China's National Defense in 2006 and US Response

China's National Defense in 2006

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China
December 2006, Beijing
Preface
I. The Security Environment
II. National Defense Policy
III. China's Leadership and Administration System for National Defense
IV. The People's Liberation Army
V. People's Armed Police Force
VI. National Defense Mobilization and Reserve Force
VII. Border and Coastal Defense
VIII. Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense
IX. Defense Expenditure
X. International Security Cooperation
Appendix I. The Leading System of the Chinese People' Liberation Army
Appendix II. Major International Exchanges of the Chinese Military 2005-2006
Appendix III. Participation in Security Consultations (2005-2006)
Appendix IV. Joint Exercises with Foreign Armed Forces (2005-2006)
Appendix V. Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations (Up to Nov. 30, 2006)
Appendix VI. Major Military Regulations Promulgated 2005-2006
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Foreword
To uphold world peace, promote common development and seek cooperation and win-win is
the common wish of the people around the world and an irresistible trend of our times.
Committed to peace, development and cooperation, China pursues a road of peaceful
development, and endeavors to build, together with other countries, a harmonious world of
enduring peace and common prosperity.
Never before has China been so closely bound up with the rest of the world as it is today. The
Chinese government works to advance both the fundamental interests of the Chinese people
and the common interests of the peoples of the rest of the world, and pursues a defense policy
which is purely defensive in nature. China's national defense, in keeping with and contributing
to the country's development and security strategies, aims at maintaining national security and
unity, and ensuring the realization of the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in an
all-round way. China is determined to remain a staunch force for global peace, security and
stability.
China's national defense and military modernization, conducted on the basis of steady
economic development, is the requirement of keeping up with new trends in the global
revolution and development in military affairs, and of maintaining China's national security and
development. China will not engage in any arms race or pose a military threat to any other
country. At the new stage in the new century, we will take the scientific development outlook as
an important guiding principle for the building of national defense and military affairs,
vigorously advance the revolution in military affairs with Chinese features, and strive to realize
an all-round, coordinated and sustainable development in our country's national defense and
military capabilities.
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I. The Security Environment

Peace and development remain the principal themes in today's world, and the overall
international security environment remains stable. But, uncertainties and destabilizing factors
are on the increase, and new challenges and threats are continuously emerging.
World peace and security face more opportunities than challenges. The world is at a critical
stage, moving toward multi-polarity. Progress is expected in addressing the serious
imbalances in the international strategic alignment. The major international forces compete
with and hold each other in check. But, they also maintain coordination and practical
cooperation in their mutual relationships, and draw on each other's strengths. Some major
developing countries and regional groupings have grown in power, and the developing world
as a whole is becoming stronger. Economic globalization accelerates and science and
technology make rapid progress; there are profound changes in the international division of
labor, global and regional economic cooperation is being vigorously promoted, leading to
increasing interdependence among countries. More dialogues are being conducted on
traditional security issues, and cooperation in non-traditional security is developing in depth. To
address development and security issues through coordination, cooperation and multilateral
mechanism is the preferred approach of the international community. The United Nations'
status and role in world affairs are being upheld and strengthened. World wars or all-out
confrontation between major countries are avoidable for the foreseeable future.
The international community is increasingly facing comprehensive, diverse and complex

security threats. The world is not yet peaceful. Political, economic and security problems and
geographical, ethnic and religious contradictions are interconnected and complex.
Hegemonism and power politics remain key factors undermining international security. Non-
traditional security threats present greater danger, and local turmoil caused by war is on and
off, and some hotspots cannot be removed in a short time. The impact of economic
globalization is spreading into the political, security and social fields. Global economic
development is uneven, and the gap between the North and the South is widening. Security
issues related to energy, resources, finance, information and international shipping routes are
mounting. International terrorist forces remain active, shocking terrorist acts keep occurring.
Natural disasters, serious communicable diseases, environmental degradation, international
crime and other transnational problems are becoming more damaging in nature.
A revolution in military affairs is developing in depth worldwide. Military competition based on

informationization is intensifying. There has not been major change in the imbalances in
relative military strength. Some developed countries have increased their input into the military
and speeded up R&D of high-tech weaponry to gain military superiority. Many developing
countries are also upgrading their armaments and modernizing their military forces. The
situation regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains grave and
complex. The international non-proliferation regime faces major challenges. The practice of a
small number of countries that have intensified their military alliances and resorted to force or
threats of force in international affairs has shown new developments, which hinder efforts to
improve international security.
The overall security environment in the Asia-Pacific region remains stable. The regional
economy maintains an unprecedented strong momentum of growth, and a framework of open
and mutually beneficial cooperation based on equality and in diversified forms is taking shape
in the region. Multilateral security dialogue and cooperation are being enhanced. The
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has entered a new stage of substantive growth,
contributing to the establishment of a new mode of state-to-state relations. ASEAN has made
steady progress in community-building and in talks on establishing free trade areas with other
countries. East Asian cooperation, which is conducted mainly through the ASEAN plus China,
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Japan and the ROK (10+3) channel, has expanded in scope and its institutional building is
improving constantly, continuing to play a major role in promoting peace, stability and
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The East Asia Summit has provided a new platform for
East Asian cooperation. Moreover, significant progress has been made in South Asian regional
cooperation. There is improvement in the relations between India and Pakistan.
There are growing complexities in the Asia-Pacific security environment. There is a new
adjustment going on in the strategic alignment and relations among major countries in the
region, and new changes have occurred in the hotspots in the region. The United States is
accelerating its realignment of military deployment to enhance its military capability in the Asia-
Pacific region. The United States and Japan are strengthening their military alliance in pursuit
of operational integration. Japan seeks to revise its constitution and exercise collective self-
defense. Its military posture is becoming more external-oriented. The DPRK has launched
missile tests and conducted a nuclear test. Thus, the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in
Northeast Asia has become more complex and challenging. Iraq and Afghanistan continue to
face turbulence. The Middle East has become more volatile. A settlement of the Iranian
nuclear issue is not yet in sight. Territorial disputes, conflicting claims over maritime rights and
interests, and ethnic and religious discords undermine trust and cooperation among states.
The threat of terrorism, separatism and extremism remains serious. In addition, some
countries face growing internal problems caused by social and economic transition.
China's overall security environment remains sound. China is committed to building a

moderately prosperous society in an all-round way and a socialist harmonious society, and it
enjoys steady economic growth, political stability, ethnic harmony and social progress. Its
overall national strength has considerably increased, as has its international standing and
influence. China's practical cooperation with major countries continues to grow, its friendly
relations with its neighboring countries have developed steadily, and it is forging strong ties
with other developing countries. This has given rise to a new relationship of mutual benefit and
win-win between China and other countries. The Chinese government has taken a number of
significant measures to improve relations across the Taiwan Straits, thus promoting cross-
Straits relations toward peace and stability.
However, China's security still faces challenges that must not be neglected. The growing
interconnections between domestic and international factors and interconnected traditional and
non-traditional factors have made maintaining national security a more challenging task. The
struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for "Taiwan independence" and their
activities remains a hard one. By pursuing a radical policy for "Taiwan independence," the
Taiwan authorities aim at creating "de jure Taiwan independence" through "constitutional
reform, " thus still posing a grave threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well
as to peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.
The United States has reiterated many times that it will adhere to the "one China" policy and
honor the three joint communiqs between China and the United States. But, it continues to
sell advanced weapons to Taiwan, and has strengthened its military ties with Taiwan. A small
number of countries have stirred up a racket about a "China threat," and intensified their
preventive strategy against China and strove to hold its progress in check. Complex and
sensitive historical and current issues in China's surrounding areas still affect its security
environment.
China persists in continuing its peaceful development road. Balancing developments in both
domestic and international situations, it is well prepared to respond to complexities in the
international security environment. Guided by a security strategy of promoting both
development and security, China strives to build a socialist harmonious society at home and a
harmonious world to ensure both its overall national security and enduring peace in the world.
It endeavors to enhance both development and security, both internal security and external
security and both traditional security and non-traditional security; works to uphold its

sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity and promote national development; and strives to
sustain the important period of strategic opportunity for national development. China is
committed to fostering a cooperative relationship of mutual benefit and win-win with other
countries and working with them to promote common security.

II. National Defense Policy

China pursues a national defense policy which is purely defensive in nature. China's national
defense provides the guarantee for maintaining China's security and unity, and realizing the
goal of building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way. To build a powerful and
fortified national defense is a strategic task of China's modernization drive.
China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defense and
armed forces, in accordance with the state's overall plan to realize modernization. The first
step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020,
and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces
and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century.
China's national defense policy for the new stage in the new century is defined as follows:
Upholding national security and unity, and ensure the interests of national development.
This includes guarding against and resisting aggression, defending against violation of China's
territorial sea and air space, and borders; opposing and containing the separatist forces for
"Taiwan independence" and their activities, taking precautions against and cracking down on
terrorism, separatism and extremism in all forms. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is
dedicated to performing its historical missions for the new stage in the new century, namely,
providing an important source of strength for consolidating the ruling position of the Communist
Party of China (CPC), providing a solid security guarantee for sustaining the important period
of strategic opportunity for national development, providing a strong strategic support for
safeguarding national interests, and playing a major role in maintaining world peace and
promoting common development. It improves its capabilities of countering various security
threats, accomplishes diversified military tasks, and ensures that it can effectively respond to
crises, maintain peace, deter and win wars under complex circumstances.
Achieving the all-round, coordinated and sustainable development of China's national

defense and armed forces. China pursues a policy of coordinated development of national
defense and economy. It keeps the modernization of China's national defense and armed
forces as an integral part of its social and economic development, so as to ensure that the
modernization of its national defense and armed forces advance in step with the national
modernization drive. China works in a comprehensive way to ensure that its armed forces are
revolutionary in nature, modernized and regularized. It strives to ensure coordination between
the revolution in military affairs with Chinese features and preparations for military struggle,
mechanization and informationization, combat force building of services and arms, current and
long-term development, and efforts devoted to the main and secondary strategic directions.
China works to deepen the adjustment and reform of its military organizations and structures,
as well as policies and systems, address deep-seated impediments and problems in its military
structures and mechanisms which hinder the development of its armed forces, boost
innovation in its military organizational structure and military management, and improve
efficiency in its military modernization drive.
Enhancing the performance of the armed forces with informationization as the major
measuring criterion. The PLA, taking mechanization as the foundation and informationization
as the driving force, promotes the composite development of informationization and
mechanization to achieve overall capability improvement in the fields of firepower, assault,
mobility, protection and information. The PLA pursues a strategy of strengthening itself by
means of science and technology, and works to accelerate change in the generating mode of
war fighting capabilities by drawing on scientific and technological advances. The PLA seeks
to raise its capabilities of independent innovation in weaponry and equipment, as well as
defense-related science and technology, and strives to make major breakthroughs in some

basic, pioneering and technological fields of strategic importance. It is stepping up its efforts to
build a joint operational command system, training system and support system for fighting
informationized wars and enhance the building of systems integration of services and arms.
The PLA is carrying out a strategic project for training a large contingent of new-type and high-
caliber military personnel suited to the task of informationization of the armed forces and
competent for operational tasks under conditions of informationization. The PLA is also
working to make its training more technology-intensive and innovative in training programs,
means and methods.
Implementing the military strategy of active defense. The PLA ensures that it is well
prepared for military struggle, with winning local wars under conditions of informationization
and enhancing national sovereignty, security, and interests of development as its objective. It
will upgrade and develop the strategic concept of people's war, and work for close coordination
between military struggle and political, economic, diplomatic, cultural and legal endeavors,
uses strategies and tactics in a comprehensive way, and takes the initiative to prevent and
defuse crises and deter conflicts and wars. The PLA will establish step by step a modern
national defense mobilization system that is centralized and unified, well structured, rapid in
reaction, and authoritative and efficient. Taking joint operations as the basic form, the PLA
aims to bring the operational strengths of different services and arms into full play. The Army
aims at moving from regional defense to trans-regional mobility, and improving its capabilities
in air-ground integrated operations, long-distance maneuvers, rapid assaults and special
operations. The Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive
operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear
counterattacks. The Air Force aims at speeding up its transition from territorial air defense to
both offensive and defensive operations, and increasing its capabilities in the areas of air
strike, air and missile defense, early warning and reconnaissance, and strategic projection.
The Second Artillery Force aims at progressively improving its force structure of having both
nuclear and conventional missiles, and raising its capabilities in strategic deterrence and
conventional strike under conditions of informationization.
Pursuing a self-defensive nuclear strategy. China's nuclear strategy is subject to the state's
nuclear policy and military strategy. Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using
or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. China remains firmly committed to the
policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It
unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-
weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehensive prohibition
and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. China upholds the principles of counterattack in
self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and
effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. It endeavors to ensure the
security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force.
China's nuclear force is under the direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
China exercises great restraint in developing its nuclear force. It has never entered into and
will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.
Fostering a security environment conducive to China's peaceful development. China

maintains military contacts with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence, and develops cooperative military relations that are non-aligned, non-
confrontational and not directed against any third party. China takes part in international
security cooperation, strengthens strategic coordination and consultation with major powers
and neighboring countries, and conducts bilateral or multilateral joint military exercises. It
promotes the establishment of just and effective collective security mechanisms and military
confidence-building mechanisms, and works with other countries to prevent conflicts and wars.
China stands for effective disarmament and arms control that are just, reasonable,
comprehensive and balanced in nature. China opposes nuclear proliferation, and endeavors to
advance the process of international nuclear disarmament. China observes the purposes and
principles of the UN Charter, honors its international obligations, and participates in UN

peacekeeping operations, international counter-terrorism cooperation and international

disaster relief operations. It plays an active part in maintaining global and regional peace and
stability.

III. China's Leadership and Administration System for National

Defense
China has established and keeps improving a leadership and administration system for
national defense in accordance with the Constitution, the National Defense Law and other
relevant laws. The state exercises unified leadership over national defense activities. China's
armed forces are under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The Central
Military Commission (CMC) of the CPC and that of the People's Republic of China (PRC) are
completely the same in their composition and in their function of exercising leadership over the
armed forces. The CMC chairman has overall responsibility for its work.
The National People's Congress (NPC) elects the chairman of the CMC of the PRC and, upon
nomination by the chairman, decides on the choice of all other members of the CMC. The NPC
decides on war and peace and exercises other functions and powers relating to national
defense as prescribed by the Constitution. When the NPC is in recess, its Standing Committee
decides on the proclamation of a state of war, decides on the general or partial mobilization of
the country, and exercises other functions and powers relating to national defense as
prescribed by the Constitution. The president of the PRC, in pursuance of the decisions of the
NPC and its Standing Committee, may proclaim a state of war, issue mobilization orders, and
exercise other functions and powers relating to national defense as prescribed by the
Constitution.
The State Council directs and administers national defense building in the following areas:
making national defense development programs and plans, formulating principles, policies and
administrative regulations for defense building, administering defense expenditure and assets,
directing and administering national defense scientific research and production, directing and
administering work related to mobilization of the national economy, mobilization of people's
armed forces, people's air defense and national defense traffic, directing and administering the
work of supporting the military and giving preferential treatment to families of servicemen and
martyrs, as well as the resettlement of servicemen discharged from active service. It also
directs national defense education and, jointly with the CMC, the building of the Chinese
People's Armed Police Force (PAPF) and the militia, the work concerning enlistment and
reserve service, and the administration of border, coastal and air defenses, and exercises
other functions and powers relating to national defense building as prescribed by law. Under
the State Council are the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and other departments
concerning national defense building.
The CMC directs and exercises unified command of China's armed forces. It has the following
functions and powers: deciding on the military strategy and operational guidelines of the armed
forces, directing and administering the building of the PLA, submitting proposals related to
national defense to the NPC or its Standing Committee, formulating military regulations,
issuing decisions and orders, deciding on the structure and organization of the PLA, appointing
and removing, training, evaluating, and rewarding and punishing members of the armed
forces, approving systems and development programs and plans for weaponry and equipment,
and exercising other functions and powers as prescribed by law.
The PLA's General Staff Headquarters, General Political Department, General Logistics
Department and General Armaments Department are departments of the CMC respectively
responsible for military, political, logistical and equipment work. The General Staff
Headquarters organizes and directs the development of China's armed forces, and organizes
and commands their military operations. Under it are departments in charge of operations,
intelligence, communications, military training and arms, adjutant and force structure,
mobilization, electronic countermeasures, Army aviation, foreign affairs, etc. Its main functions

and powers are to put forward proposals on major issues of military building and operations,
organize and exercise strategic command, formulate programs, rules and regulations for
military work, and organize and direct war preparations, as well as military training and
mobilization. The General Political Department administers the armed forces' Party work, and
organizes their political work. Under it are departments in charge of Party affairs, personnel,
publicity, security, discipline inspection, civil-military affairs, etc. Its main responsibilities are to
ensure the armed forces' compliance with and implementation of the lines, principles and
policies of the Party and the Constitution and laws of the state, draw up general and specific
policies for political work, formulate rules and regulations for political work, and make
arrangements for, supervise and provide guidance to the political work of the armed forces.
The General Logistics Department administers the logistical work of the armed forces. Under it
are departments in charge of financial matters, quartermaster materials and petroleum, oils
and lubricants, health administration, military transportation, capital construction and barracks,
auditing, etc. Its main responsibilities are to formulate programs, rules and regulations for
logistical construction, deploy logistical forces, organize logistical mobilization and provide
logistical support, carry out the application, allocation, budgeting and final accounting of
military expenditure, and conduct material procurement. The General Armaments Department
administers the provision of equipment for the armed forces. Under it are departments in
charge of overall planning, equipment for all services and arms, procurement for Army's
military equipment R&D, general-purpose equipment support, electronic information
infrastructure, etc. Its main responsibilities are to formulate strategies, programs and plans,
policies, and rules and regulations for equipment development, organize equipment R&D,
experimentation, procurement, combat service, maintenance and support, and administer the
PLA's funds for equipment buildup.
The Army has no independent leading body, and the leadership of it is exercised by the four
general headquarters/departments. A military area command exercises direct leadership over
the Army units under it. The Army has 18 combined corps, which are mobile combat troops.
The Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, each of which has a leading body consisting
of the headquarters, the political department, the logistics department and the armaments
department, direct the military, political, logistical and equipment work of their respective
troops, and take part in the command of joint operations. The Navy organizes and commands
maritime operations conducted independently by its troops or in support of maritime
operations. There are three fleets under the Navy, namely, the Beihai Fleet, Donghai Fleet and
Nanhai Fleet. Each fleet has flotillas, aviation divisions, etc. under its command. The Air Force
organizes and commands air operations conducted independently by itself or with Air Force
personnel as the main fighting force, as well as air defense operations in the capital area. It
has an air command in each of the seven military area commands of Shenyang, Beijing,
Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu, respectively. Under an air command are
aviation divisions, ground-to-air missile divisions (brigades and regiments), antiaircraft artillery
brigades (regiments), radar brigades (regiments) and other support troops. In major directions
and key target areas there are also corps- or division-level command posts. The Second
Artillery Force organizes and commands its own troops in case of launching nuclear
counterattacks with strategic missiles and conducting operations with conventional missiles.
Under it are missile and training bases, and relevant support troops.
Military area commands (theaters of war) are military organizations set up according to the
administrative divisions of the state, geographical locations, strategic and operational
directions, and operational tasks. They are CMC-appointed organs for commanding joint
theater operations. They direct the military, political, logistical and equipment work of the
troops under them. Under a military area command are the headquarters, the political
department, the joint logistics department and the armaments department. A military area
command is mainly in charge of formulating programs and plans for combat readiness and
operations of troops in the theater and for the reserve force buildup of the theater, organizing
and commanding joint theater operations involving different services and arms, and providing
joint logistical support. At present, the PLA has seven military area commands, namely,

Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu. Under a military area
command are combined Army corps, units of various Army arms, logistical support units and
provincial military commands (garrison commands at the same level).
Provincial military commands (garrison commands at the same level) are organizations set up
by the PLA in province-level administrative areas, and are under military area commands.
They also serve as departments of Party committees for military work and organs of
government for military service at the level of province (municipality directly under the central
government, or autonomous region). So, they are under the dual leadership of the military area
commands and local Party committees and governments at the same level. The leading body
of a provincial military command consists of the headquarters, the political department and the
logistics department. A provincial military command directs the military, political, logistical and
equipment work of the units under it, and oversees reserve force building, peacetime
enlistment and wartime strength mobilization in its area of responsibility.
Prefectural military commands (garrison commands at the same level) are organizations set up
by the PLA in prefectures (prefecture-level cities, autonomous prefectures or leagues). They
are under provincial military commands, but also serve as departments of Party committees for
military work and organs of government for military service at the level of the prefecture
(prefecture-level city, autonomous prefecture or league). So, they are under the dual
leadership of the provincial military commands and local Party committees and governments at
the same level. The leading body of a prefectural military command consists of the
headquarters, the political department and the logistics department. The main tasks of a
prefectural military command are to oversee the military training, political work and equipment
management of the militia and reserve force, organize and conduct wartime mobilization, and
undertake military service registration and enlistment. Prefectural military commands in border
areas are also in charge of the military, political, logistical and equipment work of border
defense troops as well as border defense duties, talks and meetings, and border management,
protection and control.
People's armed forces departments are organizations set up by the PLA in counties (banners,
county-level cities or municipal districts). They are under prefectural military commands, but
also serve as departments of Party committees for military work and organs of government for
military service work at the level of the county (banner, county-level city or municipal district).
So, they are under the dual leadership of the prefectural military commands and local Party
committees and governments at the same level. A people's armed forces department consists
typically of a military affairs section, a political work section and a logistics section. Its main
tasks are to oversee reserve force buildup, combat readiness, military service and
mobilization, and command militia operations. The grass-roots people's armed forces
departments established by the state at the level of township (town) or sub-district are non-
active-duty organizations. They are manned by full-time staff that are under the dual leadership
of the local Party committees and governments at the same level and military organs at higher
levels.
In addition, local people's congresses at all levels and the standing committees of local
people's congresses at and above the county level ensure the compliance with and
implementation of laws and regulations relating to national defense in their respective
administrative areas. Local people's governments at all levels, within the authority they enjoy
as prescribed by law, are responsible for enlistment, militia forces, reserve service, national
defense education, mobilization of the economy, civil air defense, national defense traffic,
protection of defense installations, resettlement of servicemen discharged from active service,
supporting the PLA and giving preferential treatment to families of servicemen and martyrs and
other related matters in their respective administrative areas. Local people's governments at
various levels and the military organs stationed there hold joint civil-military meetings as called
for to handle matters concerning national defense in their respective administrative areas.

