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    Foedera and Foederati in The Fourth Century by PeterHeather

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    12 FOEDERA AND FOEDERATI OF THE FOURTH CENTURY Peter J, Heather I this article Oxforl University’s Peter Heather, at accomplished historian of four Reman and barbaring history in Late Antiquity, rensinds us thet te ‘Roms hat develeped and used sophisticated, formal teconigues for dealing wt to barbarians over a ong, pevioa of tone. Roms diplomatic practices served f0 tom rntir egos, 1 mpl the barbers: peoples” doings ath ane othe, end fo proce ily intelligence bout actos alow aul beyord the ‘ener n rect Heater’ aril, tere are sera Sues oe ep 2 Wore the Romurns wise to assign sch iomporiast resporsibiities to farbarian ies? Might the barbarians themselves have fel Heir loyalties to be divided: ‘Thinking back 40 He paper by Goffnrt, one might ask: Did Roysait trenty policy comtmeasie” te barbarians oF did that policy tix diplomatic au oniny potas m eays Tha sere dedrimenisl $0 the ftir? Keeping im mind the Uijerences bean Maps 1 and 2, what inpession does Hehe provide of he Join regions on Se eve of Rome's striatal ynsformation? Do Heater dierent sport long 9 «short sty far the barbarines? Howe, dere might ask, would Heather critique Excell? ‘That the Roman sate as is feign relations with the whole series of coups inhabiting territory beyond the frontier vie innumerable trent seu ge lune the fourth century as it had been in preceding eras of its history. The questions to be addsessed by this paper are whether stich treaties jfelew—followed a cearly-defined and universally applied teget Form! Sehat such a universally applied form could have meant in practice; and hrence, whether groups bound by such treaties—s0-called forderali—seally trad a precise and comparable starus from one end of the Fimpice 60 the biher, The stucly will concentrate on the period before the Hunsic Javasions that set in motion a total transformation in the Empire's FOEDERA AND FOEDERAT? OF THE FOURTH CENTURY stategic position, and will draw primarily on ungmbiguously contemporary information in the history of Ammianus Marcellinus and the Latin panegyrics. I would like to start, however, with the treaty made ‘between the emperor Constantine and the Goths in 332, wehich receives coverage in a much wider ronge of sources (wider in the sense of chronclogical spread as much as in authorship), and has treditionalty been seen as a moment when the precise legal status of groups bound to the Roman state underwent important modifications. Foedera and foederati in theory OF Constantine's agreement with the Goths, the sixth-century historian Jordanes, writing about two hundred and twenty years after the event, reports that it was a fords, which confirmed a special relationship of long, standing. Under its provisions the Goths were to send 40,000 inen to help the Empire whenever it required. According to Jordanes, this group (the {foedera!) became so famous that their deeds were still remembered in his Covrn day." But Jordanes envisages all satisfactory pliases of Gotho-Roman relations, before and alter Constantine, to have been organised on the basis of Gothic military assistance in return, for annual gifts. Good emperors from: the first century onwards geant the Goths their dues, bad ‘emperors are too greedy or foolish to pay up” Jordanes even claims that by ¢. 300... the Empire had “for a long time” found it difficult to fight without Gothic assistance. Much of this is nonsense, Goths did fight with the Roman army after 932, but never sent anything like 40,000 men. 3,000 Goths were sent to Procopius in 3654 and this is usually taken as a more coxtect ardec af magnitude. Instead of the mass military service envisaged by Jordanes, Gothic military contingents were on a much more limited scale. Jordanes’ whole account of the Goths’ relations with Constantine is iso fraudimlent, According to the Gelica the emperor greatly valued their help: indeed, it enabled him to defeat Licinius, whom the Goths actually killed.> In fact, the 320s saw Constantine first defeat Gothic raiding parties, and then overcome still more Goths who were actually fighting for Lieinius® The peace of 332 followed further conflict in the course of which the Goths made a complete surrender, Constantine celebrating his success with a column and annual games? Nevertheless, fordanes’ picture of Constantine making the Goths into Sovoranesd fooderaté bas won general acceptance® more contemporary idence usually being drafted in to bolster Jordanes’ much later account Ammianus applies a derivative of fasts to the Goths," Gothic troops fampaigned for the Empire on three known occasions while the treaty was is farce G48, 360, and 363)" and the Goths did also receive annual payments of some kind, The latter point is documented both by the 293 PETER J. HEATHER ‘emperor Jutian ("tribute of some kind”) and the oxator Themistius who sees tat inoney, provisions, and clothing were regularly handed ovet to the Gaths.!? Hence, it is argued, the Goths fought for the Empire as Jeedevati in retum for annual payment, even if Jordanes was mistaken ‘about the scale of the commitment."