Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Sarah Catanzaro
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………...4
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………....5
Chapter 3: Methodology………………………………………………………………..28
I. Background……………………………………………………………………………….28
II. Assessing Q1……………………………………………………………………………...30
III. Assessing Q2……………………………………………………………………………...38
IV. Developing the Universe of Cases……………………………………………………..40
V. Selection of Study Subjects……………………………………………………………...42
VI. Problems Regarding Information Gathering…………………………………………43
VII. Case Study………………………………………………………………………………...44
VIII. Relevance………………………………………………………………………………….44
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Chapter 6: Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb and Abdelmalek Droukdal – A Well Executed
Merger…………………………………………………………………………………64
I. The Origins of Islamic Violence in Algeria after the War of Independence……...64
II. The Birth of the Salvation Islamic Front……………………………………………...65
III. The Beginnings of the GIA and the Onset of an Epoch of Violence……………….66
IV. An Alternative Emerges: The Origins of the GSPC…………………………………67
V. Fissions Form Within the GSPC……………………………………………………….67
VI. The Rise of Droukdal…………………………………………………………………….71
VII. Droukdal’s Program: Toward Global Jihad……………………………...………….73
VIII. The Announcement of Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb………………..………...77
IX. A New Organization……………………………………………………………………..78
X. Final Observations………………………………………………………………………80
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Abstract:
Al Qa’ida has allied with indigenous terrorist groups for over a decade. However, only in recent
years, has Osama Bin Laden increasingly relied upon these franchises to prosecute his pan-
Islamic struggle. This paper examines first the motivations of local jihadist groups who associate
with Al Qa’ida to understand the transformation that Al Qa’ida has achieved. It then focuses on
the role that local jihadist leaders play in the aftermath of the affiliation to shed further light on
Al Qa’ida’s current strategy and operations. The conclusion of this paper finds that while
opportunistic, rather than ideological concerns are the primary motivating factors for joining Al
Qa’ida, after these affiliations occur, shared visions become essential. The local jihadist leaders
who become Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers ensure ideological alignment with Al Qa’ida.
Based on this analysis, this paper offers some broad recommendations regarding the future
conduct of the Global War on Terror (GWOT).
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Acknowledgements:
The ideas of more people than I can possibly mention have affected my thinking about terrorist
organizations and Al Qa’ida over the years, and more recently into the making of this thesis. I
hope that a general acknowledgement here of the wisdom and understanding may be counted to
me for righteousness.
I have benefited particularly from communications with Professor Martha Crenshaw. Professor
Crenshaw helped answer my questions promptly, at length, and with enthusiasm. She also put at
my disposal her insights on numerous topics. Without a doubt, this project would have been
poorer without her invaluable comments. Moreover, Professor Crenshaw lives as a role model
for the next generation of female investigators researching international security, a traditionally
male-dominated discipline. Admiration should be earned, not given, and Professor Crenshaw
most certainly earned mine through her impressive career. Thank you so much for your patience,
objectivity, and coaching, but most importantly for serving as an incredible mentor.
It gives me great pleasure to thank Professors Paul Stockton and Michael May for the
opportunity to participate in the CISAC Interschool Honors Program. I would have been hard-
pressed to get this project done in anything like a timely fashion had it not been for this program.
Through the CISAC seminars, I have had the opportunity to try out some of my ideas and receive
valuable criticism from my peers, for whom I would also like to show gratitude. Moreover,
Professors Stockton and May helped me clarify and expand my views about this project on
numerous occasions. I have been so fortunate to benefit from their generosity and acumen.
I am also grateful to Dara Kay Cohen, who listened to my presentations with great attention and
offered so many thoughtful suggestions and useful comments. I was so fortunate to have had
Dara around as an academic example and important mentor. Since my sophomore year at
Stanford, she has offered me practical and affectionate support.
In addition, I would like to thank Colonel Joseph Felter and Jarrett Brachman who introduced me
to several primary and secondary documents. These sources proved to be a treasure-chest indeed.
I would be remiss not to acknowledge my parents. Their constant support, both personal and
intellectual is more important than can adequately be acknowledge in such a brief note. I would
also like to thank my brother, who is currently a junior in high school. Despite his youth, he
continues to inspire me every day with his thoughtfulness and intelligence.
Finally, I want to recognize my community, Port Washington, New York which was tragically
impacted by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the Twin Towers. I distinctly remember
the sense of dissociation and unreality as we struggled to understand how our beloved Twin
Towers were destroyed, how friends and neighbors had disappeared and presumably perished
during this devastating attack on America’s soil. There were cars parked at our train station that
were never recovered and fathers and mothers who never returned from work. Yet despite a
pervasive sense of insecurity, the members of my community began to dig themselves literally
and metaphorically from the ruins of the 9/11 disaster. Acts of kindness and heroism became
increasingly visible in my community as people mobilized to help one another. This solidarity
and resiliency consolidated my faith in humanity and sparked my interest in homeland security
studies. Thus, I dedicate my thesis to the population of Port Washington.
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Chapter 1: Building a Complex Organization
Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, Al Qa’ida was a relatively centralized
organization that used Afghanistan as a base from which to strategize, to plan attacks, and to
dispatch operatives worldwide. However, since the onset of the Global War on Terror (GWOT),
Al Qa’ida has transformed into a more ambiguous entity that scholars cannot easily define. A
few dominant camps have emerged within this scholarly debate. The first maintains that Al
Qa’ida Central Command retains ideological and operational control over the organization and
preserves a certain degree of tactical influence, Ronfeldt 2005,Stern 2003). Others suggest that
Al Qa’ida has become a decentralized network of individualized and local cells bound together
exclusively by common beliefs (Diebert and Stein 2003, Gunaratna 2004). Some scholars even
contend that the main threat no longer emanates from Al Qa’ida but from unassociated
radicalized individuals and groups who meet and plot in their neighborhoods and on the Internet
While each perspective has its merits, all oversimplify the command configuration
utilized by Al Qa’ida. Moreover, most fail to assess the exchange relationships that distinguish
Al Qa’ida. An organization characterized by “loose coupling” has cells that are relatively
includes cells that associate intimately, communicate often, and depend upon each other.
Currently, Al Qa’ida utilizes a mix of both loose and tight coupling to attain a remarkable degree
of adaptability. Although most scholars perceive Al Qa’ida as an organization in stasis, they fail
to acknowledge that this combination of loose and tight coupling has enabled Al Qa’ida to
become a modern hydra that readily adapts to changes in its environment. Thus, Al Qa’ida’s
structure and degree of centralization may fluctuate within a period of months or weeks. One can
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therefore classify Al Qa’ida as a complex organization a concept that will be elaborated in this
with local jihadist groups. Al Qa’ida has affiliated with indigenous terrorist groups for almost
twenty years. However, since the onset of the Global War on Terror, Al Qa’ida has begun to
Al Qa’ida has cooperated with local jihadist groups for years, recently, these external
efficient blend of both tight and loose coupling. This study will examine the incentives and role
of former local jihadist group leaders who now serve as Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. It is
important to analyze these individuals because they have assumed more authority since
This study will draw upon open source and primary source information to understand
why and how Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers promote the pan-Islamic agenda. By defining the
new structure of Al Qa’ida (characterized by loosely integrated and operationally attached sub-
units, each led by a commanding officer), distinguishing the groups with which Al Qa’ida is
strongly associated, and identifying and assessing the role of the commanders who interact with
Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri and the core of Al Qa’ida, this study may affect the
drawn from this analysis may present policymakers with new and novel ways of targeting Al
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In the 1980s, a large number of jihadists from the Middle East traveled to Afghanistan to
combat the Soviet Union. Osama bin Laden, a multimillionaire from a wealthy Saudi family, and
Abdullah Azzam, an Islamic scholar and founding member of the Kashmiri jihadist group
coming to fight the Soviets and as a press agency to produce propaganda to promote jihad. The
Services Bureau (“Maktab al Khadamat”) provided travel funds and guesthouses in Pakistan for
recruits and volunteers to facilitate the struggle against the Soviet forces. However, it was not
until the summer of 1988, that Bin Laden began calling his cadre al Qaeda al Askariya (“the
At the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan war, Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia as a
hero of jihad. However, in 1991, after the liberation of Kuwait from Saddam Hussein by the
American-led multinational army, Bin Laden was disenchanted with his native Saudi Arabia,
which had rebuffed his offer to defend the kingdom. He relocated to the Sudan at the invitation
of the government of Hassan Turabi and the National Islamic Front. In the Sudan, Bin Laden
hierarchical arrangement to guide and oversee its functions (Riedel 2008). The organization was
centered upon the “shura” (i.e. advisory council) consisting of Bin Laden’s closest associates,
most of whom he knew since his formative days in Afghanistan. This council promoted common
goals, coordinated targets, and authorized asset sharing for terrorist operations. The shura majilis
direct specific segments of planning and operations. The military committee was responsible for
recruiting, training, procuring, and launching support and military operations. The finance
committee oversaw and developed financial resources. The religious committee justified Al
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Qa’ida’s actions and operations within the theological parameters of Al Qa’ida model of Islam.
Finally, the media committee produced propaganda intended to generate Muslim support for the
organization and its objectives (Harmony Database Released Documents: Al Qa'ida Goals and
Structure 2006). Once a specific operation was decided upon, it would be assigned to a carefully
selected cell headed by a senior Al Qa’ida operative who reported personally to Bin Laden
(Wright 2007). Thus, although Al Qa’ida also assisted two other Salafi terrorist groups during
this formative period in the Sudan, in its earlier incarnation, Al Qa’ida could be classified as a
centralized organization.
In May 1996, Bin Laden left the Sudan to return to Afghanistan as a result of combined
pressure from the United States, other western governments, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Libya, all
three of which faced indigenous terrorist groups supported by Bin Laden. Afghanistan’s lack of
central government provided Bin Laden with greater leeway to pursue his agenda and centralize
his operations. Moreover, Bin Laden was able to forge his closest alliance yet with the Taliban
by providing it with significant financial and human resources to support the ongoing war against
other factions in northern Afghanistan. In May 1997, Bin Laden cemented his ties to Ayman
Zawahiri, the last emir of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, thereby strengthening Al Qa’ida Central
Command and forming a close-knit group of jihadists uniquely capable of executing terror
operations like the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States (Bergen 2002).
The September 11, 2001 attacks reveal the former nature of Al Qa’ida’s decision-making
apparatus. The plot to attack the United State began in 1999 after Al Qa’ida executed the
simultaneous bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Bin Laden and
Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Al Qa’ida’s former propaganda chief, hatched the plan to target the
Twin Towers, the Pentagon, and the Capitol Building. Bin Laden personally recruited the plot’s
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tactical leader, Mohammed Atta as well as the fifteen operatives who would intimidate the
passengers during the airline hijackings. Additionally, he personally handled other elements of
the conspiracy, for instance, he engaged the Taliban and its leader, Mullah Omar in the
Although Bin Laden and Al Qa’ida considered 9/11 an astonishing success, the attacks
precipitated the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Prior to 9/11, Al Qa’ida was a centralized
organization, which used Afghanistan as a base from which to carry out major operations against
American targets and did not significantly depend upon its affiliates to support its operations in
the Middle East. After the first year of the GWOT and the ouster of the Taliban from
Afghanistan, many Al Qa’ida leaders were imprisoned. These arrests led to subsequent arrests of
other senior officers. Captives revealed the names of their commanders and associates thereby
highlighting the need for loose coupling between local operatives and Al Qa’ida’s executive
leadership in order to evade government interference and limit the consequences of any further
Iran at which the shura recognized that Al Qa’ida could no longer function as a hierarchy. The
shura concluded that a decentralized, networked terrorist organizations would be less vulnerable
this point forward, individual cells, composed of less than ten operatives, were instructed to
develop their own organizational structures, detached from Al Qa’ida Central Command and
other cells. While they operated in support of centralized directives, they established their own
Nevertheless, Al Qa’ida soon learned that there are limitations to a strictly decentralized
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situational awareness and control the use of violence to achieve specific political ends. Like most
other organizations, Al Qa’ida faced challenges when Central Command was forced to delegate
certain duties to low level operatives, who espoused different personal preferences. Often, these
low-level operatives sought more violence than was useful due to the cognitive dynamics of an
underground organization, competition for prominence within the movement, and their own
Qa’ida could not effectively monitor its agents’ activities, nor could it punish renegade agents
(Felter, Bramlett, Perkins, Brachman, and Fishman 2006). In 2002 and 2003, prior to the
invasion of Iraq, Al Qa’ida leadership found itself cornered along the border between Pakistan
However, the U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq and the Pakistani decision to provoke a
crisis with India allowed Al Qa’ida to survive by regaining a degree of centralization. Invading
Iraq diverted troops from the mission of finding Al Qa’ida’s leadership; rather than consolidating
its victory in Afghanistan, the US allowed Al Qa’ida to reconstitute itself in the tribal areas of
Pakistan. Moreover, after five Kashmiri terrorists attacked Lok Sabha, the lower house of India’s
parliament in New Delhi, India began to mobilize along the border; thereby provoking Pakistan
to divert to the east troops that were needed in the west. Thus, Al Qa’ida was able to reestablish
Tribal Areas (Riedel 2008). As the result of restoration of central control, Al Qa’ida can rely
upon closer relations with its commanding officers (the former leaders of indigenous terrorist
groups), who are the most important link in the formation of a resilient, complex organization.
These commanding officers ensure that preference divergence does not result in the loss of
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operational success or security.
As this history indicates, Al Qa’ida’s demand for operational secrecy, highly visible
organizational personnel, intricate nature of resource gathering and allocation, and large size
dictated its organizational decisions. Although a decentralized organization form was more
appropriate and prudent after 9/11, it was not very efficient. Empowered by the establishment of
its safe haven in Pakistan and increased reliance upon its commanding officers, Al Qa’ida
continues to morph into a complexly structure organization (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2006).
Complex organizations are composed of a diversity of agents, who interact with and mutually
affect one another. Unlike strictly centralized organizations, qualified by tightly coupled systems
organizations can exploit a diversity of systems (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2001). Al Qa’ida now
relies heavily upon semiautonomous cells found in operational territories that are horizontally
and vertically integrated into the centralized command structure. While the relationships within
the cells are tightly coupled, the relationships between cells and between operatives and Al
Qa’ida Central Command are loosely coupled. Before Al Qa’ida Central Command reorganized
itself in the tribal areas of Pakistan, the relationship between its commanding officers and central
authorities were also loosely coupled (thus, Al Qa’ida was effectively a decentralized network).
By contrast, today, the relationship between Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers and central
authorities are moderately coupled (thus, Al Qa’ida is a true “complex organization”). This
flexible structure allows the Central Command to maintain control over specifically identified
strategic operations through its commanding officers while enabling cells to maintain their
autonomy in local and regional operations (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2006). While it is difficult to
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determine if Al Qa’ida assumed this structure by conscious design or coincidence, the extensive
negotiations that continue to occur between Al Qa’ida and its affiliates suggest that Al Qa’ida
combination of coupling. Previously, Bin Laden did not seek to exert strategic or operational
control over the leaders of its regionally based affiliates. However, now when Al Qa’ida merges,
partners, or collaborates with a local jihadist groups, it employs the groups’ leaders as its
commanding officers and integrates them into Al Qa’ida Central Command by establishing
communication channels and by offering financial and technological resources to these leaders
for their local outlets with stipulations. Al Qa’ida theorist Abu Musab al-Suri noted the
importance of a highly trained cadre of senior commanding officers. He observed that a dearth of
such leaders reduces the maximum level of control Al Qa’ida could exert thereby undermining
the potential for political impact (Felter, Bramlett, Perkins, Brachman, and Fishman 2006).
These commanding officers can serve a crucial role since they are better able to monitor the
behavior of their agents and can punish and reward them for their performance. Moreover, these
commanding officers are effective because they can develop mature relationships with their
operatives. Since they are already closely coupled to their agents, they can build differentiated
relationships with their rapports rather than espousing an “average” leadership style. These
that was impossible to achieve between Al Qa’ida Central Command executives and operatives
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patterns, leader-member value agreement, subordinate loyalty, decision influence, and member
affect are all key in this dyadic relationship (Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995).
Studies from the corporate world as well as observations by Al Qa’ida theorists reveal
that when agents develop high quality relationships with their leaders, their performance, and
their overall unit performance improves (Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995). There is a positive
correlation between the level of ideological indoctrination of cell members and the degree of
control a leader exerts. Local leaders can also effectively monitor operative’s personal and social
network, ensuring that relationships that could dilute commitment are avoided and those that
enhance commitment are strengthened(Brachman and McCants 2006). Moreover, these new,
cohesive units can innovate and adapt to the demands of the environment because they do not
need to conform to a strict set of guidelines passed down from Central Command.
Central Command. The moderate coupling between Al Qa’ida Central Command and local
leaders is essential to the performance of the organization. Because affiliations are often
preceded by several months of bargaining and negotiations, Al Qa’ida can ensure that strategic
and tactical differences between it and its commanding officers are reconciled. Thus, Al Qa’ida
Central Command can rely upon its commanding officers to handle finance and logistic tasks and
operatives is a risky strategy because each additional transfer entails communications and
lower-level operatives (who are often less committed, since the most devoted operatives are
obliged to engage in riskier or inherently fatal assignments) is a more hazardous strategy (Felter,
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By allowing its commanding officers to retain significant freedom to interact with other
local leaders and with resource providers, they are given latitude to exploit their specific
environment. Moreover, these commanding officers can ensure the dissemination of innovation
and information by acting as an intermediary between their cell members and Al Qa’ida Central
liaising with Al Qa’ida Central Command, thereby allowing Al Qa’ida to maintain ideological
and operational control over the organization and by closely interacting with local operatives,
Although these commanding officers have significant responsibilities (for example, the
use of force, finances, and equipment, obligations to Al Qa’ida Central Command, accountability
for operation effectiveness, duty of care to their agents, and powers including discipline and
punishment of their agents) no researcher has analyzed their role or background. This is the first
study that pinpoints the organizations with which Al Qa’ida has affiliated and identifies their
leaders (who subsequently become Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers). Drawing upon documents
and transcripts of legal proceedings involving global Salafi mujahedin and their organizations,
government documents, press and scholarly articles, and Internet articles, this study compiles the
biographies of over forty Al Qa’ida commanding officers, scrutinizing their stories for patterns to
determine their motivation. Moreover, this study provides valuable insight into the
transformation that these leaders undergo when they become Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers
by looking at their responsibilities before and after they affiliate with Al Qa’ida.
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Government efforts to degrade Al Qa’ida’s capacity should focus on undermining its
security environment, minimizing the degree to which it can control operations, and abort its
ability to fund its activities. By identifying the crucial role played by commanding officers in
sustaining Al Qa’ida, this study will suggest additional means of undermining Al Qa’ida.
