Jason Courtoy Middle Tennessee State University Research and Editorial Assistant at The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)

Jason Courtoy
Middle Tennessee State University
Research and Editorial Assistant at
The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)

Table of Contents
Final Defense Letter...............................................................................................................................3-4
Individual Development Plan................................................................................................................5-8
Cover Letter and Résumé....................................................................................................................9-10
Civic Engagement Project Reflection................................................................................................11-12
Informational Interview Reflection...................................................................................................13-14
Public Policy Dialogues on Capitol Hill (PPDC)...................................................................................15
Program Specific Project Analysis....................................................................................................16-18
Work Samples.....................................................................................................................................19-25
Speaker Biographies: Life After START Conferences.....................................................................19-25
Class Syllabuses..................................................................................................................................26-35
Global Policy Issues: the U.S., China, and the World.......................................................................26-32
Nuclear Proliferation: History, Technology, and Policy....................................................................33-35
Appendix.............................................................................................................................................36-49
Professional Reflection #4................................................................................................................36-37
Internal Security Working Group – Chinese Position Paper..............................................................38-39
Essay: China Spends More on Internal Security?..............................................................................40-41
Trust and Its Role in U.S. Assessments toward Chinese Capabilities................................................42-43
Nuclear Proliferation: Questions Week 1 and 2.................................................................................44-49
Courtoy | P a g e 2
2227 Woodridge Trail,
Murfreesboro, Tennessee 37130
April 23, 2011

Dr. David Carleton
Professor
Middle Tennessee State University
MTSU Box 245
Murfreesboro, TN 37132
Dear Dr. Carleton:
Over the past five months, the growth has been overwhelming. The difference in who I was
when I arrived to D.C. in January and now is vast. Looking back, when I arrived I had theoretic
knowledge, but was unprepared to put it to action. Whereas now, as I prepare to graduate this
May, I understands both, and yet know there is still much more to learn.
The Individual Development Goals laid out in the beginning of the semester have remained
unchanged. The desired development did take place. The greatest growth was my academic and
professional development. The three goals laid out for achievement in these two areas were
broad, but focused. This allowed the goals to be reached, yet to a degree I could not have
comprehended in the beginning. In the beginning of my internship, I had no clue breathe of the
knowledge or desirability to help and educate that the Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center’s executive director had. Henry Sokolski, a nuclear policy advisor under Reagan and
President George H.W. Bush was the key to the amount of growth I have seen this semester. In
giving me the opportunity to audit his graduate level course on Nuclear Nonproliferation, I
became enthralled with understanding WMD policy and implications. It became clear, however,
the limits of my technical knowledge and my writing skills. Mr. Sokolski has pushed me to
develop past these limitations. The technical knowledge that I have, while not able to
immediately express a given yield of nuclear materials, is substantial enough to understand and
express the complexities of nuclear policy. I had a displaced writing style of overwhelming
factual knowledge. Mr. Sokolski pushed me to write an op-ed for Foreign Affairs with the
determination that helped to improve my analytical and writing skills. This was accomplished
by questioning every example I proposed, forcing me to establish a clear and definite defense of
my view. The growth in my professional development is also a result of my internship with
NPEC. The various conferences, dinners, and other events that they hold allowed me to meet
various individuals from the Senate, House, embassies, DoS, DoD, DoE, and other governmental
agencies. Those that I have met, especially Jody Daniels from the State Dept, have offered their
advice and help, including writing letters of recommendation for me.
The goals of utilizing my leadership skills and becoming more confident with my skills/abilities
are quite distinctive because of my internship. NPEC’s events allowed for a unique immersion
into a circle of highly important individuals, i.e. ambassadors, political consolers, policy
advisors, and chiefs-of-staff. The confidence is apparent compared to earlier in the semester. In
the beginning, I had to build-up my courage in order to speak to participants or to discuss
Courtoy | P a g e 3
important policies. However, it is almost second nature to, for example, speak to a high-ranking
member of the House Armed Services Committee about anything. The experience at NPEC and
TWC have pressured and improved my leadership skills. Especially in coordinating group work
with other TWC students or work load with my internship supervisor. Building-up confidence in
my abilities had the corollary effect of growing my leadership ability.
My civic engagement goals are the only ones that had to be adjusted, slightly. The goals were too
ambitious for motivating policy change, but I was still able to learn about African culture. I
tutored an African immigrant from Cameroon to improve her conversational English. This
facilitated my desire by engaging her to explain her culture background, as well as past life in
Cameroon that brought her to the United States. It allowed substantive knowledge to be acquired
that could help to improve my understanding of African needs. This is the exception to my
overall perceived goal setting abilities. Many of the goals laid out in the IDP were rigorously
pursued and accomplished. If it were not for NPEC, the result would have been completely
different.
The classroom skills gained from Shelton Williams’ “Global Policy Issues: China, the US, and
the world” (GPI) were uniquely different from my roommates. In discussing what they were
doing in their classroom, it sounded like an ordinary class with exams and vague knowledge
about U.S. foreign policy by way of history. It seemed their teachers never pressed them to
answer the complexities of U.S. foreign policy, and how policy is not always clear-cut. GPI was
composed of a Model APEC conference and classroom learning. However, both were aimed not
at understanding U.S. policy towards the PRC but rather what the PRC thought of U.S. actions
resulting in a need for policy adjustment. By representing the PRC at Model APEC, it forced me
to think about policy as one of its members. The correlation between this, my classroom
learning, and NPEC was that policy issues are never cut-and-dry. Academia and the media often
tout issues as being one-sided. Either one is for or against something. The same is true of
nuclear policy. Many tout that the IAEA should hold all rights to, what the Acheson-Lilienthal
Report called, “dangerous materials.” Others convey that the best non-proliferate is nuclear
energy. If every state, including Iran and the DPRK, has “proliferation resistant” light-water
reactors then we can easily monitor and all will be satisfied. This issue is vastly more complex
than this. State sovereignty comes into play, the fact that many ignore that LWRs still produce
weapons-useable spent fuel, and the failure of IAEA “timely warning” safeguards are among the
few complex issues of nonproliferation.
This experience has proven invaluable as a capstone for my degree. The network connections,
professional experience, and coursework have broadened my overall academic curriculum. As
stated earlier, theoretic knowledge is important but where’s the purpose without the ability to
understand how to facilitate it and put it into action? NPEC and the TWC experience have given
me the skills to do this. Either by pushing me to write op-eds or by offering policy area has to
focus on. The experience, especially GPI, has solidified my desire to understand the multi-facets
of a situation. It is because of the difference in the person that arrived in January from the person
graduating in May that this experience merits academic credit.
Sincerely,
Jason Courtoy
Courtoy | P a g e 4
Individual Development Plan
Part 1:
I envision a wide set of possibilities for my path for the next five to ten years. Since I am going
to be graduating after this program/internship, I will be entering the job force soon. The possible
careers that I see for the future are an intelligence analyst, a political analyst, or a political
writer/columnist. Understanding that it will take a while in order to obtain these positions, my
primary goal in the next five years is to become an assistant or to be on the right pathway toward
the positions (i.e. the right agency, organization, or academic program). In order to perform well
in these various positions, it is necessary to gain the analytical skills needed as well as to
improve my editorial and writing skills further. My plan for this is to join the right agency that
will allow me to gain entrance into the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Masters of Science in
Strategic Intelligence program. I also will need to improve some of my weaknesses such as
language skills, and being a perfectionist that will be discussed further below.
Academic Development
My academic strengths are that I am driven, open minded and a realist, a sense of pride in
everything that I do, great research skills, and good study habits. The improvement that I would
like to see academically is to find an area to specialize. In addition, my intellectual curiosity
often times leads me to want to research quite a few different areas, which has hampered gaining
a specialty in international relations or political science. I always want to improve my writing,
critical thinking, and especially analytical skills. One could never improve too much in these
areas. The additional academic training needed is a graduate degree, especially one through
which learning a language is a requirement. This of course is not the entirety of the reasons for
needing this, as I want to pursue, further my studies in political science and international
relations, but a graduate degree is needed to pursue my long-term goals. The long-term goal is,
after years of experience and knowledge/expertise, to become teach within the field of either
intelligence or international relations. Over the course of undergraduate (from various
universities, study abroad, and TWC), I have learned that professors who come from outside
academia tend to be better teachers. I plan to fulfill this goal by completing a Master’s or a PhD.
Courtoy | P a g e 5
Professional Development
My most valuable skills, abilities, and areas of expertise are writing skills, work ethic, drive and
sense of pride in my work, computer/technical skills and knowledge, the ability to work in any
type work environment, and the ability to work “on the fly.” The areas that need the most work
are my ability to make professional contacts, and further perfecting my writing skills. The
professional relationships that I need to acquire in order to advance in the international relations
field are both mentors and networking contacts that will help to improve my skills and help me
to reach my career goal(s). I do not have a preferred work environment per say. However, I do
like an office that is jovial yet professional. I also plan to attend professional seminars that will
help to develop the necessary professional skills that move me closer to my long-term goal.
Civic Engagement
Civic engagement to me has always meant volunteering one’s time and efforts for a specific
social issue or problem. For a majority of undergraduate I was a volunteer leader for a Christian
non-profit organization called Young Life that mentored high school student. Therefore, social
issues have always been something important to me. Other, more political, social issues that
concern me are political disengagement, gun rights, and international development. Therefore,
my civic engagement will be to work to promote that African state survivability needs to be
recognized as a strategic importance component of U.S. national and international security. My
work with Young Life gave me many opportunities to help my group’s futures and lifestyles. I
was able to give them guidance on the perspective of what exactly the best path was, as well as
to encourage them to pursue it. The person who made a major difference in my life was my
Young Life leader my junior/senior year of high school, Landon Sessoms. He sacrificed both his
time and money to make the same difference I did later in my group.
Leadership
Traits of individuals with good leadership skills are good communication skills, ability to
manage the office, has good technical skills (i.e. good computer skills, understanding of all
general programs used to operate services of the office, etc), and a great problem solver. A few
of these skills I do have (such as technical skills, communication skills, and problem solving).
However, leadership skills are never perfect and always need improvement. For example, my
Courtoy | P a g e 6
ability to make a group work as a team and think ‘outside the box’ these always change because
groups always change.
Personal Growth
I measure success as the completion or progress toward a set goal or step, especially seeing the
progress along the way. Often what impedes me is the tendency to not see progress or
completion along the way in long projects, but rather to focus only on the result. This is
definitely something that should and would like to change so that I can measurably see progress
along the way, instead of always forgetting about the small victories.
Part 2:
Academic Development Goal: To become a better writer, specifically in the statistical or
quantitative area
Action Step: Engage myself in positions, such as a drafting reports and working on research,
that will increase my writing ability
Action Step: Attend seminars where I can develop my statistical/ quantifiable research
Professional Development Goal: To meet contacts or mentors that can help me in the field of
intelligence or security
Action Step: Attend functions/dinner events/conferences of my internship site hosts, where
prominent members attend or speak
Action Step: Better develop my power greeting
Action Step: Follow up with an email or phone call if I receive a business card or contact
Professional Development Goal: To develop greater or better analytical/editorial skills

