Countering WMD in Africa: A Fresh Perspective

The Obama administration’s 2010 National Security Strategy states, “The gravest danger to the American

people and global security continues to come from weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear

weapons.” Certainly this is not a new sentiment – both Republican and Democratic administrations have

focused on the issue of “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD), and in particular, how the United States

should balance its national strategy to continue employing nuclear weapons under the concept of strategic

deterrence while encouraging other nations to not pursue developing the same weapons for their national

defense. The idea that terrorists might some day obtain and employ a nuclear weapon against a U.S. city

is also not new – it has been expressed as far back as 1946 when J. Robert Oppenheimer famously

quipped that a screwdriver was the key instrument needed to detect an atomic bomb hidden somewhere in

a city, since each and every crate and suitcase would have to be inspected.

According to U.S. Africa Command’s (USAFRICOM) 2010 posture statement, Africa features an

immensely diverse population. There are more than a billion people on the continent in 53 countries,

which include 800 ethnic cultures using about 1,000 different languages. It is no stranger to continued

violence from nation-states, insurgents, terrorists, or criminals. The number of inter- and intra-state

conflicts in Africa may have decreased over the past 10 years, but there is ample evidence of new and

continued hostilities in the future. The 2010 Joint Operating Environment warns that many developing

countries across the globe will face continued population growth and poor economies, which leads to

increased frustration and potential violence. Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, faces social and economic

challenges that are made worse by corrupt or inept governments, powerful international corporations,

criminal organizations, and regional health crises. Given this gloomy prognosis, it is fair to examine

whether African nations or non-state actors will be interested in the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical

(NBC) weapons in an attempt to keep any future conflict (either internal or external) short, inexpensive,

and resolved in their favor.

Contrary to the usual rhetorical statements, the proliferation of NBC weapons and related technology has

been mercifully limited below expectations. There has been no nuclear weapons attack since 1945 by

either nation-states or terrorists. There has not been a mass casualty attack using biological weapons by

either nation-states or terrorists, even as the United States and the former Soviet Union grew their

offensive biological warfare programs during the Cold War. There have been numerous cases of chemical

warfare between 1915 and 1990, with one significant chemical terrorism incident – the Aum Shinrikyo

use of sarin nerve agent in the Tokyo subway in 1995 – but nothing since then. Yet the common wisdom

is that “it is only a question of when, not if” a WMD terrorist incident will occur, largely because of the

increased availability of technology and materials through the global economy. Notably, this warning to

us about the inevitability of “the unthinkable” does not arise from the basis of any intelligence

assessments about terrorist capability or increased proliferation by nation-states, but rather it is an

exaggerated projection about actors’ ambitions and worst-case scenarios.

This projection has led the Department of Defense (DoD), the State Department, and other government

agencies to address the challenge of WMD proliferation in Africa. Because USAFRICOM was only

recently created, it is still establishing its WMD proliferation prevention initiatives and developing

regional plans for counter-WMD efforts. Thus, there is an opportunity to shape and influence its efforts to

support execution of the U.S. government’s nonproliferation goals. This paper will suggest that

USAFRICOM should not pattern its approach based on the current counter-WMD strategy, one that has

its origins in the late 1990s and was promulgated in 2002. Rather, because of the unique characteristics of

U.S. foreign policy objectives and of Africa in general, and because the basic U.S. counter-WMD strategy

has significant flaws, a new approach is required.

Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction

Because the term “WMD” has been carelessly used by so many people for so many reasons over the last

decade, it is important to briefly explain exactly what terminology should be used in the discussion of
countering WMD in Africa. Once the “word of the year” in 2002, the term is now more often used as a

punchline in comedy clubs. In 1948, the United Nations defined WMD as “atomic explosive weapons,

radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the

future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other

weapons mentioned above.” For most of the Cold War, “WMD” was a term used by arms control experts

to attempt to develop international guidelines on their use during combat between nations at war, and

ideally their prohibition. The United States and the Soviet Union invested billions of dollars into

developing massive infrastructures supporting the development and military use of tons of chemical

warfare agents, hundreds of pounds of biological agents, and megaton-yield nuclear weapons. These

weapons truly could cause mass casualties on the battlefield and devastate major cities.

As the Cold War drew down in the late 1980s, the threat of international terrorism, which had emerged in

the 1970s, continued to rise to the forefront of national attention. This included the bombing of the U.S.

Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait in 1983, the

Achille Lauro hijacking in 1986, the Berlin disco bombing in 1986, and the Pan Am 103 bombing in

1988. There was a noticeable trend of terrorist incidents moving outside of the Middle East into the rest of

the world. The first two Gulf Wars, the Iran-Iraq conflict and the Persian Gulf War, demonstrated that the

use of chemical weapons was not limited to the two superpowers. The early 1990s featured terrorist

incidents such as the World Trade Center bombing (1993), Oklahoma City (1995), Aum Shinrikyo’s

Tokyo subway incident (1995), and the Khobar towers bombing (1996). These incidents caused the law

enforcement community to fear that terrorists would use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear

(CBRN) material against the civilian populace. In response, Congress passed a law in 1994 making it a

federal crime to use or attempt to use CBRN material – in any quantity – with the intent to cause death or

serious injury. In 1997, Congress passed a law directing the Secretary of Defense to begin developing

military capabilities to support the federal response to a domestic CBRN terrorist incident.
The Gilmore Commission for Homeland Security released its first report in 1999. One of its more cogent

observations was that the term “CBRN terrorism” was more appropriate than the “WMD terrorism” term.