The government should increase dissension between local leaders and Al Qa’ida Central
Command. The US government should publicly recognize and highlight the differences between
the acquired groups, who originally espouse ambitions such as regime overthrow and Al Qa’ida,
communications channels between local leaders and Al Qa’ida central command by utilizing
misinformation and flooding information channels, thereby forcing the commanding officers to
communicate more frequently with Al Qa’ida Central Command, possibly revealing crucial
information. There may be “psychological” tactics that can be employed to generate dissension,
to exploit certain aspects of human or group dynamics that would lead to competition, or
rebellion. Moreover, there may be certain personality characteristics of the types of individuals
Finally, government efforts should deny jihadist groups the benefit of security vacuum in
vulnerable areas; thereby barring the emergence of potential Al Qa’ida partners. Through troop
deployment, the US government can deny terrorists the use of vulnerable countries as staging
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Recently, counterterrorist agents and military officers have mounted efforts to combat Al
Qa’ida and Bin Laden supporters. However, there is considerable controversy among scholars
regarding the structure of Al Qa’ida and therefore, how best to target this formidable foe. The
debate regarding the nature of Al Qa’ida’s threat will inevitably impact upon the allocation of
influence and resource by the U.S. federal government in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)
embarked upon following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The outcome of the bureaucratic turf
wars over funding for programs under the new Obama administration will surely define future
directions and strategies to confront Al Qa’ida specifically and global terrorism in general.
commanding officers, which lead the groups with which Al Qa’ida has recently merged or with
whom it remains associated. Although Al Qa’ida retains its core group and a well-trained
terrorist cadre, it has become increasingly engaged with regional affiliates in Egypt, the Sinai
Several scholars have investigated the process whereby Al Qa’ida has achieved a broader
geographic and operational reach by employing local jihadist groups. These researchers confirm
my commentary that such partnerships can provide Al Qa’ida with increased flexibility and offer
advantages in stimulating tactical level innovation within particular environments when they are
In a report prepared for the Combat Studies Institute, Kalic describes Al Qa’ida as a
“modern hydra.” He observes that before the onset of the GWOT, Al Qa’ida functioned as a
regional indoctrination and training center for Islamic terrorist organizations. However, he
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corroborates my observation that because of the loss of support and training centers in
Afghanistan due to Operation Enduring Freedom, Bin Laden was obliged to rely upon outside
groups in order to perpetuate Al Qa’ida’s agenda. Kalic suggests that Al Qa’ida’s alliances with
Abu Sayyaf, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Tunisian Combatant Group, and Libyan Islamic Fighting
Group have enabled Al Qa’ida to expand its geographic influence and diffuse its organizational
structure. He describes the process whereby Al Qa’ida supports local “walk in” Islamic groups
that pitch their plans to Al Qa’ida for financial support. These radical groups provide additional
reach to Al Qa’ida and expand its operational capability for minimal investment because they
can develop indigenous plans and operations based on local situations and observations.
Moreover, they allow Al Qa’ida to minimize exposure of its central command structure (Kalic
2005)
In a similar vein, Takeyh and Gvosdev have observed that after the destruction of its
sanctuary in Afghanistan, Al Qa’ida has remained buoyant by forging foreign alliances. Through
this strategy, Al Qa’ida has established a presence in failed states where it believes the US will
opt not to risk significant losses associated with urban/guerilla warfare. Al Qa’ida no longer
needs a strong state for funding and supplies since it can rely on its franchises in countries like
Riedel avows that the US invasion of Iraq and subsequent efforts to quell sectarian unrest
have allowed Al Qa’ida to regroup in the tribal areas of Pakistan, where it has established a new
base of operations. Now, Al Qa’ida is once again focused on enlarging its network.
Consequently, Al Qa’ida has developed a closer relationship with Kashmiri terrorist groups, like
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad that have a presence there. Moreover, while Al Qa’ida
has failed to topple the governments of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, its attacks against these
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regimes demonstrate its expanded influence throughout the Middle East. In a similar vein, the
plot to destroy ten commercial airliners en route from the United Kingdom to the United States,
foiled in 2006, indicates that Al Qa’ida has established connections in Europe. Finally, Riedel
suggests that Al Qa’ida may seek a foothold in Gaza, Africa, or Lebanon in the near future
(Riedel 2007).
Mishal and Rosenthal describe Al Qa’ida as a “dune organization” that employs other
loosely affiliated organizations to carry out its missions. Al Qa’ida remains associated with these
groups as long as they cannot operate independently. However, when they prove that they no
Qa’ida finds another organization that can attain its other goals and leaves this former associate
to continue the war on its own. The affiliated groups may employ a modus operandi, which is not
identical to Al Qa’ida’s tactics, thus, Al Qa’ida need not maintain constant supervision or control
over the activities of its old affiliate’s operatives (Mishal and Rosenthal 2005).
Stern observes that terrorist groups’ objectives have evolved to ensure their survival. She
maintains that many organizations will form alliances with groups that have ideologies different
from their own, obliging both entities to adapt. For instance, she suggests that both Egyptian
Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan compromised their original mission when
they joined forces with Al Qa’ida. Moreover, she avows that Bin Laden has adjusted his
objectives over time and describes Al Qa’ida as a “flexible group of ruthless warriors ready to
fight on behalf of multiple causes.” Due to the adaptability of its mission, Al Qa’ida can forge
broad, and sometimes unlikely alliances with other jihadist groups (like Jemaah Islamiyah), with
Shia organizations (like Hezbollah), with traditional organized crime groups (like Artab Ansari’s
[an Indian gangster] network), and revivalist organizations (like Tablighi Jamaat) (Stern 2003).
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Fishman is less worried about Al Qa’ida franchises than other scholars. He avers that Al
Qa’ida offers these franchises few benefits; offering only its name, reputation, and ideology. He
contends that Al Qa’ida’s franchises are likely to commit rash, strategic mistakes and are more
Muslim civilians and engaging in conflict with other Iraqi insurgent groups (Fishman 2008).
collaborative activities. They avow that terrorist groups cannot be self-sustaining and must
outside threats. They analyze several possible arrangements, including “licensing agreements,”
whereby Al Qa’ida allows other groups to use its facilities, equipment, or personnel for a specific
purpose and duration and “minority equity investments,” whereby Al Qa’ida finances terrorist
groups with the intention of influencing their strategic activity. Finally, they describe mergers
and acquisitions, whereby Al Qa’ida combines with or subsumes another organization. They
contend that these interactions are the most complex form of equity engagements that terrorist
allow terrorist groups to consolidate their assets to compete more successfully or exploit
A. Ideological motivations
While these studies analyze Al Qa’ida’s strategy and explain why Al Qa’ida has pursued
such arrangements, they do not reveal why local jihadist groups choose to align with Al Qa’ida.
Many groups that merge or partner with Al Qa’ida adhere to a program based on the ethnic,
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sectarian, linguistic, and state boundaries in which they arose. Upon allying with Al Qa’ida, they
must forsake their indigenous agendas to support the global pan-Islamic movement.
Consequently, many groups grapple with contradictions between national and supranational
aims. Unfortunately, few studies investigate the incentives of the local jihadist leaders who adopt
Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic program and transform their organization into part of Al Qa’ida’s
system.
Studies regarding why individuals join radical movements may inform our understanding
of the motivations of local terrorists leaders who connect with Al Qa’ida’s global enterprise.
Della Porta suggests that individuals are persuaded to enlist in underground organizations when
they are enticed by its ideology. She maintains that political organizations often orient their
ideology to support recruitment. Like Stern, she proposes that ideology is a strategic choice made
by the organization; it is a tool for enlarging the potential supporters of the organization. She
observes that the attention groups pay to adjusting their ideology to circumstance is revealed
when they explain and justify their strategies. In fact, enemies and allies are described in
different terms at different times (Della Porta 1995). Based on her interpretation, one might
expect that local jihadist leaders subscribe to Al Qa’ida’s global jihad because the idea of
establishing an Islamic Caliphate throughout the world is attractive to them. One could also
envisage that Al Qa’ida is promoting its pan-Islamic vision because it is aware of the magnetism
of this dream.
Jones, Smith, and Weeding validate this line of thought. They observe that although Al
Qa’ida was initially devoted to fighting the Soviet forces it now espouses more internationalist
objectives. Consequently, Al Qa’ida can co-opt local struggles into an evolving network of
worldwide jihad by asserting its dedication to an international agenda. They contend that Al
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Qa’ida has improved its media wing to appeal to local jihadist groups in their native language
and honor regional customs. They offer Jemaah Islamiyah as an example of an organization that
was seduced by Al Qa’ida’s discussion of a pan-Islamic caliphate (Jones, Smith, and Weeding
2003).
Gunaratna also supports this argument. He avows that traditionally, Islamist groups
fought secular Muslim governments either to replace them or to form a separate state. However,
sophisticated propaganda campaign to orient them towards global, rather than local jihad.
Moreover, global events have provided the context for the new generation to gain exposure to
significant ideological training and indoctrination. As a consequence of the GWOT and the war
B. Psychosocial motivations
Conversely, other studies suggest that individuals join terrorist networks for psychosocial
reasons. Post, Sprinzak, and Denny interviewed 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern extremists from
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, as well as 14 secular terrorists from Fatah al-Islam. They
observed that most had a high school education and some had additional schooling and that most
came from respected families that supported their activism. Consequently, they concluded that
income and/or educational inequalities do not account for terrorism. They deduced that peer
influence and increased social standing were major reasons for joining a terrorist group (Post,
from 1973 to 2002. They noticed that these terrorists exhibited a higher rate of religious
education, membership in fundamentalist organizations and repeat terrorist acts. As a result, they
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proposed that the terrorists acted out of altruistic motives (devotion to a religious community)
and deduced that recruitment could be based on a network of shared social values(Pedahzur,
Although his research was biased towards leaders who have come to the public attention,
compiled data from public sources on 172 individuals who he identified as members of a global
Salafi mujahedeen. He sample included expatriate leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group,
members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jemaah Islamiyah, the GSPC, and Al Qa’ida. He
observed that members of terrorist organizations were generally middle-class, educated young
men from caring and religious families. These participants in jihad grew up with strong positive
values of religion, spirituality and concern for their communities. Moreover, Sagemen found no
surveyed. On the contrary, he found that social bonds were the critical element in the process of
joining jihad and he suggested that such connections precede ideological commitment (Sageman
2004).
C. Strategic/opportunistic motivations
Alternatively, terrorist leaders may have opportunistic motives for securing a spot under
Al Qa’ida’s umbrella. Several academics believe that terrorist action derives from a conscious,
rational, calculated decision to execute a particular type of action, which they perceive to be the
optimum strategy to accomplish a sociopolitical goal. Sandler and Enders contend that terrorists
must choose between different strategies and modes of attack based on their perception of
“prices” associated with alternative operations. Each mode of operation has a per-unit price that
23
includes the value of time, resources and anticipated outcome. Thus, any act executed by a
terrorist organization can be perceived as a rational choice (Sandler and Enders 2004).
Hoffman notes that approximately 90 percent of all terrorist groups collapse within a year
and only half of the remainder survives another decade. He remarks upon long running
government offensives that have nearly crushed several terrorist groups. Based on these
observations he suggests that several local jihadist outlets need the Al Qa’ida imprimatur to raise
money. He further notes that local jihadist cells shed their outlaw status within radical Muslim
circles when they have Al Qa’ida’s backing. Finally, he mentions that the Iraq war has sapped
local jihadist groups of their most active militants. In this context, embracing global jihad may be
perceived as a way to control and recruit new group members (Bruce Hoffman 2004).
Based on these accounts, one can imagine three different rationales why local jihadist
group leaders would affiliate with Al Qa’ida. First, local jihadist group leaders may be lured by
Al Qa’ida’s ideology. It is possible that these groups take the transnational jihadist challenge
seriously because the idea of creating a single Islamic state or reviving the united Caliphate of
earlier times is captivating. Alternatively, local jihadist leaders may confederate with Al Qa’ida
due to psychosocial influences. These local jihadist leaders may have developed relationships
with Al Qa’ida officials during the Soviet-Afghan war, while incarcerated together, while
training together, etc. These affinities may compel local jihadist leaders to liaise with their old
compatriots and mutually assist each other in their subsequent struggles. Finally, local jihadist
leaders, who might otherwise be contained or co-opted by local regimes and, by extension, the
United States and its allies, may unite with Al Qa’ida to guarantee organizational survival. In
joining Al Qa’ida, these local jihadist leaders may seek concrete benefits such as the provision of
financial resources, access to training facilities, and association with the Al Qa’ida label.
24
III. Literature on Terrorist Leadership
While these studies enlighten the discussion regarding incentives for merging or
partnering with Al Qa'ida, very little literature directly addresses the role that local jihadist
leaders play before or after a merger. However, some researchers have attempted to identify
personality traits that enable leaders to attract and maintain large followings.
In the 1920s, German sociologist Max Weber defined charismatic leadership as “resting
and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.” He suggested that charisma
was a personality trait by virtue of which a leader appeared endowed with exceptional power or
superhuman competencies. Charismatic leaders gained authority through qualities unique their
leadership, first exemplified by Mohammed, the prophet and founder of Islam, is prominent in
Islamic history. He notices that in the Islamic world, religious and political leadership is usually
embodied in the persona of a single charismatic individual. He cites Mahdi of Sudan, Ayatollah
Khomeini, and Osama bin Laden as examples of this archetype. Furthermore, he predicts that
this type of charismatic politico-religious leader will appear with greater frequency in the future
(Kostrzebski 2002).
Similarly, Bergen contends that Bin Laden’s charisma helped fuel an influx of recruits
and attracted aspiring jihadists to Afghanistan from Western countries. Moreover, he avows that
Bin Laden’s cult of personality prompted various militant Islamic groups to affiliate with Al
25
Qa’ida. He notes that Bin Laden left operational planning to trusted lieutenants and stood above
the fray. Consequently, few operatives received personal audience with him. However, those
who went through the vetting procedures and gained access to Bin Laden describe their
B. Targeting leadership
While these studies suggest that a leader’s charisma can inspire a devoted following, they
do not address the role that such leaders play within an organizational framework. While
research addressing this topic has been extremely sparse, some scholars have discussed how the
In a Joint Special Operations University report, Turbiville perceives that the United
States has emphasized targeting and eliminating key terrorist leadership since 9/11. He describes
the diverse experience of foreign operations against insurgent and terrorist high value targets.
Based on several case studies, he concludes that leadership targeting can be effective,
particularly when a group depends heavily on a charismatic leader. However, he cautions that
operations which target leadership must be integrated into an overall and effective
counterinsurgency and counterterrorist strategy and warns that abuses of national and
international law and human rights committed in terrorist leadership targeting programs have a
Langdon, Sarapu, and Wells examined 35 leadership crises to determine what happens to
terrorist movements after the loss of a leader. Although they predicted that the assassination of a
leader would cause a dramatic change in ideology leading to increased violence, they found that
the assassination of a leader often causes the group to fail or disband. Moreover, they observed
that the assassination of a leader is more likely to devastate a terrorist group than an arrest. They
26
suggest that arrested leaders may continue to play an important ideological role by guiding their
group from their prison cell (Langdon, Sarapu, and Wells 2004).
These studies suggest that targeting leadership could damage a terrorist group by
depriving it of effective direction and demoralizing its rank and file members. However, while
these analyses intimate that terrorist leaders play an important role in ensuring organizational
survival, they do not expose the particular function that terrorist leaders must execute. Thus, this
study is valuable since its looks at both the motivations and specific responsibilities of Al
27
Chapter 3: Methodology
Al Qa’ida has clearly transformed and evolved in ways described in the introduction. Its
terrorist activity, conducted by operatives capable of inflicting maximum civilian and economic
damages on both local and distant targets in pursuit of their extremist goals, remains an
important security threat. In fact, Al Qaida’s ability to mete out devastating destruction
worldwide has increased as cells have become progressively armed with modern technology.
Moreover, recently, Al Qa’ida has expanded its reach through its affiliations so that it is uniquely
positioned to target the West through spectacular attacks designed to inflict mass casualties and
damage to the global economy. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the motivations and
such a forceful and resilient organization, we must understand the strength that resides in its
leaders.
I. Background:
The introductory chapter explained how and why Al Qa’ida relies extensively upon the
depending upon its commanding officers (the former leaders of local jihadist groups), Al Qa’ida
has become a flexible, moderately coupled network of individuals united by a common need and
ultimately aligned behind an emergent leader, Osama bin Laden. Currently, Al Qa’ida’s
commanding officers have the ultimate authority over their region and are given wide latitude to
run their units within the boundaries of Al Qa’ida’s doctrines. As centralized communication
nodes within their system, they have become the main link between Al Qa’ida Central Command
and the organization’s operative units. As such, Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers are held
responsible for its success or failure in their region. During negotiations between Al Qa’ida and
28
the potential affiliate, commanding officers are influential arbitrators. Negotiations are often
lengthy processes, involving discussions regarding financial and capital resources and tactics.
Commanding officers also ensure that an operative’s incentives to supply effort are not
diminished and mediate conflict within their unit when the affiliation begins and as it matures.
Finally, they help stimulate interdependency and interaction among their units and other
branches of Al Qa’ida. Just as managers from the corporate arena trying to integrate newly
acquired companies and divisions, plan ahead, communicate often and address everyone
involved in the deal, so too must the commanding officers that merge their organization with Al
Although these commanding officers play a vital role in expanding the agenda of Al
Qa’ida and adding legitimacy to its international campaign, researchers have overlooked them.
The previous chapter revealed that literature on the role of leadership in terror networks has
remained limited in scope. Past studies have ignored important hierarchical considerations,
focusing primarily on principals like Osama bin Laden. This study is the first to
comprehensively examine Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. Thus, it will contribute to the bank
of information and stimulate vital discourse on the composition and function of Al Qa’ida today.
commanding officers, little is known about the characters, motivations, or credentials of these
officials. The surveys reviewed, which consider categories of influence factors and their effect
adequately explain why certain terrorists leaders affiliate with Al Qa’ida and its program of
global jihad nor do they reveal the precise role that these officers serve within the Al Qa’ida
29
Qa’ida’s operatives, such as age, educational background, years of religious training, religious
affiliation, and by evaluating these operatives for their military backgrounds (e.g. war
patterns etc, I would be able to detect recognizable patterns that characterize these terrorist
executives. The patterns that I observed would help me answer two critical questions:
1) What motivates local jihadist leaders to affiliate with Al Qa’ida’s and its pan-Islamic
agenda?