* “A legal framework for this special “federate” relationship has also been ‘constructed, Roman coins marked with the legend Gothia were issued by ‘Consiantine in the 3305. This style of coin legend seems to have been reserved for actual conquests, so that, as far as Constantine was concerned at least, the agreement of 332 involved—however notionally—the annexation of Gothic land. The point is confirmed by Julian who reports ‘that Constantine claimed to have reconquered Trajanie Dacial¥ on part of which the Goths were established. Given (from Jordanes) that the Goths were also federati, Constantine's claims have been glossed by two passages from the cixth-century historian Procopits, which deseribe the Incorporation of joederati into the Roman body politic. He tells es that Jorderati wore: those .. who had come info the Roman potitical system not in the condition of slaves, since they had not been conquered by the Romasts, but on the basis of complete eqiuality.4® ‘We also know from other sources that sixth-century foederati received ‘annul salaries in zelurn for their service. ‘Procapius and Jocdanes, both sivih-century texts, thus have very similar understandings of jocderali, Foederast are foreigners acting as imperial Coops who were being paid as such (Jordanes and Procopivs\, they also have a special, equal relationship with the Roman state Gordanes and Procopius), of which they ave legally 0 part (Procopius) ‘The 232 treaty has thus been seen a8 an importent innovation which tamed Goths into Roman soldiers; and also as the first example of @ type ‘ob agreement schich was to have a wide currency in the period of imperial Collapse, This was particularly the view of Mommsen, who stressed, after Procopins, the legal equality enjoyed by the new style forderai of the late Earpire, contrasting this status with the total subjection of republican art early imperial jociernti. Far Momusen, theretore, the treaty of 332 represented an evolution of the fordus which rected the decline of Jntperial power in late antiquity; no longer, unike its republican an early “perisl Torebeats, could the Roman state impose its will absolutely on ‘ulsiders drawn into diplomatic rations with itself. Later in the fourth ‘century, matters were to become worse when the Empice would be forced to grant such treaties fo groups actually established within the imperial ae. FOEDERA AND POEDERATI OF THE FOURTH CENTURY frontier (which the Goths were net, of course, in 332), but the weiting was already onthe wall.” ‘When etiphasis is placed not on sixth-century fexts, stich 98 Jordanes and Procopiyjs, but on properly contempotecy evidence from the fourth centory, fer diferent picture emerge Coniemporary repo aboot the treaty of 332, when set in the context of contemporary reports about other treaties of the sonte era, co not suggest that Constantine granted the Goths such a special relationship. * Tostart with, Ammianus indicates that Gothic military service after 332 yeas not a straightforward legal obligation clearly defined by the treaty. In 360, as part of preparations for » counterattack after the sack of Amida, Constantius “asked the Seythians (=Goths) for Aucilia, either for pay oF 88 a favour” (utercede ve! gratia) Jordanes’ picture of constanily available Gothic support is thus misleading; precise terms were clearly negotiated fon each occasion. And while Gothic troops were sent, the relationship implied by this vignette is tofally different from Jordanes” picture of Gothic forces being paid as Roman troops and being consequently on constant stand-by. Equally important, Ammianus’ words foaderibus ... pacis do not imply «special relationship with the Goths; his general use of the terms foes and foedera canbe investigated selatively simply thanks to the existence of modern corcordances to his work. From these itemerges that Ammiantus tases focus in its different forms quite indiscriminately of every kind of ‘agreement that the Roman state made with its neighbours, although two broad types are distinguishable. By far the rarer usage is of agreements involving no submission to the Roman state. The best exasnple of this is Jovian’s treaty with the Persians in 36322 Ammianus uses foedus and its derivations much mote frequently, however, of diplomatic agreements which followed capitulations by the relevant foreign group—"barbarians’—to the Roman statz. This type of sage is more common in Ammianus, I suspect, simply because the majority of pacts he describes stem from the Rhine and Daaube frontiers, ‘where Roman shength in the fourtia century was sufficient t0 maintain the Empire's hegemony in areas beyond its direct control. For instance, the yobmission of the Alamannic kings Gundomadus and Vadomarius to the ‘mperor Constantius I! in 354 was followed by a foedus” Or, another ‘ovample, after his complete surrender to Tulion,”? the subsequent peane treaty explicitly macie Hortarius a rex jaederaius of the Empire.