GEORGE FORTY

1
R::ADT
BERLI
THE ALLIED DRIVE FROM NORMANDY
ROAD TO BERLIN
1
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Bel ow: Mulberry Harbours. Each harbour was as
large as Gibraltar harbour, with iron breakwaters
weighing 3,000 tons and vast conc;rete catssoos,
some of them 400ft in length . They were designed to
lMKl 12,000 tons of stores and 2,500 vehicles daily.
Here, unloading is in full swing, opposite Omaha.
(IWM EA 41379)
ROAD TO BERLIN
The Allied Drive from Normandy
GEORGE FORTY
,...
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CASSELL
1
C a ~ < , { " 1 1 &. Co
wellington House , 125 Strand, London WC2R OBB
C George Forty 1<Jqq
All righh reserved. No part of this !x.l(ll may be reported
or transmitted in any form or by an)' means etectromc or
mechamcar induding photocopying recording or any
infonnation storage and retrieval system withoul
perrmssson in writing from the Publisher.
Fi"'t published 1999
British library C..ataloguing-in-l'ublication Data:
a cata logue record for thh book is available from the
British Library
ISR:-J 0-304-35.'U.)6.X
Dlst rtbuted in the USA by Sti rling PubJihing Co. Inc ,
3M] Park Avenue South.Xew YorL, NY 10016-HMIO,
Designed and edited by IMG Pubucanons l.td ,
Designed by David Gibbons: layout by Anthony A. ham;
edt ted by Mkhael Boxau. punted and bound In Great
Britain,
ACKr..:OWU I}(;[M[NTS
I mu st thank the following photographic sources for
allowing me to use their evoc ative ima/(t'<; : The [mllrial
War Museum; the Tank Museuru: the Nationa l Arr hi\'l' \ of
Canada; th e Nationa l Archives of Ameoca: IIll' US Army
and US Sign al Corps: Real war Photos, Ind iana; t ill' Patton
Museum of Cavalry and Armor; Mr Bruce kobe rtvon and
other individu al sources J \ shown in t he photographic
credits.
Contents
Introduction, 7
1. That First Toehold, 9
2. Building-up the Beach-head, 24
3. Breakout, 4S
4. Operation 'Dragoon', 69
S. From the Seine to the Rhine, 79
6. Arnhem, 99
7. Clearing the Scheldt, 108
8. The 'Lull' before the Storm, 117
9. Hitler's Ardennes Offensive, 133
10. To the Rhine, 148
11. Into Germany, 170
12. Victory, 183
Bibliography, 192
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US YICOIPS

L ~ n l
Western Europe
Normandy.
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LONDON
GREA T
BRITAIN
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6
Germany, of t hreatening the Ruhr. The right-
flank Army Group woul d advance in step,
link ing up wi th the forces that it was intended
wo uld invade sout hern France, th en toget her
th ey would advance eastwards .
4. 10 buil d up forces and supplies along th e
western borde rs of Germany, securi ng por ts in
Belgium and Britt any to facili tate this bu ild- up .
5. While the build-up was taking place, to
maintain an unr elent ing offe nsive, so as to
wea r down th e enemy and thus gain advan-
tages for the fina l battles.
6. To complete the dest ruction of enemy
forces west of th e Rhine, while constantly
seeking opportunities to seize bridge-heads
across the rive r.
7. Having crossed the Rhine in strengt h, to
launch a fina l offensive in a double envelop-
ment of the Ruhr, emp hasising the left prong,
and foll owing this up with an immediate thrust
through Gen nany (the specific di rection of th is
final thrust to be determi ned at the time).
8. finall y, to clean out the rest of ' Greater
Germa ny' , linking up wit h Soviet forces
advancing from the east.
In h is book Eisenhower states th at: 'Thi s
general plan . ca refully out lined at staff meet-
ings before DcDay, was never aba ndoned, even
momen ta rily, t hrou ghout the campaign.' In
general te rms t his is t rue, except of course for
one digress ion whe n t he unexpected Ger ma n
offensive in t he Arde nnes had to be dealt wit h.
This then is what I have used as the basic
st ructure of Road to Berlin, and [ hope it will
provide the reader wit h an interesti ng and illu-
mi na ting record of what was one of the great
moments in the history of man, cer tainly in
the 20t h century and possibly of all time.
Introduction
George Fort y
Bryan tspudd le, Dorset
September 1998
Even a brief glance at t his book will quickly
show that it is short on text and long on visual
images and this is in line wit h its mai n
purpose, namel y to te ll by photographs th e
story of the Allied campaign in Nor t h West
Europe, in the twe lve months, June 1944 to
May 1945. However, des pite the fact th at there
are more tha n 280 ph otographs and one map,
it was clear ly impossi ble for me to cover every
notewort hy eve n t, every importan t acti on,
every main town o r city liberated , every
enemy strong hold capt ure d , every enemy
ar my defeated and thus to te ll the complete
story of everyone of t he five million plus men
who fought in th e campaigns. ' Why didn 't
you inclu de ... ?' is bound to he th e co mment
from some readers, but I hope th at I have done
enough to satis fy the ma jority.
In his incomparable history of the Second
Wor ld War, Churchill says that the invasion of
Europe was what the Western Powers might
justly regard as being, ' the supreme climax of
the war' , and goes on to aver that alt hough the
rood might be long and ha rd, never: ' ... could we
doubt that dectstve victory would be gai ned' .
In hi s autobiography of the war years ,
Gene ral DWight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme
Allied Expedit ionary Force Commander, sets
out in a cha pte r concerned wit h the pla nn ing
of ' Overlord', the ou tline of the proposed
Allied opera tions . I wo uld summarise h is
words as follows:
1. To land on the coast of Nor ma ndy.
2. To build up the necessar y resources to fight
and win t he decisive battle in the Normandy-
Britt an y regio n.
3. To break out from encircli ng ene my posi-
tions and pur sue th e enemy o n a broad front
wit h two Army Groups. The left-flan k Army
Group wo uld have the ma jor tasks of securing
ports so as to ens ure maintenance of supplies,
and then , o n rea chi ng th e bounda ries of
tPRAGUE
fl'onlline\
IApril 45/
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7
INTRODUCTION
8
left: Gen Eise nhower
salutes London ers. The
Supreme Commander
wasgiven t he Freedom
of the City on 12 June
1945. (IWM - FOX
(0 111)
Alt hough thts book is primarily about the
progress of t he Allied ar mies across North West
Europe from Nor ma ndy to Ber lin, a short
description of the monumen tal even t wh ich
preceded th e mobile batt les is essential. Th is of
course was the Allied landings on th e coast of
Nor mandy which took place on D-Day, 6 Ju ne
1944.
A Second Front
Virt ually from the ti me when Hitl er launched
hi s invasion of Russia, the Soviets had been
cont inually pressing first the Brit ish then th e
American s and Brit ish , to open up a 'Second
Front' , to ta ke pr essure off the USSR. However,
firm agreement as to a suitable da te for th is
momen tous undertakin g did not co me until
t he Trident Conference, hel d in Washing ton
11- 25 May 1943, when Ch urc h ill and
Roosevel t and t hetr advisers agreed that May
1944 wou ld be th e earnest feasible date for
such an invasion to be launched. Th is was
then changed to early June, th e chosen day
bei ng the Sth, in turn po stponed for 24 hours
because of bad weat her.
Although the Allies had already planned
the invasion of Sicily (10 Ju ly 19 H ), to be
followed by that of Ital y (3 an d 9 Septe mber
1943), and despite Churchill's misgivings that
any invasion of northern Fran ce migh t well
turn into a blood bath, it was decided to land
there, wit h just the short ' hop' across t he
Eng lish Channe l, rat her than to rei n force
success in the Mediterranean. It has also to be
sald th at the American s, suspec ting Ch urc hill
o f ' Bal kan in trigues' , scotched any effo rt
proposed there. After much delibera tion the
Nor mandy bea ches between Cher hourg and Le
Havre were chosen, despite th e w ry te mpti ng
an d much shor ter ap proach offered by t he Pas-
de-Carats . Norma ndy d id offer many advan -
tages - the beaches and in land ter rain were
1
That First Toehold
suitable, the area was in easy reac h from RAF
and USAAF bases in sout hern England, the
d istance by sea was reasonable and, because
the Germans were conv ince d t hat the blow
wo uld fall in the r'as-de-Calats, the Atlant ic
Wall defences were not as st rong there. Indeed ,
having made t heir decision to go for
Norma ndy, the Allies, by means of an elabo-
rate and many-facet ed cover plan (Operation
' Porut ude'j. d id th eir very bes t to ensure that
t he Germans continued to expect th e major
land ing to be in the Pas-de-Calais. Fort u nately,
this cover plan wor ked brillia ntly.
One ma jor drawback to the chosen area was
th e absence of any immediat e po rt facili ti es.
This was compens ated by the two amaz ing
prefabricated ' Mu lberr y' harbour s; these were
in effect enor mous hollow concrete ca issons
that wo uld be towed across the Cha n nel MId
sunk off two of the selected invasion beaches
to form br ea kwaters. Near ly all t he UK's
concrete producti on had ga lle into maki ng
these caissons , and in addit ion , a num ber of
old warshi ps and merc ha n tmen h ad bee n
earmar ked for use as out er breakwaters.'
Anothe r revolutionary means of supp ly was
PLUTO - the Pipelin e Under The Ocean -
wh ich wo uld ena ble fuel to be pu mped from
Engla nd to Fran ce, for min g a lifeline to me
Allied forces on t he continen t.
By the ea rly spring of 1944 , the Allies had
bu ilt up a massive army i n t he Un it ed
Kingdom, compr tstng many thousands of
Ame rican, Briti sh, Canadia n an d ot her Allied
troops, with an enormous array of up-to-date
weapons , vehi cles and equi pment, backed by a
vast number of naval and air force units, wit h
an estimated total strengt h of more t han three
million men. For Operat ion ' Overlord ' overall
operat ional comma nd of Allied ground forces
would be vested in General Sir Bernard Mont-
gomery's HQ 2 1st Army Group, wit h troops
9
THAT FIRST TOEHOLD
from US First Army and British Seco nd Army
(the latter containing both Brtush and Cana-
dian troops). They were of course under the
overa ll command of General Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, Supreme Commander Alljcd Expedi-
tionary Force , and hi s SHAEFheadquarters. The
sea landings would be made on five carefu lly
selected beaches, code- named (from west to
east): ' Utah', ' Omaha', 'Gold', 'J Uli O', ' Sword'
and would be preceded by an airborne assault
at 0200 hrs (some -1
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1'2 hours befor e the first
seaborne waves hi t th e beaches) by American
and British air borne fo rces. xte ssive air stri kes
by some 2,500 bombers and 7,000 fighter-
bombers would soften up the beach -head areas
- not rorgetttng to homb the rest of the coast,
especially in th e Pas-de-Calais in order to main-
tain t he illusion that anything happentng in
the Normandy area was merel y a feint attack.
The numbing effect of the mass bombing
would be thicken ed up by shore bombardment
from 700 warshi ps - including five battleship",
2.1 cruisers and mor e than 100 destroyers,
whi ch were to escort the landing force s.
Backing up all this activity would be a much
10
longer bom bing campngu. spread over some
3-t weeks prior to D-Llay and covering the
coas tal area in depth, atmtng at di srupting all
road and rail communicat ions, so as to make it
as difficult as possible for the enemy to bring
up rerntorcemcn ts.
On the ether side of th e Channe l, th e
Gorman defe nders were dogged by both inde-
cision an d over-confide nc e. Field Marsh al
Erwin Rommel, he ro of Nort h Africa and now
commander of Army Group 8, some of whose
troops had direct responsibility for th e
Normandy beac hes, appreciated more th an
an yone how weak the ' Atlantic Wall ' really
was. He had been trying hard to get Hitler to
visit the area, so that he could explain the situ-
ation, make him reali se how short his Army
Group was of both manpo wl.'r and " wtt'Tid , and
impress upon his FUhrer the vitai necessity to
be able to control the deployment of th e all -
Important armoured reserve, which Rommel
needed as c10'>(' 10 the coast as possible beca use
he wanted to fight ht s main battle on the
beaches before the enemy had lime 10 get a
foothold. When it became clear that Hitler
Above: Well bden Brmsh
paratroopen board their
aircnft on the rvzht SoI6
Jtroe 1944 . They and their
~ counterparU wiI
be me f;ru AIhed troops to
bnd in ~ . (IWM - CH
I BOl)
THAT FIRST TOEHOLD
Above : CamouI1aged with blac:kened taces, the paratrOOpers take
up their positions in the aircraft. (IWM - CH 1])004)
~ : RAF Tarrant Rusht on , Dorset. On the runway are the
Halifax tugs and HorsaIHamilcar gliders for the second lift on D-
Day_ThiSphotograph was taken from the aerodrome's Tiger Moth
at around 1ac:KlI'to on D-Day, the aircraft being part of Operation
' Mallard', when 32 Halifax, t OWing 30 Hamilcao and 2 HC035,
took off between 1928 and 19S9hrs . Only one Halifax was lost .
(Broce Roberston)
THAT FIRSTTOEHOLD
would never come to France. Rommel decided
to go to see him instead and arranged for a
personal interview on 6 june. It had been
decided that the Allies would he unli kely to
invade during the period 5-8 j une because of
unfavourable t ides: moreover no ne of t he Luft -
waffe's recent rcconnatssance report s had indi-
rated any obviou s pre-invas ion acti vi ty. Few
among the Ge rman High Co mma nd approcl-
ated t he fact t hat once the invasion was un der
way. overwhelming Allied air supcrtortty would
make Ge rman troop movement so diffi cu lt as
to be Virtually impossible. ThO'\(' whose experi-
ence had been on t he Eastern Front, where t he
Luftwaffe had generally more than held its
own, just d id not believe the picture pa inted
for t hem by Rommel who had had to suffe r t he
problem in North Africa.
Determined to wi n t he Fuhrer over to his
way of thi nking, Rommel set off, mt ondtng to
go to scrcht esga rtcn via his heme in Hcrrnngen
became h is wife Lucie's birt hday was on 6 june .
Air tr aw l ha d been banned for senior officers.
because of the threat fro m Allied air activity. so
he left by car on t he 5t h and was at home on
the fateful night 5/6 june. Th e general
consensus among t he Gennan lI igh Command
was that , while it was agreed that the Allies
would attempt a landing withi n t he next few
.....eeks , the defences would be sufficient to deal
with such landings, t he l'as-de-Calats sti ll being
the most favoured site for suc h an att empt.
Rommel arrived ho me safely and was rung up
by h is ch id of staff (Spl' ilk l) bet ween
0600-0630 hrs who tol d h im abo ut t he land-
ings and the act ion Army Group B had ta ken.
He immediately cancelled his vis it to Hil ler and
returned posthaste to his headquarters , arriving
at La Roche Guyon by ZOCX> hrs that evening.
Atr barnr 'drlllinx,s. Between midn ight and
0200 hrs Ame rican and Briti sh airborne forces
were dropped or air-landed on thei r target
areas. These WNe to secure the flanks of t he
beach- head area, destroy vital bridges. gun
posuton s, etc. tn the west , US lOlst Airborne
Divisio n (Ab Div) had the job of takin g and
holding the ca useways wh ich formed t he exits
from Uta h Beach. across the marshy grou nd
just in land . The US 8Znd Ab Div we re to be
12
Top left: Men of SOOth Regt. US 82nd Ab DiY. make a last-minute
check of their equipment before taking off from an airfield in
SaItby. England on 6 June 19+4. (US Army via RealWar Photos -
AS 2022)
~ left: Brrtish Horsa glider's scattered CNef" their landing zone
~ Caen. (Bruce Robertson)
Above : Four members of the US 82nd Ab Oiv enter the village of
Ste-Mere- Eglise under heavy enemy artillery fire on 6 June 19+4.
(US Army via Real War Photos AS 2023)
Below: Weymouth. Dorset. American Rangers visit a temporary
'doughnut dugout: ' for a cup of coffee and a doughnut. provided as
always by the American Red Cross. before boarding HMS PrinS
LeopokJ. to assault Point du Hoc. (US Natiooal Archives)
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THAT FIRST TOEHOLD

landed farther inland to dear the area between
Ste-Stere-Egltse and pont-l'Abbe, but the inex-
perience of many of the pilots meant that both
divisions' drops were widely scattered with the
result that the paratroops were wry thi n on the
ground. Nevert heless they fought hard an d
bravely and had a certa in amount of luck - for
example, t111'y attacked the IIQ of German
9 1st Air Landing Division and killed t he
co mmande r, t.leut enant -Gen erut Wilhel m
Falley, the first German ge ne ral to be killed
during the invasion, thus leavi ng his division
leaderless. On the eastern flank, the British 6th
Ab Div had three main tasks : to take and hold
various crosstngs over the River Orne and the
Caen Canal between Cacn and Outstreham: to
storm the Merville battery; to blow up various
bridges over the River Dives. pespue some of
the troops bei ng landed in th e wrong locations,
all th ese tasks were achi eved and the posi tions
were held unti l relieved from the beaches.
Setrl,,,,m' The Allied z t st Army
Group (sec Annex ' A' for outline organ isatio n)
14

left : ACanadian chap-

lain holdsa service on
the top deck of an LST
(Landing Ship TVlk).
belore they head for the
beaches. Note the guitar
in lieu of a cnurch organ .
(PIbic An:hives CanacD
PA 132899)
lOWff left: ALmding

beach on 0fNha.
bringlna: in more iof;mO"y.
Notethe selection of
anks. twftracks, etc
which has been
'"""". (US Anny)
BekJw: Red Beach elut
on Uuh. which was set
III the dunes along-
side EXIt 2. ThiS was the
n'Wn route oRthis beach
on D-Dar (US Army via
IlaI War Phc:M:os A
106)
were to land on the five beach areas as detailed
bel ow, close armoured suppo rt bei ng provi ded
by amphibious DO tanks and ot her remarkable
a rmoured tt ghung ve hicles fro m British 79t h
Armoured Division (t he 'Funnies') . Thew
included mine-clearing vehicles, brtdgelaycrs,
flame-throwers, engineer vehicles and ma ny
others. They woul d prove to be exceptionally
useful. Allied naval forces were commanded by
Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay and air forces by
Air Chief Ma rshal Sir Trafford Leigh- Mallory.
O-Dar was originally scheduled for Monday, 5
June 1944, but rough seas and high winds
brought a delay of 24 hours.
Ul a h Reac h . Situated on the east coast of the
Cotenttn peninsula at les Dunes-de-va rrcvtlle,
this was General). Lawton Collins' US VII
Corps' objective. At 0630 hrs, led by US -lt h
Infa ntry Division, they landed o n the
southern sector of the beach wi th little rest s-
ranee, but marshy ground delayed their
adva nce in land . So me 28 of thei r 32
amphi bious DD tan ks reached the beach
f i fteen minut es afte r the lead ing wave, so were
THAT FIRST TOEHOLD
able to give d ose sup po rt ing fire. By t he end of
t he day more than 23,000 men had bee n
la nded, t hey had ac hieved their set D-Day
object ives, and fewe r than 250 had been killed
or wo unded.
Omaha ueach. Some eight mil es east of Utah,
General Leona rd Gerow's US V Co rps landed
her e, led by US 1st Infa nt ry Division ('The Big
Red One'). They were in troub le from t he
outset . Because of t he exceedingly rough sea ,
the infantry, engi neers and artillery were tran-
shipped into landi ng-craft too far out, and
many of the amphi bious tan ks were launched
too ea rly and sank before they could make the
beach. Visibility was poor and as a resul t most
of the bo mbing was too far in land and the
naval covering fire fell too short . Enemy return
fire was both heavy a nd accurate. The density
of underwa ter obstacles was cons iderable and
t he enemy had recenuy been reinforced. The
in itia l assault was held at t he edge of the wa ter,
subseq ue nt waves ma king o nly slow and
painful progress. Towards mid-morning the
udc of ha tt ie began to cha nge; large landing-
IS
Left: Royal Marine
Commandos making
their way ashofoe at St-
Aubin-sur -Her. The
small mot cycle being
manhandled over the
~ belonged to 4th
55 Bde HQ. (IWM B
5218)
Left : Commandos on
t he beach. The landing
at St-Aubin was direct ly
under heavy enemy fire
and No 48 Commando
suffered many casualties
befor e they could move
inland. (IWM _ MH
3354)
...-..
Left : An LCT about to
ground 00 Red Beach
(Sword Area). The time
is about 35 minutes after
H hour Note the
column of AFVS
belonging to 27th Armd
Bde also Wlding - the
leading tank near the
twO housesappean [ 0
be on fire. (IWM - B
Sill )
Above : Th is splendid
photograph was taken
on the afternoon of 0 -
as the Stonnont ,
Dw1das and Glengarry
Highlanders of Canadian
9th Brigade came ashore
on White Beach. Nan
Sector Ounoarea) at
Bemieres-sur-Mer.
(PubliC AtchiVi!s Canada
- PA122765)
craft , des pite the obstacles, forced their way to
the beach, and dest royers risked running
agrou nd to get closer and engage their targets
more accuratel y. By nightfall some 3I,CX)(J
men had been lan ded , but more tha n I ,{)(X)
Gts had been killed and many more wounded,
they had not achieved thei r first
and were still less tha n a mile inland. But they
were holding the villages of Vlerville-sur-Mcr,
St-La urent and Colleville :!. UT Mer, which
controlled the east-west road, and we re deter-
mi ned to resist all counter-attacks. To th e west
of Omaha, 2nd Ran ger Batt alion had landed
three companies at the foot of th e cliffs at
Pointe duHoc , whe re the Germans had coast al
defen ce arti llery posn tons. Afte r fierce fightin g
t hey managed to destroy the guns, and hold
the po stt ton agai nst heavy counter-at tacks.
Go ld Beach. Some ten miles east of Omaha.
Gt' ne ral G. C. Buckne ll's British XXX Corps,
It'd by 50t h Infant ry Division and HIh
Armoured Brigade, landed here. Because of Ihe
tides, t he land ings here and fart he r cast wert'
later tha n t hose on the two US beaches so
there was no surprise. Bad wealher, fierce
current s and high winds, hampe red the
approach. so the landi ng-craft carrying the DI>
tanks were brought right up on to the beach
rat her than run the risk of being swamped in
the heavy surf. The initial advance inland was
fairly rapid, but the D-Day otnecnves of
uaycux and the mai n road to Ceen were not
reached. By nightfall th e ' toe hold' was some
five :I.<luare mues in area , reserves were ashore
and aggress tve patrolling was nearing Bayeux .
Some 25,000 men had been landed at a cost of
son dead.
J uno Beach. About 5 mues cast of Gol d. This
was allocated to General John Crocker's Britis h
I Corps whose Canad ian 3rd Infantry Division
supported by Ca nadian 2nd Armoured Brigade
led t he way. The beach area was wide enough
to land two brigades side by side. Some of the
underwater obstacles were especiall y trouble-
some. hut t he amphibious DD tanks were
launched succe ssfuny only 100 yards or so
fro m shore and wert' th us available to suppor t
t he infantry, effect ively silencing the enemy
st rong points. Some 21,500 men got ashore
and pushed inland toward s Brett evtlle and
Cac n. hut were held up by enemy pressure and
t he Inevit able traffic jams. By night fall th ei r
IHogres:!. was roughly leve l wit h the left na n"
of Gold's t roops. but there was st ill a 2-mile
gap betwee n th em and Sword Beach's troops
to thei r lett . They were also a few mnes short
of their or iginal objectives. but wert' in a
strong postnon from which they were deter-
mined not to be moved.
Sword Beach. About 5 miles east of Juno.
More elements of Crocker's British I Corps
landed her e, led by 3rd Infantry Division,
17
Abo ve : A tank of the Canadian tsc Hussars , from London, Ontario,
coming ashore on the afternoon of D-Day. Note also the Royal
Canadian Engineers busy trying to make the beach passable with
the aid of an armoured bulldozer; Gening off the beach qUickly was
ext remely difficult but it was essential if the beach-head was to be
protected from counter-attacks. (Public Archives Canada - PA
128791)
Bel ow: Maj Gen Rod Keller commallding lrd Canadian Divisionis
seen here on the afternoon of D-Day, impressing on his troops that
they must be ready for the inevitable German counter-attack. Keller
was one of the best Canadi an operational commanders. hence his
being the choice for this vital role on D-Day. (Public Archives
Canada - PA 115544)
18

or
AboYe: A group of wounded Canadiansoklien wait t o be
tr.tnsferred to a Casualty Clearing Station on 0 + I. On the
whole, casWlkies wen!! light. considering the scaleof the operation.
(CanadIan Offteal Photograph 137S7-N)
Below: An appropriately-named AVREof 77 Anault Sqn R.E is
parked in lion-sur-Mer, whilst the earners passing by belong to the
2nd an, The M.dd lese l( Regiment - a machine gun battalion. The
AVREwas based upon the Churchill tank ;md mounted a 290mm
spigot mortar, called a Petard. as its main armament. for use against
enemy blockhouses. etc. (IWH - B 5(40)
19
THAT FIRST TOEHOLD
supported by 27t h Armou red Brigade, together
wit h several Commando and Marine units
who immediat ely pressed inland to link up
and relieve th e paratroops. As with Ju no, th ere
was conges tion, but th ey managed to reach
Bievtlle and to beat off a counter-attack from
2 1st Panzer Division. By nightfall nearly
29,000 troops .....ere ashore and, alt hough the
origina l first day object ives were not reached,
till' Orn e bridges had been <;t.-iZl-d.
.\ ",,,,Ildry. Undoubtedl y Operation ' Overlor d'
had bee n a success. Some 155,000 troops were
now ashore and , wit h ti ll' prot ect ton afforded
by conti nuous naval and air operations, they
were th ere to stay. Omaha had been t he most
difficult beac h to secure and th e US l st ln f Div
in particular had suffered many casua lties.
They had not all reached their I)-Day obtec-
twes, but were firml y estabttshcd everywhe re.
In th e British/Canadian sector. th e leading
troo ps were now off the beac hes , the front line
was, on ave rage. some six miles inland and
th ey had withstood a heavy counter-att ack
from 21st Pz Div. Despite the fact that the
inla nd penetration .....as only halt that hoped
for, the cha nces of th e ene my push ing them
quickl y off the bea ch-head were now remote.
In addit ion, the cas ualties had been much
light er th an expected. The remarkable British
' f unnies' of 79th Armd Iuv had more tha n
proved their worth. Now it was vita l to link up
the beac h-heads . get mo re troops, their
wl'apons and equipment ashore and start to
push inland. ' We had ac hieved sur prise,'
Montgomery wrote. 'The troops had fought
magnificently and our lo\,>e\ had bee n much
lowe r than had ever seemed powtble. We had
breached the Atlantic Wall along the whole
Neptune frontage and all assaut ung divisions
were ashore. To sum up, th e result s of n -pay
were extremely encouraging, although the
weat he r remai ned a great anxidy.'2
Notes
I. Part s of the Mulberry harbours can still be
seen off the Normandy coas t; two of the cais-
sons wert' late r brought back to Portland,
Dorset , where th ey remain.
2. Montgomery, B. Normandy to the Bettie,
20
THAT FIRSTTOEHOLD
Left Tank crews snatch
a few minutes rest w h i ~ t
they and their Shennan
tanks and Breo carTien
wart: [ 0 advitnce . Uon-
surMef". 6 June 19+4.
(IWM - B SOB)
Below: On the day alter
D-Day (7 June ). a
tracked Bofors L.AA gun
awaits the luftwaffe.
next to a disabled
Sherman 00 tank on
t he Cana dian beach. The
Bofors is mounted on a
Brit ish Crusader 111 AA
Mk I chassis - note [he
all-round open-topped
shield. The 'Duplex-
Drive' Sherman has its
flotation screen lowered.
(Public Archives Canada
PA I32B97)
N
N
Organization of 21st Army Group for Operation 'Overlord' (initial phase)
21st A r ~ y Group
r T
71h
HQ tres
0
6th I
Gds HQ GHQ
US Fi rst Canad ian British
~
Fi rst Army Second
Tk aee Tps
Armd Div
Army
I
HQ GHQ HQ Dutch Polish
74th ,Jth
_I. SAS Tps
AA Tps l of C epp rcx 1st Armd
2 Can 1st Tk
one Bde Dill
USV USVII USXIX USVIII
AGRA Bd. 5th I
Corps Corps Corps Corps
Para Bde
J I I AA ade Can II Corps AA ace 1st Gp French
(ze<h Belgian
fnd Armd approx
US79th US83rd I I I
Ab Div nems-aoe
Sh tAA Bd.
one ade
Para
Def ence
Gp
Int mv Inf Diy Can 4th Armd Can II Corps
r Div Can 2nd Tps
I cLps
HQ
US 29th US~ r d Inf Div XII Cor ps
l nf Dill Armd Div
r 1 r 1 1
us 30th
VIII Corps XXX Corps
Inf Div
AGRA AGRA AGRA AGRA AGRA
5th RM AA Bde
UJ4th usL.
US L"
I .
4th
l55
,Jth
I
75t h AA ede
10h t AA Bde
6th Ab Dill
ht
103rd AA Bde
(leu 5 Para Bd. AA Bde
Assaul t
105t h AA ade
l nf Div Dill AbDiv Bdt
Bdt' RE
US 90th US 82nd
1st SS l OOth 30th Armd
Inf Div Ab ntv ace AA Bde Bd.
162L Inf 11 .L
US~ n d
:l
Two
Sth JOfC 11
1
t h
7 ae se Sub
Inf Diy Rangers
Second ace Area
US 2nd
Bm
Sob l of C Army US 1st
Inf rnv Armd mv Area Area tps 12l of C 8 Base Sub
Area Area
Sr 3 Inf ca13rd Sl J Inf
1
.r;
BOth AA 33rd Armd Bde
Diy Inf Diy Diy
Bd. Bd.
I I I
27th Armd 8de 2nd Can
76th AA
Armd Bde
Bd.
Gds t md 11t h L, 1Sth Ilnf Diy 31st T Bd.
50th Inf
I
7t h L 49t h Armd
Div Diy
mv Div mv
I I
5Jlnf
I I
43rd Inf S3t h Inf 34t h Tk 56th Inf 8th Armd
Div Diy mv see Bd, eee
:t
1;
~
~
I
o
5
Above: 105mm M7 Priest self-propelled guns in action by the side of a field in Lion-sur-Mer. The M7 and M7Bl Howitzer Motor Carriage
mounted a 105mm howitzer on the M) and M'" medium tank chassis. They were the standard equipment in all American armoured
divisions as well as in many Allied ones. (IWM - B5032)
23
2
Building-up the Beach-head
Ro mmel Thwa rt ed
Now that th e first toe..hold had been ac hieved it
was neces sary to secure and expand the beach-
head before the defenders could launch a size-
able counter-stroke. For a variety of reasons
Rommel was prev en ted from moun tin g any
major counter-att acks, foremost among which
bctng th e AlIi{'S' total air supremacy over the
battlefield area which prompted Rommel to
make a formal complaint to th e Luftwaffe for
BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD
1
A bove: More American reinfon:ements arrive in Normandy and disembark from their landing craft. All are
heavily laden iocluding kitbags. which will be put onto uni t echelon transport before they head off into action.
(IWM - PIC 27553)
Lef t : 0 + I and more reinforcements arrive. Men of the 2nd Infant ry Division, U5 Army, climb up the sand
dunes off Easy Red sector, Omaha Beach. past a captured German bunker on t heir way to face enemy fire for
the very first time. (Bruce Robertson)
the total lack of support hi s hard-pr essed
t roo ps were rec etvtng. For examp le, on 7 June
when I SS Panzer Corps were trying to assemb le
for th e first major counter-stroke against th e
landings, th ey were severely harassed. delayed
and d tsorgan ised by conti nual air att acks unti l
9 June, by which time the Allies' reinforcement
had been such that a ' sweeping the invaders
into the sea' move by the panzers. was out of
the question. Furthermore th e unremit ti ng
Allied bo mbi ng of road and rail communtca-
tfnn s, espectally in nort he rn France, was \0
success ful th at the movemen t of retntorce-
merits was Virtually impossible, especially by
da y. These difficu lties were compounded by
till' stepping-up of subversive operations by the
French .\lallI/h . Thousands of these resistance
Itgbt ers were in the area , many of them armed
to 11ll' teeth, ready to assist th e invaders wit h
act s o f sabotage, wh ich severely disrupted the
rail net wor k. Worst of all, there was continual
interference wit h Rommel's planning from the
very top - namel y, (rom Adolf Hit ler - who,
still convinced that t he Allied landings were a
feint and that the real invasion would come in
th e Pas-de-Calai s, refused to allow Rommel
f ree rein over the reserves . in particular, the
vuat Panzer Group West .
Despit e th e enemy's problems, the consoh-
dation of t he beach-heads was still not easy.
25
BUILDI NG-UP THE BEACH- HEAD
Above : Aoother unloachng scene. this time OIl one o f the Brmsh
beacbes. Note the 40mm BofOl'1i Ught AA gun in position to
pn)Yide additional AA cover. The Swedi5h-designed gun W3S built
under licence in both UK and USA.. It W3Sundoubtedly the best
L.AA gun of the war. (rwM HU ]022)
Below: US Arrrry vehicles leaving the beach, led by a heavily
laden M] haIf-r;nck. The ubiquitous haIf-r;nck W3S used for rmny
jobs, eg: AS a weapons platform for a wide: variety of AA. anti -tank,
small artillery peces. mortars. etc, also for perwnneI as seen here
and AS a batdefseld stores carrier. (rwM - MH 2S279J

..
Below: Commandos
near Caen. Commando
(Toops resting in a
narrow lane near Caen
on7June. after taking
part in some very heavy
fighting. (IWM - B 5077)
Once the individual beac hes had been linked
up it was vital to secure a proper working
harbour - the obvious one being Cherbourg.
Thi s necessitated d earing the Cote ntin pe ni n-
sul a and cu tting it off fro m t he rest of
Normandy. At t he same time, the Mulberry
harbour s had to be established off Omaha and
Go ld Beaches. a ' belt and braces' move which
would prove doubly fortuit ous because Che r-
bourg harbour when fin ally captured was
fou nd to be completely wrecked. ' I ordered th e
armies to proceed with the plan,' wrote Mont-
gomer y later. 'Un ited States First Army was to
complete th e capt ure of its D-Day object ives,
secu re Carenta n and lsigny so as to [ink up its
beach-heads, and then th rust across the base
of the peninsula to isolate Cherbo urg as a
prelude to its redu cti on. Briti sh Second Army
was to continue the batt le for Caen, deve lop
BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD
t he bridge-head sout hwards across t he
Bayeux-Caen road and lin k up wit h Un ited
St ates V Corps at r'ort -en -uesstn.'!
Week 1: 7- 12 June 1944
2
w ednesda y 7 J une. In the west , US forces on
Utah began to link up wit h the parat roops and
move i nland towards Montebourg in t he
nort h and Carentan in t he sout h, while th ose
fr om Omaha pushed toward s lstgn y and
Baycux, reach ing Formigny. Gene ral Elsen -
hewer visited th e front that da y and orde red V
and VII Co rps to link up as soon as th ey had
ta ken Caren tan (101st Ab Div) and Isigny
(29t h tnt Div). In the far nort h 4th lnf Dtv
advanced towards t he lin e Out nevttt e (on the
coast) to Montebourg, but was held lip by a
line of Ge rman fortificati ons in the Crts-
becq-Azevtlle area, wh ile 8 RCT went to the
BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD
suppo rt of 82nd Ab Dtv wh ich was facing a
dangerous counter-attack in the Ste-Mere-
E g l i ~ area and at the La Here bridge acTOSS the
River Merde ret . South of Ste-xte re-Egttse para-
troopers of lOlst Ab Dtv established a bridge-
head across the River Douve. capturi ng the
garrisons of Le Port and La Barquet te. Progress
out of Omaha was slower. and although both
29t h and t st Divs pressed forward towards
Isigny and Bayeux, they had mixed success -
th e ene my held rorrmg ny on the right, but the
Americans cap tured Ifuppain un the left . The
Germans man aged to mai ntain a corridor
ast ride the River DrOJ1l l' , between th e US and
British /Can ad ian forces. up to Its confluence
with the River Aure. Reinforcements including
US 2nd Inf Dtv came ashore th at eveni ng.
In Bnt tsh Second Army's secto r, 50t h Inf
Div captured Baycux and pushed un its down
to the Bayeux-Caen rood. as did Can Srd Inf
Dlv in the eas t. near Cac n.
Th und ay KJ Ulie. The Allied second wave was
now almost co mpletely ashore and US -Ith Inf
Div (VII Corps! plus units of K2nd Ab Dtv
began to push towards the port of Chc rbourg,
but were again held up by t he fort ifications in
the Crtsbecq-Azevtne area . Fierce fighting
followed. while units of US V Corps took
Isgny, but failed to lin k up with VII Co rps who
were fighting for Carentan. Furt her east. Tour-
en-ncssr n and Ste-Anne were taken, but the
etWIIlY could not be rut off as he evacuated
l'ort -cn-ucsstn. Nevert heless 47th Rl'gt RM
ent ered the village in the early hours of th e
morning an d the link bet ween Oma ha and
Go ld was achieved.
I-'riday 9 JUli e. US 4t h In f Drv made a ma jor
breakt hrough in its advan ce towards Cher-
bo urg whe n th ey broke t hrough the Azevllle
fortificatio ns (found to be massive rei nforced
case mates d isguised as ordinary houses, lin ked
by t renches with overhead cover and
Below: It is 9 June and
these Gis are shelt ering
from heavy enemy shell-
fire on Omaha, which
hindered unloading until
the batteries at St
Marcouf and Azeville
could be captured.
(lWM EA 25902)
28
Link-up. Men of
ee Bntish 12th f'M<I Bn
enioY a cuppa, h<lving
inked up WIth the main
gmund forces on 10
tune, fighting vi rtu-
., guerrilla war
behindenemy lines.
(I'NM - B 5319)
contatrung ISOmm guns and many machine-
guns) , Quinevtlle was the next objective. In
till' cent re of the peninsula, K2nd Ab Dtv
attacked towards t he River Merderet , wh ile
IOls l Ab went for Ca rentan again. In V Cor ps'
area, 2nd Inf Div t roops entered Trevteres and
pushed on towards Rubercy: in the east US lsi
Inf tuv reached Agy and Dodtgny. US 2nd
Armd Div began to land. British and Canadian
forces .....ere in action against increasing enemy
reserves around Caen. Allied ai rcraft were now
operating from strips in Normandy. It is also
relevant to note that on the Italian Front
certain US troops, mostly from VI Corps, .....ere
pulled out of action in preparation for the
coming invasion of sout hern France (see later),
Salurday 10 j une. US9th Inf Div came ashore
and by the end of the day the Allies had some
325,000 men in the beach-head. The link-up
between Utah and Omaha beac hes was at last
achieved. t han ks to an advance by 2nd Armd
BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD
tuv, but the Germans were st ill holding
Carentan despit e IOls l Ab Div's efforts to
surround th e town. In VCorps' area US 1st Inf
Div reached the Bayeux-St-Lo road. In British
Second Army's sector the first major offensive
(Opt-ration ' Perch' ) was launched; t he inten-
tion being to make a wide outflanking
manoeuvre west of Ceen. cross the River Odon
and lake the high ground around Evrecy. The
attack made little progress, mainly because the
opposition consisted of the crack Panzer Lehr
Division and Ihe equally formidable 12th SS
Panzer Division around Tllly-sur-Seules. This
village changed hands twice, the British even-
tually heing driven out by a fierce counter-
attack. East of Caen the opposition facing I
Corps wa.. equally ..trong, element.. of German
l.XXXVI Corps bringing the advance to a halt.
General Montgomery estabtt..hed his HQ in
France that day. As more came into
action, the supe riority of t he Tiger's 8.8cm gun
1