2) What type of role do local jihadist leaders play within Al Qa’ida’s network when the
The previous chapter outlined three explanations for why individuals join terrorist
organizations. Some researchers suggest that terrorists follow a strategic logic and are inspired
by opportunism; they perceive armed combat at the most effective way to generate significant
governmental concessions (Sandler and Enders 2004, Bruce Hoffman 2004). Others scholars
suggest that ideology plays an important role in pushing militants of some militants toward
terrorism (Della Porta 1995, Jones, Smith, and Weeding 2003, R. Gunaratna 2002). Finally,
some academics claim that individuals join terrorist organizations due to strong solidarity bonds
derived from interpersonal relations (Post, Sprinzak, and Denny 2003, Pedahzur, Perliger, and
Weinberg 2003, Sageman 2004). Since prior studies have not discussed what incentives
provoke local jihadist leaders to affiliate with Al Qa’ida, I assumed that the motivations for local
jihadist leaders to join Al Qa’ida’s global jihad were similar to the motivations for individuals to
30
join terrorist movements. Thus, to address my first question, I developed the following
hypotheses:
opportunistic motives
ideological motives
psychosocial motives
H11 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers aligned with Al Qa’ida due to opportunistic
motives) reflects the observation that relatively undersized, less powerful indigenous assemblies
of terrorists can invigorate their organization by aligning with Al Qa’ida. In recent years, Al
Qa’ida has demonstrated unusual resilience and international reach. It has exhibited a
complexity, agility, and global scope that is unrivaled by any previous terrorist organization. Its
fluid operational style, based on a common mission statement and shared objectives rather than
informal relations with various Islamic groups to gain access to operational collaborators and
matter of joining than being solicited. Moreover, the Salafi message, which has been
disseminated over the Internet by Al Qa’ida’s media division, has attracted numerous members
of alienated diasporas (sometimes second and third generation immigrants) who feel isolated
from their communities and seek to belong to a group (Bruce Hoffman 2003). By associating
with Al Qa’ida, local jihadist groups can shore up popular support and amp up recruitment.
31
Al Qa’ida’s strength may also lie in its impressive coffers; Al Qa’ida has amassed
billions of dollars by building a strong network of financiers and operatives who are frugally
minded and business savvy. Moreover, Al Qa’ida’s finances are often hidden in legitimate and
illegitimate businesses; Bin Laden is reputed to own approximately eighty companies around the
world. Al Qa’ida has learned to effectively leverage the global financial system of capital
markets by utilizing small financial transfers, under regulated Islamic banking networks and
informal transfer systems throughout the world. Thus, it is difficult to choke off funds destined
for Al Qa’ida (Basile 2004). Consequently, Al Qa’ida can grant money to local terrorist groups
that present promising plans for attacks that serve Al Qa’ida’s general goals.
All terrorist organizations must engage in attacks to maintain support, to buttress their
organizational integrity, and to foster their continued existence. Associating with Al Qa’ida
ensures that a group has access to the necessary financial resources to conduct attacks. In a sense,
Al Qa’ida operates like a large multi-national company and the “product” that it exports is
terrorism. One must acknowledge the economic principles that underlie Al Qa’ida’s success, that
communicate with various audiences. Al Qa’ida has launched an effective advertising campaign
worldwide using the latest technology and psychology to reach their desired addressees. Al
Qa’ida uses mobile phones, text messaging, instant messaging, websites, email, blogs, and chat
rooms for administrative tasks, fund-raising, research, logistical coordination of attacks, and
recruitment. When Al Qa’ida’s media division airs its hostage videos and films of terrorist
attacks or their aftermath, it provides the organization with the oxygen of publicity necessary to
sustain itself. Unless civilian populations are made aware of terrorist acts and cowed into fear by
32
such assaults, Al Qa’ida cannot influence the governments that it targets. Moreover, these
materials are seen by potential sympathizers who may be brought into the folds of terrorism itself
(Blanchard 2006). Terrorist groups that align with Al Qa’ida can benefits from Al Qa’ida’s
terrorist organization; most modern terrorist groups do not last long. In fact, 90% of terrorist
organizations have a life span of less than one year. Cronin lists seven broad explanations for the
decline and ending of terrorist groups: 1) the capture or killing of the leader 2) failure to
transition to the next generation 3) achievement of the group’s aims 4) transition to a legitimate
other forms of violence. More than one dynamic can be responsible for their decline (Cronin
2006).
Consequently, to assess H11, I searched for evidence of terrorist group decline based on
Cronin’s criteria. To do so, I developed timelines for each organization included in this study.
The timelines featured important events in their life cycle (e.g. the founding, the onset of series
of attacks, spectacular attacks, the beginning of a government offensive, etc.). Information was
gathered from various international security think tanks including the Center for Defense
Information, the Jamestown Foundation, the Council of Foreign Relations, the Institute for
Conflict Management in New Delhi, and the NEFA foundation. I judged that the local jihadist
leader, as a rational actor, would affiliate with Al Qa’ida if he desperately needed to give his
organization a second wind. Consequently, if there was strong evidence that the group was in a
state of imminent decline immediately prior to its merger with A Qa’ida, I assumed that
opportunism was the primary motivation for merging with Al Qa’ida (coded as 2). If there was
33
some data that suggested that the group had experienced minor setbacks, I determined that
opportunism was the secondary motivation for merging with Al Qa’ida (coded as 1). More
information on statistical hypothesis testing follows in the chapter on data analysis and results.
To assess H21 (Al Qa’ida commanding officers were inspired by Al Qa’ida’s ideology), I
considered the assessment of Al Qa’ida’s ideology published by MI5, the UK’s security
intelligence agency. According to MI5, Al Qa’ida’s ideology is centered upon three key points:
1) Al Qa’ida attributes the obstacles encountered by the Islamic world to the Jewish-
organization)
Islam. Al Qa’ida would like to replace all existing governments with a supranational
caliphate and impose a strict and exclusive government based on their interpretation
as “infidel,” most notably Shiite sects. (Al Qa’ida is anti-Shia) (Al Qaida's Ideology)
Thus, to evaluate H21, I determined if the local jihadist leaders who affiliated with Al
considered the leader’s prior involvement in Islamic societies, religious education, and
statements, which they had published regarding their ideology. To execute this assessment, I
relied predominantly upon newspaper articles published in both the domestic and international
34
press and, where available, communiqués, statements, speeches and other primary source
materials authored by the leaders themselves. If I found that the leader placed more emphasis on
anti-Western, pan-Islamic, or anti-Shia goals than regional initiatives, I resolved that ideological
alignment was the primary motivation for joining Al Qa’ida (coded as 2). However, if the leader
seemed more committed to local programs, yet also expressed anti-Western, pan-Islamic, or anti-
Shia sympathies, I concluded that ideological alignment was a secondary motivation (coded as
1).
Finally, to assess H31 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida due to
prior social network affiliations), I considered operatives’ involvement in four episodes that
served to rally jihadists around Al Qa’ida principals and fostered the development of social
bonds between mujahedeen figures. In December 1979, fearing the collapse of communism in
Central Asia, the Soviet Union launched a military invasion to restore Soviet control over
neighboring Afghanistan. Countless numbers of Afghanis joined the Islamic resistance, which
was organized into several native mujahedeen organizations with headquarters in Peshawar,
Pakistan. Soon thereafter, operatives from foreign countries began trickling into Pakistan. While
some arrived to provide money and weapons to support the fight, others enlisted in the growing
corps of “holy warriors” under the lead of the legendary Palestinian Sheikh Dr. Abdullah Azzam
and the Saudi billionaire, Osama bin Laden. However in January 1993, eager to put the Afghan
jihad in the past, the Pakistani government ordered the closure of Arab mujahedeen offices in the
country and threatened official deportation to any illegal foreign fighters who attempted to
remain in Pakistan. Thus countless numbers of mujahedeen veterans who had formed tight bonds
with their fellow fighters returned to locations in the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere
35
(Wright 2007). When presented with the opportunity to reunite with their “brethren,” these
The events that unfolded subsequent to the assassination of Anwar Sadat may have
played a similar role in forging social bonds amongst jihadists. In 1981, President Sadat of Egypt
died after being shot by gunmen who opened fire as he watched an aerial display at a military
parade. Following President Sadat's assassination, more than 700 people were rounded up. Two
trials took place. The first was held in camera and consisted of 24 suspects directly involved in
the assassination. The second trial consisted of 302 defendants charged with conspiracy and
being members of the illegal Tanzim al-Jihad. In prison, these jihadists developed strategies for
establishing an Islamist state and established important personal connections. Many focused on
mobilizing the population to overthrow the government. Most jihadists rallied around Ayman al-
Zawahiri, who became a spokesman for the defendants because of his eloquence and knowledge
of foreign languages. Ultimately, despite the prosecution demand of 299 death sentences the
judges gave out none. Only 58 sentences were given and most of the defendants were released
after three years in prison. After being released, several former prisoners left Egypt (Wright
2007). However, in subsequent years, they may have decided to reunite with Zawahiri and the
After the Soviet-Afghan War, Osama bin Laden journeyed to the Sudan, where the new
regime had raised an Islamic banner. In the Sudan, he was treated as a special guest, who
appeased his hosts by mobilizing construction equipment and bankrolling construction projects.
Moreover, he convinced several Saudi businessmen to invest in Sudan and several of his brothers
and Jeddah merchants did invest in Sudanese real estate, farming, and agriculture (Gunaratna
36
2002). During this time he established links to Sudanese Islamists as well as fundamentalists in
Somalia and Yemen. In the years after departing from the Sudan, he could rekindle these ties.
Finally, local jihadist leaders may have established social connections with Bin Laden in
Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks and the Global War on Terror. By September 1996, the
Taliban had captured Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul. The Taliban rule was characterized by a strict
form of Islamic law, requiring women to wear head-to-toe veils, banning television, and jailing
men whose beards were deemed too short. Before its ouster by U.S.-led forces in 2001, the
Taliban controlled some 90 percent of Afghanistan's territory. As ethnic Pashtuns, a large part of
the Taliban’s support came from Afghanistan's Pashtun community, disillusioned with existing
ethnic Tajik and Uzbek leaders. After Bin Laden fled the Sudan in 1996 as a result of
numerous training camps in the region, and embarked upon his jihad against America. His
second presence in Afghanistan attracted many mujahedeen to return there (P. L. Bergen 2001).
The bonds that these jihadists formed prior to the US invasion may have sparked their
cooperation with Al Qa’ida after the onset of the Global War on Terror.
When considering the relevance of social network affiliations, I determined whether the
group member was involved in the Soviet-Afghan war, participated in the Sadat trial, or spent
time in the Sudan before 1996 or Afghanistan during the reign of the Taliban. However, I
assumed that social network affiliation was a permissive factor (i.e. a precondition which set the
stage for the merger). This treatment was based upon my observation that not every participant in
these episodes, although subject to the same or similar influences, became an Al Qa’ida
associate. Thus, while social affiliations may animate a small minority to engage in Al Qa’ida’s
program of global jihad, they do not explain why these particular leaders aligned with Al Qa’ida.
37
Unless the local jihadist leader was clearly not incentivized by opportunism or ideological
primary motivation.
To answer my second question (What type of role do local jihadist leaders play within
Al Qa’ida’s network when the organization for which they are responsible merges or
partners with Al Qa’ida?), I posited that Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers would fall into one
of three primary leadership categories after the affiliation occurred: operational, logistical, or
“spectacular attacks”), developing military tactics, and running training camps. They have
are accountable for the administrative and financial activities of their units. They direct the
group’s bureaucratic development and organize recruitment drives. They have vocational,
are responsible for expressing the organizational culture and philosophy of their group through
media activity and possibly fatwa as well as personal interactions with their operatives. They
38
have granted interviews, published books or articles, and released audio or videotapes. To
determine the role played by the commanding officer, considered the following variables:
Type of leader
activities
transitions
to operatives
After analyzing these variables, I assessed the commanding officer’s operational, logistic,
and ideological leadership abilities before and after the merger. I did not compare leadership
performance across categories because different measures were used to evaluate leadership
faculty for each category. Thus, this estimation would have been biases. Instead, I compared
leadership performance pre- and post-merger. If the leader demonstrated at least two of the
factors in the operational leadership category, I coded him as a strong operational leader (3). If
he demonstrated one of the factors in this category, I coded him as an average operational leader
39
(2). If he exhibited none of these factors, I coded him as a weak operational leader (1). If the
leader was not involved with the organization at the time, I coded him as such (0). I used the
same criteria to assess logistic and ideological leadership. To perform this evaluation, I used the
same secondary and primary source materials listed earlier in this chapter. A discussion of the
Qa’ida affiliated? 2) Who led these organizations? To answer the first question, I used the
Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) Database included on the website of the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror (START). From 2004 to 2008
the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security funded the creation and
maintenance of the Terrorism Knowledge Base, developed by the Memorial Institute for the
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). MIPT collaborated with Detica, a business and technology
consultancy, to collect information on terrorist groups and key leaders of terrorist groups, which
is now available to the public through an agreement between MIPT, DHS, and START (About
START). However, since START has not evaluated this data and cannot assure the reliability of
the information provided, I conducted further analyses to determine its accuracy by confirming
with at least two separate, non-partisan sources, including reports available through the
Jamestown Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Federation of American Scientists,
the Library of Congress, The New York Times, The International Herald Tribune, and The
Washington Post. I also used these sources to determine the date that the affiliation commenced.
Although the TOPs database listed thirty-six Al Qa’ida allies, I eliminated several from my study
40
1) The group must have been engaged in operations independently of Al Qa’ida (the group
My study considers the deliberate decision to affiliate with Al Qa’ida. Leaders who head front
organizations for Al Qa’ida do not make a pre-meditated choice to cooperate with Al Qa’ida,
I did not include political movements that supported Al Qa’ida’s aims because armed groups
3) While not grounds for immediate disqualification, an official denial of connections with
Al Qa’ida should induce caution (and invoke more thorough analysis of the relationship)
Based on my evaluation, I determined that twenty-one groups conformed to these the above
standards.
After performing this assessment, I coded each affiliation as a merger, a strong affiliation
(partnership), or a weak affiliation (collaboration). To qualify as a merger, the group must have
formally announced that this arrangement existed through a communiqué broadcast to a wide
audience. To qualify as a strong affiliation, the organization must have developed a symbiotic
relationship with Al Qa’ida, whereby they supported Al Qa’ida, for example by contributing to
its recruitment efforts or operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. In return, Al Qa’ida aided the local
its network of financiers, intelligence, assets, and media specialists, or opportunities for training.
Those groups that I coded as weak affiliates received financing or training from Al Qa’ida, but
did not actively conduct operations outside their region nor did they contribute to Al Qa’ida’s
other initiatives in any meaningful way. Finally, I separately examined al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya
41
(GAI), a group that did not affiliate with Al Qa’ida as a control group. In order to understand
what motivates certain groups to align with Al Qa’ida, it is equally important to comprehend
what deters other groups from associating with Al Qa’ida. Thus, I included a detailed
Next, I identified the leaders (past and present) of each of these 21 groups. I considered
all of the commanding officers of each group from the onset of their relationship with Al Qa’ida
to the present. While some groups did not experience any leadership transitions after they
partnered with Al Qa’ida (ex. the Taliban, Asbat al-Ansar), others experienced numerous
leadership transitions (ex. Jemaah Islamiya, Al Qa’ida in Iraq). In a few instances, I included a
leader who was had not actively cooperated with Al Qa’ida if this leader had communicated with
Al Qa’ida Central Command and if his successors vigorously pursued relations after his term.
Some organizations had more than one nominal chief at times, in which case I treated both as
leaders. I did not consider Al Qa’ida’s regional staff officers, who coordinate and supervise the
execution of plans, operations, and activities, but who never had a vested interest in a particular
local jihadist group. I made this distinction because I was interested in investigating the
motivations and role of those leaders who came from outside Al Qa’ida’s orbit but became
involved in its program later in their career. In performing this assessment, I used open source
materials including reports by non-partisan research institutions and newspaper articles. Based
on this data, I generated a list of 41 Al Qa’ida field commanders as study subjects, both past and
present.
My prior discussion focused on terrorist organizations that are overtly in pursuit of Salafi
42
sample was based on demonstrated and documented overt commitment to the principles of
Salafism and all of the organizations that I studied were well defined with leadership that
supported terrorist operations. I chose to limit my sample to in order to reveal certain patterns
that might not have otherwise emerged with less stringent exclusion criteria.
Although I eliminated all non-Muslim terrorists from the study sample, I did include
many groups that were deeply invested in domestic uprising and urban warfare against their own
governments. For instance, I included Muslims fighting for the liberation of Kashmir and those
In contrast, I did not include Palestinian groups, who are fighting a jihad that involves
complex social, economic, and political grievances and who may be less committed to the
principles of Salafism and thus, less magnetized by Al Qa’ida pan-Islamic agenda. Moreover, I
did not include the amorphous social movement, Salafia Jihadia, which exists in Morocco. This
grouping is just an assemblage of small illegal clusters centered around charismatic preachers.
To conduct this assessment, I used sources from the public domain. Because clandestine
organizations are often very secretive about their members and operations, the data from this
study is inevitably biased towards information about those organizations and individuals who are
regarded as more visible and who appear publicly with greater frequency.
In addition, there may have been ascertainment bias introduced by the difficulties
accurately assessing leaders’ competence in organizing and conducting important attacks. Often,
terrorist organizations will not take credit for successful operations for fear of provoking the
government to conduct a counterterrorism response. Moreover, bias was introduced by the actual
43
exercises that may not appropriately reflect the leader’s true motivations and ideology. As a
earlier.
These concerns withstanding, I used the materials available to me to try to best collect
information about and understand the leaders and organizations that I profiled. These sources
included: government documents, press and scholarly articles, and Internet articles. When
assessing the data, I considered the source of information and its degree of reliability. With the
aforementioned limitations in mind, empirical data about Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers was
Finally, I completed one comprehensive case study (in addition to my detailed discussion
of the GAI). I investigated Abdelmalek Droukdal, leader of Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb,
formerly the Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), who merged his
organization with Al Qa’ida despite the objections of the GSPC’s former leader Hassan Al-
Banna (Guidère 2007). I considered Droukdal’s prior experiences and the history of the GSPC
committed strictly to jihad in Algeria. Next, I assessed the role he played before and after
VIII. Relevance
them, and how they aligned their own local jihadist group with Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic program,
I arrived at a better understanding of how to recognize and predict who may become Al Qa’ida’s
commanding officers and how to anticipate and counter their efforts. My observations regarding
44
motivations will serve two purposes. First, they will help develop a model to identify local
jihadist leaders who may merge or partner with Al Qa’ida in the future. Secondly, my analyses
may suggest that our battles in the Middle East and our policies regarding imprisonment are
creating gathering places for global Salafi jihadists. The fundamentalists who form interpersonal
bonds through these venues may be persuaded by Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic partisans to become
the next-generation of Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers in locations scattered across the globe.
