from the
Satsuma, Ch?shu, and Tosa regional clans.10 The Army General Staff was established
in 1878 as a planning organization and had a right of audience with the Emperor to
seek the latter's approval for matters related to planning, logistics and strategy, while

9 a succinct
For account in English of Imperial Japan's decision-making system, see S. Imai, 'Cabinet,
Emperor, and Senior Statesmen', in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (eds.) Pearl Harbor as
History 1931-41 (New York and London, 1973), pp. 53-79; S. Ienaga, Japan's Last War (Oxford,
1979), ch. 3; see also an English translation of the Meiji Constitution in Edwin Hoyt, Japan's
War?The Great Pacific Conflict (London and Melbourne, 1986). Appendix E, pp. 439-49.
10
For the origins of the Japanese Imperial army, see Akira Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi (Japanese Military
History), vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1987), pp. 1-27.
 322 Saki Dockrill

the War Minister exercised

executive powers.11 By the 1930s, the right of audience
with the Emperor had been expanded to include not only the Chief of the Army
General Staff, but also the Chief of the Navy General Staff (which was established in
1893 on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War) and two cabinet members, the Minister of
theWar and the Minister of the Navy.12

The nature of the Emperor's Army

The so-called Emperor's Army were not always highly motivated. The first conscrip
tion measure was introduced in 1873. It was very restrictive , exempting the wealthy,
civil servants, medical students, and the eldest sons of families. As a result, only 3 per
cent of the total population who were fit to serve in the army were drafted. The Meiji
constitution revised this and national service became compulsory. However, about
10 per cent of those who were subject to national service evaded the call up and only
about 5 per cent of those available went into the armed forces.13
With the rapid build-up of military strength after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894
1895, the size of the Army nearly doubled and reached about 20 divisions, while the
Navy consisted of 106 ships, including 11 cruisers and 23 destroyers. However, the
war with the Russians in 1904-1905 was a bitter struggle. The Russian Army in
Manchuria was ten times larger than the Japanese army and the six months fighting
on the Liaotung peninsula cost 59,000 Japanese lives, nearly 45 per cent of the army's
fighting strength. The Japanese army's morale accordingly declined.14
In December 1926, a conscription law was passed in the Diet, which made all
Japanese males over twenty years old eligible to undergo three years service in the
navy or two years in the army, with a further four to five years in the reserves and
finally ten more years sub-reserve training. Thus even after the completion of active
service, a former conscript might be recalled at any time during this lengthy reserve
period and naturally enough the system was never popular.15 For instance, by 1932,
only about 15 per cent of those who were eligible for service were drafted16 and during
the Manchurian crisis in 1933, the Japanese Government issued a proclamation to the
nation to the effect that Japan was in a state of national emergency and that those
who tried to escape from national service should be ashamed of themselves.17
Moreover, barrack life was far from attractive: strict obedience to higher officers
was obligatory, and frequently these officers meted out private punishments on their
subordinates. Soldiers were ordered to fight to the death and desertion in front of

11
S. Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 136-7.
12
Ibid. pp. 163-7; Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, pp. 81-2.
13
Ibid. pp. 32-4, 56-8, 62-8; Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 69-70.
14
Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, pp. 81?4, 103-6, 108-115; S. Sakano, Kindai Nihon no shuppatsu (The
Origins of Modem Japan), (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 209-11; T. Furuya, Nichiro Sens? (Russo-Japanese
War) (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 96-160; W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945 (Oxford, 1987), p.
91. The Imperial military courts dealt with increasing numbers of soldiers who failed?or refused?to
obey the regulations: 2,222 cases in 1906, 1,992 in 1907 and 2,203 in 1908 with about 1,600 deserters.
See Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, pp. 134-5; M. Sumiya, Dai'nihon teikoku no shiren (Japanese Empire's
Challenge) (Tokyo, 1987), pp. 341-3.
15
Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 71-80; Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, p. 173.
16
Ibid. pp. 237-8.
17
Oue, Tennou no guntai, p. 65.
 Hirohito, the Emperor's Army and Pearl Harbor 323

