 Q. A USA-China clash is inevitable?

Discuss
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 Liberalist Framework

 On the question of the future of U.S.-China relations and, more generally, regarding
the future of world politics, liberal optimists believe in the pacifying power of three
interrelated and mutually reinforcing causal mechanisms: economic interdependence,
international insti- tutions, and democratization

 Liberal optimists believe that bilateral economic exchange ests in good relations
between states. The greater the v investment flowing between two countries, the more
group have a strong interest in avoiding conflict - economic exchange between US
and China has increased dramatically since 1970s (china’s market reforms)

 Capital flows have also risen, with U.S. investors pouring significant resources each
year into China.13 As China enters the World Trade Organization (WTO) and opens
its markets even wider to foreign goods and capital, the density of commercial
linkages between the United States and the PRC will increase.14 Economic
interdependence has already helped to create a strong mutual inter- est in peace
between the two Pacific powers. Barring some major disruption, economic forces will
probably continue to draw them together, constraining and damping any tendencies
toward conflict."5

 In addition to their faith in trade as an instrument of peace, liberal optimists place

great store in the role of international institutions of diff kinds. These can help to
improve communication between states, reducing uncertainty about intentions and
increasing the capacity of governments to make credible binding commitments to one
another - l optimists note that since the end of the Cold War there has been a
proliferation of regional Asia. Included among these are APEC (the Asia-Pacific
Economic cooperation forum); the ARF (the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian
Nations] Regional Forum); ASEAN + 3; the East Asia Summit; an expanding
network of bilateral military to military talks - Over the course of the last decade,
China has also sought entry into several important global institutions, including the
WTO (which it entered in 2001) and the nuclear nonproliferation regime (which it
joined in 1996). In addition, it has begun to play a more active and prominent role in
the United Nations.  The growth of international institutions in Asia and the
expansion of both U.S. and Chinese participation in them are drawing the United
States and the PRC into a thickening web of ties that liberal optimists believe will
promote contact, communication and, over time, greater mutual understanding and
even trust, or at the very least, a reduced likelihood of gross misperception. Aside
from whatever direct effects it may have on bilateral relations with the United States,
China's increasing participation in international institutions should also give it a
growing, albeit more diffuse, stake in the stability and continuity of the existing
global order. The desire of China's leaders to con- tinue to enjoy the benefits of
membership in that order should make them less likely to take steps that would
threaten the status quo. This, in turn, should reduce the probability that the PRC will
 act in ways that could bring it into conflict with the United States, which is, after all,
the principal architect, de- fender, and beneficiary of the contemporary international
system.

 Democratization leads to less chances of countries going to war with one another -
China may well under be the process of democratization because of economic reform
and encouragement of human rights

 Since the mid-1990s the presumed links between trade, growth, democracy, and peace
have been staple features of official U.S. rhetoric regarding relations with China.
President Bill Clinton began to make these arguments after aban- doning his initial
flirtation with the idea of linking China's access to the U.S. market to its performance
on human rights issues.2
 China adopted reforms opening up to promote closer exchange w US which improved
normalisation —-> 1979 US finally recognised PRC as the sole legitimate govt of
China and that Taiwan was inalienable part of China
 Both sides want to work together to improve world affairs —-> in GFC 2008 China
lent helping hand to US, financed crumbling US financial market and helped in
stabilising world economy
 China has become increasingly important for US —-> China is US 2nd largest trading
partner, it is largest holder of foreign currency reserves in US dollars, largest foreign
creditor of US, largest holder of US treasury bonds
 China aware of the threat it is imposing on US —> thus Hu Jintao proposed “peaceful
development” & “harmonious world”

 Both also work together on global issues like terrorism, nuclear proliferation, energy
etc, security issues over Taiwan (both oppose change in status quo) and Korean
Peninsula have been worked on together thru cooperation without resulting into a
serious conflict