Action Step: Attend seminars in which I can gain analytical skills
Action Step: Gain experience from jobs that require analytical assignments
Civic Engagement Goal: To promote that African state survivability needs to be of strategic
importance for American security
Action Step: Sit-in on a seminar or talking points about African state advocacy
Action Step: Volunteer for an outreach/advocacy organization for African states
Courtoy | P a g e 7
Civic Engagement Goal: To learn more about what is being done or should be done about
African failed states’ “stateness”
Action Step: Attend events at the Cherry Blossom Festival in which this topic is being discussed
Action Step: Volunteer at the Cherry Blossom Festival event that is focusing on African
“stateness”
Leadership Goal: To better use my skills as a leader

Action Step: Take on projects that need a leader to coordinate the acts/works of the team
Personal Growth Goal: To be more confident and comfortable with my skills

Action Step: Taking on tasks that are outside my considered comfort area, so that I gain an
understanding and more comfortable in using them
Personal Growth Goal: To be more confident and comfortable with meeting individuals in
important positions
Action Step: Taking all opportunities to meet and interview several important individuals that
would provide comfort and confident by repetitive interaction
Part 3:
The writing and analytical skills, becoming comfortable with my abilities, and meeting contacts
and mentors will help to accomplish my short-term goals. These skills will help to improve and
develop me into a better candidate for becoming, if not moving towards, an analyst. The
connections that I hope to make in Washington, D.C. will help me to develop relationships of
both mentors and recommendations of and for jobs. Volunteering for advocacy groups and
better understanding the issues of African “stateness” by attending events will allow me to
further develop and focus on an area of interest in my studies. By finding, an area to specialize
in it will provide me a set measurable pathway towards my long-term goals.
Courtoy | P a g e 8
Jason Courtoy
2227 Woodridge Trail, Murfreesboro, TN 37130
Mobile: (615) 596-8298
Jason.Courtoy@gmail.com
April 7, 2011
The Heritage Foundation

Job Title: Research Assistant
ATTN: Human Resources
Washington, D.C.
Dear Human Resources,

As a Research/Editorial Assistant at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center I have
gained the skills necessary to be an excellent candidate for the Research Assistant position. My
current job allows me to use my analytical, research, and editorial skills.
My interest in the position stems from my desire to learn about a topic and use that
knowledge to educate others on the basic application of public policy decisions. As a Young
Life volunteer leader, I was responsible for providing mentorship to a group of high school
students on life skills and choices. My responsibilities included creating weekly curriculum for
group studies to improve study habits for each student. While working for the Murfreesboro
City School’s Extended School Program (ESP), my ability to provide an educationally focused
environment became the most important element of my position when interacting with eight (8)
to twelve (12) 4th graders in the ESP program that came from diverse cultural and economic
backgrounds.
Use of my oral and written skills as a delegate for the government of China in the 2011
NMUN Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) conference serves as an asset for
participation in the internal security working group. Writing the working group statement and
negotiating with other delegates on the issues of counter-terrorism financing, corruption and
money laundering, and improving the STAR Initiative utilizes skills learned as a volunteer
leader.
My academic background and professional experience have given me a unique
perspective into the complexities of the education field and the needs that the U.S. education
system requires. This is why I believe I would be an ideal candidate for the research assistant
position.
Thank you for consideration. Please let me know if you need additional informational or have
further questions.
I look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
Courtoy | P a g e 9
Jason Courtoy
Courtoy | P a g e 1 0
Jason Courtoy 2227 Woodridge Trail
Mobile: 615-596-8298 Murfreesboro, TN 37130
Email: Jason.Courtoy@gmail.com
Education Middle Tennessee State University Graduation Date:

 Bachelors of Science in International Relations May 2011
The Washington Center for Internships and
Academic Seminars
Jan-May 2011
 Student in International Affairs Program
 Participated in Model UN-APEC as China on
Internal Security
CCSA Republic of Ireland
Summer 2010
 Studied about the cultural and historical
development of the democratic education system
of Ireland
Educational Papers/Projects – available at courtizy.wordpress.com
 “Irish Education: the Road to Educate Together”

Skills/Abilities  “Modern Slavery in the United States”
Skills
PCs, Microsoft Windows, Microsoft Works Suite,
Microsoft Office Suite, Notetab Lite, HTML code, Adobe Suite, Explorit
(Statistical analysis program), Words per minute (WPM): 75
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Jan 24th – May 5th

Leadership/Work Editorial and Research Assistant
Experience  Provided help on general administrative activities (e.g. setting up
events, copying, reports on events, etc), editorial work on
publications, as well as research projects.
Murfreesboro Young Life Fall 2007-Spring 2010

Volunteer Leader
 Provided leadership, spiritual guidance, consistency and stability
through building personal relationships following Young Life
guidelines as a mentor in the domestic mission field to high school
students.
Extended School Program (ESP) Summer to Fall of 2008

4th Grade
 Responsible for creating lesson plans that provided an educational
environment to a group of eight (8) to twelve (12) 4th grade ESP
children.
Civic Engagement Project Reflection
After finishing a paper entitled “American Foreign Policy Towards Africa,” I decided to
focus my civic engagement project on learning more about African ‘stateness.’ ‘Stateness’
simply refers to the act of being a state, i.e. how weak or strong a state is. As for an example, a
failed state, such as Somalia, lacks ‘stateness.’ However, the United States or the United
Kingdom has ‘stateness.’ Therefore, I decided to facilitate my civic engagement by volunteering
for English tutoring of African refuges where I could increase my knowledge about African
issues. At the same time, the tutoring would be helping the refugees to integrate into American
society.
American policy towards African states has been one of intervention and non-
intervention. This response ends up leaving Africa unchanged, and citizens with a disinclination
to ask for American intervention. With renewed interest in African ‘stateness’ because of the
“War on Terror”, many African’s are weary of a repeat of the Clinton administration’s failed
intervention in Somalia and the recent non-intervention during Darfur. Three major reasons for
African states’ lack of ‘stateness’ is caused by their inability to develop an effective
infrastructure, an undesired over-reliance on raw goods, and ineffective governments. The “War
on Terror” is an effective means to reestablish a good relationship with African states and
people, however, it must be one fixated not on the short-term goal but the long-term goal (as
Morgenthau once stated).
During the civic engagement I had the ability to help a immigrant from the state of
Cameroon develop English conversational skills and to help integrate here into American
society. It also allowed me to develop an understanding of life and the civic culture of
Cameroon. The group I worked with, African Immigration and Refugee Foundation
(AIRFound), also introduced me to various other refugees and as such facilitated my desire to
learn more about African cultures and life.
The engagement itself was over a span of 4 weeks. In which, I meet one on one twice a
week for two hours with Josafine, an immigrant from Cameroon. I did not receive any formal
training. However, I have had taught education-based tutoring before for an after school
program in Tennessee. I structured the tutoring session in a means to improve her conversational
English skills. This entailed common American idioms, such as driving me up the wall or that
car is a lemon, and more engaging discussion in which she explained to me her life and future.
These provided her with an understanding and better grasp of English in a non-formal
conversational setting that she uses every day.
I was unable to bring up issue at my public policy dialogue. However, the
recommendations I would have made start first with developing a long-term policy towards the
continent. Included in the long-term policy would have been establishing better relations with
African states by appointing ambassadors, which speak and understand the region. Doing so
displays American commitment to the region. In addition, increasing Africa’s infrastructure
would give African states a long-term improvement. Increasing the actions of our border
security training program near the Somalia border would also go a long way to changing the
attitude towards the United States on the African continent.
My plan for staying in contact with African ‘stateness’ is primarily through blogs and
news organizations, such as BBC Africa. I also intend to stay in contact with AIRFound after
my civic engagement back in Tennessee to continue helping them to develop civic engagement
of their clients. It is through my civic engagement and engaging in policy that I hope to improve
American policy towards Africa. I hope to raise understanding that Africa can and would be a
great strategic partner for the United States in maintaining security and economic trade, i.e.
freedom of navigation and trade routes. These are important points for U.S. and world trade
security, especially with issues such as Somalia and Gulf of Aden piracy that effects trade across
the globe.
Informational Interview
I chose to interview Jody Daniels, a Foreign Affairs Officer with the State Department,
because in the future I hope to be an FAO. I selected Jody because we have a similar background
in that we both come from Tennessee. He took a year off after getting his Bachelors in Political
Science to teach English in Tokyo, Japan. After that initial year, Jody decided to get his
Master’s from the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in Nuclear Proliferation
and Terrorism Studies. He immediately accepted a job at the State Department, and worked his
way up to becoming an FAO in the Middle East division of the Bureau of International Security
and Nuclear Proliferation.
His work deals mainly with all Middle Eastern states, except Iran, as it has its own
special division dedicated towards it. The workload and type of work that Jody deals with on a
daily basis is always changing. This is due partially to how international affairs occur, spur of
the moment and unexpected incidents such as Egypt and Libya now, but also just the case of
being a FAO means your work each week could be different.
I was able to meet Jody by way of my internships various dinner seminars. These
seminars are off the record discussions about nuclear proliferation, and he and another of his
colleagues attended several of them. After a brief discussion with him about my academic
background (such as my major, study abroad, TWC, and being a military brat that settled in
Tennessee), he became extremely enthusiastic about advising me towards becoming an FAO.
This is led to this informational interview.
In structuring the interview, I drafted various questions in order to understand what was
necessary to become an FAO. I was also curious, having a similar background coming from
Tennessee, how he became part of the State Department or an FAO. This provided a great degree
of flexibility in the interview process. Jody was able to narrate his early career and academic
pursuits, while at the same time discussing what my goals and dreams were.
Jody was extremely courteous and polite during the interview displaying his ability to
provide leadership in his field. Already having that connection of both coming from Tennessee,
and his parents actually graduating from my university, added quite a deal to the flow of the
conversation and its atmosphere. Jody was overwhelmingly happy to provide assistance and
advice on my career goals. In fact, he offered to put me in contact with a State Department expert
in a field of research that I am currently working on (Korean unification). The most interest
piece, which solidified my career goals, was that he agreed that taking a year to work before
going for a Master’s degree is essential. It gives one the ability to comprehend practicality versus
academic idealism, but also lends toward more maturity in decisions and choices of
programs/schools. In this way, the interview confirms my aspirations and goals. I feel that the
connection I established early with Jody allowed me to conduct the interview better. It gave us
the ability to transition smoothly from one topic to another. However, in future informational
interviews it might be more difficult not having that already established connection. It would
require more preparation, but I believe that I would be comfortable in the next one.
The Honorable Diane Lynn Black
1531 Longworth House Office Building
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Representative:
I wanted to thank you for taking the time, especially between voting, to meet with me. As a
constituent it is always a great opportunity to be able to meet those that are representing the great
state of Tennessee on Capitol Hill. I also wanted to thank you for answering my questions on
Sino-U.S. relations, U.S. debt, and the debt ceiling. I agree fully with your statement that it is far
better to have diplomacy from a stance of strength, rather than a stance of weakness (as we are
with our ‘banker’).
As for the question you were unable to answer, I hope to explain what you might consider if it
ever comes before the House Ways and Means Committee.
I asked what you thought of ‘islandizing’ domestic and forward military bases, essentially taking
them off the civilian grid. It is of increasing importance with such a vast number of U.S. military
operations requiring information from domestic instillations to remain operational despite a
blackout of civilian infrastructure. For example, command centers including drone operators,
intelligence and logistical information are vital to the U.S. military superiority in the air.
However, the case of the 2003 Northeastern blackout was able to show how vulnerable our
systems are. The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) published an article this
February 2011 discussing the use of small 300 MWe nuclear reactors to take military bases off
the civilian grid. These could, the report said, supply civilian infrastructure with back-up power
in the event of a blackout. However, it also stated that these small reactors were ‘proliferation-
resistant’ because they used low-enriched uranium (LEU) and spent fuel (reactor-grade Pu).
These, while not optimal for bomb usage, can be used to create an effective bomb. Therefore,
they are not ‘proliferation resistant.’ I see these small reactors as useful domestically, but the risk
of use at U.S. forward bases is too risky in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.
I feel, as the report does, that successfully ‘islandizing’ domestic and forward military bases is
necessary for national security reasons. Especially with states hostile towards
the U.S. developing capabilities to disrupt the civilian grid. A prime example would be the
disruption of the flow of fuel through Pakistan to our soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past
years.
There needs to be legislation and action taken to safeguard our second-strike capabilities and our
men and women in uniform from foreign threats.
Thank you again Congresswoman Black for taking the time to speak to your constituents and
representing the great state of Tennessee on Capitol Hill.