29
I
I
..
and the l'aut her's long-barrelled 7.Scm gu n
became more and more ap parent , especially as
the close bocage countryside favoured the
ddl'ml' .3
Sund ay I I J u ne. Units of US 90t h Inf Div
continued their advance west of t he Merderet,
whil e If} l st Ab pUI in a fierce attack on
Carcnta n whi ch the Germans evacuat ed
during till' night to escape the heavy American
artillery fire. The Gi s occupied the town , but
in the morning th ey ca me under hea vy enemy
pressure 10 r('-<x'cupy it. In the British sector,
Briti sh armour encounte red heavy resistance
around Ttlly-sur-Seulles. They took the vtltage
but were counter-att acked and forced out.
Fart her east, resistance was equally st rong
around Caen.
30
Momjuy 12Julle. /\lt hougb US Vil Corps had
sti ll not cornplvtely reach ed its D-Day objec-
ti ves, t hey wert' st il l advancing u p t he
Cotenti n peninsul a towards Cherho urg and
sout hwards towa rds St-Lo. On Ihe eastern
coast of the peninsula first Crtsbccq then
Azevt ft e were taken, bUI Montebourg
remained. in enemy hands . Other VII Co rps
units wer e fighting their wa y we stwards
across the peninsul a and south- wes twards
from Ca ren ta n. V Co rps was support ing th em
and, on it s left flank, 1st Inf Div were
advancing towards the St- l.o-Cae n road,
taking Ca umont. By the end of t he first week
some 326,fXlO men we re ashore, together
with l().l ,OOO tons of supplies and 5 4,000
vehicles.
Above: Mulberry
Harbours. Two pr e-
fabricat ed harbours
were towed across the
Channel and
constructed. Mulberry
:AI - seen here - was
opposite Omaha and
although ncr scheduled
to be fully operational
until 0 + 18 (1" June ). it
W3$ in use earlier. The
photograph shows one
of the two loebnitz
pierheads. (Bruce
ROOemon)
Sm ,w /tl'Y, It can be fairly stated that by the
en d of th e first week all four Allied Cor ps
wh ich had taken part in the assault were
firmly ashore, had joined up all five beach-
heads and linked up with the ai rbo rne for ces,
They had thus established a sizeab le lodge-
ment area with a cont in uous pe rimeter within
whi ch were secure logist ic areas. The enti re
beach-head was under the protection of an
almos t impenetrable air and sea ' umbrella' , All
that was lacking was port faciliti es and these
would soon be available as the vari ous compo-
nents of the Mulberry Harbours were brought
Gooseberry Shelt.ers. The first and Simplest
form of breakwater to protect the invasion bexhes
from rough seas , were bIock5hips - known as the
'Cofncob Fleet' , which were deli berately sunk. For
example, there were 59 elderiy merchantmen and
warships. which sailed down from Scotland to Poole
harbour prior to D-Day. ready for thei r final journey
to Normandy. where they were sunk. Behind this
Ime of bIock$hips can be seen it Whale Pierhead.
(IWM - C-4S46)
BUILDING-UP THE BEACH- HEAD
acros s. Assembly, however, took longer th an
anticipated and neit her Mulberry was
anywhere near completion by the end of the
first week.
Wloek 2: 13-1 9 June 19-1-1
The seco nd week began wit h an embarrassing
reverse for one of the most ren owned Briti sh
armoured divi sions - 7t h Armd Dtv (The
Desert Rat s) - which had bee n switched to the
right of XXX Cor ps and was advancing SWiftly
southwards , taking vtuers-socage. On quit -
ung the village, however , the division's 22 nd
Armd Bde encountered panzer ace Obersturm-
fuh rer w ittmann and hi s four Tiger
tanks, who knocked out almost the enti re
di visional advance gua rd, destroying 23 tanks
and numerous ot he r vehicles and bringing
the advance to a sh uddering halt. Elsewhere
17th Pz tuv almost succeeded in retaking
Ca renta n, so pressur e to restrict the enlarge-
ment of the beach-head was considerable.
However. on the 14th US XIX Corps became

-
-
--
-
-

--.
-
..
...
....
31
I
BUILDINGUP THE BEACH-HEAD
operational in the area between US V and VII
Corps, and next da y US VIII Corps abo
became operational. By the end of week 2. US
ter ces had pushed forward up the Coten un
penmsut a to the general lim' Quine vlllc-
va togncs- Lcs Pieux . Trapped Germ.111 troops
were refused pemussion to att empt 10
breakout - in fact lIitler refused to allow any
withdrawals ho m any area . From Omaha. US
V and XIX Corps had pushed for ward to
Caumont, but movement was still difficult in
the Brit ish/ canad ian area. At a meeting with
Rom me l and vo n Rundstedt (ov era ll
co mmande r in the west ] at Sotssons on 17
june. lI itl er raged at t111' m, accusi ng th em and
all th eir troops of cowardice. The Allies were
also ha ving their sha re of mi sfortunes. Afte r
asscmbnng t he two Mulberry harbours and
gett ing t he m close to readine...... hour... of
labour were brought to nou ght by seve re
ga les, whi ch wo uld la..t unt il the 22 nd.
irreparab ly damaging Mul ber ry A (off Omaha)
and 'Severely da mag ing ~ f u l h l ' r r y B (at Am).
mancheq . The Mulberries had been expected
to handle some 15,<XX) tons of cargo daily,
rising to 46.(KK) tons by D+90. so t he damage
was very worrying,
week 3: 20-26 june 19H
By 20 june, Ame rican troops were only some
five mil es hom Chc rbourg and by the end of
the week after ha rd fighti ng by t he three
at tacking d ivisions agai nst fanatical oppost-
lion, and accompani ed by more t ha n I ,(MJO
Ions of bombs, plus gunfire from the battle-
ship HMS RCIf{IIt'y, the mo nitor HMS RO/lI.'rh
and other naval vessels. the pori was almost
enti rely in th eir hands. apa rt from the actual
dock area which was ruined. Th e Germa n
naval commander, Admiral Hcnnecke, and th e
garrison commander. General von Schheben,
were both cap tured o n t he 26t h. Off the
Bel ow: Mulberry
Harbours. No one could
have ant icipated the
fef"ocity of the great
storm which began at
OBOhrs 19 June and
blew fOf' three days and
three nights - the worst
summef"gale fOf' 80
years. The photograph
shows the storm-twisted
piers of t he wrecked
Omaha Mulberry.
Event ually, enough was
salvaged to restore
Mulberry ' B' off the
British beAchesat
Arromanches. (US Army
SC 198165)
BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD
Above: At low tide some vesseb _ like the Norwegian SS Vest-
lfIGfI(od seen bere. were beached. so duit unloading into
DUKWsltruekswas made much easier. (Bruce Robertsofl)
Below: Scene at the Regimental Aid Post of 6 DU. SOth Inf Div.
after the battle of Lingevres, showing both Brrash and German
casualnes being treated. I .. June 19.... , (IWM . B SS270 )
33
BUILD1NGUP THE BEACH-HEAD
left: Prisonen taken by
American troops in the
dose boage country are
quizzed by an offICer-
before being sent to the
rear. Doe has been
bandaged for a head
wound . (IWM AP
28446)
Betow: This hut has
been tumed into a regi-
mental <lid post for
American casualt ies near
Mortain, south of Vire in
Normandy. (IWM - EA
] ] 190)
Right: American soldiers
brtak through a smoke-
ween to surround a
wrecked building in the
viIage SaJntenyin
western Normandy,
(lWM- KY ]0]09)
Below; ThIs young GI is
tr)'Wla to draw enemy
in", I'Ils patrol
iIlMnces through the
lines ;wi hedgerows of
Non'naI"Idy. He and his
_",onned
w<h the HI carbines,
Note also the wrecked
German machine gun by
his Itg. (JINM KY
27S40)
BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-H EAD
BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD
landing tx.. aches re pai rs to the Mulberry
harbou rs had be gun as soo n a.. the storms
abated on the 22 nd; it was dectded to combine
what was left o f them as o ne complete
Mulberry at Arromanc hes. The storms ha d
bee n so severe t hat t he y dest royed almost five
times as many landing-craft as had Ge rman
fire on D-Day! Meanwhil e, In British Second
Army's sector, regrouping was taking place in
order fo r XXX, VIII and I Corps to be launched
in a pincer movement on Cacn (Operation
' Epso m' ). The main initial thrust was in XXX
Corps' sector. hol d ing firm o n the right and
ce n t ral sectors of the corp s front , whil e
ad vancing on till' left to secu re Ne yer.. BIX'ag(',
This wou ld protect the right flank of VIII
Corps which would be launched through Ca n
3rd Dtv, wit h the ai m of seizing crossings over
t he Rj\'{'(1 Odon and Orne, to gai n a position
36
on the hi gh gro und NE of Brettevllle-sur -Latzc
whi ch dominated the sout hern ex its fro m
Caen . The bad weat her delayed operations and
the attack had to be put off until 25 june,
Some progress was made, but the e m.. my was
well concealed in d ifficult country, wit h ex ten-
sive mlnefields covering his positions, so by
t he end of 26 j une leading tr oops had only
reached Gramvtlte-sur-Odon. Colleville and
xtoucn.
Week 4 : 27 june-3 Jul y 1944
The week began wit h the Brit ish /Canadi an
forces cont in uing Operation Epsom, t fu-tr
attempt to encircle Cacn with VIII Cor ps,
toget he r with elemen ts of I a nd XXX Corps,
the first objecti ve being the hi gh ground
ar ound Hill 112, to the sout h-west of Caen. In
a second phase the AlIled forces wo uld
Above : At 0730hrs on
26 June, an attack was
put in by VIII Corps (15
Scottish, 4] Wessex and
I I Armd Divs]. with "'4
Bde of 15 ON opening
the attack to capture St
Mauvieu and La Gaule.
two small villages south
of Norrey-en-Beuin.
Here. a section of 6
RoyaJ Scccs fusilier'S fire
onto enemy positIOnS
from a sunken lane.
(IWM B 5959)
,
c

b
C
A
BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD
Above: ACanadian
7.2inch gunis prepared
for action by its crew.
Heavy guns like this
were used mainly in
counter-battery work
against enemy artillery,
28/une 1944. (Public
Archives Canada - PA
132925)
Right: Shermans
belonging to Gen Le
Cere's 2nd French
Nmoured Division leave
anl5T on Utah Beach.
The 2eme Division
Blindee was then part of
Patton'sThird Army.
wtlich landedin early
Jufy 1944. (IWM - HU
73789)
J7
BUllOI NGUP THE BEACH-HEAD
advance eastwards across t he River Orne. Once
again t he st re ngth and fighting ability of the
ene my proved too st rong, and although a
bridge-head over the Odon was secured, the
road sout h-east wa rds (known as ' Scotch
Corr idor' ) co uld not be held and Hill 112 was
soon under heavy attack. By t he 29t h elements
of seve n pa nzc r di visions we re deployed
against t he bridge-head and Hill 112, resul ti ng
in the inevitable dectston to ca nce l t he second
phase and wit hdraw. Never theless Mont-
gomery or dered Seco nd Army to ma intai n
maximum pressu re 0 11 t he enemy, so as to
ensure that t he east f lank remained firm . It
was vital that t he British/Canadian sector
hol d, so t hat ene my progress there would not
he allowed to affect th e overall Allied plan.
On the ot he r flan k, US t roops completed
the capt ure of Cherbo urg on the 27 t h . The
port was almost completely des troyed and it
would take some time to be made oper ational.
By the end of june, US 9t h Division in the far
west of the Cotenti n peninsula had eliminated
all ('n(' my resistance - the en ti re pe ninsul a was
now virtua lly dear. By J Ojune the Al1 ies had
38
landed more than t roops, 6<X),O(X)
tons of stores and 170,000 vehicles of all t ypes.
Allied casualt y figures were about I in 10 killed
or wounded. The wee" ended with US forces
maki ng a determined drive southwards
(known as the ' Battl e of the Hedgero ws' from
t he na t ur e of the t hi ck bocage count ry with its
sun "en roads a nd h igh he dge s) ai ming
towards the line Coutances-St -Lo . The weat her
was not good and litt le progress was made
towards St-jcan-de-Daye and La-Haye -du-
Putt s. US First Army had just und ergone a re-
orga nis ation, wit h VII Cor ps (4 , 9 and 13 Divs)
being moved to the sector between VIlJ and
XIX Corps. As the wee" ended blindi ng rai n
co nti n ued to make progress slow.
Wee" 5: 4-lOJuly 1944
The slow advance continued on both flanks,
both US VII and VIlJ Co rps making some
progr ess, whil e Can 1st Inf Div (part of Brit ish
I Corps) ca ptured Ca rptquet to the west of
Caen, hut failed to take the nearby airfiel d in
heavy fighting against 12th SS Pz Div. On 7
july Montgomery launched Operati on 'Cha m-
Above: Gen Omae
Bradley celebrati ng the
4t h of July. Promptly at
noon on the 4th of July
194<1, every American
gun sent a shell
screaming into Gennan
lines to celebrate Inde-
pendence Day. Gen
Bradley, then CG Ist US
Army fired a ISSm 'long
Tom' in the barrage.
(IWM - EA28821)
Right: C a n ~ i a n soldiers
hrilngtheir breakrast in
askt-trenCh on the
Caen-Carpiquet front. 9
JIJy 19+1. (Public
Archives Canada - PA
1)1 )991
8e'ow: Canadian troops
house-dear'wlginthe
0I.C5kiru of Caen. 10July
19+4. ctunng hand-to-
hind f.ghtiog. (Public
.'l'chives Canada _PA
mn7)
BUILDING-UP THE BEACH- HEAD
39
BUILDING- UP THE BEACH-HEAD
wood', an attempt to take Cacn from three
sides, suppo rted by massive bombing (some
Z,ono tons of bombs were dropped and many
civilians kutcd). The bombing created so much
rubble t hat the adva nc ing Brit ish and Cana-
dian t roops found their progress badly
impeded. but by th e 9th th ey had taken most
of th e city north of th e Orne ; th e Germans still
held the industri al area east of the river.
Mopping-up cont inued o n the 10th. In the
cit y th e bndges over th e river were eit he r
destroyed or completely blocked by rubbl e.
During the period 10- 18 Jul y, Second Army
would deliver a sencs of thrusts. aimed at
making progress sout hwards towards Thury-
Harcourt on as broad a front as possible. These
began on th e 10th , wit h -Brd Dtv attacking
th e high ground at Point liZ and th e villages
of Feuguerolles-s ur-Orne and Malt er in the
Orne valley. All were secu red, but a st rong
ene my counter-att ack then retook vtaltot.
Wt't'k 6: 11-1 7 July 1944
Throughout th e week US First Army batt led to
capture 51-to, whic h was the key 10 furt her
advances sout hwards and an essential prelimi-
na ry to their decisive breakout attack _ code-
na med Operauon 'Cobra', which would follow
once St lil was 1.1 ken. In the Britis h sector
t here were adva nces towards uouot-lcs-uagues
and Evrecv. In preparat ion fur t he forthcoming
Operation ' Goodwood' considerable re-
grouping took plan.' , namely: d uring 1Z-13
Jul y XII Corps loo k ove r from VIII Corps, and
Can II Cor p' (Can 2nd and Srd Inf Dtvs}
became operational and took statio n bet ween
XII and I Corps. On I S July XXX and XII
Corps resumed th e attack, t he latt er (a night
attack o n t he 15t h) bcmg successfully
supported for th e first time by ' Movement
Light ' (searchlights directed at the clouds and
then reflect ed downwa rds 10 give a degree of
visibilily), Some progress was made and, as
mention ed al ready, Evrecy was taken, but
fighting was severe and confused with many
enemy armoured counter-att ach taking place.
On th e 17th, Ihe Germans suffered a major
rever se. in Ihat Rommel was serious ly
wounded when tns car was strafed while he
was returning from a visit to SSPanzer General
40
'Sepp' Diet rich 's IIQ at St-l'terre-sur -Dtves. He
would play no further pari in proccedtngs, hi s
command rcsponstbthttes bl.'ing taken ove r by
Field Marsha l Gunther von Kluge, who had
already take n over as Cine west from von
Rundstedt.
week 7: H ~ ..24 Jul y
18 Jul y 1944. In the Coteutt n peninsula, SI-
LO was reached by US XIX Cor ps' troops. In
th e British sect or Operati on ' Good wood' was
launched. Thi s was a massive tank attack by
VIII Corps ' armoured di visions to punch a
Above: Gennan mines
presented an ever-
present hazard t o tbe
Allied soldier. Her e a
Canadian sapper uses his
magnetic mine-detector
whiCh will sound a tell-
tale 'beep' when it
discovers something
metal - a mine or just
some scrap metal? Near
Caen, IOJuly 1944.
(PubliC Archives Canada
- PA 132856)
Above: Troops of US
FimArmy auault
enemy po$itions near St-
Lo. Note the prone
soldier about to fire his
nfle grenade in support
01 their charge. (IWM
KY 30970)
Right : Tanks and
infantr)' crossing the
OdonRiver on the
London Bailey Bridge.
IIW"Uen. 18July 1944.
(Public Archives - PA
13 1392)
L D ~
I
BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD
way through the st rong German defences. It
was pr eced ed by a massive aer ial bombard-
ment by so me 2,()nn pl us Allied aircra ft drop.
ping mo re t han 7,uno tons of bo mbs.
Montgomer y considered th at , even if the
attack failed, it woul d take pressur e off the
American sect or, in line wit h th e overall plan;
he was also under prMo5ure to achieve some
spectacular SUCCMoS on the British /Canadian
front . The bombing, alt hough it ini tiall y
st unned the German defenders. d id not
destroy them, and ti ll' Allied tanks suffe red
heavily whe n t hey advanced towa rds the well-
placed Ger man anti -tank weapons . By the end
of th e day more than 200 Allied tanks had
bee n destr oyed. for a gain of tess than six
mues. The attack co nti nued and by last light
on the 19th th e British had made some
progfl"SStowards Bourguebus, whi le the Ca na-
42
dians had tak en t he Cae n suburbs of
va uce lles, Louv tgn y and Hcury-sur -Omc.
Then the heavens opened, thi s time with
torrential rain, and Goodwood ended o n th e
20t h in a sea of mud and burning tanks. The
weather also dela yed the sta rt of the US Oper-
ati on 'Cobra' , just west of St-LO, ai r operatio ns
be ing impossibl e until th e 25t h when US VII
Corps, supported by VIII Corps on its righ t
and XIII Co rps on its left , began its assault .
The plan was for US First Army to pivot when
it reach ed th e haw of the Cot cnn n penins ula
and swing so ut hwards, while VIII Corps
swung west towards Rennes and St-Malu ,
General Patton's US Thi rd Army, which by
now was arri ving in France and would be
ope ratio nal by 1 August , would th en foll ow
up, read y to take co mmand of th e breakout
when o rdered. Patt on had made his usua l
Above : Gen Mont-
gomery holds his first
press conference in
Nonnandy. at which he
explains the situation
and progress of the
landings to wai t ing
journal ists . (IWH - B
5339)
BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD
Aboye: General
Montgome ry toget her
wIth USGenerals Omar
Bradley and George
PilttOll, enlOY a joke ,
between
Monty ar'ld Patton were
never part iCularly
cordial , especially as
each constantly strove to
outdothe other. Note
Patton is wearing his
bmous ivory-handled
plStOIs - not pearl-
handled (he is reputed
to said that: '... only
a pmp II'l a New Orleans
wtlorehouse would have
pearl (IWM B
655 1)
spectacula r a rr iva l on th e battl e scene (o n 6
July) at a n ai rstr ip near Omaha Beach a nd
annou nced to wa iti ng re porter s t ha t Ill' was
goi ng to : ' ... cut t he guts out of those Krauts
a nd get t he hell on to Ber lin .' ! ' Cobra' wou ld
have a bad sta rt when bo mbs dropping short
ca used ma ny Allied cas ualt ies, but bot h VII
a nd VIII Co rps wo uld make good progr ess,
vindica ting the Brit ish a nd Ca nadian att ac ks
a t t he ot her e nd of the fro nt , which had
undoubtedl y drawn off man y German tank
units and ot her reserves.
The Hrst 50 Da ys
Despite ha rd fighting, bad weat he r and ot he r
problems, the bea ch-head had been ex pa nded
a nd strengt hened sufficientl y for the next
phase of o pe rations to be launched, namel y
the breakout through France a nd on across the
Sei ne. ' \\fl' were now on t he t h reshold of great
even ts.' Montgomery says in h is me moirs. ' we
were ready to break out of the bridge-head .'
Not es
1. Montgomer y, H. Notmandv to tile nt/ltie.
2. The numbering of t he weeks ha s been
chosen pu rely arhitrarily in order to d ivide th e
text up into a logical pa ttern of se....en-da y
periods. The original O-Day was to ha w been
Monday 5 June, but was postponed until
Tuesday 6 June, Th erefore I haw taken my
seven-day ' weeks' as sta rt ing on a Tuesday and
end ing on a Monday - and of course Week I
began wi th O-Day,
3. The Allied tank with the best firepower was
the She rman ' Hrcfly' a rmed with the British
17pdr. but on ly a small n umber was available
at t he time.
43
BUILDING-UP THE BEACH- HEAD
Left: ' Karnerad'! This
German sniper was only
fourteen yean; old ~
was captured by the
Americans in Normandy.
For him the fighting is
over. (US Army )
Below: Captured
German troops were
brought down to the
beaches and shipped off
in retuming LSL.s to
POW camps in UK and
elsewhere. staging
through temporary
POW cages at places like
Portiand in Dorset.
(IWM - HH 9102)
l
Be&ow: o:cellent photo-
~ taken dlrilg
Wnton Ow.rchiU's visit
m!he Uen arelI on 22
).jy I ~ _ He droYe over
two bridgesacross the
RMr Orne built: by the
Il& _ WII'ISlOO Bridge'
nl 'Oud1iI Bridge' -
nt ailed with both
8nash Mld~ i M 1
lI"1XJP5.. Here, accompa-
MIdbyGenSir Beman:I
HOI qomer-, n GenSir
f'iIes Dempsey. he looks
II: ~ mapon which 11Gen
""""'"<"'"""""'"
2nd Unadian Corps) is
porltJng out enemy pose-
DOllS. (IWM - B 7879)
Resume of the Plan
Havtng established a secure beac h-head on the
No rmandy coast an d consolidated their troops
within it , it was now ti me for the Allie-; to
move on to the ne xt phase of operations.
namely to break out from the confines of the
Cotenttn peninsula, gain control of Brittany
and then swi ng wide to the east aero..... france.
On the left flank, t he British and Canadian
armies would continue to mount attacks with
the aim of containing as many German forces
as possible and masking the mai n etten.
which would be ma de by the Americans o n
the riKltt. The latter would pivot on the Jeft
flank and swing sou t h on the right. thus
securtng the whole of the Cotenttn pe ninsula.
On reach ing the base of the peninsula , VIII
3
Breakout
Co rps would turn west into Brittany. making
for Rennes and St-Malo. US Th ird Army would
follow on t hei r extreme right , ready to take
co mmand ot the breakout when ordered. US
First Army's operation was known as ' Cobra'
and If-Hour had been set for 1300 hrs on 24
July, but then postponed for 24 hours because
of bad flying weather. Heavy saturation
bomhing and artillery barrages preceded the
attack.
Wloe"- H: 25-31 J ul y 1944
US Hrst Army's Operation ' Cobra' began on
the 25th. The massive air and artillery prepa-
rati on included some 1,500 heavy bo mbers of
US Eigh th Army Air Force. Bombs landing
short caused ma ny casualt ies, wh ich included
4S
Lieutenant General Lcstcv 1. Mr-Nalr, CG US
Army Ground force:'>, who was vtslti ng t he
front. Despite t hi s in itial setback both VII and
VIII Corps made good progress. wh ich t hey
co nti n ued o n the Zot h , US VII Corps ta king
Mangny and St-Gllles, a nd west of them VIII
Corps was across ti ll' Le ssay-Perters road. By
the 29 th, XIX Corps on the far left of t he
asvault was "dva nrin/o: towards To rtgny and
Tessy, while VII Co rps ha d reached Percy and
011 the ri/o: ht VIII Corps was across t he River
Stenne and pushtng towards Granv ille. They
entered Avrancbcs the next day, seizing vital
br idges over t he River See. On the left flank of
the ad vance the enemy counte r-a tt acked
strong ly around Percy and Villedieu. This was
the paucm for the next day's fighting; on t he
right US 41h Armd Div striking out from
Avranc hes and capt uring crossings over the
River Selune near Pontaubault, while on the
left flank det ermined resistance continued.
Fa rt he r east, in the British/Canadian sector,
British Second Army regrouped and, towards
the end of t he week , began a thrust south-
wa rds fro m the Caumont a rea . The main
weight of the attack was to be on a narrow
46
front in VIII and XXX Co rps' a rea , wheeling
sout h-west then developing eastwards towards
the Orne, The attack began on XXX Corps'
front at DonO hrs of 30 july, 4:i rd Inf Dtv's tas k
being 10 secure the hi ll Ieat ur e l' oint 36 1 10 t he
west o f [urqucs. wh ile 50l h Div aimed to
secure the h igh ground west of v tllers-Bocage.
The VIII Corps a tta ck was t un ed to sta rt an
hour later, wit h 11th Armd and l St h lnf Dlvs
being ordered to establish t hemselves in the
ar ea of xt- Ma ru n-dcs-nesaces. protectin g t he
right fla nk of XXX Cor ps. progr ess in VIll
Corps' a rea proved easier than o n XXX Co rps '
front and t he attacks were continued on :n
July, gains bei ng made alt hough opposi tion
was by now suttcnrng. In Ca n II Corps' area
sout h of Cacu. good proRres:<. was also made
towards Tttty-ta-Ca mpagne and Bourguebus.
Allied casualty figures to t he end of j ul y
we re some 122,non killed and wounded; the
Ge rmans had lost about 154,000 (induding
-10.000 taken prtscncn. The week closed with
Patt on 's US Thi rd Army, now assembled and
poised to become operational and take over
the Allied right flank. US forces wer e re-organ -
ised into 12th Army Group (under General
Abo ve : Cromwell tanks
and MIOtank destroyen
of 2200 Armd Bde . lined
up befor e an attac k east
of the River Orne , tate
July 1944. (Tank
Museum)
Above: 1st (US) Army
launch Operaucn
'Cobra', All American
palrol makes its way
arefullythrough the
ruin$ of St-L6 towards
Notre Dame Cathedral,
2S July 19H , (US Army
via Real War Photos A-
329)
Right : With Br it ish
fortes south of
Caumont, 31 July 1944,
They even had tra lllc
jam5 In the front line!
1M lane ls very
congested wit h infantry-
filled arrierS, alltrymg
to get forward . (IWM
BBlO8)
Bradl ey! co ntaini ng first Army (Ge neral
Hod ges) and Th ird Army (Patton); t he
21st Army Group ccmpr tscd
Canadian First Army (General Crerar) and
British Second Army (Ge neral Dempsey), st ill
under Montgomer y's command wh o also
retained overall command of all ground forces.
\\'l'l,.'k 9: 1- 7 August 1944
Whe n USThird Army became operationa l - at
1200 Iu s, Tuesday, I AugU',t - it a....umed oper-
ational control ove r all troops in US VIII
Corps' zone, so Patton now had under his
command four co rps: VIII Corps (Gene ral
Middleton), XV Corps (General Hal..lip) , XX
Co rps (General Walker) and XII Corps
(General Cook). The plan for the co ming
month's operations would be developed In five
phases: the conquest of Britt any; the enctr-
dement of Germa n Seventh Army in t he
Argentan- Falai se-Mortat n area ; the adva nce to
th e River Seine, to include the enveloping of
48
all ene my forces from Mantes Ga..slcourt to
Elbeu f: forcin g the enemy to evacua te sout h-
weste rn France ; routing the ene my across the
Rivers Marne, Atsne and Meuse. Patt on wa.. of
course th e ideal co mmande r for suc h a
dynamic, fast-movin g sertcs of operations.
On e of t be co rne rstones of the Allil'd cover
plan (Operation 'For t itude ') had been to
pe rsuade the ene my that he was commandi ng
a myt hical ar my grou p locat ed in Sf. England,
which would form the ma jor a..sault force In
the Pav-de-Calals.J Unce rtain what to expect
and riven by command problems, the
Germans were unable to presen t a cohesive
front line although they did manage to estab-
lish some solid defensive localit ies with well-
emplaced arti llery support . But Third Army's
armoured spea rhead.. burst out of Avranches
and made con..iderabl e progress to the south,
tak ing Ren nes on 3 August and, In the south-
cast , capturing Maycnne on th e 5t h. To the
west a special armoured Task Force made for
Above : Seaforth High-
landers, supported by
half-tracks, carriers and
tanks on the road to
Vassy. nort h of Hers. 2
August 1944. (IWM - B
8603)
Right: A typical British
sectIOO. led by its section
commander (with Sten
SMG). Brengunnel'" and
""""'". They be_
to 9 Platoon, ACoy. 115
linWelch Regiment .
(lWM - 88W )
Below: The advance
rowards Aunaysor.
Odon. Men of the
Worcntershire Regi -
ment search for snipen
Illl'\lined houses near
Benneville. 2 August
19+i. (IWM - 8 8501)

.'.
49
BREAKOUT
I.tft: Atuck on the
COon 'hI1ey. Bri t ish
SSa;!lmediumguns
n.g J Nght barrage.
...t.ch beganthe attack
enthenver valley"rea .
'IWM - B7413)
Ritht:Oneof the

lIOI'ISolP'mon's 3rd
hmf_M"iGen
'Tifti'" p:x' Woo(fs "th
Armel Orv. AJw..ys "
..-."""""",,",
'Tifti'" p:x. is seen here
III .. M8 Greyhound

(US Army via
PmOll Museum)
Left; Acasualtyenjoys"
cpette "nd a cuppa.
whilst waiting to be
taken to a field hospital
from an ad hoc casevac
point. (IWM . B 6838)
Right : Exceltent shot of
asell-propelled
howitzer, belonging to
'S' Battery, 22nd Armd
Field Artillery Bn. "th
Armd DIV, 3rd (US)
Amry seen here moving
through Coutances. The
HMC M7 mounted a
IOSmm MIA2 nowitzer
W"5 known as the
Priestin Sntish Army
se-ece. (US Army via
F'xtonMuseum)
BREAKOUT
Brest, capturing vannes on the 5th, with VIII
Corps following UI}. Brest was reached on the
7th but the garri son refused to surrender (they
would hold out until 19 Septemberl). Patton's
spearheads had excellent, dow air protection
from General Weyland's XIX Tact ical Air
Command. Durin g August and on int o
September 1944, th ey inflicted devastating
damage on the ene my by, for example,
attacking gro und targets in dir ect support of
armour and infantry, providing air cove r for
columns and assaults , area patrols and ar med
recce. pre-planned point target attacks (dive-
bombing) in much the same way as the Luft-
waffe had supported the panzer di visions in
the heady Rlitziri( ( days of th e ' France 1940'
assault. The hoot was now very firmly on the
other toot! By nightfall on the 6th Patton's
troops had already liberated some Jllz million
people in 119 towns and villages.
US First Army was also making progress
sout hwards, taking Villedieu on th e 2nd and
Mortatn on the .Ird. As they pressed steadily
beyo nd Mort ain, th e Germans mounted a
counter-attack with 2nd and 116t h I'z Dtvs
52
just to the east , and on the 7t h they retook the
town. It rapidly became clear that this was a
major enemy assault (code-named Operation
'UirtidO. The German lIigh Command had
realised that the most critical moment in the
batt le tor Nor ma ndy had now bee n reached :
indeed t hey considered that this was now such
an important batt le that it could well deci de
th e outcome of the struggle for western Europe
and possibly of th e enti re war. Hitler had
persona lly ordered tha t the panzer divisions
should be formed up outside Mortain , tactng
westwards and then launched in an attack
which was to dnve down the Rivers see and
Selun e to reach the sea at Avrancbes. However,
despite the costly battles which had occurred
along the River Odon in july, Hitler and hi s
staff did not realise that armoured operations
of this magnitude could not be successful
wit ho ut complete air superior ity. The German
field co mmande rs fu lly ap preciat ed the
danger, hut were un able to persuade von Kluge
to rescind Hitler's orders. Despite heavy enemy
pressure, the Tactical Air Forces and American
counter-measures repul sed the attacks in the
Above: The Battle for
St-LO. Utter bearers
bring wounded Gis to a
I sr Army regtmental aid
station. (US Army via
Real War Photos A
] S] )
I

Rizht:: The B.att le fOf" St-

to 1stArmy traflk
lIIOYing through [he
runs of St-LO. 2 August
19+1. (US Army via Real
War Photos A- 314)
Below: 3rd Army
b!'eak0U[. Main ' player'
inthe breakout was o r
rcerse the CG 3rd Army
-uGen George S.
Pnton, Jr. seen here
ltUdying ill battle map
WIlt1 Maj GenHugh
Galfey. his Chief or Staff.
wxched by Maj M. C.
HeIrers. Speciallntelli-
renee OffICer on opera-
DOllSof the German
forces opposing [he
Mleric.an thrust (US
/vmyl
S3
BREAKOUT
left: Monty vislts the
1$t PoIi$h Armoured
Divi$ion. 6 Augu$t 1944,
Here he meets a
number of Polishofflcer1
and is introduced to
them by Maj Gen
r-taczek. the GOC.
(I'NM 88762)
Below: Bntl$h troops
advance sooth of le
Beny Bccage. Moving
through typical bocage
hedgerows. where an
ambush can lurk around
every comer. 6 August:
1944_(Bruce Robertson)
BREAKOUT
Above: Nice to meet you !. Amencan and British troops meet for
tilefamtime as the twO armies link up on the Argentan road,
Aug.Jst 19H. (IWM - HU '1]955)
Below: Hea vy fighting in progress in the area between Caen and
Falaise. August 19.... . (IWM HU ] 02 1)
BREAKOUT
56
Above : This massive R.oy1I
TIger tank was knocked 0lA
on 7 August 19+4, near le
Plosis Grimault. Fortunately
the Germans only built 489
of there 68 ton heavy tanh.
whose 88mm gun could
easily deal with its 0ppo-
ne nts at ranges where ther
own armour was virtually
impe ne trable. (Tank
Museum)
left: Wi nnie visits Monty.
Pr ime Minister Winston
Chu rchill paid numerous
nying visits to Normarldy,
this time on 7 Augus t 19+4.
He re he meets one of
Monty 's new puppies called
'Rommel'! (IWM B 8766)
Right : Vehicles belonging
to the ]rt! Canadian DIVi-
sion, photographed during
the 'mad dash' period of
0pet'ation 'Tractable', as
they pour forward Ileal'
Breneville-Ie-Rabet, 14
August 19+4. (National
Archives of Canada - PA
1165]6)
Above: Canadian
soldiers move past a
burning ammunition
tn.d:. during Operation
loQIize', the Canadian
t:re*(U, whieh also
WJYOIved Bntrsh and
Pcbh troops. 8 August
19. (tQtionaI Archives
ofUnada - PA 131375)
xtortatn area. During the nlght of the 7th,
Canadian forces south-west of Cae n also
adva nced, assts tcd by more tha n I ,()(X) IV\ F
homhers wntch dropped some :\, 000 plus tons
of bombs on the enemy pushing towards
Falatse. The German defences here were formi-
dabl e, so the plan was to assault under cover of
darkness, with the infantry in heavy armouned
car riers (these were gutted ' Sexton' SP gun
carriages whic h came to he known as 'Kanga -
roos'). Initially t ill" attack went well and by
midday on the xrh the villages of May-sur-
Orne, Fontenay and Tilly-la-Campagne had
be en take n. The Ca nadians then came up
against ,I wry strong Jay-back posit ion astride
the hi gh ground.
Week 10: K-14 AugU' ,t 194-1
The on ly remaining aggressive enemy resis-
tance in USThird Army's area was against VIII
Corps at St-Malo which had been heavily forti-
fied and the harbour locks mined, but by the
l -tth only the ancient citadel in t he po rt area
rcrnat ned in ene my hands. The leadi ng
cleme nts of XV Corps were now on ly twelve
miles from Le Mans , the enemy offering only