 REALIST PESSIMISTS

 realists see inescapable laws of nature compelling a recurrent struggle for power and
survival

 In the absence of any higher author- ity to resolve disputes and impose order, peace
has usually proved fleeting and conflict has been the norm. Under conditions of
anarchy, it is the material power and, in particular, the military strength of the various
units in an inter- national system that has typically been decisive in shaping the
patterns of rela- tions among them

 the single most important feature of the PRC t rising power. Everything else,
including the likely character of the relationship, follows from this fact. Taking
aggregate economic capa rough surrogate for overall national power, it is apparent
that Chin has been extraordinarily rapid - d uncertainties, some expert culated that
China's economy could overtake that of the United Stat as 2015.27 The combination
of the speed and the magnitude of China in recent decades appears to be
unprecedented
• As was true of the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so too
is China's rapidly growing economy bringing expanding mil- itary capabilities in its train.
A fast-growing GNP has made it comparatively easy for the PRC to sustain a large and
expanding military effort and, in recent years, China's spending on arms and military
equipment has grown at an impressive pace - America’s military wins since 1991 and
technologising military also threaten China, but china continues to expand militarily in the
South China Sea which is certainly not liked by US (DESTINED FOR WAR)
• As a state's capabili- ties grow, its leaders tend to define their interests more
expansively and to seek a greater degree of influence over what is going on around
them. Rising powers seek not only to secure their frontiers but to reach out beyond
them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials, and transportation routes; to
protect their citizens far from home, defend their foreign friends and allies, and
promulgate their values; and, in general, to have what they consider to be their
legitimate say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world.  china’s claim
over South China sea, and Taiwan, also made ASEAN agreements etc to state that
Asia must stand for itself
• recognizing the growing threat to its position, a dominant power (or coalition of status
quo powers) may attempt to use force preventively to destroy a rising state before it
can achieve its full potential - US support for Taiwan against China, also US made
some agreements in South Asia in which China was left out
• China, a state that has for so long been humiliated (Opium Wars etc) it’s nationalism
is heightened and it will want to create a sphere of influence (which it has)
• SECURITY DILEMMA - As regards Taiwan, China's goal may be only to preven
sliding toward independence. The PRC's leaders may be p live with the status quo
indefinitely, but they may believe sue periodic threats to prevent Taiwan from
breaking free may be only to prevent forceful reunification. But China's t military
buildup may increase fears that Beijing will event achieving its objectives through the
use of force. To mainta ington may then feel compelled to increase military assista
take other measures designed to make it appear more likely States would intervene if
Taiwan were attacked. But the certainly make the PRC more fearful of a Taiwanese
bolt f which will cause Beijing to further intensify its military effort rhetoric
• China's aim in deploying large numbers of theater ballistic missiles may be primarily
to deter Taiwan from declaring independence. But those deployments inevitably
appear threatening not only to Taiwan but also to Japan, the United States, and others
in the region. Conversely, the U.S. aim in moving toward deployment of some kind of
theater missile defense (TMD) system may be to provide a measure of protection to
U.S. friends and allies and to its bases and forces in the Western Pacific. But the
possibility of such a deployment is obviously deeply threatening to the Chinese, who
see it as undermining their ability to prevent unfavorable regional developments,
especially if a U.S.- orchestrated TMD system is extended to include Taiwan.
Beijing's concerns about TMD will be further heightened by the deployment of a U.S.
national missile defense system, which the Chinese could see as reducing their ability
to deter an attack on their own territory. The Chinese response to these developments
is likely to include steps to augment both their theater- and intercontinental-range
strike forces, which will tend to heighten U.S. anxieties about their intentions.44U.S.
government officials see regional alliances as defensive bulwarks of sta- bility and
bend over backward to disclaim any intention of encircling or con- taining China. Not
surprisingly, however, Chinese strategists tend to see U.S. behavior in a less benign
light. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been busy trying to
 strengthen and solidify its ties to its traditional re- gional allies (including Japan,
South Korea, and Australia) in large part out of concern over the growth of Chinese
power. Especially since the latter part of the 1990s, the United States has also been
working to expand its network of alliances and quasi alliances in Southeast, South,
and Central Asia. The September 11 terrorist attacks have only intensified this trend.
Whatever U.S. spokespeople may say, Chinese observers are likely to view much of
this as directed towards China. And China’s attempts to improve relations with USSR
or central Asian republics will be seen as hostile by US
• US always supicious of China’s intentions and the challenges it poses economically,
politically, military —-> while China believes US will overturn its communist rule, blame
China for poor human rights and intervene in internal affairs like Tibet & Taiwan
• But with China’s embracing of market economy, free trade and globalisation US is on the
defensive —> protectionist sentiments —-> fear of losing US manufacturing jobs to China
has provoked intense lobbying against Chine made products by many US trade unions and
domestic producers —-> accusations concerning china’s labor rights/human rights
violations —-> many camps in US now want to minimise economic/military threats from
China —-> US asked china to appreciate its currency, anti-dumping investigations & trade
sanctions against China have grown —-> US been upgrading military and bases in East
Asia
• Taiwan issue will continue to be difficult challenge facing the 2 countries —> US has
maintained One China policy since normalisation but has continued to sell arms to
Taiwan which has led to grievances in China ——> US sees Taiwan as traditional
sphere of influence in Asia and uses it as leverage to deal w china , while China sees
Taiwan as internal affairs and core national interest that should be free from US
interference —-> US fears that over time china can develop a military force that can
discourage American leadership from risking war w china for Taiwan , thus it needs
Taiwan to be democratic to counter rising power of China while China sees US as
barrier to unification
• China is suspicious of US military cooperation in the region and sees US as factor of
hinderance in any kind of resolution in its favour —-> after WW2 US sees the region
as its traditional sphere of influence and sees its military presence as imp to maintain
status quo
• China knows US maintains security circle against China along Asian Pacific rim thru
bilateral military agreements with Japan, South Korea other Asian Pacific countries —->
Chinese see this as US attempt to stop china from rising, many US ppl see China’s military
modernisation as aggressive too ——> mutual suspicion continues
•