Sincerely,
Jason Courtoy
U.S. Foreign Policy in a Time of Global Conflict
This PLS event sparked my interest because it is an important part of international affairs.
As an international relations major, foreign policy has been a cornerstone of my studies. Hearing
from an expert who had a serious impact on US policy is what drew me to write on this PLS
program. Dr. Korb’s interesting approach of “choice” or “necessity” diverges from the traditional
“just” versus “unjust” war theory. This essay will expand on the unique approach that Dr. Korb
presented, what I learned from this event, why it is important to international affairs, and how
my class and work deal with this issue.
The important difference between “just war” theory and the “choice versus necessity”
idea is the associated realist cost and benefit analysis. In “just war” theory, a state fights a war
on ideological grounds. This measures into whether a state engages in a war or not. In “choice
versus necessity” or better summarized as cost and benefit analysis, a war is decided in a realist
fashion. First, is this war, in terms of vital interests, a matter of necessity or a matter of choice?
In deciding either way, an analyst establishes what the costs of engagement are, and what the
benefits of engagement and non-engagement are. If intervention is decided to be a matter of
necessity, such as fighting Germany and Japan during World War II, the benefits have already
been established as being greater than the cost. However, if it is a choice engagement this
process allows a state to define whether it is politically and economically feasible to become
involved.
After establishing that engagement is feasible and advantageous to interests, a state must
establish an end game. For the military this is the most important piece because it gives them an
objective to accomplish, and in doing so gives them a focus. In the case of Libya, the example
that Dr. Korb used, the end game for the US military is to stop Gaddafi from killing people. This
is a clear and concise objective that once finished the military can focus efforts elsewhere.
However, it also must be stressed that military action should not and cannot be seen as the only
means of foreign policy. Over reliance on hard power over soft power leads to a one-sided
engagement that if not balanced with soft power can lead to events, such as the Iraq War.
Whatever the political views on why we went in the final decision to engage must be placed on
the over reliance, by the US, on hard power towards Saddam. Bush II established an ultimatum
for Saddam that either open up your sovereignty to US inspection “or else”. Since Saddam was
stubborn, despite the fact that he stated not having WMDs, and did not open up for inspection,
Bush II had no choice but to engage. The US had to “save face” by engaging. If they did not
then the US would have lessened its effective hard power capabilities.
The definition of international relations, essentially and simplistically, is the foreign
policy of states toward each other. This is precisely why understanding foreign policy is vitally
important to understand international affairs. Understanding why the US engages in certain
world affairs, Iraq and Libya, and ignores others, Somalia and the continent of Africa is
important to understanding how the world works. Part of this is understanding international and
policy history. For instance, the Somalia debacle of the Clinton administration created what is
known as the “Somalia Complex” in issues dealing with engagement. The “Somalia Complex”
simply refers to a principle of engagement that if the cost to American lives will be too high, the
American public is against it. Therefore, understanding this concept it becomes clearer why the
US is more hesitant to engage in contingencies, such as Darfur, than before.
This topic is in direct connection with my internship site and my class each. My
internship site, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), deals with what US
foreign policy is and should be related to the issue of strategic weapons proliferation. It provides
a structured, yet specific, approach to policy goals and points out any analysis that is misleading.
For example, much research explains that light water reactors (LWR) are “proliferation-
resistant” because it only uses lightly enriched uranium (LEU) and produces a low-grade of
plutonium not suitable for bombs. However, NPECs research has shown that LWRs can quickly
switch from producing LEU to highly-enriched uranium (HEU) that is suitable for bomb usage,
but also the plutonium that is within lightly irradiated spent fuel is sufficient for the creation of a
crude nuclear weapon. This has vast foreign policy implications because it changes the cost and
benefit analysis of spreading nuclear energy technology to various countries. My class, Global
Policy Issues: China, the US, and the world, provides students with how to assess the foreign
policy and thinking of the PRC. It teaches students how to think in PRC terms, which allows
creators of and analysts of foreign policy to avoid international embarrassment or incidents, like
the Cuban Missile Crisis.
This event touched on various important aspects that are important to international
affairs. The emphasis on “choice” or “necessity” theory over “just war” theory allows policy-
makers to establish real cost and benefits analysis towards a rising contingency. In doing so, it
allows the military to have and accomplish an end game, while at the same time emphasizing
that military action is not the only tool of foreign policy. The study of foreign policy actions
during times of crisis allows analysts and policy-makers to understand events, such as the
“Somalia Complex,” which place boundaries on public willingness towards certain objectives or
interests. The connection of foreign policy both to my internship and to my class was a major
reason, along with my major, why I chose to write on this topic.
Speaker Biographies
LIFE AFTER START: NEW CHALLENGES, NEW

OPPORTUNITIES
A CONFERENCE CO-SPONSORED BY THE CARNEGIE NUCLEAR
POLICY PROGRAM AND THE
NONPROLIFERATION EDUCATION CENTER
THURSDAY, JANUARY 27, 2011
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
1779 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20036
8:45 AM - 5:00 PM
ROOT ROOM
Speaker Biographies
Panel 1: Asian Challenges
Title: China and the Emerging Pacific Strategic Competition in Long-Range Precision Strike and Space
Capabilities
Speaker: Mark Stokes, Project 2049 Institute
Mark Stokes is the Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute. Previously, he was the founder and
president of Quantum Pacific Enterprises, an international consulting firm, and vice president and Taiwan
country manager for Raytheon International. He has served as executive vice president of Laifu Trading
Company, a subsidiary of the Rehfeldt Group; a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies; and member of the Board of Governors of the American Chamber of Commerce in
Taiwan. A 20-year U.S. Air Force veteran, Stokes also served as team chief and senior country director
for the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan and Mongolia in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs. He holds a B.A. from Texas A&M University, and graduate
degrees in International Relations and Asian Studies from Boston University and the Naval Postgraduate
School. He is a fluent Mandarin speaker.
Commentator: Jim Thomas, CSBA
Jim Thomas is Vice President for Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments. He oversees CSBA’s research programs and directs the Strategic and Budgetary
Studies staff.
Prior to joining CSBA, he was Vice President of Applied Minds, Inc., a private research and
development company specializing in rapid, interdisciplinary technology prototyping. Before
that, Jim served for thirteen years in a variety of policy, planning and resource analysis posts in
the Department of Defense, culminating in his dual appointment as Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Resources and Plans and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategy. In these capacities, he was responsible for the development of the Defense Strategy,
conventional force planning, resource assessment, and the oversight of war plans. He
spearheaded the 2005-2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and was the principal author of
the QDR Report to Congress.
Jim began his career in national security at Los Alamos National Laboratory, analyzing foreign
technological lessons learned from the first Gulf War. After serving as research assistant to
Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, Jim joined the Department of Defense as a Presidential Management
Intern in 1993 and undertook developmental management assignments across the Department of
Defense over the next two years. From 1995 to 1998, he managed a NATO counter-proliferation
initiative and wrote three reports endorsed by Allied Foreign and Defense Ministers to integrate
countering-WMD as a mission area into NATO post-Cold War force planning. From 1998 to
1999, he was seconded to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, where
he wrote Adelphi Paper 333, The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000). From 1999 to 2001, Jim worked in the Secretary’s Strategy
Office, playing a lead role developing the Department’s Defense Strategy and force planning
construct for the 2001 QDR. From 2001 to 2003, he served as Special Assistant to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense. He was promoted to the Senior Executive Service in 2003.
Jim received the Department of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service in 1997 for his
work at NATO, and the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the
Department’s highest civilian award, in 2006 for his strategy work.
Jim is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic
Studies. He holds a B.A. degree with high honors from the College of William and Mary, an
M.A. degree from the University of Virginia, and an M.A. degree from the Johns Hopkins
University School of Advanced International Studies.
A former Reserve Naval officer, Jim attained the rank of Lieutenant Commander.
Title: Asian Drivers of Russian Nuclear Force Structure
Speaker: Jacob Kipp, former Deputy Director, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies
Jacob W. Kipp retired from federal service in September 2009 and is currently an Adjunct Professor at
the University of Kansas and a weekly columnist on Eurasian Security for the Jamestown Foundation. He
received his PhD. in Russian History from the Pennsylvania State University in 1970. From 1971 to 1985
he taught Russian and Military History at the Kansas State University. In January 1986 he joined the
newly founded Soviet Army Studies Office (SASO) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, as a senior analyst. In
1991, SASO became the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). In 2003, Dr. Kipp became director of
FMSO and served in that capacity until October 2006, when he joined the School of Advanced Military
Studies (SAMS)s as Deputy Director. He has published extensively on Russian and Soviet naval and
military history. Topics have included Russian naval reform in the 19th century, Soviet naval history and
analysis, operational art in theory and practice, and foresight and forecasting in Russian and Soviet
military affairs. Dr. Kipp is a member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences. He is married to
Professor Maia A. Kipp
Commentator: Phillip Karber, Georgetown University

Phillip Karber is a professor at Georgetown University and a trustee at the Great Meadow
Foundation.
Panel 2: Potential Remedial Approaches
Title: Realizing Ronald Reagan’s Other Dream: Eliminating Nuclear-Capable Ground-launched Missiles
Speaker: Henry Sokolski, NPEC