enemy troops entailed the automatic imposition of the death penalty.18 The survival
rate in the Emperor's Army during the Pacific War reflected the hierarchial nature of
the army even in death: for instance, within one war-time battalion, 67 per cent of
officers above the rank of Second-Lieutenant, 39 per cent of non-commissioned
officers, the only 18 per cent of its foot soldiers returned home.20 The rapid increase
in military manpower?ten times between 1937 and 1941?meant not only hastily
trained officers, but also increased numbers of poorly trained and medically unfit
soldiers mobilized from the sub-reserve and reserve forces, who comprised about 40
per cent of the entire military.20 During the Pacific War, soldiers' morale remained
low and the Imperial Military Court dealt with increasing numbers of soldiers who
failed to, or refused to, obey and regulations?1,138 soldiers were punished in 1937,
2,875 in 1938 and 3,148 in 1941.21
With an underclass of reluctant and oppressed soldiery, Japan's military establish
ment was directly responsible only to the Emperor so that opportunities for the
redress of grievances by the lower ranks were non-existent. The General Staff of the
Army and the Navy was independent of the Cabinet, except for budgetary matters.
This meant that there was always confusion as to which authorities were making
decisions on issues which fell into the grey area between foreign and military affairs.22
Before Hirohito came to the throne inDecember 1926, there existed, however, at least
an appearance of coordination between the Government and the General Staff. This
was because pre-1920 Japanese decision makers were relatively clearer than their
successors about their foreign policy goals and also because the by now aging
founders of the Meiji Government were still able to influence the selection of military
and civilian leaders. Externally, Japan was recognised as a major Pacific power.
Furthermore, Japan was involved in wars only for relatively brief periods?notably
between 1894 and 1895, and between 1904 and 1905, with a minor expedition to
occupy Germany's leased territory of a Shantung and her island chains, the
Carolines, the Marianas, and Marshalls in the Pacific during the First World War.23
The period after 1937 lacked these relatively stable factors which had been hitherto
conducive to successful collective leadership. As Japan became embroiled in war with
China, the General Head Quarters was established inNovember 1937 and continued
its existence until the end of the Second World War. The GHQ was a war-time body
designed to coordinate army and navy policies and at its head was the Supreme
Commander, the Emperor. This meant that during the war, Hirohito had to act both
as a constitutional monarch and as the Supreme Commander, with priority given to
the latter role.24 In order to give the cabinet a voice in war-time decision making, the
18 no gunji shi, pp. 127-34; Oue, Tennou no guntai pp. 98-104.
Fujiwara, Nihon
19
Asahi editorial, 'From Showa to Heisei', part 3, 11 January 1989.
20
Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, pp. 237^0; J. Kisaka, Taiheiyo senso (The Pacific War) (Tokyo, 1989), pp.
170-2; Fujiwara, Nitchu zenmen senso (The Chinese-Japanese War), (Tokyo, 1988), pp. 268-70; Oue,
Tennou no guntai, pp. 365-87.
21
Fujiwara, Nihon gunji-shi, pp. 239-40; and Nitchu zenmen senso, pp. 268-70; Kisaka, Taiheiyo senso,
pp. 170-2; Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 365-87.
22
T. Kobayashi, 'Kaigun gunshuku joyaku 1921-36' (Naval Disarmament Treaty) in Taiheiy? senso e no
michi, vol. 1, pp. 3-9ff, 100-1; Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 135-8.
23
For the Meiji leaders' handling of the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, see Oue,
Tennou no guntai, pp. 154-5; D. Irokawa, Kindai kokka no shuppatsu (The Departure to a Modern
State) (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 413-22; Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, ch. 4; Sumiya, Dai'nihon-teikoku no shiren
(Tokyo, 1987), pp. 243-52; Furuya, Nichiro Senso, pp. 58-93; Bouei-Cho Senshi shitsu (ed.), Daihon'ei
Rikungunbu (1) (The Imperial Army Head Quarters) (Tokyo, 1969), pp. 32-47, 89-127.
24
Oue, Gozen kaigi (The Imperial Conference) (Tokyo, 1991), p. 186.
 324 Saki Dockrill

prime minister, Prince Konoe, set up an Imperial-Headquarters-Cabinet Liaison

Conference at the same time inNovember 1937.25 This will be referred to below as the
Liaison Conference.

Japan's conclusion of the Tripartite Military Pact in September 1940

Hirohito's reign during the 1930s is often described as the period of the military
ascendancy. This is not entirely accurate. Rather, the quality of Japan's military
leadership declined, as did its discipline.26 This was demonstrated by the quasi
independent actions of overseas commanders who often acted without any instruc
tions from the General Staff in Tokyo, as, for instance, during the Manchurian crisis
in September 1931 and the conflict in North China after the clash between Japanese
and Chinese troops near the Marco Polo bridge in July 1937.27
Officers promoted during the early 1920s to replace those who had founded the
Meiji Government were not as professional as their predecessors nor did they have
much experience in international affairs, largely because of their poor education.
Army colleges did not provide instruction in analytical skill or international relations
and their courses were limited to the study of narrowly focused military tactics and
strategies. Overall, officer education was not really geared to the training of military
professionals in the broad sense, and they were either encouraged to think of them
selves as warriors or sought to become politicians or bureaucrats.28
The decline in the military leadership coincided with the decline in the quality of
civilian decision makers?Prime Minister Konoe was well known for his weak
personality, his inability to formulate a coherent policy towards China, towards the
Tripartite Alliance or towards relations with the United States. Foreign Minister
Matsuoka was expansionist, ambitious and opportunistic. Hirohito disliked most of
the officers of the Imperial Army, but had never been greatly impressed by the civilian
leaders who served under him either. Overall, there was a complete lack of confidence
between Hirohito and his advisers.
The long-drawn-out Japanese military conflict in China after 1931 eventually led
Japan to expand towards the south, thereby becoming involved in war with both
25
A. Kazama, Konoe Naikaku (The Konoe Cabinet) (Tokyo, 1982), pp. 48-62.
26
Michael Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War (Ithaca and London, 1987), pp. 64-76.
27
For the Kwantung Army's militant actions in 1928, 1931 and 1937, see T. Shimada, Kanto-gun (The
Kwantung Army) (35th edn, Tokyo, 1986), pp. 47-74; and 'Manshu jihen no tenkai' (The
Development of the Manchuria Incident), in Taiheiyo senso e no michi, vol. 2, pp. 3-34 ff; S. Baba,