Left : A vital task dUrillg

the advance - and at all
ether OI'Tle5 for that
matter - was t hat of
artillery ~ t i o n offi-
cers, who directed the
fire of the field artillery
onto enemy posItIOnS
from their often exposed
OPS. This coe was
open.ting roear Bareetco.
Praoce on 10August
1944. (IWM - EA 511)85)
Below: BntJShand e--
dWl tanks form up for
Oper.ltion "Tractable'" 14
August I'M4. Nearest
the carne-a ~ to
be an MIO tank
destroyer. Thi s open-
topped TO mounted a
lill gull on the Sherman
chassis. Another verSIOl'I
was the MI 0 Achilles.
which mounted the
British 17pdr. Behind the
MIO is a Churchill flame-
thrower. toWiog its
trailer full of flame fluid.
(Nat ional Archives of
Canada - PA 116525)
Wee k I I : 15- 2 1 Augu\t 1944
[See Chapter -I for t he Operation ' Dragoon '
land ings on 16 August and th e subseq uent
advance northwards up the Rhone valley.)
five miles fro m ratatsc. and sti ll gett ing
massive air support from til l' RAE On the
admini strati ve front , th e first PLUTO was
brought i nto c pcranon on 12 August, car ryi ng
fuel fro m the Isle of Wigh t to Che rbou rg.
Eventually no less than 20 such pipelines were
laid unde r th e Cha nne l from the Isle of Wight
and Dungcn ess to Che rbourg and Boulogne
respectively.
58
token resist ance: XII and XX Corps were
advancing o n Orlean s and Cha rtres.
The maim trouble spot for the Allies was
sti ll ar ound Mo rta tu , where t he st ruggle
continued . The Germans were still trying to
ma ke th eir major breakthrough . but they were
held, then gradually worn down, so that by
the l lth even von Kluge was more than
anxious to wit hd raw hi s forces whil e they were
sti ll reasonabl y intact ; he was pr evented from
doing so by Hitler who would only allow a
partial withdrawal . Farther south, US forces
had crossed th e River Lo ire. To th e north-east.
by the l-Ith, th e Cana dians were on ly about
- - - ----=---=-"~
Right : Bonjour Ameri
ans! French citizens of
~ crowd into the
narrow streets of A n g ~
to welcome XXCOfPS
lfOOIl'S, who entered the
tawn on 12 August .
(1'M1 EA - ]]10])
\.owff right: The
'hrnes' of 79th
Annoured Division,
t*I"I pt in Operation
hcubIe', 1-4 August
1944. ne Brettev.lle--Ie-
- - ~ ~ AYREs; the one
on me left is QIT)'lng a
brushwood fucine
"I!1Idl _ dropped into
ITttlChesJdrtrnes to assist
ee Wlk in crosSlng_ The
290mm Petard spigOt
mortar demolition gun
an beclearly seen on
theocher AVRE,
(NaoonalArchives of
C2lada.PA 11 652 ])
I
1
1
I
BREAKOUT
On the 15th, SHAH announced that US Third
Army was now operati ng in France and 12th
Ar my Group ordered Patt on t o hold the
southern ~ O J of the Argcntan-Patatse gap
wit h XV Corps, together wit h VII Corps (First
Army), whil e stmcnancousty making a rapid
movement eastwards to harass and confuse
the enemy. The objective of XX Co rps was
changed from Dreux to Chartres. By now the
area south of the Seine from Paris to Orl eans
was under USThird Army's co ntrol. nrcux was
captu red by XV Corps on the 16th and XII
Cor ps took Orleans on the same day. Patton
th en o rde red XII Corps to hol d Orlea ns with a
sma ll force, move th e bulk of t he co rps sout h
of j anvtne and press on eastwards. 8y the 18th
Below: 8mish tanks and
ami-tank guns moving
forward in the Argenun
Mea, during August
19044. (Bruce R.obernon)
Left: Canadian tanks
Il'lClVe up for their role in
Operation' Totalize' .
Notethe e xtra prctec-
DOnafforded to the
in the nght of
!he traCk. by the track
welded to the
"'" gb<d. The
despite betng a
good all-round medi um
rio was known as the
Ronson Lighter' by ItS
crews as I[ was: .... guar.
need to light first
lJne!' (National Archives
oIC1nada - PA 1329(1)
Right: Street fighting in
Fabise. Infantry-tan k co-
operatioo had to be of a
'IfJrf high order. Here
nbntry of Les Fusilier'S
Mont-Royal get support
rom a Sherman of the
Shefbrooke fusil ier'S
6.nng a snipe r hunt on
17 August 1911 .
Archives of
Unada- PA I ISS68)
th ey had secured bridge-heads ove r the River
f url' at Dreu x and Cha rtres and were closing
up on the Seine. On th e 20th, XX Corps estab-
livhed bridge-heads across t he rive r and
launc hed att acks cast of the Seine at Mcllun
and Fontai nebleau. On zrst Army Group's
front , Brit ish VIII C.. o rps en tered l 1nchebray o n
the 15t h, wh ile other British an d Canadia n
BREAKOUT
u nns were attacking towards Falalse, Can 2nd
Inf Div capt uring th e town on the 17t h. To
their sout h , US VII and V Co rps were push ing
nort hwa rd:'> in an endeavour to trap unit:'> of
Fifth Panze r Army an d Sevent h Army bet ween
them. th e enemy trying desperately to t";cape-
the pin cers. The ' Patatse Gap' was clos ed on
the 181h by a con junction of Poli sh and US
Right : Gis of 8Jrd
Infantry Division dealing
WIth enemy snipe rs in
we-to- house fighting
... St-Malo, 17 August
194-4. (US Army)
BREAKOUT
. , " ~
~
"
-
-
- ~ .
-.-
-
62
Above: The top ~ at
work in mnce, Auglm:
1944.l to R: Geo Sir
Miles Dempsey (2nd Br
Army), Gen Courtney
Hodges ( Ist US Army).
Gen He nry Cre rar (Can
I st Army), Gen Sir
Be mard Montgomery
(2 1st Army Group) and
Gen Omar Bradley ( 12th
US Army Group). (IWM
- 8967" )
left:: Convnander of the
151: Polish Armoured
0Msi0n, Maj Getl
Stanislaw Mac:zek, t.aIking
with CanadWl war
cOlTeSpClOdents. following
the Poles' t1eroic defeoce
of position ' Maczuga'
(mace), plugging the gap
to bottle up German
armoor in the Falaise
Pocket . (NatlOflal
Archives of Canada PA
129140)
BREAKOUT
Above: Polish tank
crewmen talk with Sgt
McVay of t he Black
Watch, south of Caen. It
was men like this who
plugged the Falaise Ga p
mel prevented large
numbers or German
tanksfrom escaping,
(I'NM- B 8829)
a rmoured units at Charnbois. Ther e were still
co nsrdc rabte Ge rman forces west uf the Gap
ami Allied fighter -bombers ha d a field-day,
knocking out many tanks and ot her AFVs.
Nevertheless a number of the
panzer un its d id man age to esca pe during the
ntgnt of t he 20t h . (In all fro m 19to 29 August .
some J OO,OOOenemy so ldiers and 25, 000 vcht-
ctes managed to esca pe, but they lef t behind
50, 000 dead, 200, 00 0 prt souers a nd the
wreckage of precious ve h icles and equi pment
which ha d once equipped t wo a rmi es. One
est tmate of total Ge rman ta nk losses during
t ilt' Norma ndy ca mpaign wa.. 1,3OU-pl us ;
/ 'i1/U t" Lrhr, 9t h Pz Di v and so me fifteen
in fant ry di vtstons virtua lly ceased to exist .
Another ' casualty' of the disas trous Morta tn
counter-attack was t he German commander
von Kluge. He had been vis iting the Fatai sc
a rea on 12 August when h is veh tcle was hit by
artillery fire and he was pinned down in a
ditch for some twelve hours . Hitler, assuming
that he had deserted, sent H I xtodel to replace
him, and when Kluge re-appeared he was
ordered back to Germany ' for a rest ' . Von
Kl uge, rcartng the worst, took poison and d ied
nca r Metz on the 19th, lea ving a me ssage
which prorcs-cd undyin g pe rsonal loyalty 10
hi s Fuhr er. Afte r a short time it became dear
that run ning hoth OB We..t and Army Group 1\
wav beyond Mod el's ahllities, so Hitler recall ed
von Rundvt edt tscc lat er ), leaving Model to re
or/o\.lllhl' till' sha tte red Army Group, whtch he
di d most effecti vel y.
week 12: 22-2K AUj.;ust 19-1-1
All Alhed ar mies began a rapid advance nort h-
eas twards in pursuit of t he disorga nised
German forces. At 0700 hrs on 25 August ,
Fre nch 2ml Arrnd Dtv, which had been
released from all other duties (on Eisenhower's
di rect orders: so t hat it could have the honour
of Iilx'ratin/<:: france's capital, entered Paris
fro m till' sout h-west. Half an hour later, US-nh
Int Div did likewise from t he south. Fortu-
nately the German Garrison commander,
Genera! von Choltitz, ignored Hitle r's order to
blow up the main public buildings, bridges
63
Abo...e: American
engineen dropping the
last sectiOn of a pontoon
treadway bndge into
position, across the
River Seine, west of
Pans . (Tank MU5eUfTl)
left: Half-traCks,
followed by trucks of
3rd Annd Oi... of 1st
(US) Army. crossing the
Seine on 26 August
1944. (USArmy via Real
War Phcros , A 661A)
8dow: A3. [he A111e$
raced across Fr.inc:e, the
frerda inwrgent forces
lFfl = Forces ~ s e s
de11nteneur) came out
0 the open. (Author's
"""""l
and monume nts, and at I SI S hrs surrendered
t he city to Gene ral Leclerc. relati vel y undam-
aged and wit h little fighting. General de
Gaulle ret urned to Paris the following day and
look pa rt in a large cere mo nial parade. To the
north of Pans, British -I3rd In f Dtv established
a bridge-head over the Seine at Vernon, and
downriver at Louviers near Rouen British XII
Corps did likewise. On the same day three
divisions of US VIII Corps {Znd, 80th and
90th) began a major assault against Brest after
another aerial bombardment . By the 26th
most of the Allied armies had units across the
Seine with US Thi rd Army leading the charge,
taking Chateau-Th ierry on t he Marne on the
27th, as well as reach ing Troyes. farther south
011 the Seine. On the 28th US First Army had
units across the Marne at Meaux. and US Th ird
Army was approaching Rheims. In the north,
having crossed the lower Seine o n the 26th,
Canadian First Army moved towards Calais,
while British Second Army u nits ma de for
-

BREAKOUT
nelgtum. On t he 27t h British I Corps reached
t he mouth of th e Seine and th e following day
Can II Corps expanded. its bridge- head towards
Rouen.
Note s
1. Patt o n had apparently ' disappeared.' after
Sicily and, because the Germans rated. him as
the ht.st Allied armoured commander, it
see med to them only logical that he had been
given thi s important role - t hey hadn't
realised that the notorious 'slapping incident '
in Sicily had been taken so seriously by ' the
powers that be ' . ' I' m not supposed. to be
commanding this Army: he would. gleefully
tell his troops during his ' pep-talks' in the UK
prior to the invasion. ' I' m not even supposed
to be in England. Let the first bastards to find
out be the Godda mn Ge rmans. I want t hem to
loo k up and howl: "Ach, it's the Goddamn
Thi rd. Army and that son-of-a-bitch Patton
agamt "

..
BREAKOUT

-
Leh: Gen Phiippe
Leclerc. CG 2nd French
Armd [);Y, whose divi-
sion was rightly given the
honour of being the first
Allied troops to enter
Paris_( ~ ' s CoIIec
tion)
Be low: Thousands 01
Parisians encircle the
Champs Elysees to
witness the victory
parade on 26 Augusl
1944. Gen Charl es de
Gaulle. pr esident of the
French Comminee of
Nat ional liberatIOn. led
the parade, f o l ~ by
units of l eClerc's 2nd
French Armd [);y.
(Author's CoIleetIOO)
,Right : RAF rocket .flring
Typhoons were respcn-
SIble for knocking out
INs Genmn armour
SI)Ut/'I..east of Couunces,
l-awlg beet! 'mvrted ' to
Dkt IW1: byAmeriCan
.-myehlefs, By the end
01 thedaythey had
deKroyed )2 enemy

IUTlerOUS other AFVs
... ........, """P<>'<
/>i MlI'llStry Photograph
QUI XPJ
Ript: Alter the capture
01' A.mer1un

l;Ol'lOI'Ued to push SOl.Ith
nI ust. as Patton's
"""""- tIrough mnce. These
Germin POWs were
P1 of 20.000 captured
IItheDatde lor
A-nnches. (US Army)
Right; Captured
German troops in Paris
He marched through the
streets. much to the
OeIlgt1t of crowds of
denslve Parisians,
(Author's Collection)
Above: Members of the FFI (Forces de I'Inteneur) have
linked up with friendly forces during the Allied race across France.
These two young Frenchmen wear the FFI armband, bearing the
Cross of l orraine. The young man in the helmet is cert ainly well
armed - he has a British Sterr gun and a German P38 pistol in a
Type I holster as well as his rifle! The other wears a German
leather belt with the 55 buckle (upside down) adorned with a
spread eagle clutching a swast ika. (IWM BU 217)
Above : 'vve jes Mde Scarlette of les Andelys on the
River Seine proudly wears her Union Jack blouse as she waves to
troops passing by her Hotel des Hea rs. 31 August 1944 . (IWM. 8
9869)
Belo.....: Not only did they get rid of the enemy. some Gis also
helped to bring in the harvest . These American sold.ers are helping
'down on the farm' near 5t-Malo soon after its capture. (IWM. EA
365(4)
68
4
Operation 'Dragoon'
A seco nd ' Second Front'
As has been mentioned, a long-..tanding argu-
ment had conti nually affect ed Ameri can-
British rel ati ons, concerning where the
' Sec ond Front ' should be mounted. Churchill,
worried about a possible takeover of central
and eastern Europe by the Communists, was
very much in favour of reinforcing Allied oper-
ations in Italy and striking up through the
Balkans, into Austria and Hungary, to take
Vienna and Budapest, then on across the
Danube into southern Germany, thus
thwart ing Stalin's now rampant Red Army of
many of tts spoils of Victor y. Unfortunatdy,
the Americans did not agree; they di sliked
Churchill's ' Balkan int rigues' and did not want
to sacrifice American uves for the sake of what
they saw as merely securi ng the st il l m ./uo in
Europe . They would of course live to regret
thctr dcctston post-war, but having won their
caw that ' Overlord' should take place in
northern Prance, they now opted for a second
' Sec ond Front' in the South of Prance. Stalin
was delighted and continued to support what
some Amer ican /Briti sh cynics called ' The
Stalin Plan ' ; as far as he was concerned it could
take place anywhere, preferably as far west as
posstble but certai nly not in the Balkans! Even-
tuall y Churchill Rave in and ' Anvil', as it was
then called (later changed to ' Dragoon' ), was
scheduled to take place at the same time as
' Overlord', so as 10 draw enemy troops away
from the main Allied assault. This proposal
was thwarted beca use there just weren't
Right: Preceding the
amphibious assaul t was
ee paradrop by men or
!tlt us 1st Provisional
AirtIome Division. Here
parauoopeno in [he ir
(.47a i r c ~ f t try to relax
on their way to the drop
zone, Nearly 400 C-47s
from ten different
lIIi.elds took part . (IWM
.EA H703)
69
- '
,

-,
,

.. .

..

enough landing-craft to mount both opera-
nons simultaneously; after various postpone-
ments it was agreed that Operation 'Dragoon'
woul d take place on 15 August 1944 . The
chosen locat ion was 10 be in Provence, east of
Marseilles, between Toulon and Ca nnes. The
assaulti ng force would be under the command
of Major General Alexander M. Patch's US
Seventh Army, whose HQ was then at Naples.
Its amphibious landing force was to he
composed of General Lucian K.
Truscott 's US VI Corps (US 3rd, 36th and 45th
lil t Divs). This would land fint and be
followed by Gene ral de Lau re de Tassigny's
French Armel' B (to be renamed French First
Ar my a month l ater) , a force of SOIUt' 256,{X)()
me n, co mprisin g sev en Fre nch di visi ons,
including troops from the French Expedi-
tionary Corps and their Amity d'Atrique,I Th e
amphibious assault would be preceded by a
paradrop by US t st Provisional Atrbome Divi-
sion. The landings would be watched by
70
Ch urch ill and Ge neral Mait la nd 'Ju mbo '
Wil son, who was Cine Mediterranean and
thus nominall y in charge of the ope-ano n
although he had passed responstbtli t y down 10
h is deputy, US Ge neral j acob Devers.
o pposing the landmg WNl' elemen ts o f
Ge ne ral Blaskowltz's Army Group G, alt hough
only three of h is ten divi sions were located
near the chose n beaches. As with ' Overlor d ' ,
the Allies would ha ve massive air and na val
supe riority, atthough there was a shortage of
landing-craft , and no spectaltscd armour suc h
as had been so successful on n nay would take
par t.
Th e Landi ng..
Supported by some 880 wa rshi ps of the
Western Naval Task Force, which Inc luded
five ba ttleshi ps , 21 crui sers and 100
destroyers , more than 1,400 landing-cr aft
too k pa ri in the a mphi bious landin gs o n 15
August 19H , Ih e fleet com ing fro m five ports
Above: Wrth text-boolc
precision. the par.Klrop
was completed WCCE$$-
fully near Oragutgan and
Le Muy, t he first stick
jumping at
There was onlyone
serious elT04". when, due
to low-lying fog, one
battaliOn was dropped
some 20 miles from rts
n5igned Oz. (IWH - EA
]3702)
,

,
,
,
"
e
Above: Watching the
In:Iings in scutbern
France was tbe Brit ish
Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, on board t he
destroyer Kimberley, nag.
ship of Admiral Sir John
Cunllingham. Churchi ll
would coerce the
destroyer'sskipper to get
fM dcsee to the beaches
lhar1 he should (due to the
~ from hundreds of
ftoatmg mines) . (IWM A
2525"')
Right: Landing craft
approaching the beaches .
Most Gis seem to be
wuring the issue inllat
aI* Iifebelts. but cebee-
WISt appear to be casually
_dwlg the shore
through blnoculars - no
'lIICOITIing' by the look of
l!wlgs. (IWM - IA ])990)
I
OPERATION 'DRAGOON'
of emba rkation in Ital y, Sicil y and Nor t h
Africa , to rendezvous op posite thei r
appoin ted beaches, between h e jus and
Can nes, ha vi ng fi rst head ed towards
northern Italy, to di sguise thei r tr ue desn na-
tion. Overh ead t here were conti n ual so rties
by the 2, {)OO aircra ft wh ich th e ,\ lIies had
co ncent rated on ai rfie lds in Corsica and
Sard inia, and o n ni ne aircr aft carriers -
outnumbering t he l uft waffe by at least 10 to
I ! While the invasion fleet was assembling.
the ai rborne eleme nt, t ransport ed in almost
400 C- 47s from ten ai rfields in It aly, had been
success fully dropped near Dragu tgnan and le
Muy, ti ll' first sti ck jumping at 04 :Ul Iu s. At
the same time, a Iew aircra ft had dropped
hundred s of sma ll d ummy par achutists in th e
Toulon area to co nfuse the enemy. Lo w-lying
fog hampered some of the parat roop drops
and o ne batt alion was dropped so me 20 mil es
away from t he assigned drop zo nes. But t his
was th e only serious error, the remainder of
l st Airborne Task Force landing accor d ing to
plan . The follow-up glider force landed near
le Muy some five hour s lat er, more t han 70
gliders br inging in artillery, anti -tank guns
and small vehicles. Towards last li ght a
further 330 plus gliders arri ved , so that by th e
end of the day some 9,000 Allied airborne
tr oops had been landed. wit h mor e than 200
artiller y pteccs and an eq uiva lent number of
vehicles. Losses had been slight - 434 kllh-d
and 292 i n jured. They were no w ready to
assault the ene my at le Muy.
Despite conside rable quant it ies of mines
and ot he r beac h obstacles, whic h had to be
Below: U n ~ l n g from
this landing craft on I5
August is .11 Multiple Gt,.,
Motor Carnage M I 5A I ,
which bad a l7mm
cannon and two .50 cal
machine guns in a
combination mount. The
half-track belonged to
Jrd Inf Div. (US Army yQ
Real War Photos A-
2512 )
-- - - - -------- - - - - - - - - - ----------,
OPERATION 'DRAGOON'
Above : Allied troops advancing thr ough ill smokescreen. having debarked from landing craft. w h i ~ ( a fair
numbel" of German prisone rs (in the centre of the photograph) are being corral led together. (IWM- NYF
37IS")
Below: Follow-up troops of 45th lnf Div wade ashore 0f1 Camel Beach. The leading Gis are carrying a
disassembled 81mm mortar. (IWM - NYF 40] I 0)
73
Left: A column of Arrt.
icMt infantrymefllTlOV't
past two DUKW- Of' to
give thei r full designa-
[ion: 2too 6x6
Amphibian Truck GMC
DUKW 353. They
mount 57mm anti-tank
guns and were often so
employed during beach
a5$0Wlts. (IWM - lAP
])982)
l e ft : U5 engineen;
crossi ng [he bridge at Si
Raphael after its capture.
The seaside town, which
was near Camel Red
Beach, had some of Its
waterfroot bars . kioslc.s
and bathing cabir15
disguising coastal gun
positi ons. (IWM IA
35339)
l eft: Men of 3rd
Infantry Divisioo UOUIflI
the River Doubs in
Besanr;on. during the
p u s h ~ . 8
September 19..... (US
Army via Real War
Pho[OS A-2..95)
OPERATION 'DRAGOON'
Above: Gis or l-4lrd
Regt 36Inf Div ride on
one of their tank
~ ~ i o n Shermans
lhrougtl this French
10Wll. whilst the people
dleer them on, 16
September 19-4-4 . (US
Ivmy via Real War
Photos - A 3297)
cleared by underwat er demolition tea ms, the
amphibious tandr ngs were also achi eved wit h
unly minimal casualt ies Hewe r t ha n 200
killed) , tha nks to the prelimi nary heavy ai r
and sea bomba rd ment an d the lack of tmme-
diate heavy ene my opposition. Th ree beach
areas had been chosen - from west to eas t: J rd
Inf tuv lan ding on ' Alpha', 45th Inf Dtv on
' Delt a' an d 36th Inf Div an 'Camel' , wit h 011
th e left Fren ch Commandos whose job it was
to cut the road to Toulon . The 1st Special
Service fo rce (US and Can Comman dos) was
sent to silence heavy German guns on tile lies
d'Hyeres. which cri tica lly overlooked Alpha
Keach, but on arrival. the guns were fou nd to
be dummies. The stiffest fighting was on
Camel. against heavy and accurat e fire which
co uld not be silenced by the sea bombard-
ment . Eventuall y, however, the troops made it
ashor e and consolidated their beach-head.
As pl anned, on the 16th, General de
Tassigny's (I Corps (which landed from IJ+I to
1J+25) passed through th e Amer icans and took
nve r the coas tal advance, making for th e main
ini tial targets, namely the ports of Toul on and
Mar seilles, hoth of which were heavil y
defended. The Americans advanced inland on
th e right flank, with .t eth Inf Div heading for
the valtcy of the Dura nce and 3rd and 45th Inf
Dtvs go ing for Atx-en- Provence (taken 21
t\ ugust ) and Avignon (25 August ). The
Ger man garrisons at Toul on and Marseilles
fought st ubbornly an d it took the Frenc h colo-
nial forces some twelve days to capt ure hoth
th e key ports which had been designated as
'fortresses of no surrender' hy Hit ler. Nearly
4x,Uno prisoner s we re taken in t he two
fortresses. Frenc h I Cor ps, whic h had lan ded
be hind II Corps, had crossed the Rhone and
turned northwards on 2XAugust . The race was
1I0W on to lin k up with Patt o n's Third Army
well to the north. Operation ' Dragoo n' had
been an unqualified success . In to tal some
3XO,()O() men, 69,(X)() vehicles and 306,000
tons of supplies were landed between 16
August and 2 September.
With th e Germans withdrawing in front of
th em, th e US and French forces pressed north-
wards. On the right, Grenoble was taken on 24
August and on th e left Lyons on 3 September.
7S
I
iI
OPERATION ' DRAGOON'
Above: Historic meeting of US Third and Seventh Armies. 12
September 19+4, in Autun, France. The two M8 Greyhound
annoured cars were driven by Dvr Jean QUigon (left ) who had
advanced northwards from Toulon andCpI Carl Newman, 86th
Recon Sqn of the US Sixt h Armd Di... , o ne of Partoo's hard-d riving
armoured divisions. Here. Sgt louis Basil, the Greyh ound
commander, shakes hands with the French driver. (4115 is IWM
EA37766. 4/ 16 is Author's Co llection)
B e ~ Remnants of the German First Army endeavoured. with
some success. to get through the Betfort Gap to escape intO
Germany. whilst the Seventh US and First Frenc h Armies tried to
prevent them. Here a Shennan tank belonging t o a French
armoured unit opens up onto an enemy position on the outskirts
of Selfort . (IWM - EA4.04782)
OPERATION ' DRAGOON'
AboYe: A machine
cunner of the 1st French
kmy turns his .30
Browning MG. on it s
ground mounting. onto
an enemy position in
Belfort as they liberated
keytown. (IWM -
EA +l813)
Right: Two French
soldiers of a signal team
ofthe Jrd Algerian
WlIltry Division. plus
their wire-laden mule.
IT10Ye up In the foo thills
oftheVosgl!!$ Mountains.
IIIa new Allied drive
toWards the German
Irontter. (twM EA

77
OPERATION 'DRAGOON'
.
Towa rds the end, the Germans chow 10 fight
one fin al del aying action at Besancon in order
to try to gain a breatfung-space to wit hd raw
th e bulk of what was left of their forces
through the Belfort Gap. Some 3,(XX) enemy
were in position there and a fierce fight devel-
oped for control of Besancon. On the left ,
French 11 Corps advanced northwards from
Lyons, nberanng Dijon on to September and
taking many t housan ds 01 pnsoncrs.z On 12
September the fi rst contacts were made
be tween units of Gen era l Leclerc's Prce French
2nd Armd Div, si.' rving wit h Pat ton's Th ird
Army, which had fought Its way from
Normandy, via Paris, with the advance
elements of French II Corps, in the a rea of
Chatillon-sur-Seme. A fair number of German
troops had managed to escape at various
places along the route and t hey were able
78
event ually to join up wit h Army Group B, but
t hey had taken heavy losses, t hanks to Allied
artfllery and ai r str ikes, in part icular aga ins t
General von wtctcrshetm's 11th i'z Div. In
addition, so me HO,OOO prisoners were taken.
German First Army, under General von der
Chevatlene, had also now withdrawn from
south-west France. The Allied aim had been
achieved and the front was now conttnuouv
from t he Eng ltsh Channel in the north 10
Switzerland in t hi.' sout h.
No tes
l. General de Laure de Tassigny ha d made a
st rong case for t he French to la nd first, but wa s
overruled.
2. A large proportion of these were East Euro-
pean 'volunteer' units, who killed their officers
and went over to t he Allied side .
Above : Residents of
Belfort march along With
the Second Morocc:an
Infant ry Division w ild as
they celebrate their
liberation. 20 November
1944. (IWM - EA-iSBO)
5
From the Seine to the Rhine
Below: Spoils of war.
Men of the 7Hth US
OrlNnce Ibtulion, of
s-nm Anny. d ~ n g
.. ~ t f y undiun-
.,edPzKpfw III Ausf L
011 theboItt\erteld in late
~ 19+4. using thelr
'll'l"Kker. wtNchbears
ee sundard natIOnal
odentJfat ion symbol on
c door. Note the heavy
IIIiChtne gun cal .SO on a
ms-rT1OUflt over the cab.
(Tn Museum)
A Strategic Dilemma
Poised astride the Seine, with th e new ' pus h '
f rom th e ' Dragoon' landings making good
progress up the Rhone valley, it was now time
to libe rate t he rest of France and take th e battle
into th e Low Countries. However, an tncreas-
tngty acrimon ious argument had bee n taging
for some time between the Allied sen ior
comma nders as to how best to proceed with
the overal l ...aregtc battle. Th e two main
oppos ing arguments po...ited eit her a brood
adva nce with all the armi es sharing supplies
(and gloryt), or a bolder, swift ad vance on a
mu ch narr ower front , with a much ... mallet
force. Eisenhower, ever the careful dipl omat,
favoured th e broad approach. reasoning that
the more ca ut ious advan ce, with all armi es
keeping roughly in line. would be safer, easter
to handle and a much better way of keeping
Ihe pl'ace betwee n such fiery charact ers as
Patt on and Montgomery. They of course. espe-
cia lly Montgomery, who was promoted to
Field Marshal on 31 August, favoured the
narrow thrust. His plan was for a bold advance
by some 20 divtst ons whi ch wou ld smash thei r
way into Germany, encircle the Ruhr and end
th e war at a stroke. They would of course get
the lion's share of fuel and materiel wh ile
l' Vl' ryOIlt' else waited for more supplies 10
become available. While he was happy that it
FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE
Left: Fre nch children
and their mothers W , 1 ~
to the crews of a column
of Polish tanks as they
enter the village of
Pommeroy. (Aut hor' s
Collection)
l eft: Polish tank
crewmen are pictured
here on their appropri-
ately named Sherman.
Gen r-tazcek's ~
divi sion fought valiantly
throughout the Noeth-
West European
campaign. (Author's
Collection)
-
should ht a mixed Allied stri ke force, it was
quite clea r who was to command it ! ' My own
view, wh ich I pr esen ted to the Supreme
Commander.' he wrote in his memoirs, ' was
that one po.....c rful full-blooded t h rust across
the Rhine and into the heart of Ge rmany,
backed hy t he hole of t he reso urces of the
Allied armies, ould he likely to ach ieve deci-
sive result s.' Monty outlined two routes for
suc h an advance: the nort hernmost t hro ugh
Bdgium to the Rhine, crossmg nort h of t he
80
Ruhr in dust ria l region and into the open
plain s of nort hern Germany. alternatively,
t h ro ugh Met z, the Saa r a nd into cent ra l
Ge rma ny. He na turally favoured t he northern
route !
Eisenhower di d not wa nt to rock t he boat,
but he fea red , with some justification , t hat t he
narrow a pproach was just too vulne rable and
migh t well he rut off . The Ge rma n a rmies we re
not co mptctety beaten and st ill prese nted a
considerable threat , especi ally as t hey were
Right: Alarge Dnadian
lOkIier chan to a small
membef of the FFI. who
cradles hisSten - fortu-
naely withthe cocking
IMrin mesafetyposi-
DOll! (I'NM HU 28887)
Below: Members of the
FR W3Yf! a greeting to a
cok.mn of B n t i ~ tanks.
led bya Sherman Fire fly
(mountlng the B r i t i ~
17pc1r guninstead of the
normal 7Smm). (IWM-
HU 73114)
FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE
81
.
FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE
bctng driven hack into their home territory,
and would figh t ever more fiercely to protect
11ll" Fat herland. Wit h hlndslght, a nd especially
taking in to cons idera tion the overwhel ming
Allied air supcncnry, he was probabl y being
overcaunous. though ev e ryone wou ld be
caugh t o ff balance w hen t he Ger ma ns
mount ed their Ardennes opcranon juvt three
months later. fie eventually decided on the
broad fro nt a pproach. hut Montgomery as w1..'
shall see, did not come a.....ay enti rely empty-
handed.
The Seed of a 1'011
By now it had become very clear that the Allfes
desperately needed a large worklng port near
t he front line, so as to avoid t he 3on- mile haul
bar-k to Norma ndy for replenishment . Main-
taining su pplies was a co nti nual pro blem
dcsptte employing such innovative uses of
transport as the 'Red Ball Express' which intro-
duced a one-.....ay loop system bet ween St-Lo
and Chartres, with eve ry available truck
running non-stop day and night . For example,
from 25 to 29 August 1944, just under 6,000
trucks delivere d 12,500 tons of supplies. The
ideal so lution would be the ca pt ure o f
Antwerp, '>0 instead of going all the way with
t he ' n a rrow front' proposal . Eisenhower
allowed Bnt i vh Second Army a major sha re of
t he nard-pressed fuel supplies at the expe nse
of US First and Third Armi es , so that they
co ul d ma ke a swift advance on t he lett fla nk,
enabling them to dest roy t he l' nl' my in nor th-
eastern Prance . clear the v-bomb sill'S in the
I'av-de-Ca lats. ca pt ure airfields in Belgium and.
most important ly. capt ure and open the po rt
of Antwerp.
\\h ' k 13: 29 Augus t-4 Sept ember 1944
w eek 13 began as WCl'''- 12 had ended with
mnre Allied pfOKre,>s eas twards, US VII Cor ps.
for exa mple, taking Sotssons and crossing the
Aisne. Farther eas t US Th ird Army units took
Rht' ims and Cha fons-su r-Mame. Although
fur t her prog rt'Ss would be made lor a few more
days. t he grave shortage of fuel was now begi n-
n ing to affect ope rations , av was t he argument
between t he wntor commanders. explained
already, on how best to proceed with the
82
ove ral l st rategic batik. Om' can imagi ne
General Patton's feelings, for exa mple, whe n
he real ised that his fue l suppttes would be
endange red by suc h a plan! The debate would
cont in ue , wit h Eisenhower endeavouring to
maintai n harmony between the Allies , which
inevitably res ul ted i n hi s leani ng more
towards the Briti sh . On ]O August . 12th Army
Gro up Informed US Third Army that t her e
would Ill' no mor e fuel available unti l :i
Above: 'Kamerad" TIlls
unkempt German soldier
with his ad hoc white
flag. was in f ~ a
medical corpsman. one
of a group picked up by
passIng tank colu mn.
Wit h other med ics he
was trying to help some
wounded comrades.
(IWM - EA 4877447)
FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE
Abowe: Back to Sr-
VW'y. In 1940. Sc-Valery
..... ,J;Sthe scene of a
V,lj,ant rearguard action
bytheSin Highland
l),V1s,on who were even-
wally forced to
surrender, Now the
tables are turned as IS2
Bde of the division liber
rles the [own. Here Maj
Gen G T. Rennie. OSO,
OBE. the GOe, lights
M pope andwatches hIS
so!dieoenter St-Valery.
(1V'IM- 8U 1518)
Right: A good jcb done,
I medic of 5 Ist Highland
0Msi0nrepacks hiS first
ad ~ k before
ITlOWl& on. (IWM - B
"""
83
FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE
TOcrn

Ltft: En route for Brus-
IeIl. l Septembe r 19<H,
Bnosh tanks moving
lirough AiltOing pass
ltlder a welcoming
bnlef. (IWM BU 392)
Below: Same VIllagebut
............ "'"
...... snenn.n.
Arcolng. 3 September
19+1. (IWM- BU 382)
- ..,.,.., troops
~ Brussels. Crowds
"""'" wekome
!I'ft' libemors - these
solcIoers wereespecially
welcome as they were
8eIpn. (IWM 8U 579)
Sept ember, By the end of August Pillion had
armoured spearheads in Verdun - where t hey
established a bridge-head across the MetISI.', at
Eix and St-Mlhtcl. His ord ers to his troops were
to co nt inue advanc ing no matter wha t
happened - at the lowest level one ta nk would
d rain fuel from the rest of th e plat oo n and
keep the ad vance going. When the fuel finally
ran out th ey would cont inue o n foot! By :i
September. US XII Cor ps ha d consolidated its
pos utons east of the Meuse. XV Corps were
conce ntrated in the vici nity of Nangis, and XX
Corps had secured the Verdu n bridge-head
and pushed pa t rols fart her east towards
Germany; far away. on the nort h-west coast of
France . USVIII Corps was cont inu ing its attack
on th e stu bbo rn German garrison at Brevt. To
their north, US First Army advanced to t he
general line Namur-Tirlemont, taking some
FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE
25, IXXI pncouers in a pocket centred on th e
For et de Com ptegne.
ln 2 1\t Army Group's sector, Oil 29 August,
11th Armd Div, reinforced by Sth Armd Bde,
hurst out of XXX Cor ps' bridge-head over the
Sctnv on two main axes. Amtens was reached
on t he :H st and a bridge-head across th e
Somme secured. Just outside th e town Gen eral
Hctnr tch Rberba ch, who had taken over
co mmand of Germa n Seventh Army when
Gene ral t'aut Hausser was wounded, was
captured with his Tactical IIQ. The advance
from XII Corps' bridge-head ha d begun on 30
August . th eir armour movin g some 25 miles a
day, and by midday on I Septe mber the)' had
secured a crossi ng over the Somme at Ila ngest,
midway bet ween Amtens and Abbevi lle. The
rapid advances continued ; on 2 September
Guards Armd Div captured Do uai and Tournai,
85
Above : Montgomery in
Louvain. Monty talks
with a crowd of civilians,
who surrounded his car
outside the Town Hall.
Louvain, some 20 miles
beyOfld Brussels, was
captured by the British
in September 19..... Four
years earlier when
Monty had been
commanding 3rd Inf OIV,
it had been the frontline
fOf" his division in their
att empt to nail the
German 'Blitzkrieg' -
now the situatIOn was
very different! (IWM B
9976 )
l eft: Tired infantrymen
of the KSLI catch a f_
minutes rest by the SIde
of a 3 RTRSherman
after another <byof
battle on the road to
Ghent. September 1944
(Tank Museum)
Above: Maj Gen Vemey. GOC 7th Armd Div, arriving at Ghent Town Hall. a
)eptember 1944. after its liberation by his division. (IWM. au 771)
Btlow: Infantry of 9S Inf Div. US Thir d Army. cross a railway line below a bullet-
pocked bridge support on their way towards the Mose lle nea r Men, a
September 1941. The leading GI is carrying a .30 Browning machine gun. (US
~ via Real War Photos - A 760)
FROM THE SEI NE TO THE RHINE
and I t th Armd Div reached the outskirts of
l .llh- , wh ich th ey by-passed, while 7th Armd
Il iv on the left , reac hed St-I'ol and crossed t he
netuune-Lmers road . The next targets for th e
fast-movin g ar moured columns woul d be: for
Guards Armd - Brussels; for 11th Armd Div -
Ant wer p: for 7t h Annd Drv - Ghen t. In the
l'ar ly hours of 3 September, Guards Annd Dtv
crOSSl'U l il t.' sclgtan fronti er and by ni ghtfall
had reached the capital . its recce units fanning
o ut around the city to cont rol all main
approaches. Strong resistance briefly delayed
II til Armd Div between Tourna i and Lille, but
they reach Alost th at eveni ng. Co nsiderably
mort' re..tstance was encountered o n XII
Cor ps ' front, the enemy having moved two
fnosh divisions in to reinforce the Channel
ports. :'-: everthelt.'ss, while 53r d Inf Div and -tth
Armd Bdc dealt with th ese for mations, 7t h
Armd l nv swung east around Lille and headed
swift ly for Ghent .
On ~ September l Ith Armd Div entered
Antwe rp and quicklj- dtsposcd of the garrison
save in the dock areas to the north, whi ch took
87
FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE
some days to clear. The docks were secured
Virtually intact. Bntt sh Second Army had good
reason 10 be pleased with their achievements
thai week. They had advanced some 250 mil es
in six days, the armo ur leading, while behind
th em t he infantry di visions, supported by
armoured brigades, had taken over th e ground
and mopped-up any st rong points still hold ing
out. The Allied front now ran from th e mou th
of th e Somme in t he north, 10 Troves in th e
sout h. foll owing t he line: t.tue-uru ssets-