Henry Sokolski is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
(NPEC), a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit organization founded in 1994 to promote a better
understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues among policy-makers, scholars and the
media. He currently serves as an adjunct professor at the Institute of World Politics in
Washington, D.C., and served as a member of the Congressional Commission on the Prevention
of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.
Mr. Sokolski previously served as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Department of
Defense, for which he received a medal for outstanding public service from Secretary of Defense
Dick Cheney. He also worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Office of Net
Assessment, as a consultant to the National Intelligence Council, and as a member of the Central
Intelligence Agency's Senior Advisory Group. In the U.S. Senate, Mr. Sokolski served as a
special assistant on nuclear energy matters to Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-NH), and as a
legislative military aide to Dan Qualye (R-IN).
Mr. Sokolski has authored and edited a number of works on proliferation, including Best of
Intentions: America's Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 2001); Nuclear Heuristics: Selected Writings of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter
(Strategic Studies Institute, 2009); Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom
(Strategic Studies Institute, 2008); Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War (Strategic
Studies Institute, 2008); Gauging U.S.-Indian Strategic Cooperation (Strategic Studies Institute,
2007); Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (Strategic Studies Institute, 2005); and Getting
MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice (Strategic Studies Institute,
2004).
Commentator: Dennis Gormley, University of Pittsburgh

Dennis M. Gormley is a Senior Fellow at the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation
Studies in Washington, D.C. He is also a Senior Lecturer on the faculty of the Graduate School
of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh and a Research Associate at
the University's Ridgway Center for International Security Studies.
During 2002, he was a Consulting Senior Fellow for Technology and Defense Policy at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Mr. Gormley served as a senior vice
president for 20 years with Pacific-Sierra Research (PSR), where he founded PSR's Defense
Policy Group. From 1989 to 1992, he directed PSR's Washington Operations staff of 140
scientists, engineers, and policy analysts in providing analytical studies and applications software
to government clients and served as a member of PSR's Board of Directors. Mr. Gormley has
chaired or served on many U.S. Department of Defense advisory committees, including chairing
a 1997 Summer Study for the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy on Nuclear Weapons and the
Revolution in Military Affairs; at present, he serves on a panel assisting the Deputy Director of
National Intelligence (Analysis) plan and implement the 9/11 Commission's recommendations
for improving intelligence integration. He frequently furnishes expert testimony to Congress and
has served as a consultant to Sandia National Laboratories and The RAND Corporation, among
many others. He has also been a Visiting Scholar at the Geneva Center for Security Policy,
Geneva, Switzerland. Before joining PSR in 1979, he was head of foreign intelligence at the U.S.
Army's Harry Diamond Laboratories in Washington, D.C. Mr. Gormley received a BA and MA
in history from the University of Connecticut in 1965 and 1966 and attended Office Candidate
School at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, where he was commissioned a Second
Lieutenant in the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, serving on active duty from 1966 to 1969.
He is the author of three books, including Dealing with the Threat of Cruise Missiles (Oxford
University Press, 2001) and has contributed frequently to leading journals and newspapers
internationally.
Title: Space Keep Out Zones: Arms Control that Might Just Work
Speaker: Paul Kozemchak, DARPA
Paul Kozemchak is currently the Intelligence Liaison of DARPA. Also works in DARPA as a Special
Assistant in the Defense & Space Industry.
Commentator: Jeff Kueter, George C. Marshall Institute

Mr. Jeff Kueter works with scientists to help improve the understanding and awareness of
complex scientific topics to the public, the media, and policy makers. Focused on national
security and the environment, Mr. Kueter manages the day-to-day operations of the George C.
Marshall Institute, authoring its policy papers and analyses and engaging the public and the
policy making community. He received his B.A. in Political Science and Economics at the
University of Iowa, where he graduated with honors, and an M.A. in Political Science and
another M.A. in Security Policy Studies and Science & Technology Studies, both from George
Washington University. He has served as Research Director at the National Coalition for
Advanced Manufacturing (NACFAM) and at Washington Nichibei Consultants.
Lunch Discussion: Plutonium, Proliferation, and Radioactive-Waste Politics in East Asia
Speakers: Jungmin Kang, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research; Thomas Cochran,
Natural Resource Defense Council; John J. Tkacik Jr., China Business Intelligence
Dr. Jungmin Kang Jungmin KANG is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials
and currently a visiting scholar at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University. He has authored and co-authored papers on the proliferation-
resistance of advanced fuel cycles, spent-fuel storage, plutonium disposition, converting Russian
icebreaker reactors from HEU to LEU fuel, etc. He received a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering from
Tokyo University, Japan, and M.S. and B.S. degrees in nuclear engineering from Seoul National
University, South Korea. He worked in Princeton University's Program on Science and Global
Security for 1998-2000 and at International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University for
2006-2008.
Dr. Thomas B. Cochran is a senior scientist in the nuclear program and holds the Wade Greene
Chair for Nuclear Policy at NRDC. He served as director of the nuclear program until 2007. He
initiated NRDC's Nuclear Weapons Databook project. He also initiated a series of joint nuclear
weapons verification projects with the Soviet Academy of Sciences. These include the Nuclear
Test Ban Verification Project, which demonstrated the feasibility of utilizing seismic monitoring
to verify a low-threshold test ban, and the Black Sea Experiment, which examined the utility of
passive radiation detectors for verifying limits on sea-launched cruise missiles. He has served as
a consultant to numerous government and non-government agencies on energy, nuclear
nonproliferation and nuclear reactor matters. He is a member of the Department of Energy's
Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee. Previously he served as a member of DOE's
Environmental Management Advisory Board, Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Board, and
Energy Advisory Board; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Advisory Committee on the
Cleanup of Three Mile Island; and the TMI Public Health Advisory Board.
Dr. Cochran is the author of The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor: An Environmental and
Economic Critique (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1974) and coeditor/author of
the Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Ballinger Press, 1984); Volume II: U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production (1987);
Volume III: U.S. Nuclear Warhead Facility Profiles (1987); Volume IV: Soviet Nuclear Weapons
(1989); and Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1995). In addition, he has published numerous articles and working papers, including
those in SIPRI Yearbook chapters, Arms Control Today, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
He has coauthored (with Dr. Robert S. Norris) the article "Nuclear Weapons" in the 1990
printing of The New Encyclopedia Britannica (15th edition).
Dr. Cochran received his Ph.D. in physics from Vanderbilt University in 1967. He was assistant
professor of physics at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, from 1967 to 1969;
modeling and simulation group supervisor of the Litton Mellonics Division, Scientific Support
Laboratory, Fort Ord, California, from 1969 to 1971; and, from 1971 to 1973, a senior research
associate at Resources for the Future. Dr. Cochran has been with NRDC since 1973. He is the
recipient of the American Physical Society's Szilard Award and the Federation of American
Scientists' Public Service Award, both in 1987. As a consequence of his work, NRDC received
the 1989 Scientific Freedom and Responsibility Award by the American Association for the
Advancement of Science (AAAS). Dr. Cochran is a Fellow of the American Physical Society
and the AAAS.
John J. Tkacik Jr. is currently working for China Business Intelligence. He is a 23-year veteran of the
U.S. State Department; John Tkacik joined the The Heritage Foundation in 2001 as research fellow in the
foundation’s Asian Studies Center. His career in the Department of State began in 1971 and included
tours at the US Embassy in Taipei, the US Liaison Office in Peking (Beijing), and the U.S. Consulates
General in Hong Kong and Guangzhou. In 1992 he worked as the Chief of China Analysis in the State
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He retired in 1994 and worked in Hong Kong for
RJR-Nabisco China as vice president for external relations, and returned to the U.S. in 1997 where he did
business consulting for U.S. companies doing business with China and Taiwan. Additionally, he served as
publisher of Taiwan Weekly Business Bulletin, a newsletter produced for China Online and the U.S.-
ROC (Taiwan) Business Council.
Panel 3: Stability in Southwest Asia
Title: Nuclear Weapons Stability or Anarchy in the 21st Century: China, India, and Pakistan
Speaker: Thomas W. Graham, Brookhaven National Laboratory
Thomas W. Graham currently works for Brookhaven National Laboratory.
Commentator: George Perkovich, Carnegie Endowment

George Perkovich is vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research focuses on nuclear strategy and
nonproliferation, with a focus on South Asia and Iran, and on the problem of justice in the
international political economy.
He is the author of the award-winning book India's Nuclear Bomb (University of California
Press, 2001). He is co-author of the Adelphi Paper, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, published in
September 2008 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. This paper is the basis of the
book, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, which includes 17 critiques by 13 eminent
international commentators. Perkovich is also co-author of a major Carnegie report, Universal
Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, a blueprint for rethinking the international nuclear
nonproliferation regime. The report offers a fresh approach to deal with states and terrorists,
nuclear weapons, and fissile materials to ensure global safety and security.
He served as a speechwriter and foreign policy adviser to Senator Joe Biden from 1989 to 1990.
Perkovich is an adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and
Disarmament and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations' Task Force on U.S. Nuclear
Policy.
Title: Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control and Confidence Building Measures
Speaker: Zachary Davis, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Dr. Zachary S. Davis specializes in technical intelligence on weapons of mass destruction. He
has broad experience in intelligence and national security policy and has held senior positions in
the executive and legislative branches of government. As Group Leader for Lateral Proliferation
at Z Division (the field intelligence unit at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) he was
responsible for technical intelligence assessments of proliferation networks and weapons of mass
destruction programs involving several foreign countries. Much of his research has focused on
Pakistan.
Dr. Davis began his career at the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress and
has served in the State Department, Congressional committees, and the National Security
Council. In 2006-2007 he was Senior Advisor at the National Counter Proliferation Center, in the
office of the Director of National Intelligence.
He is the author of numerous government studies and reports on technical and regional
proliferation issues. His academic publications include articles in Asian Survey, Arms Control
Today, Security Studies, and chapters in several edited volumes. He was editor of the 1993 book
The Proliferation Puzzle: Why States Proliferate and What Results. He holds a doctorate in
international relations from the University of Virginia.
Zachary Davis is currently Visiting Research Professor in the Department of National Security
Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School where he is developing a training curriculum on WMD
interdiction issues and managing South Asia programs for the Center for Contemporary Conflict.
Dr. Davis is writing a book on President Eisenhower’s strategic thought. He is married and has
two young sons, Max and Sam.
Commentator: Ashley Tellis, Carnegie Endowment