Manshu-jihen e no michi (The Road to the Manchurian Incident) (9th edn, Tokyo, 1988), pp. 185-217;
K. Seki, 'Manshu jihen senshi' (History Prior to the Manchuria Incident) in Taiheiyo senso e no michi,
vol. 1, pp. 287-327; K. Eguchi, Jugo-nen senso no kaimaku (The Outbreak of the 15Years' War)
(Tokyo, 1988), pp. 22-30, 58-79; See also Y. Saji, Ishihara Kanji, 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 21-65.
For the views of Ishihara and Itagaki (who mobilized the Kwantung army) on Manchuria, see

Taiheiyo senso e no michi-shry? hen (The Road to the Pacific War, Documents) (hereafter cited as
Documents), pp. 77-107, 124-6; S. Honj?, Honjo nikki (Honjo Diaries) (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 22, 150-3.
For the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, see S. Hayashi, Taiheiyo senso (The Pacific War)
(Tokyo, 1980), pp. 40-58; Fujiwara, Nitchu zenmen senso, pp. 62-83, 109-15; I. Hata, 'Nitchu sens?
no gunjiteki tenkai' (Military Developments of the Chinese-Japanese War) in Taiheiyo senso e no
michi, vol. 4, pp. 27-9.
28
For the education of officers, see M. Takahashi, Showa no gunbatsu (The Military Clique of Showa
Period) (Tokyo, 1988), pp. 11-26; Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 104?20; Fujiwara, Nihon no gunji shi, pp.
75-8, 191-5.
 Hirohito, the Emperor's Army and Pearl Harbor 325

the United States and Britain. On several occasions, the Emperor expressed his
opposition to further expansion, but itwas doubtful whether he had a firm grip on the
complexity of events after July 1937.29 He blamed the war with China exclusively on
the machinations of the Imperial Army.30 However, there was a strong section of the
Army General Staff, led by Major-General Ishihara and Tada, the Deputy Chief
of the General Staff, who also opposed further expansion in China, mainly because
they were becoming apprehensive about the build-up of the Soviet army near the
Manchurian border.31
On the other hand, the cabinet?having witnessed the initial successes of the
Japanese army?shifted from opposition to the war to a demand that severe con
ditions be imposed on Chiang's Government for ending it. The cabinet hotheads,
including Prime Minister Konoe, Foreign Minister Hirota, Minister of Finance
Kaya, in cooperation with the army hardliners, confronted the pro-negotiation group
in the Army General Staff. Heated exchanges between Hirota and Tada on 15
January at the Liaison Conference culminated in the defeat of the pro-negotiation
group, and Konoe's publication on 16 January 1938 of his famous statement that
Japan would no longer deal with the Nationalist Chinese Government.32 Hirohito in
his monologue made no mention of this change of attitude on the part of his Cabinet
ministers.

Japan's decision to form a military alliance with Nazi Germany in September 1940
was probably the most ominous development as far as Hirohito was concerned.
Following Japan's conclusion of the anti-Comintern pact with Nazi Germany
in November 1936 (which Italy joined one year later), Hitler, early in 1939, form
ally proposed that the anti-Comintern pact be reinforced by a tripartite alliance
agreement. However, the Navy leaders, headed by Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa, the
Minister of the Navy, Vice Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, the Deputy Minister of
the Navy, and Rear-Admiral Inoue Shigeyoshi, the Chief of the Bureau of Military
Affairs, were strongly opposed to this move.33 Berlin's sudden conclusion of a non
aggression pact with Moscow in August 1939 meant for Japan that her main
purpose of deterring the USSR by a projected tripartite pact was thrown into the
melting pot. Shocked by this new development, Tokyo suspended the negotiations
with Germany.34
Given Hirohito's Anglophilism, he was strongly opposed to strengthening Japan's
ties with Nazi Germany, which would probably lead to Britain becoming an enemy of

29
Hayashi, Taiheiyo senso, pp. 49-76ff; Y. Kojima, Tennou, vol. 3 (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 188-215ff.
30 no dokuhaku
'Showa Tennou hachi-jikan' (Showa Emperor's Eight Hours' Monologue), in Bungei
Shunju (December 1990), pp. 105-7 (hereafter cited as Monologue).
31
Japan Defence Agency, War History division (ed.), Daihon'ei rikugunbu (The Imperial Army
Headquarters), vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1969), pp. 406-14, 425-36; Inaba et al. (eds.), Kaisen-gaik? shi:
Documents (Diplomatic History before the Outbreak of theWar) in Taihei-yo senso e no michi, pp.
256-9; I. Hata, 'Nitchu senso no gunjiteki tenkai', pp. 11-14, 24-6, 32.
32
Hata, ibid. pp. 36-8; A. Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, (London
and New York, 1987), p. 49; I. Nish, 'The Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere', in K. Neilson
and R. Pr?te (eds.), Coalition Warfare?An Uneasy Accord (Ontario, 1983), pp. 129-30.
33
Japan Defence Agency, Military History Division (ed.), Dihon'ei kaigunbu-rengo kantai (1) (The
Imperial Navy General Headquarters?The Combined Fleet) (Tokyo, 1975), pp. 447-57; see also
Arthur Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies (Oxford, 1981), pp. 98-101; H. Agawa, translated by J.
Bester, The Reluctant Admiral?Yamamoto and the Imperial Army (Tokyo and New York, 1979), pp.
185-91.
34
T. Ohata, 'The Conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Problem of its Reinforcement,
1935-1939', in The Road to the Pacific War, vol. 5, pp. 159-61.
326 Saki Dockrill