W('ek 14: 5- 11 Septe mbe r 1944
On 5 Sept ember a ma jor German command
change too k place, F\l von Rund stedt being
reinstated as DB west . He was charged with
ho lding th e Allied advance whi le complcnng a
new ' West Wall ' on th e line Albert Canal- River
xteuse- Upper \foselle, a tall orde r give n that
by the time he took over th e Allies already had
bridge-heads across ho th the Alhert Canal and
th e Meuse! Thi s was yet again, an exampl e, if
one were needed, of Hitler's lack of up-to-da te
knowledge of th e true situation. Von Rund-
stedt told hi s Fuhrer that he would need at
least six weeks to prepa re ti ll' West Wall and
asked for all ava ilable armour to reinforce his
har d-pressed fro nt-li ne troops. Ama zingly,
Hit ler agreed, and alt ho ugh nowhere near as
many tanks were available as were needed (t he
Allies st ill outnumbering th em by 20 to I ),
sufficient were prod uced 10 enable him to
stabilise the front by mtd-Septcmber.
The Allied adva nce had once again started
in earnest with success all along the front lim' .
In the nor th un its of Ca n II Corps advanced
rapidly nort h of t he Som me: Polish Armd Div
crossed th e canal at St-Oni er on 6 September,
whil e nearer the coast, Ca n J rd Inf Div closed
up to th e ports of Bculog ne and Calais whe re
it soon became clear t hat th e enemy garrisons
would not surrende r wit hout a fight. Can 2nd
Inf Dtv, whi ch was followin g up, passed
th rough and closed on Dunkirk whe re a
similar sit ua tion obtained. Stro ng det ach -
mc nts pushed on, reachi ng Nieuport and
Ost cn d on 9 September. Canadian 4th M Old
Below: Antwerp dUring
its liberat ion. A nurseof
the Belgian Under -
ground Army twKb:ges J
wouoded BrItish soldier
in the front 1II'Ie oeM
Antwerp doc ks. II
Septembet' I ffi. She
was by dlt
Gennans fOl' 1
1
/2 yeAn
fOl' underground act ivi-
ties. (IWM BU 833)
a
Below: GIs moving
:!rough the I'\IbbIe of
f\orId.-cy in the Brest
......... They pan
dose bya KOed enemy
Iri; - a PzKpfw IVAusf
H. I'1tn of this model
wn produced than Any
eee- Mk IV (USArmy
l'IllWI War Photos A
}161)
Div th en came up on th e left of the Poles,
sccun ng a crossing over the Ghent-Bruges
canal sout h-east of Bruges. Mopping-up in th e
town and surround ing area t hen took place.
The Pol ish Armd Div then moved into the
Ghe nt area to relieve XII G nps.
Late on 10 september Bn rtsh I Corps began
its attack on Le Havre after a heavy bombard-
mcnt from sea and ai r (5,000 tons of bombs
were d ropped in the 90 minutes before H
HOUr). The defences were penetrated by 49th
and Sf st Jot Divs , but the port was not
captured until 1145 hrs on the 12t h; 12,noo
pnsonerv were taken. It is said that Le Havre
was one of the strongest fort resses on the
Atlantic Wall.
Brithh Second Army's intention was 10
advance with XXX Corps leading, XII Corps
protecting its left flan k and US First Army on
its nght. As a first stage in the advance on the
Rhine, XXX Corps planned to get 11t h Armd
tuv into the area Tumhout-TIlburg and (ids
Armd Iuv int o the Eindhoven area. This
meant crossing numerous water obstacles,
FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE
Incl udi ng bot h the Albe rt Ca nal and the
tcu sc-rs caut Ca na l. Reece reported th at all
bridges were blown, hut on 8 September Gds
Armd crossed t he Albert canal at Beertngen
and established a bridge-head there despite
conside rable opposition. The advance now
tu rned no rt h-eastwa rds, ai med at t he De Groot
bridge over the Esceut canal near Neerpelt. By
last light, 50th lnf Dtv had secured a small
bridge-head over the canal to the SW of Ght'C1.
After gradually extendi ng the bridge-heads.
Gds Armd broke through, then reached and
captured the De Groot bridge on the 10th,
extending the tntdge-head the following day.
The etrccts of the arrival of Ger man reinforce-
ments was now being felt, with the enemy, as
vtontgomery puts it: .... developing more spirit
against our bridge-heads over the Escaut
Canal, and had clearly received reinforcements
of better calibre.'
South of British Secon d Army, Hod ge's US
First Army pushed towards Liege with US VII
Corps and crossed the Meuse at Sedan. On II
September patrols crossed the Germa n bor der
FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE
near Aachen, creating pamc a mong the ci vil-
tans, but the actton was not followed up ,
Patton 's US Th ird Army 10, 1 VII Corp'
which was transferred to US Ni nt h Army
(Gen eral Simpson] whic h was now preparing
for action, bUI 83rd Inf and 6th Armd Din
we re transferred to XV Corps, thus remaining
as ' Georgie's Boys' , XX Corps was ordered 10
setze Met z, advance cast of the ~ l o \ l ' l I e , seize
Mai nz and secure a bridge-head across t he
Rhin e. XII Corp' was to seize Nancy and
sec ure a budge-head over t he Mose lle .
protecting the southern flank unti l relieved by
XV Corps , Th ey were also told to be ready to
move SWiftly to take xtannherm and seize a
Rhine bridge-head. Fuel supplies co ntin ued to
improve (011 7 September, for the first l ime in
several days, more fue l was available t han was
rcqot redu, but a new crts!s loomed - .1 severe
shor tage of arti llery ammunition . hut this was
fortunately all eviated by the end of the week
for all calibres exce pt 105mm howitzer .
week 15: 12-1 KSept ember 19-1-1
(Sl,'t' Ch apter 6 for Opc ruuon ' Market Ga rden '
- t he Amhem operation whi c h began on 17
Septembe r and ended o n 26 Sept embc r.)
In mid-September Ca n First Army was
comma nding Brit ish I Corps, wh ich was
reue vrng Briti sh XII Corps in the Ant werp area,
and Ca n II Corps which was opera t i ng in the
coastal belt . The intention was for Brit ish I
Corps to advance north across the Antwerp-
Iurnhout Ca na l, while Can II Corps cleared the
area to the w("S1 of the port and up 10 th e
..outbem shores of me Scheidt c..luary. AI the
same time the Ca na dians invested Dunkirk an d
stormed Ih l' garr isons of Boulognc and Calais.
Wit hi n these three ports we re some :lO,OO(j
troops who had been left behind 10 hold them
as fort resses . Boul ogne had a garrison of more
Ihan 9,000 men, with e xt re mely st rong
defences along the high ground which formed
a crescent around the port ; the ma in features
had been ma de into indiv idua l strongpctnts.
wit h concrete bunkers. wire and mt neftelds.
The assa ult was delayed by bad weather and
Ihis meant that SOffit' K,(MJ(} civilians could he
evacu ated before Ca n .lrd Inf Div launched its
attack, on 17 Sept ember, with two brigades .
heavi ly supported by artillery and from the air.
It took six days to rapture all the Isol ated
st ro ngpo ints . Coastal ar ti llery in England
hel ped in the assault - on 17 September the
Below: Trucks of the US
First Ivrny crossmg the
Albert Canal via ~
pont oon treadway
bridge near Maastricht.
12Septembe r 1944.
(Tank Museum)
FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE

.... .
;-t: :
"; '
Above: Closing in on
ilrest. Troopsof US
Third Army set up their
S7mm MI anti-tank gun
on tileoutskirts of
jeccvrance. on the way
toBrest, the second
largest naval port in
Frante. The MI was a
topyof the Brit ish 6pdr
i/Ili-u,nk gun. (IWM - EA

Right: Dramatic pict ure
ofl M18Hellcat f,ring
ItS 76mmgun at point -
blank int o a
dunrog street:
fighong in Brest. The
HtIcat was fIOfTllally a
lri. destroyer; bowevee;
a .-mout"-pten:.I"i
00 doubt
mide a hell of a mes s of
thepillbox! (IWM EA
171136}
/
Left: Men of 1-.1 st Inf
Regt, 36th Inf Div, US
Seventh Army, slog
through the rain into
Luxeuil, 17 September
19 . (US Army via Real
War Pbotcs . A 3203)
Below: Gis of F
Company. 2nd an t-4 lsc
Inf Regt. 36th Inf o.v.
ride on the back of a
tank and a half-track
towards their objectNot
near Soultz. 18
September 1944 . Note
the Browmng .50 aI
he<lvy machine gun on I
sk,ate-rlng mount and
the attentive gunner
watching the skies (ishe
- like Rommel --...
Brit ish anti-gas goggles').
(US Army via Real W
i
Sout h for eland Battery near Dover scored a
direct hit on a battery near Ca lais, at a remar k-
ahle range of 42,000 yards!
On the 12th the German garr ison of Lc
Havre surrende red as has been men tioned . On
t he 15th Briti..h Second Army secured a second
cro.....tng-potnt over the vt euse-Escaut Canal.
To the south, mo re units of US Fir'>! Army
reached the German border between Aachen
and Trier on the 12th, and took Maast richt
and Etsdcn on the 15th. In US Third Army's
area , both XII and XX Corps were fighting to
maintain their bridge-heads over the \{osellt',
with XII Corps enlarging and expanding theirs
north and south of Nancy, while XX Corps on
thctr left , pushed infantry aero.... north of
Bayon. In me south XV Corps' infantry
reached xeutcnareau. xn recoun and Charmcs.
There were still some fuel shortages, but with
PI.UTO reaching Chartres these would soon be
obviated. XV Corps continued to push east-
wards, 79th tnt Div reac hing Ramecourt on
the ].Ith, while French 2nd Armd Dtv took
xtatralncourt and made contact with elements
FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE
of US Sevent h Army adva ncing from th e
Medit er run can. There we re heavy ene my
counter-attacks against 80th tn t Dtv's bridge-
head over the Moselle, but they were dealt
wit h on the 15th. On t he 17t h XV Corps was
o rdered to take xta nnnetm and secure a
bridge-head over the Rhine. On the same day
XX Corps launched a co-ordinated attack on
the heavily fortified city of xtetz. with 5th Inf
Dtv assaulting from the south and 90th lnf Div
hom th e west. XV Corps' attack began on the
HUh, 79th Inf Div crossmg the Moselle ncar
Rayon and advancing to Gerbe\iller.
Wee k 16: 19- 25 September 19-1--1-
On the 19th back in Brittany, the German
garrison of Brest finally surrendered to US VII
Corps 8th Inf Div. Taken prisoner with 12,(X)(l
others wa s the redoubtable paratroop
commander Major General Her mann Ramcke,
who had famously commanded t he Ramckc
Para Me in North Africa. Hitler had ordered
t hat the Diamond.. to his Knight 's Cro.... be
parachuted into the beleaguered port. In 21st
Right: American engi-
neenat work in
GenTw1y enabling the
.&merican columns t o by-
~ a mined road by
r<1OI to the fields on
eeedge of the Siegfried
tr.edelences. 19
September 1944, The
~ tr acked vehicle
with the crane is a Tank
flovery Vehicle T2
(H11). an adaptation of
ee M) medium Gra nt
trl;. (US Army)
93
II
II
I
I
FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE
Army Group's ar ea . 10 t he west of XXX Corps'
adva nce towa rds Arnhcm twc Ch apt er 6).
Canadia n un its cros sed t he Escaut Ca nal and
began tbctr offensive to clear the north bank
of t he Scheidt est ua ry so as to open up t he
vital port of Antwerp to the sea . Ge neral Eisen -
hower had Kj..:l' ll top pri ori t y to t hese ojX'ra-
nons.. On the Z2nd. also in Can fi rst Army's
sect or , Boul ogne surre ndered 10 Ca n II Corps'
3Td Inf Div (9,5 35 prisoners), while by the
24l h Can I Corps ' 2nd luf Div ha d establishe d
a hridge-h ca d o VN t he An twerp-Iumhout
ca nal. On the 25t h, :\rd lnf Div attacked t he
defences of Calais after an intensive arti llery
bombardmen t. The 1' 11l' my posit ions here Wl' re
similar to those at Le Havre and Boulogne. and
there were addit ional bat teries at Cap Gns-Xez
and Sangane.
Above: Asection of
men or the King' s Own
Sccttrsh Borderen of 3rd
lnf Div move on to new
territ ory on 19
September 1 9 ~ - they
are clearly expealllg to
do some d,gglllgI n ,
(IWM B 10120,
Left: Brest apfured.
Some 35.000 enemy
surTer'ldered in Brest on
20 September 19+t, ThIs
group. wa,t lllgto be
taken off for interroga-
tion and POW camp.
incl udes both Army
(Heer) and Navy (Kriegs-
rrnJ(ine) offrcers. 23
Sept ember 1 9 ~ (IWM
KY ~ B 3 5 9 6 )
right : Always
CJll! more river to cross!
tnt vehicles over this
-'Ycoostl'\lCted bridge
iC'OSS the RIverVire
btlonged to 35th Inf DIY
clUS ThIrd Army, (US
!tm'f 'o'Q ReaJ War
Photo!. - A 3162)
p
-
",'
,
r
,

....
,
- . ..

-
z:

' .
StIow: Agood initiative
tor Shermans of the US
rth Tank BattaliOn, ..th
.lrmored DivisiOn,
indIng crouing over
theSIlted-UP, but still
...,.,. muddy and treach-
erous. National Canal
1'IW Bayon, 20
September 19..... (US
Am>y)
In US Thi rd Army's sector XX Corps
conti nued to pound St et z bu t made littl e
progress. On the 2"th leading pat rol s were
probing the outer defences of the Siegfried
Line, but wer e mel with st rong resistance from
pillboxes and ot he r fortifications . There was
extcnstvc flooding in all sectors other than to
l il t' west of the ci t y.
Wt'e'" 17: 26 Septc m bcr-z Ocrohcr 19....
US Hrvt Anny be gan a new offensive
tI ll' Stcgfr tcd Line between Aac hen and
ncttcnktrchcn 10 t he north.
In US Third Army's sector the assault on
!l.ll'tz conti nued all week, heavy a rtillery fire
be ing directed o n the fort s (t wo casements and
an ammuni tion d ump wer e bl own up in Fort
j eanne d 'Arc but it d id not fall ). On the 27 t h
XX Corps put in a major att ack on Fort Driant
hut was forced to wit hd raw. At Ihe end of t he
wee k, on 2 October. XX Co rps, suppo rted by
XIX Tactical Air Comma nd, launched a heavy
and ai r attack on Fort Drtant on the
west bank of the Mosell e, hut sti ll encounte red
heavy resi stance when they entered the fort
next day. Heavy fin' was abo directed on Forts
....,.
..,
Jeanne d'Arc and Ver dun, al so Battenes
Moselle a nd Manvatl. but despite cont inual
bomba rd me nt, the y all held out. Fuel
rati onin g had to be re-in st ituted as supplies
were down to 50 per cent, which ham pered all
Third Army's advances.
Th e Ca nadians had more success wit h the
capture of till' Chan nel ports, the citadel .11
Ca lais falling on t he 2Hlh and t he town bei ng
entered on the same day. An armistice was then
gra n ted t o all o w (or the evacuation o f civili ans,
the attack not resummg until midday on the
]()t h. By 1.1'01 light all organised opposition had
ceased, some 10,000 prtsoners having been
ta ken during the attacks. Th is would he the last
of the ' for tress' ports to he cleared. Dun kirk
would merely be ' bot t led up' and would remain
so for the remainder of the war, becoming the
last French town to be liberat ed. The respons t-
hility for Dunkirk would be handed over to the
Czech Independent Armoured Brigade, thus
leavi ng the Ca nadians free to concent rate on
clearin g the Scheidt whi ch Montgomery
ordered General Crera r to accomplish ,., wit h
all possible speed'. An account of t his ope rati on
is given in a lat er chapter.
Wttk I R: 3-9 October 19H
British Seco nd Army ope rat ions towa rds the
end of September we re designedto widen and
Above le ft : Crossing
the Moselle River, 20
September 194<4.
Infantry plus a jeep widl
a trai ler bden with
ammunitiOn boxes,
crossing a pontoon
bridge over the river.
(USAnnyI
96
Left: A Sherman
belonging to 3 RTRof
I I th Armd Div moves
up to the frondine, 26
Sept ember 19+4. The
5igns on the front of the
Sherman are : ' 52' - IM'IIt
serial number, the ttne
armd regts in the annd
bde were numbered 51,
S2 and 53; the 'triangle'
with a ' 3' inside shows
belongs to 3 TP of 'A'
Sqn : the running buI
(black 00 a yellow bad
ground ) was the divi-
sional sign of I I th Arml
DiY. (Tank Museum)
Above: US Third /4nny
completing a
pontoon bridge across
The Model
C66 mobile crane which
5 Hung one of the
pontoons could lift up to
S5001b 00 its full 25ft
utension ilIlCl 13,OOOlb
onIts shorter IOft
radius. (IWM EA
SB281 )
Above right: Troops of
US Third Army wading
x ross a stream in the
Moselle River valley,
whilst a medical jeep,
carrying stretcher cases.
makes its way back to
tileother bank. (IWM-
EA ]8139)

strengthen the Nijmegen salient, in prepa ra-

tion for the coming battle of the Rhineland,
which Montgo mery hoped to start on about
10 October. l ie t herefore Issued ins t ruct ions to
regroup, hut towards t he end of the first wee k
of October it became very dear that any such
assault would have to be delayed in view of
other commi tmen ts. The st rength of counte r-
attacks around the Nijmege n bridge-head area
showed the need for co nsi de rable reinforce-
rn ent the re, to make certain it was held. 011
the First Ca nadian Army Front there was
cons iderable st iffening of en emy rcststa nce - it
was estimated, for example, t ha t th ere wen'
some 20 enemy divisions/st rong battlegroups,
includ ing four pa nzer d ivisions in till' area
from Roer mond to Breske ns. In addition, the
nature of the country, cris s-crowed by water
obstacles. favoured the defence, \0 Mont -
gomer y relu ctantly had to IJOSIPOlll' his ottcu-
stvc and conce n trate on Call First Army's
en deavour to dear t he Sche idt , while Briti sh
Second Army deal t with th e enemy bridge-
head west of t he Meuse.
US First Army cont inued its attacks north of
Aachen and had some success in breaking
t hrough th e Siegfr ied Line in some areas.
In US Th ird Army's sect or Metz was still
betng pounded, but it was clear th at th e
enemy was determi ned to hold out as tong as
Illl..sihle, Elsewhere, Patton's t roops had more
..access. XII Corps en largi ng their bridge-head
by attacking to the north-east , capturing
Fowtcux (35th Inf Iliv), Motvrons (6th Annd
Il iv) and l Jxt eres (HOth Inf Iliv).
19: 10--16 October 194-1
In Briti sh Second Army'.. sector. VIII Corps had
been o rde red to assault from Boxmeer towards
Venrai j, wit h US 7t h Armd Div (u nder
comma nd) making an att ack from Deurne.
Th en l lth Armd Div would pa ss th rou gh and
make for Ven lo, wh ile anot her attack wo uld be
made towards th e Maas, to ca pt ure Rocrmo nd .
Th is operat ion was planned to start on 12
October, and, desp ite dogged resist an ce,
Vl'nraij was taken all the 17t h, but operations
were then concluded for a time.
In US First Army 's sector, attacks around
A'Khl' n conti nued to make ground; t he d ty's
garriso n commander declined an invitation to
su rrender and house-to-h ouse fighting
co nt inued amid th e ruins.
On US Thi rd Army's front , 6th Armd Iu v
cleared Cheutcourt and pushed o n to Aulnols-
su r-Seine. At Metz, Task Force Warnock
(Brigadier Alva C. Warnock), took over from
Tavk Force Drlant and assaults cont inued on
the tu n nels and for ts, but without success. On
9-10 Octobe r 90th Inf Div was engaged in
fierce house-to-house figh ting in Maiztc res-les-
Met z. During th is wee k 12t h Army Group d ras-
tica lly reduced the issue of field arti llery
ammunit ion by 95 per cent (from 12 October
to 7 November), so that the troops had to
make do with tanks, TDs, AA guns and even
97
capt ured enemy weapons . Cons ide rable
l'nemy troop movements wert' noted in XII
Corps' area. and heavy rail and road move-
me n t was also ob served in XX Corps sector. US
Thi rd Army was virt ua lly on th e defensive as
req uired by 12t h Army Group. Bad weat her
put a stop to ai r acti vit y, and lack of fuel
prevent ed ground movement (Th ird Army
asked for :n o,OO() ga llons plus of POL on 16
October - a nd received nant'!).
In me far sout h, in Ge ne ral Devers' 6t h
Army Group, French Hrst Army's Srd Algerian
Div reached Corn imont by the end of the
week, then, accompanied by French l st Armd
Div, launched an attack in the Vosges. In US
Seventh Army's sect or. VI Corps units began to
move from the norm-west sout hwa rds,
towards Bruyer es, but wer e heavil y engaged
when they reached there.
.'111m"",'}'. Ene my resistance was clearly hard-
en ing eve rywhere and the Atues had much to
do to consondatc their curre n t positions - in
98
the Scheldt estuary and at Metz for exa mple -
so by mid-October t he Allied drive to the
Rhi ne had virtually come to a halt. Th e nnush
and Canadians were futt y occupied in t he
north; in the central sectors US First and Third
Ar rntes were fi/o\ hti llg ha rd alo ng t he Siegf ried
Line fr om Aachen down to Trier and south-
wards in to th e area of the sout he rn Moselle. To
t heir sout h, US 6t h Army Group was now
de ployed on t he right of US 12th Army Group,
so tha t the a rea of operations continued right
down to t he Swiss frontier. At a conference in
Brussels on 18 Octobe r. Eisenhower reiter a ted
his plans: 21st Army Group must concent rat e
on the opening up of Antwerp. Hriti sh Seco nd
Army was then to advance south-eastwa rds
between the Meuse and the Rhine, on or ahout
10 Nove mber, in suppo rt of US HT'St Arm y
which would attempt to cross the Rhine in the
Cologne area (planned for 1- 5 November).
Their right flank would be protected by US
Ninth Army, which would then advance and
assist in capturing the Ruhr.
Above : Gen Mant on
Eddy. CG XII Corps.
uses the bonnet 01a
Jeep as a map table .
whilst he briefs three of
his commanders. Left to
right they are : Brig Gen
Holmes Dage r (Cdr
CCB), Maj Gen Wi(lard
S. Paul (CG 26 Inl Div),
Maj Gen 'Tiger Jack'
Wood (CG 4th Armd
Drv]. MAj Gen Manton
Eddy. and an unidefltJl'oed
cotonel of 4th Armd.
(US Army via Panon
Museum)
Bftow: us 101 St
A.rtlome 0Msi0n . TheIr
...
and defiles on
the Bntrsh XXXCorps
lll$ berNeen Grave and
Etllhoven. They were
soon esublished at Son
nI secured the Veghel
bndge intaCt. The
phoCograph men
ofthe 10Ist JUSt after
In:hng as they diSperse
to thelr obrectrves. The
!HP was brought in by
gIidef. (USArmy via Real
WPhotos A 3768)
Taki nK a Ga mble
Des pite determination to fini ..h
the war as quickly as possible and he nce hi ..
support for the narrow front approach. he wa..
still ba ..ically a cautious commander, not given
to rash dectstons, preferring to have 'belt and
braces' - as his refusal to attack Rommel in
North Africa until his forces were completely
ready, dearly indicated. So his Amhem gamble
was totally uncha racteristic Yet it was an
extremely bo ld stroke whu-h, had it succeeded,
would undoubtedly haw considerably short-
enco the war.
Having liberated Belgium. xtontgomcry's
21st Army Group now faced no fewer than five
water obstacles which could be crossed at: the
Neder Ri jn at Amnern. the waal at Nijmegen,
the Maas at Grave and the two main t ransver se
canals runnin g be tween Grave a nd ur tu sn
second Army's bridge- he ads over t he Es cau t
Canal (t he wtjhetmtna Ca nal, north of f-ind-
6
Arnhem
hoven; the Zuid \Villemsvaart which ran
pa rallel to the River xtaas , linking t he towns of
Helmond and 's Hertogen boscn). There were
road and railway bridges at both Amhem and
:\ijml'!o:en and a road bridge at Grave. all of
which were still intact . The plan was to lay a
corridor of airborne troops (three airborne
divisions _ two US and one British. plus the
I'oli ..h Parachute Brigade, all flown out from
EnglandI across the waterways. taking the
bndgcs at veghel, Grave, Ntjmegen and
Amhem: then for British Second Anny to
advance along the corridor, with General
Horrocks' XXX Corps leading.
TIlt" n c tatlcd I' lan
Ai,lJoml ' Allocatio n of I Airborne Corps'
tar gets wav as follows.
Anthem bridge;
1 Hrtt tsh Ab t uv, wil h Polish Pa ra Bde under
command (52 Airportable lu v was to be
.
flown in north of Arnhem as soon as
ai rst rips could be made ava ilable, to
strengt hen the hridge- he ad j
Nijmegen a nd Grave bridges, plus high ground
between Goe sbcck and Nijmcgen:
US H2nd Ail Div
The bri dges and defiles on Hrit ish XXX Corps '
ax is between Grave a nd Eindhoven:
US 10 Ist Ab Div
It would be tmposs tble to fl y in t he entire
Airborne Corps in ouc lift , because there
weren 't enough t rans port aircraft ; in fact it
would take four days to fly in everyt h ing that
was required. Tilt' air lift prog ramme was
sched uled as:
n a y I : 17 Septembe r
US 82nd and IOIsI Ab Din would each d rop
three pa rachute Regimental Combat Teams
(Reh)
100
British rst Ah Dtv would drop a pa ra bd e, and
land t wo-thirds of t he air- landi ng brigadl'
nay 2:
Furt her clement s of US xz nd and t ut st Ab
t nvs and remainder of IIr t st AI> l j tv
Da y 3:
Remainder of US 82nd and lOlst Ail Divs
Polish Para I\de
(irmlll ,1 r m ( l p , ~ , The Intention was that Briti sh
XXX Corps' adva nce would be co-ordinated
wi th t he airborne d ro ps so as to ga in
maximum surpnse and d islocation. They
would thrust northwa rds as Iast as possibl e
from t he Meu..e-rscaut Ca nal bridge-head
along the airborne corridor to secure t he area
Amhem-xunspcot . the advance being "pear-
headed by Gds Armd Inv, whilst 43rd and
50th Inf Divs foll owed up. Should any of the
bridges be destroyed the armour was to fan out
Above : US 101st
Ai rborne Division. Pan
of the crew of a glider
pose beside the ir craft
before take-off froman
aerodrome in UK. There
were various models of
the Waco glider; for
example. the CG 4A
cou ld carry IS fully
armed and equipped
men; the CG lOA
double that number;
whilst the I] Acould
manage a jeep and gun
crew or ] 0 men. (US
Army via Real War
Photos - A ] 7M)
Above: US 82nd
Atbome Division. Their
obtectives were [he
bridges at Nijmegen and
Gm-e. Here some
ghder-borne trccps
orientate themselves
before moving off fr om
thelanding l one. (IWM
EA 37782).
along the river ban k and, assisted by the
alrbc m e t roop", cover bridgi ng o pcrattonv
wh ich were to be carr ied out by 43r d Inf Di v,
Thi .. dlvi..ion was al so gtven the ul timat e ta..k
of wrurtng t he area fro m Apeldoorn sout h to
po ints of contact wi t h Is t Ab Iuv and to secure
cross ings over th e River Ijsscl at Dcvcnt cr and
z ct phcn. The Corps reserve would con..ist o f
50t h In f Drv wh ic-h woul d ult ima tely Ol T Upy
t he hi gh ground north of Arnhem, pu..lung
element s eastwa rd.. to secure a crossi ng over
the Ijssel at Doc sburg. The task of ope n ing the
main road axis to the north was allotted to the
two US Ab Dtvs: 8t h Annd Bde would join
IOht Ab Div and assist in holdin g the corridor
through Eindhoven, Veghel and Grave.
The Hartt e: 17- 26 Septe mber 1944
The morn in g of t he 17th dawned fair and
generally favourable for airborne operations.
Th e aircraft converged on t he dropping and
landing zones at 1300 hrs as planned. Surpr ise
was generally achieved and enemy opposition
ARNHEM
was light. Parat roo p" of US IOIst Ab luv we re
soon estabn ..hed at Son , between Eindhoven
and St-Oco en rode. They secured t he br idge at
Vt.'gh{'l Intact . but that over th e Wilhel mina
Ca na l was hlown as t hey approa ched. US82 nd
Ab Dlv also lan ded accor ding to plan, ..ctzcd
ti ll' brtdge over the Maas at Grave intact and,
late r, secu red t he t wo bridges over the
Maas- waal Ca na l between Grave a nd
Nijlllegl' n. They failed to msh t he Numcgcn
bridge but repor ted t hat it was sti ll intact . Their
main problem wa.. co nt act ing Briti sh t st Ab
Div at Ant he m who, it seemed, were holding
thv nort hern end of t he bridge, and air rt'CIT
showed that ~ I i d e r s had landed in its Vicinit y.
Briti sh XXX Corps ordered Gds Armd Dtv to
ht'gin thei r advance at 1-l2S hrs. It was covered
by a ro lling barrage and moved ast ride the
Eindhoven road, in conjunction with a 'cab
rank' of rocket -firin g Typhoons on call .
However, st ro ng opposition was encountered
almost Immediately and only some six mi les
was achieved on the first day. It soon became
101
ARNHEM
-
-
l e ft : The Nilmege n
bridge was not captured
until 20 September. then
by a ;oint artack by US
paratrooper-s and XXX
Corps. Here, one of the
wounded Genn>n
oereooees awaits medd
auemion on the bndgt
roadway. (IWM 38561)
Betow: AJhed unks roI
~ " ' o e w l y
captured Nijmegen
bridge, on their ~ y
towards 'the bndge too
far ' at Amhe m. (M'M -
EA+453 I)
Right: Maj Gen
Mitthew Bunker
R d g w ~ y , then CGof
XVIII AIrborne Corps,
tJblg with Maj Gen
Jone$ H. Canin, CG
82nd Ab Div, It is easy to
lee why Ridgway was
k.oown as 'Old Iron Tits' !
(US Armyvia Real War
PhotCl5 AS 201] )
clear that more infantry WNe needed, so a
brigade fro m 50t h Inf Div was brought forward
and the adva nce continued at first light on t he
18t h. The armoured spearhea d brushed astde
ene my opposition at Aatst , hut could not break
into Eind hoven, which was strongly defended.
The tanks then t ried to bypass to the east , but
were again held up by strong enemy positions.
t he bridges to t he west of the town were not
strong enough to take tanks, but armoured
cars d id get acrow and I1Mde contact wit h
l u t st Ah Div to till' north -west of Eindhoven,
who reported that th e Son bridge had bee n
blown. The assault on th e town conti nued
from all sides and eventually, at about 1700
h rs. the Guards broke through. Bridging work
at Son was i mmediately put in hand, wh ile
Sut b Inf Iuv mopped -up and secu red th e De
Groot bridge. Atte r an ene my counter-attack
had been held, the responsibility for th is
br idge-head was transferred to VIII Corps who
took over command of 50th tn t Div,
ARNHEH
To t he north of Eindhoven, US lOht Ab Div
st rengthened it s grip on the vi ta l points along
the axis all the way up to th e Grave bridge,
while 82nd Ab Il iv co nti nued its unsuccessful
att empt to reach th e Ntt mc gcn bridge. At
ahout th is time the ene my laun ch ed the fir..t
of a senes of coun ter-attacks from t he d irec-
lion of th e Rei chswald Forest , which initially
reac hed one of the landing zones before being
repulsed . ' .... hile th is was ta king place, a glide r
lift of retutorccmcn ts lan ded, having been
del ayed some four hour s by bad weather. News
from Arn he m was still sca rce. The mai n body
of ai rbor ne troops was established west of the
town, and elements of the para bdc were
hol ding out at the road bridge which was
appa rently still intact . But the enl'lIlY was
holding Arnhem town in stren gth wit h tanks
and 51' guns. The rctnforcemcnt s whi ch hat!
arri ved late now found t hemselves surrounded
and held up at th e western end of town. By la..t
light th e situatio n had not improved, l st Ab
103

-J-
....

.-

.- .

-d-
,
...
-.

-
,
,

-
- .-
--
.'
.-

_..

. ,
Div beinK sp llt in three locat ions and running
short of su pp lies; re-supply ha d failed ht;''(.... ause
of bad weather and heavy enemy AA.
Element s of Gds Armd tnv crossed the Son
bridge at 0615 hrs 011 t he 19th and It' SS t han
three hours later hat! advanced so me 2S miles
to lin k up with 82nd Ab Div at the Grave
bridge. Farther north, the bridge OW'[ the
xtaas-waat Canal was found to be unsuitable
for tanh and a detour had to be found - via a
crossing just north of Heu me n . leading
ar moured cars reached the banks of t he waal
by l'a rly afte rn oon, wh ile the fo rward
ar moured bri gade was conce ntr ated some
three miles sout h of Nrtmcgen. Heavy cou nter-
attacks delayed the assault on the Numegen
bridge; the town was entered at ahout 184 5
hrs, hut the bridge could not be reached and
t he attack had to be called off. At Arnhem t he
situation was now becoming critical. On ly
104
troops of t he pa rac hute brigade were at t he
bridge. holding a small are a in its Immediate
vicinity, while the rest of the division was
tr ying: to concent rate some four miles to the
west. Ene my ta n ks and ar til lery were reduci ng
the build ings to rubble. food and ammunition
was running out. In lOht Ab Dlv's area,
fighting had been heavy all day, a series of
counter-attacks being launched against the
rtndhoven-xrjmcgen section of the axis, It
was later discovered that these attacks were
put in by 107th Panzer Brigade whic h had
amvcd ' un expect edly', and undetected, in the
a rea . Th ey mounted a st rong a t tac k on the Son
bridge, but were beaten off. The weat her was
had all day. which seriously d islocated t he ai r-
lift programme, affecting bot h reinforceme nt
and re-supply. It also meant that air to ground
support was limited. and enemy movement
could not be prevented. especially around the
Above: British Ist
Airborne Division. Their
objective was the
Arnhem bridge, the
farth est north of the 1st
Allied Airborne Army's
airborne corridOl'". Here.
four-englned Stirlings of
the RAF drop supplies to
the airborne tJ"OOPS.
Unfortunately most
scpphes landed in enemy
hand s. whilst many
aircraft were damaged
or lost . (IWM - BU
1092)
~ Bnt lsh para-
lrOOpe!'Smovi ng
"""'" <owv<l,
Arnhem from their OZ.
aryJng much of their
Iut and ammunition in
lightweight. two-wheel
l J O j ~ . (IWM - BU
1090)
Arn hem bridge -head. Those transport airc raft
which d id manage to fl y, dropped th eir loads
on DZs which were now in enemy hands,
because fau lty communications had preven ted
them bei ng alt ered. It was a similar di smal
picture in both other d ivisional areas : IOl st Ab
Div receiving on ly 66 per cent of its req uire-
mcnts. aznd Ab Iuv just 25 pe r cent. Most
importa ntly, bad weather had prevented th e
Poli sh Para Bde h om taking ott from England;
they were to ha ve been dropped south of
Arnhem to reinforce the beleague red 1st Ab
Div, so th e situation was critical.
And it now began to go from bad to w O T ~ .
Enemy fire, espec talty AA, tncreased. so that
any aircraft that managed to get to th e Db
and IZs came under w ry heavy fire. Access to
the main Eind hoven road was becoming hope -
lessly congested and efforts to widen the
corridor met wit h ..tiff reststance. Progress on
both flanks wa.. described a.. being ' depress-
ingly slow' , the nature of the terrain, whi ch
was crtss-crossed with wat er ways, made wider
movement ex t remely difficult , and the
'co rridor' was extremely vu lnerab le to elwmy
attack. Three major tas ks now faced t he Alltcs:
to capture th e Nt jmegen bridge as quickly as
posvtbte: to st rengt hen Slnd Ab Div because
the enemy was building up for ces in the Retch-
swatd Forest area; to relieve the hard-pr essed
ARNHEM
l st Ah luv at Arn he m. Dur ing the morning of
20 Sep tember, combined US/Britis h for ces
cleared Nij megen up to th e sout hern
approaches to the bridge. In the town the
de fenders ha d been rein forced and bi tter
figh ting ens ued. Th at afternoon, fol lowing
some swift instruction on t he use of Brtttsh
assault boats, men of 504 RCf began to row
aCTOSSth e Waal, in full view of t he enemy and
with only suffic ien t boats to ca rr y o ne
battalion at a time. On the northern bank, the
ground was ext remel y open and flat , fire
suppo rt was limited , and the smoke-scree n laid
down to cover the operatio n proved tne ttec-
nve. Ignor ing all these problems, th e US para-
troopers ca rried out a magn ificen t operation.
Despt tc heavy casualt ies, th ey had ca ptured
the northern end of th e bridge by 184 5 hrs
and. coupled with a head-on attack by Gds
Armd tnv's tanks o n th e sout hern end, the
bridge was taken, th e demolition charges
removed and the last defenders eliminated.
Whil e Brd Inf Div was closing up from the
sout h. plans were made to resume the advance
the following da y.
In th e Arnhem area, howeve r, th e situation
had become desperate. It had sti ll proved
tmposstblc to bring in th e Poles. so t he link -up
between Nljmegen and Arnhem had not been
made, and more and more enemy forces were
lOS
ARNHEM
conccntra n ng arou nd t st Ah Div wh ich had
now wit hdrawn to a small perimet er around
t he Heveadrop ferry and th e Oo sterbeek
woods. Hemmed in o n eve ry side, they were
b e i n ~ sub jected to concent rated artillery and
mortar fire. Amhe m town was now completely
in enemy hands and not hi ng was known of
t he fate of the survivors o f the para bde. In t he
southern sector. t he IOlst still held its posi-
tions in the face of continued attacks agai nst
the corridor. TIlt" enemy did reach the main
road at one point near Son, but were driven off
by an armoured counter-attack which had
restored Ihe situation by midday. little
progress was made on either flank.
From 2 1 September onwards all efforts were
concent rated on reli eving the Arnhem bridge-
head forces. The weather, except on the 23 rd,
remai ned very d ifficult for flying, and ground
movement was eq ually slow. The Gds Armd
Dtv spea rhead resumed operations in an
attempt 10 get northwards, hut was hailed by a
strong anti-ta nk-gun screen, south of Bessem.
It was well-nigh Impossible for tan ks to get off
the roads wh ich ge ne rally ran on banks some
six feel above Ihe fields, wit h deep drainage
ditches on bot h sides. On t he 2 1st, two-th irds
of t he Polish Para Ikie was d ropped Nand NW
of Elvt, between Arnhem and Nt unegen. Th ey
sustai ned many cas ual ties i n Elst, wh ich
delayed t11l'1Tl in Iheir mai n tas k whic h was 10
get across t he Neder Rijn and rei nforce the
British pa ratroops who were now cut off from
the river beca use the Ger mans had captured
the Heveadrop fer ry termi nal .
On the 22nd, Hrd Int Div resumed the
attack northwards from the :-.lijmegen bridge-
head, but were held up at Hst . However. a
mixed force of tanks and infantry did manage
to detour to the WMI and join up wit h the
Poles at Driel ; together they reached the Neder
Rijn. Under close, concentrated fire they tried
to get supplies across, but the amphibious
trucks were unable 10 negotiate the steep
bank.'>, so very few stores got across that n ight.
Further south, between Uden and veghet.
t here was more t rouble, strong panzer and
panzcrgrenadter forces temporar ily cutting
XXX Corps' axis. By the afternoon of the 23 rd
the road had been re-ope ned and t he
remainder of Polish Para Me. pl us 82nd Ab
Dlv's Glider Rcgt . WNe flown in and some 250
Polish troops Wt' re fer ried across th e Neder
Rijn th at night 10 rein force lsi Ah Dtv. Nex t
ni ght infant ry det achmen ts crossed the river
but failed 10 make contact wit h th e paras, AI
106
left: OC 'C' Coy of 5th
Border Regt , Maj 'Jock'
Neill, seen he re in a 5lit
trench wi th his machine
gun officer. Lt
McCartney. had been
wounded twice in both
arms and legs when thi5
photograph was taken
on the 20th, but
continued fighting. (IWM
- BU 1102)
Right: The Hartenstein
Hotel. 23September
I*" Troopstake
in the
fJ&tmng to clean their
wtapOIlS and brew up.
Inthe background are
the tennis courtS where