Its logic was that terrorists were not expected to obtain the same military-grade NBC weapons or use

these weapons in such a fashion that would create mass casualties or cause mass destruction (nuclear

weapons not withstanding). Between 1998 and 2001, many analysts and other professionals used the term

“CBRN terrorism” or “CBRNE terrorism” (adding high-yield explosives), but that practice was overcome

by fear caused by the anthrax attacks in the United States in late 2001 and postulations that Saddam

Hussein’s WMD program might lead to transfers of materiel and technology to terrorist groups. It is very

important to distinguish the deliberate development, testing, and stockpiling of NBC weapons for military

use from the improvised development and limited employment of CBRN hazards in terrorist incidents.

Background of Counter-WMD Strategy

Prior to 1991, the U.S. national policy was that the United States would respond against the use of NBC

weapons against its armed forces with equal measure, but not necessarily in kind. This was classic

strategic deterrence theory for unconventional weapons. That is to say, if an adversary were to use nuclear

weapons, the U.S. government would probably respond with nuclear weapons. If an adversary used

chemical weapons, the response could be with chemical weapons or something equivalent in destructive

power. Since the U.S. capability to use chemical weapons was not as robust as it was prior to 1970, a

massive conventional weapons response or even tactical nuclear weapons might be considered. The U.S.

government had unilaterally given up offensive biological weapons in 1969, so again, a massive

conventional response or nuclear weapons might be in order. The other two “legs” of U.S. national policy

relating to NBC weapons use were arms control activities and NBC defense equipment for military

forces. This model was used throughout the Cold War period, basically envisioning a scenario of fighting

in Europe against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact allies.

When U.S. forces faced the Iraqi military in 1991, they found that this model didn’t really work.

Ambiguous threats of retaliation masked the issue that U.S. leadership couldn’t really use nuclear

weapons against a non-nuclear state, and every strategic target in Iraq was already being hit by

overwhelming conventional power. Arms control measures had not been rigorously applied to Iraq, even

after its first use of chemical weapons against Iran. Following the war, the Clinton administration initiated

a Defense Counterproliferation Initiative that was intended to develop policy and measures to deter and

counter non-nuclear adversarial states that had chemical or biological weapon stockpiles.

After years of discussion, the General Accounting Office criticized the lack of a formal military strategy

to accompany the stated defense policy. OSD tasked the Joint Staff to develop this strategy in 1996. The

counterproliferation strategy initially focused on three activities: proliferation prevention (DoD activities

supporting nonproliferation activities), offensive capabilities (counterforce), and defensive capabilities

(active and passive defense). Counterforce operations would attack WMD sites and weapon systems prior

to their use on the battlefield, while active defense (primarily air and missile defense) would intercept any

incoming delivery systems containing NBC warheads. Passive defense included those actions taken by

military personnel to protect themselves against a successful release of NBC weapons.

Because of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense against WMD Act of 1996, Defense Secretary William

Cohen directed the establishment of what would eventually be called the WMD Civil Support Teams,

which were small 22-person special teams, one in each state and territory, to advise and assist state and

local emergency responders in consequence management of terrorist CBRN incidents. The Federal

Emergency Response Agency would lead the federal response to a domestic terrorist CBRN incident,

with DoD forces in support. The final counterproliferation strategy, signed out in 2001, included

counterforce, active and passive defense, and consequence management as core capabilities.

In 2002, the Bush administration took the Joint Staff’s counterproliferation strategy and incorporated

nonproliferation to create the National Strategy to Combat WMD. In addition, the National Security
Council staff had made some significant changes in the document, primarily due to the terrorist attacks on

September 11, 2001, and the anthrax attacks in October and November 2001. The national strategy now

declared that terrorist groups were pursuing WMD capabilities through rogue states that were developing

or had the capacity to produce NBC weapons. Instead of focusing on the protection of military forces, the

new combating WMD strategy now called for the protection of the homeland and U.S. armed forces. The

strategy downplayed nonproliferation activities, arguing that treaties were ineffective in preventing WMD

proliferation, and stronger measures were required. The most significant change from the Joint Staff-

developed strategy was moving consequence management from a subordinate mission under

counterproliferation to an equal pillar to nonproliferation and counterproliferation. This move emphasized

the administration’s concern over WMD terrorism and the need for a more robust strategy that would

focus on perceived domestic vulnerabilities as well as protecting U.S. military forces.

The Bush administration also released a National Strategy for Homeland Security in 2002 and a National

Strategy for Combating Terrorism in 2003. Both documents also addressed WMD terrorism, the former

by discussing how the U.S. government would address the threat of terrorism incidents within the United

States, and the latter by outlining how the U.S. government would address the threat of terrorism external

to the United States. While these strategies were intended to be complementary, they contributed to

significant misunderstanding and disagreements as to roles and responsibilities addressing the threat of

WMD to U.S. national security interests. It took years of debate and heated discussions within the

government to work out these roles and responsibilities, which is one reason as to why the National

Military Strategy to Combat WMD was released four years after the National Strategy. In January 2005,

the failure to find WMD in Iraq led Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to direct the U.S. Strategic

Command to “integrate and synchronize” DoD combating WMD efforts, beginning with the development

of WMD interdiction and WMD elimination capabilities. These two capabilities were added to the two

nonproliferation activities, three counterproliferation capabilities, and consequence management mission

to result in the current strategic framework.