Japan. Hirohito summoned the new prime minister, Abe, who replaced Hiranuma in
the wake of the conclusion of the Russo-German non-aggression pact, and ordered
him to adopt a pro-Anglo-American line in future.35 Following the short-lived Abe
Cabinet, the Emperor recommended Admiral Yonai as prime minister in January
1940 in the hope that he would be able to prevent the conclusion of the tripartite
alliance. However, the Yonai Cabinet was too weak to resist the pressure of the
pro-German Japanese Army and Yonai's efforts to maintain good relations with
Britain and the United States were frustrated.36 After Yonai was replaced by Konoe,
Hirohito still clung to the hope that the Navy's reluctance to cooperate with Nazi
Germany might prevent the formation of the tripartite alliance.37
However, the second Konoe Cabinet adopted basic guidelines in July 1940 which
called for Japan's expansion towards the south by taking advantage of the defeat of
France and Britain in Europe, while at the same time, moving closer to Nazi
Germany and Italy.38 According to Matsuoka, the projected tripartite military
alliance should be expanded later to include Soviet Russia and that, with such a four
power alliance, Japan could deal with the United States from a position of strength,
which in turn would facilitate the ending of the war in China in Japan's favour. The
Army hardliners supported these ideas, while the Navy General Staff remained
opposed to an outright alliance directed against the United States and Britain.39 The
Navy also warned a joint Navy-Army meeting on 27 August 1940 that it would be
very difficult to maintain the fighting capabilities of both the Army and Navy once
Japan had embarked on a war with the United States, since she largely depended on
that country for raw materials. Therefore, the Navy insisted that the idea of south
wards expansion by military means be treated with considerable circumspection.40
During Germany's bombing of British towns and cities, Hirohito saw the headline
'the British Museum set on fire by a German bomber' in his morning newspaper of 10
September and he immediately called his Lord Keeper, Marquis Kido, and asked him
whether 'there was any possibility that Japan might intervene as mediator between
Germany and Britain in order to avoid any further destruction of Britain's cultural
assets.' Kido pointed out that such an initiative would be somewhat difficult at this
time.41

Indeed, Matsuoka was negotiating with a German special mission led by Heinrich
Stahmer in Tokyo on 9 and 10 September, and at the Liaison Conference on 14
September, the foreign minister told the Navy representatives that:

35
Monologue, pp. 108-9.
36
Hayashi, Taiheiyo senso, pp. 133^7.
37
Monologue, pp. 110-11.
38
Documents pp. 319-23; The Imperial Army General Staff (ed.), Sugiyama memo, vol. 1, pp. 5-16;
'Important National Policies Relevant to the Outbreak of the Pacific War', A-700-9-49, Diplomatic
Record Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo (hereafter cited as JDRO). For the origins of
Japan's thinking about the move towards the south, see Hata, 'Futsuin shinchu to gun no nanshin
seisaku' (The Invasion of French Indochina and the Military's Policy for Southward Expansion), in
Taiheiy? sens? e no michi, vol. 6, pp. 145-60.
39
J. Tsunoda, 'Nihon no taibei kaisen' (Japan's Opening of theWar with the USA), in Taihei yd sens? e
no michi, vol. 7, pp. 53-5; Record of the preliminary conference between T?j? (War minister), Yoshida
(Navy minister), Matsuoka and Konoe at Konoe's residence in Tokyo, on 19 July 1941; see
Documents, pp. 319-20.
40
Sugiyama memo, vol. 1, pp. 17-24.
41
Kojima, Tennou?the Pacific War (Tokyo, 1988), p. 121; K. Kido, Kido Diaries, vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1966),
p. 821.
 Hirohito, the Emperor's Army and Pearl Harbor 327

the time has come for Japan to make it clear whether she should stand on the side of
in opposition to the Anglo-American ... if Japan had to swallow all
Italy/Germany powers
the American conditions for ending the war with China, she would have to abandon all ideas
about the new order in East Asia. Do you think that our people would accept
constructing
these consequences and what about some ten million soldiers who were killed on the
Continent in fighting war there?42