® There are any simtiar exaseples in Arnmianus’ history2* Itis worth digressing herea moment to stress that Ammianus’ usage of filusffoederati in this second context is entirely in accord with ancient Koman precedent, Older commentators, particularly Moounsen in his magisterial Ritwisches Sinatsreckt, considered ihe surrender or submission—deitio—of a foreign group to the Roman state to ental their 205 PETER J. HEATHER total legal dissolution, Hence groups making a surrender could not afterwards act as a legal entity, and formal legal agreements with them, such as a joedus, subsequent to their surrender were quite inconceivable. ‘There is enough of the logical quibble about this view to have aroused suspicions about its application to the real world s griori, and a run of recent (and not so recent) work has incleed shown that dedi never roled ‘out the possibility of a subsequent foxes. itis worth stressing this paint, ‘because some recent work still makes a clear distinction between focderati {groups bound by a feds) and dedificié (groups who had made a submission} as though there could be no point of contact between the two ‘When Ammiamus’ use of oes and its derivatives is investigated, and particularly when this is related to ancient Roman practice, a clear question presents itself It is quite insufficient to say that Constantine's treaty with the Goths in 332 was a foedus, One must also ask: what kind of reds was il? Was it an equal fords involving no submission, such as Jovian’s teeaty with the Persians, or was it a foetus subsequent to detitio? ‘As we have seen, the sixth-century historian Procapius has been used tointerpret Ammianus ond, by implication, answer the question in favour of the first alternative® But contemporary fourth-century sources cemonstrate that Procopius’ detinition is wot relevant, making it clear beyond doubt that the Goths’ notional status aftes 332 was not one of ‘equality. The treaty, it will be remembered, was preceded by a total Gothic collapse in the face of Roman military operations north of the Danube” Likewise, both Eusebius and Libanius use the language of slavery (bouis0ew) of the Goths’ status afterwards."* The treaty did not, in the Roman view, admit the Goths as equals, therefore, but notionally subordinated them. Rather than looking to the sixth-century Procopius, oF indeed the sixth-century Jordanes, whose understanding, as we have seen, of forderati matches that of Procopius and whose whole account of the nature of Constantine's relations with the Goths is thoroughly mistaken, it is nacessary to pursue an alternative tack. Once the evidence of Libanius and Eusebius has been adduced, the problem can be defined more closely. What we need, isa form of unequal alliance, current in the fourth ceniury, which both Ammianus would have been willing to describe as a foedus, and «nich would also have allowed Constantine to claim that he had added the Goths to the Roman Empire. This in fact poses little problem, because another rich set of foucth- century texts, the Latin panegyrics, comes to our aid. A whole series of passages demonsteate, via thice related points, that it was ax established contemporary idea that an act of submission meant, in ene sense, that the foreign group involved did become part of the Empire, and did 0 not as full citizens, but as dependent subjects. 296 FOEDERA AND FOEDERATI OF THE FOURTH CENTURY First, any area or people brought to submission by the ing mE yMeNeas cinder got he ne Sea th apse ue if fear oF Roman arms, eather than an actual ss submission And third, once they hat sbinteg: ae ae part of the Empire (a least according to the Romans) even ifto provinel fxganisation was established and their existing social order conte! o¢ Pefore. The best around example ofthese ideas at work i the care othe Eeankish king Gennoboudes. The panegyrics describe his sucrenler to the anpire, and how the emperor Maximian then restored him to connreared of his peopte, It is emphasised throughout that the king nevertheless remained in servitude 0 the Empire, and he is scen, at the evel af the passage, encouraging his followers to take a good look at thelr tmne lord Yaimian.