Today, the term has changed from “combating” to “countering” WMD. While the National Strategy has

not yet been changed (and the National Security Presidential Directives remain in effect), the implication

is that the current administration favors nonproliferation over counterproliferation, as opposed to the

former administration’s preferences. Certainly President Obama’s personal involvement in leading

international nuclear nonproliferation activities in 2009 bear out that approach, if not through the release

of any new directives or strategic guidance. At the end of 2009, the White House released a National

Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. This strategy called for a common approach to preventing

and responding to both man-made biological warfare agents and natural infectious diseases. The emphasis

on WMD interdiction and elimination remain as desirable as with the previous administration, focusing

on the potential threats from Iran and North Korea in particular. There are few differences, if any,

between the current and previous administration in their views to either counter or combat WMD. Both

administrations have referred to the need to “prevent, protect, and respond” to the WMD threat.

Combating WMD Terrorism

The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism identifies six objectives to address WMD terrorism.

These efforts are largely executed between the State Department, as the lead federal agency for this area,

and those elements within the DoD that are responsible for combating terrorism. These include:

 Determine terrorists' intentions, capabilities, and plans to develop or acquire WMD

 Deny terrorists access to the materials, expertise, and other enabling capabilities required to

develop WMD

 Deter terrorists from employing WMD

 Detect and disrupt terrorists' attempted movement of WMD-related materials, weapons, and

personnel

 Prevent and respond to a WMD-related terrorist attack

 Define the nature and source of a terrorist-employed WMD device

This strategy explicitly states that terrorist groups, no one in particular, intend “to acquire and use

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to inflict even more catastrophic attacks against the United States.”

It includes the oft-quoted line “We cannot permit the world’s most dangerous terrorists and their regime

sponsors to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.” Most high-level government officials

who use this rhetorical line are suggesting that terrorist groups are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapon

from a foreign government, with that government’s willing or unwilling participation or through illicit

activities, and bring it to the United States with the intention of destroying a U.S. city. The actual ability

of terrorist groups to develop a militarized NBC weapon of any type with the purpose of causing mass

casualties is not addressed by any open source government documents, but more recent unclassified

intelligence reports to Congress have merely stated that “some terrorist groups” are seeking to acquire

“CBRN materials and threaten to use them.” This is a far cry from the “world’s most dangerous

terrorists” and “world’s most destructive weapons.”

Nonetheless, the six WMD objectives in this strategy do offer an official position on the development of

international activities supporting an increased capability to identify and prevent terrorist acquisition of

CBRN materials or development of a WMD capability. It focuses on the development of a global

approach to deny access to WMD-related materials, notably fissile materials, through increased

discussions with partner nations, deterrence options, interdiction operations, global operation centers to

monitor technology and material transfers, and development of consequence management capabilities for

overseas response. The actual metrics and progress in these six objectives, however, are less obvious.

The National Counterterrorism Center’s 2009 annual report on terrorism noted that there had been

approximately 11,800 terrorist attacks in 2008 resulting in more than 54,000 deaths, injuries, and

kidnappings. None of them involved CBRN material. Nearly all of them were caused by armed assaults,

high explosives, or other conventional weapons. That is to say, it is much easier for terrorist groups to

acquire easily available material and use it for violence than to try to acquire NBC weapons that nation-

states have spent billions in developing and testing for the purposes of large-scale coverage and
significant casualties. The reason for the overwhelming absence of terrorist organizations gaining WMD

capabilities is not due to the success of any national strategy, but rather the ease and availability of

conventional weapons that more than adequately allow those groups to execute their plans.

Components of National Military Strategy

To understand how USAFRICOM addresses the WMD threat, it is necessary to quickly walk through the

eight military mission areas within the National Military Strategy. Nonproliferation mission areas include

security cooperation and partner activities and threat reduction cooperation activities that are intended to

deter, roll back, or prevent WMD proliferation from occurring. The first includes those efforts to improve

international efforts to prevent proliferation as well as building up partner nation capabilities to protect

against and respond to WMD attacks. By building relationships based on discussions on WMD threats,

the United States fosters a common awareness of the threat as well as building coalitions and improving

interoperability. The latter includes efforts to detect, monitor, and attribute WMD programs as well as

assisting nations in securing, dismantling, and destroying WMD stockpiles. The most visible effort is the

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program that destroys NBC weapons within the former Soviet

Union and addresses physical security challenges of the weapons. The program is expanding beyond its

initial charter to include addressing biological threats in Asia and East Africa. While African laboratories

focus on naturally occurring biological organisms in the course of addressing public health and research,

some of the same pathogens (e.g., anthrax, Marburg, and Ebola virus) were biological warfare agents in

former Soviet Union laboratories. In 2010, the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense authorized the

expansion of the CTR Chemical-Biological Engagement Program to Africa. Focusing on a few states

(Kenya and Uganda), this program may expand to other countries interested in participating in the effort.