 Constructive Optimists

As regards the U.S.-China relationship, optimistic constructivists generally emphasize the

possibility that China's increasing participation in international institutions of various kinds
will lead to shifts in its strategic culture, in the norms of international behavior accepted by
its leaders, and ultimately in their conceptions of national identity. In contrast to liberal
optimists, who stress the role of institutions in altering the narrow cost-benefit calculations of
rational decisionmakers, constructivists believe that repeated interactions can actually change
the underlying beliefs, interests, and mental categories of those who participate in them. Thus
it may be true that some significant fraction of China's rulers are still in the grips of old-
fashioned ideas about the zero-sum character of international relations and about the potential
utility of deception, surprise, and force in resolving interstate disputes. These ideas may
appear to be deeply rooted in traditional Chinese statecraft, as passed down in ancient texts,
taught in military academies, and absorbed through the skin, as it were, by anyone raised in
Chinese culture. But what lain Johnston has referred to as the "parabellum paradigm" can be
softened over time by repeated contacts be- tween Chinese statesmen, scholars, and soldiers
and their less fatalistic foreign counterparts.69 Optimistic constructivists believe that it was
exactly these types of interactions between Soviet and Western scientists and arms control
experts that helped to alter the course of Soviet foreign policy in the 1980s and to bring the
Cold War to a peaceful conclusion.70 A similar process of exter- nally induced intellectual
evolution is certainly possible in China and indeed, in the view of some optimists, it may
already be well under way.