IV. The People's Liberation Army

To effectively fulfill its historic mission in the new stage of the new century, the PLA is
speeding up the revolution in military affairs with Chinese features and enhancing in an all-
round way its capabilities of defensive operations under conditions of informationization.
Completing the Reduction of 200,000 Troops
In 1985, 1997 and 2003, China announced that it would cut the size of the PLA by one million,
500,000 and 200,000 persons, respectively. By the end of 2005, China had completed
reducing the PLA by 200,000 troops, and the PLA currently has 2.3 million troops. The PLA
has made new progress towards the goal of being proper in size, optimal in structure,
streamlined in organization, swift and flexible in command, and powerful in fighting capacity.
Downsizing the PLA. The Army was the focus of force reduction, and its authorized number of
personnel has been reduced by more than 130,000. Over 60,000 military personnel have been
removed from the headquarters and directly affiliated units of military area commands and
provincial military commands. Through restructuring, the proportion of the Navy, Air Force and
Second Artillery Force in the PLA has been raised by 3.8 percent while that of the Army has
been lowered by 1.5 percent.
Streamlining the headquarters and directly affiliated units as well as educational institutions.
More than 3,000 departments of and over 400 units directly affiliated to the headquarters at
and above the regimental level have been cut. A considerable number of agricultural and
sideline production units, cultural and sports units, military representative offices at railway
stations and material supply organs have been closed. The PLA has also closed 15
educational institutions and 31 training organizations.
Improving the structure of services and arms. The Army has cut a number of combined corps,
divisions and regiments, increased the number of combined corps whose order of battle is
corps, brigade and battalion, and set up units with new and high-tech weaponry and
equipment. The Navy and Air Force have cut some ship groups and aviation divisions,
regiments and stations, and set up some high-tech surface ship, aviation and ground-to-air
missile units. A number of reserve infantry divisions have been dismantled, but the number of
divisions (brigades) of other arms has increased.
Reforming the leadership and command system. The leadership and command system of the
general headquarters/departments has been enhanced through adjusting the functions of
relevant departments and improving joint operational command. The Navy has cut the naval
aviation department and converted naval bases into support ones. The Air Force has closed
corps (base) headquarters and set up regional command posts. Following these adjustments,
the combat troops of the Navy and Air Force are now directly under the fleets and the air
commands of the military areas, respectively.
Deepening the reform of the joint logistical support system. The joint logistical support system,
based on military area commands, has been expanded, and overlapping support organizations
reduced. Apart from special-purpose depots and general hospitals under the general
headquarters/departments, the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, all the other rear
depots, hospitals and recuperation centers have been integrated and reorganized into the joint
logistical support system. A total of eight joint logistical sub-departments (offices), 94 rear
depots, and 47 hospitals and recuperation centers have been closed.
Improving the ratio between officers and men. The PLA has reduced the number of its officers

by 170,000. More than 150 officer posts at or above the corps level have been eliminated,
nearly 70,000 posts formerly taken by officers are now filled with non-commissioned officers
(NCOs), and over 20,000 posts formerly taken by NCOs are now filled with contract civilians.
Development of the Services and Arms
The Army is speeding up the upgrading and informationization of its active main battle
equipment to build a new type of ground combat force which is lean, combined, agile and multi-
functional. Priority is given to building Army aviation, light mechanized and information
countermeasures units. The share of the armored component in the Army combined combat
forces has been further raised. The artillery and air defense component has fielded new types
of cannons, field antiaircraft missiles, reconnaissance early warning radars, fire-control
systems, and intelligence and command systems, and increased the proportion of ground-to-
air missiles to antiaircraft guns. The engineering component has grown in step with the main
combat arms, and improved its capabilities of accompanying support and precision support.
The anti-chemical component has established a preliminary nuclear, biological and chemical
(NBC) protection system tailored to joint operations, and greatly increased its capabilities of
rapid NBC protection, NBC emergency rescue and operations against NBC terrorism. The
communications component has enhanced the building of platforms for general-purpose
information transmission and processing, C2 systems and spectrum management systems,
and raised communications and information support capabilities.
Founded in 1986, the Army aviation arm has a three-level (general headquarters/departments,
theaters of war and first-line task groups) administration system. Equipped mainly with armed
helicopters, transport helicopters and service helicopters, it carries out air strike, air landing,
airlifting and battlefield service support operations. The Army aviation arm works to strengthen
its capabilities of rapid power projection, precision strike, long-range assault and support.
The Navy is working to build itself into a modern maritime force of operation consisting of
combined arms with both nuclear and conventional means of operations. Taking
informationization as the goal and strategic focus in its modernization drive, the Navy gives
high priority to the development of maritime information systems, and new-generation
weaponry and equipment. Efforts are being made to improve maritime battlefield capabilities,
with emphasis on the construction of relevant facilities for new equipment and the development
of combat support capabilities. The Navy is endeavoring to build mobile maritime troops
capable of conducting operations under conditions of informationization, and strengthen its
overall capabilities of operations in coastal waters, joint operations and integrated maritime
support. Efforts are being made to improve and reform training programs and methods to
intensify training in joint integrated maritime operations. The Navy is enhancing research into
the theory of naval operations and exploring the strategy and tactics of maritime people's war
under modern conditions.
The Air Force is working to build an informationized air fighting force with both offensive and
defensive capabilities. It is reducing the number of combat aircraft, giving priority to the
development of new fighters as well as air and missile defense weapons. It is working to
enhance command and control systems. It stresses mission-oriented and confrontational
training, increasing combined tactical training of different arms and aircraft types, and conducts
training in flying refitted new aircraft and using new weaponry and equipment in an active and
stable way. Air Force pilot training is conducted at flying colleges, training bases and combat
units in five phases, namely, basic education, primary flying, advanced flying, refitted combat
aircraft flying and tactical flying. Aviation units mainly conduct training in counter-air operations,
air-to-ground attacks and joint operations. Pilots fly training hours are commensurate with the
tasks assigned to pilots.
The Second Artillery Force is striving to build a streamlined and effective strategic force with

both nuclear and conventional capabilities. It is quickening its steps to raise the
informationization level of its weaponry and equipment systems, build an agile and efficient
operational command and control system, and increase its capabilities of land-based strategic
nuclear counterstrikes and precision strikes with conventional missiles. It is improving the
construction of its battlefield system, and associated logistics and equipment, and raising the
cost-effectiveness of integrated support. It is deepening the reform of training, enhancing
integrated training, using scientific and technological achievements to raise training quality. It is
strengthening the safety management and control mechanism of nuclear missiles, and
improving the relevant rules and regulations and technical preventive measures as well as
emergency steps for handling nuclear accidents. The Second Artillery Force is equipped with
surface-to-surface strategic missiles and tactical operational missiles of various types.
Military Training
The PLA regards military training as a basic means to raise its combat effectiveness in
peacetime, as well as an important method to foster and administer troops. It takes vigorous
steps to accelerate the transition from military training under conditions of mechanization to
military training under conditions of informationization. At the PLA-wide military training
conference held in June 2006, the General Staff Headquarters put forward a comprehensive
plan for carrying out military training in a creative way for the new stage in the new century. It
called on all PLA troops to set high and strict standards, base their training on actual combat,
use scientific and technological means in training, advance the reform of training, and elevate
military training to a higher level.
The PLA conducts training in strict accordance with the requirements for winning local wars
under conditions of informationization. It conducts basic technical and tactical training,
combined tactical training, and strategic and operational training. The PLA conducts training
and integration to boost its combat capabilities level by level. It conducts training with live
ammunition and holds exercises with opposing players in a realistic manner to temper troops
in near-real-war environment. The PLA conducts training by scientific and technological
means, employs modern training methods and means, and develops on-base, simulated and
networked training. It is increasing the use of scientific and technological means with focus on
improving the quality and effect of training.
The PLA focuses on enhancing joint training to improve the integrated joint operational
capabilities of various services and arms. It gives priority to the training of joint campaign
commanders and command organs, joint field exercises and the training of different support
forces in integrated support. It works to enhance the commanding and organizing capabilities
of strategic and operational commanders and command organs, and the joint operational
capabilities of the services and arms. Keeping in mind the future informationized battlefield, the
PLA closely follows the emerging trend of integrated joint operations, conducts integrated
training in an innovative way, and actively explores training approaches for the internal
integration of fighting units, systems integration of fighting elements and comprehensive
integration of fighting systems.
The PLA conducts training in strict accordance with pre-set plans, and is strengthening the
scientific management of the overall processes and all the aspects of training. It is exploring
new modes for organizing and managing training under conditions of informationization, and
intensifying precise and mission-oriented management according to law to keep training
processes standardized. It is improving training procedures, making strict training
assessments, and setting and improving training standards to meet the requirements of
informationized operations. Priority is given to the training of command organs and collective
training. The PLA uses live-ammunition exercises and means such as exercise assessment
systems for a comprehensive evaluation of the training and combat capabilities of the troops.

Political Work
The basic tasks of the PLA's political work are as follows: ensuring the success of the reform
and opening-up of the country and the building of a moderately prosperous society in an all-
round way, as well as promoting the socialist modernization; advancing the revolution in
military affairs with Chinese features, as well as the revolutionization, modernization and
regularization of the PLA; guaranteeing --politically, ideologically and organizationally -- the
nature of the people's army under the absolute leadership of the Party; upholding the PLA's
socialist ethical standards, the goal of which is to cultivate military personnel with lofty ideals,
high moral standards, a wide range of knowledge and a keen sense of discipline; ensuring the
PLA's internal unity, unity between the PLA and the government, and unity between the PLA
and the people; and ensuring the PLA's combat effectiveness and the accomplishment of the
PLA's tasks.
In the long years of fighting revolutionary wars and seeking modernization, a fine tradition of
democracy has taken root and a complete democratic system has developed within the PLA.
The conference of servicemen's representatives at the levels of the brigade and regiment is
part of this democratic system, which ensures the practice of democracy and the right of
servicemen to exercise their democratic rights and participate in troop management. The
conference of servicemen's representatives is mainly tasked with reviewing the work reports of
their commanders, supervising their units' compliance with and implementation of regulations,
orders and directives from the above, voicing servicemen's opinions, raising demands on their
behalf and monitoring the use of funds in their units. Guided by Party committees and political
organs at the same level, units at the levels of brigade and regiment hold annual conferences
of servicemen's representatives. The representatives are selected through bottom-up
democratic elections from among active servicemen and employees on the PLA payroll. Led
by Party branches or grass-roots Party committees and directed by military and political chiefs,
the servicemen's committee is an organization through which companies and company-level
units practice democracy in political, economic and military affairs, ensure servicemen's
democratic rights and conduct servicemen's activities.
The PLA conducts political work in a creative way to raise the overall performance of its
officers and men. The PLA educates its officers and men in its historic mission, ideals, beliefs,
fighting spirit, and the socialist concept of honor and disgrace, to raise mission awareness,
foster revolutionary ideals, strengthen the will to fight, draw a clear line between right and
wrong, and arouse enthusiasm for training. The PLA conducts psychological training and
studies on psychological operations, and has in place a mechanism involving both political and
medical institutions to provide psychological education, catharsis and health service. The CMC
and the general headquarters/departments have formulated a series of policies and
regulations to strengthen the building of grass-roots units. Most of the commanding organs at
and above the regiment level have mechanisms to coordinate grass-roots work. In the course
of implementing the Outline for Armed Forces Building at the Grass-Roots Level, a large
number of advanced grass-roots units and excellent soldiers have come to the fore.
Logistical Support
To ensure the cost-effectiveness of logistical support, the PLA is enhancing the management
and reform of logistical support in an effort to build a modern logistics system.
Upgrading logistics management. The PLA is speeding up the formulation of logistical rules,
regulations and standards to establish a standardized system covering supply, consumption
and management. During the period of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and
Social Development (2001-2005) (hereinafter referred to as the Tenth Five-Year Plan), the
PLA conducted a comprehensive review of its logistical regulations and standards. Over 200
standards were adopted or revised, and more than 240 regulations were enacted. During the

period of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2006-
2010) (hereinafter referred to as the Eleventh Five-Year Plan), the PLA is giving priority to
standardizing logistical supply and establishing a mechanism for the dynamic adjustment of
supply and support standards. It is strengthening the management of logistics and ensuring
the overall sound implementation of the military budget. In addition, it is enforcing financial and
economic discipline through strict auditing supervision.
Improving the material life conditions of the officers and men. The PLA has adopted the
practice of serving separate portions of food to improve hygienic conditions. Some organic
battalions have begun to provide battalion-based food service. Board expenses of enlisted
men have been increased substantially since January 1, 2005, and now the food supply for
officers and men aims at providing sufficient nutrition rather than just serving enough food.
From July 1, 2006, the salaries for service people have been increased by a wide margin. The
PLA has issued new types of uniforms to the enlisted and Air Force officers and men, new
types of special-purpose fatigue clothing to troops other than those of the Army, and new types
of plateau cold-proof uniforms to some troops stationed in Xinjiang and Tibet.
Steadily advancing logistics reform. Adhering to the principles of the incorporation of tri-service
components into joint logistical organs, joint management and employment of support entities,
and unified organization of supply and support, the PLA is conducting experimental reforms in
joint logistics in the Jinan Theatre. This marks an important step towards the goal of building
an integrated tri-service logistical support system. It involves comprehensive efforts to expand
the reform of the centralized payment system to establish a support mode of fund settlement
with single financial accounts as the basis and centraliz ed payment as the main form. The
reform of the military medical support system is being smoothly carried out, with priority given
to ensuring the medical care of military personnel. Over 70 percent of the PLA's employees are
covered by the social medical insurance system. The housing system reform has made
progress, and a housing system for military personnel has taken shape which combines
military support with social support, government houses with self-owned houses, and supply in
kind with supply in money.
In October 2004, the General Staff Headquarters, General Political Department and General
Logistics Department jointly issued the Circular on Further Promoting the Reform of Military
Materials Procurement under the Corps Level. The PLA has basically established a three-level
(logistical organs of the general headquarters/departments, major units, and units) materials
procurement and management system and a system of centralized procurement. During the
Tenth Five-Year Plan period, the PLA's centralized procurement reached RMB 45 billion,
enabling it to save RMB 3.15 billion and spend 7 percent less on average.
Weaponry and Equipment
With the backing of China's economic development and scientific and technological
achievements, the PLA is accelerating its weaponry and equipment modernization drive mainly
by relying on its own efforts.
Planning long-term weaponry and equipment development in a scientific way. Based on the
military strategic guidelines of the new era and the outline for the building and development of
the military, the PLA is making efforts to correctly handle the relationship between the needs of
equipment development and the availability of funds. As required by comprehensive
integration of the Army, Navy and Air Force, joint operation and systems building, the PLA has
conducted studies and feasibility assessments of its weaponry and equipment development
strategy, adopted the outline and the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for weaponry and equipment
development, and set the direction, goals and priorities of its future weaponry and equipment
development.

Enhancing the capability of independent weaponry and equipment innovation. The PLA is
strengthening applied and basic research as well as research on key defense technologies,
ensuring the application of technological achievements and raising its capabilities of original
innovation, integrated innovation, and innovation through digesting and absorbing introduced
technologies. It is improving the innovation mechanism for defense-related science and
technology, and weaponry and equipment to support the independent, leapfrogging and
sustainable development of new and high-tech weaponry and equipment.
Optimizing the system of weaponry and equipment. The PLA gives priority to developing new
types of equipment which are advanced and reliable in technical performance, and effective in
operations. It is speeding up the development of integrated electronic information systems,
enhancing the comprehensive integration of various types of weapon systems and support
systems, and facilitating information sharing and fusion. The PLA is accelerating the retirement
of redundant equipment, carrying out the prioritized, selective and phased retrofitting of
equipment and informationization of equipment on active service, and tapping the potential of
existing equipment. It is strengthening the systematic development of equipment to form a
complete system of equipment, weaponry and equipment support.
Increasing the capability of integrated equipment support. The PLA is strict with equipment
management and carries out scientific, institutionalized and regular evaluation on such
management in order to maintain and improve the operability of existing equipment. The PLA
has established and improved mechanisms for integrated civilian-military equipment support. It
is developing new and high maintenance technologies, widening their application and
enhancing the capabilities of equipment maintenance, emergency rescue and repair, and
remote technical support. It is strengthening equipment support force building, equipment
support training, pre-field training and training of qualified equipment personnel, to promote the
organic and systematic development of operational and support capabilities of equipment.
Actively advancing the reform of the equipment procurement system. In December 2005, the
CMC approved and issued the Opinions on Some Issues Concerning the Deepening of the
Equipment Procurement System Reform. In the past two years, the General Armaments
Department has improved the review and approval of equipment procurement modes, and
gradually enlarged the scope of competitive procurement, raising the percentage of funds for
such procurement from 10 percent to 20 percent. The General Armaments Department has
strengthened the management of the centralized procurement of equipment of the same kind
for the whole PLA, formulated related rules, regulations and standards, and substantially
increased the quantities and varieties of equipment procured in a centralized way, saving eight
percent of the planned funds and greatly improving the efficiency of fund use.
Military Legal System
During the Tenth Five-Year Plan period, the Standing Committee of the NPC, the State
Council and the CMC, exercising their prescribed functions and powers, formulated and
revised 99 military laws and regulations. The general headquarters/departments, military area
commands, Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force formulated and revised nearly 900
military rules and regulations. In 2006, the CMC began to implement its law-making program
for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period. In a period of five years, a military legal system will
take shape which covers multiple aspects, and is coherent, scientific, closely knit and well-
designed.
As military courts exercise the function of civil trial within the military, military procuratorates
have begun to conduct civil prosecution on a trial basis and supervise civil trials in the military
in accordance with the law. In line with the regulations on the people's supervisory system
practiced by civil procuratorates, military procuratorates have started to introduce, on a trial
basis, a system of servicemen's supervisors to strengthen supervision over investigation of

misconduct on duty. In conformity with the requirements of the state's procedural law, a new
servicemen's jury system has been established, which specifies the selection of jury members
and the procedure for the performance of their duties. In keeping with the state's judicial
system, the PLA has instituted a specialized rank system for military judges and procurators
which consists of 11 grades at three levels. This has enhanced the professional performance
of the military judicial personnel.
In recent years, based on the experience gained from appointing military lawyers at the three
levels of combined corps, division and brigade in the Army, units at and above the brigade
level in the Second Artillery Force have also started to be staffed with military lawyers. The
General Armaments Department and the Navy have set up professional legal advisory offices
concerning national defense patents and maritime issues. Military lawyers have played an
active role in providing support to commanding officers and organs in decision-making,
defending defendants in criminal trials, and undertaking civil cases to protect the legitimate
rights and interests of military units and personnel.
Military Institutional Education
Under the unified leadership of the CMC, the PLA institutional education is managed at two
levels: by the general headquarters/departments and by the military area commands (Navy, Air
Force or Second Artillery Force). The four general headquarters/departments provide overall
guidance for all PLA educational institutions, and the General Staff Headquarters administers
military education. The development goal of military educational institutions is to establish and
improve a new school system with distinct military features to shift priority from education of
officer candidates for academic credentials to pre-assignment education. The new system
takes pre-assignment educational institutions as the main form, and makes a distinction
between these two types of education. The PLA has 67 military educational institutions, which
are divided into two types: those for academic credentials and those for pre-assignment
education. The former offers undergraduate education for pre-commission officers and
graduate education for officers. The latter consists of elementary, intermediate and advanced
level institutions and NCO schools, and offers pre-assignment training and rotational training
for active-duty officers and NCOs. Some pre-assignment educational institutions also offer
graduate courses in military science. At the same time, 112 regular institutions of higher
learning in China undertake the task of training defense students, thus gradually increasing the
number of military officers trained in civilian educational institutions.
The PLA endeavors to improve the overall performance of military educational institutions
through focused and coordinated development. It has launched a project for establishing key
military colleges and schools in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period. It continues to focus
efforts on building a number of institutions and research centers for disciplines and specialties
that are important in building an informationized military and winning informationized wars. A
new round of reform in teaching is underway to improve the training target models for officers
in different fields and at different levels, and to develop new programs and curricula for the
training of military personnel. The PLA is also improving the information network for military
training, and has built more virtual laboratories, digital libraries and digital campuses to provide
distance learning and online teaching and training. In graduate education, the focus is shifted
from academic-oriented to practice-oriented, from emphasis on quantity to emphasis on
quality, and from a relatively closed-door approach to a more open and diversified approach.
The PLA now has 41 educational institutions authorized to award doctor's degrees and 60 to
award master's degrees.
Management System of Military Cadres In 2005, the PLA began to reform the evaluation,
selection and appointment system for military cadres, and to institute a system to evaluate
commanding officers. It conducts both evaluation and examination in selecting leading officers
at the level of deputy regimental commanders for combat troops. It has improved the

regulations on reserve cadres, and works to establish a long-term mechanism to select and
train outstanding young cadres. In March 2006, with the approval of the CMC, the four general
headquarters/departments jointly promulgated the Provisions of the PLA on Rewarding
Technical Experts, which gives awards and allowances to military technical experts.
In June 2005, the State Council and the CMC promulgated the Regulations of the PLA on
Contract Civilians, deciding to introduce a system of employing contract civilians to fill some
support posts in the military, so that active-duty officers, who are limited in number, mainly take
up command and combat posts. The regulations contain specific provisions on the nature and
status of contract civilians, the procedures of their employment, and the coordination of the
civil and military authorities' relevant policies. In 2006, the PLA started the employment of
contract civilians.
Officers and non-commissioned officers transferred to civilian work are resettled in one of the
following two ways: state-planned job assignment, and finding jobs by themselves. The State
Council has an office for overseeing the nationwide resettlement of such officers. The
provinces (autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the central government) have
corresponding offices for resettling such officers in their respective administrative areas. The
General Political Department is in charge of PLA-wide transfer of officers and non-
commissioned officers to civilian work, and Party committees and political organs at and above
the regiment level are responsible for transferring officers to civilian work in their own units.
The provincial military commands (garrison commands at the same level) are responsible for
turning over PLA officers and non-commissioned officers transferred to civilian work in their
respective provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the central
government. In 2005, the state and the PLA began to deepen the reform and adjustment of the
policies on resettling officers and non-commissioned officers transferred to civilian work.
Supporting the Government and Loving the People
The PLA attaches great importance to mass work, taking supporting the government and
loving the people as its major thrust. The political organs of the four general headquarters/
departments and the military area commands, the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force
all have offices for mass work. The political organs of corps, divisions (brigades) and regiments
also have special officers in charge of such work. These offices and officers are responsible for
maintaining contacts and coordination with governments at all levels. Education in supporting
the government and loving the people is conducted PLA-wide. The PLA participates in national
economic development, emergency rescue and disaster relief, and public welfare activities.
In the past two years, the engineering troops of the Army, Navy and Air Force have taken part
in more than 430 key construction projects for transportation, hydropower, communication and
energy infrastructure. The PLA has assisted in building new socialist villages in the
countryside, and provided regular assistance to poor farmers in more than 19,000 villages. It
has helped build over 48,000 small public projects such as water-saving irrigation projects,
drinking water projects for both people and livestock, roads, and hydropower projects, bringing
immediate benefits to nearly 800,000 people. In addition, it has helped build or enlarge 211
primary and secondary schools, enabling 142,000 school dropouts to return to class. PLA
troops stationed in China's western region have taken part in such ecological engineering
projects as the construction of shelterbelts and the improvement of small drainage areas. They
have planted 210 million trees and sown grass on more than 13 million sq m of land. PLA
hospitals have established regular assistance relations with more than 400 county or township
hospitals in the western region. They have helped train key members of the medical staff,
made rounds of visits offering free medical consultation and treatment, and donated medical
equipment and medicine. The PLA and PAPF have dispatched over 340,000 troops to take
part in more than 2,800 emergency rescue and disaster-relief operations, involving more than
40,000 vehicles, flown more than 2,000 sorties (including the use of helicopters), evacuated

over 3.4 million people and prevented economic losses of several billion yuan. At the end of
2006, the PLA donated 230 million yuan and over 930,000 cotton-padded clothes and quilts to
disaster- and poverty-stricken areas.
In June 2005, the State Council and the CMC promulgated the Regulations on Participation of
the PLA in Emergency Rescue and Disaster Relief, prescribing the PLA's main tasks,
coordination with local people's governments, limits of authority and procedures for employing
troops, joint command with local authorities, preparations and readiness, financial and material
support, etc., for such operations.