Closely related to the nonproliferation military mission areas and bridging into counterproliferation

military mission areas is WMD interdiction, embodied in the form of the Proliferation Security Initiative

(PSI). This initiative does not have a formal international agreement to follow but rather is a cooperative
effort among participating nations to use existing laws and jurisdictions to intercept and inspect naval

vessels for WMD-related technologies and materials. The United States also trains border guards of

European and Asian nations to inspect vehicles and trains for radiological materials, and an air

interdiction effort is being developed. The State Department traditionally leads these nonproliferation

areas with close support from agencies within the DoD and the Department of Energy (DoE).

Counterproliferation mission areas, on the other hand, are largely oriented on protecting U.S. forces

during military operations from the effects of deployed WMD delivery systems. While the tools and

concepts are somewhat applicable to counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism efforts, these missions are

primarily focused on limiting casualties from the deployment and use of weapon systems developed by an

adversarial nation’s offensive WMD program. There are three mission areas developed along a linear line

of execution. Offensive operations, the new name for counter-force, focuses on destroying the WMD

production and storage sites within a given nation, or destroying the delivery systems (artillery, missiles,

aircraft) prior to their releasing NBC weapons against U.S. forces. Active defense includes air and missile

defenses designed to intercept a delivery system while in flight. This should not be equated to the national

missile defense program, but rather the protection of a much smaller theater of operations. Last, passive

defense includes those efforts to minimize the effects of NBC weapons once they are employed against

U.S. troops. This includes the traditional set of agent detectors and monitors, hazard prediction and

decision support tools, individual protective suits and masks, medical countermeasures, collective

protection systems, and decontamination systems.

Similar to WMD interdiction, WMD elimination is something of an outlier that bridges

counterproliferation and consequence management. Given a situation where the United States wishes to

completely dismantle a current or former adversary’s WMD capability, either during combat operations

or immediately following, the U.S. military will use WMD specialists, explosives experts, intelligence

analysts, and other supporting functions under a joint task force structure. These efforts might involve

either rolling up stockpile sites and apprehending scientists and engineers involved in an offensive WMD
program, or deploying to a failed state, such as the possible collapse of North Korea, to secure those

weapons from being lost or stolen.

Consequence management is a very complex and misunderstood pillar and mission area. At its root

function, the intent is to offer military specialists to assist a state or local government, or a foreign

government, in the response to a CBRN incident and support the restoration of critical and essential

services. There has been extensive debate as to what the DoD role is in both domestic CBRN response

and foreign CBRN response, since in spirit, the DoD is supposed to be subordinate to either the

Department of Homeland Security or the State Department (respectively). And yet, due to differing

definitions of consequence management, views on roles and responsibilities, ability to fund and execute

particular functions, it remains unclear exactly how these operations should unfold. The plans to respond

to multiple, simultaneous mass casualty events results in high demands on resources and technical

expertise. On the other hand, the very low probability that terrorists will successfully use CBRN hazards

and lack of clarity on the actual requirement from state/local governments and foreign nations has

resulted in a reluctance to adequately invest the necessary personnel and resources.

Getting past the potential challenges within this framework and the philosophical soundness of the

strategy, the common approach to implementing this strategy is that it requires a global perspective to

plan and execute. Because (in theory) WMD proliferation activities cross geographic areas of

responsibility, because global economics and global communications enable the free flow of materials

and technology with limited visibility and accountability, because non-state actors are not limited in their

choice of targets, the U.S. military requires a unified and global approach to countering WMD threats. If

(hypothetically speaking) terrorists use criminal organizations in Africa to move a nuclear weapon from

Pakistan to the United States, the cooperation of African nations to counter that activity would be

beneficial. In that light, the U.S. Strategic Command has the task to assist the combatant commands in

developing regional plans that mirror the National Military Strategy, thus ensuring the ability to execute

nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management missions in any region of the world.
Developing USAFRICOM’s CWMD Regional Plan

Among the many DoD concept plans is Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 8099 or Combating WMD Campaign

Plan, developed by U.S. Strategic Command. This plan incorporates national-level guidance for

countering WMD with the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) – a document that establishes

the Department’s force development planning and resource priorities needed to met future contingencies

– and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which provides guidance to the combatant commands and

Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. The intent is

to provide a common framework (the eight mission areas) and methodology for DoD plans and operations

that will allow the development and execution of a global strategy to counter WMD. U.S. Strategic

Command also oversaw the completion of a Joint Integrating Concept for Combating WMD in 2007. In

addition to describing how a military commander would conduct future counter-WMD operations, it lays

out the template by which the services and defense agencies identify capability gaps. A Joint Capabilities

Document for countering WMD was approved in 2008, which outlined material and non-material

capability gaps that might limit the military’s ability to operate in operations that included WMD use.

U.S. Strategic Command’s role, as originally identified in 2005, is two-fold – to synchronize regional

counter-WMD plans and to advocate for the address of military capability gaps identified in the process

of evaluating how well the services and combatant commands can currently execute the counter-WMD

strategy. In this fashion, military capabilities developed for situations involving unconventional weapons

is uniform, allowing low-density, high demand assets to be applicable across the globe. The question

becomes, does this synchronization approach amount to a boilerplate process of taking a particular

framework and forcing it over each combatant command? Does every geographic combatant command

require the same capabilities amongst nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence

management missions? What happens when a geographic command – such as USAFRICOM or U.S.