Matsuoka was backed by the prime minister and the Army, and the Navy finally
accepted the decision to conclude the Tripartite alliance. By that time, the so-called
anti-Tripartite Alliance trio (Yamamoto, Yonai, and Inoue) had gone from the
Ministry of the Navy and the Navy's mainstream thinking was influenced by a
pro-German middle-echelon group in the Bureau of Military Affairs.43
On 16 September 1940, Konoe visited the Imperial Court to inform the Emperor of
the result of the Liaison Conference. Hirohito told his prime minister: T do think that
it would be better to take time and to see how German-Russian relations developed
in future before concluding the treaty with Germany.' Hirohito did not trust Nazi
Germany, regarding it as an opportunist state; however, Konoe answered that
Germany could be trusted.44 Hirohito then said, T wonder how the Navy could cope
with the US, as I often heard that the result of the Naval exercises always turned out
to be Japan's defeat against the US.45 The Emperor continued that he would be very
worried Japan's future if Japan concluded
about the tripartite alliance and asked
Konoe (who had dissolved his cabinet in January 1939, in exasperation at the con
tinued dead lock in China) whether 'under the circumstance, you should be prepared
to throw in your lot with me'. Konoe was deeply touched by the Emperor's remarks,
but neither he nor Matsuoka, in spite of the Emperor's pleas, changed their minds
and the tripartite alliance was concluded on 27 September 1940.46

Hirohito's approval of Japan's decision for war

Hirohito's apprehensions about future German-Russian relations proved to be

correct?Nazi Germany invaded the USSR on 22 June 1941. A four-power alliance
was obviously now unattainable?in September 1940 Prime Minister Konoe had
thought that Japan's conclusion of a tripartite military alliance was a sensible policy,
but by the summer in 1941 it was out of the question.47 Accordingly, Konoe wanted
to change Japan's policy entirely, involving the dissolution of the tripartite pact,

42
Author's translation of Konoe memorandum in Sugiyama memo, p. 35; See also 'Konoe
memorandum on the tripartite pact', undated, reel 1 of Fumimaro Konoe papers, the National Diet
Library, Tokyo.
43
K. Ikeda, Kaigun to nippon (The Navy and Japan) (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 104-13; C. Hosoya, 'The
Tripartite Alliance and the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Neutrality', in Taihei yd senso e no michi, vol. 5,
pp. 204-6.
44
Sugiyama memo, pp. 36-7; Kojima, Tennou, vol. 4, pp. 124-5.
45
Ibid. p. 125; Incidentally, Admiral Yamamoto, in a letter to Navy Minister Oikawa, admitted the fact
that Japan never defeated the United States through the Naval exercises. See Yamomoto to Oikawa
7 January
(letter), 1941, in Self-Defence Agency, Military History Division (ed.), Hawaii Sakusen
(Strategy for Hawaii), (Tokyo, 1967), p. 7.
46
Kojima, Tennou vol. 4, pp. 125-7; Kido, Diaries, p. 822; Monologue, pp. 111-2.
47 on the tripartite pact', reel 1,Konoe
'Konoe memorandum papers.
 328 Saki Dockrill

and at the same time making efforts to improve relations with the United States.48
Foreign MinisterMatsuoka reacted differently and he obtained an audience with
the Emperor on the day of the outbreak of the Russo-German war. According to
Matsuoka's now that theWar had broken out in Russia, Japan should fight on
view,
the side of Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union, which in turn would delay
her plan to move towards South Indochina. However, under these circumstances,
Japan would have to fight not only the Soviet Union in the north but also the
Anglo-American powers in the south. The foreign minister's ideas upset Hirohito and
the emperor became extremely doubtful about Matsuoka's competence49, suggested
to Konoe that Matsuoka be removed from the cabinet.50 However, Konoe could not
make up his mind at that time and itwas not until 18 July 1941 that Konoe dissolved
his cabinet and formed his third cabinet, which effectively secured Matsuoka's
dismissal.
Hirohito's opposition to hostilities with the Soviet Union in the north in co
operation with Nazi Germany together with Japan's expansion towards the south
reflected the views of the majority of his civilian and military officials. However,
Matsuoka was not dismissed immediately and since he was a strong and dominating
character, he was still able to influence the ensuing debates at meetings of the
Liaison-Conference in the wake of the Russo-German War. The Army regarded
Russia as the traditional enemy of Japan. None the less, in view of its recent military
defeat by the Soviet Army in disputed border areas of Manchuria in 1938 and in 1939
and given that the war with the Chinese continued, the Army would only agree to
fight the Soviet Union if the latter's strength was substantially reduced (by about one
half), such as by transferring its troops from the Far East to the Western front.51 As
a result, Japan's basic national guidelines, which were ratified by the Emperor on 2
July 1941, laid down that Japan should proceed with her plan to move towards South
Indochina, and should resort to war with the Soviet Union only when circumstances
were propitious.52
Matsuoka's subsequent dismissal on 18 July and growing suspicions about
the possibility of a rapid German victory over Russia enabled the Army to shelve its
plan to challenge the Soviet Union on 9 August 1941.53 However, partly because the
Japanese decision makers were so deeply involved in the debate as to whether Japan
should fight in the north first or the south later or embark on both strategies at
the same time, there were no serious discussions about the implications of Japan's
move into South Indochina on 23 July 1941 and few anticipated that the United
States, Britain and the Netherlands would immediately place economic sanctions on
Japan. Finally, on 1August 1941, the United States imposed a full oil embargo on
Japan. Hirohito was equally surprised by these measures and by the seriousness