V. People's Armed Police Force

The People's Armed Police Force (PAPF) is charged with the fundamental task of
safeguarding national security, maintaining social stability and ensuring that the people live
and work in peace and contentment. It strives to make itself a powerful, disciplined and
politically reliable force.
Structure and Organization
As a component of China's armed forces and subordinate to the State Council, the PAPF is
under the dual leadership of the State Council and the CMC. The State Council exercises
leadership over the PAPF through relevant functional departments, assigns routine tasks to it,
decides its size and number of organizations, and is responsible for its command, operations,
and financial and material support. The PAPF has an independent budgetary status in the
financial expenditure of the state. The CMC is responsible for the PAPF's organizational
structure, management of officers, command, training and political work. It exercises
leadership over the PAPF through the four general headquarters/departments. In terms of
conducting public security operations and relevant capability building, the PAPF General
Headquarters is under the leadership and command of the Ministry of Public Security, and the
PAPF units at and below the contingent level are under the leadership and command of the
public security organs at the same level. The PAPF has a total force of 660,000.
The PAPF consists mainly of the internal security force and forces guarding gold mines,
forests, water and electricity supply, and communications. The border security, firefighting and
security guard forces are also components of the PAPF. The PAPF General Headquarters is
the leading and commanding organ that directs and administers the internal security force and
forces guarding gold mine, forest, water and electricity, and communications, etc., and
provides guidance to other forces subordinate to the PAPF. Under it are the headquarters,
political department and logistics department. The PAPF has one commander-in-chief, one
first political commissar (assumed concurrently by the Minister of Public Security), one political
commissar, and several deputy commanders-in-chief and deputy political commissars. The
PAPF internal security force is composed of contingents at the level of the province
(autonomous region or municipality directly under the central government) and armed police
divisions. Contingents, detachments and squadrons are instituted at the province, prefecture,
and county levels, respectively. The armed police divisions have regiments, battalions and
companies in battle order, which are stationed in a number of provinces, autonomous regions
and municipalities directly under the central government. The forces guarding gold mines,
forests, water and electricity supply, and communications have their own headquarters, which
function as their leading and commanding organs. The PAPF General Headquarters has an
educational institution directly under it. The contingent headquarters and the headquarters of
the forces guarding gold mines, forests, water and electricity supply, and communications have
elementary command colleges under them.
Basic Tasks
In peacetime, the PAPF is tasked to perform guard duties, handle emergencies, combat
terrorism, and participate in and support national economic development. In wartime, it assists
the PLA in defensive operations.
Every day, more than 260,000 PAPF servicemen are on guard duty. Through the combined
use of manpower, facilities and technologies, the PAPF has effectively enhanced the efficiency
of guard duties and security in recent years. The PAPF annually handles an average of over
100 cases of attempted attacks against guarded targets and escape attempts by detained
suspects and imprisoned criminals, organizes thousands of important temporary duties, and

ensures the security of important international and national conferences and large-scale
events, in cooperation with the government departments concerned. Adhering to the guidelines
and principles for handling emergencies, and using proper methods and tactics, the PAPF
effectively safeguards the fundamental interests of the people, social stability and the dignity of
the law. The PAPF anti-terrorism units closely follow the state's anti-terrorism guidelines and
principles, and enhance their combat-readiness training. They have been involved in the
successful handling of cases of bombing attempts and kidnapping incidents. The various units
of the PAPF take an active part in efforts to keep local order, and assist the public security
departments in catching and arresting criminal suspects and cracking down on organized
criminal gangs.
The PAPF gold mine force has completed 38 geological prospecting projects in a dozen
provinces and autonomous regions, and found some rich gold deposits. In the last two years,
the PAPF forest force has put out 552 forest or prairie fires, protecting valuable natural
resources. The PAPF water and electricity force has taken part in the construction of 21 key
national projects, including the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, the West-East Natural Gas
Transmission Project, the South-North Water Diversion Project, and major hydropower
projects. The PAPF communications force is responsible for the maintenance of the Xinjiang-
Tibet Highway and the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, and has undertaken the construction of
national high-grade highways, extra-long tunnels and bridges. Those projects built by the
PAPF communications force are all up to standards. In the past two years, 224,000 PAPF
troops have participated in 2,320 emergency rescue and disaster relief operations, and
rescued and evacuated 250,000 people in disaster-stricken areas.
Force Building
The PAPF is working to strengthen itself through science and technology. It is enhancing staff
competence, and conducting strict management so that its personnel can fully perform their
duties. Using the national information infrastructure, the PAPF has established a preliminary
system of three-level integrated information networks, linking general headquarters with the
grass-roots squadrons. It has made progress in real-time command and control, management
of duties through visual means, networked education and training, and office automation. The
PAPF possesses a basically complete range of equipment through R&D and procurement of
urgently needed weaponry and equipment. It has set up and improved a distinctive mechanism
for the selection, training and employment of officers and NCOs. In particular, priority is given
to the training of inter-disciplinary personnel. The PAPF conducts mission-oriented training on
a priority basis to better perform guard duties, manage emergencies and combat terrorism. It
participated in China's "Great Wall-2003" and "Great Wall II" anti-terrorism exercises, and the
SCO's "Joint-2003" exercise, and sponsored the "Guard-04" and "Guard-06" exercises to deal
with large-scale emergencies. The PAPF runs its forces strictly and pursuant to the law. It
stresses that leaders make decisions, administrative organs conduct management, and
officers and men perform their duties strictly in accordance with the law. As a result, its overall
performance has been greatly boosted.
The PAPF is steadily improving its logistical support system based on self-support and
supplemented by social and PLA support to raise the efficiency of integrated support. It runs a
crisis response support system covering the three echelons of the general headquarters,
contingents (divisions) and detachments (regiments), to better respond to emergencies, and
unexpected and complex situations. It promotes standardized and institutional logistical
management by exploitation of IT and uniformly standardizes its facility configurations, work
procedures, operating mechanisms and management requirements. The PAPF is pursuing
reforms in housing, procurement of bulk materials and project procurement, medical care, and
outsources food, barracks and bedding and clothing services.
In recent years, the PAPF has conducted friendly exchanges with the armed police forces,

military police, internal security forces, public security forces and other similar forces of more
than 30 countries to draw on each other's practices and cooperate in conducting anti-terrorism
training. Its medical personnel, as part of Chinese rescue teams, have participated in disaster-
relief missions in the aftermath of the earthquakes in Iran, Pakistan and Indonesia, and the
tsunami in the Indian Ocean.

VI. National Defense Mobilization and Reserve Force

China, responding to new developments in modern warfare and the needs of national security,
is reinforcing national defense mobilization and reserve force building to enhance its
capabilities of rapid mobilization, sustained support, comprehensive protection and swift shift
from a peacetime to wartime footing.
Mobilization of the Armed Forces
China's mobilization of the armed forces includes the mobilization of manpower, weaponry and
equipment, as well as logistical materials. The main tasks of the PLA's mobilization are as
follows: to formulate plans for wartime troop mobilization and support according to operational
plans, carry out pre-regimentation of reservists into active units and organization of reserve
units, and expand and form units according to wartime structure and organization upon the
state's issuance of a mobilization order. The main tasks of the PAPF's mobilization are to
formulate mobilization and support plans based on the PAPF's possible wartime tasks, carry
out pre-regimentation of reservists and adjustment, expansion and reorganization of units, and
adjust the organizational system or form or expand units according to designated tasks after
the state issues a mobilization order. The main tasks of the militia's mobilization are to call up
militiamen, adjust and reinforce organizations, issue weapons and equipment, carry out pre-
war training, and provide support in accordance with the needs of wartime manpower
mobilization and plans for participating in warfare and supporting the front.
Acting on the directives of the State Council and the CMC, the General Staff Headquarters
organizes and conducts mobilization of the armed forces with the assistance of the General
Political Department, General Logistics Department and General Armaments Department as
well as the relevant government departments. The Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force
are responsible for the mobilization of their respective forces. The military area commands,
provincial military commands and local Party committees and governments at different levels
are responsible for the mobilization of reserve forces within their respective jurisdictions.
By maintaining a lean standing army, improving the reserve service system, setting up reserve
units, designating manpower replenishment areas, pre-positioning equipment and supplies,
and organizing civil-military mobilization rehearsals, China has ensured the smooth
mobilization of the armed forces, enabling the latter to deter or defuse security crises with even
a downsized standing force. In recent years, China has accelerated the adjustment and reform
of the organization and structure of the militia and the reserve forces and increased the
number of reservists with high-tech backgrounds, and strengthened the reserve forces of the
Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force. As a result, the level of the general quality of the
backup forces of national defense has been raised notably.
Mobilization of the National Economy
The basic policies for the mobilization of the national economy are:
To boost economic mobilization based on China's development strategy and its economic
strength, and incorporate the development of the defense economy into that of the national ec
onomy;
To make economic mobilization a bridge between China's economic development and

available national defense capacities, and strike a balance between military and civilian needs
and between peacetime and wartime needs in economic restructuring, to keep the national
defense economy at a proper level in peacetime;

To speed up the development and application of new and high technologies and dual-
purpose technologies, and give priority to the mobilization of high-tech products and the
reserves of high technology, to raise the overall scientific and technological level of economic
mobilization;
To build an organizational structure, mechanism and legal system of economic mobilization

in keeping with the socialist market economy for dealing with both wars and emergencies in
accordance with the assigned functions of economic mobilization, to serve economic
development in peacetime and respond rapidly in cases of emergency or war; and
To pursue the principle of self-defense by the whole nation and improve the capacity of
economic mobilization to meet the needs of defensive operations under conditions of
informationization.
The primary objective is to establish a complete economic mobilization system with the dual
functions of responding to both wars and emergencies, and to set up an economic mobilization
base that is an integral part of China's economy to meet the economic needs of local wars and
unexpected incidents.
With the rapid growth of China's economy, the capacity of its economic mobilization has been
steadily raised. In building information and communications systems, highways, railways,
bridges, tunnels, airports, ports, docks and major urban infrastructures, China pays close
attention to the requirements of national defense, and ensures that peacetime needs and
wartime needs are properly balanced. In working to set up a mechanism of economic
mobilization for responding to both wars and emergencies, China has set up a system of plans
for economic mobilization that takes both peacetime and wartime needs into consideration. It
has established economic mobilization centers in the machine-building, weaponry, aviation,
space, shipbuilding and chemical industries, and has optimized the mobilization structure and
layout. It has basically completed a survey on the potential of economic mobilization and set
up an information system for economic mobilization management by the state and a number of
provinces and municipalities directly under the central government. As a component of the
national emergency response force, economic mobilization offices at different levels have
established a mechanism for contacts between economic mobilization offices and emergency
reaction management offices to provide support for handling public emergencies and ensure
public security.
Civil Air Defense
Civil air defense (CAD), air defense of critical areas and field air defense constitute China's
homeland defense structure. The tasks of the CAD in the new era are to protect the people
and their property and China's economic development in wartime, and carry out disaster
prevention and relief and handle public unexpected incidents in peacetime. The CAD
expenses are born by the state and the public. The state has promulgated the Civil Air
Defense Law, and the people's governments at various levels have formulated and improved
corresponding CAD rules and regulations. CAD work is incorporated into plans for economic
and social development by the people's governments at and above the county level.
China's CAD capabilities in preparations against war, integrated urban protection and public
unexpected incident response have been greatly enhanced in recent years. Interconnected
and interoperable communications networks for command and warning at the provincial, city
and county levels have been basically established, and urban air defense early-warning
networks have been improved. Over 85 percent of areas in major cities are covered by air-
defense sirens. Most of the key CAD cities have CAD command posts. All large and medium-
sized cities have protection and rescue contingents for emergency rescue, rush repair, medical
aid, fire fighting, maintenance of order, chemical defense, epidemic prevention,

communications and transportation. Short-term and full-time training courses are conducted,
and emergency rescue drills for handling disasters are organized to help the public acquire
CAD knowledge and skills. CAD courses are included in school teaching programs and
curricula. Volunteer CAD teams have been formed in some factories, mines, enterprises and
communities.
Militia Force Building
China's militia is under the unified direction of the State Council and the CMC, and the dual
leadership of local Party committees and governments as well as the military commands. The
concept of people's war, and the principle of combining regular work with military training and
combining peacetime needs with wartime needs are observed in the building of the militia.
The focus of the militia work is being shifted from rural areas to cities and areas along
communication lines. The setting up of militia forces has expanded from state-owned
enterprises to private enterprises and from traditional industries to high-tech industries.
Specialized technical units rather than infantry are becoming the backbone of the militia. The
proportion of antiaircraft artillery, ground artillery, missile, communications, engineering, anti-
chemical, reconnaissance, information and other specialized technical units in the overall
militia force is being raised. The building of militia units of the Navy, Air Force and Second
Artillery Force is being strengthened. A new organizational structure of the militia has taken
shape, with specialized technical units and units with corresponding specialties serving as the
main body, and air defense units, units of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and
emergency response units playing a leading role.
The state has increased investment in militia weaponry and equipment, with priority given to
equipment for air defense, emergency response and maintenance of stability. The state has
phased out a number of out-dated weapons. Militia training reform has been deepened; a four-
level system for organizing training is practiced, the four levels being provincial military
commands, prefectural military commands, people's armed forces departments of counties
(county-level cities or municipal districts) and basic-level people's armed forces departments.
Through interlinked training as well as joint training and exercises with active PLA units, the
militia has boosted its capabilities of conducting rapid mobilization and carrying out its
specialized tasks.
Reserve Force Building
As a component of the PLA, the reserve force receives priority in the building of the defense
reserve. The reserve force conducts peacetime training as provided for in relevant regulations,
assists in maintaining order when necessary pursuant to the law, and activates its units in
wartime in observance of the state's mobilization order.
In recent years, while keeping its overall size unchanged, the reserve force has reduced the
number of Army reserve units, while increasing the numbers of reserve units of the Navy, Air
Force and Second Artillery Force, the proportion of specialized technical reserve units and the
number of logistical and equipment support reserve units, thus accomplishing the task of
forming new reserve units of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force in the Tenth Five-
Year Plan period. Most of the PLA's reserve divisions, brigades and regiments have training
bases, armament depots, necessary office space and living quarters, and optical-fiber cable
communication. With military training as the primary task, the PLA reserve units carry out
training strictly pursuant to regulations, ensuring the accomplishment of all training tasks. The
focus of training is being shifted from individuals and units to command posts, key technicians
and higher levels of training such as joint and live-fire exercises.

VII. Border and Coastal Defense

Adhering to the principles of conducting overall planning, placing equal emphasis on land and
sea, giving priority to defense, and integrating defense and administration, China is
endeavoring to make its border and coastal defense unified, effective, solid and
informationized.
Border and Coastal Defense System
China's border and coastal defense is under the unified leadership of the State Council and the
CMC, and practices an administration system of sharing responsibilities between the military
and the local authorities. The State Commission of Border and Coastal Defense, composed of
the relevant departments of the State Council and the PLA, and under the dual leadership of
the State Council and the CMC, guides and coordinates China's border and coastal defense.
All military area commands, as well as border and coastal provinces, prefectures and counties
have commissions to guide and coordinate border and coastal defense within their respective
jurisdictions.
The PLA is the main force for defending China's borders and coasts. The PLA border defense
force has a three-level structure, namely, regiment, battalion and company. The PLA coastal
defense force has a five-level structure, namely, division, brigade, regiment, battalion and
company. In 2003, the PLA border defense force took over the defense of the China-DPRK
border and the Yunnan section of the China-Myanmar border from the border public security
force, thus enabling the state to integrate land border defense and administration. The border
public security force is tasked with safeguarding security and maintaining social order in border
and coastal areas. Within the border public security force there are contingents in provinces
(autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the central government), detachments,
groups, border police substations and frontier inspection stations in border and coastal areas,
border inspection stations in open ports, and marine police force in coastal waters. Since
China launched its reform and opening-up program, the state has consolidated border and
coastal law-enforcement functions in organizations responsible for public security, customs,
inspection and quarantine, maritime surveillance, fisheries administration, marine affairs and
environmental protection. The state has also established and reinforced the border public
security force, as well as border and coastal law-enforcement contingents for marine affairs,
anti-smuggling, fisheries administration and maritime surveillance.
Building Border and Coastal Defense
China has promulgated the Law on National Defense, the Law on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf and
other relevant laws and regulations, and updated its border and coastal defense policies and
regulations pursuant to international laws and practices, to manage its border and sea areas in
conformity with the law. China endeavors to strengthen its border and coastal defense,
administration and control, and build a modern border and coastal defense force featuring joint
military-police-civilian efforts in defense and administration. Over the past decade and more,
the state has invested more than RMB 2 billion in construction of border defense infrastructure,
building over 20,000 km of patrol roads, over 6,000 km of barbed-wire fences and installing
some 600 sets of monitoring equipment. Construction of coastal defense infrastructure,
including duty piers, monitoring stations and centers and auxiliary facilities has been underway
since 2004.
China pursues a good-neighborliness policy, and works to enhance friendship and partnership
with its neighbors. It calls for settling boundary and maritime demarcation issues with countries
concerned in a fair and equitable manner, and through consultations on the basis of equality.

China has signed land border treaties or agreements with Myanmar and 11 other neighboring
countries, thus resolving boundary issues left from history with these countries; it is currently
negotiating with India and Bhutan to settle boundary issues with those two countries
respectively. Since 1996, China has set up bilateral consultation mechanisms on the law of the
sea with the Republic of Korea and Japan, to exchange views on maritime demarcation and
cooperation. In 2004, the Agreement Between China and Vietnam on the Demarcation of the
Beibu Gulf officially entered into force.
China actively promotes border and coastal defense cooperation with its neighbors,
strengthens border and coastal defense contacts in different fields and at various levels, and
handles in an appropriate manner border- and coastal-defense-related issues with countries
concerned. In 2005, the Agreement on Joint Patrols by the Navies of China and Vietnam in the
Beibu Gulf was signed, and China respectively signed with the Philippines and Indonesia the
Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Affairs Cooperation and the Memorandum of
Understanding on Maritime Cooperation. In July 2006, China and India reopened the border
trade route at Nathu La Pass, which links China's Tibet with Sikkim, India. China's border and
coastal defense forces, acting strictly in accordance with international law and the agreements
and understandings signed by China with its neighbors, have established and improved
mechanisms for talks and meetings with their counterparts in the neighboring countries, and
conduct law enforcement and anti-terrorism cooperation to jointly maintain peace and stability
in border areas and related sea areas.
Ensuring the Stability of Border Areas
Stability and development of border areas are the foundation for border and coastal defense.
The Chinese government attaches great importance to work related to ethnic minorities and
economic development in border areas; it has formulated a series of policies and adopted
many strategic measures in this regard. In the early days of New China, close to one million
PLA officers and men were collectively transferred to civilian work in the Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region, Tibet and Inner Mongolia autonomous regions, and Heilongjiang and
Yunnan provinces. They were organized into production and construction corps and state
farms, and made great contributions to the economic development of the border areas and the
maintenance of border stability in those areas. In the 1950s and 1960s, the state moved a
large number of industrial enterprises and skilled workers from inland and coastal areas to
border areas, and set up a fairly complete industrial system and communications and
transportation network there. Since the reform and opening-up policy was initiated in the late
1970s, the state has set up 253 open ports and implemented the strategy for developing the
western region and revitalizing old industrial bases including Northeast China. It pursues the
policy of developing border areas and making border inhabitants prosperous, and
consolidating defense through building close ties with the local people. It has taken steps,
including encouraging inland provinces to provide assistance to their border counterparts, to
accelerate the economic development there. This has laid a solid foundation for strengthening
border and coastal defense.
The PLA border defense force and the border public security force are resolute in maintaining
social stability in border areas and unity among ethnic groups, and take an active part in the
economic development of border areas. They take measures to crack down hard on cross-
border crimes, such as weapon smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal border crossing and human
trafficking, and on separatist, violent and terrorist activities. They strictly implement the ethnic
and religious policies of the state, respect the customs and lifestyle of ethnic minorities, and
strengthen PLA unity with the government and the people, together with unity among ethnic
groups, thus contributing to maintaining political stability and promoting social development
and progress in border areas.

VIII.Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense

China's defense-related science, technology and industry focuses on consolidating its
foundation, making independent innovation, and speeding up the implementation of the
strategy of transition and upgrading, so as to ensure the production and supply of military
equipment and promote the development of national economy.
Improving the industrial structure, enhancing its capabilities of developing and producing new
and high-tech weaponry and equipment. Defense-related science, technology and industry
endeavors to accelerate structural adjustment in research and production, adopt advanced
production modes, promote specialized production and upgrade processing technologies.
Priority is given to R&D of new and high-tech weaponry and equipment, and endeavors to
achieve breakthroughs in a number of key technologies and leapfrogging technological
progress, thus speeding up weaponry and equipment modernization. Defense-related science,
technology and industry is enhancing its core capabilities in R&D and production of the overall
systems and key subsystems of major projects, and introducing more competition into the
manufacturing and processing of general and supporting equipment, gradually establishing an
all-round outsourcing system of cooperation for developing and producing weaponry and
equipment. Priority is given to upgrading technologies and products in the nuclear, space,
aviation, shipbuilding, weaponry, electronics and other defense-related industries, so as to
form a cluster of high-tech industries to drive the growth of China's economy. In 2005, the
output value, added value and gross revenue of the entire spectrum of defense-related
science, technology and industry increased by 24.3 percent, 20.7 percent and 21.6 percent,
respectively, over the previous year.
The defense manufacturing industries have been further informationized. The Tenth Five-Year
Plan period saw the rapid development of digitalized manufacturing technology and wide
application of computer-aided design, manufacturing and system-integrated manufacturing
technologies in China's defense industries. The capabilities of master design and
development, as well as of final assembly and integration, and the technological level of
precision and super-precision processing were significantly raised. The means and methods of
systems integration, experimentation and simulation, as well as of inspection and testing were
upgraded.
The defense industry enterprises have stepped up restructuring and reform, and are exploring
approaches for diversifying their ownership structure and steadily transforming themselves into
share-holding enterprises. The reform of defense-related research institutes is being speeded
up and greater support was given to research institutions engaged in strategic research, basic
research and research in the public interest.
Strengthening capabilities of independent innovation. Efforts are being made to improve the
innovative system of development and production of weaponry and equipment, and the
innovative system of technology for high-tech industries combining military and civilian needs.
The former takes master design, final assembly and manufacturing, and experimentation and
verification as leading factors, and is supported by research and manufacturing of core
systems and specialized equipment, and completed by an outsourcing system. The latter
combines production, education and research, takes enterprises as the main body and
research institutions as the mainstay, and is market-orientated. Priority is given to enhancing
basic research, key technology research and frontier technology research. As a result, a
number of state-of-the-art scientific and technological achievements that enjoy independent
intellectual property rights have been made. Patent applications have increased rapidly -- at an
average annual rate of over 40 percent. Major scientific and technological projects, such as
manned space flights and the Lunar Probe Project, are being carried out to spur the
leapfrogging development of high-tech enterprises combining military and civilian needs and to

bring about overall improvements in defense-related science and technology. Platforms for
developing weaponry systems, lab systems for defense-related science and technology, and
research and application centers for advanced industrial technologies are being built. As a
result, a fairly mature scientific and technological infrastructure is taking shape, which is well-
configured, multi-functional, efficient and based on close cooperation between the military and
civilian sectors. In addition, higher education and vocational education are being boosted for
defense-related science, technology and industry. Three professionally specialized contingents
are being constructed, namely, a contingent of business managers, a contingent of
professionals and specialists and a contingent of skilled workers. Efforts are being made to
establish an innovative mechanism to absorb and train high-caliber people for defense-related
science, technology and industry.
On the premise of strictly honoring its international commitments, China encourages and
supports participation in international cooperation and competition in civilian-military industries.