• 3) Constructivist - Chinese leaders have moved towards embrace of liberal values, norms,
institutions in their contact w Western countries since reform and open-door policy —->
shift away from rigidity to flexibility/pragmatism —-> Peaceful development shows china
as status quo power not a threat to it

Constructive Pessimists however say that interaction can actually reinforce old values ;
Ritualized U.S. criticism of the PRC's human rights practices probably reinforces the
impression that the United States seeks to undermine the current Chinese regime. Repeated
instances of what the United States regards as cheating or evasion on agreements intended to
limit the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction give credence to the view
that Chinese and U.S. interests on this important issue do not truly coincide. And despite all
that has been claimed for them, there is no guarantee that repeated contacts between U.S. and
Chinese military officers will build trust or make either side regard the other as less
threatening.77 -

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Thucydide’s trap  Can be seen as similar to realism

• When a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, the resulting structural stress
makes a violent clash the rule —->happened b/w Athens & Sparta, b/w Germany &
Britain, B/w SU and US in 1950s/60s
• China’s economic rise is threatening US
• China has gained military expansion
• Also China created BRICS —> again in which US was left out
• China’s AIIB in response to US rejection to give it more votes at World Bank
• Point of BRI —-> more economic ties and diplomatic ties —-> OBOR and its major aims
—-> once chinas economic market and physical infrastructure have integrated its
neighbours into China’s greater co-prosperity US will become weak —-> its rightful
assumption as maintaining status quo in the region and as a guarding of regional
stability/security will become threatened —-> Xi wants people of Asia to run Asia and
uphold its security
• Chinas claims over South China sea and right over 90% of the territory —-> this will help
it in establishing more military bases, operate aircraft, draft ships —-> will also make it
easier to conduct surveillance of US ships —-> economic dependence on China will also
increase, as it has been —-> US strategic alliances in the region to contain China
• America’s military wins since 1991 and technologising military also threaten China
• US values differ from Chinese Confucian values —> being taken over by a country that
has diff values could be worse as it would sweep away US values/ideas
• US tries to apply its political ideologies around the world —-> goes on to advance the
cause of democracy (Taiwan) —->Chinese suspicious that US would try to convert their
values also
• China has lost Manchuria and Taiwan in the past to the Japanese —-> 1937—> Japanese
occupied much of China thru a brutal campaign (National humiliation) —> Xi wants to
revive nationalism —-> wants china to go thru a 3rd economic revolution and also wants
to reorganise/rebuild china’s military

• Xi’s big plan aims to make china’s economy greater than US, be number one, and
make the party the worthy vanguard of the people (ideology again)
• US-China also stuck between North Korea-South Korea conflict —-> third party —->
2010 incident
• Trade conflict of the 2000s —-> tariff war —> US wants china to devalue its currency and
stop unfair subsidies —->

Why war is not inevitable ;

• Higher authorities can help resolve rivalry without war —-> supranational frameworks like
UN
• States can be embedded in larger economic, political and security institutions that constrain
historically “normal behaviours” —-> US and China economically interdependent on one
another —-> if they hurt the other they will basically be hurting themselves ; America
major market for Chinese products, china second largest for US ; mutually assured
economic destruction
• Preventive intervention —-> US supporting China’s One China policy on Taiwan ;
China’s “peaceful development” —-> US “Accommodate” —-> China become more
patient on Taiwan issue
• MAD —-> US/China both have robust nuclear systems —> war no longer an acceptable
option
• Domestic needs guiding foreign policy —-> for China to sustain its growth it needs to
maintain good relations with US, to maintain living standards for its people
The concerns of power transition7 and Thucydides traps8 are misplaced—not because trade
trumps power, but because the realities of the two are profoundly asymmetric
Moreover, the bilateral relationship between the United States and China is played out in a
stream of grander global changes. Globalization has produced a diffusion of economic
options that makes the formation of Cold War-style camps unlikely, and China is only the
leading case of the continuing rise of middleincome countries.  common interests and
globalization trump the occurance of a full-blown conflict (Brantly Womack)

M. Taylor Fravel

- China’s rise to power is seen through different lenses with the aim to predict whether
its rise will be peaceful or violent