-..e-e kepi: . (IWM - BU
1114)
ARNHEM
Below: One of the two-
IIWl slitsin the shrinki ng
.-borne penmeter.
(I'NM- BU I II )
Inst light, Intense lire from the high ground
overlooking the river put a stop to these oper-
auons.. To the south, heavy fighting flared up
again in and around Elst and Remmel, and
during the afternoon of 24 September the
main axis was again rut sout h of Veghel.
Fighting continued and the axts was not re-
opened until the 26th.
On the night of 25 September Field Marshal
Montgomery rel uct an tl y decided to withdraw
th e Arn hem bridge-head. The troops had
suffered grievous cas ualt ies and were short of
ammunition and suppltes: their situation was
no longer tenable. In all about 2,200 survivors
managed to escape. leaving some 7,000 killed ,
wounded or capt ured. Mo ntgomery later
wrote: ' We had undertaken a d iffirult opera-
ti on, attended by considerable risks. It was
juslifil'<1 because. had good wea the r obtained,
th ere was no doubt that we shoul d have
at tained full success. The battle of Arnhe m
was ninet y pt' r cen t successful. We were left in
possession of crossi ngs over four major water
obst acles including t he Maas and th e waal.'
7
Clearing the Scheidt
Opening-up Antwerp
The capt ure of Ant werp on 4 September 19....
with its port facilit ies in good condi t io n, did
not solve the Allie-; ' supply problems because
t he enemy still held the Scheidt est ua ry in
st rength and coul d thus preven t sh tppt ng
fro m usi ng t he por t. General Elscnhowor
considered th e opening of Antwerp to be of
vital importance prior to th e conquest of
Germany and on 22 S ~ .. pt ember gave absolute
priorit y to opc reuons 10 liberate the area. The
task was passed to the Can Fint Army by Held
Marshal Montgomery a few days lat er as t he ir
pri mary target which had to be achieved as
qui ckly as possible. Alt hough in sca le it was a
sma ll operation by co mpar ison wit h ot hers,
such as the breakout fro m Normandy, or th e
battle for France, or even t he Anthem opera-
tio n, it was of vital importa nce and deserves
to be loo ked at in tsota non. Indeed, Mont-
gomery wrote later: ' It had bec ome nt'Cl':'>:<.ary
to devote the whole of our resources into
getting Antwerp working a t o nce, and I had to
shut down all ot her offensive operations in
2 h t Army Group u ntil ttus ob ject wa s
achieved.'!
Thi s di d not mean ho wever t hat t he
Ger man gerrt son in t he rematn tng st ubho rn
'fort ress' of Dunkirk would be let off the hook.
In st ead, as already mentioned, whil e the
Ca nad ia ns concent rated o n cleari ng the
Sche idt, responstbtlny for the stcge of Dunkirk
was pa ssed to the Czech Independent
Armoured Bri gade Group, commanded by
Major-Gene ral Atots Lishka. l-or part of thi s
stcge th e Ch urchlfls of 7t h RTR would al so be
u nd er co m ma nd of t he Czechs. Dunkirk
would remain ' bo t tled up' for t he remainder o f
the war, being the last French town to be libe r-
ated -on 10 xt ay 1945.
.
108
Left : Whilst the
Canadians conc entrated
on clearing the ScheIdt.
the stubborn garrisonin
Dunkirk had to be
'bottled up' , This was
done by the Czech
Indep Armel Bde, which
had both French and
British troops uodef
comnund. Here sapper1
of the bde pilt rol the
flooded areas around
Dunkirk from their base
at Bulscamp near Fuma,.
(IWM - B 15132)
Right: French infantry
III'tl'" also kolding the
ft ~ Dunkirk.
3lorIf: the De LaClome
roo 8ercues. This team
m.l a capt1Jred German
HG 42machine gun -
eeeof the best MGs of
WW2. Its nigh rate of
h made ill noise likened
tol talTlg linoleum!
tfNH B 1511 6)
CLEARING THE SCHELDT
Ope rati ons in the SCheidt estuary were not
ma de any easier by the fact that much of th e
area cons isted of recl aimed land - flat , mu dd y
ami in SOIll(' places flooded, a trul y horrihlt.'
place in which to have to fight . But, a ~ 011 D-
Day, the Allies had a number of ' aces' up thei r
slee ves. two important ones being the Royal
Naval Su pport Squa dron, which would
provide d ose fi re support for the required
arnph lbious operations. and yet more of the
rema rkable ' Fu nn ies', the strange ;\FVs of 79t h
Armd Div. These factors, combined with t he
bravery of the Canadian and British troops
and th ei r sea and air cover, meant th at victory
was assured, th ough not without a di fficult
ca mpaign which lasted from 2 October until H
November, by wh ich time th e mi neswee pers
were already d ea rin g the river ahead of th e
first convoy which reached the port on th e
26th.
Til t. ' Plan
The dearing of th e SChe idt estua ry invol ved
the captu re of three separate yet related areas:
the coastal plai n be tween Ternuezen and
Knokkc (known locally as ' Breskens Island' )
wh ere Ge rma n heavy coasta l ba tteries at
ureskcns and Cadzand covered th e approaches
to th e estu ary; the ist hmus and peninsula of
South ncvctanu, which stuck out into th e
Schcldt : finall y, watcncrcn Island. where
some 25 heavy battenes covered sh ipping in
t ill' estua ry. The area was gar risoned by tough ,
seasoned t roops who had fought on th e
Easte rn Fron t - the ma inla nd sout h of th e
estuary was held by Ger man 64th lnt Iuv
which had been left isolat ed when Fifteenth
Army had withdrawn eastwards. walcheren
was ga rriso ned by German 70t h Inf Div,
known cu riou sly as the ' Whitebread Division'
bec au se most of its 71t.!: thou sand troops had
stomac h problems and required special di et s -
th ou gh thi s would not affect th eir lighting
ahility! On Sout h Bcveland were elements of a
divisional battlegroup, and between t he
est uary and Turnho ut we re troops from
Germa n 346t h, 71 lth and 719t h Int Iuvs.
The A I I i ~ plan ned to clear the estuary in
three phasee-
I. Clear ' Breskens Islan d' , while at the same
109
time seali ng off the Sout h Beveland peni nsula
by a thrust from Ant werp,
2, Clear South Bevcland by ad vanci ng along
t he isthmus in co n juncti on with an
amphibious assault ar row the estuary from the
south,
3, Capture warcnerc n hy a series of concentric
assault s from cast, south and west (which
woul d ent ail a second crossing of the est uary
to take Flushing), together with a seaborne
assault by a for ce coming from o ne the
Channe l ports,
Exec ut ion
"/'11\(' I. On I October. Can 2nd Inf Div
crossed til l' Antwer p-Turnhout ca na l and
advanced westwa rds towards t he north ern
suburbs of Antwerp , Resistance was scattered
and by the eveni ng of 4 Oct ober the Cana-
dians ha d cleared the Merxem-Eekercn area
and the ir leading t roops had reac hed Putte,
about halfway to the peninsula. They
contin ued to make steady progress, hut as they
11 0
approached xortevcn. resistance increased and
they were unable to capture the village, The
ent' my launched nu merous counter-attacks.
hut on 16 October th e village of woensdrccnt
was occupied. Meanwhile on the right flank of
Can First Army, I Cor ps advanced on the line
of tilt' Antwerp-Tut n hout canal. The Polish
Armd Dtv crossed th e Dutch frontier north of
Merkspl as on I October. 49th Inf Dtv at t his
nme being engaged in fighti ng nor th of St.
Lenaart s. By 5 October leading troops were in
Alphen. and about fou r miles from 11lburg,
and were ab le 10 hold their pc smons des pite
contin ual counter-attacks over th e next few
da ys, In the thi rd wee k of Octobe r. Can 4th
Armd tnv was switched from th e Leopold
Canal sector to join I Corps, and US 104t l1 Inf
Div was also moved into the sec tor. From 2U
Octobe r good progress was made north wards
so Ihat by the evening of th e 23rd, Can 4th
Armd Div had crossed the Dutch fronti er near
Essen and was swinging westward s toward s
Bergen-cp-Zoo m. This manoeuvre, together
Above: The new
amphibian - to the
Bntish Army mat _ -
to be used in consider-
able numbeni wMst
clearing the Scheidt was
the American 'Buffalo'
landing Vehicle Tracked
- two main v e ~ i o n s of
which we re used by
79th Armd DIV, the lVT
2 and the lVT 04 . the
latter having a hinged
stern ~ p which meanl:
mat the eng.rte had to
be re pcstocoed. This
Buffalo, belongi ng to II
RTR, was man oeuvring
off Beveland, just before
the assault took place
there on ]0 Octcoer
19+4. (IWM HU 71712)

.,
counte r-attacks and con tinuous morta rin g. On
t he 7t h, rein for cemen ts were ferr ied across,
hut it was still touch-and-go un til a Hailey
bndgc had been co mpleted four da ys later. Th e
amphibious force landed at about 0200 Iu s on
Ii October, with mi nimum opposition and
ma xi mum sur prise. But at daybr eak t he
batt ery at Hushing rvnsstngen) and the gum
in the Btervltet area began to bombard the
beach and the approa ches. But by 0500 hrs the
Uuffaloes
Z
used by the ass au lt fo rce ha d
ret urned to e mba rk the follow-up echelon
which began to arr ive at abo ut 0900 hrs. Rests-
ranee nucnstncd as t he day progr essed, but the
advance conti nued westwa rds al ong the coast .
wh ile ot he r elemen ts pushed inland. By last
ligh t the bea ch-head was 2-3 miles deep.
Because o pposit ion had been so strong on the
Leopold Ca nal, it was dectded to reinforce t he
beach- head and push do.....n sout hwa rds along
t he western ba nk of the Savot aa rds Plaat inlet,
so as to open a n inland ro ute via t he vi llage of
Isabella; this was ach ieved by last light on 14
wit h con ti nued pressur e at wocn sdr ccbt .
successfully sea led off the Sout h Bcveland
pcntnsuta and opened the wa y for an adva nc e
along the ist h mus.
In the Leopold Canal ar ea sout h o f
' nres kens Isla nd ', Ca n J rd lnf Div pla nned a n
assault across the ca nal, due nor th from
Matdegcm, whil e a br igade-sized a mphibious
landing would ta ke place on the NE corne r of
th e ' isla nd '. Enemy positions on the north
ha nk of the Leopol d Ca nal wer e extremel y
di fficult to d islodge because t hey wer e o n the
rever se slope of the ca nal dike, so It was
decid ed to use the Church ill Crocodile flame-
thrower s of 10l h t Regiment RAC agains t them
pr ior to the assault. II -Hour was in the ea rly
hours of 6 October and the attackin g cnmpa -
rues launched their assault boats as won as t he
fla ming had stopped. On t he right all ..... cnt
well, but on the left t here we re heavy cas ual-
ti es from machine-gun fir e. However , the
attackers managed to ga in a foothol d on t he
ta r bank and to hold it all that day despite
Above: Buffaloe s of S
ARRE. 79th Annd 0 1v.
e loaded onto LCTs at
Ostend for the West-
kapelle operat io n. There
were 102 Buffaloes
manned by SARRE and
I I RTR in the assault ,
together with 2 Sherman
gun tanks and 10 Flails
from 1st Lothians . plus
other Funnie s' .
(Author 's Collection)
"'
ClEARING THE SCHELDT
October. The 52 nd Lowla nd Int Div was now
arr iving in t he thea tre under command of Can
First Army, and took over the Leo pol d Ca nal
br idge-head. The add it ional t roo ps . plus excel-
lent ai r suppo rt soon quickened the pace of
operations, Breskcns bei ng capt ured on t he
22nd. Mor e t ha n ha lf the ' Isla nd' was now in
Brtt tsh/Cauadtan hands: t he remainder was
left to Ca n 3rd Inf Dtv, while 52 nd Lowl and
prepared to cross t he Scheidt est uary.
I'hIHt' 2. Early on 24 October Can 2nd Inf
Div began its advance along the Beveland
ist hmus, leadin g to the peni nsula, t heir
progress slowed by the d iffiOl It goi ng. The re
was considerable floodin g, es pecially o n the
approaches to the uevetand Canal, and all
unflood ed roads we re cra te red a nd mi ned.
Slowly the Canadians forced their way to the
west. sometimes waist-dee p in water, By 25
October t hey had reached Rilland and the
followi ng da y were only six mi les from the
Beveland Ca na l. Meanwhile, on t he ni ght of
25 /26 Octobe r a brigade of t he Lowl and Dtv
sailed from Temeuzen in Buffaloes a nd I.CAs to
make an assa ult land ing ncar Baartand. On the
left- ha nd beach t he landin g was unopposed,
hut on till' righ t t here was some she lling. A
squadron of DD Sherman am phibious tanks of
t he Staffords hire Yeo manry had go t across t he
est uary withoul di fficult y but we re then
stopped by mudfla ts and di kes. Despit e
counter-a t tacks. the beach-head was being
ex tended beyond Oudelande in t he west . On
27-28 Oct obe r, while this was ht'ing done ,
leading troops of Ca n 2nd Inf Iuv reached t he
Beveland Ca na l; all the brt dgcs we re blown, bUI
they managed to force a crcssmg and by 1200
hrs next day a Class 9 bridge was across and
operating near Vlake. By thi s t ime Ca n 41h
Armd tuv had ca pt ured uergcn-op-zoom. The
deari ng of Sout h newland connnue d qui ckly
a nd on 30 October they reached t he eas te rn
end of the causeway over to watchercn Island.
A force was then dispatched to ens ure t hat
North Beveland was also clear of enemy.
Wh ile Phase 2 was ta king place operat ions
o n ' urcs kc ns 1s1,1lHI' had also contt nued
successfully, so Ihat by ni ghtfal l on I
Nove mbe r, Cadzand and Knokke had been
liberated and only t he are a between the canal
11 2
Right: One of the LCTs on its way to Walcheren.
These were t he same landing craft as had carried
men of the Jrd British Inf Div ontOQueen Beach on
D-Day. (Authol-' s COllect ion).
and Zeebrugge remained to be cleared. and
was accomplished by 3 November. The whole
sout he rn bank of the Sche idt est ua ry was now
in Allil'd hands, after SOIl1l' of the fiercest
fightin/o: eve r exper ienced by 2 1st Army Group.
II now remained to cl ear the island of
walcberen.
l'IIlIW .1. walcheren had a ga rr ison of some
6-7,000 manning the heavy coas tal batte ries,
many of which were housed in massive
concrete emplace ments a nd covered the
entrance to the West Sche idt. West a nd south
of the isla nd we re ex tensi ve underwater obsta-
cles, a nd there were masses of wire and mines
on the bea ches and beach exits. Fluvhlng had
a pe rimet er defence system with a double lim'
of a nt i-tank ditc hes. As in t he res t of the area,
t he terrain was difficult - dikes and steep
banks - which ruled out an ai rborne landi ng .
But if the sea dikes we re breached t he enti re
island coul d be ' sunk' , render ing many of the
artillery po si tions untenable and rest ricting
troop movement except in a mph ttnous ve hi-
cles - so an assault force t hus eq uipped would
be abl e to take the defences in rear. Early in
October, Bomber Command ca rried out a
highly accu rate str i ke, breaching the sea dikes
in four places. These /o\a ps we re gr aduall y
wide ned by further bomhing duri ng the
month, so that by t he end of October the
island hall been gradua lly flooded. The most
importa nt ga p was near w est kapene and was
some 110 yards wide by about 10 feet high
above the low wate r ma rk.
It was planned 10 make two seabo rne land -
ings on watche ren by troo ps ca nted and
supported by Force ' T' (Royal Nary). One force
would move from a reskens to take Hushi ng;
the other, sailing from Ostend, would pass
t hrough t he breach in the di ke at w est kapc llc
Right : Approaching Westkapelle. which has just
been attacked by rocket-firing Typhoons. The Wes t-
kapelle Tower can be seen t o the left of the smoke.
(AuthoI-'s Collection)
.'
I

.
CLEARING THE SCHELDT
114

Above: W e s t ~
beach. In the foreground
is iii Weasel - iI small
amphibious load carrier,
wh ilst behind it is a
boggedAVRE, I
November 1944.
(Aut ho r's Collection)
Left: German prisoners
taken in the fighting on
Walcheren Island being
housed in A bam on their
W.ly to iii POW cage.
The enemy were ~ ~
from 70 Inf Div, known
as the ' Whitebread OM-
sion' because manyof lt$
~ i e r s had stOfNCh
problems And needed
special dieu! Neverthe-
less they fought ~ _
(IWM - BU 1267)

Right : Dut ch
commandos who took
IW'tin the attack on
Flushing march along the
mterfront as they take
over the port. (IWM -
HU 59803)
to get into t he island and lin k-up wit h t he
Flushing attack. In conjunct ion wit h the two
seaborne la ndings, a t hird attack would be
made ove r the Sout h Beveland ca useway, TIlt"
assa ult began o n 1 November. Early in the
morni ng troops of ~ Commando landed near
Hu",hing withou t suffering many casual ties.
Luck was on their side because they hi t the
only sectio n of the shore line ncar the town
which was not mined. They were followed by
troops of 52nd Lowland Inf Dtv in Buffaloes,
which came under heavy and accurate fire
from xxmm guns an d los t some 15 per cent of
their st rengt h. The remaind er got ashore
successf ully and t he attack pressed on into t he
town. Ferrying conti nued t hroughout the rest
of the day, bringing over the leadtn g infantry
bngade.
In th e mea ntime , th e west kapene force was
to a pp roac h the coast. accompanied by naval
force.... with -I Commando Brigade, less -I
CLEARING THE SCHELOT
Commando, in the lead . They assaulted the
German positions in west kapetle and on the
sand dum' s each side of the town. d earing
them as far north as Domburg. and sout h-
wa rds until they joi ned- up with the for ce
att acking Hu shing. They wer e ca rried in 102
Buffalos manned by 5 ARREand II RTR. C 1 0 ~
behind we re a mi xture of ' Fun nies'. includi ng
IwO Sherma n gun tanks. ten She n nan flail s
tmtncc teartng tanks) from l st Loth ians. eight
AVRb from 6 ARRE with SBGs (small box
Il; irdl' rs) and tasctnes . and four bull dozers, all
earned in LCTs whi ch were to beach on t he
northern side of the breach in the stone -fared
di ke. The R.'\J Force 'T' incl uded 25 close..
..upport craft (Land ing Craft GUllS, Landing
Craft AAand Landing Craft Rockets ], In addi -
tion t here was a bomba rd ment force
conn..ting of the batt le..h ip H ~ { S Wan pitt', and
two 1Sin-gun monitors. Air cover was
provided by rocket -fmng Typhoons from 85
115

Cl EARJ NG THE SCHElDT

Group RAE The force sailed from Oste nd at
0100 hr s on 1 November and by 0800 hr s
(Quid see wesrkapene Tower shrouded in low
rain clouds. The warshi ps o pened fire on west -
kapeue and Homburg at 08 30 Ius, but were
hampered by pom visibilit y and Ihe absence of
aircraft spotters. Eventuall y RAAir 0 1' Austers
were used and proved highl y sucn..ssful. The
Buffaloes ran ashore protected by the close-
suppo rt craft of the RN Inshore Squadron
which e n ~ a ~ t ' d th e defences at ranges of less
Ihan 1,000 yards , despite heavy and accurate
return fire wh ich ca used many cas ualt ies
among the na val craft and th e Buffaloes.
The t O s carryi ng breaching teams from
79t h Armd Div came as hore wit h th e
Commandos. Despite heavy fire and many
casualt ies some of th e AFVs man aged 10 get
ashore and asstst cd me Commandos in
capt uring westkapeue and in ope rati ons
against the German ba tteries. Tilt' tiny force
was not helped by the very h igh tide which
swamped those flails that had landed and lett
just two Sher ma ns and three AVREs available
for further operations. By 8 November. opera-
tions had bee n exte nded 10 cover Ihe northern
end of the island, where the Domhurg batt ery
was knocked out. part ly by tank shells fired
very accurat el y through emplaceme nt slits.
The assault on watcheren ended when xnddle-
burg was captured on the 8t h, what was left of
th e ga rrison (some 2,000 men ) surrendering
wit h their commander, Lieutena nt -Ge neral
Wilhel m Dascr. Royal Naval mt neswce pcrs
began to clear the seaway 10 Antwerp almost
immediately, but it look th ree weeks o f
unremitting work by 100 vessels before th e 75-
mil e channe l was safe for use, the first convoy
bert hing at Antwerp on 28 November. The
Germans lost many troops in the battle and
some 10,000 were taken prisoner. But the
Canadi ans and British had paid a high price -
the casualt y figu re was 27,633, in what Eisen-
hower described in his memoirs as ht.'ing ... a
spectacul ar and grati fyi ng opcrauon'.
Administrative gcorgantsatrcn
Now th at Antwerp was open, il was po ssible to
shut down th e cxt sung Rear Maintenance Area
and some of th e Channel ports and use thei r
116
resources in th e new Advan ced Base. II was
plan ned that Ant wl'rp would recei ve 40,000
tom of sto res a day (excl us ive of pet rol . oil and
lubricants (1'01.)); 22,500 Ions of this total was
to be allocated to US forces. There was also
plenty of capacity for th e handling of bulk
fuel , so all would soon IX' wen in that vital area
also. But there was sti ll dan ger to be faced from
enemy V- ho mb and rock et att ach - the firsl v,
Is and V-2s had landed In Antwerp on lJ
October and the pori would re main the
priorit y v -bomb target aft er Lo ndo n, unti l the
launching sit es were cleared.
Sutl-\
1. xt ontgomery, B. S"mll/tltly to ril e B./Uk
2. Of US origin, the ' Buffalo' was a tra cked
amphibi ous craft whi ch could ca rry 28 men or
4 tom of stores at some 7mph in t he wat er. liS
armour could wit hsla nd small-arms fire.
Be ktw: Meanwhile. on
the mainland, 00 me
road from TIlburg to
Breda. Dutch machine
gunnen keep watch
WIththeir Bntrsh lCken
.l Olin MG at the ready.
to engage any enemy
forces Withdrawing.
(IWM . HU 73791)
8
The 'Lull' before the Storm
Below: MOlj Gen Undsey
McDonald Silvester
(left). CGUS7th Armd
[)yooutlining the IXticaI
~ notth of oYer-
loon. Hobnd. to some
hJSh offlCen who
~ ~ t o Q . k e
IM!r the Mea. It ~
11th Armd Div tNt
"I'OlAd take over the
ru between Deume
lJId the M;us. whilst 7th
US Annd Div would
hold a se<tioo on thei r
f'Iht from Deume to
HeijeI. 7 October 1944,
(US Amry via ReAl War
Photos- A 94OA)
Although many of the soldiers who were
fiRhting in most of the armies on the Allied
front in North west Europe might not agree ,
ther e was definitely something of a lull
bet ween the succes sful opening of th e Scheidt
est ua ry to the port of Antwerp, and the start of
th e Germans' totally unexpected ' last gamble'
in th e Ardennes. Strictl y spea king, thi s period
did not begin until mi d-Novembe r, and it
would last until mid-December , but for th e
sake of co nti nui ty I begin where I ended
Cha pter 5 (week 191. because the Scheidt oper-
ati on only concerned Ca nadia n First Army in
particul ar and 21st Army Group in general;
now we mu st cover acti vities in the remaining
sectors.
\\'et.' k 20: 17-23 October 1944
In uru sscts o n th e 18th, General Eisenhower
held a co nference with Montgomery and
Bradley to pl an futur e operations. The ma in
ronc lus tons drawn were: that 2ht Army
Group should conti n ue its ope rati ons to open
the port of Antwerp as quickl y as possible,
th en launch an attack south-westwa rds from
till' Nljmegen brid ge-head towards Krefcld .
Meanwhile, sta rt ing ea rly in November, US
first Army would advan ce to the Rhine near
Cologne and gain a bridge-head over th e
river, with US Nl rit h Army o perati ng on their
left flank. The latter would then att ack north-
ward s between th e Rhine and th e Meu se, so
as to link up wit h British Second Army's
117
THE ' LUll.' BEFORE THE STORM
Above: Engineers of 23rd Annd Engr Bn, Jrd Armd Div, US First
Army, planting explosive charges in or der to blow a gap in thiS
' Dragons Teeth' anti-tank barrier which was part of t he Siegfried
line. 7 October 19+4 . (US Army via Real War Photos - A 66 18)
Be low: Tank commander, Cpl Eugene McKay of II lillOis, spca an
ene my position through his binoc ul,," during the lighting in
Aachen. To the left of his Sherman is an MI0 tank desU'Oye. (l'NH
- EA1 11 36)
,

,
,
Street blottle in

IIIOI.rIded comrade to
ntter as they follow up
Qnks mopping up the
enemy opposition in
house-to-house fighting
in the streets of Aachen.
16October 19.... . (IWM
KY -4(961)
Right: Infantrymen
clamber on beard a 1
RTR Sherm.an, of 11th
Armd Div, to Advance
towards r-tee-seic and
Haag on I7 October
1941. The back decks of
J Sberman tank provided
a welcome chAnge from
foot slogging, but
infantry thus carri ed
were more vulnerable to
enemy fire than when on
the ground. (Tank
Huseom)
THE ' LUll.' BEFORE THE STORM
southwards d rive. During this pa rt of the
operation, US Nint h Army would pa , s under
command of Brlt tsh 21st Army Group. US
12th Army Group wav to be responsible for all
operat ions couccmtng the capture of th e
Ruin, while 21st Army Gro up would deter-
mine the teastbttny of a north ward t hr us t
over the Neder Rijn and o n toward ' th e
Zutder Zee .
On th e 17th, in their d rive for vente. the
leading elements of British Second Army's VII
Corps took th e Dutch town of venratt - only
10 miles from the German border, and by the
Z3rd, XII Corps was attacking towards TIlbu rg.
By the end of the wee k, 15th Inf Div had
reach ed Tllb urg, and 7th Arrnd and 53rd Inf
Divs. followed by 51st In! Div, were heading
for 's Hert ogcnbosch. Operations were im-
peded by wldcsprcad mincftcld s.
In t he adjoin ing US First Army sector, th e
Ger man garrison at Aach en was th warted in its
attempts to break out and th eir resistance
steadily weakened. On t he 19th, US t st In! and
3rd Armd tuvs began a strong assa ult , taking
such vilal features as the Lo usberg Heigh ts and
Salvator Hill, wh ile cu tt ing the Aachen-
La urcn sburg road. ny t he znm . l st tn t tuv had
pushed the Germans back into th e sout he rn
sub ur bs. At midday on t he 2 1st car ne t he
inevitable sur rende r of wha t remained of the
garrtson of the now almost completely rui ned
city.
In Patton's US Thi rd Army sector bad
weat her, plus fue l and ammunition sho rtages,
affected operations during this week . US 90th
Inf Dtv was engaged in hand-to-hand fighting
in Maizieres-les-Mt'tz. Elsewhe re fron t lim' s
remained unaltered throu ghout th e wee k.
Sout h of th em, in USSeventh Army's sector.
XV Corps troops neared t.unevme. some 10
miles sou th-cast of Nancy, wh ile VI Corps -
sti ll heavily opposed - reac hed s ruyeres and
captured part of th e town on the 18th, and th e
remainde r on the 19th. A follow-up division
Above: Bloody Aachen.
Crouching behind a
knocked-out enemy hghl:
Anti-aircraft gun
mounting in Aachen, Pte
William Zukerbrcw
draws a bead on a Nazi
sniper. 19 October 19+4
(US Army via Real War
Pbeecs A "'65)
120
~ -,l....._
(:lrd Inf Div) took over th e advance towards
the next objective - St-Dte - but were soon
effectively sto pped by st rong oppositi on from
German Nineteenth Army. Also in US Sevent h
Army's sector. two more US divisions (l O()th
and 103rd Inf Dt vsj landed at on th e
20th .
In th eir drive towards the Vosges. troops of
Fren ch First Arm)' had paused . having
sustained heavy casualties.
Wt.'1.'i.> 2 1: 24-30 October 1944
In Braba nt . leading ele me nts of Brit ish Second
Army had reached 's Hert ogenboscf by the
24 th . then pushed on beyond, but t he
Germans launched a counte r-offensive. west
of Venia, a sudden. violent attack against US
7th Armd Div (still part of British VIII Corps)
forced them out of vari ous positions on the
Deume and No rd Canals.
South of them throughout US 12th Arm)'
Grou p, there was an unexpected lull on all
three US Army fro nts (First , Nint h. Third). On
22 October. HQ 12th Army Grou p issued a
letter of instruct ion to all Armies: ' 12th Army
Group will regroup and prepare for an advance
b)' all thr ee Armies to th e Rhine River ..: Th e
sta rt date would depend all the weat he r.
On the 24t h, in Third Army, Patt on's
personal quart ers wer e narr owly missed by
three 2HOmm shells. Also on that dat e he
infor med SHAEF that his Army had received
more than 2. 1 million gallons of fuel below
th eir request s and that he now had less than
two o pcrat toual days' fuel left . The 29th saw
Matz jeres-les-Met z captured, except for the
town hall which held out for anothe r day. To
make up for his fuel sho rtages. Patton had
instit uted aggresstve foot pat rolling.
Farther sout h, in US VI Co rps ' sector o f US
Sevent h Army, 3rd Inf Div had now take n over
the push for St-Die, while units of 45th Inf Div
took St-Bcnott on th e 30t h.
Sti ll farther south, on t he 24t h, General de
La ttre de Tassign y prepa red his orders for
Operation ' Indepen dence', an assault by
French First Army on t he importa nt Belfnrt
Gap, not far from the Swiss border, which was
to be carried out in ea rly xovember. The attack
would take place in conjunction wit h a
THE ' lULL.' BEFORE THE STORM
general cttenstve wh ich had three main obj ec-
tives: to eliminate all German strc ngpot nts
west of th e Rhine; to esta blis h bri dge-heads
eas t of the river; fina lly, to mount an assault
dee p into the heart of the Fatherland.
Wt.'t' k 22: 3 1 October-s November 19....
On the 3 1st, Bnt tsh Second Army's XII Corps
overcame ent' my resistan ce in t he Raamsdonk
area . At the end of th e wee k. in Briti sh I Corps'
sector, Polis h 1st Armd Div, supported by units
of US t o- nh In f mv, began an offensive to ta ke
Moc rdqk.
In 12th Army Group's area , t he long-
awai ted attack had not yet materialised,
having bee n delayed by bad wea ther, but all
three Army Groups were by now ' rann' to go!'
In US Third Army's area , us XX Corps
troops of 5th In f Div occupied the Arnaville
bridge-head south of Metz. rel ieving men of
95th In f Div. US XII Co rps crossed the River
Seille and capt ured Abaucourt and Let rt-
co ur t .
In US Seventh Army's sector, US XV Corps'
French 2nd Ar md Di v ente red Bertrichamps
Oil I November, US Il Xlth Inf Div arrived in VI
Co rps' sector to rep lace 45t h Inf Di v, wh ile Srd
In f Div occupied la Bourgonce, nort h-west of
St Die. tht' ll conti nue d to adva nce throu gh the
Mort agne Fo rest.
Wt.'t.'i.> 2:'1: 7-13 Novem ber 1944
TIl(' ' Battk' for Ger many' officiall y began at
0600 Ins on 7 November. There was no
preparatory aortal bo mbardment, so ta cti cal
surprise was co mplet e. The German High
Co mmand had reckoned th at th e extreme
flooding in many areas would prevent any
Allied offensi ve.
In USTh ird Army 's are a XII Co rps launched
their att ack wit h 26t h, 35t h and 80th lnf luvs
advanci ng sim ulta neous ly to the south.
ce nt re a nd north respectively. between
Mo ncourt in the south and Clemery in th e
north. Wit h excellent coun ter-battery fi re
from heavy art illery, they ca ptured jallau-
court , Malaucourt and Rouves on t he first da y,
as the divisions all raced for the Rhine. At the
same time XX Corps launched a massive
assault un Metz on the 8th, but this was
121
THE 'LUu.' BEFORE THE STORM
Above : US tankers advance into Gennany. The crew of an Amer-
ican tank destroyer halt on the road to Vossenach, to check their
route. Vossenach is in the Hurt gen Forest . south-east of Aachen,
which was recaptured by US First Army troops on 7 November
after earlier being forced to evacuate it by a strong Gennan
counter-attack. (IWM. EA46076)
THE 'tuu' BEFORE THE STORM \
Above: Gen Onur
IlradIey (left) CG 12th
Hmy Group. visiting US
Thrd Ivmy. I3
NcJ,oember 1944. In the
voup are Gen George
S, Panon, Jr (CG 3rd
Nmy), H.lj Gen P.ilul
(CG26th InfDiy) and
M ~ GenManton Eddy
(CGXII Corps on far
nght). (US Army)
Lrft : Hiirtgen Forest.
Men of 3rd an, 8th Inf
~ 3th US InfDiv.
move across a small
brldge to follow up an
M10tank destroyel" on
thetrxk. 18 November
19+1. (US Army via Real
'NlI' Photos - A 232)
hampered by severe flooding in the a rea of
the Mosett e. US 5t h Inf Drv reached
Chemt not . sout h of Met z. 90t h Int Di v
crossed the river in DUKW\l and established a
bridge-h ea d nea r Thfonvtlle. On the same day
US 6t h Armd Dtv crosse d t he Settle a nd
prepared for a furt her advance, as did 10th
Armd Dtv. The weat her had improved cons td-
cra bly and US Army Eight h Air Force s('111 in
near ly 1,500 heavy bombers 10 hn-ak the Met z
deadlock, hnmmc rtng away at all t he fortifi ed
towns east of t he bridge-head area: Met z,
vcmy, Orny, l'omrnerteux and Saa rbruc ken.
wtth XIX TAC flying in support . Progress
continued on t he 10th and 11th, wi th the
enemy t i ~ h t i n g delaying actions in t he
villages and fo rest s. Engineers began building
the longest Railey bri dge to date (200ft ) at
Thtonvtlle and two ot he rs at Malling, over
which pour ed 10t h Annd ntv. On II
Novem ber. Oil Bradley's ve rbal orders, 83 rd In f
Div rever ted to US First Army a nd thi s move
prevented Saar bruc ke n from bctng taken -
t his . in Pat ton's opinion, was o ne of the direct
causes of the Germans ea rly succ'ess in t he
Ardennes Ottenstve.z
Wl.... k 24: 14-20 Novem ber 1944
In 2 1\ t Army Group's sector on the l-it h,
Brit ish Second Army's. XII Corps opened an
one nstve to deal with t he Ge rman bridge-h ead
over the Maas, between vente a nd Roermond .
By t he 201h they had made good progress,
pushin g on towar ds the river wit h 49th and
5 1st Inf Dtvs.
On the 16th, US Nint h and First Armies
launched a co-o rd inated offensive (Ope rati on
' QUt't>ll') to seize the a rea north of Aachen,
be tween t he Rivers Wurm and Ruh r. Nin t h
Army's XIX Corps advanced towards the Ruhr
with 2nd Annd Div on the left making for
juhch: 29 th In f Div in the cent re for Alden-
hoven which they ca pt ured on the 20t h; .mt h
Inf Div on the nght flank for wurselen whkh
they reached on the 17th. A determined
coun ter -attack by Ge rman Seventh Arm y on
the 19th was repelled by 2nd Armd Div,
Further sout h, US First Army's VII Corps
advanced 0 11 Duren [towards Corogner, east of
Aachen.
On 1M November US f irst Arm y began n s
advance and bitter ca mpaign in the Hurtgcn
For est , penetrating the o uter def ences of
123
THE 'LUu.' BEFORE THE STORM
Duren. This would prove to be o ne of the most
bitterly contes ted batt les of t he enti re
campaign in Nort h West Europe. The Ger mans
had all th e advantage s of strong defensive
terrai n; the att acking Gt s ha d to depend
almost excl usively o n in fantr y weapons
because of t he density of the for est and the
terrible weath er (whenever veterans of the US
-I th , 91h and 2Hlh Inf tuvs later referred to
ha rd ughtmg. t hey d id so in terms of compar-
ison wit h ti ll' Battl e of the Hurtgcn Forest
which th ey put at th e top of Iheir list !).
In US Third Army's secto r slow and steady
progress was made, despite extens ive mine-
fields, road-blocks and all ma nner of other
obstacles. On the I-Ith, leading ele ments of XII
Cor ps took Haraucourt and Mar val, and
further north 6tb Armd Div seized Landroff. In
XX Cor ps' area, 95t h Inf Dtv took Ouve-St-
Hubert, Feves and f ort d' Illan ge, while 10th
Armd Drv crossed th e Moselle behind a smo ke-
scree n near Th ton ville and Mailing. Further
south, on till' 15th, 51h Inf Iu v too k Moctcuves
in a flan king dri ve towa rds Metz, which was
no w enti rel y surrounded - six major strong-
points were still holding out. On 19 November
5t h and 951h Inf Dtvs fina lly entered the ci ty
and by the 20t h it was reported clear of enemy,
although certai n for lS around Ml'IZ were st ill
ho lding out.
In US Seventh Army's sector, XV Cor ps
advanced towards Avricourt and Halloville,
while VI Corps broke through ene my post-
nons at Raon-l'Etape, north-west of St-Dle,
whic h other tr oops were pre paring to attack
from the sout h-west . By the end of the wee k
VI Corps ' 3rd Int Dtv ha d crossed the Meunhc
between Ctatretontatne and St-Mtcnet-sur -
Meurthe an d Iheir large br idge-head incl uded
numerous villages .
Bel ow: Geilenkirchen
captured. A soldier of
US Ninth Anny watdles
Shermans rumbling
throogh the town which
was deared on 19
November, only t h ~
days after the US N,nth
Army had opened its
assault . (IWM KY
44S75)
Below: The ~ r t l e for
I1ett- Men of the 95th
WDrv. USThird Army.
lllIi:5h down the door of
I house in Mea. dUring
SIJ"eel fighting. 22
Noooember 1944, (US
~ via Real War
Phol:O$ - A 755)
In the far south. French First Army's I Corps
be gan its offensive towards th e Bellon Ga p on
the 1-Ith, reach ing Hencourt. Montbelta rd and
Hertmoncourt o n the 17th. Nex t day, the
leadi ng units were throu gh the Gap and some
six mnes beyond between the Rhine Ca nal an d
Delle on the Swiss borde r. They reac hed the
ou tskirts of Beltort on the 19t h and by last
light were at Rosenau, near Basel, on th e
Rhine. Fighting continued in Belfort . but
meanwhile on the 20t h, units of l st French
Armd Div reached Mul house.
\\'l't:k 25: 21-27 November 1944
British Second Army's 49t h and Stst Inf Divs
were continuing thei r advance on vente.
whi le on 22 November, VIII Corps' 15th Inf
Div took the villages of Sevenum and Horst to
the north-west of t he town. On 26 November
V]'s and V-2's hit Antwerp for t he first time.
THE ' LULL BEFORE THE STORM
In US Ninth Army's sector. XIXCorps bega n
the fina l pha-,cof Operation 'Queen'.
In US Hrst Army's sector, VII Corps' 104th
Inf Dtv took Frenz on t he 26t h, whil e units of
-lrh Inf tnv consolidated th eir gains in the
Ha n gen Forest area. Mopping-up co nti nued
throughout the rest of the week, whi le 29th
Inf tuv were similarly occupied on their way to
t he River Ruhr,
The Germans were sti ll causi ng US Thi rd
Army considerable delay on XII Corps' front ,
but at vtetz, 'The Bastion of the East', the two-
month siege ended on 22 November when XX
Corps report ed it subdued. This opened
another route to the German frontier and the
Siegfried Line. Despite bad weather, which was
hampering ai r and ground movement, US XII
and XX Corps made steady progress east and
north-east, -nh Armd Div crossing the saar on
24 November and 10th Armd Dtv crossing the