IX. Defense Expenditure

Pursuant to the National Defense Law and the Budget Law, and guided by the principle of
coordinated development of national defense and the economy, the Chinese government
decides on the size and use of defense expenditure in an appropriate way to meet the
demands of national defense in keeping with China's economic development.
China's defense expenditure mainly comprises expenses for personnel, training and
maintenance, and equipment. Personnel expenses mainly cover salaries, insurance, food,
clothing, and welfare benefits for officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men as well
as for civilian employees. Training and maintenance expenses cover troop training, institutional
education, construction and maintenance of installations and facilities, and other expenses on
routine consumables. The equipment expenses mainly cover research on, experimentation
with, and procurement, maintenance, transportation and storage of weaponry and equipment.
The defense expenditure covers not only the active forces, but also the militia and reserve
forces. Also covered by the defense expenditure are costs to support part of the retired
officers, education of servicemen's children and the national economic development, as well as
other social expenses.
Since the early 1990s, to safeguard its sovereignty, security and unity, and to keep pace with
the global revolution in military affairs, China has gradually increased its defense expenditure
on the basis of its economic development. This increase, however, is compensatory in nature,
and is designed to enhance the originally weak defense foundation. It is a moderate increase
in step with China's national economic development. In the 1980s, China began to shift the
focus of its work to economic development. At that time, it was decided that national defense
should be both subordinated to and serve the country's overall economic development. As a
result, national defense received a low input, and was in a state of self-preservation. From
1979 to 1989, the average annual increase of defense expenditure was 1.23 percent.
However, the defense expenditure actually registered an average annual decrease of 5.83
percent, given the 7.49 percent average annual increase of the consumer price index in the
same period. From 1990 to 2005, the average annual increase in defense expenditure was
15.36 percent. As the average annual increase of the consumer price index during the same
period was 5.22 percent, the actual average increase in defense expenditure was 9.64
percent.
Chart 1: Comparison Between the Growth Rate of China's Defense Expenditure and the
National Residential Consumer Price Index (1989-2005)

China's GDP in 2004 and 2005 was RMB15,987.8 billion and RMB18,308.5 billion,
respectively, with a growth rate of 10.1 percent in 2004 and of 10.2 percent in 2005. The state
financial expenditure was RMB2,848.689 billion in 2004 and RMB3,393.028 billion in 2005, up
15.57 percent and 19.11 percent respectively over the previous year. China's defense
expenditure in 2004 and 2005 was RMB220.001 billion and RMB247.496 billion, respectively,
with growth rates of 15.31 percent and 12.50 percent. In the past two years, the share of
China's annual defense expenditure in its GDP and in the state financial expenditure in the
same period has decreased, being 1.40 percent and 7.74 percent respectively in 2003, 1.38
percent and 7.72 percent in 2004, and 1.35 percent and 7.29 percent in 2005. Its defense
budget for 2006 is RMB283.829 billion.
Chart 2: Share of China's Annual Defense Expenditure in the State Financial Expenditure
(1994-2005) (%)
Chart 3: Composition of China's Defense Expenditure in 2005 (unit: RMB billion)
The increased part of China's defense expenditure is primarily used for the following purposes:
(1) Increasing salaries and allowances of military personnel and improving their living
conditions. Along with the growth of China's economy and the steady improvement of the
people's life, the salaries and allowances of military personnel and the pensions of retired
officers are increased accordingly. The insurance, medical, housing and other benefits are also
increased. Subsidies are being increased, too, to compensate for regional and post
differences, and the living conditions of the troops stationed in hardship areas are being
improved. (2) Increasing investment in weaponry and equipment and infrastructure. The PLA is
accelerating its informationization drive, increasing the expenses on procurement and
maintenance of weaponry and equipment, upgrading the military infrastructure, and increasing
input for improving the facilities for border and coastal defense troops. (3) Supporting the
training of military personnel. The PLA is increasing input into education and training through
both military educational institutions and regular institutions of higher learning. It is also
increasing subsidies for professionals with outstanding performance and incentives for experts,
and increasing the budget for the employment of contract civilians. (4) Compensating for price
rise. As the prices of oil, building materials and staple and non-staple foodstuffs rise, the PLA
accordingly increases the expenses on military petroleum, oils and lubricants and defense
engineering, and raises the boarding subsidies. (5) Increasing expenses for international
cooperation in non-traditional security fields.
Both the total amount and per-serviceman share of China's defense expenditure is low
compared with those of some other countries, particularly major powers. In 2005, China's
defense expenditure equaled 6.19 percent of that of the United States, 52.95 percent of that of
the United Kingdom, 71.45 percent of that of France and 67.52 percent of that of Japan.
China's defense expenses per serviceman averaged RMB107,607, amounting to 3.74 percent
of that of the United States and 7.07 percent of that of Japan.
China practices a strict system of financial appropriation of defense funds . The PLA's

budgeting is based on the defense development strategy, military building objectives and
annual military tasks set by the state. Budgeting units at each level carry out studies to decide
on their budget items, make calculations of their requests for funds and then report to the next-
higher authorities. The General Logistics Department, working with the relevant departments of
other general headquarters/departments, analyzes, calculates and verifies the annual budget
requests submitted by all the military area commands, the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery
Force, and draws up the defense budget. After being reviewed and approved by the CMC, the
defense budget is submitted to the Ministry of Finance. The latter, on the basis of medium- and
long-term fiscal plans and the estimated revenue of the year, puts forward a plan for military
expenditure appropriations after consultation with the General Logistics Department, and then
incorporates it into the annual financial budget draft of the central government. Upon approval
by the State Council, the annual financial budget is submitted to the Budget Work Committee
of the NPC Standing Committee and the Finance and Economic Committee of the NPC for
review before it is submitted to the NPC for review. After the budget of the central government
is approved by the NPC, the Ministry of Finance informs in writing the General Logistics
Department of the approved defense budget. The defense budget is then implemented down
to troops at different levels through prescribed procedures.
Financial departments are instituted at the General Logistics Department, military area
commands, Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and units at the levels of corps,
division (brigade) and regiment. These departments are responsible for the appropriation,
management and supervision of the defense funds. The auditing offices of the state and the
PLA conduct strict supervision of the defense budget.
Chart 4: Comparison of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries in 2005 (unit: US$ billion)
Chart 5: Comparison of Percentages of Defense Expenditures in GDP of Major Countries in

2005

Chart 6: Comparison of Per Serviceman Share of Defense Expenditure of Major Countries in

2005 (unit: US$1,000)
Source of the figures: Defense reports, budget reports or other government reports released
by these countries.
Note: One pound is equivalent to 1.7439 US dollars. One Euro is equivalent to 1.3029 US
dollars. One US dollar is equivalent to 28.5470 Russian rubles. One US dollar is equivalent to
106.9998 Japanese yen. One US dollar is equivalent to RMB8.0759 yuan.

X. International Security Cooperation

China pursues a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and
coordination, and adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It works to promote
good-neighborliness, mutual benefit and win-win, and endeavors to advance international
security cooperation and strengthen military relations with other countries.
Regional Security Cooperation
Since its founding five years ago, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has steadily
deepened and expanded cooperation in security, economic and cultural areas in practical
terms. A decision-making mechanism has taken shape, with the Council of Heads of State and
the Council of Heads of Government being its core. Two permanent bodies, namely, the
Secretariat and the Regional Anti-terrorism Structure, have also been established. A number of
documents on cooperation in fighting terrorism, separatism, extremism and drug trafficking
have been adopted. In April 2005, the SCO, ASEAN and the Commonwealth of Independent
States signed a memorandum of understanding on conducting cooperation in counter-
terrorism. In July, the Concept of Cooperation between SCO Members on Combating
Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism was adopted at the SCO Astana Summit. In April 2006,
a meeting of SCO defense ministers was held in Beijing, and the Sixth SCO Summit was held
in Shanghai in June. Ten documents, including the Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, were signed during the Summit.
China attaches great importance to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). At the 13th ARF
Ministerial Meeting in July 2006, China called for enhancing mutual trust, respecting diversity
and properly handling the ARF's relations with other mechanisms. In the past two years, China
has, within the ARF framework, hosted the Seminar on Enhancing Cooperation in the Field of
Non-traditional Security Issues, sponsored the ARF Seminar on Non-proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction with the United States and Singapore, held the Fifth and Sixth ARF Inter-
sessional Meetings on Disaster Relief with Indonesia, and held the Fourth ARF Inter-sessional
Meeting on Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime with Brunei.
China's cooperation in the non-traditional security area with ASEAN and within the framework
of ASEAN and China, Japan and the Republic of Korea has achieved significant progress. In
January 2005, China proposed a series of initiatives on disaster prevention and reduction at
the Special ASEAN Leaders' Meeting on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunamis. In
August, China hosted the Workshop on Policing Exchanges and Cooperation among the
Capital Police Agencies of ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, during which the
Beijing Declaration on Policing Exchanges and Cooperation among the Capital Police
Agencies of ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea was signed. In October, China
hosted the Second International Congress of ASEAN and China on Cooperative Operations in
Response to Dangerous Drugs. The Beijing Declaration and other documents were adopted.
In November, China attended the Second ASEAN and China, Japan and the Republic of
Korea Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime and the First China-ASEAN Informal
Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime.
Honoring Commitment to International Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
China has made sound preparations for implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). To this end, a preparatory office has been established at the PLA General Armaments
Department. With the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Health, the State
Environmental Protection Administration, the China Earthquake Administration and other
government departments, this office is responsible for setting up 11 monitoring stations in
China as part of the international monitoring system, and formulating their administrative

regulations and detailed rules for the implementation of the CTBT. Two primary seismological
monitoring stations have been set up in Hailar and Lanzhou, respectively, and three
radionuclide stations have been set up in Beijing, Guangzhou and Lanzhou, respectively. The
surveying of the two sites for two infrasound stations in Beijing and Kunming has been
completed, and construction is scheduled to start soon. The China National Data Center and
the Beijing Radionuclide Laboratory have been built, and are now in trial operation.
China supports multilateral efforts aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the Biological
Weapons Convention. It has attended the review conferences, annual meetings of State
Parties and meetings of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts in an active and
responsible manner. China has also submitted in a timely fashion to the United Nations
declarations regarding confidence-building measures under the Convention.
China honors in good faith its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. It has
promptly and completely submitted all the annual declarations, subsequent declarations
regarding newly discovered chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in China and the annual
national programs related to protective purposes. It has also received more than 100 on-site
inspections by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The PLA is working,
in strict compliance with the Convention, to ensure the smooth management and operation of
the "single small-scale facility" and the "10kg Schedule I Chemical Synthesis Laboratory."
China and Japan have held 42 rounds of bilateral consultations to accelerate the destruction of
the chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in China. Since 2005, China has assisted Japan
in 24 on-site verifications, and recovered over 3,100 chemical weapons abandoned by Japan.
At the request of Japan, China has taken into temporary custody the recovered Japanese-
abandoned chemical weapons confirmed by Japan. These chemical weapons will be
destroyed by Japan in the future.
China fully honors its obligations under the amended Landmine Protocol to the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons. The PLA keeps its troops fully informed of China's obligations,
and has implemented the technical standards and limitations specified in the Protocol. It has
carried out a general check of all the anti-personnel landmines that do not meet the standards
of the Protocol, and has destroyed several hundred thousand old landmines in a planned way.
China has made technical modifications to usable anti-infantry landmines in inventory to make
them conform to the technical standards of the Protocol. China continues to take an active part
in international demining operations. In the period September-December 2005, Chinese
military demining experts worked in Thailand to train demining personnel and give on-site
instructions. China also provided Thailand with demining equipment. In the period September-
December 2006, China ran demining training courses for Lebanon and Jordan in Nanjing, and
provided the two countries with demining equipment. China has taken part in a constructive
way in the discussions on anti-vehicle landmines by the Group of Governmental Experts of the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and is making preparations for ratifying the
Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War.
China is firmly opposed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery. It supports the United Nations in playing its due role in non-proliferation. China is a
party to all international treaties on non-proliferation and related international organizations. It
has established a complete legal regime for controlling the export of nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons, missiles and other related sensitive items and technologies, and all
defense items. China follows strict procedures in approving exports, to ensure effective export
control.
Military Exchanges and Cooperation
China has established military ties with over 150 countries and military attach offices in 107
countries. A total of 85 countries have military attach offices in China. In the past two years,

senior PLA delegations have visited more than 60 countries, and defense ministers,
commanders-in-chief of the services, chiefs of the general staff and other high-ranking officers
and military-related officials from more than 90 countries have visited China. China and Russia
hold regular high-level military exchanges, and the general staff headquarters of the two
countries have held the ninth and tenth rounds of strategic consultations. The military activities
connected with "Russia Year" were successful. In October 2005 and July 2006, Chinese and
US military leaders exchanged visits. China and the US maintain in-depth exchanges through
institutionalized defense consultations and maritime military security consultations. China has
enhanced high-level military contacts and defense consultations with the European countries,
and China-Europe military exchanges have progressed steadily. China maintains military
contacts with its neighbors, and has enhanced military exchanges with other developing
countries. Since 2005, China has held workshops for senior officers from Latin American and
Middle Eastern countries, and China-Germany, China-France workshops for senior officers. It
has also hosted the SCO defense and security forum and the China-ASEAN workshop on Asia-
Pacific security issues. Since 2002, China has held 16 joint military exercises with 11
countries. In August 2005, China and Russia conducted the "Peace Mission-2005" joint military
exercise in Russia's Vladivostok and China's Shandong Peninsula, and their respective
offshore waters. In November and December 2005, the PLA Navy held joint maritime search
and rescue exercises with its Pakistani, Indian and Thai counterparts, respectively. In
September 2006, China and Tajikistan conducted the "Cooperation-2006" joint counter-
terrorism military exercise. In September and November 2006, the Chinese Navy and the US
Navy conducted joint maritime search and rescue exercises in the offshore waters of San
Diego and in the South China Sea. In December 2006, China and Pakistan held the
"Friendship-2006" joint counter-terrorism military exercise. In the past two years, the PLA has
sent observers to military exercises held by Turkey, Thailand, Pakistan, India, the US and
Australia. In September 2005, the PLA invited 41 military observers and military attachs from
24 countries to attend the "North Sword-2005" maneuvers organized by the Beijing Military
Area Command. Naval ships from Thailand, the United States, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, France, Singapore and Peru have paid
port visits to China. PLA naval ships have visited Pakistan, India, Thailand, the United States,
Canada and the Philippines. In the past two years, the PLA has continued to expand
exchanges of professional expertise and military students with its foreign counterparts. It has
sent division- and brigade-level officers of combat troops and relevant functional organs of the
Navy, Air Force, Second Artillery Force, military area commands, and general headquarters/
departments on overseas study tours. Over 500 military personnel have been dispatched to
study in more than 20 countries, and over 2,000 military personnel from more than 140
countries have come to China to study in military schools.
Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations and International Disaster Relief Operations
Since 1990, China has sent 5,915 military personnel to participate in 16 UN peacekeeping
operations. Eight lost their lives and several dozens were wounded on duty. Since 2000, China
has sent 893 peacekeeping police officers to seven mission areas. At present, China has
1,487 military peacekeeping personnel serving in nine UN mission areas and the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Among them, 92 military observers and staff
officers, 175 engineering troops and 43 medical personnel are in Congo (Kinshasa); 275
engineering troops, 240 transportation troops and 43 medical personnel are in Liberia; 275
engineering troops, 100 transportation troops and 60 medical personnel are in Sudan; and 182
engineering troops are in Lebanon. China also has a total of 180 peacekeeping police officers
in Liberia, Kosovo, Haiti and Sudan.
The PLA has actively participated in the international disaster relief operations conducted by
the Chinese government. It has set up an emergency command mechanism, sent personnel to
join specialized rescue teams, provided equipment, and assisted in mission-oriented training.
In the past two years, PLA personnel have joined China's international rescue teams in
international rescue operations after the Indian Ocean tsunami and the earthquakes in

Pakistan and Indonesia. They have conducted search and rescue operations for people in
distress, treatment of the sick and injured and prevention of epidemics, and assisted the
Chinese government in providing relief materials to disaster-stricken countries.

Appendix I. The Leading System of the Chinese People' Liberation

Army
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Appendix II. Major International Exchanges of the Chinese Military

2005-2006
Date Outgoing Visit Incoming Visit

January 10-14, 2005 Minister of Defense, Pakistan
March 3-7 Port call by a Thai naval ship
Political Commissar of
March 6-20 Guangzhou Military Area
Command to Cuba
Commander of PLA Air Force to
March 10-27
Sweden, Spain and Brazil
Assistant Chief of the General
March 14-17
Staff to Russia
Commander, Carabinieri
March 15-21
Corps, Italy
Chief of the General Staff,
March 17-20
Russia
Minister of Defense,
March 18-21
Kyrgyzstan
Chief of Defense Forces,
March 20-27
Lesotho
Commander of Air Force and
March 23-25
Air Defense Force, Belarus
Deputy Minister of State for
March 24-27
Defense, Japan
March 27-April 3 Minister of Defense, Liberia
March 28-30 Port call by US naval ships
March 30-April 2 Minister of Defense, ROK
Port call by Royal Australian
April 2-13
Navy ships
April 4-10 Chief of Naval Staff, Italy
Minister of National Defense to
April 6-21 Egypt, Tanzania, the
Netherlands and Denmark
Political Commissar of General
April 16-May 2 Logistics Department to
Uruguay and Bolivia
Shenyang Military Area
April 17-28
Command to Slovakia and
Greece
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Deputy Chief, General

April 19-23 Political Bureau, Peoples
Army, DPRK
April 24-30 Armaments Department to
Brazil
Deputy Chief of General
April 25-May 3
Staff, Cuba
Deputy Chief of General Staff to
April 28-29
US
May 8-25
Romania, France and Finland
Chief of the General Armaments
May 9-21 Department to Italy, Belarus and
UK
May 11-17 Chief of Army Staff,
Romania
Chief of General Staff to
May 19-June 9 Bangladesh, India, Turkey and
Germany
Deputy Chief of Defense
May 22-28
Forces, New Zealand
Commander, Jinan Military Area
May 25-June 8
Command, to Russia and Croatia
May 30-June 3 Minister of Defense, Belarus
May 30-June 13 Political Department to Cuba
and Mexico
June 1-7
Mozambique
Political Commissar of Beijing
June 1-16 Military Area Command to
Egypt and Syria
Deputy Chief of the General
June 2-7
Staff to France
Secretary-General, Ministry
June 2-9
of Defense, Gabon
President of the Academy of
June 3-14 Military Science to Germany
and Ukraine
Assistant Chief of General Staff
June 4-10
to Russia
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces,
June 4-12
Angola
June 5-9 Chief of Army Staff, Italy

Chief of Defense Forces,

June 6-12
Finland
June 6-13
Australia
Superintendent, US Military
June 13-19
Academy at West Point
Director, Royal College of
June 16-20
Defense Studies, UK
Port call by naval ships of
June 17-21
New Zealand
Commander, National Guard,
June 17-24
Tajikistan
June 18-July 5 Logistics Department to Egypt,
Kenya and Tanzania
Chief of Defense Staff,
June 21-24
Belgium
June 26-29 Logistics Department to the
Philippines
June 26-July 12 Political Department to Bulgaria
and Switzerland
July 2-11 Minister of Defense, Zambia
Assistant Minister of
July 4-10
Defense, Thailand
July 10-17 Minister of Defense, Hungary
July 10-17 Minister of Defense, Peru
July 10-18
Comoros
Chief of General Staff,
July 11-16
Romania
July 13-20
Mongolia
Deputy Minister of Defense,
July 15-22
Vietnam
Minster of Home Affairs,
July 16-22
Vanuatu
Commander of Guangzhou
July 16-29
Military Area Command to USA
Chief of General Staff, Air
July 17-20
Force, ROK
July 21-28
Djibouti

Chief of Naval Staff,

July 26-31
Bangladesh
Commander of Nanjing Military
Aug. 3-22 Area Command to Ethiopia,
Eritrea and Iran
Commander of Moscow
Aug. 4-14
Military Region, Russia
Minister of Defense and
Aug. 10-17
Retired Servicemen, Mali
Chief of General Staff
Aug. 17-19
to Russia
Ministers of Defense of
Russia, Tajikistan,
Aug. 21-26 Kyrgyzstan, and Deputy
Ministers of Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan
Aug. 25-31 Minister of Defense, Greece
Aug. 27-Sept. 3 Chief of Army Staff, Argentina
President and Minister of
Aug. 28-Sept. 2
Defense, Sri Lanka
Port call by Royal Navy ships,
Aug. 30-Sept. 1
UK
Aug. 31-Sept. 4 Chief of Royal Australian Navy
Sept. 1-4 Port call by naval ships, ROK
Sept. 1-16 Logistics Department to Poland,
Czech Republic and Bulgaria
Sept. 1-17
Denmark and Hungary
Chief of General Political
Sept. 4-18 Department to Venezuela and
Argentina
Sept. 5-9
Russia
Sept. 5-10 C-in-C USPAC
Sept. 5-20
Australia and New Zealand
Chairman of Joint Chiefs of
Sept. 10-18
Staff Committee, Pakistan
Sept. 13-16 Port call by US naval ships
Sept. 13-18
Tajikistan and Kazakhstan
Sept. 16-23
Russia


Sept. 19-Oct. 6
Columbia and Chile
Minister of Defense, Papua
Sept. 20-28
New Guinea
Chief of Peoples Defense
Sept. 24-30
Force, Tanzania
President of National Defense
Oct. 10-13
University to Vietnam
Deputy Chief of Australian
Oct. 10-14
Defense Force
Oct. 11-19
Afghanistan
Oct. 16-22
Brunei
Vice-Chairman of CMC to
Oct. 16-25
Turkey and Sudan
First Deputy Minister of
Oct. 17-23
Defense, Tajikistan
Oct. 18-20 Secretary of Defense, USA
Oct. 18-25 Chief of General Staff, Nepal
Oct. 20-23 Minister of Defense, Finland
Oct. 24-29 Chief of Defense, Denmark
Commander-in-Chief, Armed
Oct. 24-31
Forces, Bolivia
Oct. 25-28 Minister of Defense, Vietnam
Oct. 25-Nov. 9
Argentina, Uruguay, and Cuba
Oct. 30-Nov. 4 Minister of Defense, Belgium
Oct. 31-Nov. 6 Minister of Defense, Austria
Port calls by PLA naval ships to
Nov. 7-Dec. 23
Pakistan, India and Thailand
Nov. 13-28
to Greece and Australia
Deputy Commander, Armed
Nov. 14-21 Forces, and Minister of
Defense, Syria
Nov. 15-19 Port call by naval ships, France
Nov. 15-20 Minister of Defense, Singapore
Nov. 15-20 Minister of Defense, Moldova
Commander of Second Artillery
Nov. 19-Dec. 2
Force to Algeria and Tunisia
Commander of Lanzhou
Nov. 20-Dec. 1 Military Area Command to
Hungary and Belarus

Chief of General Staff, Central

Nov. 21-26
Africa
Representative at Ministerial
Level of Ministry of Defense
Nov. 22-26
and Retired Servicemen, Office
of the President, Togo
Nov. 22-27 Chief of General Staff, Bulgaria
Commander, National Guard,
Nov. 25-Dec. 2
Kyrgyzstan
Nov. 27-Dec. 3 Chief of General Staff, Croatia
Chief of General Staff, Armed
Dec. 4-11
Forces, Republic of Congo
Dec. 6-9 Minister of Defense, Uzbekistan
Dec. 6-11 Forces, Democratic Republic of
the Congo
Dec. 11-17 Commander, Armed Forces,
Fiji
Dec. 20-27 Minister of Defense, Namibia
Deputy Chief of Royal Antigua
Dec. 22-29
and Barbuda Defense Force
Jan. 15-19, 2006 Minister of Defense, Portugal
Feb. 13-16 Port call by naval ships, Peru
Feb. 23-Mar. 1 Minister of Defense, East Timor
Feb. 25-Mar. 1
Switzerland
Feb. 26-Mar. 5
Forces, Senegal
Port call by naval ships,
Feb. 28-Mar.3
Singapore
Political Commissar of Second
March 2-13
Artillery Force to Cuba
President of National Defense
March 19-28 University to Argentina and
Mexico
March 20-27 Minister of Defense, Ecuador
Commander, Border Forces,
March 22-29
Kyrgyzstan
March 25-29 Army Commander, Russia
March 26-April 3 Minister of Defense, Rwanda
March 30-April 6 Minister of Defense, Sudan
Commander of Beijing Military
April 1-13 Area Command to Hungary and
Romania


April 2-17 Political Department to Syria
and Cameroon
April 4-19 DPRK, Vietnam, Malaysia,
Singapore and ROK
President, National Defense
April 10-15
University, USA
April 11-14
Forces, Belarus
Political Commissar of PLA Air
April 13-21
Force to Peru and Argentina
April 15-22
to Chile and Mexico
April 23-28
Kyrgyzstan
April 24-28
Kazakhstan
April 24-30 Minister of Defense, Tajikistan
April 25-26 Minister of Defense, Uzbekistan
April 25-27 Minister of Defense, Russia
May 9-15 C-in-C USPAC
May 10-17
Forces, the Philippines
May 11-20
to Indonesia and Malaysia
May 14-25 Russia, Norway and
Denmark
Chief of Army Staff,
May 15-20
Bangladesh
May 15-21 Chief of Naval Staff, Pakistan
May 16-22 Minister of Defense, Burundi
Political Commissar of Lanzhou
May 17-30 Military Area Command to
Russia and Slovakia
Supreme Commander, Armed
May 20-23
Forces, Thailand
May 22-25 Chief of Air Staff, Spain
Commander, Armed Forces,
May 24-30
Malaysia
May 25-31 Minister of Defense, Eritrea