- China’s rise puts forth the idea of a multipolar distribution if power which has not
been witnessed for more than half a century

Mingjiang Li

- Different theories put forth for the possibility of a conflict with US as china’s rise
seems to be a distortion to the unipolar world and US hegemoy

- Such theories have become more prominent in the wake of China becoming an
important player in both international institutions (WTO, UN, BRICS, G-2-) and
regional agreements essentially the BRI, as well as Xi’s plans of a Great China
emerging as a superpower - multilateral institutions can be seen as a shift towards a
multilateral world - this multilateralism is essentially seen through different lens in
the context of a conflict with the US

Nguyen Thi Thuy Hang

- China’s rise is essentially seen through 3 aspects, its rising economic growth, its
military modernization and its increasing soft power influence

Conclude using why conflict is not inevitable aspects  considering those aspects past
conflict and cooperation is likely, however a full blown conflict is not possible. As
Nguyen states that in the face of China’s rise US can opt for cooperation plus conflict ;
with the aim to say that the two should cooperate on matters where they agree on and try
to avoid conflict where there may be a clash such as Asian region.
  Q. What role does BRI play in China’s rise as a great power?
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 it can be argued that China had been positioning itself as a veritable alternative to the
Washington-dominated order, an approach which subsequently acquired the sobriquet of
‘Beijing Consensus.’9 By posing as a provider of alternative development aid, focused on
infrastructure rather than, say, improving good governance, it benefited, and continues to
benefit, from being perceived by developing countries as anti-Western in the same way that
the United States benefited from being seen as anti-colonialist during the Cold War.

The big question is what China’s long-term strategy is, China’s reassertion is frequently cast in a
historical perspective. Until the late Manchu empire, China regarded itself as ‘the Middle Empire’,
one which expected other nations to pay tribute to it, sometimes in the literal sense of the word The
way the Belt and Road Initiative is presently unfolding suggests to many that a reconstitution of the
old tributary order could be China’s long-term objective.

China’s engagement with the outside world is chiefly driven by economic gains (“win- wins” as the
Chinese themselves like to say17) and to increase geopolitical security. These have provided the main
impetus behind the BRI scheme, which was initially focused on areas west of China

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 Chu argues that China advocated a new security concept “in order to undermine the American military
presence in Asia and the U.S.-Japan security alliance (...) because China’s new security concept does
stand against the ‘old thinking’ represented by military blocs.” In Chu’s view it also “reflects China’s
search for a (...) regional security arrangement for the Asia-Pacific region for the future.” 8

 As a result, China endorsed multilateralism and focused on improving relations with neighbouring
countries. This development has been visible in China’s diplomatic efforts, for instance to improve ties
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries or to establish the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001.

 What has remained unchanged in China’s strategies is that its calculations are closely tied to the US
presence in the region and globally. The Chinese government’s view on the US gives us an idea of China’s
aspirations. Xi Jinping in particular has been promoting a “new type of great power relationship”, in
which he sees China and the US in a “G2 world”. Xi also proposed a “Chinese solution”, in October 2016,
to imply that China might have better solutions to regional or global problems than the US, or indeed
any other country. The BRI and the establishment of the AIIB are already “solutions” China offers to
 improve global infrastructure and transportation. China’s ambition to be a global power must therefore
be seen in the context of its US policies.