Southern Command – doesn’t have any nation-states with offensive WMD programs, nor terrorist groups

with WMD ambitions? Does it make sense to apply this singular approach in that situation?
It should be obvious that the U.S. government’s approach to Africa is different than how it addresses

other regions of the world. Without going into a lengthy discussion of U.S.-Africa history, it should be

safe to say that U.S. involvement was largely constrained until the introduction of a Bureau of African

Affairs in the State Department in 1958. Diplomatic and military issues largely revolved around Cold

War confrontations with Soviet-backed nations and facing the challenge of ending apartheid in South

Africa. Humanitarian aid, disease prevention and treatment initiatives, and economic assistance programs

have been ongoing in Africa for decades. The deaths of 18 American soldiers in Somalia in 1993,

followed by bombings at U.S. embassies at Tanzania and Kenya, have decreased the appetite to station

U.S. military troops in Africa, but have increased U.S. involvement in combating international terrorism.

President Obama’s priorities for U.S. government engagement in Africa are listed in USAFRICOM’s

2010 posture statement. They include supporting strong and sustainable democracies, fostering sustained

economic growth, improving health and education levels, and reducing the level of armed conflict in the

continent. These objectives are all led by the State Department, with DoD in support, without a permanent

military presence in any African nation. Across this huge land of nearly 12 million square miles inhabited

by a billion people in 53 countries, USAFRICOM’s theater strategic objectives include defeating al

Qaeda, ensuring that the capacity to execute peace operations, deterring and rolling back WMD

proliferation, improving security and stability in the region, and protecting the population from deadly

contagions. This is a massive challenge, considering the small scope of military support available to

USAFRICOM and its headquarters being in Germany rather than in an African nation.

Nearly all U.S. government nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities are conducted in Europe,

the Middle East, and Asia. Unlike the personal relationships forged between American and Russian

politicians as a result of arms control talks, there have been no parallel relationships with African

politicians built on collaborative counter-WMD efforts. USAFRICOM’s budget for building partnerships

and security cooperation agreements is not near the scale of other combatant commands, and given the

lack of any known WMD-owning state or WMD proliferation activities, that should not be surprising.
The question has to be asked – if there are no WMD-armed nation-states in Africa, if there are no terrorist

groups that are attempting to acquire CBRN materials from African nations, and if there are no plans for

involving U.S. military combat operations in Africa, why should USAFRICOM have to spend

considerable time, energy, and resources developing a regional CONPLAN 8099?

Nonproliferation Status of African Nations

One can appreciate the unique nature of Africa’s WMD issues through examination of its nation-state

participation in international nonproliferation agreements. Nearly all of the states are signatories and/or

have ratified their acceptance of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The three exceptions are

Egypt, Angola, and Somalia. Egypt has refused to sign the CWC as long as Israel possesses nuclear

weapons. It is unclear why Angola or Somalia have not signed or acceded to the treaty, other than perhaps

that neither state sees any benefit to doing so. Although South Africa and Libya had offensive chemical

weapons programs, both have openly declared their programs and are no longer developing those

weapons. Interestingly, Sudan acceded to the CWC a year after the United States bombed a Sudanese

pharmaceutical factory in 1998 suspected of producing VX agent for al Qaeda. No other country in Africa

has shown any desire to develop chemical weapons, and signing onto and ratifying the CWC improves

one’s chance of importing chemicals off the global economy and developing indigenous chemical

industries within one’s country.

The status of countries that have signed the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) is

somewhat different. Of the 53 nations in Africa, 35 have both signed and ratified the BTWC, but eight

have not ratified any accession to the treaty, and 10 have neither signed nor acceded to the treaty. As to

why so many nations have not taken steps to join this effort, the primary one seems to be one of

resources. The focus of most African countries is on disease prevention and biosecurity relating to their

food crops and livestock. No African country appears to be interested in biological weapons today (with

the possible exception of Egypt, again because of Israel’s WMD program). In contrast to the CWC, the
BWC has no effective verification mechanism and does not stipulate punitive measures for non-

compliance. The overwhelming majority of the African states have invested very little time with the

BTWC, the exception being South Africa, despite their dependency on agriculture and farming and the

presence of major infectious diseases.

All of the African nations have supported a “nuclear free” Africa and have all signed onto the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty. Since South Africa and Libya have abandoned their nuclear weapons programs,

there are no indications that any other nation has any interest in this area. However, the growth of nuclear

technology to support medical efforts, address energy needs, run desalination plants, and sell to nuclear

power plants outside of Africa, has caused concern that radiological material may be vulnerable to

exploitation by criminal or terrorist activities. The fact that there has never been a terrorist incident

involving a radiological dispersal device in recorded history doesn’t seem to faze those predictions of

gloom and doom. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. National Nuclear Security

Administration are very active in assisting those nations with advice on securing, monitoring, and

disposing of radiological material.

There are at least two international agreements that are of importance. The first is the Proliferation

Security Initiative, an effort developed by the Bush administration to interdict and inspect ocean-borne

cargo that might be carrying WMD-related materials and technical components or ballistic missile parts.