Ashley J. Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. While on assignment to
the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs,
he was intimately involved in negotiating the civil nuclear agreement with India.
Previously he was commissioned into the Foreign Service and served as senior adviser to the
ambassador at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi. He also served on the National Security Council
staff as special assistant to the President and senior director for Strategic Planning and Southwest
Asia.
Prior to his government service, Tellis was senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and
professor of Policy Analysis at the RAND Graduate School.
He is the author of India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture (2001) and co-author of Interpreting
China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (2000). He is the research director of the
Strategic Asia program at NBR and co-editor of the seven most recent annual volumes, including
this year’s Strategic Asia 2010–11: Asia's Rising Power and America's Continued Purpose. In
addition to numerous Carnegie and RAND reports, his academic publications have appeared in
many edited volumes and journals. He is frequently called to testify before Congress.
Tellis is a member of several professional organizations related to defense and international
studies including the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute of Strategic
Studies, the United States Naval Institute, and the Navy League of the United States.
Panel 4: Nuclear Developments in the Middle East
Title: Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East and Key Determinates of Nuclear Developments in the
Middle East
Speaker: Douglas Frantz, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Douglas Frantz is the chief investigator for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He is the former
managing editor for the Los Angeles Times. He is also the former Istanbul, Turkey bureau chief for the
New York Times.
Commentator: Patrick Clawson, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Patrick Clawson is deputy director for research at The Washington Institute, where he directs
the Iran Security Initiative. Widely consulted as an analyst and media commentator, he has
authored more than 150 articles about the Middle East and international economics as well as
eighteen books or studies on Iran.
Dr. Clawson appears frequently on television and radio, and has published op-ed articles in
major newspapers including the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. He
has also testified before congressional committees more than twenty times and has served as an
expert witness in more than a dozen federal cases. Prior to joining The Washington Institute, he
was a senior research professor at the National Defense University's Institute for National
Strategic Studies, a senior economist at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,
and a research scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Title: The First Blink: Kissinger and Nixon Give Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program a Pass
Speaker: Victor Gilinsky, former Commissioner 1976-1982, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Dr. Victor Gilinsky is an independent consultant on energy matters. He has been deeply involved in
nuclear power, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear fuel cycle and waste issues. Gilinsky served two terms
as Commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, where he played an important role in tightening
U.S. nuclear export standards. He was previously Head of Rand Corporation’s Physical Sciences
Department, dealing with a wide range of scientific and technical matters, both civilian and military. Most
recently he has been a consultant to the State of Nevada in relation to the proposed Yucca Mountain
nuclear waste repository.
Commentator: Sasha Polakow-Suransky, Council on Foreign Relations

Sasha Polakow-Suransky is a Senior Editor at the Council on Foreign Relations. Sasha
Polakow-Suransky holds a D.Phil in Modern History from St. Antony's College, Oxford, where
he was a Rhodes Scholar from 2003-2006. He has written for the American Prospect, the
International Herald Tribune, and Newsweek, and is the author of The Unspoken Alliance:
Israel's Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa.
The Washington Center for Internships and
Academic Seminars
SS11-4443
Global Policy Issues: The US, China, and

the World
Shelton L. Williams, Ph.D.
Spring 2011
Global Policy Issues: US, China and the World
Instructor Name Shelton L. (Shelly) Williams
Contact Information (phone number & email) 301-704-5538, saistype@aol.com
Course Date (day and hours) Tuesdays, 6:00-9:00 PM
Course Description
The Obama Administration came into office seeking a Strategic Dialogue, if not partnership,
with the People's Republic of China. This course will discuss how the Administration now
approaches a multitude of issues with China ranging from trade to security to environment to
multilateral institutions. In addition to lectures, expert visits, and readings, the students will
also prepare for and engage in the National Model Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum,
presenting the economy of China. This event will occur March 10-13, 2011, and will feature
interaction with the actual senior leaders of the APEC economies convening in Washington
that same week. Students should expect an interdisciplinary course covering basic US Foreign
Policy toward Economics, security, human rights and environmental topics.
Course Objectives
This course will provide the student with background knowledge on a wide range of topics in
US-Chinese relations and at the same time afford students the opportunity to meet current and
former decision-makers . One of the highlights of the course will be the opportunity to
represent a variety of nations at the National Model UN-APEC and thus to engage in research
negotiations, and public speaking on a wide array of global policy issues.
Learning Objectives
The Global Issues course is a 15-week academic course in Washington, D.C. It is designed to
prepare young leaders from with a better understanding of the complexity of global issues and
to help them develop tools for solving problems. Students will have the opportunity to interact
with some of the foremost practitioners of US diplomacy, taking advantage of their presence
in Washington, D.C. The experience will prepare these young leaders for careers with civic,
economic, government and political responsibility. Specific objectives of the course are to
prepare students to:
 Gain in depth knowledge and understanding of American Foreign Policy;
 Gain detailed understanding of multilateral organizations;
 Acquire detailed knowledge of global public policy issues and other nations’ views on the
issues;
 Further develop research, public speaking, and negotiating skills.
Required Texts
Michael David Lampton, Power Constrained: Sources of Mutual Suspicion in US-Chinese

Relations, Bureau of Asian Research, July 2010:
http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/Free/2010_U.S._China.pdf
CRS Report: Comparing Global Influence: China and the US
http://web.resource.amchamchina.org/wysiwyg/WP2008-PartI.pdf
APEC Background Guides: http://nmun.org/apec_committee_guides.html
APEC at a Glance: http://publications.apec.org/publication-detail.php?pub_id=1077
Recommended Secondary Readings
Fareed Zakaria, The Post American World (Norton, 2008)
Course Requirements
Class Participation 40%
APEC participation 20%
Weekly Essays 40%
Presentations
APEC speeches and negotiations in class at the conference
Participation
Weekly discussions
Classroom and Grading Policies
Just listening is not an option. Get involved. Ask questions, make comments, raise issues
Class Schedule
Week 1: January 25: Introduction to US-China Relations, Model APEC, and Foreign
Policy Dynamics
Week 2: February 1: Introduction to Model APEC and China (Readings for period up to
APEC)
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2604/t15264.htm
http://nmun.org/apec_committee_guides.html
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2604/2607/t15290.htm
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2604/2606/t172477.htm
Guest: Julie Petruzzi, State Department expert on China
Week 3: February 8: APEC Preparation
Guest: Ryan MacFarlane, US Department of State, Far East Bureau
Week 4: February 15: APEC Preparation
Model APEC Rules and Procedures, Position Papers
Guest: State Department expert on the Working Group
Week 5: February 22: Model APEC Preparation
The Dynamics of APEC Negotiating
Guest Expert: Shawn Trumbo, Osgood Center
Week 5: March 1: APEC Preparation
Rules, Reports, Strategies
Guest: Mike Aguilar, Secretary General, Model APEC
Week 6: March 10-13: Model APEC, Washington Plaza
Week 7: March 15: No Class
Week 8: March 22: Overview of US-Chinese Relations under Obama
Michael David Lampton, Power Constrained: Sources of Mutual Suspicion in US-Chinese

Relations, Bureau of Asian Research, July 2010:
http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/Free/2010_U.S._China.pdf, pp. TBA
President Hu, “Common Ground” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2011/01/16/AR2011011601920.html
Guest: Carla Freeman, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Week 9: March 29 Chinese Decision-making
CRS Report: Comparing Global Influence: China and the US
http://web.resource.amchamchina.org/wysiwyg/WP2008-PartI.pdf
Guest Shanshan Mei, American University PhD candidate
Week 10: April 5 US-China Security Issues
Gates in China: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12146922
Lampton, pp. TBA
Guest: TBA
Week 11: April 5: US-China Security Issues
Bureau of Asian Research: http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=469
Guest: Lawrence Wilkerson, GW professor and former Chief of Staff for Colin Powell
Week 12: April 12: China and Human Rights
US Policy and Human Rights: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/index.htm
Human Rights and US Foreign Policy:

http://www.fpif.org/reports/human_rights_and_us_policy
Human Rights and China: http://www.fpif.org/reports/human_rights_and_us_policy
Guest: Helen Lowman, Osgood Board
April 19: No Class
Week 13: April 26: China, the US and Climate Change
The Cancun Consensus: http://neronline.co.uk/blogs/environmental/2010/12/15/the-cancun-

consensus/
China and Climate Change: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68N19220100924
Week 14: May 3: Intellectual Property Issues
NERA Consulting: IPR Trends and Legislation in China
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=74520
Google
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html
Guest; Steve Adkins, Orrick, partner
Week 15: May 10: Energy and Resources
China’s Energy Needs: http://www.iags.org/china.htm
Brookings:http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/1130_china/20091130_china.
pdf
Brookings:http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/09_us_china_energy_cooperation_liebertha
l.aspx
May 17 Final Evaluation and Wrap up
TWC Course Policies
For a detailed list of all TWC policies, please refer to your student handbook.
Professionalism
We strongly encourage students to be professional at all times.
Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action
The Washington Center actively subscribes to a policy of equal opportunity in education.
Class Cancellation
Students are expected to attend every class period as scheduled unless there is an unavoidable
circumstance or illness. Classes do not meet on federal holidays; however, your professor may
elect to reschedule the class for another evening to make-up time and work. If you miss two
classes, your instructor will notify your program advisor.
Verbal, Sexual, Ethnic/Racial Harassment
The Washington Center does not tolerate harassment of any nature. Verbal, sexual, ethnic and
or racial harassment in nay way of its students, staff, and faculty are prohibited. The
Washington Center advises students to notify their Program Advisor if they believe they may
have been exposed to sexual or verbal harassment.
Disability Services
If you are a student who is defined under the American with Disabilities Act and requires
assistance or support services, please inform The Washington Center's disability coordinator,
by emailing disabilityservices@twc.edu. The coordinator will organize such services as note
takers, readers, sign language interpreters, etc. If you need course adaptations or
accommodations because of a disability, if you have emergency medical information to share,
or if you need special arrangements in case the building must be evacuated, please make an
appointment to speak with disability services upon arrival. Disability services information is
available on online at ww.twc.edu/disability_services.shtml.
Academic Misconduct
1. Plagiarism – the use of ideas or writings of another as one’s own. Students are expected to
submit original evaluations, essays and papers, and to cite all appropriate sources. If
requested, students should be prepared to provide original notes, previous drafts, pr other
materials to indicate original research or intellectual ownership of an assignment.
2. Cheating – the use of notes or books when prohibited, and the assistance of another student
while completing a quiz or an exam, or the providing of information to another individual for
this purpose, unless such collaboration is approved by the course instructor.
3. Falsification – the improper alteration of any record, document or evaluation.
4. Obstruction – behaving in a disruptive manner or participating in activities that interfere with

the educational mission of The Washington Center at lectures, courses, meetings or other
sponsored events.
5. Absenteeism – the chronic failure to attend program components (including internship,

internship courses, or other scheduled activities) without a valid reason or prior notification.
Student Grievances
If students have a problem with their instructor, the course material, class format, or other
aspects of the course, they should speak to the instructor first. If that is not possible or they
choose otherwise, students should speak with the course coordinator who will arrange a
conference in consultation with the managing director for academic affairs. If students wish to
make a formal complaint, they must submit it in writing to the course coordinator, the senior
vice president, Dr. Eugene Alpert, who will investigate the situation and will consult the
relevant parties and inform the student of the progress of the investigation in order to come to
a resolution of the situation.
Disclaimer Readings, assignments, and due dates may change due to unforeseen
circumstances. Your professor will advise you of any changes and present them to you in
writing.
TWC COURSE POLICIES
(FOR A DETAILED LIST OF ALL TWC POLICIES, PLEASE REFER TO YOUR