* Such acts of restitution aftex surrender had long been 9 part of Roman diplomacy, and were in fact the legal mechanism which mete Jessie 2 we have already seen to he common, #r 2 formal cen be followed nonetheless by 2 tegally-binding is same vision that surrender and subsequent treaty meant side variety of fourth-century texts. Similar ideas were aired when ymmachus celebrated the Rhine campaigns of Valentinian. ant in references Libanius makes to those of the emperor Julian a topic which prompts their appearance in the historical narratives of Amavonue aed Uunapius, Eunapius, for instance, records that julian told his snen, [that] while they must ust regard as enemy territory that which belonged to those at war with them, they fst teat a these that which belonged to those who had subinitted to them. More precisely, Ammianus’ account ' recsely, Amumianus’ account of Jala’seampaigas reveal th bmissinsofAlamannickings were tstouuriy lawl bree Alamanni as “common slaves” 2” A Roman victory and Gethic surrender, followed by a reg of events matched on numerous occasions in the fouth cent) [lis Rhine snd Danube. Such a survencier, at Yeast in Roman een alse inten Ele Permanently dependent on the Roman state, These jontemporary islets, fully apticlated in texte of the cone perod, j provide a compechensive answer to the problems posed! by Constentite's eTeR |. HEATHER 6 9 negotiated agreement swith the Goths in 332. The fact that it was a nego " ety wt ott srender aed Amina fo refs 10 seats comme 08a fers (more precisely fois aftr destin) ane Se srgrecrnent nonetheless upheld, in Reman eves a Tens Corsi Chm nave aed he vhs nt equals bua sublecs of EE Taman Empire. Fourth-century texts thus allo oy ue Raman Ee omar of Conti's weaty with we Cod Tater wexts conspicacnely fail ; pstand vernal contention, indeed, that this is the comest way 6 SCTE Conantine’s elations with the Goths is provided by another netonee erent emperat’s coinage, es sith ehe Goths, claimed that «riers Car been edd to ehe Roman stee, From the mid 3105 colt RS is vime to peoples vmnilarin form to Gothia are known, referring this soil ie dated ¢- 310-313, and the series continued into ee Th ‘hronalogical and geegraphical coincidence leaves Site Ne corer e fore commemorating, in the first instance, Constantine ® regent opine Rhiwe ae the bate of the Miva Be, een te eter! and defeated a hostile coalition of tives whe hac facet and deleted 9 Ne yet ret ising agree So Pe Cnetntine’s manceuvtes with acy degenes Of renity, bat the end reste was a Romar. vitary, wom PAE 0 MY seer le and pasty through the submission of uafought, but sulably Beta a Fe) pe folevance of this K obvious & EVO Comin ea seigatBetaners nwo ute eat atl special rlinsbip wih he foreigners ino, serene a Eee ove copa Ua AEG Foominaion of Constantine's teaty, with the athe contanpevary matexit ts allovs us aot only fe overturn fhe Pasion ce thet i marked a major innovation in the conduct of Reman for ve tions but algo to uncover much about the Empire's ew of eee Tree pese before ne Kura invasions, As fa a he diplomats Neon vee htoman state was concerned, the Persians excepted, fowler! Tt dean ya act of surrender (dio) on he pan ofthe people oie Saeed by » veaivtion af the existing social ont (resttuio) ane Oe aking of a negotiated agreement (cts ‘This series. ot aes | tthe fe A Teast in the Emnpine’s view, 9 federate group involved, at least ee 0 e Fo judge by is widespread appearance in ‘ omen atte Tot ark wae ot nly el developed and wily Lee ole ol als wily daemiated atone ers Fears ihe Empite, From a theoretical point of view, then, 4 Hatt perfect sense. By providing such subsidies, the Empire could hope to de two things. First, it gave the king to whom the payments were made som reason to maintain the treaty for a number of years and not just break it a the jirst opportunity, thus provisiing a reasonable return on an investmen of Roman military effort. Second, by giving that king wealth t« 302 FOEDERA AND FOEDERAT! OF THE FOURTH CENTURY [ecdistribute within his own society, the Eimpire could hope to build up the position of 3 leader who might otherwise have been compromised be the relationship he now had with the Roman enemy. Diplomatic Payments thus helped to exeate and support allies beyond the frontier Jefe would have 2 stake in maintaining the status quo and minimising ‘The practice of Roman diplomacy was very different, therefore, fro the monolithic theoretical framework we encounter in the someon he reality, Roman diplomacy was a sensitive instrument for frontier management, which could be adapted to suit a wide variety of circumstances. ts treaties could express quite different degrees of domination, different practical demands were made of its subordinate allies according to need and possibility, native forms were utilised to add fo the solemuuty of ceremonies, and. it was standard, and eminently sensible, policy to endeavour, via payments, to create a class of amenable, semicient kings along, its frontiers. The iron fist of imperialism was thuc fauched—as most successful imperialistic fists through history have been—in a practical, well-informed velvet glove. . Theory and practice The comparison of fourth-century diplomatic theory and fourth-centu diplomatic practice made in this paper raises one obvious kathy fusstion. Why did Roman commentators want to pretend that groups beyond the frontier celated to