The PSI is not an arms control organization; rather, it is a multi-lateral coalition of nation-states who

agree to support inspecting ships that fly under their flags or that stop at their ports using existing laws

and regulations. By not promoting any new laws or agreements, the PSI avoids the encumberment of

hosting treaty review conferences and negotiating new agreements. There are no binding agreements or

reporting requirements. It is largely driven by the United States and has hosted exercises in several

regions of the world. Six African countries (Angola, Djibouti, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia)

participate in the PSI. Of course, land-locked nations need not apply.

The United Nations Security Committee passed Resolution 1540 to address existing loopholes in

nonproliferation agreements by requiring all UN members to criminalize the proliferation of WMD

material and technology to non-state actors. It mandates the implementation and enforcement of measures

within national legislation to prevent terrorist groups from being able to develop, acquire, manufacture,

possess, transport, transfer or use any type of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon. While UNSCR

1540 is generally well-received as a good measure, the challenge is in developing and enforcing laws

within each nation to do exactly that. In addition, the resolution requires member states to report to the

committee on what steps they have taken or plan to take to implement these provisions. Overall, 34 of 53

African nations have not submitted their 1540 reports since the resolution was adopted in 2004.

Again, nearly all African states are of a mind that they do not need nor require nuclear, biological, or

chemical weapons. But they do question the Security Council’s authority to enforce this measure that

basically dictates the creation of local laws to address the potential WMD proliferation challenge. Some

states have the concern that the UNSCR 1540 will be used as a pretext for military action or economic

sanctions by the United States or other nations against noncompliant nations. There is the impression that

other nations are expected to go to great lengths to assure the United States it will not be attacked by

international terrorists that are acquiring CBRN hazards for nefarious use. The emphasis on controlling

WMD-related materials and technologies in nations without WMD programs seems misplaced against the

lack of apparent disarmament by nuclear-weapon owning states. As members of the Non-Aligned

Movement, African states do want to have input and consultations on arms control issues, but their input

is often controlled and has limited impact in any outcome.

The CWMD Strategy is Flawed

The challenge is greater than one of determining how Africa’s unique challenges ought to be addressed

under the U.S. counter-WMD strategy. The National Strategy to Combat WMD is significantly flawed,

and since the entire approach to developing regional concept plans to counter WMD is based on that
national strategy, it becomes difficult to envision why any combatant command would want to use this

framework (other than U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command, perhaps, who do have to

address nation-state WMD programs). When the counterproliferation strategy was initially released in

2001, prior to 9/11, it was very focused on protecting U.S. military forces from NBC weapons. It was

intended to enable combat forces to survive and to sustain operations against an adversary with CB

weapons on overseas battlefields.

After 9/11, the strategy was modified to include counterterrorism and homeland security concerns. This

created the collision of very unique communities – the counter-WMD community (including

nonproliferation and counterproliferation), the combating terrorism community (including counter-

terrorism and antiterrorism), and the homeland security community (including homeland defense and

consequence management). These very different communities were all considered to have responsibilities

under the combating/countering WMD concept. It took two solid years for the DoD to deconflict the roles

and responsibilities of each community, to determine what definitions were appropriate, and to develop

operational plans that did not overlap or conflict between the communities.

Of course, this challenge was only made more difficult when other federal government agencies entered

into the discussions. Formerly, this WMD issue area was largely limited to State and Defense. With the

new concern about terrorism and homeland security, the Department of Justice became increasingly

involved in the topic to the point of changing the definition of what constituted a WMD. Any amount of

explosives or industrial chemicals used to harm a person now became part of the WMD lexicon for law

enforcement purposes. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) became involved in

overseeing the development and storage of medical countermeasures for federal responses to CBRN

terrorism and for the protection of military forces. The National Guard Bureau became intimately

involved in developing a huge federal response force for domestic terrorist CBRN incidents, an issue with

decidedly political overtones. The DoE retained its focus on nuclear weapons and radiological/nuclear
terrorism, but found itself more intimately involved with similar efforts ongoing within the Departments

of Homeland Security and Defense.

The nature of the threat has changed for the DoD as well. Once it was enough to focus on a particular set

of NBC weapons that had been developed and tested by nation-states to cause mass casualties on the

battlefield or in use against cities that were strategic targets. With the increased concern about

international terrorism, the case was made that “rogue states” would either unwittingly or willingly

provide terrorists with weapon-grade materiel ready for use against unprotected noncombatants. This

concern grew to include viewing terrorists as being eager to develop their own capabilities using

industrial chemicals, natural endemic diseases, and radiological material as improvised “WMDs.” The

challenge is clear – it is one thing to carefully draw up regulations and to develop protections against a

select class of military capabilities. It is quite another to include tens of thousands of industrial chemicals

that are manufactured in millions of gallons every year; scores of natural biological diseases that affect

humans, plants and animals across the globe; and radiological materials required to fuel nuclear power

plants and to support public health care.