STUDENT HANDBOOK)
PROFESSIONALISM
We strongly encourage students to be professional at all times.
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY/AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The Washington Center actively subscribes to a policy of equal opportunity in education.
CLASS CANCELLATION
Students are expected to attend every class period as scheduled unless there is an unavoidable
circumstance or illness. Classes do not meet on federal holidays; however, your professor may
elect to reschedule the class for another evening to make-up time and work. If you miss two
classes, your instructor will notify your program advisor.
VERBAL, SEXUAL, ETHNIC/RACIAL HARASSMENT
The Washington Center does not tolerate harassment of any nature. Verbal, sexual, ethnic and
or racial harassment in nay way of its students, staff, and faculty are prohibited. The
Washington Center advises students to notify their Program Advisor if they believe they may
have been exposed to sexual or verbal harassment.
DISABILITY SERVICES
Students with Special Needs: If you are a student who is defined under the American with
Disabilities Act and requires assistance or support services, please inform The Washington
Center's disability coordinator, by emailing disabilityservices@twc.edu. The coordinator will
organize such services as note takers, readers, sign language interpreters, etc. If you need
course adaptations or accommodations because of a disability, if you have emergency medical
information to share, or if you need special arrangements in case the building must be
evacuated, please make an appointment to speak with disability services upon arrival.
Disability services information is available on online at ww.twc.edu/disability_services.shtml.
ACADEMIC MISCONDUCT
Plagiarism – the use of ideas or writings of another as one’s own. Students are expected to
submit original evaluations, essays and papers, and to cite all appropriate sources. If
requested, students should be prepared to provide original notes, previous drafts, pr other
materials to indicate original research or intellectual ownership of an assignment.
Cheating – the use of notes or books when prohibited, and the assistance of another student
while completing a quiz or an exam, or the providing of information to another individual for
this purpose, unless such collaboration is approved by the course instructor.
Falsification – the improper alteration of any record, document or evaluation.
Obstruction – behaving in a disruptive manner or participating in activities that interfere with

the educational mission of The Washington Center at lectures, courses, meetings or other
sponsored events.
Absenteeism – the chronic failure to attend program components (including internship,

internship courses, or other scheduled activities) without a valid reason or prior notification.
STUDENT GRIEVANCES
If students have a problem with their instructor, the course material, class format, or other
aspects of the course, they should speak to the instructor first. If that is not possible or they
choose otherwise, students should speak with the course coordinator who will arrange a
conference in consultation with the managing director for academic affairs. If students wish to
make a formal complaint, they must submit it in writing to the course coordinator, who will
then advise the Director for Academic Affairs, Mr. Kevin Nunley.
NPEC Course Syllabus
Nuclear Proliferation: History, Technology and Policy

27 January Course overview
Victor Gilinsky, How Will the Nuclear Weapons Story End?

http://www.npolicy.org/files/20060924-Gilinsky-
BeijingRemarks.pdf
Controlling the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Council on

Foreign Relations, April 2010
http://www.npolicy.org/files/IIGG_WorkingPaper3_Nuclear_
Control.pdf
Introduction, Best of Intentions
Class 2 Nuclear Energy Primer
Xeroxed materials
Class 3 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Primer
Xeroxed materials
Gilinsky, et. al., “Fresh Examination”

http://www.npolicy.org/files/20041022-GilinskyEtAl-
LWR.pdf
Class 4 First Attempts at Controlling Nuclear Energy
Acheson Lilienthal Report

http://www.learnworld.com/ZNW/LWText.Acheson-
Lilienthal.html
“The Baruch Plan,” and “Atoms for Peace” chapters in Best of

Intentions
Class 5 The IAEA and NPT
Cochran, Lyman, and Zarate in Falling Behind
http://www.npolicy.org/Books.asp%3FBookID%3D-
1009596920
Sokolski, “Building Support for the Agency’s Safeguards Mission,”

November 2, 2010, presentation before the IAEA.
http://www.npolicy.org/files/Building_Support_for_the_Age
ncys_Safeguards_Mission_More_Transparency_Funding_an
d_Safeguards_Candor.pdf
“The NPT” chapter in Best of Intentions
Introductory chapter to Reviewing the NPT

http://www.npolicy.org/reviewingthenpt#intro
Steven Kidd, “Nuclear Proliferation Risk: Is It Vastly Overrated?”

Nuclear Engineering International, July 23, 2010
http://www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2056931
Class 6 Nuclear Economics, Intelligence, and Future Restraints
Introduction to Nuclear Power’s Global Expansion: Weighing Its

Costs and Risks
http://www.npolicy.org/files/20100602-
Nuclear_Power_Carbon.pdf
John Mueller, Atomic Obsession, pp. 129-42.
Chow and Wohlstetter, “Arms Control that Just Might Work” The
Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1985
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB89
3.pdf#pagemode=bookmarks&page=481
Sokolski, “Missiles for Peace,” Armed Forces Journal, July 2, 2010.

Available at http://www.npolicy.org/files/20100708-
Missiles_for_peace.pdf
“Nonproliferation Games,” National Review Online, August 3, 2010,

available at http://www.npolicy.org/files/20100805_-
Nuclear_Nonproliferation_Games.pdf
“Fighting Proliferation with Intelligence” ORBIS, available at

http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/fp/b19ch16.htm
Victor Gilinsky, “First Blink: Kissinger and Nixon’s Handling of

Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program”
Class 7 Student Presentations
Class 8 Student Presentations/Final
Project Ideas
Document previous efforts to prevent nuclear fuel making for Brazil, Argentina, Pakistan,
Japan
Tally predictions of when Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea would get their first bomb
against data available at the time suggesting that they had already acquired or were close to
having nuclear arms.
Catalog conflicting goals of the IAEA and conflicting restraints on IAEA safeguards
procedures
List the predominate small nuclear reactor projects and assess their economic and
nonproliferation claimed benefits and risks
Henry Sokolski: Home office: 703-271-9852, cell 571-277-1815 hdsokolski@hotmail.com
Appendix:
Professional Reflection #4
North-South Korean Conflict: The Sunshine Policy
The topic of the conflict between the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea) and ROK (Republic of Korea) is so vast that I decided to focus on the
Sunshine Policy implemented by ROK’s President Kim Jae-Dung. The importance of
this topic for international affairs is because it has consequences for the relationship
for the Korean peninsula and the surrounding region. The two main viewpoints are
that the continued use of the Sunshine Policy was a means to rebuild the DPRKs
infrastructure and relationship. The second view is that it did nothing but fund the
DPRKs nuclear program.
The primary policy of the ROK from Kim Jae-Dung until the current president,
Lee Myung-bak, was that of aid towards the DPRK. The primary goal of the Sunshine
Policy was to help to rebuild their infrastructure and to give food to the Koreans in the
North. It was seen as a means to increase unification between the two governments,
which the result was the closest relationship between the two sides that had ever
existed. It proposed that the ROK would not attempt to absolve the North, but also
would not tolerate DPRK aggression. This set a clear strategy and plan for the DPRK
to understand and to follow creating a partial stability between them, which lead to the
first Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000.
The critics of the Sunshine Policy point out that the aid given by the ROK to
the DPRK was funneled into their nuclear program, rather than actually going to the
North Korean people. The argument for this is that the regime continues to starve its
people in order to develop its WMDs, which the underground nuclear tests and the
missile test over Japan shows to be true. However, this argument does not explain
why relationships between the two governments were so close and why the first Inter-
Korean Summit talks on unification started, supposedly, because of the Sunshine
Policy.
The relationship between the DPRK and the ROK is an issue for all
Asia/Pacific nations because there are consequences for both sides. As was seen in the
Korean Wars, the result is the same a collapse of the ROK would mean US troops and
a collapse of the DPRK would mean PRC troops. It also has serious consequences for
the non-proliferation regime in the region, since Japan is capable of create nuclear
weapons within months. Another major concern is raised in comparing the Korean
peninsula to Pakistan. The implication of collapse or worse due to instability poses a
serious question, what will happen to the DPRKs nuclear program.
Global Policy Issues – Classwork
Delegation from Represented by
China The Washington Center
Position Paper for the APEC Internal Security Working Group (ISWG)
The problems set before the ISWG are Enhancing Regional Cooperation through
Counter-Terrorism Financing; Applying Mechanisms for Combating Corruption and
Money Laundering; and, Re-Evaluating the STAR Priorities for 2011: The Secure
Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) Initiative.
I. Enhancing Regional cooperation through Counter-Terrorism