Political Commissar of National

May 25-June 8 Defense University to Turkey
and Egypt
May 25-June 10 Logistics Department to
Tanzania and Zambia
May 28-June 2 Minister of Defense, India
Chief of General Armaments
May 30-June 12 Department to Austria and South
Africa
May 31-June 5
Guinea Bissau
First Deputy Minister of
May 31-June 7
Defense, Turkmenistan
Chief of General Office,
June 1-7
Ministry of Defense, Guinea
June 4-10 Chief of Navy, Chile
June 13-16 Commander, Navy, Malaysia
June 18-24 Chief of General Staff, Qatar
June 27-30 Port call by US naval ships
Chief of General Staff,
July 3-7
Singapore
Chief of Armed Forces,
July 11-15
Switzerland
Vice-Chairman of CMC to US
July 16-29
and France
Air Force Commander,
July 19-23
Thailand
Chief of Special Operations,
July 24-25
Australia
July 24-Aug. 10 Logistics Department to Finland
and Sweden
July 26-30 Chief of Army Staff, Indonesia
Chief of General Staff, Navy,
Aug. 5-11
ROK
Aug. 5-13 Chief of Defense Staff, Chile
Political Commissar of Jinan
Aug. 11-25 Military Area Command to
Togo, Benin and Tanzania
Chief of Staff, Peoples Army,
Aug. 14-19
Algeria
Aug. 14-20
to Pakistan and Thailand
Port call by naval ships of
Aug. 15-24
Canada
Aug. 21-23 C-in-C, USPAC

Port calls by PLA naval ships to

Aug. 21-Nov. 5
US, Canada and the Philippines
Aug. 22-Sept. 6
Germany and Egypt
Minister of State for Defense,
Aug. 23-30
Kenya
Aug. 28-Sept. 3 Minister of Defense, Bolivia
Aug. 28-Sept. 16 Department to Finland and
Greece
Chief of National Defense
Aug. 29-Sept. 2
Forces, South Africa
Commander of Lanzhou
Aug. 30-Sept. 13 Military Area Command to
Columbia and Peru
Sept. 1-9 Air Force Commander, Peru
Sept. 2-17 Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and
Belarus
President of Academy of
Sept. 3-14 Military Science to Egypt and
South Africa
Commander of Army and Navy,
Sept. 4-9
Uruguay
Sept. 7-14
Cape Verde
Vice Chairman of CMC to
Sept. 10-21
Australia and New Zealand
Sept. 11-18 Shenyang Military Area
Command to Mexico
Sept. 14-30 Logistics Department to Brazil
and Chile
Sept. 21-24
Tajikistan
Minister of State for Defense,
Sept. 22-30
Gabon
Sept. 22-30 Minister of Defense, Liberia
Inspector General of
Oct. 7-11 Germanys Federal Armed
Forces
Chief of Defense Forces, New
Oct. 8-14
Zealand
Commander of PLA Air Force
Oct. 13-27
to Turkey, India and Pakistan


Oct. 14-26 Kampuchea, Laos, Thailand and
Myanmar
Oct. 15-20
to Russia
Oct. 15-22 Department, Peoples Army,
Vietnam
Oct. 16-22 Minister of Defense, Estonia
Oct. 18-20 Chief of Army, Australia
Oct. 18-31 Armaments Department to
Namibia and Algeria
Oct. 19-22 Minister of Defense, Chad
Port call by Royal Navy ships,
Oct.19-23
UK
Oct. 24-Nov. 1
Forces, Kenya
Oct. 26-Nov. 2
Afghanistan
Oct. 29-Nov. 2 Port call by naval ships, France
Deputy Chief of General Staff,
Oct. 29-Nov. 5
Armed Forces, Romania
Oct. 29-Nov. 13 Political Department to Egypt
and Uganda
Minister of Defense, New
Nov. 10-13
Zealand
Nov. 15-19 Port call by US naval ships
Nov. 19-25
Forces, Slovakia
Nov. 21-Dec. 5
Yemen and Tunis
Political Commissar of Chengdu
Nov. 24-Dec. 8 Military Area Command to India
and Vietnam
Nov. 26-Dec .8 to Vietnam, Japan, Thailand and
South Africa
Nov. 27-Dec. 1 Chief of Air Staff, Sweden
Nov. 28-Dec. 5 Chief of General Staff, Benin
Commander of Second Artillery
Nov. 29-Dec. 15
Force to Argentina and Chile
Political Commissar of National
Nov. 30-Dec. 4
Defense University to Cuba
Political Commissar of Beijing
Dec.2-16 Military Area Command to
Poland and Belarus


Appendix III. Participation in Security Consultations (2005-2006)
Date Venue Content

2nd Meeting between the General Staff
Jan. 7-14, 2005 Paris
Headquarters of China and France
8th Meeting between the General Staff
Jan. 19-21 Beijing
Headquarters of China and Germany
Jan. 31- Feb. 1 Beijing China-US Working Level Defense Meeting
1st China-Poland Dialogue on Military
March 29-31 Warsaw
Cooperation
6th China-Japan Defense and Security
March 24-27 Beijing
Consultation
March 30 London 3rd China-UK Export Control Exchange
3rd China-Pakistan Defense and Security
April 4-11 Beijing
Consultation
1st China-Vietnam Defense and Security
April 10-15 Beijing
Consultation
3rd Meeting of China-France Working Group
April 25 Paris
of Arms Control and Non-proliferation
Washington D. 7th China-US Defense Consultative Talks at
April 28-29
C. Vice Defense Ministerial Level
China-US Consultation on Arms Control and
June 13 Beijing
Non-proliferation
2nd China-South Africa Defense Committee
June 16-17 Beijing
Meeting
4th Annual Defense and Security Consultation
July 4-10 Beijing between the Defense Ministries of China and
Thailand
Annual Meeting of China-US Military
July 7-8 Qingdao Maritime Consultative Mechanism
Agreement
9th Consultation between the General Staff
Sept. 16-23 Moscow
Headquarters of China and Russia
9th Annual Defense and Strategic
Oct. 10-14 Beijing Consultation between the Defense Ministries
of China and Australia
1st Consultation on Joint Maritime Patrol by
Oct. 25-30 Haiphong the Navies of China and Vietnam in the Beibu
Gulf
Working Group Meeting of China-US
Oct. 26-28 Hawaii
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
4th Meeting of China-France Working Group
Oct. 27 Beijing
Nov. 5-8 2nd Dialogue between the General Staff
Rome
Headquarters of China and Italy

3rd Meeting between the General Staff

Nov. 13-15 Athens Headquarters of the Armed Forces of China
and Greece
Working Level Meeting between the
Dec. 8-9 Beijing
Ministries of Defense of China and US
Jan. 23-26, 2006 3rd Meeting between the General Staff
Beijing
Headquarters of China and France
China-UK Consultation on the Trade
March 14 Beijing
Agreement of Weaponry and Equipment
March 30-31 Ningbo
Consultation between the Foreign Affairs
April 2-8 Beijing Department of the Armed Forces of China
and Romania
May 11-14 Jakarta 1st China-Indonesia Defense and Security
Consultation
2nd China-Poland Dialogue on Military
May 14-20 Beijing
Cooperation
May 15-20 Kuala Lumpur 1st China-Malaysia Defense Consultation
10th Consultation between the General Staff
May 29-June 3 Beijing
Headquarters of China and Russia
June 8-9 Beijing 8th China-US Defense Consultative Talk
2nd China-South Africa Defense Committee
June 16-17 Beijing
Meeting
15th China-Australia Consultation on Arms
July 24 Canberra
Control and Security
Aug. 7-8 Hawaii
4th Meeting between the General Staff
Aug. 7-13 Beijing Headquarters of the Armed Forces of China
and Greece
Annual Meeting of China-US Military
Aug. 9-11 Hawaii
Maritime Consultative Agreement
4th China-Pakistan Defense and Security
Aug. 14-16 Islamabad
Consultation
5th Annual Defense and Security Consultation
Aug. 16-20 Bangkok between the Defense Ministries of China and
Thailand
5th Meeting of China-France Working Group
Sept. 14 Beijing
2nd China-Philippines Defense and Security
Oct. 9-13 Beijing
Consultation
Consultation on the SCO Joint Anti-terrorism
Oct. 15-20 Moscow
Exercise
3rd Dialogue between the General Staff
Nov. 1-8 Beijing
Headquarters of China and Italy

2nd China-Vietnam Defense and Security

Nov. 26-28 Hanoi
Consultation
7th China-Japan Defense and Security
Nov. 28-Dec. 1 Tokyo
Consultation
3rd China-South Africa Defense Committee
Dec. 5-6 Pretoria
Meeting
Washington D. Working Level Defense Meeting of China and
Dec. 7-8
C. US

Appendix IV. Joint Exercises with Foreign Armed Forces (2005-2006)
Date Place Name

Vladivostok, Russia and Shandong
Aug. 17-25, 2005 China-Russia Joint Military Exercise
Peninsula, China
Sea area adjacent to the Port of Karachi, China-Pakistan Joint Maritime Search and Rescue
Nov. 24, 2005 Pakistan Exercise
Sea area adjacent to the Port of Cochin,
Dec. 1, 2005 India China-India Joint Maritime Search and Rescue Exercise
Sea area adjacent to the Port of Sattahip, China-Thailand Joint Maritime Search and Rescue
Dec. 13, 2005 Thailand Exercise
Sea area adjacent to the Port of San China-US Joint Maritime Search and Rescue Exercise
Sept. 20, 2006 Diego, USA (Phase I)
Hatlon Prefecture, Tajikistan China-Tajikistan Joint Counter-Terrorism Military
Sept. 22-23, 2006
Exercise
Nov. 18-19, 2006 South China Sea, China China-US Joint Maritime Search and Rescue Exercise
(Phase II)
Dec. 11-18, 2006 Abbottabad, Pakistan China-Pakistan Joint Counter-Terrorism Military
Exercise
Appendix V. Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations (Up to Nov. 30, 2006)
Troops Observers Police

UN Peacekeeping Mission Abbreviation Timeframe
Current Total Current Total Current Total
UN Truce Supervision UNTSO April 1990-present 3 80
Organization
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer UNIKOM April 1991-Oct. 2003 164
Mission
UN Mission for
Referendum in Western MINURSO Sept. 1991-present 15 288
Sahara
UN Transitional Authority UNTAC Dec. 1991-Sept. 1993 800 97
in Cambodia
UN Operation in ONUMOZ June 1993-Dec. 1994 20
Mozambique
UN Observer Mission in UNOMIL Nov. 1993- 33
Liberia Sept. 1997
UN Special Mission in UNSMA May 1998-Jan. 2000 2
Afghanistan
UN Observer Mission in UNOMSIL Aug. 1998-present 37
Sierra Leone
UN Mission of Support in UNMISET Jan. 2000-July 2006 207
East Timor
UN Mission in Ethiopia and UNMEE Oct. 2000-present 7 42
Eritrea
UN Mission in Bosnia and UNMIBH Jan. 2001-Jan. 2002 20
Herzegovina
UN Mission in Congo MONUC April 2001-present 218 1,308 14 69
(Kinshasa)
UN Assistance Mission in UNAMA Jan. 2003-May 2005 3
Afghanistan
UN Mission in Liberia UNMIL Oct. 2003-present 558 2,232 13 51 23 73
UN Operation in C?te UNOCI March 2004-present 7 19

d'Ivoire
UN Mission in Kosovo UNMIK April 2004-present 18 55
UN Stabilization Mission in MINUSTAH May 2004-present 130 514

Haiti
UN Operation in Burundi ONUB June 2004-present 6
UN Mission in the Sudan UNMIS May 2005-present 435 435 23 40 9 21
UN Interim Force in UNIFIL March 2006-present 182 182 8 8

Lebanon
UN Integrated Mission in UNMIT Oct. 2006-present 2 2
Timor-Leste
Total 1,393 4,957 92 958 180 893
Appendix VI. Major Military Regulations Promulgated 2005-2006
Date of
Title of Regulations Issuing Authority
Promulgation
Regulations on the Participation
State Council (SC) and Central
of the Military in Disaster Relief June 7, 2005
Military Commission (CMC)
Operations
Regulations on Nonmilitary
Personnel in the Chinese
SC and CMC June 23, 2005
Peoples Liberation Army
(CPLA)
Regulations of Afforestation of CMC July 22, 2005
CPLA
Supplementary Regulations of
the CPLA on Implementing the
CMC July 22, 2005
Disciplinary Punishment
Regulations of the Communist
Party of China
CPLA Regulations on Science
CMC July 22, 2005
and Technology in Logistics
CPLA Regulations on the Work
of Science, Technology and
CMC July 22, 2005
Information in Weaponry and
Equipment
Regulations of the CPLA on the General Political Department
July 22, 2005
Work of Supervision (Authorized by the CMC)
Regulations on Flying
Air Force (Authorized by the
Operations of the CPLA Air Sept. 7, 2005
CMC)
Force
Regulations on the Work of
Type Finalization of Military SC and CMC Sept. 20, 2005
Products
Regulations of CPLA on
Handling Official Documents in CMC Oct. 2, 2005
PLA Departments
Criteria for Physical Check-ups Ministry of National Defense

Oct. 19, 2005
of the CPLA for Air Cadets (authorized by the SC and CMC)
Regulations on the Work of

Branches of the Communist CMC Dec. 1, 2005
Party of China in the CPLA

Regulations of the Headquarters

CMC March 4, 2006
of the CPLA
Regulations of the CPLA on

GSHQ, GPD, GLD, GAD
Rewarding Professional and March 4, 2006
(authorized by the CMC)
Technical Personnel

Establishing a System for
Evaluating the Influence of CMC March 4, 2006
Military Activities on the
Environment

GSHQ, GPD, GLD, GAD
Receiving Petitions and Aug. 1, 2006
Personal Visits
Provisional Measures for

GPD, the Disciplinary
admonition and Letters of
Commission of the CMC Oct. 3, 2006
Inquiry for Leading Cadres and
Party Members of the CPLA
Provisional Regulations on the

Self-Examination of GPD, the Disciplinary
Performance and Integrity of Commission of the CMC Oct. 3, 2006
Leading Cadres and Party (authorized by the CMC)
Members of the CPLA

ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
Military Power of the

Peoples Republic of China
2007
Office of the Secretary of Defense

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Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China
A Report to Congress
Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act
Fiscal Year 2000
Section 1202, Annual Report on Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China, of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106-65, provides that
the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report on the current and future military strategy
of the Peoples Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future
course of military-technological development on the Peoples Liberation Army and the tenets
and probable development of Chinese grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy,
and of the military organizations and operational concepts, through the next 20 years.
Executive Summary
Chinas rapid rise as a regional political and economic power with global aspirations is an important element
of todays strategic environment one that has significant implications for the region and the world. The
United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China, and it encourages China to participate as
a responsible international stakeholder by taking on a greater share of responsibility for the health and success
of the global system. However, much uncertainty surrounds the future course Chinas leaders will set for their
country, including in the area of Chinas expanding military power and how that power might be used.
The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed
for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-
intensity conflicts against high-tech adversaries which China refers to as local wars under conditions of
informatization. Chinas ability to sustain military power at a distance, at present, remains limited but, as
noted in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, it has the greatest potential to compete militarily with
the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military
advantages.
Chinas near-term focus on preparing for military contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, including the possibility
of U.S. intervention, appears to be an important driver of its modernization plans. However, analysis of
Chinas military acquisitions and strategic thinking suggests Beijing is also generating capabilities for other
regional contingencies, such as conflict over resources or territory.
The pace and scope of Chinas military transformation has increased in recent years, fueled by continued high
rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, acquisition of advanced
foreign weapons, and far reaching reforms of the armed forces. The expanding military capabilities of Chinas
armed forces are a major factor in changing East Asian military balances; improvements in Chinas strategic
capabilities have ramifications far beyond the Asia Pacific region.
Chinas strategic forces modernization is enhancing strategic strike capabilities, as evidenced by the DF-31
intercontinental range ballistic missile, which achieved initial threat availability in 2006. Chinas counterspace
program punctuated by the January 2007 successful test of a direct-ascent, anti-satellite weapon poses
dangers to human space flight and puts at risk the assets of all space faring nations. Chinas continued pursuit
of area denial and anti-access strategies is expanding from the traditional land, air, and sea dimensions of the
modern battlefield to include space and cyber-space.
The outside world has limited knowledge of the motivations, decision-making, and key capabilities supporting
Chinas military modernization. Chinas leaders have yet to explain adequately the purposes or desired end-
states of the PLAs expanding military capabilities. Chinas actions in certain areas increasingly appear
inconsistent with its declaratory policies. Actual Chinese defense expenditures remain far above officially
disclosed figures. This lack of transparency in Chinas military affairs will naturally and understandably
prompt international responses that hedge against the unknown.
Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China I

II Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China

Table of Contents
Chapter One: Key Developments 1
Chapter Two: Understanding Chinas Strategy 6

Overview 6
Strategy with Chinese Characteristics 6
Comprehensive National Power 6
Strategic Configuration of Power 7
Stability, Sovereignty, and Strategy 7
Balance, Position, and Strategy 8
Resource Demands and Strategy 8
Other Factors Influencing the Future Direction of the Chinese Strategy 9
Chapter Three: Chinas Military Strategy and Doctrine 11

Overview 11
Military Strategic Guidelines 11
Asymmetric Warfare 13
The Role of Secrecy and Deception in Chinese Military Strategy 14
Chapter Four: Force Modernization Goals and Trends 15

Overview 15
Emerging Area Denial/Anti-Access Capabilities 15
Strategic Capabilities 18
Nuclear Deterrence 18
Space and Counterspace 20
Information Warfare 21
Power Projection Modernizing Beyond Taiwan 22
Chapter Five: Resources for Force Modernization 25

Overview 25
Military Expenditure Trends 25
Chinas Advancing Defense Industries 26
Foreign Weapons and Technology Acquisition 28
Chapter Six: Force Modernization and Security in the Taiwan Strait 30

Overview 30
Chinas Strategy in the Taiwan Strait 30
Beijings Courses of Action Against Taiwan 32
Limited Force Options 32
Air and Missile Campaign 32
Blockade 33
Amphibious Invasion 33
Appendix: China and Taiwan Forces Data 36
Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China III

Figures
1. Chinas Critical Sea Lanes 9
2. The First and Second Island Chains 16
3. Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles 19
4. Maximum Ranges for Chinas Conventional SRBM Force 23
5. Comparison of Outside Estimates of PRC Military Spending 26
6. Chinese Defense Budgets and Estimates of Total Related Expenditures 27
7. Surface-to-Air Missile Coverage Over the Taiwan Strait 31
8. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces 36
9. Major Ground Force Units 37
10. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces 38
11. Major Air Force Units 39
12. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces 40
13. Major Naval Units 41
14. Chinas Missile Forces 42
15. Chinas Space Assets 42
IV Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China

Chapter One
Key Developments
Never before has China been so closely bound up with the rest of the world as it is today.
Chinas National Defense in 2006
Several significant developments in China over the to human space flight due to the creation of an
past year relate to the questions Congress posed in unprecedented amount of debris.
Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65). Evidence in 2006 suggests that China revised the
1993 Military Strategic Guidelines for the New
Developments in Chinas Grand Strategy, Period, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)
Security Strategy, and Military Strategy guidance documents for military strategy and
forces development. The specific contents of the
Beijing released Chinas National Defense guidelines are not known.
in 2006 in December, its fifth Defense White
Paper since 1998, to describe Chinas security PRC President Hu Jintao and Russian President
perceptions, national defense policies, and Vladimir Putin proclaimed 2006 as The Year of
the goals of its modernization programs. As Russia during their March meeting in Beijing,
declaratory policy, the paper reflects a modest the leaders fifth meeting in less than twelve
improvement in transparency, but it does not months. Building on their joint exercise in
adequately address the composition of Chinas 2005, the two leaders agreed to increase military
military forces, or the purposes and desired end- exchanges and hold eight cooperative military
states of Chinas military development. activities in 2007.
Beijing released Chinas Space Activities in Reflecting increasing concerns over energy and
2006 in October the previous edition was resource needs, 2006 saw the largest annual
published in 2000. The paper reviews the increase in new energy contracts signed by China,
history of Chinas space program and presents a including new agreements with Saudi Arabia
roadmap for the future. The paper also discusses and several African countries. Chinas effort to
Chinas cooperation with various partners in court African nations in 2006 culminated with
space activities. It remains silent on the military a November summit in Beijing attended by 40
applications of Chinas space programs and heads of state and delegates from 48 of the 53
counterspace activities. African nations.
In January 2007, China successfully tested In March 2006, China formally launched its 11th
a direct-ascent, anti-satellite (ASAT) missile Five Year Plan (2006-2010), which includes
against a Chinese weather satellite, demonstrating ambitious calls for a 20 percent reduction in
Chinas ability to attack satellites operating in energy consumption per unit of Gross Domestic
low-Earth orbit. The test put at risk the assets Product (GDP) by 2010, a doubling of Chinas
of all space faring nations and posed dangers 2000 GDP by 2010, and an overall GDP of $4
Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China 1