-
, -
Right: Engineef1; of 24ttl ..,
Engineer,; , 4th Armd ..
oiv, US Th ird Army.
carryi ng out the UI!efM-
able task of clearing a
dirt road of mines. One
man has already been
killed. I December
19+4. (US Army vQ P.eJI
War Photos - A S04)
Right : The St1ermans of
US Army have
Certainly battered
Hi.irtgen to pieces. It
was at an important
road junction on the
road to Cologne, in the
mtddle of the Hi.irtgen
Forest vlCI _ c:aptUI't(I
28 November 19+1.
(IWM EA 4607] )
lek: Infantrymen of XII
Corps, US Third Ivmy,
pass a sign to Saar -
brucken as they advance
through St Avoid, which
was liberated on 27
November 19+4. (IINM-
EA 456+4)
THE 'LUu' BEFORE THE STORM
Ge rma n borde r on t he 25 t h to ca pt ure
Bethtugen.
In US Seventh Army's sector, 2nd Armd Div
was adva nct ng to wards Saveme from
Bouxwtl ler and Hirkenwald, while 1000h lilt
Div took Sencncs on the 22nd and pushed on
towar ds St. B1aiw; on the same day 3rd ln f Dtv
too k StDie. On the 27t h 100th Inf mv a rrived
in the Saar ebourg area, and General Eise n-
hower ordered General Pat ch's Army to swing
north to assist Ge neral Patton's troops to
ca pt ure the Saar ba sin. On that day too, VI
Corps' 3rd lnf Iuv replaced French 2nd Armd
tuv in Strasbourg.
On t he 22 nd l st In f Dtv of French First
Army's II Corps, look Gtro magny, ope n ing up
a gap along the River Savoreuse, and I Corps
entered Mulhouse, close to the German
border. On t he 24t h, t roops of both US I and II
Corps .....ere ordered to converge o n Burnhaupt
as quickl y as possible so as to force an enemy
wit hdrawal Into Alsuce.
\\'l"t'k 26: 28 December 1944
By 30 November, in so ut h-eas t Holland ,
Briti sh Second Army's VIII a nd XIX Corps had
clea red t he enemy's bridge- head ove r the
Maas, on ly a small pocket remaining ncar
Hl erlck. On 2 December the Germans blew a
di ke on till' lower Rhine nea r Amhem, caustng
severe flooding and forcing can First Army's II
Co rps to withdraw over the \Vaal. Brit ish
Second Army's XII Corps capt ured Blenck
(o pposite vente on the !\.faas) on .l l:k"'Cember,
thus dearing the enti re region wes t of the
river.
In US Nint h Army's sec tor, XIII Corps
co nti n ued to advance towards Linni ch wh ich
126
102ml lnt Div took 0 11 t st December; they
reached the River Ruh r t wo days later. On the
4t h t hl'y bro ke off t he ir off ens ive, havtn g
ta ken al l thei r obj ectives wes t of t he River
Ruh r except t he vi llages of Wii rm and
Mullendorf.
US First Army's VII and V Corps continued
thei r dlfftcult operations in t he Hur rgen Fort'S!
and in t he River tnde sector, V II Corps reaching
the Vicinity of Lamme rsdort and Inden on the
30t h. On :i D e ~ .. -embcr t roops of 5th Arrnd tnv
reached Brandenberg and rein forced their
bridge-head 0\,('[ the river next day.
US Third Army's XII and XX Corps made
stead y p r u g r ~ s in their attacks against the
' West Wall ', despite continuing bad weather
whtcb restr icted armoured vehicles to the
roads. The enemy made full use of obstacles,
including, for example, old xtagt not Line post-
127
1
THE 'lULL BEFORE THE STORM
nons. On t he 29th XII Corps regrouped , an d
its .tth and 6th Armd Dtvs probed into the Saar
and took high ground in the co rps area, while
XX Corps troo ps continued to make progress
wit hi n Ger many. US III Corps remained non-
opcreuona t at Etatn. 011 ] 0 Nove mber, 6th
Cava lry Group was formed - soo n to be known
as ' Patt on's Hou sehold Cavalry'! At th e end of
the week III Corps' 87th Inf Div took over
from 51h Inf Div in th e xt etz area, with the
tavk of contatnmg th ose forts thai were still
holding out, including Fort Jeanne d'Arc.
Sarre-Uruon was clea red on the -ttb .
Fart her south in US Sevent h Army's area,
Fren ch 2nd Armd Div tVI Corps) reached
Erste in, about 10 miles SW of Sirasbourg, on
the 281h, but was halt ed by det ermined rest s-
la nce . US XV Corps' 79th lnf Iuv captured
Schwetgcnhause in Alsace on I December,
while Hlh and -15th Inf tuvs were engaged in
heavy fighting near Tiffenbach and Zinswiller,
managing 10 take th e latt er un th e 3rd .
In th e far so ut h, Fren ch First Army, rein-
forced by th e ar rival of US 76th Inf Div on 2
December, began an operation 10 squeeze out
the Colmar pocket by co nverging attacks from
north and sout h.
Above: Maj Gen Maurice Rose, dynamic CG of]rd Armd Divfrom August I ~
until] I March 1945. when he was killed in aetioo, is seen here beside hisJeep ill
Zweifall, ]0 November 1944. (US Army via Patten Museum)
Right: Amassive 240
mmMI howitz er
belongingto US Ninth
Mny is seen in action
cbl ngthe drive on
Germany, 12December
194-4. The l 60lb shell
coukl be delivered out
to 2l J'OO metres. (US
Mny VI3. ReAl War
Photos .A3167)
Below: A platoon of
tine HMC MBs of US
Fnt /4nny, in action in
the Hiirtgeo Forest area
on 7 December 19+4.
The HMC M8 mounted
J 75mmhowiuer on the
cNssisof an M5 light
ttnk. to make a very
effectie small HMC;
neiy 1.780were built
nl used in HQ Compa-
IlleS of mediu m tank
bmaIionsuntil replaced
by I05mm howItzef"S.
(US /4nny via Real War
Photos A 209)
Wl'l'k 27: 5-11 Decembe r 1944
On 10 December US First Army's V II Cor ps
launch ed all attack bet ween the Rivers lnde
and Ruin to take Duren, using 9th, 83rd and
104th Inf Iuvs. plus 3rd Armd Div,
In US Third Army's sector, XII Corps ' 4th
Ann d Div seized an intact br idge over the
River Eich el at Vollerd ingen and establis hed a
small br idge-head. In XX Corps's area 95th lnf
Div encountered heavy street lighting in Saar-
laute n, but managed to esta blish a bridge-head
at l.isdorf. On th e 8th, 35t h Inf Dtv crossed th e
Saar in four places. Bad wea ther rest ricted
flyi ng, but, significantly, air reoce report s indi -
cated a build-up of enemy forces in th e Eifel
area. On the 9t h G2 sent a report to SHAH
that a major enemy assault in the Ardennes
wa.. probable, but this was ignored.
3
US Seven th Army deployed two corps in an
advance towards the Mag tnot and Stcgfrtcd
Lines.
In th e far south, on 6 December French Hr st
Army's I Corp.. began an att ack on the Co lmar
pocket, whi le II Corps was facing heavy
co un ter- attacks in the area of Os t he tm.
Gncma r and Mtttctwrhr: the latter was ta ken
on th e 9th afte r heavy lighting. By 10
Dec ember, I Corps' 2nd Mor occan Div had
taken Than n and 9t h Colon ial Dtv had e1 imi -
nated all enemy wes t of the Rhine between
Kl' mlx and t he Swiss border.
Wlock 28 : 12-1 8 Dec ember 194-1
(See Cha pter 9 for an account of the Battle of
the Bulgl' - 16 December 194-4-20 January
194 51
129
130
Above: A mortar crew
in action near the
Hurtgerl Forest . I]
December 1944. (US
Army via ~ War
Photos - A 203)
Left : Men of a heavy
w eapons platoon set Ull
their .JOeal MI 917AI
Brow ning machine eun
in Saarlauten, during
he avy fight ing there. The
MI9 17AI was the dras
lic:aJ1y revised model of
t he original M191 7
machine gun. ~ _
the standard support
MG of the US Army
throughout .WII. (I'NM
- EA53 IS3)

IeIow: This hNYy

!IIiChine gun crew are
anying their .SOcal
Ilrownlng machioe gun
rto ~ shell-pocked
~ in Saartauten.
l.i:.e the .30 cal
Srowning. [he .50 is still
I'lseMce worldwide.
(1NH - EA53096)
US First Army began the wee k by taking Pier
and forcing the ene my to wit hdraw over t he
Ruh r. Having taken most of the area between
the lnde a nd the kuhr, VII Corps ope rat ions
were concl uded. while l 04th In f Div reac hed
t he Ruhr on a I'll-mile front. But h US First
and Third Armies' operations ceased on the
14th a nd t he re was a lull.
On 12 December US Third Army's (j -2 sent
yet anot her wa rning to SHAEF about a
dangerous enemy bui ld-up opposite US l-'i rst
Army and the like lihood of a major German
offe ns ive in the Ardennes. I'atton quiet ly
began hi s own planning so t hat he would be
ready if and ......hen the balloon ......ent up -
which of COUN' it did on the 16th.
US Seventh Army was halted at
Hottviller-Bitche on the ~ I a g i n o t Lrne, while to
it s south, French First Army was attacking post -
lions west of the Rhi ne in t he Colmar pocket.
Operations virtual ly ca me to a halt along
the ent ire front as attention focu sed on t he
posstbtnty of a Ge rman assault in the
Ardennes.
THE ' t uu' BEFORE THE STORM
Notes
l. DUKW = Truck, Amphi bious z va-t on 6)(6,
whic h used its normal drive on land and had a
rudder and propell er for use in water.
2. Patton was to record t ha t he considered this
to be one of the major errors of t he entire
ca mpaign . ' If Brad ley ha d not wels hed on his
ag ree me nt ,' he wrote in his diary. ' ......e would
have taken Saa rbrucken within 48 h rs after we
got Kocntgsmacker, Once we had (Koenigs-
mackcrl they couldn't have stopped us from
taking Trier . and if ......e'd had Trie r it would
have been impossi ble for t he Ge rmans to
launch their Arde nnes offensive.'
3. US Third Army's G-2 Section reported on a
significant enemy build-up. and it s after-
action report for t he period 3-10 December
1944 included the statement (written at the
ti me ): ' Overal l the initiative rests with the
Atnes. but t he massive Armored force the
enemy has built up in reserve gi ves h im the
deftntte capability of launching a spoiling
(dive rsionary) offensive to disrupt the Allies'
dri ve.' It was ignored by SHAEF.
13 1
f
THE ' LULL' BEFORE THE STORM
132
Left: Wintet" mod. A
'Jimmy' (GMC 2ton)
struggles through thtdt
win tet" mud, ~
in Belgium, before the
wmtet" snow came in
late 19-41, (Tank
Museum)
Left: Men. German
prisoners march out of
Fort Jeanne d' An::: at
Mea. . following its aprt.
ulation to USThird
IvTrry on I) December
19-41. (IWM- EA47S06;
Left: Metz. Maj Gen
Wal ton Walker. CG XX
Corps. leavi ng the town
hall in Mea after
formally handing back
t he hberated city to its
citizens. (IWM - EA
<4S037)

9
Hitler's Ardennes Offensive
Right: Ovenll Com-
mander of the German
te-ces for the assault
W3$ Field Marshal Gerd
vonRundstedt , who had
beenreinsta ted as DB
West in September
1944, When he first
heard of Hit ler ' s
proposals. he was stag-
gered by the scale of the
operation. had grave
misgivings. but was
forced to go along wi th
It. (IWM AP "' 7832)
(Wt"t.k 28 (12-18 December 19.... ) to Wt"" k
:n ( 16-22 January 19-15)
1\1"'" d m Rhein
' Soldiers of t he West Front! Your grea t hour has
a rrived. Large attacking armi es have sta rted to
ad vance aga ins t the Anglo-Americans, I do
not have to tell you anyt h ing more than that.
You feel it yourselves. We are gmt/bUns ('l't'l}"-
t/l;n,(! You carry with you the hol y obligation
10 give everyt hing to ach ieve Ihings beyond
human possibilities for our Father land and our
f uhrer!' Held Marshal Ge rd von Rundstedr's
me-ssage 10 his troops.
It was as ea rly as rntd- September that Adolf
Hitl er had first astounded hi s generals wh en,
afte r a normal ' Fuh rer conference' , he had
in vited Held Ma rsh al Keitel and Generals j odl,
Gude rian and Kretpe (represent ing Gori ng)
into an inner cha mber where, 3S t he y
discussed the current position of t he wa r. the
name 'Ardennes' had been mentioned and
Hitl er had come to life. ' Raising h is hand, he
had exclaimed: "Stop!" There was a dead
pause. fi nally Hitler spo ke: "I have made a
momentous decision. I am taking the offen-
stve. Here - out of the Ardennes! " He smashed
h is fist o n t he unroll ed map before him.
..Across the Meuse and on to Antwerp!" The
ot he rs sta red in wonder. His shoulders
squared , h is eyes luminous, t he signs of care
a nd sickness gone. This was the dynamic
Hitl e r of 19..0 .' 1
The plan for thi s daring ope ration was
undoubtedl y Hitler's brainchild. It was C1"K1e
named ' l VI/elit 1lt1l Rhein twatcn o n the
Rhine), so as to mislead Allied intelligence,
and when he sen t copies to von Rundvtedt
tre tnsta tcd as on West in September) and
Model (Comma nder Army Group B] he is
supposed to ha ve personally ma rked the cover:
'NOT TO BE ALTERED' ! In esse nc e, the plan
co ns isted of an ea rly mornin g (05.'\0 Ius)
assault by three a rmies, st riking through t he
Ardennes between Monschau in the north and
rchtcmach in the south - a frontage of some
H5 mi les . After crossing the Rive r Meuse
bet ween Ui'!o:l' and Namur, the assault would
bypass Brussels and aim at ca pt uring Antwerp
wit hi n a wee k. The America n and Brit ish
for ces, now cut in t wo, woul d never be able to
recover fro m the shoc k and would have to
make a sepa rate peace, leavi ng Ge rmany free
to deal wi t h the Soviet Un ion. The German
High Co mmand (OKW) we re secretly appalled
by the plan. but, in t he afte rmath of t he
unsuccessful atte mpt on the Fuhrer's life, no
one ua red 10 argue. Hit ler chose tough SS
General ' Sepp' Dietrich to play a leading ro le.
133
HITUR'S ARDENNES OFFENSIVE

Hts Sixt h 5S Panzer Army wo uld be in the

nort h of the assa ult force, to its left was to be
General Baron Basso von Manteutfel's Fifth
Panzer Army, wit h Ge neral der Panzenruppen
Erich Bradenberger's weaker Seventh Anny,
prot ect in g the sout he rn flank of the ope ration ,
Field Mar shal Model would he in overall ope r-
anoual co ntrol. When von Rundstedt heard
about t he scale of t he opt-ration he was stag-
gc red by it s Sill' and scopt.', and, cons idenng it
far too ambitious, proposed a more limited
auack to take out t he Allied salie nt around
Aachen, hu t this was d ismissed by Hitl er and
the OK\\'. Post -war he commented: ' It was
t he n on ly up to me to obey, It was a
no nsensical operat ion a nd the most st upid
pa rt was setting Antwerp as the target . If we
reac hed the Meuse we should have got down
on our knees and thanked God - Jet alone tried
to have reached Antwerp.'2 There was also
opposit ion to the plan from Dietrich , who
took his complai nts to Jodi, Chief of Staff
OKW, but got nowher e. His .'iS pa nzcr divisions
were to make the mai n effort, whil e t he Army
134
panzer divi sions would only play a supporti ng
rol e - a deliberate slap in the eye for t he Army,
whose office rs had tr ied to kill Hit ler.
Vo n Manteu ffe! was a tough. loyal
commander, but like von Runds tedt and Diet-
rich he did not hol d out much hope of getting
be yo nd the Meuse . He would show hi s
personal bravery early on in t he operattou.
going out d tsgul sed as an intelligence colone l
a nd perso nally d irec emg t he t ntenstve
patrolling t hat took place before the attack.
Erich Brade nbergcr, despite his 'unheroic
appearance' - he looked more like a school-
master - had already proved hi mself a compe-
tent co mmander whe n he took over as
Sevent h Army commander fro m Gc n Heinrich
Eberbach whe n the latter was capt ured (28
August 1944), but he was nevertheless worried
ahout his role on the southern flank, being
short of tanks and facing Patton's Th ird Army
for whom the Germans had devel oped a
hea lt hy respec t . In round figures t he Ge rma ns
had assembled some 250, 000 1111' I1, nea rly
2,nOO gum and 1,000 tanks, making it th e
Above left: Playi nga
major role in the a.uauIt
was the rough , tough55
Geoenl J.... "$epp'
Dietrictl, HrtIet' deIiber"
atetyga.ve his Sixth
Panzer Army the map'
role in the anault. asa
snub to t he Armyfor
failing to protect him
properly in the unsuc-
cessful bomb plot: to kI
him. (Tank Musetm)
Above: Field MarVIaI
Walter Model
commanded Heers-
gruppe Bduring the
Ardennes Offensive,
and, with voo Rundstedt.
was sent a copy of
Hider "s 'Wxht am

"""''''' by
Hitler. "Not to be
altered '! (IWM MH
12850)
Above: CG of 12th
Army Group was Gen
Omar Bradley (here
photographed in London
just after VE.Day), Gen
Hodges' First Army was
part of his Army Gr oup
as was Gen Patton's
Third Army to the sout h
aod GenSimpson's
Ninthto the north.
(Author' s Collection)
most formi dable fighting force eve r to face the
British and Americans in one sing le ope ration,
They were 10 he supported by some 1,500
aircraft of the Luftwaffe's /I - about
ha lf the n umber Goring had or iginall y
promised.
racing t hem in t he Arde n nes sector were
iust six divi sions of V and VIII Corps in
General Court ney Hodges' US First Arm y, On
til e left flank was V Corps ' 2nd lnf Div,
veterans who were prepari ng for an assault on
the da ms of the Rivers Roer and Urft. Th ey had
been holding the St . Vit h are a, but were
relieved o n II December by V III Co rps' 106th
Inf Div, so that they could take part in t he
att ack on the da ms. The ot he r divi sion in V
Corps was 99t h Inf Div a recen tly arrived
for mation (entered the line 9 Novembe r),
wh ich bega n the assa ult on the dams o n 13
Dec ember aga ins t heavy opposit io n . Th ey
woul d bot h be hit har d by the totally unex-
peered German assault. Sout h of them was
Ge ne ral Troy Middl et on's VIII Corps with t he
' green ' l06t h In f Div now in the line and
HITLER' S ARDENNES OFFENSIVE
shortly to receive it s first tast e of battl e; sout h
of them was 28t h Inf Dtv whi ch was recov-
er ing fro m the fightinR in the Hiirtgen forest
where it had sustai ned hea vy casualties. The
ot her t wo di visions in VIII Corps were the
' gree n' 9t h Armd Dtv, whi ch was to support
t he Roer dams operation and for whom the
co ming bat tle would be t heir first major oper
arton . and 4th Inf Div, al so recover in g in
Lu xe mbour g after t he Hurtgen Forest
ca mpa ign .
The Ptan
In the north, t he first wa ve of Dietrich's SS
Sixt h Panzer Army, comprising fou r infantry
( 12t h , 277t h, 326th vot ksgrenadrer ut vs
(VGD) a nd 3rd Par achute Div) and two SS Pz
Divs ( 1st (uihst,m,I,Irtt' Allol( Hi tl er) and 12t h
Cllitln 11I,( t"II I} were concent rated o n a narrow
front bet ween \10nschau and the Loshetm
Ga p. In thi s gro up was also Otto Skorzeny's 11/1
Iwe Co mma ndo bngade (I5Oth Pz Bde]. The
infantry was to lead in itially, stri king int o the
spa rse road network o f t he Ardennes,
adv ancing so me 3-5 rnt les on the fir st
morning and thus ope ning the way for the
tanks to pass t h rough and head with all speed
for the Meuse. The armour would be led by t st
S5 I'z Dtv whose 140+ AFVs (ind uding maIl Y
Panthers a nd Tigers) made it the most
po werful German unit in the Ardennes, It was
conf tdentl y assu med that the leadin g tanks
woul d reach till' Meuse and seize a crossing by
the end of the fourt h day. Sout h of this ma jor
assault , von Maureuffel's fifth Pz Army had
two prima ry cbtccnves: to e nci rcle t he forwa rd
elements of US 106th Inf Div in t he Schnee-
Eifd and ad vance to capt ure the key town of
St. Vith. This would he the main ta sk for two
o f the infantry di vi sions. Second ly, t wo
infantry a nd three panzer divi sions woul d
secure crosstngv over the River Our further
sout h, then go like hell, parallel with Dietrich's
leading elements, all the way to Ant werp! As
t he first problem concerned bri dging the Our,
the in fantry would lead, esta blis h its bri dge-
heads and protect the engi neers while they
erected sui table tank bridges across the river .
Hnatl y, to the sout h of the two pa nzer Armies,
Sevent h Arm y, the weakest of the t hree a rmies,
1)5
I
HITlER' S ARDENNES OFFENSM
would captu re a bridge-head, aga in over the
Ou r, between vtanden and tctrtemach. t hen
advance westwards, kee..ping statio n, so as to
protect von Manteuf fvl's left flank aga ins t
pos siblt' attacks from US Third Army.
The Germa ns wen.' hoping that til t' weat her
would remain bad enough to gro und Allied
aircraft, although they had assembl ed more
Luftwaffe support than for any previous oper-
ation on the Allied front.
Deceptton
Following th e Allied example after th e success
of the Operation ' fortitude' dcccpnon plan ,
th e Ger mans too k many precauti ons to concea l
t he nature of ' lVi/eli! lI/11 Rlteln' - even the code-
na me was deliberately chosen so as 10 so und
defensive. Troo ps, weapons and equip ment
were only moved by nigh t . Troop posl ttons
were carefully camouflaged, and only smo ke-
less charcoal fi res we re pe rmitted in the
Left: CG of the US First
Ivmywas I t Gen
CourtneyHodges - seen
here with Ge n Eisen-
howef, in the front
raN are Panon and
Bradley on Ike 's right
nI Simpsonon the far
leftof Hodges. The
phlxograph was taken in
Belgium on 10October
19+4. (IWM - At> 44557)
Right: AttKk! AAhough
this definitety a
posed photograph, it
doe!. have dramatic
as an 55 Rotten
Uref" orders his men to
atXk. The
_ one of a sequence
!aken aftel'" an aetuaI
battle between men of
Kimpfgruppe Hansen of
155 Pz DiYand 14th
Cav Group, US 7th
Armd D(\' . north of
Poteau. Destroyed
American vehicles form
thebackdrop. (IWM
EA 47959)
Left: Bastogne before
the siege began. The
photograp h shows vehi-
cles and men of Combat
Command B (no rmally
justcalled 'CCB') of 10th
ArmdDiv arriving in the
main st reet of Bastogne
on 18December 1944.
It was then split into
three combat groups
and sent to help close
themain routes towards
thetown from the
l"lOrttt-east . (IWM - EA
48295) forward areas which wert" st rict ly policed by
special sccnruy detachments. Even the leading
tXlI'S were kepi unaware of wha t was actually
planned unlil the ni ght before the attack. The
Germans had great faith in their
cipher machine , unaware that it had been
broken by the Allies years ago. Believing that
the Allies were obtaining information from
spies and traitors, extra precautions wen.' taken
and most of th e planning orders were de livered
by hand so that for this operation f1'iIG\ IA
had few secrets 10 yield. The Germans also
Intended to use groups of specially trained
tngttsh-spcakrng Commandos dressed and
equipped in American uniforms and driving
captured American vehicles. to infiltrate
137
HITlER'S ARDENNES Of fENSM
behind AlIil"d lines, blow up dumps, attack
headqua rters, kill troops and civilians, cut tele-
phone tines. and generally spread pan ic. This
was the primary tack of Otto Skorzenys 150th
Panzer Brigade. It was etso intended to drop
paratroops in depth. so as to block the move-
men t of American reinforcement s sout hwa rds.
The Assault
As planned. a barrage of she lls and rockets
landed on the American positions just before
first light on 16 December, heralding the
opening of the largest and mos t important
battle of the Allied campaign In Europe . In the
north. the two VGDs of I SSI'z Corps moun ted
a heavy attad.. against the green troops of 99th
lnt Div, but instead of caving in, the Gls
fought with great bravery and, despite heavy
138
cas ualties, held their posit ions all day and
throughout th e night. To th eir sout h. von
Manteuffel's chose n location for crossi ng the
Our was directly opposite t he veteran 28th Inf
Div, which had suffered heavy casualties in the
Hurtgen Forest. In places t he Germans had a
nu merical adva ntage of more than 10 to I ,
and den w fog and t he delfberate absence of a
long, preparatory barrage (although when it
came it was ext remely heavy), allowed the
assault force to get within yards of t he USposi-
t ions, in some places before they were
detected. Nevert heless, jmt as in t he 99th Inf
Div sector, the Ameri cans fought braw ly, the
key villages of Mamach and Hostngen holding
out all day. But many Ger man troops were
bypassing the US posi tions and disappearing
westwards, moving deeper into the forests .
left: Pnotographed
from underneat h a
KOed M8 Greyhound
armoured car. more SS
simulate M1 advance.
The foremost of the
now cigarette-smoking
Nazis (presumably
looted cigarettes (rom
t he Ame rican vehicles) ~
armed with a c.aptured
MI carbine . The strut
near him is is an eec-
triaty pole WIthfoot-
holes in iL (IWM EA
"'8012)
..
Gis stnIgg\e to

57mm gunin a
f<lno,wd area on the
Gonnony/Belg,"",
border in order t o try to
helpstem the German
_ .!IWM.EA
....,)
Fur t he rmore, the pioneers had managed 10
complete ta nk bridges at Dasburg and
Gemund. \0 that the panzers could Ret across
the Our and debouch westwa rds. US VIlI
Corps' commander, Gene ral Middleto n, had
been planning to conduct a fighti ng wit h-
drawal in the event of an enemy ottenstve. bu t
changed his plan once the hatt ie had begun
and Instead, ordered his beleaguered t roops 10
defend their positions for as long as possible.
A Breakthrough
Against this determined defence. the German
assault was soon falli ng seriously behind
schedule. everywhere that is except in the area
of the Loshetm Gap. on al most exactly the
same route which the Germans had used when
they invaded France and Belgium in 19-10. The
approximately seven-mile gap was the most
lightly held section of the enti re fronl line. It
HITLER'S ARDENNES OFFENSIVE
also was close 10 th e Inter-corps bounda ry
between US V Corps in the nort h and VIII
Cor ps in t he sout h. Never t heless, the ou tn um-
bered Amer ican'> did their best 10 hold t he
pa nzer'> bac k and did so un ti l first light the
followi ng day (17th), when Tiger tanks made a
breakthrough. To t he immediate sou th of the
Losbet m Ga p, the Gls in the Schnee-Ei tel area
were also now under heavy attack and very -
vulnerable, and a two-pronged attack also
th reatened the key road centre of 51. Vith.
Thus, by the morning of the 17th. it was dear
that the Germans had torn two gaps through
the US line - one on l06th lnf Dtv's front
(Schnce-Elfeh, the other on 28th Int Div's
trent. Reports were confusing, but it was
apparent that enemy armour was now
progressing rapidl y westwards. In addition,
German Seventh Army had made some
progress, crossing the Sauer and establishing a
HITLER' S ARDENNES OFFENSIVE
l eft: Men of the belea -
guered Bastogne gani-
sion (paratroopers from

the 'Screami ng
collect medical wpplia
dropped to them.
Unfortunately, during the
early part of the Siege.
the weather" was t oo bad
for flying. (IWM FRIo.
200218)
Below: When t hey
heard that Patton's Third
Army was on its way to
relieve them one of the
beleaguered garrison
said: ' If Georgie's coming
we have got it made! ' -
such was the reputation
of the clurismaliC Gen
George S. Patton. Jr.
(Author's CoIIectlon)
number of bridge-heads. Hitler was reportedly
delighted with the results to dat e, the wea ther
was still ' Hitler weat her' - fog, d rizzle and
ha ze, and it was forecast to co ntinue, whi le h is
ground forces appea red to be advancing as per
plan : ' Everyt h ing h as ch anged in the West!' he
exclai med. ' Success - co mplete sucCt'Ss - is
now in our grasp!'
All il'd React ion
when Ge neral Hodges fi rst hea rd of the
Ge rman attacks (at about 0 7lJO hr s o n the
16t h ), he h ad put a reserve Regi mental
Co mbat Team on full alert and a few hours
lat er o rdered 9th Armd Dlv to release thei r
CCA (rom the Roer dams attack and send it
to suppo rt VIII Corps. Apart from this he did
little, not realisi ng that this was a maj or
enemy assault and not just a spoili ng attack
to coun te r the goer dams assa u lt. Middleton,
however, was in no doubt that this was a
maj or ouens tve and requested rei n fo rce-
ments. There wa s co nsiderable delay i n
releasing anything: for a numbe r o f reasons :
th e Allied High Command did not wa nt to
put 0 (( the Roer dams assaul t o r postpone
future planned operations ; there were only
140
Below: The skies clear,
23 December" 1944_Gen
Patton's pn.yef" for fine
weather was ceruinly
nwered and the skies
deed on the 21n:l for
somesix days. givlng US
ThirdATmy plenty of
dear weather for battle.
Pmon presented his
pd'e with a 8I'onle
Star. telling him: .., You
5ln standin good W ith
the Lord and the
soId.en!' Here Gis
Wltch an aenaI dogfight
0Yel" the mowcovered
Ardennes. . (IWM EA
49742)
fo u r uncommitted US d ivisio ns , two of
which were airborne; they were not
co n vinced that this wa s a maj or assault.
Eisenhower, however, sensed that somet hi ng
big wa s taking place: ' I was immed iately
co nv inced that this was no local att ack,' he
wrot e in his memoirs. ' It was not logi cal for
th e e!le my to att empt merel y a minor offen-
sive in th e Ardennes ... we had alwa ys bee n
con vinc ed that before the Germans acknowl-
edged final defeat in the west they would
attempt one desperate co unter-o ffermve."!
He recommended that Bradl ey send in two
armoured di vi sions - 7t h from the north and
10th from th e sout h and ea rma rk US 82nd
and lOist Ab Dtvs (resti ng and rehabilitating
aft er the Amhem o perations) as tmmcdtate
reinfor cements. They would be o n their wa y
to th e Ardennes ne xt day: 82nd to the Houf-
f ahze sector at the very centre o f von
Manteuffet's assault , Iu t st to Bastogn e, th e
most i mport an t road junction i n the region.
On Sixth SS Pz Army's front the Ge rman
HITLER' S ARDENNES OFFENSIVE
attack wa s being contained in the area of th e
Mouvc h au -Elsenbom Ridge by those
elemen ts of 2nd and 99th Inf Dtvs that had
pulled hac" and jo ined with the veteran t st
Inf Iuv to form a tough defensive position,
fortunat el y with plenty of artillery on call.
On Hitl er 's direct orders th e Germans would
co nt inue 10 att ack here without success until
Ch rist mas Eve. Farther sout h, i n the Lovheim
Gap, the Germans had more success,
rea ching Trotv-Potnt s o n the River Amhleve
by the 19th, then advanc ing northwards
toward s Spa. But they were held, and a
coun te r-attack by 82nd Ab tnv pushed th em
hack o ver the river where they dug in. One of
the leading elemen ts of t st SS Pz Dtv was
Ober sturmbanntuhrer Joa chim perper's
battlegroup which comprise d some 100
tanks (Pan thers and Mk IVs) plus a fully
motorised panzergrenadter unit. Petper
would gain in famous notoriet y, by shooti ng
8 S American prisoners just sou t h o f
Malmedy - an act which he thought was in
,.,
keeping wit h his role of spreading alarm and
de spondency among the Americans, In fact
it had the dir ectl y opposue effect of stiff-
eni ng the Gt s' resolve everywhere. By 25
Decembe r, th e attack by Dietrich's much
vaunted 55 Army had virt ually ground to a
halt and they had gone on 10 the defensive.
In the central sector. von Mantcuffcl's Fifth
Panzer Army was still advancing, a major
obj ective bein g St. Vith . Here, Colonel Bruce
Clarke, then command ing CCH of 7th Armd
Div, took over command of a hodgepodge of
units in the area and rapidly welded them into
a co hesive fighting force, capable of ho lding
off all enemy thrusts un til 23 December. using
mo bile ' hit and rcure tacucs', dela yin g th e
enemy's advance so that thctr carefully timed
142
programme was soo n in tatters. Aft er t he war
von Manteuffcl said t ha i he had Ihought he
was being opposed by a far larger force, whil e
' Clarke of 51. Vith ', as he came to be called.
said: ' As the co mmande r of CCH, I analysed
the situation and decided that the probable
objective of the Ger man attack was not just 51.
Vith or a bridge-head over the Salm River, but
rat her a decisive objective far to my rear, prob-
abl y toward the English Channel. I could well
afford to be forced hack slowly, surrendering a
few kilometres of terrain at a time to the
German forces while preventing the destruc-
tio n of my command and giving other units to
my rear th e time to prepare a defe nce and a
counter-attack. Therefor e by ret iring a kilo-
met re a day, I was winning, and the Ge rmans,
Above: The relief of
Bastogne. Jeeps and tWf
tracks belongiog to 25th
Ca.... Regt. US "th Annd
Oiv, pass deiKl Gis OIl
the read near Chau-
lT1OIlt, Lullembourg,
where they were killed
in the desperate race to
reach Bast ogne and
relieve the garriSOll
there. 27 December
1944. (US Anny via Real
War Photos - A SOl)
Above: Men of 137th
Regt. 3S Inf Div,
advancing towards the
luxembourg border
from Tintange in
Belgium, in their drive to
cut off the German
advance. 27 December
19-4-4 (US Army via Real
War Photos - A 3179)
hy prevented fro m advancing many
kilometres or so a day, were
Whil e Cla rke was performin g mi racl es at St.
Vith, fart her sout h ot he r panzer spearheads
were clostng up on t he equally vi tal road bub
of Bastogne . It too wo uld bt'CO!TIl' a focal po int
of the American defence in t he Ardennes. But
whe n rr senhowe r held an emergency mee t i ng
on the evening of the 19th, it loo ked as
though t he enemy we re going hell for leather
between Bastogne and St. Vith, across the
Ourthe a nd on towards the xt eusc. At the
meet ing Patton alone was all for letting the
e ne my outreach himself and t he n ' chewing
hi m up' ,5 Bradley and Eisenhower we re
adamant that the enemy must not be allowed
to en.....'> the Meuse: indeed, it was at this june-
t urc thai Eisen hower inst ructed Mon tgomery
to take command of US First a nd Ni nt h Armies
north of the salient, and to halt the ene my
and oppose him with a firm front in con junc -
ti on with 12th Army Group to t he south,
Monty immediately deployed XXX Co rps in a
blocking position on the Meuse, whil e
deploying Hod ges to contain the northern
shoulder of the enemy thrust .
Not conte nt wit h calling a ha lt to the
German thrust s, Eisenhower wan ted a t the
same time to launc h a major counte r-att ac k,
ideally from the south. Il l' asked Patton when
he could a ttack and with .....hat force. He didn't
know t hat GSr had been looking at t he situa-
t ion for some days and preparing for just such
an emergency, so his con fident reply: ' On
1.3
HiTlER' S ARDENNES OFFENSIVE
German Order of Battle f or 'Wacht Am Rein'
1
LXXX Corps
Pz l ehr
or,
I I
Sixth Panzer Fifth Panzer
Army Army
o;. r,ic.h I'OfI M..
1- - --,1 '---1--1------,
ISS p, Corps I XlVII T O'''' p, Corps IlXVl i ' cO''''1
2nd pz 26t h 18th 62nd
Diy VGD VGD VGD
rst S5 Pz Diy