This realization, if proven, has strong implications for US foreign policy in the post 9/11 era and
greater attention should be paid to identifying such settings. Finally, by understanding the role
that Al Qa’ida commanding officers play, we can better understand Al Qa’ida’s overall strategy
(e.g. are they focused on promoting their message through propaganda or are they intent on
conducting more attacks?). Based on our knowledge of Al Qa’ida’s strategy, we can better
45
Chapter 4: Universe of Cases
also observed noticeable patterns while developing my universe of cases. First, I considered the
development of Al Qa’ida’s affiliation over a period of time from 1991 until 2005 (Table 1). To
assess the date of the affiliation, I determined the year that the group first received or conveyed
occurs, since a group does not merely affiliate with Al Qa’ida and then sever all relations.
Although I have recorded the first year in which the group cooperated with Al Qa’ida, in every
case, this relationship has perpetuated to the present day. In many instances, the relationship
between Al Qa’ida and its affiliate has strengthened or weakened (such is the case with the
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, who consolidated relations with Al Qa’ida, and Abu Sayyaf,
who diluted relations with Al Qa’ida). To address this concern, I have classified the affiliation
according to its current state. The investigation of Al Qa’ida’s patterns of affiliation with respect
of franchising as a new development. They contend that after September 11, 2001, Al Qa’ida
was deprived of a “state within a state” in Afghanistan, lost several of its top officials, and failed
to overthrow the governments in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Since 2001, they argue, Al
Qa’ida has transformed into an international enterprise with like-minded local representatives
loosely connected to a central ideological base (Riedel 2007). Despite the popularity of this
argument, the evidence indicates that Al Qa’ida’s strategy is not new: it has operated like an
international franchise by providing financial and logistical support, as well as name recognition
46
to terrorist groups operating in such diverse places as the Philippines, Algeria, Eritrea, Afghanistan,
Al Qa’ida first seriously affiliated with other terrorist organizations in 1991. In this year,
Al Qa’ida linked up with Al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI) and Abu Sayyaf. However, when one
considers the historical context, this observation is not nearly as stunning. On August 7, 1990,
the first US troops were dispatched to Saudi Arabia as part of Operation Desert Shield. For Bin
Laden, this was as perturbing and foreboding an event as the Russian invasion of Afghanistan
that had occurred a decade earlier. Bin Laden perceived this intrusion as part of a larger Western
design to dominate the whole Arab and Muslim world. After Hussein’s forces invaded the small,
oil rich state of Kuwait on August 1, 1990, thereby threatening the security of Saudi Arabia, Bin
Laden had immediately volunteered his services and those of his holy volunteers but the Saudis
After the Saudi government, tired of Bin Laden’s critiques, effectively put him under
house arrest, he departed for the Sudan, where he was warmly welcomed by Hassan al-Turabi,
the leader of the National Islamic Front. While Bin Laden was situated in the Sudan, Turabi and
Bin Laden engaged in a convenient symbiotic relationship. Bin Laden could operate freely in the
Sudan and in return he would invest millions of dollars in the desperately poor country.
Consequently, during his time in the Sudan, Bin Laden organized training camps at which
hundred of his followers were tutored in paramilitary tactics as revealed in the previous chapter.
As a result of the Sudanese government’s hospitality and support, Bin Laden had the opportunity
to interact with other terrorist units to expand Al Qa’ida’s reach. He was able to send Al Qa’ida
operatives to Somalia in 1991-1992 to liaise with their leaders and then help AIAI organize itself
militarily. These operatives also offered advice to their Somali counterparts on how to set up
social services for the local population. This relationship strengthened throughout the nineties.
47
Bin Laden ramped up his assistance to the Somali terrorists after the Bush administration sent
avowed that having already taken over the Persian Gulf area and now encroaching upon Somalia,
the US military, if successful, would next march into Southern Sudan and then into other Islamic
countries(Gunaratna 2002).
Concurrently, while residing in the Sudan, Bin Laden convinced several Saudi
businessmen, including some of his brothers, to invest in the country’s moribund financial
institutions, where their transactions would go unnoticed and in its infrastructure projects, which
would elicit support from the Sudanese population, many of whom would be employed by these
Arabic executives. While occupied with these financial negotiations, he persuaded his brother in
law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifah to support the Abu Sayyaf Group, which sought to pursue a
more fundamentalist battle against the Philippine authorities than the Moro National Liberation
Front, their parent organization. Bin Laden probably saw the struggle in the Philippines as an
opportunity to open a second front for his organization without becoming embroiled in the
conflicts in the Middle East. Moreover a number of ASG members had fought in Afghanistan in
the 1980s (Rogers 2004). Thus, Bin Laden exploited a cache of trustworthy warriors who he
After associating with these groups, my data indicates that Al Qa’ida did not engage
another affiliate until 1996. From 1991 to 1996, Al Qa’ida was preoccupied with other pursuits
and could not devote energy towards developing such high-maintenance relations. Instead, Bin
Laden focused his efforts on other missions like determining how best to attack US forces in
Somalia. Moreover, he attempted to centralize the core of Al Qa’ida’s operations and develop its
human resources as discussed in Chapter 1. By 1991, between a thousand and two thousand
48
members of Al Qa’ida converged upon the Sudan and within three years, Bin Laden had set up a
number of military camps in the north. He also sought to acquire weapons for these militants. He
turned his attention to exotic weaponry and weapons of mass destruction. Simultaneously some
members of the group undertook the massive task of writing the Encyclopedia of the Afghan
Jihad, a multi-volume series detailing everything the Afghan Arabs had learned in the jihad
against the Soviets. Finally, hundreds of Afghan Arabs engaged in fighting in Bosnia (P. L.
Bergen 2001). As a result of this multitude of tasks, Bin Laden and his cadre were engrossed by
other concerns and did not focus on developing external relations with other jihadist groups.
By 1996, intense pressure had been placed on the Sudanese government by the United
States and Egypt to expel Bin Laden, who left the Sudan to return to his familiar stamping
grounds in Afghanistan. From Afghanistan, Bin Laden was able to function unimpeded,
attracting Muslim militants to a country, which became the modern world’s first jihadist state.
Bin Laden knew Afghanistan well and greatly admired the Taliban religious warriors who had
taken control over much of the country. Upon Bin Laden’s arrival, Mullah Muhammad Omar
sent a delegation to assure Bin Laden that the Taliban would be honored to protect him because
of his role in the jihad against the Soviets (Gunaratna 2002). Given this stable and secure
environment, it is not surprising that between 1996 and 2001, Al Qa’ida engaged 15 of its 21
affiliates.
Having obtained sanctuary, Bin Laden began to focus, once again, on widening his
movement. During this time, Bin Laden issued a slew of radical pronouncements beginning with
a call to arms against the continued American military presence in Arabia on August 23, 1996.
These communiqués served to attract the attention of various local jihadist leaders. To
49
supplement this strategy, Laden convened conferences of several Afghan ulema. While Bin
Laden was well read in the Koran, he was not a religious scholar. Thus, he needed the backing of
religious scholars and the clerical cover to call for a real global jihad. The clerics who Bin Laden
summoned also had acquaintances with jihadists beyond Afghanistan who they could introduce
Amidst this background, in 1998, one observes a surge of new Al Qa’ida affiliates. In
part, this is due to the fact that in 1998 Bin Laden created the International Islamic Front for
Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders (IIF). According to this Word Islamic Front manifesto, “in
order to obey the Almighty, we hereby give all Muslims the following judgment: the judgment to
kill and fight Americans and their allies, whether civilians or military, is an obligation for every
Muslim who is able to do so in any country.” Based on this quotation, the establishment of the
IIF can clearly be interpreted as an effort by Al Qa’ida to expand its battle against Western
influence. In addition to Bin Laden and EIJ’s Ayman al-Zawahiri, members included the head of
the violent faction of Egypt’s Gama’a al Islamiyya, the secretary general of the Pakistani
religious party known as the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam, and the head of Bangladesh’s Jihad
Movement. Later the IIF was expanded to include the Pakistani jihadist organizations Lashkar-e-
(Carafano 2005).
In addition to its formal alliances through the IIF, in the years before the September 11,
2001 attacks, Bin Laden’s organization nurtured ties with a variety of other armed jihadist
groups. These sequential steps were part of Bin Laden’s plan to expand his multi-national
terrorist campaign. However, before 2001, he probably did not rely extensively upon the leaders
of these organizations.
50
Contrary to popular belief, after 2001 and the onset of the Global War on Terror, Al
Qa’ida has not enlisted many new affiliates. As stated in the introduction, Al Qa’ida aims to
establish itself as a complex organization with a flexible structure in order to preserve control
over specifically identified strategic operations while offering cells a degree of autonomy in local
by semiautonomous cells that are horizontally and vertically integrated into the centralized
command structure, are built up through mergers, partnerships, and collaborations (Marion and
Uhl-Bien 2006). Thus, the dearth of new Al Qa’ida affiliates seems puzzling given what
scholars perceive to be Al Qa’ida’s organizational strategy. There are two explanations for this
observation.
Firstly, few can deny the United States and its allies achieved progress in the first phase
of the Global War on Terror. Aggressive US and allied efforts impeded Al Qa’ida’s ability to do
anything; be it to plan attacks or to align with other jihadist groups. Al Qa’ida’s training camps,
destroyed and uprooted, temporarily crippling it. After 2001, Osama Bin Laden was compelled
to makeover his organization. Whereas before Al Qa’ida had a distinct center of gravity, after
9/11, Bin Laden had to engineer a colossal transformation of his organization from a more or less
unitary, near bureaucratic entity to a fluid movement tenuously bound by a loosely networked
transnational constituency (i.e. from an actual center to a virtual network) (Bruce Hoffman
2004).
To more easily engineer this metamorphosis, Bin Laden elected to strengthen existing
affiliations rather than pursue new ones. Groups such as the Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication
et le Combat and Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad were brought further into Al Qa’ida’s folds.
51
Moreover, Bin Laden and Al Qa’ida Central Command relied more heavily and interacted more
frequently with the leaders of these groups, who had become his commanding officers. For
instance, prior to 2005, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Tawhid, was responsible for
developing his own strategy and operations. However, in 2004, Ayman Zawahiri, who had
become Bin Laden’s second-in command, began to instruct Zarqawi regarding tactics and
specific theater-of-war concerns. For example, in a letter dated July 9, 2005, Zawahiri
reprimanded al-Zarqawi for indiscriminate attacks on Shias, beheading of hostages, and lack of
concern for public support. Moreover, he urged Zarqawi to prepare for a precipitous American
military withdrawal from Iraq, for establishing a post-US Islamist emirate governed by a
coalition of Islamic groups, including Shias, and for maintaining the momentum of an Islamist
victory by expanding operations into Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, and Egypt (Michael 2007).
Another observable and notable trend is that the number of affiliates that Al Qa’ida
enrolled has increased since the onset of the war in Iraq in 2003. Al Qa’ida now teams up with
terrorist groups who can send foreign jihadists to Iraq where they conduct guerilla warfare
against the America and British troops. For instance, the Uzbek fighters associated with the
Islamic Jihad Union have supported fighting in South Waziristan against the Pakistani
Qa’ida has exploited the Iraqi occupation for rousing propaganda and as a recruitment tool for
the global jihadist cause. Bruce Hoffman has suggested that for Al Qa’ida, “Iraq’s preeminent
utility has been a useful side show” – an effective means to sidetrack American military forces
and divert US attention while Al Qa’ida and its affiliates make inroads and strike elsewhere.
Nowadays, Al Qa’ida and its affiliates can conduct attacks in countries that are venerable sources
of Bin Laden’s antagonism or where an opportunity has presented itself. In fact, terror attacks
52
around the world tripled in 2004, according to statistics released by the US government’s
Qa’ida’s affiliates since the beginning of the Iraq war, include the 2004 bombings against
Madrid’s commuter trains, the 2005 bombings against London’s public transport system, the
2006 transatlantic aircraft plot to detonated liquid explosive carried on board from the United
Kingdom to the US and Canada, and the 2007 terrorist attacks in Algiers (Bruce Hoffman 2004).
consider the geographic distribution of Al Qa’ida’s affiliates (Figure 2). Considering the sample
as a whole, over forty percent of the 21 affiliates are based in the Core Arab states (Iraq,
Afghanistan, Egypt Uzbekistan, Lebanon, and Yemen). The other large clusters come from the
Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia) and Southern Asia (namely, Pakistan). The smaller
One can anticipate that the majority of affiliates would hail from the Core Arab states and
Maghreb Arab states. These regions have a history of conflict with the West. Samuel Huntington
observed that after World War II, when colonial empires began to retreat, Arab nationalism and
then Islamic fundamentalism strongly manifested. In the aftermath of this transition, conflicts
along the fault line between western and Arab Islamic civilizations frequently erupted. For
instance, France fought a war in Algeria and British and French forces invaded Egypt. Later, the
American forces went into Lebanon. The warfare between Arabs and the West culminated in
1990 when the United States sent a massive army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab
countries against aggression by Saddam Hussein The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling
humiliated and resentful of the West’s military presence in the Persian Gulf (Huntington 1992).
53
These struggles had a profound effect on the development of jihadist outlets; Ayubi
suggests that the general Islamic resurgence that one observes today represents a reaction to
alienation and a quest for authenticity by disaffected Muslims who resent Western participation
in their lands. He maintains that most Islamic revolutions evolve from movements for indigenous
self-assertion. For those countries resisting foreign dominance, Islam can provide a medium of
cultural nationalism that is defiant and self-assuring. Secular prescriptions (whether nationalist or
to French and Italian cultures, whereas the religious-framed prescriptions of Arabia Islam have a
There is also a simpler explanation to account for the plethora of Al Qa’ida affiliates
hailing from the Core Arab states. Since 1996, Al Qa’ida has appealed to militants in the four
neighboring former Soviet Central Asian republics, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan, all of which are in immediate proximity to Afghanistan. These states have porous
borders, weak security apparatuses and crisis-torn economies. Additionally, for years, the
Taliban controlled the Afghan territory bordering Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
Thus, Al Qa’ida and the Taliban could facilitate the transportation of militants moving back and
forth across the borders. Furthermore, they could permit leaders of these jihadist groups to
establish training camps without fear of government intervention. For instance, Tahir Yuldashev,
one of the masterminds behind the assassination attempt against Uzbek President Islam A.
Karimov, and leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, fled to Afghanistan where he set
up a military training camp, just a few miles from the border (Luong and Weinthal 2002).
Moreover, at the present time operatives from these organizations can assist the Al Qa’ida-
54
supported insurgency in Afghanistan; thus, affiliates from these nations are particularly
desirable.
Similarly, terrorist operatives in the Maghreb move easily across international borders.
Conservative estimates suggest that at least several hundred North African volunteers have
traveled to Iraq. With the assistant of Al Qa’ida’s Algerian affiliates, fighters transit through
Syria. Upon returning to the Maghreb, these militants can stage local campaigns due to their
I also observed that a large percentage of the groups that merged with Al Qa’ida hailed
from Pakistan (20%). This too, should be expected. The conflict between Muslims and Hindus in
the subcontinent manifests itself in the rivalry between Pakistan and India. Separatist violence in
India’s Muslim majority Jammu and Kashmir state has continued unabated since 1989. However,
after the September 2001 attacks, President Musharraf, under strong US diplomatic pressure,
offered to President Bush Pakistan’s unqualified cooperation in the fight against terrorism.
Pakistan has allowed the US military to use bases within the country, has helped to identify and
detain extremists, and has helped to tighten the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the
wake of these changes, thousands of Muslim extremists were detained. Consequently, several
Kashmiri separatist terrorist groups turned to Al Qa’ida for support. Al Qa’ida, eager to regroup
in Pakistani cities where police control was more negligible, quickly granted this concession in
return for safe haven. Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are now believed to be in
Pakistan’s rugged tribal areas, where Islamabad exercises limited authority. In addition, these
groups help Al Qa’ida attack coalition troops in Afghanistan and then escape across the Pakistani
55
Within my sample, there were fewer groups from the Eastern African region and from the
Southeast Asian region. Again, this can be easily explained. Although Muslims represent a
majority in countries like Somalia and Eritrea, in general Muslims are a minority in East Africa,
where the other major Abrahamic faiths dominate. Moreover, while Somalia has served as a
transit route for terrorists, most visibly Al Qa’ida, the depth of its involvement with terrorists is
constrained by the very disorder seen as a classical setting for terrorism. There are almost no
legitimate terrorist targets and terrorists themselves can be subject to extortion in largely lawless
settings. Unlike Eastern European countries, in which there is just enough government control
and economic security to provide an adequate target for terrorist groups, in East Africa, a central
government with even rudimentary influence has yet to emerge. Also, hostility from indigenous
religious authorities may also impede the growth of Wahabism (Dickson 2005).
Despite the fact that Southeast Asia seems like a good candidate for the second front in
the US campaign since it is home to the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country,
Indonesia, and two other mostly Muslim states, Malaysia and Brunei, it has not emerged as such.
In Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines, Muslims are a minority, while Buddhism and
Roman Catholicism are dominant respectively. Additionally, the profound ethnic and religious
diversity (including in the practice of Islam) that characterizes the area militates against the
organizations in Southeast Asia genuinely oppose Al Qa’ida and most are nonviolent. The largest
and most influential are either political parties or revivalist organizations, such as the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF). In Indonesia, the rise of political Islam can be linked
principally to the collapse of Suharto's regime, the nation's continuing economic crisis, and the
56
banned from the 1950s to the 1980s, and many of their leaders were imprisoned. Although such
groups have since become a major political force in recent years, more extremist forms of
Mergers were much less common (approximately 17%). Through partnership and collaborations,
Al Qaida can provide financial or logistic support to other terrorist groups with the intention of
influencing their strategic activities. This sort of arrangement is convenient when Al Qa’ida
wants to spread its radical ideas and has financial resources but does not necessarily care for the
local politics in the region. Supporting local terrorist groups in this manner makes noise, causes
havoc, and distracts the enemy while Central Command plans for more detailed attacks
elsewhere. Additionally, it is difficult to cut off centralized funding due to the complex nature of
structure itself as a complex organization, described in the first chapter. Through partnerships
and collaborations, Al Qa’ida achieves the ideal mix of tightly and loosely coupled systems.