trillion by 2020. The plan stresses coordinated for a seat on the UN Security Council remain
development, and greater investment and sources of friction.
urbanization in the rural interior, to address
income disparities and social unrest. In October 2006, a Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA) Navy SONG-class diesel-electric
In 2006, according to the World Bank, China submarine broached the surface in close proximity
became the worlds fourth largest economy, to the USS KITTY HAWK aircraft carrier in
surpassing Great Britain by 0.004 percent in waters near Japan. This incident demonstrated
national production as measured by the World the importance of long-standing U.S. efforts to
Banks Atlas model. improve the safety of U.S. and Chinese military
air and maritime assets operating near each other.
Official reports claim the number of mass In 2006, these efforts produced a two phased
incidents declined 22 percent in 2006. bilateral search and rescue exercise with the PLA
Nevertheless, these incidents, directed mainly Navy (one phase off the U.S. coast, the second
at local policies and officials, reflect continued off the PRC coast).
popular dissatisfaction with official behavior
related to property rights and forced relocations, In 2006, China conducted two counterterrorism
labor rights, pensions, pollution, corruption, and exercises with Shanghai Cooperation
police brutality. Organization (SCO) partners, and hosted the
fifth anniversary of the founding of the SCO in
Developments Related to Chinas Regional Shanghai in June.
Strategy
China is increasing its role in the Asia-Pacific
China responded to North Koreas ballistic Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, the
missile launches over the Sea of Japan in July Association of Southeast Asian Nations
and nuclear test in October by voting in favor (ASEAN), and the ASEAN Regional Forum
of UN Security Council Resolutions 1695 and (ARF). The United States has encouraged this
1718 and by continuing efforts to use diplomatic increased participation, and cooperated with
means, specifically the Six Party Talks, which China to co-chair an ARF seminar on non-
China hosts, to address North Koreas nuclear proliferation. During the October 2006 ASEAN
programs. The Talks, which involve the United Summit, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao proposed
States, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and North expanded security and defense cooperation
Korea, as well as China, produced agreement between China and ASEAN.
in February 2007 on initial steps to implement
the September 2005 Joint Statement on In November 2006, PRC President Hu Jintao
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. made the first visit to India by a PRC head of
state in ten years, demonstrating the importance
The visit of new Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo China places on improving ties with India
Abe to China in November helped to ease while preserving its strategic relationship with
somewhat tensions between Tokyo and Beijing. Pakistan.
However, issues such as territorial disputes in
the East China Sea, over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai
islands, and Chinas efforts to block Japans quest
2 Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China
Developments in Chinas Military Forces
Naval Power. Chinas naval forces include 72
China is pursuing long-term, comprehensive principal combatants, some 58 attack submarines,
transformation of its military forces to improve its about 50 medium and heavy amphibious lift vessels,
capabilities for power projection, anti-access, and and approximately 41 coastal missile patrol craft.
area denial. Consistent with a near-term focus on
preparing for offensive Taiwan Strait contingencies, China received the second of two Russian-
China deploys its most advanced systems to the made SOVREMENNYY II guided missile
military regions directly opposite Taiwan. destroyers (DDG) in late 2006. These DDGs
are fitted with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs)
Ballistic and Cruise Missiles. China is developing and wide-area air defense systems that feature
and testing offensive missiles, forming additional qualitative improvements over the earlier
missile units, upgrading qualitatively certain SOVREMENNYY-class DDGs China purchased
missile systems, and developing methods to counter from Russia.
ballistic missile defenses.
China is building and testing second-generation
By October 2006, China had deployed roughly nuclear submarines with the JIN-class (Type 094)
900 mobile CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and
ballistic missiles to garrisons opposite Taiwan, the SHANG-class (Type 093) nuclear-powered
expanding at a rate of more than 100 missiles attack submarine, which began sea trials in
per year. Newer versions of these missiles have 2005.
improved range and accuracy.
China took delivery of two KILO-class
China is modernizing its longer-range ballistic submarines from Russia, completing a contract
missile force by adding more survivable systems. for eight signed in 2002. China operates twelve
The road-mobile, solid-propellant DF-31 KILOs, the newest of which are equipped with
intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM) the supersonic SS-N-27B ASCM, and wire-
achieved initial threat availability in 2006 and guided and wake-homing torpedoes.
will likely achieve operational status in the near
The PLA Navys newest ship, the LUZHOU-
future, if it has not already done so. A longer range
class (Type 051C) DDG is designed for anti-air
variant, the DF-31A, is expected to reach initial
warfare. It will be equipped with the Russian
operational capability (IOC) in 2007. China is
SA-N-20 SAM system controlled by the
also working on a new submarine-launched
TOMBSTONE phased-array radar. The SA-N-
ballistic missile, the JL-2 (IOC 2007-2010),
20 more than doubles the range of current PLA
for deployment on a new JIN-class (Type 094)
Navy air defense systems marking a significant
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine,
improvement in Chinas ship-borne air defense
also in development.
capability.
China continues to explore the use of ballistic and The LUZHOU-class DDG complements ongoing
cruise missiles for anti-access missions, including
developments of the LUYANG I (Type 052B) and
counter-carrier and land attack, and is working on
LUYANG II (Type 052C) DDGs. The LUYANG
reconnaissance and communication systems to
I is fitted with the Russian SA-N-7B GRIZZLY
improve command, control, and targeting.
SAM and the YJ-83 ASCM. The LUYANG II helicopter, the Z-10, is undergoing flight testing.
is fitted with an air defense system based on the The Z-10 will fire the Red Arrow 8E anti-tank
indigenous HHQ-9 SAM. guided missile, offering combat performance
equal to the Eurocopter Tiger, but below that of
In 2006, China began producing its first guided- the AH-64 Apache.
missile frigate (FFG), the JIANGKAI II (Type
054A). The JIANGKAI II will be fitted Improvements to the FB-7 fighter program will
with the medium range HHQ-16, a vertically enable this older aircraft to perform nighttime
launched naval surface-to-air missile currently maritime strike operations and use improved
in development. weapons such as the Kh-31P (AS-17) anti-
radiation missile and KAB-500 laser-guided
At the 2006 Zhuhai Air Show, PRC military munitions.
and civilian officials asserted Chinas interest in
building an aircraft carrier. Air Defense. In the next few years, China will
receive its first battalion of Russian-made S-
Air Power. China has more than 700 combat 300PMU-2 surface-to-air missile systems. With
aircraft based within an un-refueled operational an advertised intercept range of 200 km, the S-
range of Taiwan and the airfield capacity to expand 300PMU-2 provides increased lethality against
that number significantly. Many aircraft in the PLA tactical ballistic missiles and more effective
force structure are upgrades of older models (e.g., electronic countermeasures. China also is
re-engined B-6 bombers for extended ranges); developing the indigenous HQ-9 air defense missile
however, newer aircraft make up a growing system, a phased array radar-based SAM with a 150
percentage of the inventory. km range. As noted above, a naval variant (HHQ-9)
will deploy on the LUYANG II DDG and a vertical
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is deploying the
launch naval SAM (HHQ-16) will deploy on the
F-10 multi-role fighter to operational units. The
JIANGKAI II FFG.
F-10, a fourth generation aircraft, will be Chinas
premier fighter in the coming decades.
Ground Forces. China has about 1.4 million
China is now producing the multi-role Su- ground forces personnel with approximately
27SMK/FLANKER (F-11A) fighter under a 400,000 deployed to the three military regions
licensed co-production agreement with Russia opposite Taiwan. China has been upgrading these
following an initial production run of Su-27SKs units with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and
(F-11). China is employing increasing numbers additional artillery pieces. In April 2006, China
of the multi-role Su-30MKK/FLANKER fighter- made its first delivery of the new third generation
bomber and its naval variant, the Su-30MK2. main battle tank, the ZTZ-99, to units in the Beijing
and Shenyang military regions.
Chinese aircraft are armed with an increasingly
sophisticated array of air-to-air and air-to-surface Amphibious Forces. The PLA has deployed a new
weapons, satellite and laser-guided precision amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) and developed
munitions, and cruise missiles. a range of modifications for existing vehicles
including flotation tanks and mounted outboard
Chinas first indigenously produced attack
engines. Its newer amphibious vehicles have

greater stability and performance in open water. advanced capabilities opposite the island have not
Increased amphibious training, including multiple eased, with the balance of forces continuing to shift
training evolutions in a single year, is building in the mainlands favor. Tension could also increase
proficiency among Chinas amphibious forces. as Taiwan prepares for its next presidential election
planned for March 2008.
Developments in Chinese Military Doctrine
Taiwan appears to be reversing the trend of
China continues to focus on capabilities to declining defense expenditures. In 2005, Taiwan
operate under informatized conditions with leaders announced plans to increase defense
an emphasis on integrated joint operations, joint spending to three percent of GDP by 2008. In
logistics, and long-range mobility. 2006, this figure was approximately 2.4 percent
of GDP. The 2007 defense budget requests funds
In June 2006, the PLA released new guidance at a level of 2.8 percent of GDP, with a planned
to increase realism in training and to expand the 2007 supplemental request expected to raise this
use of simulators and opposing forces in training figure to 2.85 percent.
evolutions.
Taiwan abandoned the strategy of using a
In December 2006, the leaders of the command Special Budget to procure major defense systems
colleges for the PLA Second Artillery Corps, approved for sale by the United States in 2001. It
the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and PLA ground will attempt instead to fund the programs in the
forces signed a cooperative education agreement regular defense budget and budget supplementals.
paving the way for joint professional military Taiwans Legislative Yuan has yet to pass these
education. funding bills, however.
In December 2006, the National Defense Consistent with the provisions of the Taiwan
Mobilization Committee issued the Outline of Relations Act, Public Law 96-8 (1979), the
National Defense Education for all Citizens, United States continues to make available
to standardize defense education across China. defense articles, services, and training assistance
The goals of such education include arousing to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
patriotism and raising the citizens awareness defense capability. In September 2006, Taiwan
of their national defense duty. accepted delivery of the last two of four KIDD-
class DDGs.
Assessment of Challenges to Taiwans
Deterrent Forces
There were no armed incidents in the vicinity of

the Taiwan Strait in 2006 and the overall situation
remained stable, as it was for most of 2005.
Beijing reacted responsibly to Taiwan President
Chen Shui-bians decision to suspend the National
Unification Council and National Unification
Guidelines in early 2006. However, Chinas
military modernization and the deployment of

Chapter Two
Understanding Chinas Strategy

Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time;
be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.
Deng Xiaopings 24 Character Strategy
Overview
Chinese leaders and strategists rarely use a Western
Chinas leaders do not explicitly provide an
ends-ways-means construct to discuss strategy.
overarching grand strategy that outlines
Rather, they discuss strategy in terms of two central
strategic goals and the means to achieve them.
concepts: comprehensive national power (CNP)
Such vagueness may reflect a deliberate effort to
and the strategic configuration of power. These
conceal strategic planning, as well as uncertainties,
concepts shape how Chinese strategic planners
disagreements, and debates that Chinas leaders
assess the security environment, gauge Chinas
themselves have about their own long-term goals
relative position in the world, and make adjustments
and strategies. Still, it is possible to make some
to account for prevailing geopolitical trends.
generalizations about Chinese grand strategy
based on strategic tradition, historical patterns,
CNP. Chinas strategic planners use CNP scores
statements and official papers, an emphasis on
to evaluate Chinas standing in relation to other
certain military capabilities, and recent diplomatic
nations. These scores are based on qualitative and
efforts.
quantitative measures of territory, natural resources,
economic prosperity, diplomatic influence,
Strategy with Chinese Characteristics
international prestige, domestic cohesiveness,
military capability, and cultural influence. Chinas
At the core of Chinas overall strategy rests the
leading civilian and military think tanks apply
desire to maintain the continuous rule of the
slightly different criteria for CNP. A 2006 report
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). A deep-rooted
by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, for
fear of losing political power shapes the leaderships
example, used economic, military, and diplomatic
strategic outlook and drives many of its choices. As
metrics to rank China sixth among the world
a substitute for the failure of communist ideology,
powers.
the CCP has based its legitimacy on the twin pillars
of economic performance and nationalism. As
Since the early 1980s, Chinas leaders have
a consequence, domestic economic and social
described their national development strategy
difficulties may lead China to attempt to bolster
as a quest to increase Chinas CNP. They stress
support by stimulating nationalist sentiment which
economic growth and innovation in science and
could result in more aggressive behavior in foreign
technology as central to strengthening CNP. A
and security affairs than we might otherwise expect.
The 24 Character Strategy
In the early 1990s, former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (d. 1997) gave guidance to Chinas foreign
and security policy apparatus that, collectively, has come to be known as the 24 character strategy:
observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time;
be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership. Later, the phrase, make some
contributions (you suo zuo wei) was added.
Elements of this strategy have often been quoted by senior Chinese national security officials and
academics, especially in the context of Chinas diplomacy and military strategy. Certain aspects of this
strategy have been debated in recent years namely the relative emphasis placed upon never claim
leadership or make some contributions. Chinas increased international profile, especially since the
2002 16th Party Congress, suggests Beijing is leaning toward a more assertive, confident diplomacy.
Taken as a whole, Dengs strategy remains instructive in that it suggests both a short-term desire to
downplay Chinas capabilities and avoid confrontation, and a long-term strategy to build up Chinas power
to maximize options for the future.
key assumption of this strategy is that economic (e.g., the collapse of the Soviet Union) that might
prosperity and stability will afford China greater prompt an adjustment in national strategy.
international influence and diplomatic leverage as
well as a robust, modern military. Chinas leaders describe the initial decades of the
21st Century as a 20-year period of opportunity,
A commentary in the official Liberation Army Daily meaning that regional and international conditions
in April 2006 shed some light on the relationship will generally be peaceful and conducive to
between CNP, military modernization, and Chinas economic, diplomatic, and military development
international status: As Chinas comprehensive and thus to Chinas rise as a great power. Closely
strength is incrementally mounting and her status linked to this concept is the peaceful development
keeps on going up in international affairs, it is a campaign to assuage foreign concerns over Chinas
matter of great importance to strive to construct a military modernization and its global agenda by
military force that is commensurate with Chinas proclaiming that Chinas rise will be peaceful and
status and up to the job of defending the interests that conflict is not a necessary corollary to the
of Chinas development, so as to entrench Chinas emergence of a new power.
international status.
Stability, Sovereignty, and Strategy
Strategic Configuration of Power. The strategic
configuration of power, or shi, is roughly The perpetuation of CCP rule shapes Beijings
understood as an alignment of forces, although perceptions of Chinas domestic political situation
there is no direct Western equivalent to the term. and the international environment. Regime survival
Chinese strategic planners continuously assess the likewise shapes how Party leaders view instability
strategic configuration of power for potential along Chinas periphery e.g., North Korea, Central
threats (e.g., potential conflict over Taiwan that Asia which could escalate or spill over into
involves the United States) as well as opportunities China. Concern over maintaining legitimacy also

influences how Beijing treats the status of Chinas widening north-south gap.
land and maritime territorial claims, since any
challenge to Chinese sovereignty could undermine Resource Demands and Strategy
the strength and authority of the Party.
As Chinas economy grows, dependence on secure
China has settled territorial disputes with many of access to markets and natural resources, particularly
its neighbors in recent years. However, disputes metals and fossil fuels, is becoming a more urgent
with Japan in the East China Sea, with India along influence on Chinas strategic behavior. At present,
their shared border, and with Southeast Asian China can neither protect its foreign energy supplies
nations in the South China Sea remain. Although nor the routes on which they travel, including the
China has attempted to prevent these disputes from Straits of Malacca through which some 80 percent
disrupting regional relations, occasional statements of Chinas cruse oil imports transit a vulnerability
by PRC officials underscore Chinas resolve in President Hu refers to as the Malacca Dilemma.
these areas. For example, on the eve of President
Hus historic October 2006 visit to India, PRC China relies on coal for some two-thirds of its
Ambassador Sun Yuxi told Indian press, the whole energy, but its demand for oil and gas is increasing.
of what you call the state of Arunachal Pradesh is In 2003, China became the worlds second largest
Chinese territory . . . we are claiming all of that consumer and third largest importer of oil. China
thats our position. currently imports over 40 percent of its oil (about
2.5 million barrels per day in 2005). By 2025, this
Balance, Position, and Strategy figure could rise to 80 percent (9.5 15 million
barrels per day). China began filling a strategic
Beyond Chinas efforts to maintain stability on petroleum reserve in 2006. By 2015, Beijing plans
its borders and assert its territorial claims, Beijing to build reserves to the International Energy Agency
seeks to advance its strategic interests into the standard of 90-days supply, but with poor logistics
greater periphery encompassing Central Asia and and transportation networks, this may still prove
the Middle East. The security goals behind this inadequate.
emphasis include maintaining access to resources
and markets, and establishing a regional presence Nuclear power and natural gas account for smaller,
and influence to balance and compete with other but growing, portions of energy consumption.
powers, including the United States, Japan, and China plans to increase natural gas utilization from
India in areas distant from Chinas borders. 3 percent to 8 percent of total consumption by 2010.
Similarly, China plans to build some 30 1,000-
Similarly, Chinas strategy for the developing megawatt nuclear power reactors by 2020.
world seeks to secure access to resources and
markets, build influence in multilateral bodies Chinas reliance on foreign energy imports has
such as the United Nations, and restrict Taiwans affected its strategy and policy in significant ways.
diplomatic space. To build these relationships, It has pursued long-term energy supply agreements
China emphasizes its self-proclaimed status as in Angola, Central Asia, Chad, Egypt, Indonesia,
the leader of the developing world and one that Iran, Nigeria, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
can sympathize with local dissatisfaction over and Venezuela. China has used economic aid,
the effects of globalization and perceptions of a diplomatic favors, and, in some cases, the sale of
Please notice they don't name these countries. If they
did, we would be able to see that they are the same
countries with whom the US had made deals. This
wording makes them sound much more problematic
that they are and attempts to differentiate them from
US. - bd
Figure 1. Chinas Critical Sea Lanes. China is heavily dependent upon critical sea lanes for its energy imports. Some 80% of
Chinas crude oil imports transit the Straits of Malacca.
military technology to secure energy deals. Chinas Other Factors Influencing Chinese Strategy
desire to meet its energy needs, moreover, has
led it to strengthen ties with countries that defy Economic Reform. Economic success is central to
international norms on issues ranging from human Chinas emergence as a regional and global power,
rights, support for international terrorism, and and is the basis for an increasingly capable military.
proliferation. However, underlying structural weaknesses threaten
economic growth. Demographic shifts and social
In the past few years, China has also offered dislocations are stressing an already weak social
economic assistance and military cooperation with welfare system. Economic setbacks or downturns
countries located astride key maritime transit routes. could lead to internal unrest, potentially giving
Concern over these routes has also prompted China rise to greater reliance on nationalism to maintain
to pursue maritime capabilities that would help popular support. just like US.
it ensure the safe passage of resources through
international waterways. Political Reform. In an October 2005 White
Paper on Political Democracy, Chinas leaders
just like US.
reaffirmed the peoples democratic dictatorship,
and declared that China is against the anarchic
call for democracy for all. However, internal
pressures for political liberalization persist. Party
leaders criminalize political dissent, censor the
media and internet, suppress independent trade and
labor unions, repress ethnic Tibetan and Uighur
minorities, and harass religious groups and churches
not recognized by the regime. The Party is wary
of any unsanctioned organization in China, even
if non-political, fearing these organizations could
facilitate organized opposition.
Non-Traditional Security Challenges. Non-

traditional security challenges such as epidemic
disease (e.g., HIV, avian influenza), systemic
corruption (according to official Chinese press,
more than 17,500 government officials were
prosecuted for corruption in the first eight months
of 2006 alone), international crime and narcotics
trafficking, and environmental problems (e.g.,
pollution, water shortages, and renewable resource
depletion) could exacerbate Chinese domestic
unrest and serve as sources of regional tension and
instability.
We can be sure the US government will be financing these

efforts.

Chapter Three
Chinas Military Strategy and Doctrine
. . . resolutely and effectively carry out the sacred duty of defending national sovereignty, unification,
territorial integrity, and security . . .
Hu Jintao
except for the 57 page

document that proceeds this,
Overview them dirty bastards!
Chinese military theorists have developed a Military Strategic Guidelines

framework for doctrine-driven reform to build
a force capable of fighting and winning local China does not publish an equivalent to the U.S.
wars under conditions of informatization. This National Military Strategy. Outside observers
concept emphasizes the role of modern information therefore have few direct insights into the
technology as a force-multiplier enabling the PLA leaderships thinking about the use of force or
to conduct military operations with precision at into the contingencies that shape the PLAs force
greater distances from Chinas borders. Drawing structure or doctrine. Analysis of authoritative
upon lessons learned from foreign conflicts, speeches and documents suggests China relies on a
particularly U.S.-led campaigns up to and including body of overall principles and guidance known as
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation Military Strategic Guidelines to plan and manage
IRAQI FREEDOM, Soviet and Russian military the development and use of the armed forces.
theory, and the PLAs own, albeit limited, combat
history, Chinese military planners are pursuing The PLA has not made the contents of the
transformation across the whole of Chinas armed guidelines available for outside scrutiny.
forces. Scholarly research suggests that the current
guidelines most likely date to 1993, reflecting
The pace and scale of these reforms is impressive; the impact the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the
however, the PLA remains untested in modern collapse of the Soviet Union had on PRC military-
warfare. This lack of operational experience strategic thinking, forming the basis for much of
complicates outside assessment of the PLAs the PLAs transformation over the past decade.
progress in meeting the aspirations of its doctrine. However, speeches, authoritative commentary, and
The same applies to internal assessment and new military training guidance suggest that some
decision-making among Chinas senior civilian elements of the 1993 guidelines may have been
leaders who, for the most part, lack direct military revised recently. These revisions appear to reflect
experience, giving rise to a greater potential for Chinas perceptions of its security environment
miscalculations in crises. Such miscalculations and the character of modern war (i.e. local wars
would be equally catastrophic whether based under conditions of informatization), progress
on advice from operationally inexperienced in and lessons learned from Chinas military
commanders or from scientific combat models modernization, a shift from building forces
divorced from the realities of the modern battlefield. for modern, information-age warfare to training
except for me who is heavily invested in the arms industry.
to win such wars, as well as Hu Jintaos own act. For example, China refers to its intervention
ideological imprimatur. in the Korean War (1950-1953) as the War to
Resist the United States and Aid Korea. Similarly,
The operational, or active defense, component authoritative texts refer to border conflicts against
of the guidelines, appears to remain intact. The India (1962), the Soviet Union (1969), and Vietnam
active defense posits a defensive military strategy (1979) as Self-Defense Counter Attacks. This
in which China does not initiate wars or fight wars logic suggests the potential for China to engage in
of aggression, but engages in war only to defend military preemption, perhaps far from its borders, if
national sovereignty and territorial integrity. the use of force protects or advances core interests,
including territorial claims (e.g., Taiwan and
Beijings definition of an attack against its unresolved border or maritime claims).
unlike US
sovereignty or territory is vague, however. The
history of modern Chinese warfare is replete with Once hostilities have begun, according to the PLA
cases in which Chinas leaders have claimed text, Science of Campaigns (Zhanyixue) (2000),
military preemption as a strategically defensive the essence of [active defense] is to take the
unlike US
Is China Developing A Preemptive Strategy?

Over the past decade, as the PLA transformed from an infantry-dominated force with limited power
projection ability into a more modern force with long-range precision strike assets, China acquired weapon
systems and adopted operational concepts that enable military preemption (including surprise attack) along
its periphery.
As of October 2006, the PLA 2nd Artillery Corps had roughly 900 short-range ballistic missiles in its
inventory. Acquisition of Su-30 strike aircraft and the F-10 fighter aircraft both of which are equipped
with a variety of precision guided munitions has improved Chinas offensive air power. The PLA is
also building capabilities for information warfare, computer network operations, and electronic warfare,
all of which could be used in preemptive attacks.
PLA authors describe preemption as necessary and logical when confronting a more powerful enemy.
Chinese doctrinal materials stress that static defenses are insufficient to defend territory based on the
speed and destructive power of modern forces. As a result, PLA operational concepts seek to prevent
enemy forces from massing and to keep the enemy off balance by seizing the initiative with offensive
strikes. According to PLA theorists, an effective defense includes destroying enemy capabilities on
enemy territory before they can be employed.
Chinas acquisition of power projection assets, including long-distance military communication systems,
airborne command, control, and communications aircraft, long-endurance submarines, unmanned combat
aerial vehicles (UCAVs), and additional precision-guided air-to-ground missiles indicate that the PLA is
generating a greater capacity for military preemption. PLA training that focuses on no-notice, long-
range strike training or coordinated air/naval strikes against groups of enemy naval vessels could also
indicate planning for preemptive military options in advance of regional crises.
unlike US
ALL INTELLIGENT
initiative and to annihilate the enemy . . . . While Asymmetric Warfare

strategically the guideline is active defense, [in
military campaigns] the emphasis is placed on Identifying and exploiting asymmetries is a
taking the initiative in active offense. Only in this fundamental aspect of Chinese strategic and military
way can the strategic objective of active defense be thinking, particularly as a means for a weaker
realized (emphasis added). force to defeat one that is stronger. Since the 1991
unlike US who kisses its enemies and sends them bed.
Persian Gulf War and Operation ALLIED FORCE,
In addition to developing the capacity to annihilate Chinese military strategists have emphasized using
opposing forces, the PLA is exploring options for asymmetric approaches to exploit vulnerabilities
limited uses of force. Chinese campaign theory of technologically superior opponents. A 1999
defines these options as non-war uses of force Liberation Army Daily editorial suggested
an extension of political coercion and not full- this explicitly: a strong enemy with absolute
scale acts of war. The 1995 and 1996 amphibious superiority is certainly not without weakness that
exercises and missile firings in the Taiwan Strait can be exploited by a weaker side. [O]ur military
are examples of non-war uses of force. However, preparations need to be more directly aimed at
the concept also includes air and missile strikes, finding tactics to exploit the weaknesses of a
assassinations, and sabotage. Such writings strong enemy. Elements of Chinas exploration of
highlight the potential for China to miscalculate, asymmetric warfare options can be seen in its heavy
given the likelihood that the target of any such investment in ballistic and cruise missile systems,
actions, if not the broader international community, including advanced anti-ship cruise missiles;
would view them as acts of war. undersea warfare systems, including submarines
unlike US
and advanced naval mines; counterspace systems;
A Comprehensive View of Warfare

Over the past two decades, Chinese civilian and military strategists have debated the nature of modern
warfare. These debates draw on sources within the Chinese strategic tradition and its historical
experiences to provide perspective on the revolution in military affairs, asymmetric warfare, and
informatized war. Such debates highlight Chinas interest in non-kinetic means of warfare and the
increased role of economic, financial, information, legal, and psychological instruments in Chinese war
planning. Underscoring the PRC militarys comprehensive, multi-dimensional view of warfare, the PLA
Academy of Military Science text, the Science of Military Strategy (2000), notes that war is not only a
military struggle, but also a comprehensive contest on fronts of politics, economy, diplomacy, and law.
Recently, PRC military strategists have taken an increasing interest in international law as an instrument to
deter adversaries prior to combat. In a Taiwan Strait context, China could deploy an information campaign
to portray third-party intervention as illegitimate under international law. China is also attempting to
shape international opinion in favor of a distorted interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea by moving scholarly opinion and national perspectives away from long-accepted norms of freedom
of navigation and toward interpretations of increased sovereign authority over the 200 nautical mile
Exclusive Economic Zone, the airspace above it, and possibly outer space.