48
T. Yabe, Konoe Fumimaro (Tokyo, 1976), p. 571; Shigenori Togo, Jidai no ichimen (memoirs), (Tokyo,
1989), pp. 150-1.
49
Monologue, pp. 113-14; Yabe, Konoe, pp. 569-71; Oue, Gozen kaigi, pp. 69-70; Kido, Diaries, p. 884;
C. Hosoya, 'The Tripartite Alliance and the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Neutrality', in Taiheiyo senso e
no michi, vol. 5, p. 310.
50
Monologue p. 113-14.
51 on 25, 26, 27, 28 and 30 June and 1 July, see
For the records of 32nd to 37th Liaison Conferences,
Documents, pp. 445-63; Oue, Gozen kaigi, pp. 71-2, 76-7; Yabe, Konoe, p. 571; Daihon'ei kaigun bu,
vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1979), pp. 336-42.
52 on 2 July 1941,
'National Guidelines in the light of Developments of International Situation',
A-700-9-49, JDRO.
53 . . .', pp. 323-31;
Hosoya, 'The Tripartite Alliance Oue, Gozen kaigi, pp. 87-8.
 Hirohito, the Emperor's Army and Pearl Harbor 329

with which the military now began to prepare for a possible war with the Western
powers.54
Japan had little room for manoeuvre, as the oil embargo would allow Japan to
survive only for two years, and in the case of war, for one and half years.55 There were
few options left for Japan. She could either make peace by making considerable con
cessions to the United States, or prepare to go to war with her, or by a combination
of both negotiation and preparations for war. The third approach was the core of the
decision made at the Imperial Conference on 6 September 1941.
Historians have hitherto dismissed the Emperor's role as minimal, partly because
the Emperor merely presided over the so-called Imperial Conference without usually
making any comments at all. Nevertheless, the Imperial Conference was regarded as
the highest decision-making organ. There were often meetings between top officials
and the Emperor prior to the Imperial Conference about the issues which were to be
discussed or decided at the Imperial Conference. The day before the Imperial
Conference on 5 September 1941, the Emperor arranged a meeting with the Army
and Navy Chiefs of the General Staff, and the prime minister. At this meeting,
Hirohito emphasised that Japan should, if possible, choose peace and diplomacy over
preparations for a possible war.56 The next day, at the Imperial Conference, the
Emperor, following a request by prime minister Konoe, who now desperately wanted
to avoid war with read a poem by his grandfather
the US, to express once again his
desire for peace.57 His appeal was not entirely ignored by Japanese leaders. The Navy
and the Army became confused as to whether they really wanted to go to war, as was
shown during their subsequent meetings on 7, 8, 9 and 12 October 1941.58 The Navy
remained dubious about going to war in the south, which seemed to be merely a
means of compensating for the Army's failure to settle the situation in China, while
at the same time, the Army leaders, confronted with a long war of attrition in China,
were faced with a dilemma. If the Navy leaders admitted their inability to wage war
against the United States and urged the Army leaders to reconsider their strategy, the
war minister might have been able to persuade his subordinates to agree to some kind
of conditional withdrawal from China which would not involve the loss of face for
the Army. However, the Navy leaders were generally reluctant to intervene in what
seemed to them to be entirely a political matter, that is 'negotiations or war', since
they believed that such a decision should be left to the prime minister. The Navy's
indecision placed Konoe in a quandary as to how to determine Japan's future course
and, after failing to persuade the Army leaders to preserve peace with the United
States by withdrawing from China, he resigned.59
General T?j?, who replaced Konoe as prime minister on 18 October, was a loyal,
if somewhat simple-minded, follower of the Emperor. To him, Hirohito's poem was
absolute gospel. T?j? wanted to maintain peace with the United States, but did not
know how to do so. Having made so many aggressive and expansionist moves, there
was now a huge gap between American conditions and what Japan could accept. The
withdrawal of troops from China (excluding Manchuria) was a sticking point, and

54
Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 2, pp. 349-52ff; Oue, Gozen kaigi, pp. 85-7; Monologue, p. 114.
55
Kido, Diaries, pp. 895-6; Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 2, pp. 452-3.
56
Sugiyama memo, vol. 1, pp. 309-11.
57
Ibid. pp. 311-12; Kido, Diaries, pp. 905-6; Monologue, p. 116; Yabe, Konoe, pp. 604-5.
58
Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 2, pp. 484?504ff; Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 90-137.
59
Yabe, Konoe, p. 622; Kido, Diaries, pp. 914-16; Togo, Jidai no ichimen, pp. 195-6.
330 Saki Dockrill