While the relationships within the cells are tightly coupled, the relationships between cells and
By contrast, mergers, the highest order form of equity-based engagement, were much less
common. Although this type of arrangement allows Al Qa’ida and the merged group to
consolidate their assets so that they can compete more successfully, the group that Al Qa’ida
subsumes must be capable of completely integrating Al Qa’ida’s methods and approaches into
their repertoire. When a group merges with Al Qa’ida, they forfeit a degree of control. While Al
57
Qa’ida Central Command does not usually plan operations, they can “offer” tactical advice,
which the merged group must obey, as observed with the Zarqawi-Zawahiri letter referenced
earlier. Moreover, mergers often end up splintering as a result of differences of ideologies, goals,
and strategies. Oftentimes, operatives are estranged when Al Qa’ida takes credit for the operation
and they are forced to assume a more “behind-the-scenes” role (Desouza and Hengsen 2007).
There are other practical difficulties, which should be addressed when discussing
mergers. For instance, when groups officially merge with Al Qa’ida, they often become the
States. Executive Order 13224 provides the means to disrupt the support network that funds
terrorism. Under this order, the United States government may block the assets of individuals
and entities providing support, financial or otherwise, to designated terrorists and terrorist
organizations. Such blocking actions are a critical tool in combating the financing of terrorism
(Mayer and Price 2002). In addition, designation under the UN Security Council’s 1267
Committee’s consolidated list will trigger international obligations on all member countries,
requiring them to take steps to prevent designated individuals and entities from continuing to
fund or otherwise support terrorism. Through this measure, supporters of terrorism are publicly
identified thereby providing warning to other entities that they are prohibited from doing
business with the Al Qa’ida affiliate (Uruena 2008). Finally, groups that merge officially with
Al Qa’ida may risk alienating the local population. When a group commits to jihad against the
far enemy, they may split their own ranks and upset surrounding communities, who have no
interest in establishing a global Islamic caliphate, but are more interested in deposing their
current government.
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Given these considerations, it is also important to acknowledge that organizational issues
must be addressed up front when a merger is negotiated since this type of affiliation is a long-
term contract. Like corporations settling a merger, organizations must have the patience and
resolve to work through issues. As the example of Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, provided in
Chapter 6 proves, mergers only occur when terrorist groups have developed a close relationship
and realize the mutual value of working together. Thus, Al Qa’ida may have several mergers in
Although Al Qa’ida’s policy of pursuing affiliations with local jihadist groups is not a
new development, evidence suggests that Al Qa’ida will continue to pursue such relations and
will rely upon them more heavily, since they offer increased organizational flexibility and
operational reach. Moreover, while Al Qa’ida’s affiliates are concentrated in the Core Arab and
Maghreb states, Al Qa’ida may be seeking to expand into other Muslim-dominated territories,
such as Western Africa. While in recent years, several groups have announced a formal merger
with Al Qa’ida; the data demonstrates that Al Qa’ida may be more likely to pursue lower-order
affiliations.
59
Chapter 5: Results of Statistical Hypothesis Testing
I. Data Analysis and Results for Q1: What motivates local jihadist leaders to affiliate with
assess the effects of motivational factors contributing to individual terrorist's decision to affiliate
with Al Qa’ida, each subject was rated on one of three scales: "opportunist motives,”
"ideological alignment,” and "social network affiliations.” Each subject was rated 0-2 for each
(for a more detailed explanation regarding coding, please refer to Chapter 3 on Methodology).
Statistically significant differences among subjects were evaluated using a chi-squared test
statistic for variation within each scale. The null hypothesis tested for each scale was that there
This analysis yielded the results contained in Table 1. The chi-squared test yielded p-
alignment,” and “social network affiliation” respectively, when three scales were used. All three
statistics are significant with a p-value less than 0.05; thus, in each case, the null hypothesis was
rejected. Based on this analysis, one can conclude that opportunistic motives, ideological
alignment, and social network affiliation all motivate local jihadist leaders to an extent, although
the smaller values of p for “opportunistic motives” and for “social network affiliation” suggest
that these incentives are more robust. By comparison, ideological alignment appears to be of
60
To supplement this analysis and clarify the relative impact of each incentive, scores 0 and
1 were combined into a single scale "not a motivation,” while score 2 was considered as
"motivation.” The null hypothesis, tested for both scales, was that there was no difference in the
This analysis produced the results recorded in Table 2. The p-values associated with the
chi-squared test statistic were 1.289E-06, 0.639, and 0.042 for “opportunistic motives,”
“ideological alignment,” and “social network affiliation” respectively. The p-value for
opportunistic motives permits us to reject the null hypothesis of no effect. This implies that
opportunism is the primary motivation among the variables considered in this study for
affiliating with Al Qa’ida. The p-value associated with social network affiliation also allows us
to reject the null hypothesis. It is of note that the statistical significance for social network
affiliation is far less impressive than that for opportunistic motives. In contrast, the effect of
ideological alignment does not even reach statistical significance, thereby suggesting that this
particular factor is not a significant motivating variable for local jihadist leaders in this sample.
Based on this analysis, H11 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida
due to opportunistic motives) is proven. H21 (Al Qa’ida commanding officers associated with Al
Qa’ida due to ideological motives) is rejected. H31 ( Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers
associated with Al Qa’ida due psychosocial motives) requires further investigation. However,
the data suggests that psychosocial motive(i.e. social affiliations) have some influence on the
decision to associate with Al Qa’ida.
II. Data Analysis and Results for Q2: What type of role do local jihadist leaders play within
Al Qa’ida’s network when the organization for which they are responsible affiliates with Al
Qa’ida?
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Subjects were evaluated on their performance in each of three categories: “Operational,”
“Ideological,” and “Logisitic” on a scale of 0-3, pre and post merger. The null hypothesis tested
in this analysis is that there is no difference in each category post-merger, compared to pre-
The chi-squared test statistic was used to evaluate the overall difference in performance
in each of the three categories post-versus pre-merger. Results are presented in Table 3. Paired
statistics were then applied to compare the scores for each individual terrorist, pre- and post-
merger. These included the Wilcoxon statistic (Table 4), which utilizes both the direction and
magnitude of the change, as well as the simpler paired sign test (Table 5), which considers only
the direction of change. The null hypothesis tested in this analysis is that there is no difference
individually.
The Wilcoxon statistic was negative for all groups; thus based on this statistical test, we
could not reject the null hypothesis for any category. Accordingto this test,there was no statistic
difference between the pre- and post-merger score for any category. However, the paired signed
test rejected the null hypothesis for ideology (p=0.015). This suggests that ideological leadership
performance does actually improve after a merger. Additionally, the p-value for overall
leadership performance was borderline (p=0.0501), which suggests that leadership performance
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The results obtained through the paired sign test suggest that the direction of the change
for ideological performance was significant; however, the variability among subjects in the
magnitude of the changes may have affected the results, thereby hindering us from rejecting the
null hypothesis using the Wilcoxon statistic. Most frequently, ideological performance improved;
however, there were a few changes in the opposite direction in particular subjects that were
Figures 4-5 demonstrate that for ideological performance, most changes were positive,
whether they were categorized as only positive or positive plus no change. Moreover, for the
ideological performance, there were the fewest number of negative changes post-merger.
Figure 6, a plot of the distribution of scores, demonstrates that each group had a similar
number of “no change” results (i.e. a pre-post score of 0). The operational category had the
largest number of “-3” results and “+3” results. Generally, for all three categories, there was a
tendency to improve scores post-merger. However, this was clearly most prevalent and only
This analysis allows us to accept H32 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officer play an increasingly
ideological role after affiliating with Al Qa’ida). Moreover, it lets us to reject both H12 (Al
Qa’ida’s commanding officers play an increasingly operational role after affiliating with Al
Qa’ida) and H22 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers play an increasingly logistical role after
affiliating with Al Qa’ida).
Effectively what we are observing from this study’s data analysis is that while ideological
concerns do not appear to be primary motivating factors for joining Al Qa’ida, after mergers with
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Chapter 6: Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb and Abdelmalek Droukdal –
On September 11, 2006, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qa’ida in Iraq
announced the allegiance of the Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafist Group
for Call and Combat or GSPC), the only remaining armed terrorist group in Algeria, to Al
Qa’ida. Three months later, Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb was born. After the merger of the
GSPC with Al Qa’ida, the new organization radically changed its tactics: the series of suicide
bombings and violent attacks executed in 2007 by Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
smaller, less powerful Algerian indigenous assembly of terrorists would not have been possible
commanding officer of Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb region and directed the internationalization of
the former GSPC's war in order to revitalize a movement that was slowly dying in Algeria. He
accomplished this revitalization and expansion of goals and activities by providing compelling
ideological leadership and by organizing sophisticated public relations and media campaign both
The GSPC was founded with a regional focus: it sought to establish an Islamic state in
Algeria and rejected the legitimacy of secular democratic governance. While the first official
communiqué of the GSPC appeared in September 1998, the Islamic movement in Algeria
originated in the 1960s. Algeria achieved independence from France in 1962, whereupon Ahmed
Ben Bella was elected the first president of Algeria. However, in 1965, Defense Minister Houari
Boumedienne staged a bloodless coup to remove Ben Bella from power. He then adopted an
64
authoritarian, one-party, socialist political system, which he codified in the Algerian constitution
in 1976. This socialist government's repressive secularism and one party rule were oppressive for
many people in Algeria and helped fuel a fundamentalist backlash when Islamic leaders branded
the government as “a band of atheists” and called for a return to an Islamic government (Johnson
2006).
Before the independence, the Algerian Islamic movement was centrist, nationalist, and
response to the dictatorial and exclusionary policies proffered by the Socialist party, the weak
alliance between the secular and religious groups (the Ulama and the academic elite who led the
liberation movement against the French) collapsed. Thus, during the 1970s, the fundamentalist
abortive leftward shift in economic and cultural policies. Mustapha Bouyali, a fundamental
Islamic preacher established the Armed Islamic Algeria Movement (MAIA) in 1982 to establish
an Islamic state. The MAIA sought to resolve the social and economic injustices that had
In 1989, under Boumedienne’s chosen successor Colonel Chadli Benjedid the right to
establish political parties was accorded in Algeria and with this decision, the Salvation Islamic
Front (FIS) was formed, directed by Abdallah Djaballah. Unlike the MAIA, the FIS was a
political organization, not an armed group that sought to reverse the economic decline in Algeria
by implementing Sharia, Islamic religious law. This political platform resonated with the
Algerians, disgruntled by the failure of Socialist economic policies. The FIS became popular
amongst the Algerian population who supported the group financially and politically. In 1991,
65
the FIS achieved a victory in national elections. However, with the prospect of the FIS in control
of the parliament, the secular and military elite forced Benjedid's resignation, halted the electoral
process, and suspended parliament. A High Committee was established with Mohammed
Boudiaf named as president. The new regime calculated that the repression of the FIS would
ignite a wave of extremist fundamentalist violence, which would divide and alienate the FIS’s
III. The Beginnings of the GIA and the Onset of an Epoch of Violence
As the new regime predicted, after the cancellation of the 1992 general elections in
Algeria, several Islamists became disenchanted with the political process and defected from the
FIS to form armed splinter groups. Many Islamists became increasingly interested in radical
approaches. The GIA was formed from a collection of Algerian militant groups who had been
However, the GIA quickly alienated itself from other Algerian Islamic activities by
adopting stringent interpretations of Islamic law. The GIA was responsible for the murder of
over 2000 schoolteachers guilty of “taming the youth” and more than 100 other competing, less
militant Muslim clerics and political leaders whom it designated heretics. In an effort to racially
purify the country, GIA supreme commander Saifullah Ajffar ordered the assassination of over
90 innocent civilians and eventually forced a mass European exodus from Algeria. After
subsequent leadership transitions, Antar Zouabri became the head of the GIA on July 18, 1996.
He was an illiterate criminal and his reign, which lasted until his violent death in February 2002,
was marked by barbaric methods and attacks against entire civilian communities. He repelled
most members of the GIA when he issued a fatwa condemning the entire Muslim population of
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Algeria as “kuffar, apostates, and hypocrites” for “not supporting them in their struggle against
The GSPC was not set up as a pan-Islamic movement; the decision to establish the GPSC
was the direct result of the GIA’s strategic impasse. Zouabri’s attacks on innocent Muslims
estranged many former GIA military commanders, who were left without an ideological
umbrella. In 1998, these officers founded the GSPC as a military organization dedicated to the
Salafist creed and the battle against the Algerian regime to restore the Caliphate and implement
Sharia. However, the GSPC denounced the massacres that the GIA had committed and entered
the international arena with the goal of restoring the credibility of armed groups in Algeria and
attracting embittered Algerian youths for whom the ideology of Islamic guerilla war had lost its
appeal. Consequently, the GSPC was able to amass hundred of defectors from the FIS and the
The first prominent leader of the GSPC, Hassan Hattab, a former GIA commander,
clearly articulated the narrow agenda of the GSPC. He asserted that the GSPC sought to
overthrow the government in Algiers and to install an Islamic regime in Algeria. He depicted the
Algerian government as a postcolonial lackey at war with Islam. However, he rejected the policy
of terror executed by the GIA under Zouabri and enforced symbiosis with the local population.
While he preferred not to engage in force-on-force confrontations with the Algerian military to
avoid depleting his cadre, he encouraged operatives to target Algerian government officials,
military, police, and gendarmerie through the use of false roadblocks, ambushes, bombings, and
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The GSPC was originally organized as a loose confederation of regional divisions under
a supreme emir who supervised the organization. Each of the regional groups, katibats,
controlled a territory that roughly aligned with the governments’ own military districts. Although
as supreme emir, Hattab provided religious guidance; the katibats were responsible for supplying
and funding their own operations. Nevertheless, it was difficult for the local leadership to
coordinate or control the activity of its fighters since attempts to communicate could result in
discovery or interception by security services. Thus, the organization was plagued by internal
rivalry. Several GSPC cadres were killed or captured by Algerian security services
following leads provided by rival GSPC elements (Celso 2008). These fault-lines were
exacerbated by external events that occurred soon after the founding of the GSPC.
By the end of the twentieth century, Algerians had become less tolerant to the violence of
the GSPC. Consequently, the Algerian government implemented a law that offered amnesty to
the combatants who capitulated. In July 1999, the Civil Harmony Law was adopted and
overwhelmingly endorsed in a national referendum the following September 2000. This law
declared that citizens not involved in massive killings, bombing of public places, or sexual
crimes would be placed under probation for a period ranging from 3 to 5 years, and could even
participate in the fight against the remaining active terrorist groups. Imprisonment sentences
were reduced; death penalty and life imprisonment were commuted to a maximum of eight years
imprisonment for individuals under probation. The law set a deadline of January 13, 2000 for
members and supporters of armed groups to surrender to the authorities (Black 2007).
The issue of whether or not to accept the terms of the Civil Harmony Law created
considerable dissension within the GSPC. A study conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School
determined that although the probability of defection by GSPC members was less than 10
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percent before the implementation of the law, the probability of defection reached a high of 60
percent during the Civil Concord period (Gyves and Wyckloff 2006). Due to this amnesty
program, which resulted in the demobilization of hundreds of militants from both the GIA and
the GSPC, the GSPC’s operational reach diminished. It was thus effectively limited in scope by
The September 11, 2001 attacks were another defining moment for the GSPC. Fifteen
days after the attacks, on September 26, 2001, 23 people were killed, and 9 were injured in a
massacre that occurred in the Algerian town of Al-Abri. The GSPC denied involvement,
reasserting their dedication to avoiding civilian atrocities. They accused the Algerian secret
service of executing the attack to isolate the GSPC from its popular base amongst the Algerian
people and of attempting to align the existing Algerian governmental agency with the
intelligence services of the United States in the Global War on Terror. However, certain
members of the GSPC dissented, believing that it would be better to take credit for the attack and
thereby imply GSPC’s collusion with Al Qa’ida. They suggested that courting Al Qa’ida would
enable the organization to maintain its relevancy and shore up declining recruitment. Members of
this organization realized that a merger with Al Qa’ida could have both political and financial
This became a point of friction between Hattab and the younger members of the GSPC
and two dominant camps emerged within the organization. The pan-Islamists encouraged
solidarity with their “brothers in Islam” (Al Qa’ida agents) while the Islamo-nationalists were
preoccupied with Algerian politics and the installation of an Islamic state there. They were
devoted to regime change and preferred not to actively support the “Muslim brothers.” This
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minority faction opposed such a merger and preferred to remain like a small, independently
operated company that could focus on their own regional national agenda (Guidère 2007).
Moreover, in July 2003, Algeria, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria signed a co-operation
agreement on counterterrorism, thereby joining both sides of the Sahara in a complex map of
security arrangements. The United States also provided support for the war on terrorism in North
and West Africa and in the Sahara desert through the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), implemented in
November 2003. Funded by the United States State Department, the Pan Sahel Initiative
consisted of training regional military units by soldiers from the US Special Forces in Niger,
Mali, Chad, and Mauritania in an effort to improve border security and counterterrorism
capacity. The PSI was judged to be a success by US officials and local participants. Thus, its
next iteration was expanded to include Algeria. As a result of hard-hitting endeavors by these
transnational partnerships, the GSPC was forced to retreat from urban areas (Ellis 2004).
Although the GSPC was able to recover from the infighting provoked after 9/11 and
aggressive counter-terror measures, the war in Iraq further exacerbated the debates that were
occurring within the GSPC concerning the strategies to adopt with regards to Al Qa’ida. Hattab
refused to send Algerian combatants to Iraq to battle the Americans because he predicted that
doing so would deprive the GSPC of its best combatants when they joined the insurgency.
However, others within the GSPC did not share this perspective. Although Hattab invoked the
original Charter of the GSPC, which stated that the objectives of armed conflict should be to
fight the Algerian regime and not other governments, his efforts were in vain. Observing the
images of Iraqi soldiers and citizens humiliated by the American invaders, the many GSPC
fighters sought to engage in the struggle in Iraq. Moreover, the majority of the local emirs seated
on the GSPC’s shura believed that the war in Algeria was lost, thus, the organization should
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focus on preserving the honor of the Iraqis. They also believed that participation in the war in
Iraq would enable the GSPC to establish connections with other jihadist groups in North Africa
and introduce them to new strategies and tactics. Finally, they could use the war in Iraq to attract
new recruits who believed that they would be sent to Iraq after basic training in Algeria, but who
would, in fact be absorbed into the GSPC’s domestic campaign. When the shura of the GSPC
voted to actively support the “Iraqi brothers,” Hassan was obliged to resign. Soon thereafter, the
old guard members who espoused a nationalist orientation were expelled from the GSPC
(Guidère 2007).