 BRI is a grand strategy, coordinating and giving direction to a large array of national resources to
achieve a political objective, which Xi Jinping has defined as the “China Dream of the great rejuvenation
of the nation” (中华民族伟大复兴 zhonghua minzu weida fuxing): the achievement of China’s
unimpeded rise.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/26760128?
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The BRI is the cornerstone of President Xi Jinping’s for- eign policy. It is the vehicle through
which China intends to increase its connectivity with over 100 countries and international
organizations based partly on the historic Silk Road land and maritime routes. The ini- tiative
aims to build these linkages through investing in infrastructure, opening transport and
economic corridors, and connecting China to other countries “physically, financially,
digitally, and socially.”1 The BRI is wide- ranging both geographically and functionally.
Geographically, the BRI spans many countries across Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle
East, as well as parts of Latin America

The most common complaint is China’s use of debt and market traps to “reshape
international relations in its favor” by creating BRI partner country dependency.3 Due to
internal political and economic weaknesses, the debt of “more than half the nations listed
under BRI are rated ‘junk’ or not graded.”4 Because of limited options, many of these
countries are vulnerable to dependency and economic coercion. Unlike loans from
multilateral financial institutions that insist on accountability and reforms, Chinese loans
typically lack such strings but instead often require that projects be given to Chinese
companies and “at least 50% of material, equipment, technology, or services” be sourced
from China.5

The BRI is further explained as a response to “trade protectionism, unilateralism,

isolationism, and other virulent trends” that have damaged the global economy and multi-
lateral trading system, a thinly veiled effort to paint China as a positive alternative to the
United States.6 Likewise, Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th Party Congress argued for shared
community and international co- operation, particularly between China and its neighbors—
including through the BRI.7

This article argues that, in the context of South and Southeast Asia, the BRI represents
China’s strategic effort to gain predominance in the Asia- Pacific by advancing its influence
over countries in the region, overcoming its “Malacca Dilemma”(the vulnerability of sea-
lanes through the Malacca Strait), and gaining access to or establishing new ports with the
potential to serve both commercial and military purposes
The fact that China is no longer biding time is likely related to two factors. First, China’s
rapid economic growth of the past two decades is beginning to slow. The BRI is an
opportunity to reinvigorate growth, re- duce energy vulnerability, and increase global
presence and prestige while China remains positioned to self-fund many of the initial BRI
projects. Also, the BRI is a lifeline to inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOE).

Second, the BRI is a result of China’s dissatisfaction with the status quo—at least in its own
region—that can be linked to the Obama-era pivot to Asia announced by the United States in
2011. China’s military buildup, consolidation of what one author calls the “China model” of
control over political and economic decisions, and be- havior toward regional institutions all
indicate its dissatisfaction with the status quo. 16

Some scholars argue that China is using “energy mercantilism,” facili- tated by the BRI and
the encouragement of overseas energy sector invest- ments by Chinese companies, as a
means to neutralize the United States’ ability to use access to oil as a weapon of coercion.17
Securing multiple energy supply sources and routes, as well as improving the ability to pro-
tect sea-lanes and vessels, is important to China’s security.

China is building relationships both within the region and globally, including Africa, which
accounts for around 25 percent of all members of the United Nations General Assembly.
Ensuring favorable votes in the United Nations and other multilateral bodies is an element of
China’s long-term approach to protect its actions in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere.

Overcoming the Malacca Dilemma is a primary goal of the BRI in South and Southeast Asia.
The term “Malacca Dilemma” became widely used after Hu Jintao declared in 2003 that
“certain major powers” were intent on controlling the Malacca Strait, which would give them
the ability to cut off energy supplies to China.19 The solution to the Malacca Dilemma
described more than a decade ago included “reducing import dependence through energy
efficiencies and harnessing alternative sources of power, investment in the construction of
pipelines that bypass the Malacca Strait, and building credible naval forces capable of
securing China’s SLOCs [sea lines of communications].”20