computer network operations; and, special
operations forces.
The Role of Secrecy and Deception in Chinese

Military Strategy
As oppoosed to the US who sends
the enemy all of its plans
The stress on seizing the initiative in conflicts beforehand so they are ready and
and keeping the adversary off balance in Chinese properly equipped to keep the
playing field level!
military strategy gives rise to a strong emphasis on
deception at the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels. Chinese doctrinal materials define strategic
deception as [luring] the other side into developing
misperceptions . . . and [establishing for oneself] a
strategically advantageous position by producing
various kinds of false phenomena in an organized
and planned manner with the smallest cost in
manpower and materials.
In addition to information operations and

conventional camouflage, concealment, and
deception, the PLA draws from Chinas historical
experience and the traditional roles that stratagem
and deception have played in Chinese statecraft.
Recent decades have witnessed within the PLA a
resurgence of the study of classic Chinese military
figures Sun-tzu, Sun Pin, Wu Chi, and Shang Yang
and their writings, all of which contain precepts on
the use of deception.
The Chinese Communist Partys heavy reliance

on secrecy acts in tandem with military deception
to limit transparency in national security decision-
making, military capabilities, and strategic
intentions. However, over-confidence may result
from military leaders enamored with the uncertain
benefits of stratagem and deception. In addition, the
same skills commanders use against adversaries can
be used to cover up or slow the transmission of bad
news internal to the PLA system, a chronic problem
in the PRC. Secrecy and deception may therefore
be a double-edged sword, confusing Chinas leaders
as much as Chinas adversaries.
Chapter Four
Force Modernization Goals and Trends
China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defense . . . . The first step
is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is
to basically reach the strategic goal of building informatized armed forces and being capable of winning
informatized wars by the mid-21st century.
a number of exercises designed to develop the

Overview
PLAs joint operational concepts and demonstrate
new capabilities, command automation systems,
Chinas leaders have stated their intentions and
and weapons. The PLA hopes eventually to fuse
allocated resources to pursue broad-based military
service-level capabilities with an integrated network
transformation to enable joint operations that
for command, control, communications, computers,
encompasses force-wide professionalization;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
improved training; more robust, realistic joint
(C4ISR), a new command structure, and a joint
exercises; and accelerated acquisition of modern
logistics system. However, it continues to face
weapons. For the moment, Chinas military is
deficiencies in inter-service cooperation and actual
focused on assuring the capability to prevent
experience in joint operations.
Taiwan independence and, if Beijing were to decide
to adopt such an approach, to compel the island
As PLA modernization progresses, twin
to negotiate a settlement on Beijings terms. At
misperceptions could lead to miscalculation or
the same time, China is laying the foundation for
crisis. First, other countries may underestimate
a force able to accomplish broader regional and
the extent to which Chinese forces have improved.
global objectives.
Second, Chinas leaders may overestimate the
proficiency of their forces by assuming new systems
The Intelligence Community estimates China will
are fully operational, adeptly operated, adequately
take until the end of this decade or later to produce
maintained, and well integrated with existing or
a modern force capable of defeating a moderate-size
other new capabilities.
adversary. In building such a capability, Chinas
leaders stress asymmetric strategies to leverage
Emerging Area Denial/Anti-Access Capabilities
Chinas advantages while exploiting the perceived
vulnerabilities of potential opponents using so-
In the near term, China is prioritizing measures
called Assassins Mace programs. The January
to deter or counter third-party intervention in any
2007 ASAT test could be viewed in this context.
future cross-Strait crises. Chinas approach to
dealing with this challenge centers on what DoDs
The PLAs ambition to conduct joint operations
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report refers to
can be traced to lessons learned from U.S. and
as disruptive capabilities: forces and operational
Coalition operations since the 1991 Persian
concepts aimed at preventing an adversary from
Gulf War. Since 2004, the PLA has conducted
deploying military forces to forward operating
locations, and/or rapidly destabilizing critical western Pacific airbases, ports, surface combatants,
military balances. In this context, the PLA land and space-based C4ISR, air defense systems,
appears engaged in a sustained effort to develop and command facilities.
the capability to interdict, at long ranges, aircraft
carrier and expeditionary strike groups that might To prevent deployment of naval forces into western
deploy to the western Pacific. Increasingly, Chinas Pacific waters, PLA planners are focused on
area denial/anti-access forces overlap, providing targeting surface ships at long ranges. Analyses of
multiple layers of offensive systems, utilizing the current and projected force structure improvements
sea, air, and space. suggest that in the near term, China is seeking the
capacity to hold surface ships at risk through a
PLA planners have observed the primacy of layered defense that reaches out to the second
precision strike in modern warfare and are island chain (i.e., the islands extending south and
investing in offensive and defensive elements of east from Japan, to and beyond Guam in the western
this emerging regime. China is pursuing improved Pacific Ocean). One area of apparent investment
ISR assets ranging from unmanned aerial vehicles, emphasis involves a combination of medium-
satellite constellations, and informatized special range ballistic missiles, C4ISR for geo-location of
operations forces which could provide targeting targets, and onboard guidance systems for terminal
data for long-range precision strikes when linked homing to strike surface ships on the high seas or
with robust communications. The PLA envisions their onshore support infrastructure. This capability
precision strike capabilities sufficient to hold at risk would have particular significance, owing to the
Figure 2. The First and Second Island Chains. PRC military theorists conceive of two island chains
as forming a geographic basis for Chinas maritime defensive perimeter.

preemptive and coercive options it would provide operations forces, and computer network attacks.
China in a regional crisis. Strike aircraft, enabled by aerial refueling, could
engage distant targets using air-launched cruise
Chinese military analysts have also concluded missiles equipped with a variety of terminal-homing
that logistics and mobilization are potential warheads.
vulnerabilities in modern warfare, given the
heavy requirements for precisely coordinated Advanced mines, submarines, maritime strike
transportation, communications, and logistics aircraft, and modern surface combatants equipped
networks. To threaten in-theater bases and logistics with advanced ASCMs would provide a supporting
points, China could employ its theater ballistic layer of defense for its long-range anti-access
missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, special systems. Acquisition of the KILO, SONG,
Building Capacity for Conventional Precision Strike

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) (< 1000 km). According to DIA estimates, as of October 2006
the PLA had roughly 900 SRBMs and is increasing its inventory at a rate of more than 100 missiles
per year. The PLAs first-generation SRBMs do not possess true precision strike capability, but later
generations have greater ranges and improved accuracy.
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) (1000-3000 km). The PLA is acquiring conventional
MRBMs, apparently to increase the range to which it can conduct precision strikes, to include their
possible use in targeting naval ships operating far from Chinas shores.
Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs). China is developing LACMs for stand-off, precision strike
capability against hard-targets. First- and second-generation LACMs may be deployed in the near future.
Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASMs). China is believed to have a small number of tactical ASMs and
precision-guided munitions, including all-weather, satellite-guided and laser-guided bombs, and is
pursuing foreign and domestic acquisitions to improve airborne anti-ship capabilities.
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs). PLA Navy has or is acquiring nearly a dozen varieties of ASCMs,
from the 1950s-era CSS-N-2/STYX to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22/SUNBURN and SS-N-
27B/SIZZLER. The pace of indigenous ASCM research, development and production and of foreign
procurement has accelerated over the past decade.
Anti-Radiation Weapons. The PLA has imported Israeli-made HARPY UCAVs and Russian-made anti-
radiation missiles, and is developing an anti-radiation missile based on the Russian Kh-31P (AS-17)
known domestically as the YJ-91.
Artillery-Delivered High Precision Munitions. The PLA is deploying the A-100 300 mm multiple rocket
launcher (MRL) (100+ km range) and developing the WS-2 400 mm MRL (200 km range). Additional
munitions are being fielded or are under development.

SHANG, and YUAN-class submarines illustrates sometimes termed an information blockade.
the importance the PLA places on undersea warfare. China is pursuing this ability by improving
The purchase of SOVREMENNYY II-class DDGs information and operational security, developing
and indigenous production of the LUYANG I/ electronic warfare and information warfare
LUYANG II DDGs equipped with long-range capabilities, and denial and deception. Chinas
ASCM and SAM systems demonstrate a continuing concept of an information blockade likely
emphasis on improving anti-surface warfare, extends beyond the strictly military realm to
combined with mobile, wide-area air control. include other elements of state power. Secrecy,
information controls (including internet security),
PLA air defense has shifted from point defense of and propaganda remain hallmarks of CCP rule.
key military, industrial, and political targets to a new
Joint Anti-Air Raid Campaign based on a modern, In 2006, several independent researchers used a
integrated air defense system and offensive and U.S.-based commercial imagery service providers
defensive counter-air operations. These operations archive of overhead imagery to identify several
extend beyond the defense of Chinese airspace Chinese military-related facilities including a
to include strikes against an adversarys bases submarine base, a facility that appeared to replicate
(including aircraft carriers) and logistics to degrade a contested portion of the Sino-Indian border, and a
the adversarys ability to conduct air operations. mock Taiwan airfield. Shortly after the publication
of these studies, Chinese state-run media in August
The air defense component of anti-access/area- 2006 claimed that foreign map makers had illegally
denial includes SAMs such as the SA-10, SA-20, surveyed Chinese territory and threatened Chinas
HQ-9, HQ-15, and extended-range C2 suites such as security. The article referenced Chinas 2002
the S-300PMU2. Beijing will also use Russian-built Surveying and Mapping Law and quoted the PRC
and domestic fourth-generation aircraft (e.g., Su-27 State Bureau of Survey and Mapping as stating that
and Su-30 FLANKER variants, and the indigenous foreigners who illegally survey, gather and publish
F-10). The PLA Navy would employ recently geographical information on China will be severely
acquired Russian Su-30MK2 fighters, armed with punished. This sequence of events may indicate
AS-17/Kh-31A anti-ship missiles. The acquisition that China is attempting to lay the groundwork to
of refueling aircraft, including the Russian IL- extend the concept of the information blockade
78/MIDAS and the indigenously developed B-6U into space.
refueling aircraft, will extend operational ranges for
PLAAF and PLA Navy strike aircraft armed with Strategic Capabilities
precision munitions, thereby increasing the threat
to surface and air forces distant from Chinas coast. Nuclear Deterrence. China is qualitatively and
Additionally, acquisition of UAVs and UCAVs, quantitatively improving its legacy strategic
including the Israeli HARPY, expands Chinas forces. These presently consist of approximately
options for long-range reconnaissance and strike. 20 silo-based, liquid-fueled CSS-4 ICBMs (which
constitute its primary nuclear means of holding
A final element of an emerging area denial/anti continental U.S. targets at risk), approximately
access strategy includes the electromagnetic, or 20 liquid-fueled, limited range CSS-3 ICBMs,
information, sphere. PLA authors often cite the between 14-18 liquid-fueled CSS-2 intermediate
need in modern warfare to control information, range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and upwards of
50 CSS-5 road mobile, solid-fueled medium range the survivability and flexibility of Chinas nuclear
ballistic missiles (MRBMs) (for regional deterrence forces.
missions), and JL-1 SLBMs on the XIA-class
SSBN. Chinas 2006 Defense White Paper states that: 1)
the purpose Chinas nuclear force is to deter other
By 2010, Chinas strategic nuclear forces will countries from using or threatening to use nuclear
likely comprise a combination of enhanced CSS-4s; weapons against China; 2) China upholds the
CSS-3s; CSS-5s; solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-31s principles of counterattack in self-defense and
(which achieved initial threat availability in 2006, limited development of nuclear weapons; and, 3)
and will likely achieve operational status in the China has never entered into and will never enter
near future, if it has not already done so), and DF- into a nuclear arms race with any other country.
31A ICBMs (expected IOC in 2007); and the JL-1 The paper reiterated Chinas commitment to
and JL-2 SLBMs (expected IOC between 2007- a declaratory policy of no first use of nuclear
10). The addition of the DF-31 family of missiles weapons at any time and under any circumstances,
and the JL-2 and JIN-class SSBNs will give China and states China unconditionally undertakes
a more survivable and flexible nuclear force. New not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
air- and ground-launched cruise missiles that could against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear
perform nuclear missions will similarly improve weapon-free zones. Doctrinal materials suggest
Figure 3. Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles. China currently is capable of targeting its nuclear forces
throughout the region and most of the world, including the continental United States. Newer systems, such as the DF-31, DF-31A,
and JL-2, will give China a more survivable nuclear force.

additional missions for Chinas nuclear forces necessary, he said, to implement the principle
include deterrence of conventional attacks against of independent innovations, leaps in key areas .
the Chinese mainland, reinforcing Chinas great . . carry out major state science and technology
power status, and increasing its freedom of action special projects in manned space flights and a lunar
by limiting the extent to which others can coerce probe, and achieve new breakthroughs in research
China. Chinas assertion of a nuclear no first use and development [of] aerospace equipment and . . .
policy, therefore, is ambiguous. This ambiguity space technology.
is compounded with the juxtaposition of the no
first use declaration and the stated commitment Reconnaissance. China is deploying advanced
to adhere to the principle of counter attack in self imagery, reconnaissance, and Earth resource
defense. systems with military applications. Examples
include the CBERS-1 and -2 satellites and the
Periodic military and civilian academic debates Huanjing disaster/environmental monitoring satellite
over the future of Chinas nuclear doctrine have constellation. China is planning eleven satellites in
questioned whether or not a no first use policy the Huanjing program capable of visible, infrared,
supports or detracts from Chinas deterrent, and multi-spectral, and synthetic aperture radar imaging.
whether or not no first use should remain in place. In the next decade, Beijing most likely will field
The Chinese government has provided public and radar, ocean surveillance, and high-resolution
private assurances that its no first use policy has photoreconnaissance satellites. In the interim,
not and will not change. Nevertheless, coupled China probably will rely on commercial satellite
with the debates themselves, the introduction of imagery (e.g., SPOT, LANDSAT, RADARSAT, and
more capable and survivable nuclear systems in Ikonos) to supplement existing coverage.
greater numbers suggest Beijing may be exploring
the implications of Chinas evolving force structure, Navigation and Timing. China has launched four
and the new options that force structure may BeiDou satellites with an accuracy of 20 meters
provide. over China and surrounding areas. China also uses
GPS and GLONASS navigation satellite systems,
Space and Counterspace. Chinas space activities and has invested in the EUs Galileo navigation
and capabilities, including anti-satellite programs, system.
have significant implications for anti-access/area
denial in Taiwan Strait contingencies and beyond. Manned Program. In October 2005, China
China further views the development of space and completed its second manned space mission and
counter-space capabilities as bolstering national Chinese astronauts conducted their first experiments
prestige and, like nuclear weapons, demonstrating in space. Press reports indicate China will perform
the attributes of a world power. its first space walk in 2007-2008, and rendezvous
and docking in 2009-2012. Chinas goal is to have
China has accorded space a high priority for a manned space station by 2020.
investment. Premier Wen Jiabao, marking the
50th anniversary of Chinas aerospace industry Communications. China uses foreign providers, like
in October 2006, stated that Chinas aerospace INTELSAT and INMARSAT, for communications,
industry is standing at a new starting point and but is expanding indigenous capabilities in this
facing a new situation and tasks. It is now area. China may be developing a system of data
relay satellites to support global coverage, and Chinas nuclear arsenal has long provided Beijing
has reportedly acquired mobile data reception with an inherent ASAT capability. However,
equipment that could support more rapid data in recent years Beijing has pursued a robust,
transmission to deployed military forces and units. multidimensional counterspace program. UHF-band
satellite communications jammers acquired from
Small Satellites. Since 2000, China has launched Ukraine in the late 1990s and probable indigenous
a number of small satellites, including an systems give China today the capacity to jam
oceanographic research, imagery, and environmental common satellite communications bands and GPS
research satellites. China has also established receivers. In addition to the direct ascent ASAT
dedicated small satellite design and production program demonstrated in January 2007, China is
facilities. China is developing microsatellites also developing other technologies and concepts
weighing less than 100 kilograms for remote for kinetic (hit-to-kill) weapons and directed-energy
sensing, and networks of imagery and radar (e.g., lasers and radio frequency) weapons for ASAT
satellites. These developments could allow for a missions. Citing the requirements of its manned and
rapid reconstitution or expansion of Chinas satellite lunar space programs, China is improving its ability
force in the event of any disruption in coverage. to track and identify satellites a prerequisite for
effective, precise physical attacks.
Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons. In January
2007, China successfully tested a direct-ascent Information Warfare. There has been much
ASAT missile against a Chinese weather satellite, writing on information warfare among Chinas
demonstrating its ability to attack satellites operating military thinkers, who indicate a strong conceptual
in low-Earth orbit. The direct ascent ASAT system understanding of its methods and uses. For
is one component of a multi-dimensional program example, a November 2006 Liberation Army Daily
to generate the capability to deny others access to commentator argued:
outer space.
[The] mechanism to get the upper hand
In a PLA National Defense University book, Joint of the enemy in a war under conditions of
Space War Campaigns (2005), author Colonel Yuan informatization finds prominent expression in
Zelu writes: whether or not we are capable of using various
means to obtain information and of ensuring
[The] goal of a space shock and awe strike is the effective circulation of information;
[to] deter the enemy, not to provoke the enemy whether or not we are capable of making full
into combat. For this reason, the objectives use of the permeability, sharable property,
selected for strike must be few and precise and connection of information to realize the
. . .[for example] on important information organic merging of materials, energy, and
sources, command and control centers, information to form a combined fighting
communications hubs, and other objectives. strength; [and,] whether or not we are
This will shake the structure of the opponents capable of applying effective means to weaken
operational system of organization and will the enemy sides information superiority and
create huge psychological impact on the lower the operational efficiency of enemy
opponents policymakers. information equipment.

The PLA is investing in electronic countermeasures, provide China with a force capable of prosecuting a
defenses against electronic attack (e.g., electronic range of military operations in Asia well beyond
and infrared decoys, angle reflectors, and false Taiwan. Given the apparent absence of direct
target generators), and computer network operations threats from other nations, the purposes to which
(CNO). Chinas CNO concepts include computer Chinas current and future military power will be
network attack, computer network defense, and applied remain unknown. It is certain, however,
computer network exploitation. The PLA sees that these capabilities will increase Beijings options
CNO as critical to achieving electromagnetic for military coercion to press diplomatic advantage,
dominance early in a conflict. Although there is advance interests, or resolve disputes.
no evidence of a formal Chinese CNO doctrine,
PLA theorists have coined the term Integrated The principal focus of, and driver for, Chinas
Network Electronic Warfare to prescribe the use military modernization in the near term appears
of electronic warfare, CNO, and kinetic strikes to to remain preparing for potential conflict in the
disrupt battlefield network information systems. Taiwan Strait. However, official documents and
the writings of Chinese military strategists suggest
The PLA has established information warfare Beijing is increasingly surveying the strategic
units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer landscape beyond Taiwan. Some Chinese analysts
systems and networks, and tactics and measures to have explored the geopolitical value of Taiwan in
protect friendly computer systems and networks. In extending Chinas maritime defensive perimeter
2005, the PLA began to incorporate offensive CNO and improving its ability to influence regional sea
into its exercises, primarily in first strikes against lines of communication. For example, the PLA
enemy networks. Academy of Military Science text, Science of
Military Strategy (2000), states:
Power Projection Modernization Beyond
Taiwan If Taiwan should be alienated from the
mainland, not only [would] our natural
In a speech at the March 2006 National Peoples maritime defense system lose its depth,
Congress, PLA Chief of the General Staff Liang opening a sea gateway to outside forces, but
Guanglie stated that one must attend to the also a large area of water territory and rich
effective implementation of the historical mission resources of ocean resources would fall into
of our forces at this new stage in this new century. . the hands of others. . . .[O]ur line of foreign
. preparations for a multitude of military hostilities trade and transportation which is vital to
must be done in concrete manner, [and] . . . Chinas opening up and economic development
competence in tackling multiple security threats and will be exposed to the surveillance and threats
accomplishing a diverse range of military missions of separatists and enemy forces, and China
must be stepped up. will forever be locked to the west of the first
chain of islands in the West Pacific.
Consistent with this guidance, China continues to
invest in military programs designed to improve Chinas 2006 Defense White Paper similarly raises
extended-range power projection. Current trends concerns about resources and transportation links
in Chinas military capabilities are a major factor when it states that security issues related to energy,
in changing East Asian military balances, and could resources, finance, information, and international
shipping routes are mounting. The related desire variety of non-Taiwan contingencies. Airborne
to protect energy investments in Central Asia early warning and control and aerial-refueling
and could also provide an incentive for military programs will permit extended air operations into
investment or intervention if instability surfaces in the South China Sea. Advanced destroyers and
the region. Disagreements that remain with Japan submarines reflect Beijings desire to protect and
over maritime claims and with several Southeast advance its maritime interests. Expeditionary
Asian claimants to all or parts of the Spratly Islands forces (three airborne divisions, two amphibious
in the South China Sea could lead to renewed infantry divisions, two marine brigades, about seven
tensions in these areas. Instability on the Korean special operations groups, and one regimental-size
Peninsula likewise could produce a regional crisis reconnaissance element in the Second Artillery) are
in which Beijing would face a choice between a improving with the introduction of new equipment,
diplomatic or a military response. better unit-level tactics, and greater coordination of
joint operations. Over the long term, improvements
Analysis of Chinas weapons acquisitions also in Chinas C4ISR, including space-based and
suggests China is looking beyond Taiwan as it over-the-horizon sensors, could enable Beijing to
builds its force. For example, new missile units identify, track and target military activities deep
outfitted with conventional theater-range missiles into the western Pacific Ocean.
at various locations in China could be used in a
Figure 4. Maximum Ranges for Chinas Conventional SRBM Force. China currently is capable of deploying ballistic missile
forces to support a variety of regional contingencies.

Finally, analysis of PLA training activities provides extremism, and national separatism, including:
an additional indication that the PLA is exploring
contingencies other than Taiwan. For example, the Tianshan-1 2006, a bilateral exercise with
July-August 2006 North Sword-07, a simulated, Kazakhstan in August 2006, which took place
opposing-forces exercise, involved for the first time in Almaty, Kazakhstan and Yining, China
two fully equipped PLA divisions with the support improved cooperation between law enforcement
of the air force, Second Artillery Corps, and the and security departments.
Peoples Armed Police. The exercise focused on
Cooperation 2006, a bilateral exercise with
long-distance maneuver, intelligence acquisition,
Tajikistan in September 2006, featured 150 troops
and mobile counterattack operations.
from China and 300 troops from Tajikistan in a
scenario for coordinated responses to terrorist
China in 2006 also conducted a series of exercises
attacks.
with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
with the stated objective of fighting the three
evil forces of international terrorism, religious
Status of Aircraft Carrier Developments

In October 2006, Lieutenant General Wang Zhiyuan, vice chairman of the Science and Technology
Commission of the PLAs General Armament Department stated that the Chinese army will study how to
manufacture aircraft carriers so that we can develop our own . . . . [A]ircraft carriers are indispensable if
we want to protect our interests in oceans.
China first began to discuss developing an indigenous aircraft carrier in the late 1970s. In 1985, China
purchased the Australian carrier the HMAS Melbourne. Although the hull was scrapped, Chinese
technicians studied the ship and built a replica of its flight deck for pilot training. China purchased two
former Soviet carriers the Minsk in 1998 and the Kiev in 2000. Neither carrier was made operational;
instead, they were used as floating military theme parks. Nevertheless, both provided design information
to PLA Navy engineers.
In 1998 China purchased the ex-Varyag, a Kuznetsov-class Soviet carrier that was only 70 percent
complete at the time of the Soviet Unions collapse. Recent deck refurbishment, electrical work, fresh
hull paint with PLA Navy markings, and expressed interest in Russias Su-33 fighter has re-kindled debate
about a Chinese carrier fleet. The PLAs ultimate intentions for the Varyag remain unclear, but a number
of possibilities exist: turning it into an operational aircraft carrier, a training or transitional platform, or a
floating theme park its originally-stated purpose.
Regardless of Beijings final objective for the ex-Varyag, PLA Navy study of the ships structural design
could eventually assist China in creating its own carrier program. Lieutenant General Wang stated that,
we cannot establish a real naval force of aircraft carriers within three or five years. Some analysts in
and out of government predict that China could have an operational carrier by the end of the 12th Five-
Year Plan (2011-2015); others assess the earliest it could deploy an operational aircraft carrier is 2020 or beyond.