Given the greater scope of the strategy and the increased number of federal agencies (let alone the aspects

of international research and development agreements, building partner capabilities, and arms control

talks), one might expect an increased role in the oversight and management of said federal agencies with

respect to countering WMD concerns. And one would be wrong. While there are pockets of excellence in

the National Security Staff and other federal agencies that address certain discrete issues, there is no

coordinated discussion or evaluation of how the U.S. government – let alone the DoD – addresses WMD

issues. A conscious decision to segregate WMD activities from mainstream national security and foreign

policy discussions has resulted in a small community of subject-matter experts who often do not have the

time, authority, or skills to address the many critical issues. So while the national attention is on major

operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, there is very little focus

on evaluating how the U.S. military (and federal government overall) is doing on countering WMD.
The fundamental principal that seems to guide the counter-WMD strategy, throughout its evolution, is

that if the DoD outlines a particular linear path of how adversaries will develop and use NBC weapons or

CBRN hazards against U.S. forces, territories or interests, the DoD should be able to develop capabilities

to employ against certain critical points in that path to ensure that the United States and its armed forces

will not be encumbered or influenced by the use of those weapons. Therefore, the United States will avoid

having to deal with the negative impacts of those weapons and it will be able to fight and protect itself on

its own terms. This approach has resulted in developing a large number of political and military leaders

who are ignorant of WMD issues because they expect the arms control and technical experts to have

taken care of this particular challenge. And since the arms control and technical experts have allowed the

challenge to grow across three communities of interest and to increase in scope in terms of the

composition and type of threat, it has become unmanageable and thus cannot be expected to succeed.

Back to the Future

USAFRICOM’s focused mission, small staff, and limited operational funding, combined with Africa’s

unique nature, dictate the need for a new strategy and a more appropriate concept plan to address

potential WMD threats. Using the eight military mission areas outlined in the National Military Strategy

and developing a regional concept plan based on that framework is not appropriate for a region of the

world that lacks any mature WMD threat, that has such turmoil caused by war, terrorism, and crime, that

features so many developing countries with other, more pressing priorities. At the same time, this

important region also features rapidly growing industrial companies that interact with the global

economy, continued struggles against outbreaks of major infectious diseases, and difficulties addressing

the transit of weapons and other illicit cargo across international borders.

Dealing with the WMD threat of the future requires that we look back to how we dealt with the WMD

threat of the past. During the Cold War, the model was “diplomacy, deterrence, defense.” Again, since

there is no real WMD threat in Africa and the current U.S. policy approach is to eschew offensive
military involvement in Africa, the new model should be “diplomacy, development, defense.” This

means, first and foremost, that the State Department needs to lead nonproliferation activities (as it

currently does) by assisting African nations to understand how they can implement the CWC, BTWC,

NPT, and other arms control agreements to the benefit of all involved. This includes the sponsorship of

conferences and symposia on WMD-related topics for both defense and academics in the region, as well

as discussions on how the global threat is evolving and what actions individual nations can do to lessen

the chance of any accidental or willing support to other nations’ WMD programs occurring within their

jurisdiction.

This is different than the traditional “threat reduction” and “security cooperation” activities outlined in the

nonproliferation section of the current counter-WMD strategic framework. If there are no active WMD

programs in Africa, there can hardly be any offensive WMD stockpiles to reduce or any need to equip

foreign militaries with CBRN defense capabilities. Obviously it is in the interests of the United States to

have African countries actively support and participate in PSI, but that benefits the United States more

than African states. The concern about terrorists obtaining CBRN materials or criminal organizations

trafficking in CBRN materials or technology needs to be addressed by attacking the root causes of

international terrorism and crime. That is to say, if African (and U.S.) concerns are about terrorists using

CBRN materials, then the answer is to stop the terrorists before they get the materials. This doesn’t

require WMD expertise; it requires law enforcement and intelligence activities combined with border

security. WMD is the lesser concern for African nations, compared to international terrorism and crime.

The “development” part of this proposed strategy focuses on working with African nations to improve

their capabilities to address challenges related to industrial chemicals, endemic infectious diseases, and

radiological materials. It is a mistake to attempt to push biological threat reduction efforts onto African

nations in an attempt to monitor their public health systems and to catalogue the major infectious diseases

in the region. Yes, African nations require assistance to address these diseases, and there are more

appropriate agencies other than DoD and USAFRICOM to assist them. It is more important to ensure that
DHHS and international agencies such as the World Health Organization are engaged on public health

challenges than having DoD and State pushing monies for the establishment of biosurveillance

laboratories that address U.S. concerns about bioterrorism. The focus needs to be on African priorities to

reduce the impact of natural infectious diseases.

There is a parallel concern about radiological materials and technology in Africa. There is no question

that nuclear technology will proliferate in Africa to support the growing population and demand for

improved public and industrial services. The DoE is already heavily engaged with the security and control

of radiological materials, as is the International Atomic Energy Agency. The DoD should voice its

support for such measures but avoid duplicating these programs or attempting to force a WMD-terrorism

concern where no such evidence exists to support such fears. The arguments for DoD participation in both

biosecurity and radiological monitoring programs has been that adding defense funds to existing efforts

will have some kind of synergistic effect on improving security from WMD threats. One might also see

an equally compelling argument that too many bureaucratic projects will create more challenges and

waste than synergy.

The “defense” part is two-fold – first, DoD should support State, DHHS, and DoE as described above,

through encouragement toward African nations to engage rather than by duplicating those federal agency

efforts. As long as there are no African nations developing NBC weapons, there really is no need to

develop counterproliferation capabilities for either U.S. forces engaged on the continent or for African

forces. It would be a waste of time and funds to consider building air and missile defense sites or

outfitting military troops with protective suits and masks, time and funds that would be better applied to

combating terrorism and developing intelligence sources that improve situational awareness. But there is

this question about how USAFRICOM should develop “consequence management” capabilities for

Africa. Ironically, all other U.S. federal agencies have abandoned the terms “crisis” and “consequence”

management and now talk about “incident management,” but the National Strategy and DoD terms still

refer to “consequence management.” Given that DoD has directed that combatant commands should be
prepared to direct U.S. forces to support a foreign nation requesting support to respond to a CBRN

terrorist incident, the question has been, how to develop and sustain this capability.