Overseas strategic pivots” (海外战略支点) in places like Gwadar Sea Port are an important
means of addressing SLOC vulnerability.21 These pivots are described as “support facilities”
designed to expedite escort operations and reduce the risk of China’s SLOCs “being harassed
or blockaded by hostile naval forces.”22 The dual commercial and military purpose of these
strategic pivots correspond to the civil-military integra- tion described in China’s 2015
Military Strategy.23 Such ports can serve as important enablers for People’s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) vessels in terms of ship maintenance and oil replenishment, thereby allowing
China to increase its reach, presence, and prestige. From India’s perspective, these port
projects—particularly in Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—appear to confirm the “string of
pearls” theory, which argues that China endeavors to establish a string of facilities in the
Indian Ocean region that can sup- port the PLAN.24
China behaves according to what theorists of realism would expect of regional hegemons
when its neighbors do not acquiesce on issues such as its claims in the South China Sea.
China has used a divide-and-conquer approach to keep certain issues from appearing on
multilateral agendas.27 By its insistence to deal with countries on an individual basis, it is able
to use its overwhelming economic power in an effort to bring countries into compliance.

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take on its responsibilities as the largest developing country so as to push for a partial reform of global
governance and international cooperation. This reform would not be aimed at weakening the US, but simply at
empowering developing countries

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improve relations between China and its neighbours, strengthening economic ties and deepening security
5
cooperation.

Xi clearly sees China’s considerable economic resources as a key tool in his efforts to maintain regional stability
and assert China’s leadership in the country’s neighbourhood.

Beijing expects OBOR to play an important role in facilitating the export of higher-end Chinese manufactured
goods. Chinese policymakers believe emerging markets targeted under OBOR will be more willing to accept
higher-end Chinese industrial goods than developed countries in North America and Europe. China is not just
trying to export higher-end goods through OBOR but to encourage the acceptance of Chinese standards. The
Chinese Government’s focus on exporting its technological standards must be understood in terms of its broader
ambition to become an innovation- based economy and a leader in research and development.

Under OBOR, Chinese companies and especially higher-end industrial goods manufacturers will be encouraged
and expected to operate in more demanding markets and more stringent regulatory environments. The expansion
of a China- centred production chain will also force Chinese manufacturers to move higher up in the value
chain. These efforts will be supported by Chinese financiers, who often urge loan recipients to accept Chinese-
made goods as a condition of extending credit.

During the global financial crisis, the Chinese Government delivered one of the largest stimulus packages in
recent economic history. It saved China (and arguably a host of other countries, including Australia) from
recession by sending commodity prices sky-high. Though the stimulus program was effective, one of its lasting
side effects was the creation of massive excess capacity in many industrial sectors from steel to cement.

Many state-owned firms in sectors with excess capacity borrowed heavily during the financial crisis. The
slowing economy, sluggish international demands, and the supply glut have reduced their profits

Moving factories with excess capacity to OBOR countries helps China reduce the supply glut at home while
helping less developed countries to build up their industrial bases. In essence, domestic economic liabilities
become foreign economic and diplomatic assets

• Constructivism

• Helps understand regional relationships to situate BRI

• Blend of Neo-realism and liberal perspective

• Dont look at Global dynamics of great power in terms of polarity —-> look at mediating
thru regional security complexes —> politics articulates itself through regions

• Security is not just about economy but it can be about land, water, sea —> it is a blend of
politics, military, economy, social and environmental power, security is multi-dimensional
—> all of these things can become a security issue

• What we’re talking about how power articulates in a region as opposed to simply a country
; if you want to understand a region (how china affects thru BRI) you have to look at the
region

Security of each actor in a region interacts with the security of other actors

• Chinese get short term/immediate gains ; they have overproduction in basic industrial
products like cement/steel —-> there is now an opportunity to export

• BRI becomes a vehicle by which they’re able to export capital and industrial production
thru infrastructure projects BRI is laying down (whether its CPEC all the way to Gwadar)

• On another level it is a response to 2008 GFC —> development of poorest regions by

developing neighbours to have new markets —-< developed markets are saturated and new
markets need to be accessed

• This is also kind of a neighbourhood policy for China ; if they are going to underdevelop
parts of China, they must develop neighbours such as Urumqi which is the gateway to
Europe —-> if they want to ship goods from china to Europe —> but urumqi requires
markets in turkestan, Kazakistan and Pakistan if it is to develop —-> so Chinas internal
development is linked to external development