Abou Ibrahim Mustapha, who succeeded Hattab in 2003, sought to actively support the
Iraqi insurgents in order to gain credibility for the GSPC. Although he wanted to eventually
establish his group as some sort of training authority, he did not yet possess an adequate network
establish a sense of unity amongst GSPC operatives. On September 2003, the 2nd anniversary of
September 11, he issued a communiqué of support for Al Qa'ida in which he criticized Hattab’s
position and extolled bin Laden. This was the first strong sign of official will to establish a
relationship between the GSPC and Al Qa’ida and the beginning of three years of efforts to
prove the GSPC’s will and commitment to Al Qa’ida. He continued to make entreaties to Al
Qa’ida; for instance, asserting his will to establish a community of Muslims dedicated to the
creation of a Caliphate and calling upon GSPC members to attack all foreigners who supported
the war in Iraq. However, his career was cut short when he was killed in a skirmish with the
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Upon Mustapha’s death, Abdelmalek Droukdal immediately assumed control of the
GSPC. Droukdal sought to provide a new focal point for his members by participating in the
global jihad. After losing combatants due to the amnesty program announced by the Bouteflika
regime, the GSPC was struggling to fill its ranks with recruits. Droukdal realized that in order to
maintain support, the GSPC needed to achieve a certain number of visible successes to appear
active and successful. By affiliating with Al Qa’ida, the GSPC would gain access to a network of
financiers, intelligence, assets, and media specialists who could reinforce the group’s capabilities
and help it lead operations. Additionally, by supporting a cause that was seen to benefit the
global community of Muslims, the GSPC could more easily recruit operatives, informants, and
logisticians. Thus, a merger with Al Qa’ida was particularly appealing to Droukdal (Johnson
2006).
Born on April 20, 1970 in the small village of Zayan, situated near Mifan in the Blida
region, Droukdal was recognized as an exceptional student, who easily obtained his
1990 to 1993, he pursued a degree in technology from the University of Blida. Nevertheless, like
the majority of young Muslim students, he was attracted to the FIS and actively sought to get
close to its leaders. In 1992, he was enthused when an officer of the FIS and a former member of
the Algerian army, Said Makhloufi, recruited him. One year later, he officially joined the
organization and in December 1993, he went underground at the age of 23 (Guidère 2007).
As a member of the clandestine ranks of the FIS, he was assigned the mission of
fabricating explosives due to his scientific background and knowledge of chemical bases and
mechanical processes. He continued to hold this role when he enlisted with the GIA from 1993
to 1996. In 1996, he was promoted to chief bomb maker for one of the most important GIA
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battalions. Soon thereafter, he was selected to command the Al-Quds Brigade (Abu Bakr al-
Siddiq Brigade) at the behest of the leader of the GIA (Guidère 2007).
Although he served the GIA in a military capacity, he allegedly opposed the massacres
conducted by the organization in the late 1990s. Thus, he seized to opportunity to serve as chief
military sergeant for the GSPC, which had been created in 1998. In 2001, Hattab selected
Droukdal as a member of his consultative council and made him a regional commander for the
GSPC. He occupied this position until 2003, when Hassan Hattab was forced to resign. After
Mustapha assumed power, he nominated Droukdal as the director of the consultative council.
Finally, one year later, he was promoted to the position of supreme emir of the GSPC after
Mustapha’s death. Upon his appointment as emir of the GSPC, he had not yet had any contact
Upon assuming power, Droukdal, incentivized by his opportunistic desire to revive the
demoralized GSPC, sought to align with other jihadist groups. His aspiration was to link his
the group after government crackdowns and legislation had reduced its numbers. Thus, with his
a limited number of attacks, he served the GSPC as an ideological figurehead, instructing his
followers in the ways of global jihad. In order to accomplish this feat, he conducted a nuanced
publicizing the GSPC’s activities in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Libya, Somalia, and the Sudan.
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regarding international politics and events affecting the Middle East and the Maghreb. For
assassination of Ahmed Kadirov, the President of the Chechen Republic in May 2004. Later,
Droukdal launched a magazine for the GSPC, which was inspired by that of Al Qa’ida in Iraq. It
included articles on Salafism, the crisis in Iraq, in Morocco, in Chechnya, and other international
themes (Guidère 2007). These initiatives allowed him to transmit his message to operatives
across the Maghreb region, which were still committed to local initiatives.
Droukdal’s media strategy became clear after the Summit of the Arab League in Algiers,
which took place from March 22-24, 2005. In response to this event, he issued a communiqué
addressed to the leaders meeting in Algiers. He criticized the Arab leaders who allegedly
embraced communism and capitalism and were becoming increasingly sensitive to the Judeo-
Christian coalition. He derided these leaders as puppets of the American government, thereby
Muslim honor, a more “global” goal. This communiqué, which was broadcast to a large audience
of operatives and supporters, was a reprisal of themes elucidated by Al Qa'ida. In publishing this
document, Droukdal sought to align the GSPC theoretically with Al Qa’ida and express his
The first operation undertaken by the GSPC outside its borders occurred in Mauritania in
June 2005. The communiqués published in conjunction with the operation in Mauritania
operatives in the ways of global jihad. The communiqués included messages with international
themes. For instance, a GSPC statement posted by Droukdal on the Internet defending the raid
indicated that the attack was in response to U.S.-led military exercises in northern Africa dubbed
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the “Flintlock Plan” by military officials. These exercises were part of a broader U.S.
troops. The statement also denounced the recent arrests and trials by Mauritanian authorities of
dozens of Islamic extremists accused of having links to the GSPC. The communiqué ended by
urging the Islamic youth throughout North Africa to join the Algerian cause (Lecocq and
Schrijver 2007).
Moreover, a long video filming the combatants who had participated in the operation was
broadcast over the Internet in jihadist forums. Using this video, Droukdal sought to encourage
Maghreb jihadists to join the Algerians in their struggle. This was the first time that Droukdal
actively sought to recruit from outside the Algerian ranks. Droukdal realized that he could
operatives from abroad and encouraged his agents to train abroad and engage in jihadist activities
in other nations in an effort to expand the GSPC’s global profile. Furthermore, in 2005, Droukdal
began filming all operations conducted by the GSPC and distributing these clips online in the
This operation provoked the first official reaction of Al Qa'ida to the GSPC. One week
after the attack, the director of the media division of Al Qa’ida in Iraq issued a communiqué
congratulating the GSPC. In fact, this was the first time Al Qa’ida had congratulated another
group not affiliated with their organization. This recognition was particularly meaningful for the
Algerian operatives because it made them feel more “secure” in their ventures, knowing that they
had Al Qa’ida’s support. Shortly thereafter, leaders from Al Qa’ida and the GSPC signed a pact
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In July 2005, Zarqawi signaled his complicity with the GSPC by seizing two Algerian
diplomats. Upon taking these hostages he promised to execute them unless the Algerian
government withdrew its support for the war in Iraq. When the Algerian government failed to
improve the image of the GSPC amongst Algerians and the international Islamic community and
to enable him to preach pan-Islamic sermons to his operatives. First of all, he sought to bracket
the Algerian operations, including the attack in Mauritania and the execution of the Algerian
diplomats with other attacks that occurred during the same time period (including the
coordinated suicide bomb attacks on London’s public transport system that occurred on July 7,
2005). Moreover, he sought to centralize the GSPC’s communications. Prior to this effort, each
GSPC katibat possessed its own media bureau and published its own communications regarding
its operations and successes within its territory. Thus, there were numerous GSPC media outlets
information overflow by distributing false reports on the GSPC’s channels. As a result, the
would transmit all communiqués. Those communiqués not approved by this committee could be
regarded as unauthentic. This system enabled the GSPC to elucidate several ambiguous
Droukdal’s leadership during this time period was primarily ideological in nature, as
evidenced by the frequency of his declarations and interchanges and his efforts to improve the
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GSPC’s reception nationally and internationally. However, one cannot ignore the fact that prior
to the official announcement of the merger of Al Qa’ida and the GSPC, Droukdal also directed
several tactical changes to prepare his organization for international jihad. Therefore, overall his
leadership performance improved during this time period. On December 22, 2005, two bombs
exploded in the port de Delis. This was the first time that the GSPC had led an attack against a
maritime target. The attack involved immaculate planning: the GSPC had surveyed the location
for weeks and the day before, a group of combatants had penetrated the highly protected port.
Finally, on September 11, 2006, on the fifth anniversary of the World Trade Center and
Pentagon attacks, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the deputy leader of Al Qa’ida, announced the merger of
Al Qa’ida and the GSPC. It is important to note that this announcement came one year after
Droukdal had made his first forays to Al Qa’ida. Al Qa’ida Central Command had stalled the
merger for one year, intent on ensuring that the GSPC’s membership, under Droukdal, could
an assertive public relations drive continued after this announcement. Two days later, he
published a communiqué affirming the GSPC’s allegiance to Al Qa’ida and bin Laden, thereby
crystallizing the relationship. His communiqué was particularly revelatory because it reflected
the alleged changes in the official ideology of the GSPC. His discourse supported pan-Islamic
notions and highlighted the necessity of creating an “Islamic United States.” He spoke of the
need to suppress national borders in order to establish an Islamic caliphate and urged the
immediate union of the nations of North Africa under Islamic law. Moreover, he expressed the
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sentiment that Al Qa’ida was the only group that could unite all Islamic combatants and steer the
battle against the Coalition forces. He expressed confidence in the specific competencies and
Approximately six months later, Droukdal issued another claim in which he suggested
that after pledging allegiance to Islam and demonstrating his faith in Bin Laden, it was now time
for him to change the name of his organization. This change would demonstrate the solidarity of
Al Qa’ida and the GSPC. In changing the name of the GSPC to Al Qa’ida in the Islamic
Maghreb, Droukdal expressed concern about projecting a certain image of his organization to his
base as well as the international community; he wanted to highlight its role in global jihad.
Moreover, Zawahiri himself refused to allow the group to call itself “Al Qa’ida in Algeria” since
this name seemed too “local” and did not reflect the transnational and pan-Islamic agenda of Al
In the months after the name change, Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb (AQIM), Droukdal and
his operatives began to target foreigners who continued to support secular regimes and
proselytize their culture (specifically the United States, Spain, and France). Some scholars have
suggested that AQIM remains sharply focused on its Kabylia strongholds despite Droukdals’s
global rhetoric (Filiu 2009), however, a few recent attacks indicate otherwise. For instance, in
December 2006, AQIM conducted an attack against a bus transporting employees from Brown &
Root-Condor, a joint venture between a Halliburton subsidiary, KBR, and the Algerian state-
owned oil company, Sonatrach, in an elaborate roadside bombing. The bomb attack killed an
Algerian driver in a convoy transporting the workers, nine of whom were wounded, including
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four Britons and one American. Always attentive to public reaction, Droukdal disclosed a
communiqué, in which AQIM admitted to the attack, in online jihadist forums about one month
later. A lengthy film of the operation, detailing the fabrication of the bombs, the surveillance and
lookout, and the explosions was also transmitted. This video, intended to galvanize combatants
and attract recruits, emulated the propaganda materials of Al Qa’ida in Iraq (Jebnoun 2007).
Europe to provide money, recruit, indoctrinate, and train potential terrorists. These recruits were
then dispatched to Kashmir, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq and training camps in the Sahel to
pursue international jihad. Recent reports express fear that AQIM will be able to increased
recruitment in Mauritania or Nigeria. Some specialists fear that AQIM could severely damage
While Droukdal’s role was primarily ideological, attention should be paid to the tactical
changes that he implemented. He encouraged his operatives to executed attacks inspired by the
Iraqi model. Originally, the GSPC was engaged in a war of attrition whereby combatants would
descend from the mountains and attack the armed forces. However, Droukdal encouraged the
such as bombings. Under his leadership, the use of firearms plummeted while the use of
The attacks that occurred on April 11, 2007 demonstrated Droukdal’s new tactics. On this
day, three cars driven by suicide bombers blew up in Algiers, killing at least 33 people and
injuring others. One bomber drove into the guard post at the government building housing the
offices of the prime minister and the Interior Ministry. Two other cars were detonated beside a
police station in the east of the Algerian capital (one at the seat of Interpol and the other at the
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office of the special forces of the police in Bab Ezzouar). These attacks utilized remote
explosives and were thus less costly in human lives. They also demonstrated the
rigged vehicles, kamikaze fighters, an effective propaganda and selective recruitment were
employed to make AQIM a formidable, and sustainable fighting force. This also permitted
AQIM officers to move from the periphery of Algeria back into its urban centers. Moreover, this
method consisted of engaging in spectacular attacks with a symbolic dimension that could
destabilize the regime. Such spectacular attacks could also appeal to younger sympathizers
and defuse criticism. His communiqué suggested that the April 11 attacks were executed in
response to a concession agreement with the United States, which could allow the Western
power to use petroleum in Algeria for 100 years. Through this rhetoric, Droukdal positioned his
group as the defender of the riches of Muslim countries faced with avarice and imperialism of
the West. The second justification for the attacks was the Algerian government’s military
cooperation with the American forces. To capitalize upon his operatives’ anti-colonialist
concerns, Droukdal suggested that this was the beginning of a foreign occupation and deemed it
necessary to combat the Western presence in Algeria. Finally, Droukdal criticized the adoption
of an anti-Islamic policy allegedly championed by the Americans in their war against terrorism.
In doing so, he expressed a message frequently articulated by Al Qa’ida, thereby cementing the
X. Final Observations
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To this day, AQIM continues to conducted several suicide attacks and roadside
bombings, each accompanied by a revealing and incantatory communiqué. The merger, and its
success, can only be explained by highlighting Droukdal’s ideological leadership and the major
shifts that he pioneered on the propaganda front. Through his communications, Droukdal sought
to effectively straddle the divide between local and international Islamic terrorism. After the
ranks of his organization had been depleted at the turn of the twenty-first century, he effectively
brought the Algerians insurgents out of isolation so they could work more closely with
international Islamic networks to promote Islam. Thus, he directed an ideological shift – from a
Droukdal recognized that by aligning itself with Al Qa’ida, the GSPC could render itself
capable of operating in the context of global jihad, rather than confining itself to local activity.
He incited the organization to expand by attacking foreign targets, most particularly French
interests. The most powerful French AQIM cell to date was dismantled in September 2005, when
French police thwarted a series of bombings set to occur in Paris as Algerians voted on the
National Charter for Peace and Reconciliation. By uniting radical Islamists to attack Americana
and French targets in northwestern Africa, Droukdal advanced the goal of undermining the
secular Algerian regime while damaging the interests of Western nations (Black 2007).
Moreover, he reflected AQIM’s international focus and the growing ratio of attacks against
foreign targets into an emphasis on international issues and threats against Western countries in
AQIM’s statements.
Droukdal recognized the global appeal of Al Qa’ida message, which had dramatically
expanded since the September 11, attacks. The US invasion of Iraq and media coverage of
American detention and interrogation policies lent credence to the Qa’ida narrative that
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portrayed isolated American actions as a coordinated war against Islam. A current of cultural
Islamization was created that has increased Al Qa’ida’s attraction. Droukdal capitalized upon
these trends by highlighting the importance of solidarity among the mujahedeen in face of
Western aggression against Islam. He saw clearly an opportunity for synergy; Al Qa’ida’s global
ideology intersected with local anger directed at the undemocratic regime would encourage
jihadists’ activity in the Maghreb. Having formulated an appropriate ideological stance, he was
able to tap into local grievances and tie them to the global jihad against the west. Thus, he
successfully aligned with Al Qa’ida to co-opt and exploit local, ready-made networks that could
be internationalized.
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Chapter 7: Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya: The Unrealized Merger
In the early 1970s, two prominent Salafi jihadist groups operated in Egypt: Al-Gama’a al-
Islamiyya (GAI) and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Both broke with the Muslim Brotherhood over the
government and to replace it with an Islamic regime. Both collaborated on the assassination of
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 and both fell victims to the bitter campaign of state
violence, mass arrests, and financial crackdowns during much of the 1990s. However, in the late
1990s, members of Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya apologized for the group’s involvement in the Sadat
assassination, renounced violence, and denounced Al Qa’ida. In contrast, the Egyptian Islamic
Jihad members joined forced with Al Qa’ida. Why did GAI repudiate terrorism rather than
I. The Emergence of the GAI from the Ashes of the Muslim Brotherhood
Brotherhood in 1973 in the Upper Nile regions of Al-Minya, Asyu’, Qina, and Sohaj. However,
the GAI rejected the Muslim Brotherhood’s gradualist approach to change, and instead based
their ideology on the principles articulated by Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian fundamentalist writer
and educator. Upon its birth, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat gave the group’s members free
reign, covertly supplying them with arms with which to defend themselves against potential
attacks by Marxists or Nasserites, his rivals. Moreover, GAI quickly gained strong support
among the university students in both Cairo and Alexandria by recruiting mid-level leaders from
the ranks of the unemployed university students who were disillusioned by Egypt’s lack of
economic opportunities. In addition, GAI recruited more indigent, uneducated individuals from
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the southern rural regions of Assiuet and Minya to further populate their rank and file (Keats
2002).
Sheikh Omar Abdel Al–Rahman assumed the mantle as spiritual leader for the group
during its infancy. He provided the moral justifications for the group’s moneymaking attacks on
Christian shopkeepers and small-business owners by his issuing fatwa – religious rulings that
Egypt, Sadat changed his political strategies to combat internal unrest in the mid 1970s. He
began rounding up several Islamic militants and placing them in jail. As a result of his policies,
Al-Rahman fled Egypt and toured the neighboring Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia,
where he found and developed financial supporters. During Al-Rahman’s time abroad, clashes
between Egyptian security forces and Islamic movements in the universities increased. Fearing
harsh repression (like that which the Muslim brotherhood has experienced under former
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser), GAI leaders decided, “A need [had] arisen for a
military force for us to defend [themselves]” (Carmon, Feldner, and Lav 2006). Consequently,
they established a branch devoted to jihad and began to execute increasingly violent operations.
Upon returning to Egypt in 1980, Al-Rahman issued a fatwa that provided the religious
justification for the assassination of President Sadat in 1981. The GAI and Egyptian Islamic
Jihad allegedly cooperated in this conspiracy. As a result of his role in the assassination, Al-
Rahman served six months in an Egyptian prison, avoiding a sterner sentence on a technicality
(Keats 2002).
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Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak began a brutal campaign against Egypt’s militant
groups that lasted throughout the 1980s. His methods included false arrests, torture, and
executions. Although fairly successful at curbing the number of violent attacks, this crackdown
further radicalized the university-educated population, who continued to struggle under high
unemployment(Gerges 2000).