Adolf Hitkr)
'2th
Volksgr enadier
mv (VGD)
3rd Para
Diy
116th
Pz Div
_h
VGO
212nd
VGO
276th
VGO
3401h
VGO
12t h SS Pz mv
(Hi rler Jugend)
277t h VGD 1501h pz
ace
5t h Para
mv
352nd
VGO
1
99th Inf Diy
1
2nd Inf Div
I
VII' !"'P'
28th Inf Diy
American Ord er of Battl e i n Ardennes Sector, 16 December 1944
Fi rst US Army
r-t- _,
1
4th Inf Diy
9th Armd Diy l 06th Inf mv
December 22, wit h three divisions, the -uh
Armored, the 26th and the BOth: came as a
complete shock and was as Martin Blumenson
says in the ' Patt on ra pers': ' t he sublime
moment of his IGSI"s) career' . The assault was
also aimed at rcncvtng uastogn e, where IOlst
Atrbornc was now under stcge. Their epic
defence last ed un t il th e equally eprc advance
of CCR, -uh Armd Div, broke t hrough o n 26
December.
Meanwhile, the main body of the German
armies were pushi ng on towa rds the Meuse. In
the north 116th l'z Div crossed the Ounhe at
Hott on. but were then halt ed by US 84th Inf
Div. To their south th e crack Panzer IA" Divi -
sion reached as far as Clergnon. some twel ve
miles from Dinant and the Meuse. wh ile 2nd
l'z Div occupied Fe y-Notre-Dame, only a ta nta-
lis ing fou r miles from t he river on 24
December. Thts was the limit of the German
advance after which ' \ Vacllt lim RIJej,,'
collapsed. The leadi ng panzefs were now some
60 mtles from th eir star t lines, shor t of eWfy-
thing, Clews exhausted, and sur rounded by
their ene mies who were not only sta rt ing to
mo unt counter-attacks but were also
unleashing the full weight of thei r devastating
air attacks from the rapidly clea ring skies.
Th ere was nothi ng to do but retreat and they
WNe harried all th e way. Req uests to he allowed
to ma ke an orderl y withdrawal WN l' den ied by
Hitler; in fact , as von Manteuffel wrote later:
'44
Below: Armoured
Infaotry of 5Jrd Armd
Inf Bn. US Third Anrry.
move forward to atuek
the Germans who are
SUITOUnding Bastogne.
Together with 37th Tank
an. abo of ..th Armd
Div. the 53rd spear -
headed the relief of
Bastogne. (IWM EA

' Ins tead of orderi ng a timel y wit hdrawal. we
were forced to reti re yard by yard. under the
prc u re of t he attack ing Allies, mfferin/ol
u...ere lo...scs.' On 16 January, US Third Army
linked up with Hodges' US First Army nort h-
east of uastogne. and the battle was over.
' The battle of t he Ardenne... was won
prima rily by th e staunch fight ing qualities of
the American soldier.' That test imoni a l came
from one of th eir severest critic; - Mont -
gomery. And it was not idle praise . Neverthe-
less vict ory had been won at great expense on
both sides - the Americans 10000t more than
10.000 men killed. nearly 018,000 wounded
and 23.(x)() mi ...sing. German losses were even
higher _ some sources put the figure a'lo high as
120.000. There was also a high loss of AFVs o n
both ... ides. but whereas the Allies could
quickl y replace thei r los ses. th e 60() plus
HITLER' S ARDENNES OFFENSIVE
pa nzer s wh ich bad been destroyed could not
be so easily replaced . The Arde n nes offensive
had delayed the Allied advance into Germany
by some th ree weeks. but had undoubtedly
brought the end of the war much nearer.
Notes
I. Toland. J. Al lilif Hilla .
2. Bret t-Smit h, R. Hitler's Generals,
3. Elwnhnwer, D. Cr usade ill Europe.
01 . Clarke. General Bruce. 111(' Batt le for St
vtth', in Annor MilX'lZille. xovember-Deccmbcr
19701
5. At the meeting Patton sald: ' Hell let'... have
the gut... 10 lei th e sons of bitches go all the
way to Pari.... Then we'll really cut ' em up and
ch ew 'e m up!' Needl ess to say Ike went for a
more cautious approach which did not allow
th e enemy to cross the
145

Top left: New Y ~ r ' s Day mel vehi-

cles belonging to II Armd DIY
prepare for an atuck on the
outskirts of 8a5togne. Closest to the
amera is. an Ml half-track. (IWM
EA -481-42)
Lek: Covering the Bastogne
corridor. A Browning machine gun
crew of l Ot:h Infantry, 4th Armd Div
look out of their fc xhct e. ove r the
snow-covered fields of the
Ardennes near Bastcgne, covering
an advancing Sherman in the
8astogne corridor. 3January 1945.
(USArmy)
Above: Bazookamen of 3rd Armd
0w, US First Army, in a snow-
covered foxhole near the Ardennes
forest. await enemy armour. 1-4
January 19-4S, probabty in vain. With
amaximum range of 700yds. the
HI Bazooka could penetrate -4.7in
of armour. Nearly half a mi llIOn
were produced during the war, (US
Army via Real War Photos A 66OB)
Right: Neville. near 8a5togne. 16
January 19-45. Gen MuwenT ~ .
commander of IOlst Ab Div.
confers WIth senior offICers of the
division. (IWM EA 50507)
HITLER' S ARDENNES OFFENSIVE
147
I
I
10
To the Rhine
Into t he Rhineland
The ca mpaig n whic h began as soon as th e
Ger man Ardennes o ffensive had been effec-
tively dea lt w irh was to prove a very va ried
one which, as the US official htstory says.
had: ... gathered its momentum in the
snows of the Ardennes and the mud and pill -
boxes of the west Wall'. The fighting would
be every bit as hard as any th ai had gone
before, a.. the Germans tri ed desperately -
but wit h little real chance of success - to
defend their f-uh rer an d their Patherfan d ,
wh ile t he Ameri can, Briti sh , Ca nad ian and
Fren ch armies co nunued to puvh them bac k
from the Siegfrie d Line def ences, taking
every advantage of the heavy losses the
enemy had suffered. The Allies would have
'':4
1
1
>
to fan ' ..cveraI mor t' month s of fighting,
which would incl ude not only t he capture o f
t housands o f priso ners, the ta ki ng of ac res
a nd ac res o f enemy territ ory and t he occupa-
tion of h undreds of ruined towns and cities,
but such major events as t he crossing o f t he
Rhine; the release of Allied PO\ "'s and t he
full realisat io n of t he horrors of the Nazi
concent ranon camps; the successful lin k-ups
wit h the Red Army o n the Elbe: and the final
sha mbles in Ber lin wit h t he death o f Adolf
Hi t te r and the end of the Thi rd Reich . On t he
other side o f Ger ma ny, the Red Arm y was
conu n umg Its vic torio us winter dri ve to the
Od er - launch ed in m id-Ja nuary 1945 -
whic h would lead to eve nt ual vic tory in t he
east as we ll.
~ ..

Below: Men of XII

Corps advance further
into Germarty. At dawn
on 15 January 1945. 4f5
Royal Scots Fusilieo, t56
Bde of 52 Inf Div, put in
an attack towards Stein
from Tuddem. He re
men of I I PI. BCoy, are
firing at the withdrawing
enemy from trenChes in
Stein. (IWM B 13793)

TO THE RHINE
--
- -

Above: Xli Corps attack continues. Infantrymen of 6th Camero-

nians advancing from Tuddem. north of Sinard. Note the group of
AfVs to thei r right ; the nearest is a Sherman Crab. mine flail. used
to gap mineflelds. 18 January 1945. (IWM B 1378 2)
Below: XII Corps attack. Near Echt . troops of 5 KOSB. 131 Bde
of 7th Armd Drv, move past a group of German PQWs - they are
luftwaffe persoonel. behind whom are some British armoured
cars. (IWM B 1375 1)

149
left: Xli Corps attack.
Troops of the 6t h
Cameronians, advancing
toward s the village of
HAvert from Tuddern.
pass a column of
ShemIan tanks, Bren gun
aniers ilIld other"AFVs
in Tuddem. All the MVs
Iqvoebeen whitewashed
to blend wrth the snow.
The second Sherman is a
MrefIy. as can be seen by
tile shape of in muzzle
break just sticking above
therear of the leading
ank. 18 January I9<4S.
(1WM B 13767)
Right: Men of 9 DU in
Schilberg. together wrth
I column of Churchill
ron tanks . 20 January
I9-4S. (Author's ceaee-
- )
TO THE RHINE

left: XII Corps attack.

Troops of t he 1st Bn
Glasgow Highlanders
being carried by tanks of
8th Armd Bde through
the damaged Village of
Hengen . They must be
well out of enemy
art illery ra nge t o be
travelling so ex posed.
19 January 1945.
(IWM - B 1]924)
Wloek 34: 23--29 j anuary 194 5
The Immediate Allied plan in the northern,
2 1st Army Gro up , sector was for a t wo-
pronged attack to clear th e area betwee n the
Rhi ne and the Maas from Dusseldor f to
Nttmegen. esta blishi ng a bridge-head nort h of
t he Ruhr. To the sou th of Briti sh Second Army,
US Nint h Army would carry out th e sout he rn
prong of th e offensive, but only after US First
Army had taken the Roer dams. The Hrit ish
and Canadian att ack was code-named Opera-
tion ' Verit able', t he American, Ope rat ion
' Grenade' . The comb ined assault was planned
to star t on 8 February.
Before t hese operat ions could be launched,
however, the area known as th e Roermond
tr iangle had to be clea red. This was achieved
by 26 january, units of British second Army's
XII Corps in Operation ' Blackcock' pus hing
the enemy back east of the River Roer ewry-
where except for a small bridge-head in the
area of Vlodrop.
South of 21st Army Group in the Ardennes
sector, 12th Army Group 'US First and Third
Armies) conti nued their offensive to win hack
all t he gro und taken during t he German
assault , capturing the area south and south-
east of St. Vith and finally eliminati ng the
entire Ger man salient by 28 janu ary, when US
First Army troops began their fina l advance to
th e Slegfrted Line. Initially at least t he coun-
tryside was lust as inhospitable as in the
Arde nnes, hut by att acking through the Eifel
the rugged co untry around Monschau, in
which t he Roe r da ms were located, was
avoided. Gene ral Bradley's forces were able to
bypass and outflank th e da ms, yet were still in
a pos it ion 10 support the main effort further
no rth . Bradley intended to att ack north-east-
wards along the German frontier between
Monschau and St. Vith, and to seize the town
of Eusktrc hen, t hereby putting US t roops
behind th e main enemy defences. The first
phase of the offensive was to be a frontal
attack to pen et rate the West Wall between
xton schau and Leutzkampen, the main effort
being made by XVIII Ab Corps on the right
wing, fighting th rough the Losheim Gap (as
the Germans had done - albeit in the other
dir ect ion - in 1914 , 19010 and 19H). To their
151
TO THE RHINE
152
Above: The crew of tt.s
Shennan are hoIving to
replace both tr.Jdu on
their Sherman - not I
pleasant job at :my time.
but one can imagine tbe
difficulties in the depths
of winter! Near Wilt.
l uxembourg. 26January
1945. (USArmy viaRnI
War Pbotos . A887B)
l eft : Battle of me Retchs-
wald Forest. BritishIll
Canadian trOOpS . massed
to enter the flbchswald
Forest. part of ()penDlln
' Veritable. the thrust
from the Nirnqen
bridgehead, whichwas
the beginning of the
battle of the Rhneland.
Note the Ieadmg ~
covered ShernwlIS I
17pdr Firefly, PICtIft
taken early ~
1945. (IWM . /4P 5357)
nor th . US V Co rps would aim 10 penet rat e th e
western ar m of th e \ Vest Wall in th e Monschau
Forest. In reserve was US VII Corps, ready to
ex p lo it enhcr attack. Ridgwa y's airborne
t roops opened th eir att ack on 28 January. V
Corps' th e following da y.
On t heir right. Patton 's Th ird Army would.
in the first phase of operations. protect First
Army's right fla nk . openi ng its own otfennve
on 29 January which was also designed to
force a way t h rough th e Siegfr ied Line. US VIII
Corps on the right flank also began thei r
attack on t he 29t h. The terrai n an d foul
wea t he r proved every bit as hosti le as t he
enemy; snow everyw here up to 2 feet deep and
in places up to wais t leve l not only choked t he
roads bUI also h id t he enemy's mines, which
made progress d ifficult and dangerous.
Much farther sout h. French First Army's 11
Co rps launched a new offens ive across th e
River Ill. ..... hile, on t he 29t h, US XXI Corps
crossed th e Colmar Ca nal.
W l ~ ' k 35 : 30 Jan uary--6 Feb rua ry 1945
Roosevelt and Churchill met in Malt a on th e
:iOl h . pri or to t he Yalt a Co nference wit h Stalin.
which began o n .. Februa ry. All th e Allted
armies .....ere ma king progress on all fronts. On
.. February it was an nounced t hat Bel gtum was
now clear o r enemy.
In US 121h Army Group 's area, t he d ifficult
wi nter conditi ons slowed XVIII Ab Corps'
TO THE RHINE
pr ogress and it was not until the firth da y of
t he att ack ( 1 February) that th ey reached the
west Wall. To t hei r nort h, US V Corps had
entered Ge rma ny on :i I January as they
advanced to take t he Schwammenauet dam.
:-low, however, Eisenhower decided to ha lt
121h Army Group's dri ve on Euskinhen and
move troops nort h to Ntnt h Army's secto r. On
JOJa nuary, 78th Inf Div (XIX Corps. US Ninth
Army) opened thei r offensive towards t he
Rive r Ruhr along the northern edge of t he
xronsch eu Forest .
On J February, Pat ton ordered Thi rd Army's
XII Co rps to initiate a night attack on Bit bu rg
on 6/7 February, while VIII Corps conti nued
it .. drive towa rd.. Pru m . It appeared t ha t th e
Germa ns were withdr awing pa nzer un its from
til t' We..tern Front (or deployment in the eas t .
leaving th eir west ern defences in t he hands of
low-grade infantry, th ousands of whom wou ld
eventually surrende r or desert.
To the so ut h. US Seven t h Army crossed th e
River MOON o n I February and advanced
towards Obc rhotcn. while French First Army
in Alsace con tinued to make progress near
Col mar, completing it s capture by 3 Februa ry.
Wl'l'k :\ 6: 7-13 February 1945
On K February ncar Nijmegen, th e Briti sh!
Canadian offenstvc (Operation ' Veritable')
tX'/o: an as planned, and t he Rhine was reached
OI l Millill/o: l'll . By 10 Februar y they had reached
Right : The Canadians in
Germany. Up at the
northern end of the
front lines, in t he Cana-
dian sector. vehicles of
the Jrd Canadian
Infantry Brigade travel
aloog the flooded MSR
(Main Supply Route)
near Cleve. I] February
1915. (National Archives
of Canada - PA 1"' ] 916)
153
TO THE RHINE
Kleve and xtatcrtom. capturing Kleve on the
11th.
In US First Army's sector. Schmidt was taken
on 7 Februa ry. The Ge rmans opened the
Schwammenauct dam in an attempt to delay
the American advance.
US Third Army co ntinued. its att acks near
Prum in t he north, wh ile XII Corps troops kept
up the press ure in th e sout h. In III Corps' area
a limited attack took place across t he River Our
and the bri dge-head was enlarged during the
week. In VIII Corps 11th Armd Div captured
Habsc he id, -I t h In f Div took Brandscheid and
Schlausenbach, and 87th Inf Iuv attacked th e
Siegfried Lrne. The armoured divisions in
lhird Army, and elsewhere, had now begun to
recei ve the new M2-1 Chaffee light tanks for
their cavalry rec ce squadrons which greatly
improved thei r capabtnttes. Also , flame-
throwers were received by -Ith and 6th Armd
Divs to fit into their medium tanks. These
proved. idea l for me aga inst pillbo xes. Un its of
XX Corps launc hed th e ni ght att ack as
plan ned , using artif icial moonlight (fro m
154
sea rchlights) on Saa rtautern. Roden and
Fraulautcrn.
Everywhere a sudden thaw had given the
engineers even more almost impossible prob-
terns wnh streams becoming raging to rrent s
W(}..ZOO teet wide, the ch urni ng water over-
t urning assa ult boat s and floats, drown ing
many Gls. Another problem was th at much of
th e stacked reser ve ammunition toppled <IIHI
had to he to-stac ked . Despite th ese added. diffi -
cu lt ies, th e assaults co nti nued.
Wt't' ''- 37: I4-Z0 February 194 5
Montgomery's 21st Army Group had reached
the so uth bank of the Rhine opposite
Emmerich by the l-rrh, and in the north th ree
days later the Canadians reached the Rhi ne on
a t o-rune front . British XXX Co rps at tacked
Goch.
US Nint h Army began Ope rauon ' Grenade
on 16 February.
1'.11101l'S US Th i rd Army launch ed new
att acks from southe rn Luxembourg (XII Corps)
and Saar louis (XX Corps), and by t he 18th VIII
Left: Warning sign on
the GermanlOutch
border, I ~ February
1 9 ~ 5 " (IWM - PL
390102)
Above : Near Bellendorl,
Germany, men of Co 'B'
91 st Chemical Bn, 5 US
Illf Div, lay down a
smoke barrage with
their 4.2ill mortar, [ 0
cover other troops of
the division whilst [hey
are crossing tbe River
Sauer. (US Army via Real
War Pho[ OS - A 2621)
Corps had broken through t he Siegfri ed Line
north of rchtemach. Th ese advances ha d
created a ' bulge' in the front line nne ' v tauden
Bulgc' ), wh ich then ha d to be cleared. I'rum
wa s fina lly taken and t he Americans
co nti n ued to clear pillboxes and str ongpo tnt s
along the Siegfried Line. US Seven th Army
att acked near Saarbrucken.
\\'t. 'ek 3M: 2 1- 26 Fehruary 1945
Goch was taken by xx Corps' 5lst Highland
Div an t he zt st, a nd two days later US Nint h
Army crossed the Roer.
On 23 February, US First and 9t h Armt es
launched a new offensive along t he Roer, most
pa rti cula rly in the area of junch and Duren.
The river was crossed in several places and
Du ren was ta ken on t he 25 th by First Army's
VII Corps. Soon more bridge-heads had been
secured, in the north and south, and thew
were rapidly expanded.
US Th ird Army finally st raighte ne d out the
' Vianden Bulge' thi s week, tha n ks 10 t he
combi ned efforts of US VIII and XII Corps. The
scale of th e proble m which they had faced Gill
be gaugt'd by the fact t hat fro m 29 Janua ry tn
2 \ Febru ary, VIII Corps uni ts dest royed a stag-
gt' ring 'n o enemy-held pill boxes. On the 2 1st,
when 10th Armd Dtv had reached a po int jus t
six mi ll's fro m Trie r, Patton orde red XX Cor ps
to a tt ac k and ca pt ure this key Ge rman
communica tions cent re,
Wt.'ck 39: 27 Pebru a ry-S March 1945
In 21s1 Army Group's sector, Udem and Kalkar
fell at the beg in ning of the week, a nd by 3
March US Ni nth Army had linked-up with the
Canadians at Geldern .
In US First Army's sector, VII Corps units
CTQS>;t.'d t he River Erft at Modrarh and had ta ken
Ccoicnz. Bonn and Co logne by the 5th; two
days later they linked -up with the Canadians.
155
TO THE RHINE
156
Above : 00 the Cleve-
Calcar road, Canad,ans
prepare to follow up
retreating Germans.
Before resuming the
advance these
'Kangaroo' crews have a
quick 'wash and brush
up' in a sea of mud.
Their Kangar oo APC5
(de-turret ed Canadian-
built RAM tanks] held II
infantry soldiers in full
battle order, plus a crew
of two, 22 February
1945. (Author's
Collection)
Le ft : Infant rymen of9Q
Inf Div and AFVs of 6m
Ann<! Div, USThird
Army, move through me
dragons' teeth of the
Siegfried Line, near
Heckuschied, Germany.
Fe bruary /9<45. (IWM-
EA 54147)
Above: A hair-track and
trailer, be looging to 10th
Armd Div, crosses a
pontoon bridge over the
Saar River, at Taben, in
the U5 Third Army
sector 00 25 February
1945. (U5 Army via Real
War Phc tos v A 985)
Right: Men o r the
Queen's Own Camerons
of Winnipeg open a
parcel fro m ho me in a
pup tent-covered
German dugout in the
Hochwal d Forest .
Gennany.5 March 1945 .
(Nat ional Archives of
Canada - PA '37458)
TO THE RHINE
In US Third Army's \{'(.10r. all corps were
making rapid gatns: on the 5t h t hey took their
200. 000t h prisoner.
e rm,dng the Rhine
Although by ea rly 1945, the Allied armies had
reached the Rhine in both the north
(Nijmegenl a nd the sout h tStra\bourgl, in the
cent re the German Ardennes offensive had
delayed t heir advance, so it was not unt il early
Ma rch that they approached this last grea t
symbonc de fensive line along its entire len gth.
Th e SHAH ma st er plan called for the crossing
to take place in 21st Army Group's ar ea. with
a....rstance h om US Nint h Army, plus airborne
troops. The assault was planned on a -t-dtvt-
ston frontage - two on 2 1st Arm y Group's
f ro nt and two in the attached 9t h Army a rea -
t he whole supported by an airborne attack
mount ed by US 17th Ab and Briti sh 6th Ab
Dtvs. The ar ea chosen was just to the north of
t he Ruhr. Detailed. methodical planning was
necessary, beca use it was known that the
Germans had some of their best rema in ing

troops hulding the line in this ar ea , induding

pa ratroops. In prepa ration for the coming
bat tles, a n entire Ca na dian corps had been
brought fro m Ital y, plus a Briti sh division from
t he Middle East . The airbo rne troops were to
he used in a novel wa y. namely as follow-up
forces rather than in advance of a ny
a mphibious crossing att empt. The river would
he crossed by night . and the airborne troops
would be d ro pped near by the fo llowin g
mo mtng. to par ti cipat e in the close tact ical
hatt ie. In all Montgomery had some 29 di vi-
sions under hi s command. but not all of them
would be used in the o pe ration because the
Allies' 'l ong left flank' had st ill to be defended.
Before thi s setpfece assault could tak e place.
however. the Allies were fortunate enough to
' bo unce' crowtngs over the river elsewhere.
Remagen
The honour of betng the first unit to capt ure a
r ross tng over the grea t rive r fell to a detach-
ment of US Ni nt h Armd Div - of III Co rps in
Ge neral f 1 o d ~ e s ' US Firsl Arm y. TIl ey rea ched
-
-
Below: Into Cologne.
Tanks or the us First
Army moving into
Germany's third City, on
7 Man:.h 19<15. They
captured over 3.600
prlsonen in the battle to
take the city. (IWM - EA
55822)
TO THE RHINE
Above : Men of the I Ith Inf Regt, 5 Inf Div. US Third Ivmy
boarding trueks that will take them even closer to the Rhine in
pursuit of t he enemy. The pho togra ph also gives an excellent view
of the ubquitous litt le Jeep. over 630.000 of which we re built
dUring the war. One of the Jeeps mounts a cal .30 Ml9 17Al
Browning machine gun on its tripod mounting. It was the standard
support machine gun in the US Army. 7 March 19-45. (US Army via
Real War Photos A 26-4 1)
Right: A VIeW of the
Remagen Bridge, taking
in the quad .50 c.aJ
guns of a
Multiple .5Cin MG
Urriage MSI , whtch
belonged to 6J 9t h AAA
Bn. US FIl"St Anrty. (Tank

159
TO THE RHINE
the river opposite t he sma ll town of Remagen
in the late morning of 7 March and were
amazed to find that the double t rack railway
bridge was still intact . Led by Lieutenant Karl
TImmerman, a small de tachment rushed the
bridge. The bridge garrison set off the demoli-
tion charges, but amazingly the br idge
remained almost completely intact and t he
Gts q uickly d1a\1..'<1 off the remnant of t he
defenders, disconnec ted the cha rges that had
not detonated and proudly reported t hei r
amaz ing succe ss. They were swift ly reinforced
and by even ing a firm br idge-head had been
established. Hitler , who had orde red th at no
bridges over th e Rhi ne were to be ca ptured on
160
pa in of death, was fur ious and his tmmcdtat e
reaction was to sack f ~ ( von Rundstedt (yet
agai n!), rep lacing him wit h Bo( Kesselring
fro m the Italian front . Of course this !>ingle
crosst ng would dearly not suffice for the enti re
Allied forces , so ot he r, more substantial CTO!>!>-
tngs we re needed bot h above and be low
xcmagcn.
US Thi rd Ar my Cro....Ings
In early March kem agen was the o n ly
crosstng-potnt in Allied hands, and it loo ked as
though th e next one would be tilt' setptccc
assault ..... hi ch Montgomer y had bee n planning
so met hodically. Patton, however, had other
left: Exce llent close-up
of ~ 8 1mm morur
crew of I04 I In' R.egt.
36th Inf Dfv. US Seventh
Army. firing ill mission. 9
March 19-45. (US Arrrry
via Real War Photos _A
3197)
Righ t : Winterberg,
Germany. Men of the
11th Inf Regt, 5 Inf Diy.
move along ill country
road. Note the various
half-tracks aod jeepson
e ither side. plus 00 the
right: of the p h o t ~ .
two HMC MSs, which
mounted ill 75mm
howitzer 00 ill M5 light
tan k chassis. (US Arrrry
via Real War Photos -
A26043)
Right: Men of HQ Co.
2nd Bn, II th Inf Regt. 5
Inf Div. move iII\ong the
bank of the Moselle
River, ccccene Maden,
Gennany, as they
advance on Lutz, I5
March 19045. (USArmy
via Real War Photos _A
26042)
TO THE RHINE
Ideas! Bradley had already given him pcrmts-
ston to cross the nver. and he ha d been
looking into an ingenious plan to get a sman
body of troops over th e river in artill ery obser-
vancn and army liaiso n ai rcraft (his army had
some ZOO of these and each coul d take a
passenger. so in t heory an infant ry batt alion
could be got acros s in abo ut 1
1
/2 hou rstj.
However, Ihe ligh t aircraft were never used.
because they .....ere not need ed. ,\I 21nO hrs on
22 \farch, th e lead ing assault boats of CO K,
J rd Bn, 11th tn t gegt . 51h lnt Dtv, crossed at
Nterstern without a sbot being fired . Fur t he r
upstrea m at Oppenheim, Cos ,\ and B, of the
h i Bn of the regtment . crossed at the same
t unc and engaged in a short mach ine-gun
battl e, The enti re cros sing had been achieved
wit h just 20 casualti es and Patton was
delighted at having put one over on Mo nty!
li e informed Brad ley immed iately, but asked

crossing the Rhine .
Troops of USNinth
Army paddle small st orm
boats across the River
r-taas. whilst larger
assault craft await their
tum. during amphibious
crossing rehearsals.
(Author's Collection)
Below: Tucked up a
ssdestreet. fairly close to
the Remage n bri dge. the
machine gunner on this
Ml hair-track gets ready
to e ngage any enemy
aircraft trying to bomb
the bridge. Not e also
the Browning AutonutIC
RifleIylngbessde him.
The Gemw1 engineer
comrnandeo at
Remagen were e xecuted
for not blowing the
br idge in time , despite
the fact that it was
a fault with the demoli.
tion equipment . (US
Army via Real War
Photos - A 281)
Right : Dense clouds of
white smoke - from
white phosphorus
smoke shells fired by US
Third Army amllery -.
bursting on the steep
east bank of the Rhine .
26 Marc h 19"'5. (IWM -
EA 5(960)
TO THE RHINE
him not to make any offici al announcement
\0 as to avoid possibl e counter-att acks. Durin g
the next momrng tanks and tank destroyer s
were ferried across and by late afternoon on
the 23rd, a Class 40 treadway bridge had been
completed at Niervteln. Patton was unabl e to
conta in himself for very long a nd just hours
before the main 21st Army Group cTOssinK was
due to begin he ' phoned Bradley aga in: ' Brad:
he shouted. " For Goo's sake tell t he world
we're across ... I want the world to know that
Third Arm y made it before Monty starts
across!'!
Opcrauon ' Pt under:
Despite US Third Army's success , the main
assault. by 21st Army Group, was launched on
a zs- rnnc front between Emmerich and Rhei n-
berg. Troops, veh icles and equipment were
concent rated be hind an almost continuous
Right: CrosSi ng at St
Goar. Infantrymen of
35'"Inf Regt . 89th Div.
U5 Third Army, crossing
the Rhine in their assault
boats towards St
Goarhausen on the east
bank. (IWM EA 6"'607)
163
TO THE RHINE
smoke-screen which la..ted throughout the
23rd. The smoke-dischargers were switched off
at about 1730 hrs and ha lf an hour later the
enti re a rt ille ry of Briti ..h Seco nd and US Nin t h
Armies opened fire ami continued to pour in
shells ami roc kets unti l 0945 hrs next day. H-
Hour for the leading am phibia n- ho rne troops
was 2100 h rs on 23 four battalions of
XXX Corps (5 1 Highland Div plus a Canadian
Bde) cro.... ing the river in seven minutes, using
150 Buffalo tracked amphibians. The ('nemy
contested the landing and there was a fierce
battle in the area a rou nd Ret's, whe re t he cas u-
al ties incl uded t he CDC, Ma jor-General
Thomas Rcunt e, who was killed. TIl(' riverside
town was not clea red until the monung of 26
March, by t roops of Srd Canadian Inf Div, and
it took four more days to dear Emmerich .
Everyone was surprised by the tenacit y of the
Germans, who were fighting marl' uercety
than at any time since Normandy. ' It says a lot
for the morale of t hose German parachute and
pa nzt.'r t roop" : commented XXX Corps
commander, Lieute nant-Genera l Sir Bria n
Horroc ks, 'that with ch aos. drso rgantsanon
and disillusion all around them they should
still be resisting so stubbornly,' On the far right
of XII Corps' sector, t st Cdo Bde crossed
almost undetected and infiltrated into the
outskirts of weset . just before some 200 RAf
Lancasrers ' neut ralised' the town. Around
Xanteu, 15th (Scottish) Div spearheaded XII
Co rps' assa ult of the eastern ha nk.
Meauwhlle, at Rhe tnbcrg, sout h of wesct a t
0200 hrs on 24 March, .lOt h a nd 79 t h US Inf
Divs of US Ninth Army's XVI Corps, crossed
with minimal opposition, achieving all thei r
objectives without any major problems.
Indeed by dusk that day they had constructed
a 1,150-foot ' treadway' bridge. Altogether,
twelve bridges we re in service across the Rhine
by the eve ni ng of 26 Marc h.
Operatton ' Va rsit y'
The airborne assault we nt in at llMMI h rs 24
March, the d rop zone being a round
Harnminkeln, some seven miles east of the
Rhine. One of the tasks allocated to t he
airborne troops was to capture Intact some of
the bridges over the which flows pa ralle l
164
to the Rhine bet ween weset and Emmerich.
There were connderable casualties from
enemy AA fire, despite pre-drop atrstnkes and
softening up by accompanying fighter -
bo mbers. ' v arsit y' was dest ined to be the la..t
ever action by gli der-bo rne t roops.
Brit ish Prime Minister Wi nston Churc hill
had be en prese nt thro ughout t he cross tng
operations and later crossed in a Buffal o to t he
West.'! bridgehead.
Field Marshal Montgomery. who considered
operation ' Plunder' to be one of his best-
organised operations. summed it up later in
just sixteen wo rds: 'Our at tack across the
Above: CrOSSIng at St
Goar. Troops of US
Third Army the
Stars and Stripes at the
lor'elei Rock
the Rhine Gorge, dose
to St Goar, where 354
Inf Regt had made their
crossing. (US Army)
~ t
-
-
-
-
. ~
-
Above: Operancn 'Varsity',
This photograph snows tbe
great air armada on Its way
towards the Rhine. Dakotas of
the British airborne fleet are
the ones flying in Jcrmancn.
after meeting the American
fleet over Wavre in Belgium.
whilst high above them are
Stirlings towing gliders - an
aerial crossroads but not a
traffic jam! The photo was
taken on 24 March, H hour on
the DZ was IOOOhrs, the DZ
being some miles east of the
mer. It was the first phase of
Operation ' Plunder' and was
completely soccessrct (Bruce
Roberston)
Right: US paratroopers of
17th US Ab Diy take cover in
the orchard in whICh they
have dropped. Their initi,)1
obfectl\le is the farm building
in the rear of the photograph,
<II German st rongpoin t. which
must be taken quickly. In all
the 17th Ab DIY took 2,000
pnsonen aod the Br 6th Ab
Div. <II further 1,500. (IWM -
165
166
Above: Amerian para-
troopers di g in WIthin
thei r Oz, some miles
east of the Rhine ne
Hamminkeln. All
airborne t roops Wef"e on
t he ground by 1230hrs
and in it matter orhours
bo th American and
Brit ish had sei zed all
their objectives assigned
for Day I . Link-up was
made with British
ground troops by night-
fall. (IWM KY 6(486)
l eft : Follow-up to the
crOSSing at WeseI.
Llndlng t ~ i r e s on
the .ahemoon of 14
March, to support 1st
Cdo Bde of 2ndBr
Army, at weser. Photo--
graph shows two
BuffAloes dropping thetr
cargoes on the eul
bank. The damaged
railway bridge can be
seen behind them. (IWM
BU 2]]5)
Above : Cnnsing at
Frankenthal. It was at
0230hn on the 26th that
men of the 3rd Inf Dw,
US Seventh Army.
crossed in assault boats
with outboard motors as
seen here on the west
bank. (IWM - EA 59875)
Right: U5 Third Army
engineen of 80th Inf Div
built this 1.865ft long
'Sunday Punch' pontoon
treadway bridge at
Mainz. (IWM EA
80873 )

167
TO THE RHINE
Rhine, suppo rted by a very large-scale airborne
operati on, was an outst anding success.'
In all th er e were 23 assault crossi ngs of the
River Rhi ne , the last nve bl'inK well 10 the
sout h in Fren ch FirSI Army's sec tor:
I. 7 March , 1600 hr s: Rcrnagcn . US First Army,
27 Armd Iu f lin
2. 22 March, 2200 Ius: Oppenheim, US Third
Army, 11th Inf Regl
3. 22 March, 2200 Iu s: Nicr stcin, US Third
Army, l Ith Inf
4. 23 March , 2100 Iu s: aces, British Second
Army,S l st Highland tuv
5. 23 March , 2200 hrv wcse t. Briti sh Second
Army, l st Cdc ud c
6. 24 March , 0200 hrs: uadertch . US Nin th
Army, 119th Inf Regt
7. 24 Marc h, U2nn hr s: Wallach , US Nint h
Army, 117th Inf Regl
8. 24 March, 02Un h rs: Rhctnberg. US Ninth
Army, 1201h Inf Regt
9. 24 02UU hr s: x ant en. Britis h Second
Army, 15th Scottish Inv
10. 24 March. O](X) h rs: watsum. US Nin th
Army, 3151h Inf Regt
168
II. 24 March , O;\no hr s: Orsoy, USNint h Army,
31]t h Inf Regt
12. 25 March , rxxn hrs: Boppard, US Third
Army, 345t h Inf Rl'gt
13. 25 March , IX)(II hr s: Rhcn s, US Thi rd
Army, 34 7th In f Regt
14. 26 Mar ch , 02()(llu s: St GO,H, US Third
Army, :\ 54Ih In f Rl'gt
15. 26 March, 02(XI hr s: Obcrwcscl, US Thir d
Army, 3S:lrd In f Rl'gt
16. 26 March. 02(X) Iu s: Hamm, US Sevent h
Army, 45th Inf Div
17. 26 March, 023U hr s: Frankcnthal, US
Seven th Army, l rd Inf tuv
18. 28 March, m ouhrs: Matnz, US Th ird Army,
317th Inf Rl'gt
19. 31 M3Kh, U2]O Iu s; Speyer, Fren ch First
Army, Srd Regt Tua tllvur s Algt-riem
20. 31 March . 060() Iu s; Gcrmcrshet rn. French
First Army, -ttn Regt Ttratlleurs Afgenc ns
21. 31 March, 0600 hrs: Mechtersheirn, French
fi rst Army, l Shtlnf mv
22 . 2 April; Leimershelm, French First Army,
9th Colo nial Inf Div
23 . l S April, 1100 hrs, French First Army, 23rd
Inf Regt
Above: This t riO of
Bnt ish soIdien in
Ge ilenkirchen near
Munchengladbach
provide good shots of
two varieties of Sten
Guns - the shiny Sten on
the left is a Mk 5, whilst
the other carried by the
middle soldier is
probably a Mk 2. In
addition, the main
weapon of the trio is the
PlAT(Projector Infantry
Ant i-Tank) hanging over
his shoulder. The PLAT
had a combat range of
on ly 100 yard s. but
coul d fire WlOke and HE
rounds to far greater
ranges. (IWM - BU
1))5)
Abo ve: Machine
gunners of 303rd Inf
Regt . 97th Inf Oiv, US
f irst Army. cover an
important intersect ion in
Siegburg - east of t he
Rhine and north-east or
Bonn. with their ,3Ocal
MI917AI Browning
Machine Gun. 10 April
1945, (US Army via Real
War Photos - A 4185)
Right: Sherman crews
belonging to A Sqn SHQ
I st lothian and Border
Horse. relaxing after the
eventual capture of
Amhem. on 12 April
1945. Note how both
Shermans have addi-
toonal track plates on the
ssdes of the ir hulls and
turrets. in c-oer to give
'The Ron$OO Ughter' (as
the Shennan was called
because it was : 'ruar-
teed to light first t ime')
extra J)'"otectJOn.
(Author's Collection)
With this last maj or obstacle behi nd them.
the Allied armies could now press on into th e
enemy heartla nd.
~ u t t ' "
I . Third Army's offidal announcement read:
' Wit ho ut th e benctn of ae rial bombardme nt ,
gro und smoke. artillery pr epar ati on o r
airborne a.... tstance [al l digs at 21st Army
Group!] , the Th ird Army at 22 00 hrs ,
Thursda y evening, 22 March , crossed th e
Rhtne River.'
169
11
Into Germany
The La st Few w eeks
On 26 March 1 9 ~ 5 . General Miles Dempsey,
Cine British Second Army told his troops:
'Thls is collapse! The German line is broken.
The enemy no longer has a coherent system of
defence be t ween till' Rhine and t he Elbe . It is
difficult to sec what ther e is to stop us now.'
His enthusiasm was undoubtedly shared by all
the Allit"d co mma nders, but there were still
some 45 days to go before the Germans surren-
dered , so there was still plent y of fighting to be
done.
Ge ne ral Eisenhower was about to modify
his plans, in line with what had been ag reed
with the Soviets, namely thai the main attack
from th e west would be directed from the
Kassel area . directl y eastwards towa rds Leipzig,
through what remained o f the Ge rma ns '
in du str ial hea rt land, rather than at Berlin
which the Russians were rapidly approaching.
At the same time, 21st Army Group. supported
by US Ninth Army. .....ould clear out till' whol e
area from Kid and Lubeck westwa rds. In the
sout h he woul d also endeavour to link-up wit h
t he Russian s in the Danube valley, by
thrusting south-eastwards, so as to prevent the
establishing of a Nazi redoubt in sout hern
Germany. This plan did not have entire imme-
diate Allied approval; Churchill. for example.
was still advocating that a major attempt be
made to reach Berlin before the Russians.
Etscnhower had at his command nea rly" V2
million men. including ninet y act ive divisions
(twentv-ttve of which were armoured and five
airborne: sixty-one American. twelve British.
eleven French, five Canadia n and one Polish I.
170
Below: Exce llent
photograph of a US
Third Army 40mm
Bafon L.AA gun
outside the Opera
House ill Frankfurt. 27
March 19" 5. (US Army
via Real War Phcr cs .
A 262)
Below-: 7th Armd Oiv.
Br Second Army. A
column of Armoured
"""'""'" c.rne..
(APes) containing men
of 9 OLl , near Borken,
wait before moving
nortn to take weseke.
28 H20rcn 19"'5. (IWH .
au28-46)
w hen the drive began Montgomery's 21st
Army Gro up co ntrolled thirty divis ions, which
incl uded the twelve US divis ions in US Ninth
Army, together with the newly arrived Ca na-
dian corps from Italy. Bradley had thirt y-four
d ivisions, includ ing six in hi s new army,
General Gerow's Fifteenth Army, which was
intended to be a mainly ocrupying force,
initia lly with rear echelon assignments
although they we re made responsfble for 66th
Inf Dtv which were currently containing the
besieged Brittany ports of lorient and St-
Nazaire. General Deve rs' 6t h Army Group had
twelve US and eleven French dtvtst ons, two of
the latter being employed in other areas - one
on the Alpine front facing Italy, the other on
th e Gtronde estuary in south-west France.
Week 43: 27 \lan;:h- 2 April 1945
To the north of 215.t Army Group's area , Carra-
dian First Army's main tasks were to open a
supply route through Amhe m, advance no rth -
wards to dear the rest of the coastal area of
Holland, then to co ntinue on across the Ems
towards wt lhelmshave n and Oldenburg.
Canadian II Cor ps initiall y met strong rests-
INTO GERMANY
ran ee in its adva nce towards Emmerich but
captured th e tow n on the 29t h, then extended
their brid ge-head, wh ile on th eir left , Can I
Corps bega n its adva nce on Arnhem. In Brit ish
Second Army's area, leadi ng troops of XXX
Cor ps reac hed hssclburg on the River ljssel on
27 March, and XVIII Ab Corps advanced
through the weset Forest. On 30 March this
for mation ceased to be operational, prior to
coming under co mmand of US Ninth Army,
and British 6th Ab Div passed to VIII Corps.
The main intended advances of the three corps
in General Dempsey's army were to be: in th e
north, XXX Corps, targeted on Enschede,
Bremen and Hamburg; in the cent re, XII
Corps on Rhome. Nienburg and Luneburg. on
th e right VIII Co rps on Osnabrock. Celie and
Ulzen. By 2 April, XII Corps had reached the
Dortmund-Ems Canal at Rheine, and VIII
Co rps was continuing its advance on
Ovnabruck.
South of t he British , in US Nint h Army 's
sector. XVI Corps was advanci ng into the Ruhr
where a ma jor pocket of resistance was being
established. By I April, US Ninth an d First
Armies had joined-up at lippst adt t he reby
1
171
INTO GERMANY
172
,