Financing
The air cargo terrorist plot in late September made it clear how important it is to
increase cooperation among APEC members to prevent terrorists, as defined by
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Special Recommendation (SR) II “Criminalizing
the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering”, from acquiring and/or
using funds for terrorist acts. The cooperation of all member economies is important
to reach the 1994 Bogor Goals, which call for free and open trade and investment in
the region. Increased attention should be paid to improving cooperation between the
private and public sector, as well as full implementation of all of FATF’s nine (9) SRs.
There are three main areas of development or enhancement that the ISWG should
work towards: 1) improved cooperation between the private and public sector; 2) full
integration of the World Customs Organization (WCO) standards on and international
level with all member economies, capacity-building in maritime/aviation security
provided by the CTTF, and full implementation of the UN’s Terrorist Financing
Convention, Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy; and 3) FATF’s nine (9) SRs
(especially SR five (5). China’s signing of the UN’s Terrorist Financing Convention,
as stated by Ambassador WANG Guangya, “illustrates the long-standing position of
the Chinese Government to resolutely fight against terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations, and the determination of the Chinese Government to combat terrorism
through international cooperation in accordance with the relevant national and
international law.” China’s position is that regional cooperation will strengthen
relations with member states, improve trade of all member economies, and provide
developing APEC states with the capacity to establish a security and growing
economy.
II. Applying mechanisms for Combating Corruption and Money Laundering
The primary hindrance of global trade is corruption and money laundering. APECs
role has been in establishing effective and universal business standards of both the
public and private sector, as a means to establish preventative systems. The UN
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is the driving force behind many of APECs
action in this area. It is the first binding document on corruption, but more
importantly it outlines specific preventative measures to combat corruption. This
document led to: the APEC Transparency Standards, which make it mandatory of
APEC members to publish all laws and regulations on the subject of fighting
corruption; and the Santiago Commitment to Fight Corruption and Ensure
Transparency, which established a consensus desire to implement all measures of
UNCAC and to establish cooperation between APEC members. The Anti-Corruption
and Transparency Experts Task Force (ACT) has been instrumental in developing
codes of conduct for both the public and private sector, administrative officials, and
establishing measures that would improve cooperation between member economies.
China sees that it is instrumental for member economies to implement all standards on
corruption and money laundering that have been addressed by the aforementioned
documents. In compliance with the 2002 Statement on Fighting Terrorism and
Promoting Growth China rejoined the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering
(APG-ML) and is considering joining the Egmont Group Financial Intelligence Unit
(FIU). In addition, full cooperation and implementation of FATF’s Forty (40) + Nine
(9) SRs, and a full commitment to China’s 2009 Counter-Terrorism Action Plan
(CTAP).
III. Re-evaluating the STAR Priorities for 2011: The Secure Trade in the APEC
Region (STAR) Initiative
The Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) Initiative has been the primary anti-
terrorist component of APEC. Having been ratified by all twenty-one (21) members,
the universal understanding that increasing security of trade, both of people, goods,
and services, is the utmost importance. The III and IV STAR Conferences established
that in order to increase security private business and the public sector must work
together in harmony doing so that follow the objectives of the IV STAR Conference
stating that all economies agreed to see the private sector as more than providers but as
important partners in establishing trade security. The V, VI, and VII STAR
Conferences express that cooperation, coordination, and communication are needed in
order to enhance regional security in all areas of trade including: maritime, aviation,
cargo, people, and money. Although the III, V, and VI STAR Conference addressed
the issue of cooperation and private-public partnership, they remain areas that are still
weak and vulnerability to attack, especially maritime security. The cargo attack
attempts in the United States in September of 2010 shows just how pertinent the issue
still is, and how much of APECs mission remains to be accomplished. China sees that
these issues must be at the forefront of APECs agenda.
China Spends More on Internal Security?
The Chinese spend more on internal security than defense. This statement is
very truthful, yet the Chinese people are happy with the “direction of the country.”
Why is this possible? Some would explain it as the results of an oppressive regime.
However, this essay will explain that it is a result of the Chinese social contract; China
is still a developing nation; and China’s choice of non-intervention.
The Chinese social contract is based upon economic development. The social
contract of the United States is based on security of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. In principal, if a government fails to agree to the social contract the people
can create a new one. This is even truer in the case of the PRC. Therefore, the Chinese
people care less so about the military expenditures as long as they still grow
economically. The Chinese people also fear the results of the collapse of the PRC. The
legend says that once a regime loses the favor of the gods, the land dissolves into
regional warlords. With this in context, the Chinese see that the PRC has brought
China back to greatness. It is because of this that the Chinese are happy with the
direction, even if that means more internal security spending than defense.
Many in the Western world see China as an emerging superpower, but China
technically is still a developing nation. This explains why they spend more on internal
security than defense. China is a vast nation with many regions still not fully
controlled by the PRC, both on the mainland and off. In last week’s lecture, it was
stated that China’s foreign principal is to secure the mainland before involving itself
abroad. Until China is fully under the control of the PRC and its rulings able to be
enforced on all, internal security will be more than defense spending.
The Chinese foreign policy is one of non-intervention. From the last lecture, it
is a win-win scenario. These are policies and relations that China likes. It means
going into a country, say Ecuador, exchange to give them the technology to refine oil,
while China gets all the oil. It is an idea of get in and get out. This allows China to
keep its external military expenditures down. The US military budget is because they
are involved quite extensively in the world. This calls for a massive military force, i.e.
expenditures. China on the other hand, only needs to protect its borders and sphere of
influence. This is a very light expenditure. If you included the policy of non-
intervention, China has no need to build a military that has to secure a foreign region.
Trust and Its Role in US Assessments toward Chinese Capabilities
Lack of trust in Sino-US relations is inherent, but something never understood.
The US believes that it understands why the PLA is building up its military in the
Asian-Pacific region. However, they fail to understand that the principle cause is the
PRC feeling of encirclement by the US and its allies. This essay will portray this point
by examining how miscalculations, misunderstandings, and zero-sum strategies
exacerbate the problem creating a security dilemma.
Miscalculations and misunderstanding are a result of governments lacking trust
in one another. For example, the US-Soviet relations that led to the Cuban Missile
Crisis were caused by misunderstandings and miscalculations. In this example, the
US misunderstood why Russia was in Cuba, while Russia miscalculated the response
of the US. The same can be said for Sino-US relations in the Asian-Pacific region.
The US sees an increase in Chinese military expenditures as a means to secure more
power in the region. This statement is true. The PRC want more power in the region,
but not because it simply wants to dominate the region. It feels threatened by US
encroachment. In the article this week, it makes the point that Robert Gates, after his
meeting with the Chinese Defense Minister, is going to meet with the various military
leaders of US allies. The PRC sees this as the US increasing their influence in the
region and encircling them. The US must understand these correlations.
Zero-sum strategies have been the lens that US policy-makers have seen
relations with the PRC. However, this strategy only exacerbates mistrust in Sino-US
relations. The PLA military build-up of so-called “carrier killers” and the Chinese
stealth fighter have created some zero-sum strategies among US military leaders. In
the article, Gates states that the US must stay up to date on its military capability vis-à-
vis the PLA. This policy, while truthful and important, is a zero-sum strategy. It states
that any military build-up by the PLA must be met by a build-up in the United States.
It is a recipe for a security dilemma.
The US must learn from the mistakes of the Cold War. Principally, that lack of
trust caused by misunderstandings, miscalculations, or zero-sum strategies need to be
eliminated. Misunderstandings are something easily fixed by increasing discussions
between states and by raising concerns that can be clarified. If states have, a degree of
mistrust between each other relations will always be strained. It breeds miscalculations
that create zero-sum policies that exacerbate the issue into a security dilemma
scenario.
Nuclear Proliferation – Class work
Questions Week 1:
1. Which of the following types of reactions requires the most energy to initiate:
Fission, fusion, or chemical? Which requires the least?
Nuclear fusion requires the largest amount of energy of the three. The larger
energy cost is needed in order to overcome the electrostatic repulsion field in
order to fuse the two atoms. Fission on the other hand takes much less energy
than that because one only has to split an already unstable element into a
much more stable one, such as Uranium or Plutonium into Kryton and barium.
Chemical reactions take the least amount of energy because they only require
the smallest spark, such as TNT only requires a short fuss.
2. When uranium is fissioned to produce other elements, such as barium and Kryton,
these elements have higher binding energies among their neutrons and protons in
their nuclei than uranium does. What is the source of their higher binding energy?
a. the loss of a small portion uranium nucleonic matter (atomic weight), which is
converted to energy
b. the gain of electronic binding energy in the outer electron shells of the resulting
fission products
c. the shift in atomic numbers from the large atomic number associated with
uranium to the two smaller numbers associated with barium and krypton
d. all the above
3. What is the yield in kilotons (i.e. the amount of energy released in tons of high
explosive equivalent) of
a. The 10t Grand Slam conventional bomb used in World War II -- 0.01
kilotons
b. The Hiroshima fission bomb -- 13 kilotons
4. Advanced fission bombs in the very early 1950s were boosted with thermonuclear
fuels to produce yields of .5 megatons. Roughly how many times greater is this yield
than that of a nominal 10-kiloton first-generation fission bomb? In the mid 1950s,
Russia exploded a 50 megaton nuclear weapon. Roughly how many times greater was
its yield than the Grand Slam of World War II?
A 0.5 MT bomb would be roughly 50 times greater in yield than a 10 kt first-
generation fission bomb. A thermonuclear-fueled bomb of 0.5 MT is
approximately ~5,000 times greater in yield than the Grand Slam of World
War II.
5. Detail at least four different ways a bomb designer can reduce the amount of
fissionable material needed to make a fission nuclear weapon of a given yield.
The four primary ways expressed in the handout are: a neutron reflector,
increasing the density of weapons material, increasing the speed at which the
two critical masses come together, and encasing it in a heavy metal casing.
However, increasing the speed that they are brought together causes a major
risk that the bomb might fissile before there is enough material separated.
6. Why are fission bombs made with plutonium prone to predetonate and bombs made
with HEU not? How did the Manhattan project bomb designers overcome this
plutonium predetonantion problem? Name two advanced bomb technologies that can
be used to help offset this problem even further.
Fission bombs made with plutonium are made with Pu239, which is ideal for
nuclear fission. However, it is extremely hard to produce without creating
Pu240, which is comparatively active and prone to release neutrons that can
cause Pu239 to prematurely fission. HEU on the other hand has a low level of
neutron emissions that make it possible for weapon designs like the gun
barrel, in which conventional ballistics are used. In order to overcome this
problem the Manhattan Project designers created a new method of detonation
called implosion, which consists of using an explosive to crush a hollow
subcritical sphere into a dense ball of critical mass plutonium. This method
allowed the designers to overcome the issue of Pu240 needing to be brought
together faster than the gun model could. They also designed a neutron source
generator that would increase the volume of material in the area during
fission; in addition, designers encased bombs (such as the Fat Boy) in steel,
and a neutron reflector to mitigate the Pu240 premature emission.
7. What nuclear bomb material is the enrichment process used to produce? What
nuclear bomb material is the reprocessing process used to produce? Which process is
chemical? Which process is isotopic?
U235, which is in nature a rare isotope of uranium, is produced to WGU by a

form of enrichment called the gaseous diffusion method and is isotopic. This
method produces U235 by turning natural uranium into UF6 and capturing the
lighter U235. On the other hand, plutonium is produced by chemically
reprocessing spent reactor fuel into plutonium.
8. How many kilograms would the sphere critical mass be of a weapon using a thick
neutron reflecting uranium shell and a crude weapons design using:
a. uranium that contains 50% U238 and 50% U235? ~50kg
b. uranium containing 100% U235 and 0% U238? ~17kg
c. plutonium containing 50% Pu240 and 50% Pu239? ~10kg
d. plutonium containing 100% Pu239 and 0% Pu240? ~4kg
9. According to recent analysis, the amount of fissile material needed to produce a

weapon of a given yield varies according to the sophistication of the weapons design.
How many kilograms of plutonium are needed for a 10kt bomb using a low technical
capability weapons design? How many is needed for the same yield using a high
technical capability weapons design?
For a low technical capability weapon design, one needs 5 kg of plutonium,

whereas for a high technical capability weapon design one only needs 2 kg.
10. Had the first US nuclear device been made using reactor grade plutonium it:
a. Would have produced a yield that would have exceeded 1 kt
b. would have not produced any nuclear yield
c. would have produced a weak yield of less than .01 kt
Questions Week 2:
1. What key provisions in Acheson-Lilienthal Report/Baruch Plans were not reflected