T?j? had no confidence that he could persuade the Army hardliners to accept this. He
decided that he could not go further than the September decision, that is, to prepare
for war, while negotiations with the Americans were continuing.60
According to Oue's recent study, if the Emperor had insisted on peace, thereby
reversing the September decision, T?j? would have tried to fulfil the Emperor's will.
The consequence of accepting all the American conditions in order to avoid war
a
might have been military revolt, but T?j? was already making arrangements to cope
with a possible coup d'etat.61 However, Hirohito stopped insisting on peace and the
Imperial Conference on 5 November 1941 decided that if the negotiations with the
United States were not completed by 1st December 1941, Japan would go to war. It
was evident that Hirohito was also now divided about whether war could be avoided.
At conferences with the military leaders he began to ask detailed strategic and tactical
questions?about the extent of the readiness of the Navy and the Army for war,
about the air defence of mainland Japan, about the effects of weather on military
operations inMalaya and the Hongkong area, etc.?questions designed to ascertain
whether Japan had any chance of winning a war if it came.62
At a conference on 2 November, he asked his subordinates whether he should
request the Pope to mediate.63 He also told General Sugiyama on 15November that
the military preparations should be called off if the negotiations with the US were
successful.64 The Emperor was also informed at a conference with Navy and Army
Chiefs of General Staff on 3 November that Japan would make a surprise attack at
Pearl Harbor on 8 December, Japanese local time.65 Admiral Yamamoto, now the
Supreme Commander of the Combined Fleet, who still believed that Japan should
not resort to a war which might impoverish the nation, had to determine a method of
making it possible for Japan to win a war, quickly by demoralizing the Americans.66
This required that two conditions be met: Japan must resort to an offensive strategy
in the initial stage by attacking the American Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor and
that war with the United States must be declared about half an hour before such a
surprise attack. Yamamoto believed that if Japan resorted to military force without
even completing the formality of a declaration of war, this would strengthen the
Americans' will to fight, and would, in turn, make it impossible for the Japanese to
end the war in the south quickly.67 It was not until 19 October that the Navy General
Staff, who had initially thought that Yamamoto's strategy was too unconventional
and risky, was persuaded to approve the Pearl Harbor operation.68

60
See Daihon'ei rikugunbu (5), pp. 186-26Iff; M. Hosaka, Tojo Hideki to tennou nojidai, vol. 1
(T?j? Hideki and the Emperor's Era) (Tokyo, 1988), pp. 254-99ff. At a Conference with Hirohito on
2 November 1941, T?j? cried when he reported to the Emperor that T?j? could not persuade his
ministers to decide for peace. See: Daihon'ei rikugunbu, (vol. 5) p. 261; Hosaka, T?j?, p. 299;
Sugiyama memo, pp. 386-7.
61
Oue, Gozen kaigi, pp. 211-12; Hosaka, Tdjo, p. 277; Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 266-7.
62
For instance, Conference with military leaders on 2, 3, 5 and 15November, in Sugiyama memo,
pp. 387-8,431,525.
63
Sugiyama memo, p. 387.
64
Sugiyama memo, p. 625.
65
Ibid. p. 387-8; Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 336-40.
66 on 29 September
See the record of meeting between Yamomoto and Nagano 1941 in Daihon'ei
kaigunbu, vol. 5, p. 484.
67
Hawaii sakusen, pp. 5-33, 73-89ff; Shigeo Fukuda, 'America no tainichi sansen' (US Participation in
theWar with Japan), Taiheiyo senso e no michi, vol. 7, pp. 370-5.
68
Hawaii sakusen, p. 12.
 Hirohito, the Emperor's Army and Pearl Harbor 331

In mid-November the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were also examining the

situation in the event of the war. In a minute on justifying war, (Tai-gi M?i-bun),
the Ministry put forward three reasons which it thought could justify a Japanese
resort to war with theWest: First, for 'the right of existence'?'the United States, in
cooperation with Britain, the Netherlands, and China, threatened Japan's security,
deprived the nation of its important resources and imposed economic sanctions to
the extent in which made it nearly impossible for Japan to survive peacefully'. The
Ministry thought that 'the right of existence' would express the nature of the war
better than the often-used phrase 'the right of self-defence'. The second reason was
the expansion of Anglo-American influence from China and finally, for the peaceful
development of East Asia under Japan's leadership.69 Its officials also examined
various possible ways of informing the United States that war had been declared,
but eventually decided that Japan should declare war either at the same time, or just
after, Japan's surprise attack. They were aware that this action would violate the
Hague convention, but they believed that it would ensure the success of the initial
operation.70
The so-called Hull note, which Japan received on 27 November, stated that the
United States recognized the Chiang regime as the sole legitimate government of
China, and, at the same time, demanded that Japan withdraw all her troops from
China and Indo-China. This was interpreted by the Japanese decision makers as an
'ultimatum', calling on Japan to relinquish all the gains she had made after the
'Manchuria incident' in 1931. The Liaison Conference, which convened during
the afternoon of the 27th, unanimously agreed that the American proposal was
completely unacceptable to Japan. After nearly seven months of negotiations, some
ministers were surprised, while the others were disappointed, by the strong terms
contained in the note.71
On 29 November, Hirohito, still not sure whether he should approve the decision
for war, arranged a meeting with key cabinet ministers and ex-prime ministers,
including, T?j?, Konoe, Hirota, Yonai and Hiranuma, to ask for their views. These
appeared to Hirohito to be a consensus for war, although there were a few abstract
remarks such a course.72
against
Hirohito was aware
that the Navy was reluctant to go to war and in view of the
Emperor's fears about the danger of such a course, Prime Minister T?j? suggested
that Hirohito arrange a meeting with Navy leaders. On 30 November, Navy Minister
Shimada and Chief of General Staff General Staff Nagano were summoned to the
Imperial Palace. According to Shimada's memoirs, the Emperor told them 'in a
warm and calm manner' that 'While the nation was on war footing, once she went to
war, I gather that itmight be a long one. Are you sure that you still intend to go to
war as planned?' Admiral Shimada thought that the Emperor was trying to face
'courageously' the fact that Japan was compelled to go to war, although he wanted to
avoid it.73 In order to allay Hirohito's apprehensions, Navy leaders replied that they
had full confidence in victory. On 1 December 1941, Hirohito ratified Japan's