Left : A 7th Armel Div Cromwe ll passing through the

badly damaged small town of Borken , in the ir drive
east of the Rhine. 30 March 19"'5. (IWM BU 2895)
closing a ring around the Ruhr and t rappmg
the whol e of Field Model '.. Army
Group R plus part of Army Group H. The
{'(wmy poc ket was some 70 miles long and SO
mil es wide. XIX Corps units rea ched the
Cologne- Bcrun autobahn, whil e XVI Corps
advanced in th e sector south of Hatt em. On
the 2nd, XIII Cor ps took Munster and pushed
on toward s th e weser. whil e XIX Corps was
fiRhtinR in th e Teutoburger wald and XVI
Corps reached the Dortmund-Ems cana l.
On 2S Starch in US First Arm y's sector, VII,
III and V Corps reached t he River Lah n, a nd
US Fir..' and Th ird Armies linked-up on the
Cologne-Frankfurt autobahn north o f rdst etn.
trappi ng many enemy troops in th e wres-
ba den-Bingen ar ea , On the 29t h 111 Corps
started their offens ive towa rds t he Eder whtch
they reached next day, as did V Corps, By 3 1
March VII Corps ' 3rd Armd Div we re fighting
for I'aderbom wh ich they captured o n I April.
At the bcgtnnmg of the week, VIII Corps of
Patton's Third Army wi dened and stren gt h-
eued it s bridge-head across t he Rhine, in tilt'
area of wtcsbsccn, wh ile fart he r so ut h XX
Corps prepar ed to cros s hot h t he Rhine and
t he Main in the Mainz area - they had estab-
ushed a secure bridge-head at Mainz on t ilt'
2Hth . The enemy could do l ittle to halt
Patt on's a rmoured co lu mns. Frankfu rt wa..
captured on 29 March a nd XX Corps pushe d
northwar ds in t he directio n of Kassel, reuch tng
the Edcr o n the 301h, while XII Corps was
advanci ng in th e Hcrsfcld sector. nca r Ha nau.
Enemy resista nce appeared 10 be harden ing in
the area between Fulda and t he line of the
Ris'NS werra and weser.
Sout h of t he m, US Seventh Army had also
reached the vt a tn by the 28th, in the ar ea of
Obemau wh ere XV Corps established a bridge-
head, while Hth In f Div of the same corps
Left : A mixture of tarlks and other vehicles belonging
to 7th Armd DiYare seen here in the relatively
undamaged village of Ahaus. north-west of Mumter,
Westphalia. 30 March 1945. (IWM - BU 3135)
INTO GERMANY
crossed t he Nec ka r tha t day, ma ki ng for
Mannhclm whic h t hey entered. nn the 29th.
US XV Corps was then held up around Aschaf-
Ienburg, but XXI Corps conti nued on north-
east wards towa rds wurzburg and Komgs-
hoten. wh ile VI Co rps advanced along the
Neckar va lley to make co ntact with French Hst
Army on I April .
In the south, French Ftrst Army made fina l
preparati ons for its offens ive across the Rhine
in the Germershetm area, which it ope ned on
3 1 March and soo n widened to reach Linken-
hetm. havin g cut the Karlsruhe-Frankfurt road
near and Bruchsat.
Surrender
On 31 Ge ne ral Etsenho.....er issued a
prodamation to the Ge rma n tr oops and
people. urging the former to surrender a nd the
latt er to begi n planting crops. He described
their hopeless sit uation and explained how
further resistance would onl y add to their
nusencs in the future. ' \ Iy purpose was to
bring the ..... hol e bloody bu siness to an e nd,' he
wro te lat er. Sadl y, however, suc h was the hold
that Hitler and h is gang had on t he German
people, via the Gestapo and S5, that t hey st ub-
boml y co ntinued to fight.
Wl'1.' k H; :i-9 Ap ril 19-1 5
On ti ll' northern flank Ca nadia n II Cor ps,
wh ich had been advanci ng nort h-eastwar ds
towards Oldenburg. cr ossed t he River Ems in
til l' Muppcn- Lamc u a rea on 8 Apr il
On :i Apri l ti ll' 1t'ading elements of Briti sh
Second Army reached t he Do rt mund- Ems
Ca nal around Lmgen a nd established a bridge-
head the re (XXX Corps) a nd also at Rhetne
(XII Corps) on -I ApriL Leading elements of
VIlI Corps entered Osnabruck the same day,
wh ile o t he rs pushed o n towa rds xnnden.
eSlahlishhlg a br idge. head over the weser in
the Mmden- Stotzenau a rea on the 7t h, then
pu shing o n south-eastwards from xrenburg
towards the River Leine which they reached on
ApriL Meanwhil e to their north, XXX Corps
had taken e ne my defensive positions east of
Lingen a nd was pressing on towards Bremen.
In US Ni nt h Army's sect or , ha ving completed
the capt ure of Munst er XIII Corps moved up to
173

-

the weser and establis hed a bridge-bead on the

7th, while farther south XIX Co rps began to
exert pressure on the Germans trapped in the
Ruhr pocket. US First Army also began its oper-
ation against th e Ruhr pocket on 3 April with III
Corps and XVIII Ab Corps. the for me r be tween
the Rivers Letnv and Ruhr, the latu- between
the Ruhr and the Rhine. !'re'Osun.' was
continued. XVIII Ab Co rps opening an offen-
sive at the confluence of the Ruhr and Rhine on
the 6th. That same da y, V Co rps reach ed the
weser, as did VII Corps on the 7t h, but they
found tha t all the bridges 0\'('1 the river in their
sector had bee n des troyed.
On 8 April. XIII Corps' Sth Armd Dlv was
orde red to cros s the Leine, sout h of Han over.
On the 9th, units of XIII Corps launched
assau lts on Han over fro m th e north, north-
west and west.
In US First Army's sect or, XVIII Corps t roops
crossed th e Ri ver Steg in th e Ruhr pocket,
while VII Co rps e...tabli ...hed a ... trong bridge-
head over the Wewr; V Corp' , already acros...
by the Sth, was advancing eastwards. All corps
conti n ued to advance towards the Elbe, VII
Co rp... making for No rd hausen and th e River
Lctnc in the Gontngcn area.
On 2 April , in US Third Army area , -tth
Armd Div established a crossing over till' River
wcrru, th en adva nced to Stregda and Go ld-
bach , whil e lIth Armd Div did t he same at
Ritschenhausen, th en ad vanced fifteen miles.
In XX Co rps' zo ne, Kassel was captu red o n -l
April by HOth Inf Div, whil e 6t h Armd Dtv
crossed the wehre and advanced 20 mill'S
closely followed by 65th Inf Div. US Third
Army co nti nued to advance rapidl y wit h XX
Co rps north, VIII Corp.. ce ntre and XII south .
Only around Kassel in the north d id the
ene my make a det ermined stand, eve n after
th e city had fallen.
On :\ April, in US Seventh Army's sector
A\Cllilffl'nburg surr endered to XV Corps' -l5th
Inf Div after three da ys of savage figh ting. US
XXI Corp... att acked Wiirzburg and estabtt shcd
a bridge-head over the River Mam in th e
A bove: Soklieo of 44th
Armd Inf Bn, 6th Armd
Div, US Third Army.
dodge enemy fire during
street fighting in Ober-
doria. Germany. -4th
Ap ril 1945. (US Army )
17.
INTO GERMANY
Above : Ohrdurf. '" April
19"'5. Gen Eisenhower
and a party of high-
ranking US Army officers
look ing at the bodie s of
Russian and Polish pris-
oners. shot by their 55
guards. before they
retreated in front of "'t h
Armd Div. US Third
Army. Gens Bradley and
Patt on can also be seen
in the group. (US Army)
western end of the town. By 7 April XV Co rps
had taken Neustadt on t he River Saal. They
conti nued the attack, wit h XV Co rp..
adv ancing on the Hohe Rhon hills, whil e XXI
and V Corps adva nce d towards Schwclnturt
and Hotlnronn.
To th eir south, French First Army extended
its bridge-head and captu red Karl sruhe on the
3rd, then prepared to occu py the Black Forest.
moving south-westwards toward s fr {'iburg and
south-eastwards towards Tubmgen. Leading
elements of French II Corps reached till' Rtver
Necka r in th e vicinity of Lauten. the Rtver Enz
at Muhlackcr. th e outskirts of Pforzheim and
captured Stein and K6nig..bach. On 8 April
French l st lnf Div took Pforzhl'i m, tu etcn-
ha nsen and Ineungen. and establis hed a
bridge-head o n the River Enz near
Muhlhausen.
Wl'1.'k 45; 10-16 April 1945
In the nort h, Canad ian II Corps had advanced
towards Groni ngen and Oldenburg, taking the
former town 011 t he 16th; Canadian I Corps
had attacked Amhem on the 12t h and ta ken it
on t he I St h.
South of them. Second Army's XXX Co rps
was pmhing on toward.. Bremen while XII
Corps ma de for Soltau and VIJI Cor ps for
ed it" crm sing the Lctn c near Weste n an d th e
Aller at Cctte o n the IlIh, th en pressing o n
towards Uelzcn . By the end of th e wed; XXX
Co rps wa.. close to Bremen, and VIII Corps was
cncou nten ng strong resistance at Uelzcn.
On 10 April in US Ninth Army's sector, XIII
Corps took Han over and pushed on sout h of
the city to Patrensen o n th e River Leme: XVI
Corps rea ch ed Essen, Bochum and
(iel\Cnkirchc n on the same day. In US XIX
Corps' sector, 2n d Armd Dtv, ..... hich ..... av
providing advance gua rds for XIXCorps, made
a spectacula r leap forward to reach the Elbe
near Magdebu rg on the 11th. On t he 12t h XIII
Corps also reached t he river further north nea r
Witt en berg, whilst XIX Corps established a
bridge-head over the river near Randau, south
175
INTO GERMANY
176
of Mea nwhile XVI Corps ha d
adva nced in to the Ruh r pocket. reaching t he
River Ruin oppo site wtneu on t he 111h, then
taki ng th e northern sector between Willen
and west hotcn and complcn ng the cap ture of
Dortmund on the tJth. Un the l St h, XIII
Corps launched an ottenstve along t he River
Saale, ai ming to take the h igh ground between
t he Saalc a nd t he Rhtue. In US First Army's
area. XVIII Ab Co rp.. crossed the River Steg
into t he Ruin pocket , in pur..u it of the enemy
who wcre bc gtnnmg to ret ire fro m th eir defen -
..Ive pos itions . By 14 April XVIII All Corp.. had
begun till' final phase of therr operation; oppo-
sition was cru mbling and by the l ot h Ihey had
taken more t ha n 20, (XX) pnsoner.... US III Corps
ha d been attac king t he same objective and by
t he 14th had secured the a rea between t he
Rive r.. Ruhr a nd Hen ne. US VII Corp..
advanced towards Nordhausen...... hich they

too k on the 11t h, a.. well as Osterode. Teuen-
ho rn a nd Neu hof Own conti nued nort h-east-
wa rds to wards till' Rivers Elbe a nd Mul de. US V
Co rps reac hed till' bridges over the Ri ver
Mulde between Coldttz and Lastau on Ihe
151h, and by the 16t h bot h VII and V Corps
had bndge- headv across the river and 9th
Armd luv (v Corps} had entered Co lditz.
US Third Army was also pushing t he enemy
towar d s the Rive r Mulde. ,\I Coburg the
a rmour cut loose o n t he 11th, bypassing
Erfurt , Weimar, jena and Gera . crossing t he
Mulde a nd co ntinu ing on for some flO mi les,
halting at Che mnil z. The bypassed towns fell
10 the follow-up in fant ry. On the l -it h Pa tton
opened the Roosevelt xt emona t Rail wa y
Bridgl' over the Rhine. t wo days after the l'res-
tdent '... death. On the l Sth, 1201h Evacuation
Hc spt ral moved to Et t ersburg 10 pro vide
medica l services for Buche nwald where
I
f'
-
JIll
I
lek: The commander of
a M5AI light tan k
belong,ng to the 5th
Armd Div. US Ninth
Army. uses a portable
loudspeaker to t ell the
citizens of Peine , that
their Burgenneister
(Mayoi'") has surrendered
the town, and tha t they
must hand in all
weapons and stay off the
streets . 10 Apri l 1945 .
(US Army vQ Real War
Photos- A 88I B)
Below: A column of
unks aod half-tracks
belonging to 5th Armd
Oiv. US Ninth Army.
stops for a short break
in open country
between wooch . during
their advance to
BIsmarck, north of
Magdeburg. I I April
19"'5. (US Army via Real
War Photos - A 88 IA)
120,000 of th e Nazis' vict ims needed tmme-
dtatc care.
In US Sevent h Army's sector, XXI Co rps was
ad vancing towards Schwei nfurt and along th e
east bank of th e Rhine. XV Co rps had been
pr esstng o n rapidly sout h o f tcure mbu rg.
reaching Bamberg on th e 12th and en tering
the town th e Ioltowt ng day, th ough it was not
cleared of ene my until the l-tth. After nr nc
days of hard fighting VI Corp' troops took
Heilbronn , and XV Co rps reac hed Nuremberg
on th e 16th.
By 12 Apr il, French First Army had estab-
lished a bridge-head across the River F.nz, and
I Corps crossed t he Rhi ne north of Kehl on t he
15th, wh ile II Corps occupied th e Black Forest
area .
\\'N.'k -l6: 17- 23 Ap ril 194 5
On the 18th. Canadian I Corps reached the
Zutder Zt--e, isolating enemy forces and vi rtu-
ally ending their offensi ve operations. They
event ually closed along th e line of the Rivers
Grcbbc and rem where they remained for th e
INTO GERMANY
remainder of th e war. Canadian II Corps area
was also virtuall y clea r except for some oppo-
sit ion south-west of Olde nburg.
On 17 April Briti sh Second Army's XXX
Cor ps were still ugh nng in t he suburbs of
Bremen: XII Corps too k Soltau t he same day,
th en adva nced swiftly northwards to cu t the
Bremen-Hamburg aut obahn the following
day. VIII Corps reach ed t he Elbe in th e Lauen-
burg area th e same day, taking Uelzen and
Luncburg on the 18th; 11th Armd Dtv and 5th
Inf tuv were concentrati ng jus t east of
Osna bruck, ready to advance to the Balt ic. By
the zard. XII Co rps had reached the Elbe,
opposite Hamburg.
In US Nint h Army's area, XIX Corps began
an assa ult on Magdeburg on the 17th.
In US fir<>t Army's area . XVIII Corps in the
Ruhr poc ket took Dutsburg, Sottngcn. Dussel-
dor f and Werden, By the 18t h they were
f i n i s h i n ~ off the remnants of organised resis-
ta nce, Esti mates of prisoners ta ken in t he
pocket were a staggeri ng 325,lKXl, more than
twice as many as had bee n expected. Thei r
178
Above : Keppel . Austr ia.
A large amount of f,re-
power fr om carbines.
machine guns and main
t ank guns is di r ect ed at
the town of Keppel by
men 01 I I tn Armd Diy,
US Third Army. (US
Army via Real War
Photos -A6 14)
left: Ferrying a Carnl-
dian tank across t he
Ijessel River, near
Deveruer, Holland. 11
April 1945. This was
during the F,rst Canadian
Army's clearance of
western Holland. as they
pressed forward
towards teecwaroee
MId Groningefl.
( Nat ional Archives of
Canada - PA '''HOT)
-
Right: Mopping up
operanons along the
Oranje Canal, 12Apnl
1945. Men of the South
Sas.katchewan Regiment
deal WIth scattered
enemy f"e$i$unce from
po$ition$ along the canal
bank. (Nauooal Archive5
of Canada PA 145977)
Right : Advancing
towards Gronmgen to
complete the clearance
of the west of Holland.
A Shermao Firefly
belongIng to BSquadron
Fort Garry Horw came5
infantrymen of the Royal
Hami lton Light Infantry.
dUring the advance. 13
April 1945. (Nat iorW
Archive5 of Canada - PA
13093 5)
Right: Anot her Sherman
belonging to the Fort
Garry Horse passes a
column of German pos-
cners. on the way
towards Groningen.
(Nat ional Archive5 of
Canada . PA 130923)
commander, Field Marvhal committed
suicide on the 21\1.111 Corps was .....arned that it
was 10 be t ransferred to US Third Army short ly,
while VII Corps consoli dated Irs poxitions
between t he Rivers Elbe an d Mulde taki ng
Halle on the 18t h . US V Corps' leading HOOps
12nd and 9th Inf Divs.)converged on Leipzig on
the 17th, then launched a co-ordinated attack
and captured thl' cit y next da y. On 2 J April VII
Corps began an offensive agatnst Desseu, and
had taken t he enti re sec... or by the 23rd.
On t he J7t h US Th ird Army was ordered 10
change the direction of advance 10 the ....unh-
180
ea st into Bavaria to attack the so-called
'German-Austrian Redoubt' , while main-
taini ng pat rols alo ng the Czech border. Tht s
led 10 VIII Corps betng pili under command of
US Hrst Army; III Corps took its place. but was
moved to t he southern flank, to be responsible
for ..... hat had been part of the US Seventh
Army's. sector. This. re-organisation and rede-
ployment took from 17 to 22 April and the
assault was then resumed on all fronts, Grafen-
wohr was taken by XII Corps, and t'egnttz.
south of Bayreut h. by XX Corps. It was soon
dear t hat the l'nemy defences wert' me rely a
Above: Gis of me 61st
Armel Inf Bn ode on the
back of a Sherman
belonging to 21st Tank
Bn. CCA. 10t h Armd
Diy, US Seventh Army.
as they move forward
towards Bubenorbic. 17
April 1904 5. (US Army YI3
Real War Photos _A
985B)
l eft : Betsen Concen-
tra tion Camp . When the
British liberated the
Bergen-Belsen camp
near Celie. on 15 April
19"'5. they found
unspeakable horrors.
some of which were
described on the I'wtily
erected SIgnboard.
(Ground Photo Reece
Unit . HQ 2nd Army)
Right : 11 th Armd Oiv
reaches the BaltIC cout o
) May 1945, HaVing
pushed on from Lubeck.
via the autobahn to the
coastal town or Trave-
munde. where [hey
captured the aufleld
intiK[ and also took a
great number of pris-
oners. the dIVision
twted. This Cromwell
unk. near the t\arboor.
mounts a 95mm
OOwlttef' in place of the
usual 6pdr Of" 75mm gun
and was the close
support variant. (IWM
BU 5278)
Right: Link-up with t he
Red Army, Brit ish troops
of 6t h Airborne Division
link up with Red Army
soldiers near Wismar on
the Balt ic coast.
ellchanging handshakes.
drinks and cigarettes.
(IWM - BU 52] 0)
th in cr ust , eas ily pe netrated and th e speed of
adva nce gai ned momentum eve ry day.
In US Seventh Army's sector, XV Corps
hegan its batt le for x uremburg on the 17th;
next day XXI Corps t roops entered Furth jmt
west of t he cit)' and closed off all exit routes.
The cuy fell on t he 20th under the co-ontt-
nated attacks of three infant ry d ivisions of XV
Corp'> (jrd, 42nd and 45th}. On the 22nd XXI
Corp' unit s reached t he Danube at La umgen
and Dttlengen. quickly establishing bridge.
heads, w hil e further south the river was
reached and crossed by VI Corps at Ehrtngen.
In t he south, French First Army's II Corps
took Freudcnstadt on t he 17t h and pushed o n
towa rds St uttga rt. while I Co rps occupied t he
western pa rt of the Black Forest. reaching
Uihl'rach and Mahlberg. On the 20th Stuttgart
was at tacked by French II Corps and US
Seventh Army's VI Corps. Next day French II
Corps' 5th Armd Div penetrated the defences
and occuptcd th e cit y.
Wl"Ck 4 7: 24-30 April 194 5
On th e 241h, British XXX Corps launched an
offensive a/o:ainst Bremen and completed irs
181
INTO GERMANY
capture on the 26t h; VIII Corps reached the Elbe
at I.aucnbcrg. and XII Corps was now deployed
alo ng the west ban k of the river opposite
Hamburg. The plan was for VIII Corps to assault
and establish a bridge- head. while to their right
in US Nin th Army's sector. XVIII Corps would
establish anot her bridge-head; VIII Corps woul d
then mow troops across with all speed. and tum
northwards to take Lubeck, while XII Corps
mas ked off Hamburg [which would surrende r
un cond itionally on ,1 May). Th is last operation
began in the early hours of the zsth. 15th Inf
Dtv, supported by I Cdo Bde, crossing in
amphibians. as in the Rhine crossing. supported
by on tanks, All went according to plan, British
XVIII Corps also began its advance towards the
Balt ic. North of the E1b\.> the countrysi de was
packed with refugee s - milita ry and civilian -
fl eeing from the armies that were converging
from west and east.
In US Ninth Army's sector, all its three corps
- XIII. XIX and XVI- were across the Elbe and
had dug in on t he easte rn ha nk by the en d of
April.
In US Thi rd Army's area, III Corps had now
ta ken over the forme r XV Corps' zone and was
advanci ng wit h th ree divivions abreast: XII
Cor ps' units were movi ng sou th in a long
conti nuous column along the Czech border. XX
Corps in the centre wit h 80t h Inf Div (SHAH
reserve) to t he rear. III Co rps crossed the
Altmuhl in th ree places on the 24th, advan ced
some 25 mil es and captu red nu merous small
towns, while ot her un its reached the Danube.
On t he 28t h ano ther order from 12th Army
Group direct ed Th ird Army to continue its dr ive
to join the Russians in the Danube valley and to
seize Salzburg. US First Anny bavtng taken over
responsibilit y for the Czech border. Advancing
from t heir bridge-hea ds over the Dan uhe, 111
an d XX Corps swep t south to reach t he tstar on
the 29th, whi le armoured elements of XII Corps
had also crossed the Austrian border and were
well inside, with enemy res istance conapsrng
everywhere.
US Seventh Army also pressed on towa rds
the Danube, VI Corps taking Ulm on the 24th,
XVCo rps Munich o n t he :\0111, whi le XXI and
VI Co rps ad van ced toward s the Aus t rian
bor der in th e areas of Gar misch and Rosen-
182
helm. By t he end of April, XV Corps wer e
moppi ng-up around Mun it-h wh ile VI Corps
was advanc ing towards Innsbruck and lrnst,
On t he 24t h fr ench First Army's II Corps
reached th e Swiss fronti er at Basel , and I Corps
was engaged agai nst a last desperate attempt
by Ger ma n forces to esca pe into the Bavar ian
Alps. By t he end of April the Frenc h Army had
crossed th e Austrian frontier an d occupied
Brcgenz.
Uncond tt fonal Surrender
During the next few days the Germans' situa-
tion on all fronts was o ne of complete
colla pse. It was soon evident that there had
bee n a total breakdown of any ce ntral cont rol ,
indi vidual un its, di visions, co rps and armies
all eur rende n ng piece mea l to whichever Allied
forces were nearest and prepared to accept
thei r surrender. All the time there was a
desperate move by both civilians and
servicemen to move westwards, out of the
clutches of the advancing Red Army. There
was on ly one way to resolve the chaoti c situa-
ti on and t ha t was d early uncoudtt tonal
surrender by th e enti re Ger man na tion.
Abo ve : Tanks of 10t h
Annd Div, US Seventh
Army. entering the
famous Winter-sports
centre of Garmisch-
partenkircheo in the
Bavarian Alps, 30 April
1945. They halted here
to allow 44th and I03rd
Inr Divs to pass through
their lines and fini shed
t he war at lnnsbruck on
7 May 1945. (US Army)
Below: Shame It'S only

captured this oil painting
of the Fuhrer, U [hey
advanced through Cleve,
on their way to cross
the Rhine. (IWM - AP
275362)
Wl't"k\ 4S a nt.l 49: 1- 13 1945
There was a senes of surrenders by the German
forces in North West Europe, the first bei ng
tri ggered by the capitulatio n in Italy on 2 May
1945. Thi s placed the German forces (mainly
Army Group G) just to the north of Italy, in an
impossible positi on and on 2 May their
commander, General der Infant erie Friedrich
Schulz, sent word asking to whom he should
surrende r. He was told to apply to General
Jacob Devers, co mmander of 6th Army Group,
12
Victory
the sout hern most of SHAH's ann)' groups.
However, he was also told th at onl y uncondi-
tional surrende r would be acceptable. These
German forces therefore capitulated and the
surrender document was signed at 1400 hrs on
5 th e surrender being made effect ive
from noon on the 6th.
Considerably farth er north, in the Hamburg
area, th e local German commander also appre-
ciated the situati on and realised that the end
was nigh. On 29 April, word came via Stock-
holm, that Field Marshal Ernest Busch, CinC
in th e Nort h West, who was then stationed in
Norway, and General Georg Lindemann, who
was commanding in Denmark, both wished to
surrender as soo n as the Allied advance
reached the Baltic. They did not wan t to capit-
ula te to the Red Army nor to be or dered to
conti nue to fight by th e Nazi hierarch y, so
the y plan ned that as soon as 2 1st Army Group
ar rived in th e Lube ck area, thus cutt ing the m
off from th e rest of Germa ny, they would act
o n thetr own and immediately capitulat e.
forces arrived there on J May,
but be cause Hitler had committ ed suicide o n
] () April, there was now a new leader of t he
Third Reich, namely Admiral Karl Do rutz, and
he sl' ll\ibly directed t hat all Germa n forces
ever ywhere should surrender to th e western
Allies. Thus it was that on 3 May 1945, nearl y
one million German troops, the enti re force
which had been occupying north-west
Germany, Holland, Nor way and Den mark,
decided to surrender unconditionally to Field
Mar shal Montgomery. Nex t day, '"
German delegat es att ended Montgomery's HQ
o n Luneburg Heath, to hear the un condi-
tional surrender terms. Admiral Hans von
Fnedburg. now Ci nC German Navy, who
would lat er co mmit suicide, signed th e term s,
which were to become effec t ive o n the
morning of 5 \ Iay.
183
VICTORY
184
l eft : Field M a ~ a 1 5N"
Bemard MontgOfTlef'y
with the German
deleg:atlOfl led by
General-Admiral von
Friedburg. outside the
tent tn whtch the
$l.Irrendet" of all GenNn
forces in Denmark.
north-west Germany
and the Netherlands.
will be signed. The Ioc.a-
(Ion was on Luneburg
Heath, some 25 miles
south of Hamburg and
the date was 4 May
1945. (rWM au 5142)
left: GenTw1s on the
Bntish front c.aprtulate.
Around the table from l
to R are: Konuw Adm!
Wagner. Gen Adm! von
Friedburg. FM Mont -
gomery. Gen of Inf
Kinzel and Col Pcleck.
Montgomery is seen
reading the surrender
terms to the German
delegates. (IWM a u
5207)
l eft : Gen-Admiral von
Friedburg commrtted
suiCide soon aftef"signilll
the surrender docment
at Montgomery's tent on
liineburg Heath. (IWM -
a u 6681 )
Above: The 'Master
Race' is vanquished,
Close-up 01a group or
German pr isoners fr om
the Nijmegen area,
queuing for food.
(Author's Collection)
Right: ' Defeat and
humi liation to the Hun' -
that is how the original
caption to this photo-
graph reads, which
shows some of the thou-
sands of prisoners now
stumbling through vast
stockades for count ing.
(IWM - FRA 100)19)
185

VICTORY
186
Above:
He rman n Goering surren-
dered t o 36 USInf Div near
Mautendorl on 8 May 19<4S.
He is seen het"e talking to
CG 36 Div - Maj Gen Jonn
E. Dahlquist and his deputy,
Brig Gen Robert I. Stack.
Goering was the se nior
N.ui tried at Nuremburg.
but took poison on 1S
October 19<46. the day
before he was doe to be
hanged. (US Army via Real
War Pbct cs A 3212)
Left: Field Marshal von
Rundstedt was also
captured by the US 36th Inf
Div. Seventh Army and is
seen hef"eWIth his son Lt
Hans von Rundstedt and a
Ge rman medical att endant .
He was rec eiving treat ment
fOf" arthritis at Bad Toll..
when captured on 2 May
19<4S. (IWM- EA6S3S))
Above: Gen jean-Mane
Lartre de Tassigny
represented France at
the formal Gennan
surreoder in the early
hours of 8 May 19'15, in
the Berlin suburb of
Karfshorst. signing il5 a
witness. He was then
commandi ng the French
First Army, but went on
postwar to become the
French CGS. (IWM - AP
69738)
It was also on 5 ~ f a y that a representanve of
Admiral Donit z cont acted General Eisenhower's
SIIAIT headquart ers at Rheimv and proposed
..urrender, at t he same time advtstng t hem that
.111 V-hoats had been ordered to ret urn to port .
Ge ne ral Eisenhower immediatel y appraised the
Sovie ts of the situatio n and requested that t hey
send a rep resentati ve to he present at any IIl'go-
neuons - Major -General Ivan Suslo parov, who
had long been t he Soviets' liaison officer at
SHAFF was so designated. Admiral Friedburg
a rrived al Rhctms t ha t day, to be followed
rapidly by General Alfred JodI, Chief of Staff
OKW, di rect from Donitz's HQ.
VICTORY
It seemed to Gene ral Eisenhower as though
the Germans were stalli ng for time, so as to
all ow the maximum number of their beaten
t roops to move we..twards into Allied lines
and away from the Red Arm y. He told hi s
Chief of Staff, Lieut enant General W. Bedell
Smit h, to warn JodI that unl ess he stopped
prevar icating, the fronti er wo uld be closed to
prevent any more refugees reaching the we..t .
Finall y the German represent at ive.. sent a
message to Donttz, asking for aut ho rity to
make a co mple te sur re nder which they
want ed to he cttecttve 48 hours afte r sig ni ng.
But thi s coul d d early lead to even more delay,
so Eisenhower put hi s fool firmly down a nd
told them that the sur render would be ef fec-
tive 48 hours from mi dnight of thaI ver y day!
In the War Room of the SHAH HQ (i n a boys'
red bric k ..chool in Rhe tms! Bedell Smith and
Jodi signed the uncondit ional surrender docu-
ment at 0241 hr.. on Monda y, 7 May 19-15,
whi ch was witne..sed by the I\rili sh , trench
and Ru....ian rcprcscntanvcs. All hosuunes
would ther efore officially cease at midnight
011 Tue..da y, H May 194 5. Pre..iden t Harr y S.
Truman and Prime Mini st er Winst on
Ch urchill mad e Ih is hi storic an nounce ment
to both nations on the 8th.
In the ea rly hours of the morning 018 May
1945, Fiel d Marshal Wilhel m Keitel tChief of
OKW, signed the third and final surrender
document ill t he Bertin subur b of Kartsnorst .
Ill' wa.. accornparucd by Admi ral vo n Fned-
burg and General St umpf of th e Luft waffe. At
midnight the Ge rmans had been brought into
a room draped with t he Ameri can, Bnnsh,
French and Soviet Union flags. Keite l was
asked by Air Ch ief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder if
he clearly understood wha t he was signi ng.
Whe n he replied t ha t he did. he, Fncdburg
and St umpf all signe d, followed by the Allied
stgnatortcs wh o we re; Mar sh al Zhukov for the
Soviet Un ion High Command and Air Ch ief
Mar sh al Tedder, for t he Allied Expedi tionar y
force. Lieut en ant General Ca rl A. Spaa tz.
Commander VS Snategtc Air Fo rces and
General de Laure de Tass igny, Commande r of
French First Army, also sig ned as witnes ses.
vtctory in Europe (V E) Day was thus held
o n wednesda y, 9 xra y 19-1 5.
187
\
I
Upper ri gh[: The
Fuhrer's mountain-top
hideaiway. This photo-
graph of the ' Eagle's lair'
at Ben:htesgarten was
taken Ofl 19 May 191S and
snows 501diE'rt o r the US
I0 Ist Airborne Division -
appropria te ly nicknamed
'The Screaming Eagles'
because of their shoulder
insignia - lounging on the
patio! (US Army via Real
Wa r Phctos > A 3778)
Left: Pre sident Harry S.
Truman. Visiting Brussels
Ofl ISJuly 1915. pauses to
speak to one of the
Honor Guard, furnished
by 137th InfRegt.US 35th
Inf [);y. (US Army via Real
War Photos - A 3150)
Righ[: Although the tOP
of Adolf Hit le r 's mountain
hideaway looked fine , the
lower part was guned by
fire - Started by SS troops
who I'Iad been left behind
to guard it, (US Army via
Real War Photos - A
2198)
Left: General Dwight D.
Eisenhower together with
.. some of the seniOl'" Amer-
ican generals who helped
pave the way to victory in
Europe, gatber at 12th
Army Group HQ, Bad
Wildungen, Germ.any, Ofl
12 May I'HS. Seated Ofl
the front row from L to R
are : Lt Gen William H.
Simpson (CG US Ninth
Army). Gen George S.
PanOfl, Jr. (CG US Third
Army). Gen Cart A. Spaaa
(CG USATAF). Gen Eisen-
hower. Gen Omar N.
Bradley (CG 12th AG).
Gen Courtney H, Hodges
(CG US First Army). Lt
Gen Leonard 1. Gerow
(CG US Fifteenth Army).
IUS Anny)
VICTORY
Vic tory Parades
While the Western ,\ lIil'd Armies had halt ed as
agreed. well to th e west of Berlin, the city
would be di vided into zones '>0 that all the
victorious n ati ons could be represented t here.
And of course it was the obvious pl ace in
wh ich to hold Victory Par ades. As the
Right : 5Ist Highland
Division hold a ViCtory
Parade in Bremerhaven.
12 Hay 19"'5, at which
the salute was taken by
XXX Corps commander
Geo Sir Brian Horrocks.
Here troops of the Black
Watch march past. (IWH
- BU 6109)
lower right: US Third
Army revIeW in Berlin,
20 July 19"'5. In the
leading half-track are the
US Secretary of State for
War, Henry L Stimson
and Gen George 5,
Patton. Jr, as they drive
past the tanks of US 2nd
Armd Div. (US Army)
Opposite page, top:
Field Marshal
Montgomery. accompa-
nted by It Col Pat
HobMt CO I RTR.
inspecting Ist Royal Tank
Regiment in Berlin in
September 19"'5. (Tank
Museum)
Opposit e page,
bottom: All ied VICtory
~ . 7 Septembet"
I ~ S . A Uio of Red
Arrrrt JS ) heavy tanks
mOtor past the saluting
base. Over "',000
infantrymen and 200
/4FIIs. representing USA,
USSR. Great Bntain and
Fnronce, ~ in the
Tiergarten, whIlst
Zhukov and Patton took
the salute. (IWM AP
281590)
190
photographs sh o w, both the Amertcans and
British held Victory I'aradcs in Ber li n dur in g
Ju ly 19 .J5, and in September 1945 there wa s
anot her gr and pa rad e which included rep reo
sent auves o f the Soviet Union. Th e ' Road to
Berli n' had at long last been complet ed.
Bibliography
Brett-Smith, Richard. Hitler's Gt'lIt'fllh. Ospr ey, 1976
Eisenhower, Gene ral Dwight D. Cru\ lIdt' in Europe. \Villiarn Hei neman n Ltd, 1948
Forty, George. 1"/1t' Armies ofGem:'IW S. Pat t on, Mills and Armour Press Ltd., 1996
j oslen. Lieute na nt-Colonel H. .... O'l/a .\ of R.Jttle SUlil t WorM lVil T193 9-19-15, vet . II,
H\ISO. 1960
vtontgomery, Field Marshal B. Soml<lll,l.v to til e Bettie. Barrie & Jen kins Ltd., 1971 (in
a combined volume with 1 Alamein to tilt' Rh.,.,. S.mgfoJ
Toland, John. Allol( tinter. Doubleday & Co. rnc., 1976
Bel ow: Allied nag-rais ing ceremony
in Berlin, Monday. 20 August 19<15.
The four pri ncipals at the ce remony
were l [ 0 R: Montgomery. Zhukov.
Eisenhower and Koenig. Behind rhem
is the courthouse building wher"ethe
Allied Control Counci l will meet to
detide on policies to govern postw
Germany. (IWM KY "954(9)