During these years, many GAI members and leaders fled to Afghanistan, where they
were active in the jihad against the Soviet Union. In Afghanistan, they trained and fought
alongside al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad and other Afghan Arabs, such as Osama Bin
Laden. Moreover, following the Soviet withdrawal, many fighters moved on to combat the
Serbian forces that were decimating Bosnian Muslims in Yugoslavia. Several were implicated in
numerous plots directed against American diplomatic and military targets in the Balkans and
other parts of Europe. During the 1990s, many GAI members continued or commenced their
training in Al Qa’ida facilities in the Sudan and Afghanistan. Some, like Mustafa Hamza, a
leading member of the GAI, even worked for businesses owned by Osama bin Laden in Somalia
After the Soviet-Afghan war, some GAI members returned to Egypt where they initiated
a campaign against the influences of Western culture. Between 1992 and 1993, they carried out a
number of attacks on tourists that killed dozens of people. Al-Rahman, who had immigrated to
the United States by this time, again provided the religious justification for these attacks by
arguing that tourism in Egypt fostered poor morals, and spread diseases such as AIDS (Stacher
2002).
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In 1993, Al-Rahman was arrested in the United States in connection with the first World
Trade Center bombing. In 1996, he and nine other operatives were convicting for conspiring to
destroy New York City landmarks, including the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels.
In 1993, Al-Rahman was arrested in the United States in connection with the first World
Trade Center bombing. In 1996, he and nine other operatives were convicted for conspiring to
destroy New York City landmarks, including the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels.
Yet despite his arrest, GAI continued to attack tourists throughout the 1990s and began
targeting Egyptian business establishments as well. The group bombed theaters, bookstores, and
banks. In 1995, the group allegedly collaborated with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in a failed
assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In September 1997,
militants killed nine German tourists and their driver in front of the Egyptian Museum in Cairo.
Two months later, the group killed 63 people at a tourist site in Luxor (including four Egyptians
As a result of GAI’s campaign in the late 1990s, Cairo clamped down on both the GAI
and Egyptian Islamic Jihad even more, arresting thousands of suspected terrorists and executing
or killing others during police raids. This prompted some influential militants to reconsider their
strategy and tactics and some GAI leaders renounced violence. On July 5, 1997, GAI announced
a unilateral initiative of conciliation with the Egyptian regime. During a court hearing, a GAI
member read aloud a communiqué, signed by six of the organization's leaders, which declared a
halt to all armed operations within and outside Egypt, and a stop to agitation to commit attacks.
Thus, when the Luxor attack occurred, several GAI leaders immediately conveyed their disgust,
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insisting that the operation was not executed by the GAI, but rather by a breakaway faction
(Ghadbian 2000).
The Luxor attack and the reports of mutilation of the victims’ bodies had sparked public
repulsion at GAI. Consequently, the GAI spokesman Osama Rushdie, a Netherlands resident
announced his resignation (Cohen 2003). Moreover, the GAI was weakened both operationally
and financially by the aftermath effects of the attack. Therefore, it needed a publicity boost if it
In 1997, the group split into two factions; the larger, moderate one, organized by Mustafa
Hamza, supported non-violence and the ceasefire, while the smaller, more radical faction, led by
Rifai Ahmad Taha deplored the ceasefire as cowardly and called for a return to armed
operations.
After the schism, Rifai Ahmad Taha courted bin Laden by making trips to Afghanistan
and even appeared sitting next to him and Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a
videotape released in September 2000 that threatened US interests. Moreover, Taha signed Bin
Laden’s 1998 Declaration of War against the “Jews and Crusaders,” thereby becoming a
signatory to the International Islamic Front. It is unclear whether Taha actually agreed with bin
Laden’s views, wanted to seize power in the GAI, or simply saw the financial and organizational
advantages that Al Zawahiri had reaped from making the decision to join Al Qa’ida.
Yet despite his efforts, he was unable to recruit many of his cadres to support Bin Laden
and a minimal number joined the global jihad (Botha 2006). The GAI had witnessed how the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad had suffered significant setbacks because of its decision to join Al
experienced a major upset when in 1998 Albania agreed to extradite 12 members of EIJ to Egypt
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in the case known as the “Returnees from Albania” (Aboul-Enein 2004) Consequently, most
members of GAI preferred to go underground until the group regained its strength and influence
VI. Reconciliation
In 1999, the group’s historic leadership declared a unilateral ceasefire. Even Al-Rahman,
who remained the group’s spiritual leader, agreed to this measure. The GAI has not conducted a
terrorist attack either inside or outside Egypt since August 1998. In 2002, the leadership issued a
statement reaffirming its commitment to end violence. Karam Zuhdi, a self-proclaimed leader of
the underground group, even said the GAI owes the Egyptian people "an apology for the crimes
which [the group] has committed against Egypt. We are even thinking of paying blood money to
Since this time, the historic leadership of the GAI has published a series of books, known
as the “Concept Correction Series” in which they renounce indiscriminate violence and extremist
August 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri, by then the closest associate of Osama bin Laden, announced
that the GAI had merged with Al Qa’ida. GAI leadership in Egypt quickly rejected this claim.
During his interview with Asharq al-Awsat, Dr. Nageh Ibrahim, a senior leader and chief
ideological theorist for the GAI, stressed that significant differences in philosophy exist between
the GAI and Al Qa’ida. “Their aim is jihad, and our aim is Islam," he maintained. In doing so,
struggle as a means to further its goals and suggested that Al Qa’ida was propagating a false
definition of jihad. He asserted that Al Qa’ida’s aggressive tactics have failed Muslims. Since
this time, despite widespread skepticism in Egypt and abroad about the nature of its true
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intentions, the GAI has concentrated its efforts on revising its former extremist worldview and
The leadership of the GAI had longstanding connections with Al Qa’ida, and exhibited
strong anti-Western proclivities, however, when their group was in a state of imminent decline,
they decided to renounce violent activity rather than appeal for Al Qa’ida for assistance to
continue their existence as a terrorist group. While this decision may seem counterintuitive,
evidence suggests that this choice was strategic. GAI was well established and active prior to Al
Qa’ida’s emergence in the international arena. Consequently, GAI members were less receptive
to Al Qa’ida’s ideology of global jihad than other groups that have emerged since that time, who
were not already entrenched in Salafi jihadist circles. Moreover, GAI interpreted their jihad
much more narrowly than groups affiliated or associated with Al Qa’ida. They believed that their
main foe was the Egyptian state and that the near enemy was more worthy of fighting than the
distant enemy. While they attacked Western targets, they perceived their struggle as regionally
confined to the Egyptian territory. GAI’s theoretical and operational priorities were the product
of a literal reading of the Quranic and prophetic texts, which gave precedence to doctrinal
correctness above all other issues, primarily to the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt
When GAI reemerged in the early 1990s with a renewed sense of purpose after the return
of its members from the Afghan jihad, its leaders were convinced that they could accomplish in
Egypt what the mujahedeen had achieved in Afghanistan, the ouster of the “illegitimate”
governing power. They attacked Coptic Christians, banks, police, politicians, tourists, and the
media with the goal of undermining Egyptian state power, secular institutions, and the economy
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and creating the perception that the Egyptian government could not protect its citizens (Keats
2002).
Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, GAI were compelled to shift strategies as a political
tactic. Reflecting on the seven years of GAI violence between 1992 and 1997, Osama Rushdie, a
former leader of GAI, admitted that the group was in a stronger position before it started
attacking the government. He attempted to rationalize this earlier aggression by suggesting that
adopting violence in 1992 " was mainly a reaction to what we saw as the suppression and killing
of our brothers” (Carmon, Feldner, and Lav 2006) It is possible that in mid-1997, when several
leaders of GAI announced its cease-fire initiative, this may have been a maneuver to buy time,
reunite the groups’ ranks, and prepare for a new offensive. However, the relative success of the
government’s security policy obligated the group to concede to what its leaders called “military
defeat.” Between arrests, deaths in armed clashes, stiff sentences that included dozens of
executions, and severe treatment in prisons and detention facilities, the ranks of the leadership
and general membership were decimated. This exceedingly severe security strategy disrupted the
ranks and cohesion of GAI prompting the group’s leaders to reconsider its acts and concepts.
Thus, by the turn of the century the group realized that it was useless to try to topple a powerful
Additionally, after its initiative to end the violence, the security establishment facilitated
meetings between the group’s leader and members in Egyptian prisons to ensure that the group
honored this commitment. During their time in prison, the groups’ leaders acquainted themselves
with other schools of Islamic thought. In fact, the effect of their new, wider reading and
understanding is evident in the sources on which the leadership relied to compose the revisionist
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VIII. Final Observations
For GAI, terrorism was a means to a political end; it was meant to produce a change in
the Egyptian government’s political position, not to destroy the government’s military potential.
GAI used terrorism to influence political behavior by devaluing the state in the eyes of its
citizens. However, one must note that terrorism depends on the ability to generate the appropriate
level of terror and anxiety. Acts of terror induce psychological effects, which must fan out
among a possibly substantial population, the bulk of which may be able to make a reasonable
calculation that they are not a risk. Thus, terrorists groups must conduct a sequence of directed
attacks that creates a sufficient sense of threat for it to be understood that the campaign will
continue unless and until there is a change in state policy (Freedman 2007). Even with some
assistance from Al Qa’ida, GAI would not have been able to defeat the Egyptian government,
nor did GAI members have any interest in targeting the “far enemy.” When GAI was unable to
achieve its political goal through terrorism, they changed their strategic tactics.
environment and are apt to respond to policy-induced changes to their constraints since, by
definition, they lack resources. Crenshaw’s description of the instrumental approach to assessing
terrorist violence is useful for understanding GAI’s rationale. GAI acted on the basis of its
calculation of the benefit to be gained from violent action, the costs of attempting violent attacks
and of these attacks failing, the consequences of adopting a nonviolent position and the
probability of achieving its political goals through terrorist undertakings. A constant failure to
achieve its stated goals led to internal strife and its ultimate collapse as a terrorist group. The
costs of executing attacks became too high and the consequences of adopting a nonviolent
position seemed promising (Crenshaw 1987). Accordingly, the group abandoned its violent
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strategy. For GAI, terrorism was merely a means to an end and substitutes were available. GAI
now appears to be concerned with carving out some political space to operate in Egypt.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Discussion – Al Qa’ida’s Commanding
each level of the hierarchy within the system. It is naïve to focus on chief executives, like Osama
bin Laden or Ayman Zawahiri or to concentrate on the suicide bombers who conduct operations.
While Osama bin Laden’s capture or death would be an important psychological blow to those
vested in his invincibility, his loosely affiliated, broad-based Al Qa’ida network augmented by
affiliations with various groups has durability that will surpass his mortality. Recent studies
indicate that strategies aimed at enabling stringent police techniques and punitive military action
will not succeed in deterring the Al Qa’ida suicide bombers(Atran 2003). Consequently,
In the first chapters, I posed the question: what motivates local jihadist leaders to affiliate
with Al Qa’ida? I hypothesized that opportunism, ideology, or social bonds could motivate local
jihadist leaders to enroll in Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic program. The data collected in this survey
and analysis of Al Qa’ida’s leadership has significantly demonstrated that leaders were strongly
incentivized by opportunism, while social bonds facilitated the process of affiliating (i.e. social
bonds served as a “permissive factor”). Moreover, the analysis of Al Qa’ida in the Islamic
Maghreb provides an example of an intelligent and shrewd local jihadist leader, Abdelmalek
Droukdal whose desire to revive his group inspired him to associate with Al Qa’ida while the
examination of Al Gama’a al-Islamiyya demonstrates why strategic calculations can rouse other
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Previous studies depict terrorists as rational actors seeking to maximize political goals
(Lake 2003). Psychological surveys indicate that terrorists are not psychologically deviant or
ideologically blinded(Sageman 2004). My data analysis and case studies support these
conclusions. One should consider terrorism as “one of a set of rebel tactics that is consciously
selected in response to changes in funding, popular support, competition against other rebel
groups, the type of regime against which they are fighting, and counterinsurgency tactics” (Laitin
and Jacob Shapiro 2008) Like individual terrorists, insurgent groups should also be perceived as
rational entities that are more likely to adopt terrorist tactics when the benefits of other forms of
violence decrease, when the costs of other forms of violence increase, or both.
Since they are rational actors, it is not surprising that local jihadist group leaders have
opportunistic motives for joining Al Qa’ida. But what are these motives? In fact, the fundamental
purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself. Leaders, in particular, wish to enhance
and promote the organizations that they direct since their personal ambitions are tied to the
efforts aimed at winning battles and capturing terrorist actors deplete the ranks of terrorist
counter-terrorism strategy when amnesty is offered to operatives who renounce violence, as was
the case with the GSPC (Sederberg 1995). Moreover, groups may lose members to other
terrorist groups when a competing group can put together a package of purposive goals and
selective incentives that is more appealing than that of the first organization. Factionalism is also
common amongst terrorist organizations. Within the larger understanding of a terrorist group’s
political aims, there may be a divergence of opinion on precisely what objectives should be
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pursued. This divergence compels operatives to defect. Finally, groups may alienate the
operations (Crenshaw 1991). When this occurs, their public image shifts from well-intentioned
increasingly difficult. Groups only enjoy popular support when the population believes their
actions are justified under the political conditions of the country (i.e. when they occupy a “moral
high ground”).
When loss of membership occurs, some groups may find it beneficial to renounce
violence and enter the political arena, like the GAI. However, transforming from an armed group
into a political party is no easy feat, especially in less democratic nations. Thus, many groups
may choose to align with Al Qa’ida to remain salient. For example, security sources in Algeria
said that the Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb offensive in August 2008 reflected the
recruitment of scores of operatives, including suicide bombers, combatants, and those with inside
knowledge of the military and police(Gray and Stockham 2008). Al Qa’ida can transfer
operatives to help support the local jihadist group since Al Qa’ida’s own recruitment is
accelerating. Bin Laden and Al Qa’ida’s elite cadre have convinced many volunteers to fulfill
the duty of jihad and to thus respond to “the call of Allah.” While it is impossible to know
precisely the size of Al Qa’ida due to the decentralized structure of its organization, Al Qa’ida
probably has several thousand members and associates. Since the 1980s, Al Qa’ida trained over
5,000 militants in camps in Afghanistan. In recent years, Al Qa’ida’s recruitment has picked up
in 30-40 countries. Recruiters for Al Qa’ida reportedly told researchers that volunteers were
“beating down their doors” to join (Atran 2004). Thus, Al Qa’ida can easily dispatch a few
combatants to assist local groups in desperate need of increased membership and expertise.
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Additionally, Al Qa’ida is a high-value global brand that is esteemed amongst the Salafi
community, as discussed in Chapter 3. By aligning with Al Qa’ida, groups gain credibility and
respect that can be effectively leveraged to increase recruitment. Before joining forces with Al
Qa’ida, many terrorist groups are compared to criminal gangs. However, upon aligning with Al
Qa’ida, they are perceived as legitimate actors, striving for global jihad. Therefore, their social
status is enhanced. Al Qa’ida uses propaganda to foster its positive public image as the defender
campaign. In fact, Bin Laden has created a company called al-Sahab, which produces the
professional tapes and promotional film clips disseminated throughout the Arab and Western
world, primarily by means of the Qatari television station al-Jazeera. In doing so, Al Qa’ida has
substantially promoted and publicized its image throughout the globe. To complement this
strategy, Al Qa’ida also selects sympathetic journalists to whom it grants interviews (Schweitzer
2008). These journalists present Al Qa’ida to the outside world in a supportive manner, depicting
footsteps of their pious predecessors (i.e. the Muslim warriors of the crusader period) by
establishing a territorial base for Islam and by protecting those who are oppressed by foreign
raises awareness amongst Muslims of the grievances that gave rise to its birth. For instance,
recruits are shown provocative photos of Iraqi women and children killed or bloodied by
occupation forces stepping with their boots on the backs of Arabic men that have just been bound
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and forced to the ground with black sacks over their faces. Such emotional narratives highlight
the theme of humiliation at the hand of callous and arrogant Western powers(Hafez 2007). Al
Qa’ida also attributes Muslim societies’ “greatest misfortune and decadence to their
abandonment of jihad due to the love of this world and abhorrence of death. Because of that,
tyrants gained dominance over the Muslims in every aspect and every land”(Calvert 2004).
Thus, it effectively encourages redemption through faith and sacrifice, even death. Al Qa’ida’s
affiliates learn from Al Qa’ida how to conduct comparable propaganda campaigns in their home
countries to attract and enhance their own recruitment efforts. Abdelmalek Droukdal certainly
modeled his publicity efforts on that of Al Qa’ida and benefited from advice from Al Qa’ida’s
media branch.
Moreover, Al Qa’ida can help groups conduct attacks. Al Qa’ida is infamous for
providing terrorist training and for establishing sites and camps where recruits are educated,
indoctrinated, and mentored. For instance, Al Qa’ida established numerous local military training
facilities in Mindanao and Indonesia in the last two decades. It can also offer groups information
on the government, physical environment, nature of the military and intelligence services,
financial services, etc. due to its exceptional intelligence-gathering skills. Al Qa’ida’s veterans
can offer groups tactical and strategic advice. For example, Riduan Isamuddin, known as
Hambali and Ali Gufron, known as Muklhas, both alumni of the Afghan jihad, helped Jemaah
Islamiyah plan and execute the 2002 Bali bombing that killed more than 2000 people (Abuza
2003). Finally, Al Qa’ida can offer groups financial resources, equipment, and weapons.
According to several reports, Ansar al-Islam was started with $300,000 to $600,000 of Al Qa’ida
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Conducting attacks connotes a high degree of devotion and strength to potential recruits.
Suicide attacks, in particular, demonstrate that the organization has a loyal and impassioned
following. Also, just as a conventional military organization might glamorize its heroes to inspire
others to volunteer for field military actions, martyrdom operations not only produce spectacular
incidents of large-scale destruction, but also create and promote “heroes” that represent the
organization. Such missions create publicity events that effectively advertise the organization
and psychologically appeal to individual needs to feel important and meaningful through
By joining Al Qa’ida, local jihadist leaders are presented with appealing and cost
effective opportunities to bolster their own recruitment and ensure organizational survival and
their ability to achieve their political aims without abandoning arms and investigating political
avenues. Moreover, the results of this study suggest that most local jihadist group leaders have
already established significant social bonding and networking with members of Al Qa’ida
Central Command. Due to these associations, local jihadist group leaders are positioned to seek
assistance from their colleagues when decline within their own organizations seems imminent,
rather than abandon their mission. While not a precipitant cause for an affiliation, social
networks can be thought of as a stipulation that pre-structures and facilitates the merger process.