69
Folders (3) and (20), A-700-9-51, JDRO.
70
Folder (22), A-700-9-51, JDRO.
71
Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 486-92; Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 2, pp. 546-9; Togo, Jidai no ichimen,
pp. 247-65.
72
Monologue, pp. 119-20; Sugiyama memo, pp. 535-6; Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 495-9.
73
Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 504?5; Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 5, pp. 548-9.
 332 Saki Dockrill

decision for war at the Imperial Conference. According to a minute by T?j?'s Private
Secretary on 1December, the prime minister said that 'when I arrived at the con
clusion that Japan had to go to war, I asked for the Emperor's approval. However,
he had great difficulties in authorizing the decision for war ... I was aware that the
Emperor really wanted peace.'74
Hirohito
approved Japan's decision because of the oil crisis, the Cordell Hull Note
of 26 November 1941, and the general mood in Japan which appeared to favour
war. Under these circumstances, he confessed that he was not able to veto the final
decision. He was also aware of the possible consequences of such a veto?military
revolts, internal revolution, the assassination of his close officials and probably of
himself.75

Conclusion

Two things are clear about the Emperor's attitude in December 1941. He was not
entirely opposed to Japan's decision to go to war, because he could see no other
alternative. Hirohito wanted Japan to work with the existing international status quo,
and to cooperate with Britain and the United States. He also believed that Japan
should try to keep on good terms with China. He acknowledged the fact that while
Manchukuo was created as a result of Japan's invasion, it could, however, be
regarded as properly within her sphere of influence, as the Lytton report had
suggested in 1933.76However, he was certainly sympathetic with the prevailing feeling
in Japan, nurtured over the years, that Japan had suffered from the effects of a
white-dominated international system.77 Nevertheless, he believed that if Japan
wanted to challenge the Anglo-American hegemony by military means, she should
do so only if she was certain of victory. This would explain the detailed strategic
questions he asked his military chiefs on the eve of Pearl Harbor. His letter to his son,
Akihito, in the aftermath of Japan's defeat in September 1945, reflected the ration
ality of the Emperor's thinking. Hirohito wrote that:
I wanted to say why Japan lost the war, this was because Japan believed too much in her

Empire, and as a result she underestimated Anglo-American power. Secondly, our military
men emphasized moral too much and forgot about science. my grandfather's time
During
[i.e. theMeiji era (1868-1912)], there were many responsible military leaders, but this time
military leaders failed to see the wider context of the international situation and were driven
to expansionism without any flexibility.78

Secondly, the relations between Hirohito and his subordinates were generally
insecure. On many occasions, not only the military but also the civilian leaders

74
Ito, Hirohashi and Katashima(eds.), Tojo naikaku sori-daijin kimitsu shiroku (Secret Documents of
Prime Minister Tojo), (Tokyo, 1990), p. 479.
75
Monologue, pp. 118-20, 145.
76
Monologue, pp. 101-2, 105; see also Britain's attitude towards the Manchurian crisis, Peter Lowe,
Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War?A Study of British Policy in East Asia 1937-1941.
(Oxford, 1977), pp. 6-8.
77
Monologue, p. 100.
78
Author's translation, quoted from H. Takahashi, Shoch? Tennou (The Emperor as a Symbol) (Tokyo,
1988), pp. 2-3.
 Hirohito, the Emperor's Army and Pearl Harbor 333

either ignored Hirohito's instructions, policies and demands or dismissed them as

impossible to perform. Nor did Hirohito feel complete confidence in his position as
Emperor. The almost total confusion in Japan's administration and the bankruptcy
of her decision-making apparatus during the years prior to Pearl Harbor was partly
the consequence of the fact that the system was founded upon a delicate political
balance between the Emperor and the civilian and military leaders, a balance which
scarcely existed after 1937.
In 1179, 1221, and 1332, at least four Emperors who actively involved themselves
in politics were placed under house arrest or sent to uninhabited islands by the
powerful clans. After 1338, the Emperor seldom interfered in politics and the royal
family resided quietly in Kyoto and was isolated from the population of Japan until
1868. The restoration of the throne was designed to create the appearance of a nation
state and to secure the position of the Meiji leaders, who came from the lower
ranking Samurai class. Thereafter, Japanese leaders did their best to portray the
Emperor as a living god. The relationship between Japanese leaders and the Emperor
was one of the inter-dependence?because the Emperor's position was also dependent
upon the protection of those leaders. Once Japan's leaders became divided amongst
themselves, and when the international problems Japan faced became more complex,
the delicate balance between the Japanese leaders and the Emperor fractured under
Hirohito. Hirohito's position was an extremely delicate one. This is why his efforts
to influence crucial decisions stopped half way?and as a result his attitude did not
make much difference to Japan's final decisions. He should be credited at least for his
efforts, however feeble, to avert war although this does not alter the fact that in the
last resort, he was responsible for the decision to go to war.