The Benefits of Committees

Conventional wisdom by members of the NSO and those who agree with
them is that committees are generally useless and should be avoided at all costs.
This is something with which I highly disagree. In fact, it is odd that committees
have the reputation that they have among a group of people who believe the World
Assembly should only be dealing with the most important issues in the
international system. As an International Federalist, I believe committees play an
important role in global governance. To understand why, we should look at the two
types of broad issue areas in which the World Assembly deals. Aside from these two
areas, there are also practical and organizational uses for committees.
Solving Common Aversions
The first issue area that the World Assembly deals in is solving issues of
common aversions. These are issues where all states have an interest in avoiding a
certain outcome. The most common
example here is which side of the road to Actor B

drive on. Neither actor particularly cares B1 B2

if they drive on the left or the right side of Actor A1 1,1** 0,0
the road. However, everybody involved
A A2 0,0 1,1**
wants to avoid getting into a collision. In
order to do that, the actors need to ensure Basic game theory form for common aversions.
It is possible for actors to have different
that they both choose to either drive on the preferred outcomes. In that case, compromise is
generally necessary.
left or drive on the right. If they choose to
act independently, there is a high risk that they will choose different options, and
both end up with a 0,0 payoff – getting into a collision. The solution here would be
to coordinate their actions. They need to get together and decide which side of the
road to drive on. Once they come up with a decision, the solution is self-enforcing.
Neither side has any incentive to start driving on the opposite side of the road. If
they do, it will result in a collision. In the context of the World Assembly, solving
problems of common aversions does not require the use of a committee. It is
sufficient enough to pass a resolution setting down the rules. Once the rules are
established, nobody has any incentive to “cheat,” therefore organizations
(committees) are unnecessary.
Playing the Assurance-Provider
The second area is more complicated. This issue area is solving issues of
common interests. Problems of common interests occur when actors have dominant
preferred outcomes that are different from one another. In other words, Actor A’s
preferred outcome leaves it gaining more than Actor B’s preferred outcome, and
vice-versa. The most common example here is the Prisoners’ Dilemma. The scenario
is that you and your friend are arrested for robbing a bank. The police don’t have
enough evidence to convict either of you, although you are unaware of this fact. So,
they give you a choice: rat out your friend and you’ll be set free. The best possible
outcome for both you and your friend is if you both are set free and split the loot:
this is Choice 1, and result in a 3,3 payoff. Individually, the best outcome for you is
if you rat out your friend, but he stays quiet. In that case, your friend will go to jail
and you’ll get all the loot for yourself.
The ultimate result of this scenario is that you will rat on your friend and
your friend will rat on you, meaning you’ll both be in jail and will both end up with
the worst collective outcome possible. Why? It is not because you are both self-
interested and tried to get the loot all for yourself. That plays a part, but it is mostly
because you cannot trust your friend to not rat you out. You know that, just like
you, your friend’s best possible individual outcome is to rat on you and get all the
loot for himself. Knowing this, it would not make sense for you to stay quiet: there’s
too much a risk that your friend will talk and you’ll go to jail. Your friend is
thinking the exact same thing. In the end, because no assurance can be given that
you won’t rat on your friend and your friend won’t rat on you, both of you guys
choose to talk.
 This is highly analogous to an arms Actor B
treaty. It is highly difficult for two states to
B1 B2*
agree to reduce their arms, because neither
Actor A1 3,3 1,4
state can be assured that the other won’t
A
cheat and increase their arms while the A2* 4,1 2,2**

other reduces theirs. Absent any assurance ** = equilibrium outcome

* = actor’s dominant strategy
mechanisms, both states will refuse to
reduce their arms; they’ll increase their arms; and ultimately, both states will be
worse off security-wise, because now there are more arms in play. One of the most
important functions of the World Assembly is to provide assurance. The most
important issue in the international system is security, and assurance is an
absolute necessity in formation of security agreements, like arms reduction
resolutions. As an International Federalist, I do not favor simply writing down that
arms should be reduced and having faith that states will comply. The Prisoners’
Dilemma shows that, without failure, states will not comply. It is within their best
interests not to.
Other Beneficial Uses
Outside of solving common aversions and providing assurance in problems of
common interests, committees also have practical and organizational uses. First of
all, when we create committees to provide assurance, we need to staff those
committees and pay for the operations. This has led to the creation of the General
Accounting Office, a committee dedicated to assessing and collecting annual
payments that keep the World Assembly running. Technically, this is also a
problem of common aversions – all actors have a common aversion to the World
Assembly being rendered useless, for whatever reasons (acting as an assurance-
provider could be one, for example) – but it’s simpler to refer to this as a practical
and organizational use for committees.
Second, when problems of common aversions have divergent interests,
committees may be useful. When common aversion problems have divergent
interests, “cheating” incentives tend to form over time. This means that, to use the
road example, after the resolution passes, a state might determine that it is too
expensive to change their driving style. In this case, a committee could provide
assistance. It could also ensure compliance with fines, for example, to take a less
benign approach. There are many situations in which problems of common
aversions could use committees.
Another beneficial use of committees is in the realm of humanitarianism,
environmentalism, social equality, etc. Most of the time, these areas will deal with
common aversions or common interests. However, there are situations where the
introduction of a committee can be beneficial without solving any “problems” at all,
in the sense of game theory problems. Take, for example, the World Microcredit
Foundation. It helps stimulate small business in rural and poor areas. Could this
have been done without a committee? Possibly, but the introduction of a committee
has many positive benefits. First of all, it decreases the complexity needed in the
proposal. Instead of having to write out every single rule, a committee can be
created to establish rules. This is very useful for complex issue areas. Second of all,
the committee can act. Instead of just writing down what should be done, the World
Assembly can take a hands-on role with a committee.
When Committees Shouldn’t Be Established
This all begs the question of when committees simply aren’t useful. There is
certainly one universal situation in which no committee is generally necessary:
when there are no incentives to cheat. If oversight is not needed, if the resolutions
are self-enforcing, or if assurance doesn’t need to be provided, there is probably no
use for a committee.
Beyond that, it becomes a far more political issue. Should we establish a
committee to oversee the protection of museums and cultural heritage sites? That
largely depends on whether you believe museums and cultural heritage sites are
valuable and need protection. International Federalism cannot provide a stance on
these issues. If it is valuable, then in theory a committee is beneficial. Where
National Sovereigntists seem to be in agreement is that committees, in these cases,
can be objectively “useless.”