Since Al Qa’ida provides local jihadist group leaders with numerous opportunities to
stimulate and expand their organizations, and because such affiliations are not difficult to initiate
due to the existence of prior social connections, it may be futile for counterterrorist forces to
discourage local jihadist group leaders from soliciting Al Qa’ida. Instead, strategies should be
developed to isolate these groups from Al Qa’ida, thereby making such affiliations more
problematic and risky. Efforts should ensure that the necessary resources (both human and
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capital) cannot be exchanged between Al Qa’ida and its weaker partner. If groups are precluded
from affiliating with Al Qa’ida, they are less likely to survive or recuperate from setbacks. For
instance, some suggest that AQIM’s globalization process has been impeded by the expulsion of
AL Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) from Baghdad in 2008. Since the Iraqi branch of Al Qa’ida suffered this
setback, Bin Laden has devoted less attention and resources to AQIM, thereby crippling its
Throughout the 1990s, state borders were opened to international trade flows. In the age
of globalization, terrorists have learned how to make legal immigration channels and legitimate
immigrant communities serve their lethal jihadist ends. Thus, former Secretary of Homeland
Security, Tom Ridge, portrayed US borders as “conduits for terrorists, weapons of mass
destruction, and illegal migrants” (Ross 2003). To thwart Al Qa’ida’s connections with local
jihadist groups, border control measures must be established to prevent the movement of
restrictive “fortress” responses and sweeping immigrant surveillance hinder cooperation with key
policies. In areas like the Core Arab states and the Maghreb, governments should implement a
networked border monitoring and border control system, which features a common visa policy
and region-wide fingerprint or iris photography database. A model system is that which is
utilized in the European Union. The new Schengen Information System computer database
contains information on criminals on the run, previous asylum applications, stolen cars and other
stolen property as well as biometric data. This system is also used to store and disseminate
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subject to a European arrest warrant or under surveillance for criminal activity(One Single EU
Border 2005) A system for region-wide arrests would also be useful in areas where terrorist
activity is high.
The United States can provide assistance to foreign governments to enhance operational
capacity to tighten border controls. One impressive program was the East Africa Counter
Terrorism Initiative, whereby $50 million for security programs administered by the US
Department of Defense was offered to East African states to provide for military training for
border control and security of the coastline, police training, and aviation security capacity
(Kagwanja 2006).
Future research will center on the development of predictive models based on emerging
patterns among terrorist groups that align with Al Qa’ida. These predictive models could be used
partnerships with Al Qa’ida and of the strength of the alliance that materializes as a result. Future
research may also focus on how alliances mature and evolve over time since this article focuses
on aspects of maturity among terrorist groups who have engaged in networking with Al Qa’ida.
The second question that I sought to answer involved the type of role local jihadist
leaders played within Al Qa’ida. By understanding what function local jihadist leaders play,
counterterrorist forces can better undermine these leaders. I considered leadership roles before
and after the affiliation to uncover trends. While there were no significant patterns in the data on
the operational and logistic role of the leaders profiled, it appears that most leaders took on an
increasingly ideological role after the merger. After the merger, the leaders issued more
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To understand why this increase in evangelizing and political activity of these leaders
occurs, one must consider the philosophy and ambitions of local jihadist groups compared to Al
Qa’ida. The roots of most of the terrorist networks included in this study can be traced to
established in the 1980s through the merger of Salafi groups. These groups enjoyed popularity in
Somalia in the 60s due to their attempts to regain lost Somali land after independence and to
their resistance to dictator, Siad Barre. Consequently, they gained the support of the Somali
people through nationalist causes more than through a common affinity for Salafism, an ideology
that was widely unpopular in the country in previous years (West 2006). In contrast, Al Qa’ida
conceives its resistance as a single, unified struggle that transcends local, state, and regional
concerns. Central to Al Qa’ida’s vision is the awakening of the Muslim ummah, the worldwide
community of believers(Sutton and Vertigans 2006). Although Bin Laden wants to align with
local militant groups with country-specific grievances to increase his global reach and influence,
he demands that his commanding officers convince their operatives to adopt and accept Al
Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic program. When local jihadist leaders are not interested in promoting this
agenda, as was the case with the GAI, an affiliation will not occur.
followers that Al Qa’ida has a better ideology. As mentioned in earlier chapters, Al Qa’ida’s
commanding officers are tightly coupled to their operatives. The dyadic relationship between
these leaders and their followers is characterized by high quality leader-member exchange
value agreement, effective influence tactics, a high degree of decision influence, and subordinate
loyalty. The leaders of local jihadist groups develop differentiated relationships with their
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rapports, rather than using an average leadership style. Due to such high quality leader-member
exchange, followers trust their leaders and can be persuaded to engage in activities that they
otherwise would not and can be encouraged to move beyond their own self-interest to focus on
officers can ground their message in the narrative elements most likely to resonate with this
target group. When the security situation does not permit direct communications, Al Qa’ida’s
commanding officers correspond with their cohorts through communiqués, speeches, and
interviews, in which they clarify their vision, as Droukdal did on numerous occasions. Because
they know their audience well, they can apply effective message management, rhetoric, and spin.
initiative and exercise personal leadership to make their unit more effective. Thus, through their
integrate their previous regional ambitions with a wider transnational Islamic agenda. In doing
so, they subordinate their radical group to Al Qa’ida’s strategic goals and move their localized
Islamic resistance beyond sovereign state boundaries to transcend provincial frames of reference.
When a group first affiliates with Al Qa’ida, culture shock is inevitable. In addition to
accepting Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic program, operatives must also integrate new tactics and
strategies into their repertoire. For instance, the GSPC was encouraged to engage in suicide and
arson attacks(Guidère 2007). Valuable insights can be gained by considering the role that
managers play when two companies merge in order to understand the role that Al Qa’ida’s
commanding officers play in mitigating culture shock and encouraging integration. Like Al
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Qa’ida’s commanding officers, transition mangers assume full-time responsibility and
When corporate mergers occur, transition managers must make the case for integration to
large numbers of employees. Although some of the groups that Al Qa’ida merges with have less
than five hundred operatives, the burden of responsibility still rests on the commanding officers
to assuage their followers after the affiliation with Al Qa’ida commences. Soon after the GSPC
announced its merger with Al Qa’ida, Droukdal issued a communiqué explaining and justifying
this repositioning. For Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers and corporate transition managers, one
of the most common difficulties that arise during the merger is “cultural differences.” For
example, a corporation may encourage teamwork while the venture it subsumes may be more
oriented towards individual initiatives. Both transition managers and Al Qa’ida’s commanding
officers must be skilled in relinquishing and helping others relinquish past values and practices
that are not in tune with the current, shared vision of future organizational arrangements (Marks
and Mirvis 2000). This can only be achieved by providing ideological guidance through leader-
In addition, mergers represent sudden, major change and generate a great deal of
uncertainty due to the fact that organizational cultures are underpinned by deep assumptions that
are constant, patterned, and shared. The threat to old corporate values and organizational lifestyle
within the institution. Employees’ reactions most often pass through four distinct stages. They
commence with disbelief and denial and pass into anger and then rage and resentment, next
acceptance occurs. These are identical to Dr. Helen Kubler-Ross’s four stages of bereavement or
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grief. What the operative grapples with is akin to the “death” of the previous organization and
Leaders hoping to initiative organizational change and general follower acceptance face a
daunting task. They must assuage their followers’ fears and convince them of the saliency and
relevance of the new program through constant communication. Finally, they must inspire hope,
optimism, and a sense that the future will be better than the past through their speeches and other
outreach activities.
for a unique vision of the organization through a publicity campaign. Effective leaders possess
powerful persuasive personal characteristics and execute actions designed to change internal
organizational culture and substance. In this context, leadership can be viewed as the art of
mobilizing others to want to struggle for shared aspirations (Covin et al. 1997).
When a merger occurs, transition managers (and Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers) must
define the new “combination” goals, principles, and desired end state. Moreover, they should
clarify critical success factors for the merger, anticipate the impact of change, and address
inconsistencies between the espoused operating principles and actual management of change. It
is their responsibility to define, promote, and support necessary changes in behaviors and culture
to successfully realize the post-combination organization. Finally, they should serve as role
models on how to “work together” for the goals of the organization. These initiatives can only be
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Understanding Al Qa’ida’s commanding officer’s role as transition managers during a
merger is important when designing initiatives to undermine their efforts. My data indicates that
these commanding officers are leading Al Qa’ida’s growing media offensive. The media has
become a crucial battlefield in the current conflict against radical Islamic terrorism (Blanchard
2006). Counterterrorism units can use media organizations to launch global propaganda pushes
that will taint the Al Qa’ida brand and make it even less attractive to local militants. It is
important to remember that some groups, like the GAI, do opt to renounce violence. Thus,
messaging should refute the imputation of malign Western intention in the Muslim world and
undermine the notion that terrorism is authentically Islamic. This program should expose tension
between Al Qa’ida leadership and supporters. For instance, authorities can publicize the rejection
of Al Qa’ida by credible local figures, especially religious ones. In fact, several leaders of GAI
and Al-Jihad al-Islami, another principle Islamist militant group in Egypt, have taken steps to
promote peaceful co-existence with the government and society(Gunaratna and Ali 2009).
will appeal to communities anxious to retain their cultural heritage and religious integrity.
Approaching communications in this manner ensures that the government avoids exacerbating
Counterterrorist forces can also harness the power of the “Shayma effect” (which refers
images off jihadist attacks that have killed Muslim children. Proxies must manage from affair
and this sort of counter-terrorism publicity campaign. For example, counterterrorist units should
channel messages through volunteers in Internet forums(Brachman and McCants 2006). For
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instance, Salafi and Islamist communities in London have consistently demonstrated skill,
courage and commitment in countering al-Qaida propaganda and recruitment activity. Ed Husain
and Shiraz Maher were two young British Muslims who became involved with radical Islamist
politics with Hizb ut-Tahir before renouncing their affiliation and speaking out publicly about
Moreover, the government should continue to capture Al Qa’ida news and production
staff, along with their PCS and data files. The collapse of Al Qa’ida’s propaganda operations will
also cause the Arab media to move towards more coverage of the legitimate Iraqi government.
This study indicates that Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers are playing an increasingly
ideological role. The leaders of the Western world should follow suit. Ayman Al Zawahiri
acknowledges that the struggle between the secular governments in the West and the militant
jihadists of Al Qa’ida is a “battle of ideologies, a struggle for survival, and a war with no truce”
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Appendix I: List of Terrorist Groups
Merger Partnership Collaboration Unaffiliated
(Control)
Jemaah Islamiya
Abu Sayyaf
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Appendix II: Sources by Terrorist Group
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134
Appendix III: Commanding Officer Attribute Codebook
Type of merger Formal merger 4
Strong affiliation (partnership) 3
Loose affiliation (collaboration) 2
No affiliation 1
Opportunism Primary motive 2
Secondary motive 1
Not a motive 0
Pan-Islamic ideology Primary motive 2
Secondary motive 1
Not a motive 0
Social network Primary motive 2
Secondary motive 1
Not a motive 0
Operational leadership Strong leadership 3
Ideological leadership Average leadership 2
Logistic leadership Weaker leadership 1
135
Appendix IV: Leadership Attributes
Harkat ul-Ansar/Harakat
Fazlur Rehman Khalil ul Mujahidin Southern Asian cluster Pakistan 1985 1998 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 2 3 3
Harkat ul-Ansar/Harakat
Farooq Kashmiri Khalil ul Mujahidin Southern Asian cluster Pakistan 1985 1998 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 2
Riaz Basra Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Southern Asian cluster Pakistan 1996 1999 3 0 2 1 3 2 3 2 3 3
Akram Lahori Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Southern Asian cluster Pakistan 1996 1999 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 2 2
Hafiz Mohammad
Saeed Lashkar-e-Taiba Southern Asian cluster Pakistan 1990 2001 3 0 2 1 2 3 2 1 3 3
Maulana Abdul Wahid
Kashmiri Lashkar-e-Taiba Southern Asian cluster Pakistan 1990 2001 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 2
Maulana Masood Azhar Jaish-e-Mohammad Southern Asian cluster Pakistan 2000 2000 2 2 1 1 1 3 3 2 3 2
Sheikh Ali Warsame al-Ittihaad al-Islami African cluster Somalia 1984 1991 2 2 1 0 1 3 3 2 3 3
Sheikh Hassan Dahir
Aweys al-Ittihaad al-Islami African cluster Somalia 1984 1991 2 2 0 1 3 1 2 3 3 3
Hassan Abdullah Hersi
al-Turki al-Ittihaad al-Islami African cluster Somalia 1984 1991 2 2 0 0 3 1 1 3 3 3
Sheikh Khalil Eritrean Islamic Jihad
Mohammed Amer Movement African cluster Eritrea 1988 1998 2 2 1 0 1 2 1 2 2 2
136
al-Qaeda Organization in
the Islamic Maghreb
(formerly Groupe Salafist
pour la prédication et le
Hassan Hattab combat) Maghreb Arab cluster Algeria 1996 2005 4 2 0 0 3 3 3 0 0 0
al-Qaeda Organization in
the Islamic Maghreb
(formerly Groupe Salafist
pour la prédication et le
Nabil Sahraoui combat) Maghreb Arab cluster Algeria 1996 2005 4 2 1 1 3 2 1 0 0 0
al-Qaeda Organization in
the Islamic Maghreb
(formerly Groupe Salafist
pour la prédication et le
Abdelmalik Droukdal combat) Maghreb Arab cluster Algeria 1996 2005 4 2 1 0 3 3 3 3 3 3
Libyan Islamic Fighting
Anas Sebai Group Maghreb Arab cluster Libya 1995 1997 4 2 1 0 3 1 1 3 1 3
Tarek Ben Habib Tunisian Combatant
Maaroufi Group Maghreb Arab cluster Tunisia 2000 2000 3 0 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 3
Tunisian Combatant
Saifallah Ben Hassine Group Maghreb Arab cluster Tunisia 2000 2000 3 2 0 1 1 1 3 1 1 2
Mohammed Al Moroccan Islamic
Karbouzi Combatant Group Maghreb Arab cluster Morocco 1993 2001 3 2 0 1 1 2 3 3 2 3
Moroccan Islamic
Taeb Bentizi Combatant Group Maghreb Arab cluster Morocco 1993 2001 3 2 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 1
Abu Bakar Bashir Jemaah Islamiya Southeast Asian cluster Indonesia 1993 1998 3 2 0 0 1 3 3 3 3 3
Abu Rusdan Jemaah Islamiya Southeast Asian cluster Indonesia 1993 1998 3 2 0 1 2 1 2 3 3
Abu Dujana Jemaah Islamiya Southeast Asian cluster Indonesia 1993 1998 3 2 0 1 3 2 3 3 3 3
Abdurajak Janjalani Abu Sayyaf Southeast Asian cluster Philippines 1991 1991 3 2 0 1 1 2 3 3 3 3
Khadaffy Janjalani Abu Sayyaf Southeast Asian cluster Philippines 1991 1991 3 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 3 3
Yasser Igasan Abu Sayyaf Southeast Asian cluster Philippines 1991 1991 3 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3
137
Appendix V: Data on Universe of Cases
Figure 1: Number of Affiliations by Year
Number of Affiliations by Year
7
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
138
Appendix VI: Data on Q1
What motivates local jihadist leaders to affiliate with Al Qa’ida’s and its pan-Islamic
agenda?
Table 1: Chi-Squared Test (Three Scales)
Opportunistic Ideological Social Network
Motive Alignment Affiliation
Total 0 (Not a
motivation) 5 22 14
Total 1
(Secondary
motivation) 3 11 27
Total 2 (Primary
motivation) 33 8 0
Expected Total 0 13.67 13.67 13.67
Expected Total 1 13.67 13.67 13.67
Expected Total 2 13.67 13.67 13.67
P Value 1.14786E-09 0.018767854 1.60648E-06
Not a motivation 5 22 14
Motivation 36 19 27
Expected (Not a
motivation) 20.5 20.5 20.5
Expected
(Motivation) 20.5 20.5 20.5
P Value 1.28936E-06 0.639411853 0.042330234
139
Appendix VII: Data on Q2
What type of role do local jihadist leaders play within Al Qa’ida’s network when the
organization for which they are responsible affiliates with Al Qa’ida?
Table 3: Chi-Squared Test (Strength of operational, ideological, and logistic leadership before
and after the merger)
Operational Ideological Logistic
Before After Sum Before After Sum Before After Sum
Total Not
active (0) 7 4 11 6 4 10 6 4 10
Total
Weak (1) 10 5 15 7 10 17 8 3 11
Total
Average
(2) 7 12 19 16 5 21 11 17 28
Total
Strong (3) 17 20 37 12 22 34 16 17 33
Total 41 41 82 41 41 82 41 41 82
Expected
Not
active 5.5 5.5 5 5 5 5
Expected
Weak 7.5 7.5 8.5 8.5 5.5 5.5
Expected
Average 9.5 9.5 10.5 10.5 14 14
Expected
Strong 18.5 18.5 17 17 16.5 16.5
0.256764552 0.021962838 0.262682055
P Value
140
Table 4: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (Strength of operational, ideological, and logistic
leadership before and after the merger)
Wilcoxon Wilcoxon Wilcoxon
Signed Rank Signed Rank Signed Rank Wilcoxon
Test for Test for Test for Signed Rank
Operational Ideological Logistic Test for Overall
Leadership Leadership Leadership Leadership
Performance Performance Performance Performance
(pre-post) (pre-post) (pre-post) (pre-post)
# of 0
Differences 15 16 15 9
# of Ties 3 3 2 5
Z-Value -1.359 -1.466 -1.422 -1.898
P-Value 0.1742 0.1425 0.1549 0.0577
Tied Z-
Value -1.382 -1.526 -1.477 -1.91
Tied P-
Value 0.161 0.1269 0.1397 0.0562
Count 16 19 16 22
Sum of
Ranks 229 217 231.5 365.5
Mean
# Ranks <0 Rank 14.313 11.421 14.469 16.614
Count 10 6 10 10
Sum of
Ranks 122 108 119.5 162.5
# of Ranks Mean
>0 Rank 12.2 18 11.95 16.25
Table 5: Paired Sign Test (Strength of operational, ideological, and logistic leadership before
and after the merger)
Paired Sign Paired Sign
Test for Test for Paired Sign Test
Operational Ideological for Logistic Paired Sign Test for
Leadership Leadership Leadership Overall Leadership
Performance Performance Performance Performance (pre-
(pre-post) (pre-post) (pre-post) post)
# Differences >0 10 19 10 10
# of Differences
<0 16 6 16 22
# Differences =0 15 16 15 9
P-Value 0.3269 0.0146 0.3269 0.0501
141
Figures 4-6: Paired Sign Test Results
40
35
30
Score Difference (Post-Pre)
25
Improved
or no
20 change
15 Declined
10
0
Operational Ideologigcal Logistic Total
25
20
Score Difference (Post-Pre)
15
Improved
Declined
10
0
Operational Ideologigcal Logistic Total
142