DoD has had numerous internal debates as well as discussions with the State Department over how it

should execute “foreign consequence management” for such incidents. Most discussions have been

focused on developing dedicated response teams with technical experts (potentially stationed overseas),

designed to quickly deploy and assist in saving lives at the scene of an incident, at the request of a host

nation. This idealistic vision is challenged by multiple factors: the lack of available technical expertise to

support both domestic and foreign response across the globe, the time required to deploy such expertise

from the United States to overseas incidents, the lack of coordination with foreign nation response forces,

and lack of dedicated funds to sustain a dedicated, robust capability for overseas response.

Part of the challenge has been overcoming the reluctance to dedicate funds and personnel to a very low-

probability threat, such as a terrorist CBRN incident that would be so massive as to require dedicated U.S.

assistance in addition to whatever capability the affected nation had and whatever neighboring states

might provide. On the other hand, State also oversees humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR)

missions in Africa that also include military support to foreign nations. Combined with the lack of U.S.

military forces stationed within Africa and more than ample opportunities for HA/DR across the

continent, it becomes difficult to justify a dedicated capability to address terrorist CBRN incidents that

may or may not ever occur. Both use similar, but parallel, processes for any requests for assistance.

USAFRICOM should abandon the charge to develop a separate plan and identified forces to execute

foreign consequence management and rather interject WMD subject-matter experts into its plans to

conduct HA/DR. This would have multiple advantages by streamlining foreign government requests for

U.S. assistance to any incident or accident, regardless of the hazard, reducing overall operations and

sustainment costs of a separate force for WMD consequence management, and integrating WMD issues

into conventional military operations. In fact, one could probably eliminate the concept of foreign
consequence management in its entirety, and turn the attention toward building coalition partnerships that

emphasize letting foreign nations develop appropriate CBRN response capabilities.

Conclusions

The United States is saddled with a counter-WMD strategy that was developed after the Cold War ended

but that still relies on military capabilities developed for a Cold War approach to warfare. This strategy,

originally designed to protect U.S. military forces, was modified to address the potential threat of

terrorists acquiring WMD-related materials and technologies and using those capabilities against

noncombatants in the American homeland. There has been an irrational hope that, by defining a linear

process of WMD countermeasures, U.S. forces could control and eliminate the possibility of a WMD

attack from future contingency operations. It is a dysfunctional strategy that has resulted in the

development of a global framework that every combatant command is expected to apply to its region.

Despite the rhetorical statements about how the WMD threat is increasing due to the availability of

modern technology and information and ease of procuring materials on the global economy, in fact just

the opposite has happened. Nonproliferation activities have successfully decreased the number of nation-

states with offensive WMD programs. International terrorist groups have been unable to leverage

commercially-available CBRN hazards and unable to procure WMD-related material and technology

from nation-states. Nation-states have turned from NBC weapons to conventional warfare tools such as

smart munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles, and emerging technologies enable them to achieve political

objectives requiring the use of force.

Given the decreasing threat of chemical and biological weapons in particular, the WMD community’s

reaction has been to broaden the definition of WMD to include industrial chemicals, natural infectious

diseases, radiological material, and in some instances, high-yield explosives. This expansion has actually

retarded progress toward developing discrete and effective countermeasures to mass-casualty type NBC

weapons, and in addition, has duplicated existing government initiatives aimed toward addressing the
dangers inherent in the global chemical industry, emerging infectious diseases, nuclear technology

growth, and homeland security in general.

USAFRICOM has an opportunity to push back against the organizational model and to suggest a new

model, one of “diplomacy, development, and defense” against WMD threats and CBRN hazards. The

U.S. government should recognize that African nations do not want WMD capabilities, but they do want

to support international actions against WMD proliferation. However, they do not support spending

precious time, resources, and critical staff on programs that address a non-existent threat or that duplicate

existing government efforts.

We have the opportunity to critically review how the National Strategy to Combat WMD is functioning

and to reform it in the light of 21st century concerns. We have heard too much talk about “the most

dangerous weapons in the hands of the most dangerous people” and “thinking about the unthinkable.”

This rhetoric is not driving any productive action. If the U.S. government is serious about addressing this

threat, it needs realistic threat assessments, careful definitions that are accepted across the interagency and

international community, risk management tools that understand limitations of government resources, and

a policy approach that integrates WMD concerns into existing conventional military operations,

counterterrorism, and homeland security policies instead of isolating it outside of the mainstream.

USAFRICOM can be the model to develop a way forward to that better end-state.

Al Mauroni is a senior policy analyst with more than 25 years in the area of DoD chemical-
biological warfare and defense programs and policy. He is a former Army officer and 1985 graduate
of Carnegie-Mellon University. He has published six books, the latest of which is “Where Are The
WMDs?” by the Naval Institute Press, and has also published numerous journal articles on the topic.
The views expressed in this article are my own, and do not necessarily represent the views of SAIC or
other SAIC personnel.