the Empire in 2 universal rhyttun of gesiha ind festitutio which created propesly subservient faederai all along ite Fee then the reality, as we would @ priori expect, was rather iferent? ‘An answer begins fo emerge to this important question when we onsider the contexts in which this monolithic vision of tumphant Imperialism was being expressed. As we have seen, narrative historlans uch as Ammianus and Eunapius certainly reflect it, but the vision is most fully articulated in our panegyrical sources: the Latin prose panegyties, Symmachus’ account of Valentinian’s campaigns, and the political rations of Themistius. These were fosmal praise speeches, given on ‘Mulor imperial ceremonial occasions (formal entries to cities, emperors’ juminit meetings, celebrations of consulships and so forth), whose fontents were approved by the imperial regime towards whose felebration the ceremonial was directed. We are, in shart, in the world of linperial propaganda, and this context provides the Key for Jinderstanding the vision of foreign affairs transmitted by these text The chief atuibute requited of a Roman emperor, as a recent study hag Welfectively reminded us, was victory. An emperor was expected to be {slamphant over peoples beyond the frontice and thus protect the Empire = sa PETER ). HEATHER ‘and its citizens from ali harmS* Against this background, the vision of foreign affairs promulgated in our sources makes perfect sonse. A frontier zone peopled with suitably subservient foederati, made so following an act ‘of surrender, deditio, is entirely in tune with the expectation that Roman emperors should be eternally victorious. ‘The theoretical framework applied to foreiga affairs by our sources is thus of its essence concerned with erecting and maintaining. a vision of foreign affairs acceptable to its anudience, not in describing reality. The audience expected an endless catalogue of triumph, not a detailed account of carefully applied variations in policy and the occasional setback, and this is precisely what such a theoretical framework supplied ‘The roots of this expectation are in themselves interesting, and seem to have been essentiaily qwo-told. On the one tiand, the self justificatory ideology of the Empize’s politically enfraychised, ruling landowning classes revolved around the conceit that these classes were totally superior as human beings to any of the\groups beyond the Empire’s political fringes. According to this views-the political order, legal Framework, and Graeco-Roman culture af the Empire were a package instituted by God—the creating Divinity, whether pagan or chistian—to bring human beings to the highest state that it was possible for them to achieve, The Empire thus had a mission to create and protect civilisation and was sustained in this by the support of God. Failure to subdue morally inferior groups from beyond the frontier was thus very hard to square with such an ideological vision of the Empire's teleological Importance, and more or less demanded that foreign affairs should be a story of success.” ‘More practically, the ceremonial occasions on which panegyricists deployed and developed this vision of triumphant imperialism, were important political moments when particular imperial registes justiied! themselves and their policies to the landowning classes of the Empire, ‘whose taxes and general support were crucial to the smooth running of the state. It is quite clear that the central ideological justification for paying tax was, indeed, that the monies were used to defend the way of life enjoyed particularly by the landowning classes. When the aemy failed, for instance, complaints about the buzden of taxation began, a5 in the famously disparaging remarks of Count Ursulus, one of Constantius t's chief financial officers, alter the fall of Amida fo the Persians and the capture of mich of its garrison For straightforwardly political reasons, therefore, as well as highly developed ideological ones, it was of critical importance that, on formal public cccasions, a satisfactory report shoul! be given on the state of piay in foreign affoirs, Hence, performing in frori cof the newly created political forum of eastern landowners, the senate Constantinople, Themistius’ central concern, throughout his justification }- FOECERA AND FOEDERATT OF THE FOURTH CENTURY cf the twists and tuens of imperial policy towards the Goth. tae ong al gem wa st conciliatory peace was made, it was cone because the emperor realised wt is eas the ight course of action, not because he hadl been forced inte AEA The needs of imperial propaganda, pasticulady in justifying petal policy a tron ofits tapers, no he eality of frcign tere are what the monolithic definition and application of fourticcentiry, vanes and foes really illuminate. meeny close look at foedern and fosderati of the fourth century thus suggests grumber Ofeonclsions Str-

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