in the Atoms for Peace program and the IAEA?
A major provision that was not in the Atoms for Peace program or the IAEA
is the idea of establishing, under the Atomic Energy Agency, dangerous
nuclear facilities in each nation so that if an aggressor takes one facility it
would be considered an attack on the UN. The complete and total control of
all means of nuclear production was another provision left out of the IAEA
and Eisonhower’s program. This provision stated that inspections alone were
not enough that the authority must have complete control, but the Atoms for
Peace and IAEA dropped this for international inspections of state owned
facilities. The Atoms for peace program did call for the slow transfer, or
contributions, from states to the IAEA, but it never came to fruition.
2. What did the Acheson-Lilienthal Report consider to be clearly safe nuclear
activities and which activities did it believe were clearly dangerous?
The Acheson-Lilienthal Report noted “safe activities” as three broad points.
The broadness was designed to express the development in nuclear technology
that the writers saw would come in the future. In other words, they did not
want to hamper innovations but at the same time to safeguard the diversion to
weapons production. The three main safe activities noted are: 1) the use of
radioactive tracers as they have a clear use in the scientific fields; 2) small,
low powered nuclear power plants that use denatured Pu and U235; 3) and large
scale, high power reactors in which the Pu and U235 is used in the absence of
uranium or thorium.
The Report expressed “dangerous activities” as three main categories as well.
These are the mining and/or processing of raw uranium (as they labeled it
“provision of raw materials”), the use of facilities for the production of
nuclear weapons (i.e. reactors and separation plants, anything that needs only
minor changes to create weapons), and any action to produce nuclear
weapons. These definitions of “dangerous activities” are quite broad, but as
shown above there are exceptions to these rules. An example is that not all
reactors are in use for nuclear weapons, as expressed that even high power
reactors are accepted. However, there is a fine line between safe and
dangerous is the essential piece gathered from the Acheson-Lilienthal Report.
3. What view did the original Acheson-Lilienthal Report have regarding how safe
power reactors might be? What did the authors of the Acheson-Lilienthal report mean
when they referred to denatured uranium, to denatured plutonium? The authors of the
report qualified their views regarding the value of denaturing as a safeguard April 9th.
What did they say regarding the value of denaturing plutonium and what were the
implications regarding the reports’ original view regarding how safe power reactors
were?
The original Reports view on power reactors was that the production of “safe”
reactors meant that there had to be a “dangerous” reactor in order to produce
the material needed for production. They expressed desires and
recommendations to create an international agency that would oversee and run
the production of the “dangerous” reactors, allowing for the free development
by public and private entities (companies) to construct and run “safe” reactors.
As far as what the authors meant by denatured uranium and plutonium, by
denatured uranium they meant the use of low enriched uranium (LEU) which
is not optimal for weapons use. The report focused primarily on the case of
plutonium, seeing that they saw uranium 235 was extremely scarce. This
observation was wrong, later it was found to be abundant on the planet. In the
case of plutonium, the focus of the Report, they wanted to use a blend of
depleted uranium (U238) and “denatured” plutonium (e.g., Pu239 and Pu240).
Despite knowing that these isotopes could be used to create a bomb, the
authors pushed on (even though Oppenheimer wanted to expose this issue, it
was posted as an attachment to the original report).
The April 9th view states that the value of denaturing plutonium is not a
principal safeguard and should not be considered an effect all-in-one. It
instead is something to guarantee that there is a minimum of one-year worth
of “timely warning” before a state can develop a nuclear weapon. They also
stated that there is no means of creating nuclear energy without the use of raw
uranium. Essentially, this means that there is no complete and total safeguard
for fissile material but one can reduce the effectiveness of materials to a point
that it takes a large amount of effort in order to produce a single bomb’s worth
of material.
4. What is the difference between the IAEA requirement for “timely detection” and the
view the Acheson-Lilienthal Report gave as to what “time adequate” (a.k.a., now
“timely warning”) required?
The IAEA’s “timely detection” safeguard simply requires that it be found
before a state is able to create a single nuclear weapon (i.e., a SQ). This
means that the IAEA is concerned principally with detecting a nuclear
program before a bomb is created. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report’s “timely
warning” requirement is that the international agency detects a states diversion
of materials and/or position to do so. In other words, if the state seems to be
moving in the direction of acquiring nuclear weapons that agency should send
out a warning signal to the international community.
5. What did the Baruch Plan mean by condign punishment and how did this concept
differ from what the Acheson-Lilienthal report laid out as an approach to
enforcement?
The condign punishment that the Baruch Plan spoke of was a broadly un-
defined punishment, yet it was very sharply pointed out that any attempt made
by a nation for seizure or producing a bomb should be met swiftly with said
punishment. It called forth that an amendment be made to the UN Charter in
regard that the IAEA have the authority to punish ANY nation, whether one of
the big five (5) or not. The purpose was sound, but too far-reaching for any
state to agree to. It simply meant that in the event of a state, such as the
USSR, seized an IAEA plant to produce weapons; the USSR should not have
the ability to veto their punishment. Otherwise, the IAEA has little authority
(keep in mind this is a Cold War scenario, since the major powers are the
USSR and the US). This directed and sharp punishment is the largest
difference between the Baruch Plan and the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. The
Acheson-Lilienthal Report expressed that it would take at least a year for a
state to develop nuclear weapons, and therefore it left punishment to the realm
of diplomacy and international sanctions.
6. What does the IAEA safeguards term “significant quantity” refer to? “Conversion
time”?
The IAEA’s term “significant quantity” refers to the estimated amount needed
to create a single nuclear weapon. The reasoning is that they want to prevent
states from creating not just nuclear weapons, but from creating a single
weapon. The IAEA’s term “conversion time” refers to the time that a state
needs in order to prepare material for use and insert it into a weapon. This
period is highly conservative and so takes less than is actually noted by the
IAEA.
7. Are the IAEA timeliness detection goals longer or shorter than the conversion times
for A. separate plutonium, B. HEU, C. mixed oxide fuel, and D. LEU? (Give your
answer for each case).
A. Separate plutonium – In the case of separate plutonium, the amount of time
is 7-10 days, and a 1-month timely detection goal. Like HEU, this is far
too infrequent.
B. HEU –HEU has a conversion rate estimated at 7-10 days, and a timeliness
detection goal of 1 month. The timeliness detection goal is much longer
than the conversion rate, and it is troublesome because a state could create
more than enough nuclear weapons from the time inspectors leave until
the next month when they visit again.
C. Mixed oxide fuel (MOX) – This conversion rate time is estimated at 7-21
days with a timely detection goal of a month. While this is a far greater
timetable for inspectors’ actual detection, the range at which MOX can be
converted merits a more frequent inspection time. It is greater than the
conversion rate, but not by much.
D. LEU – The conversion rate is 3-12 months and the timely detection goal is
1 year. This timely goal allows for inspections and for sanctions (such as
the cause of Iran). It is far greater to exact in the conversion/detection
time gap.
8. Given that the IAEA has surveillance cameras and radiation sensors at fresh and
spent fuel storage ponds at all the light water reactor sites it safeguards, how might a
nation still divert these materials without the IAEA knowing?
The principle way would be during a regular spent-fuel evaluation in which
the rods are taken away from the site for inspection. A significant amount of
material could be taken off-site to a reprocessing plant that is too small for the
IAEA to detect. The state could also use a method in which they claim less
material made it to the site, than was suppose to receive.
9. Given the IAEA’s desire for nations to agree to more intrusive inspections by
having them adopt the Additional Protocol, is the IAEA proposing to increase or
decrease the frequency of inspections of nations to adopt this protocol?
In this regard, the IAEA is proposing to reduce the frequency in exchange for
more states to adopt the Additional Protocol, which mandates states give over
more information about their nuclear facilities, including information about
their manufacturing facilities for enriching uranium.
10. Assuming you used a levitated pit design or 2x the assembly speed of the Mark I
solid pack design used in the original Trinity shot in 1945, how much of a difference is
there in the probability of achieving a 1 KT yield using fuel-grade rather than
weapons-grade plutonium? And for a 5 KT device?
In the case of a 1 KT yield the probability between FG (83%) and WG (93%)
is only 10%. Whereas for 5 KT, the difference between FG (58%) and WG
(83%) is 25%. Assuming that in the 2x Trinity Technology charts, the first
grade (4.5%) is super WG, the second (6%) is WG, and the third (14%) is FG.
11. What must a nuclear safeguard be able to do to meet the “timely warning”
criteria? Do small research reactors be safeguarded to meet this criteria and, if so,
why? What of reprocessing, enrichment, MOX fabrication plants?
In principle in order to meet the “timely warning” criteria, the value of
detection must be less than the conversion rate. This gives the IAEA and
other states time to inflict sanctions against nations diverting material for
weapons. No, most nuclear production facilities do not meet the “timely
warning” standard because the conversion rate is much faster than the
detection time. This means that the rate of frequency of visits is too long and
allows virtual nuclear-weapon states to divert fuel in between IAEA visits.

Jason Courtoy Middle Tennessee State University Research and Editorial Assistant at The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Jason Courtoy Middle Tennessee State University Research and Editorial Assistant at The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Jason Courtoy

Middle Tennessee State University

Research and Editorial Assistant at

The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)

Final Defense Letter...............................................................................................................................3-4

Individual Development Plan................................................................................................................5-8

Cover Letter and Résumé....................................................................................................................9-10

Civic Engagement Project Reflection................................................................................................11-12

Informational Interview Reflection...................................................................................................13-14

Public Policy Dialogues on Capitol Hill (PPDC)...................................................................................15

Program Specific Project Analysis....................................................................................................16-18

Speaker Biographies: Life After START Conferences.....................................................................19-25

Global Policy Issues: the U.S., China, and the World.......................................................................26-32

Nuclear Proliferation: History, Technology, and Policy....................................................................33-35

Professional Reflection #4................................................................................................................36-37

Internal Security Working Group – Chinese Position Paper..............................................................38-39

Essay: China Spends More on Internal Security?..............................................................................40-41

Trust and Its Role in U.S. Assessments toward Chinese Capabilities................................................42-43

Nuclear Proliferation: Questions Week 1 and 2.................................................................................44-49

April 23, 2011

Dear Dr. Carleton:

Professional Development Goal: To develop greater or better analytical/editorial skills

Leadership Goal: To better use my skills as a leader

Personal Growth Goal: To be more confident and comfortable with my skills

The Heritage Foundation

Dear Human Resources,

I look forward to hearing from you.

Education Middle Tennessee State University Graduation Date:

 “Irish Education: the Road to Educate Together”

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Jan 24th – May 5th

Murfreesboro Young Life Fall 2007-Spring 2010

Extended School Program (ESP) Summer to Fall of 2008

Kingdom has ‘stateness.’ Therefore, I decided to facilitate my civic engagement by volunteering

African states’ lack of ‘stateness’ is caused by their inability to develop an effective

Morgenthau once stated).

learn more about African cultures and life.

conversational setting that she uses every day.

I was unable to bring up issue at my public policy dialogue. However, the

displays American commitment to the region. In addition, increasing Africa’s infrastructure

attitude towards the United States on the African continent.

and Nuclear Proliferation.

being a FAO means your work each week could be different.

Tennessee), he became extremely enthusiastic about advising me towards becoming an FAO.

This is led to this informational interview.

United States House of Representatives

U.S. Foreign Policy in a Time of Global Conflict

my class and work deal with this issue.

benefits of engagement and non-engagement are. If intervention is decided to be a matter of

The definition of international relations, essentially and simplistically, is the foreign

important to understand international affairs. Understanding why the US engages in certain

US is more hesitant to engage in contingencies, such as Darfur, than before.

the Cuban Missile Crisis.

reason, along with my major, why I chose to write on this topic.

LIFE AFTER START: NEW CHALLENGES, NEW

Panel 1: Asian Challenges

Speaker: Mark Stokes, Project 2049 Institute

Commentator: Jim Thomas, CSBA

Commentator: Phillip Karber, Georgetown University

Speaker: Henry Sokolski, NPEC

Commentator: Dennis Gormley, University of Pittsburgh

Speaker: Paul Kozemchak, DARPA

Commentator: Jeff Kueter, George C. Marshall Institute

Lunch Discussion: Plutonium, Proliferation, and Radioactive-Waste Politics in East Asia