Chapter Five
Resources for Force Modernization
. . . uphold the scientific development concept as the important guiding principle in strengthening
national defense and army building; push national defense and army building forward in a faster and
better way . . .
Hu Jintao
Overview continues a trend of annual budget increases that

exceed significantly growth of the overall economy.
Sources for PLA modernization include domestic
defense expenditures, indigenous defense industrial Analysis of PRC budget data and International
developments, and foreign technology acquisition Monetary Fund (IMF) GDP data for the period
all of which are driven by the performance of the of 1996 to 2006 shows average annual defense
economy. Chinas economic growth has enabled budget growth of 11.8 percent (inflation adjusted)
Beijing to invest ever increasing resources in its compared with average annual GDP growth of
defense sector over the past 15 years. 9.2 percent (inflation adjusted). Of note, Chinas
2006 Defense White Paper contains a similar
As its domestic defense industry matures, China analysis in stating that between 1990 and 2005 the
is acquiring foreign weapons and technology, defense budget grew by an average of 9.6 percent
primarily from Russia, to fill near-term capability between, while Chinas GDP over the same period
gaps. In the long term, however, Beijing seeks grew in constant prices an average of 9.7 percent
a wholly indigenous defense industrial sector. yearly, according to the IMF. The 1996-2006 data
Chinas defense industries benefit from foreign is a more useful measure, however, as it covers
direct investment and joint ventures in the civilian the period following the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan
sector, technical knowledge and expertise of Strait crises and incorporates the 9th and 10th Five
students returned from abroad, and state-sponsored Year Plan periods (1996-2000 and 2001-2005,
industrial espionage. The EU arms embargo not respectively) in which the post-Persian Gulf War re-
only remains an important symbolic and moral invigoration of the PLA modernization drive would
restraint on EU countries military interactions with be fully reflected.
the PLA, but a lifting of the embargo would expand
Chinas access to military and dual-use technology Substantial growth in Chinas defense budget aside,
to improve current weapon systems and develop Chinas published defense budget does not include
indigenous capabilities to produce future systems. large categories of expenditure, including expenses
for strategic forces, foreign acquisitions, military-
Military Expenditure Trends related research and development, and Chinas
paramilitary forces. The Defense Intelligence
On March 4, 2007, Beijing announced a 17.8 Agency (DIA) estimates Chinas total military-
percent increase in its military budget, bringing related spending for 2007 could be as much as $85
its official defense budget figure for 2007 to billion to $125 billion.
approximately $45 billion. This development
Accurately estimating Chinese military expenditures in defense spending. To date, Beijing has provided
is a difficult process due to the lack of accounting only highly aggregated military budget data in its
transparency and Chinas failure to comply with Defense White Papers. Moreover, some Chinese
international standards for reporting military officials remain opposed to candid dialogue on
expenditures and funding. As a result, outside the subject. In response to an August 2006 press
estimates of Chinas military spending vary widely. question on transparency in PLA budgeting, the
For example, select government and independent PRCs UN Ambassador in Geneva, Sha Zukang,
calculations for the PLAs expenditures for 2003 asserted bluntly that its better for the U.S. to shut
the most recent year for which a significant up and keep quiet about it.
number of institutions published estimates ranged
from $30.6 billion to $141 billion based on official Chinas Advancing Defense Industries
exchange rates or purchasing power parity (PPP)
models. Chinas declared budget in that year, in Defense industry modernization accelerated in the
contrast, was $22.3 billion. mid-1990s based on reforms to rationalize military
procurement and increase innovation among Chinas
The United States and other countries have, for state-owned defense companies. These reforms
many years, urged China to increase transparency have enabled the development and production of
Figure 5. Comparison of Outside Estimates of PRC Military Spending. Government and research institutes have developed
various but often incompatible methods to account for the PLAs off-budget expenditures and sources of income, and other factors.
Two different exchange rate models official exchange rate and purchasing power parity indices further complicate estimates of
Chinas defense spending. Estimates above are in 2003 U.S. dollars based on official exchange rates unless otherwise indicated.

Figure 6. Chinese Defense Budget and Estimates of Total Defense-Related Expenditures. The graphic depicts China official
defense budget since 1994, and associated Defense Intelligence Agency estimates of actual defense expenditure. All figures in 2006
US Dollars.
select weapon systems, such as missiles, fighter jets, an additional 100 satellites by 2020.
and warships, approaching performance parameters
comparable to Western systems. Shipbuilding Sector. In the last five years,
Chinas shipyard expansions, mainly in the
Missile and Space Industry. China develops commercial container ship market, have increased
and produces a broad range of ballistic, cruise, Chinas overall shipbuilding capacity. Dual-
and surface-to-air missiles. Improved production purpose (military/civilian) shipyards are capable
capabilities will enable China to more efficiently of supporting construction of major combatants,
address force modernization goals by enhancing large amphibious ships, and supertankers. China
production of existing missile designs and is capable of serial production of modern diesel-
supporting the development of new cruise and electric submarines and is moving forward with
ballistic missiles with longer ranges and precision new nuclear submarines. China continues to rely
strike capabilities. Chinas space launch vehicle on foreign suppliers for propulsion units, and to a
industry is expanding to support the national lesser degree for weapons systems, sensors, and
emphasis on satellite launch capability and the other advanced electronics- and materials-based
manned space program. China hopes to have more ship-borne technologies.
than 100 satellites in orbit by 2010, and to launch
Aircraft Production. Chinas commercial and Foreign Weapons and Technology Acquisition
military aviation industry has advanced from
producing direct copies of early Soviet models In 2005, China signed arms agreements with
to developing and producing indigenous aircraft. foreign suppliers worth almost $2.8 billion,
China is producing improved versions of older making it the third largest arms recipient among
aircraft as well as modern fourth generation fighters, developing countries. Russia remains Chinas
and is developing a fifth generation combat aircraft. primary weapons and materiel provider, selling
China continues to seek Russian and other foreign it advanced fighter aircraft, missile systems,
assistance in areas such as engines and avionics. submarines, and destroyers. China is currently
Chinas commercial aircraft industry has imported negotiating the purchase of additional surface-to-
high-precision and technologically advanced air missiles, combat aircraft, aircraft engines, and
machine tools, electronics, and other components. assault and transport helicopters. China relies on
This dual-use technology can also be used in the Russian components for several of its production
production of military aircraft. programs and has purchased production rights to
Russian weapon designs. Russia cooperates with
Beijing is decreasing reliance on foreign assistance, China on technical, design, and material support for
improving business practices, streamlining numerous weapons and space systems; for example
bureaucracy, shortening development timelines, Chinas Shenzhou manned space module is based
boosting quality control, and increasing production on the Russian Soyuz capsule.
capacity for military orders. As part of these efforts,
Chinas 11th Five-Year Plan aims to strengthen the Israel has also historically been a supplier of
defense-related scientific, technical, and industrial advanced military technology to China. The
bases. These defense-related industries will Israelis transferred HARPY UCAVs to China in
continue to reap benefits from: 2001 and conducted maintenance on HARPY
parts during 2003-2004. In 2005, Israel began to
Transfers of technology and skills from foreign improve government oversight of exports to China
joint ventures. by strengthening controls of military exports,
establishing controls on dual-use exports, and
Increased government funding for research,
increasing the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
development, and procurement.
in export-related decisions. In January 2007, Israel
Legal and illegal acquisition of foreign military implemented new dual-use export controls, based
and dual-use technology. on the Wassenaar Arrangement. As of February
2007, legislation pending in the Knesset would
Increased partnerships with academic institutions, adopt Wassenaar controls on munitions list exports.
which improve student recruitment and technical It remains unclear to what extent the new export
training for existing staff. controls will prevent additional sensitive military-
related transfers to Beijing in the future.
Chinas reverse brain drain. Many of Chinas
new generation of scientists, engineers, and
Despite their history of strong arms trade
managers are returning to China after receiving
relationships with China, Russia and Israel have
training and gaining experience abroad.
usually refrained from transferring their most
sophisticated weapons systems to China. To
diversify its arms supplier base and acquire systems, advanced space technology, radar systems,
advanced technology, the PRC is looking to early-warning aircraft, submarine technology, and
alternative suppliers such as Europe. Since 2003 advanced electronics for precision-guided weapons
China has been pressuring EU states to lift the would advance PLA operational capabilities.
embargo on lethal military sales to China that
the EU imposed in response to the PRCs 1989 China continues a systematic effort to obtain
crackdown on Tiananmen Square demonstrators. In from abroad through legal and illegal commercial
their Joint Statement following the 2004 EU-China transactions dual-use and military technologies.
Summit, European leaders committed to work Many dual-use technologies, such as software,
towards lifting the embargo, a pledge they repeated integrated circuits, computers, electronics,
in 2005 and 2006. Although the issue officially semiconductors, telecommunications, and
remains on the EU agenda, the current political information security systems, are vital for the PLAs
sentiment among most Member States remains transformation into an information-based, network-
opposed to lifting the embargo in the near future. centric force. Several high profile legal cases
highlight Chinas efforts to obtain sensitive U.S.
Some Member States have advocated eliminating technologies (e.g., missile, imaging, semiconductor,
the embargo in the context of making the EUs and submarine) illegally by targeting well-placed
enhanced Code of Conduct on arms exports scientists and businessmen. U.S. Immigration and
binding; the Code governs arms transfers to third Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials have rated
countries but is currently a voluntary instrument. Chinas aggressive and wide-ranging espionage as
Although some in the EU have argued that ending the leading threat to U.S. technology. Since 2000,
the embargo and instead subjecting exports to ICE has initiated more than 400 investigations
China to the terms of the Code of Conduct would involving the illicit export of U.S. arms and
result in no qualitative or quantitative increases in technologies to China.
Chinas military capabilities, other EU members
remain concerned, as does the United States, that
the provisions of the Code remain inadequate.
Lifting the EU embargo would likely contribute

significantly to the PLAs modernization goals. An
end to the embargo would raise the possibility of
competitive pricing for arms sales to China, giving
Beijing leverage to pressure its existing suppliers
including Russia, Israel, and Ukraine to provide
even more advanced weapons and favorable terms
of sale. Increased military-to-military exchanges
consequent to arms sales resulting from lifting the
embargo could also give the PLA access to critical
military management practices, operational doctrine,
and training. Finally, the transfer of sophisticated
military and dual-use technologies that China most
likely desires from the EU C4ISR components and
Chapter Six
Force Modernization and Security in the Taiwan Strait
The struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for Taiwan independence and their activities
remains a hard one. By pursuing a radical policy for Taiwan independence, the Taiwan authorities
aim at creating de jure independence through constitutional reform, thus still posing a grave threat to
Chinas sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Overview Department of Defense, through the transformation

of U.S. Armed Forces and global force posture
The security situation in the Taiwan Strait is largely realignments, is maintaining the capacity to resist
a function of dynamic interactions among policies any effort by Beijing to resort to force or coercion
and actions taken by the mainland, Taiwan, and to dictate the terms of Taiwans future status.
the United States. Chinas emergence as a global For its part, Taiwan has taken important steps to
economic force, increased diplomatic clout, and improve its joint operations capability, strengthen
improved air, naval, and missile forces strengthen its officer and non-commissioned officer corps,
Beijings position relative to Taipei by increasing build its reserve stocks, and improve crisis response
the mainlands economic leverage over Taiwan, capabilities. Taiwan has bolstered its defensive
fostering Taiwans diplomatic isolation, and capabilities by taking delivery of the final two of
shifting the cross-Strait military balance in the four KIDD-class DDGs in September 2006. These
mainlands favor. Taiwan, meanwhile, has allowed improvements have, on the whole, reinforced
its defense spending to decline in real terms over Taiwans natural defensive advantages in the face of
the past decade, creating an increased urgency Beijings continuing build-up.
for the Taiwan authorities to make the necessary
investments to maintain the islands self-defense However, Taiwan has yet to acquire other major end
capabilities. The U.S. Government has made clear items offered for sale by the United States in 2001,
that it opposes unilateral changes to the status quo namely, Patriot PAC-3 air defense systems, P-3C
by either side of the Taiwan Strait, does not support Orion anti-submarine aircraft, and diesel electric
Taiwan independence, and supports peaceful submarines. These systems would enable Taiwan to
resolution of cross-Strait differences in a manner make necessary improvements to its air and missile
acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan defense and anti-submarine warfare capability. In
Strait. the six years since the offer was made, China has
continued to make significant advances, some
In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act [Public unexpected, in the capability areas these systems
Law 96-8, (1979)], the United States has taken steps are designed to protect against.
to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the
region. In addition to making available to Taiwan Chinas Strategy in the Taiwan Strait
defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, the U.S. Beijing appears prepared to defer unification as long
as it believes trends are advancing toward that goal Although Beijing professes peaceful resolution as its
and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. preferred outcome, the PLAs ongoing deployment
In the near term, Beijings focus is likely one of of short range ballistic missiles, enhanced
preventing Taiwan from moving toward de jure amphibious warfare capabilities, and modern,
independence while continuing to hold out terms long-range anti-air systems opposite Taiwan are
for peaceful resolution under a one country, two reminders of Beijings refusal to renounce the use
systems framework that would provide Taiwan a of force.
degree of autonomy in exchange for its unification
with the mainland. Beijing is pursuing these goals The sustained military threat to Taiwan serves
through a coercive strategy with elements of as an important backdrop to the overall
persuasion that integrates political, economic, campaign of persuasion and coercion. Exercises,
cultural, legal, diplomatic, and military instruments deployments, and media operations all contribute
of power. to an environment of intimidation. For example,
Figure 7. Taiwan Strait SAM coverage. This map depicts notional coverage based on the
range of the Russian-designed S-300PMU2 system equipped with the SA-20 SAM. Actual
coverage would be non-contiguous and dependent upon precise deployment sites.

in a March 2006 speech before military deputies Beijings Courses of Action Against Taiwan
to the National Peoples Congress plenary,
Chinas Minister of National Defense, General The PLAs capabilities to pursue a variety of
Cao Gangchuan, noted that the Taiwan Strait courses of action are improving. In the absence of
situation was still very grim and complicated, and direct insights into PLA contingency planning, some
proclaimed that, all PLA officers and men must analysts hold that Beijing would signal its readiness
enhance their sense of imminent danger as well as to use force imminently in an attempt to menace
their sense of mission and sense of responsibility, Taiwan in accordance with Beijings dictates.
lose no time in making military preparations for Others assess that the likely Chinese course of
military struggle, and resolutely safeguard national action would be designed to create military and
sovereignty and territorial integrity! political pressure toward a rapid resolution on
Beijings terms before the United States or other
The circumstances in which the mainland has countries would have a chance to respond. If a
historically warned it would use force against the quick resolution is not possible, Beijing would seek
island are not fixed and have evolved over time to deter U.S. intervention or, failing that, delay such
in response to Taiwans declarations and actions intervention, defeat it in an asymmetric, limited,
relating to its political status, changes in PLA quick war; or, fight it to a standstill and pursue
capabilities, and Beijings view of other countries a protracted conflict. Rough outlines for these
relations with Taiwan. courses of action are presented below.
These circumstances, or red lines, have included: Limited Force Options. A limited military
a formal declaration of Taiwan independence; campaign could include computer network attacks
undefined moves toward independence; foreign against Taiwans political, military, and economic
intervention in Taiwans internal affairs; indefinite infrastructure to undermine the Taiwan populations
delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue confidence in its leadership. PLA special operations
on unification; Taiwans acquisition of nuclear forces infiltrated into Taiwan could conduct acts of
weapons; and, internal unrest on Taiwan. Article economic, political, and military sabotage. Beijing
8 of the March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states might also employ SRBM, special operations
Beijing would resort to non-peaceful means if forces, and air strikes against air fields, radars,
secessionist forces . . . cause the fact of Taiwans and communications facilities on Taiwan as non-
secession from China, if major incidents entailing war uses of force to push the Taiwan leadership
Taiwans secession occur, or if possibilities for toward accommodation. The apparent belief that
peaceful reunification are exhausted. significant kinetic attacks on Taiwan would pass
below the threshold of war underscores the risk
The ambiguity of these red-lines appears of Beijing making a catastrophic miscalculation
deliberate, allowing Beijing the flexibility to leading to a major unintended military conflict.
determine the nature, timing, and form of its
response. Added to this ambiguity are political Air and Missile Campaign. Surprise SRBM attacks
factors internal to the regime in Beijing that are and precision air strikes against Taiwans air defense
opaque to outsiders. system, including air bases, radar sites, missiles,
space assets, and communications facilities could
support a campaign to degrade Taiwan defenses,
Factors of Deterrence
China is deterred on multiple levels from taking military action against Taiwan. First, China does not
yet possess the military capability to accomplish with confidence its political objectives on the island,
particularly when confronted with the prospect of U.S. intervention. Moreover, an insurgency directed
against the PRC presence could tie up PLA forces for years. A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would
also affect the interests of Japan and other nations in the region in ensuring a peaceful resolution of the
cross-Strait dispute.
Beijings calculus would also have to factor in the potential political and economic repercussions
of military conflict with Taiwan. Chinas leaders recognize that a war could severely retard economic
development. Taiwan is Chinas single largest source of foreign direct investment, and an extended
campaign would wreck Taiwans economic infrastructure, leading to high reconstruction costs.
International sanctions could further damage Beijings economic development. A conflict would also
severely damage the image that Beijing has sought to project in the post-Tiananmen years and would
taint Beijings hosting of the 2008 Olympics, for which Chinas leaders would almost certainly face
boycotts and possibly a loss of the games. A conflict could also trigger domestic unrest on the mainland,
a contingency that Beijing appears to have factored into its planning. Finally, Chinas leaders recognize
that a conflict over Taiwan involving the United States would give rise to a long-term hostile relationship
between the two nations a result that would not be in Chinas interests.
neutralize its military and political leadership, and countervailing international pressure, and risk
rapidly break its will to fight while attempting to military escalation. Such restrictions would have
preclude an effective international response. immediate economic effects, but would take time
to realize decisive political results, diminishing the
Blockade. Beijing could threaten or deploy a naval ultimate effectiveness and inviting international
blockade as a non-war pressure tactic in the pre- reaction.
hostility phase or as a transition to active conflict.
Beijing could declare that ships en route to Taiwan Amphibious Invasion. Publicly available Chinese
ports must stop in mainland ports for inspections writings offer different strategies for an amphibious
prior to transiting on to Taiwan. It could also invasion of Taiwan, the most prominent being the
attempt the equivalent of a blockade by declaring Joint Island Landing Campaign. The Joint Island
exercise or missile closure areas in approaches Landing Campaign envisions a complex operation
and roadsteads to ports to divert merchant traffic, relying on supporting sub-campaigns for logistics,
as occurred during the 1995-96 missile firings and electronic warfare, and air and naval support,
live-fire exercises. Chinese doctrine also includes to break through or circumvent shore defenses,
activities such as air blockades, missile attacks, establish and build a beachhead, and then launch an
and mining or otherwise obstructing harbors and attack to split, seize, and occupy the entire island or
approaches. More traditional blockades would key targets.
have greater impact on Taiwan, but tax PLA
Navy capabilities. Any attempt to limit maritime Amphibious operations are logistics-intensive, and
traffic to and from Taiwan would likely trigger their success depends upon air and sea superiority
in the vicinity of the operation, the rapid build-
up of supplies and sustainment on shore, and
an uninterrupted flow of support thereafter. An
amphibious campaign of the scale outlined in the
Joint Island Landing Campaign would tax the
capabilities of Chinas armed forces and almost
certainly invite international intervention. Add
to these strains the combat attrition of Chinas
forces, and the complex tasks of urban warfare and
counterinsurgency assuming a successful landing
and breakout and an amphibious invasion of
Taiwan would be a significant political and military
risk for Chinas leaders.


APPENDIX
China and Taiwan Forces Data
Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces

China Taiwan
Total Taiwan Strait Area Total
Personnel (Active) 1.4 million 400,000 130,000
Group Armies 18 8 3
Infantry Divisions 25 9 0
Infantry Brigades 33 12 13
Armor Divisions/Brigades 9 4 0
Armor Brigades 11 4 5
Artillery Divisions 3 3 0
Artillery Brigades 15 5 3+
Marine Brigades 2 2 2
Tanks 7,000 2,700 1,800
Artillery Pieces 11,000 3,200 3,200
Note: The PLA active ground forces are organized into Group Armies. Infantry,
armor, and artillery units are organized into a combination of divisions and brigades
deployed throughout the PLAs seven Military Regions (MRs). A significant
portion of these assets are deployed in the Taiwan Strait area, specifically the
Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Jinan military regions. Figures for the Taiwan Strait area
do not include the 15th Airborne Corps and garrison units. In 2004, Taiwan began
transforming motorized rifle and armored infantry brigades to mechanized infantry.
Taiwan has seven Defense Commands, three of which have Group Armies. Each
Army contains an Artillery Command roughly equivalent to a brigade plus.
Figure 8. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces

Figure 9. Major Ground Force Units

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces
China Taiwan
Within range
Aircraft Total Total
of Taiwan
Fighters 1,550 425 330

Bombers 775 275 0
Transport 450 75 40
Note: The PLAAF and PLA Navy have a total of around 2,325 operational combat aircraft:
air defense and multi-role fighters, ground attack aircraft, fighter-bombers, and bombers.
An additional 470 older fighters and bombers are assigned to PLA flight academies or
R&D. The two air arms also possess approximately 450 transports and over 90 surveillance
and reconnaissance aircraft with photographic, surface search, and airborne early warning
sensors. The majority of PLAAF and PLA Navy aircraft are based in the eastern part of the
country. Currently, more than 700 aircraft could conduct combat operations against Taiwan
without refueling.
Figure 10. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces

Figure 11. Major Air Force Units

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces
China Taiwan
East and South Sea
Total Total
Fleets
Destroyers 25 16 4
Frigates 47 40 22
Tank Landing Ships 25 22 12
Medium Landing Ships 25 20 4
Diesel Submarines 53 28 4
Nuclear Submarines 5 0 0
Coastal Patrol (Missile) 41 34 50
Note: The PLA Navy has a large fleet that includes 72 principal combatants, 58 submarines,
some 50 medium and heavy amphibious lift ships, and about 41 coastal missile patrol craft.
In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the East and South Sea Fleets would be expected
to participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The North Sea Fleet would be
responsible primarily for protecting Beijing and the northern coasts, but could provide
mission critical assets to support the other fleets. Taiwan completed delivery of four KIDD-
class DDGs in 2006.
Figure 12. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces

Figure 13. Major Naval Units

Chinas Missile Forces
Chinas Missile Inventory Launchers/
Estimated Range
Missiles
CSS-4 ICBM 20/20 12,900+ km
CSS-3 ICBM 9-13/16-24 5,470+ km
CSS-2 IRBM 6-10/14-18 2,790+ km
CSS-5 MRBM Mod 1/2 34-38/40-50 1,770+ km
JL-1 SLBM 10-14/10-14 1,770+ km
CSS-6 SRBM 70-80/300-350 600 km
CSS-7 SRBM 110-130/575-625 300 km
JL-2 SLBM DEVELOPMENTAL 8,000+ km
INITIAL THREAT
DF-31 ICBM 7,250+ km
AVAILABILITY
DF-31A ICBM DEVELOPMENTAL 11,270+ km
Note: Chinas SRBM force has grown significantly in the past few years. Chinas Second
Artillery maintains at least five operational SRBM brigades; another brigade is deployed with the
PLA ground forces garrisoned in the Nanjing Military Region and a second brigade is forming in
the Guangzhou Military Region. All of these units are deployed to locations near Taiwan.
Figure 14. Chinas Missile Forces
Chinas Space Assets
Inventory Total
Communications Satellites 14
Navigation Satellites 3
Meteorological Satellites 3
Remote Sensing/Imagery Satellites 6
Scientific Satellites 8
Manned Space System 1
Total 35
Note: China seeks to become a world leader in space development and maintain a leading role in
space launch activity. Beijings goal is to place a satellite into orbit within hours upon request.
With increasingly capable satellites, China is becoming competitive in some markets, but is not
yet among the worlds technological leaders.
Figure 15. Chinas Space Assets

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