• President Xi has integrated this in 2013 as part of china’s 13th five year plan —_> it is
about development strategy to increase connectivity and cooperation with neighbouring
countries —-> they have created the BRICS bank and BRI fund to facilitate this —->

• The cash they have accumulated they will invest in infrastructural projects rather than in
US treasury for which they get peanuts —> also to increase connectivity —-> Africa,
Europe ; have a direct link to the European market ; they will become less dependant on
the united states

• They want to create alternative markets and be less dependant on US

• This creates new markets, new financial investments, they want to diversify from investing
in US treasury

• Look at slides for the six passages its running rn

• In the medium term its about industrialising western and central china —-> development
will allow more Han migration and Uighyur uprising will reduce (three of the tours pass
thru Xinjiang)
• It has created china-europe freight rail —-> now its beginning divert sea traffic from Korea
and Japan

• China has also made energy investments in Central Asia, Oil in kazakhistan, Uranium in
Uzbekistan

• There are strategic implications for BRI —-> it is a major foreign policy objective, gwadar
provided access to Persian gulf which is major oil area —-> if this is successful they can
show other countries which dont have much connectivity with China

• China has a long-term plan to change from a low-tech economy to a more sophisticated
high-end economy which is more focused on green-technology, AI —> SO BRI is about
giving old industries oppurtunity/time for transition

• In the medium term —-> attempt to industrialise Western and Central China —-> once
development takes place there will be an influx of Han Chinese in Xinjing ( which is imp
because 3 corridors pass thru Xinjiang) —->

• In the long term BRI lays the foundation of a new global order ——> it will be formed
around the architects of the silk route, it will be a series of ports/manufacturing/shipping
—-> china will already have invested in this —-> which will allow it create a new type of
global connection —-> these are economic hubs/processing zones which allow china to
export labour-intensive products allowing it to go up into more sophisticated technology
——-> Shenzen experiment—>

• There are strategic implications in Central Asia —-> it is a key major foreign policy
objective —-> Gwadar will allow access to the Persian Gulf where 60% of its oil comes
from

• All of these investments dont stand alone, have an impact on the Chinese economy —> if
this becomes a major economic development, then this will begin to challenge America’s
dominance —-> wants a shift to a new model where state owned companies play a more
central role as an economic power —-> can be seen as why US is hostile, why they see it
as a challenge —-> every port can become a military port, potential is real and worries US

Nguyen Thi Thuy Hang

- China’s aims to become a regional and economic global power and to challenge US primacy
can be seen in its new initiatives namely the BRI, AIIB and BRICS
- BRI is built on China’s broad geographical links with countries in Eurasia and the great
potential for economic benefits that this can have aiming at advancing China’s economic
cooperation with Eurasian Countries.
- BRI can help to expand China’s economic connections with many Eurasian countries and
foster China’s economic influence in Eurasia  can promote China’s soft power in the
 Eurasian region  Can also be seen as an aim to devise Asian solutions for Asian problems
in order to reduce US influence within the region
- Will eventually help China’s rise to the status of a global superpower, will help it destablise
the global economic system that the United States has set up
- A mode to deter US pivot towards Asia through the New Silk Road Initiative (NSRI) In 2011
- Can also be seen as a mode to challenge US relations with developing countries ->

Baogang He

- Economic corridors of BRI connect China with developing and developed economies in a
way that positions China at the world’s economic centre-of-gravity
- BRI an initiative to perform infrastructure exporting function to open new markets and help
china build globally competitive industries  opening up of new markets will help reduce
dependence on the US as right now their relationship stands at economic interdependence and
so US has some leverage over China  in the long term when this economic project becomes
successful China will already have investments in it which will only lead to its rise as a global
power with increased political influence
- BRI focuses on facilitating flows of capitals to accelerate development of China’s frontier
regions to increase Han influx
- China is aiming to create a BRI partner country dependency, as many of the developing
countries in the region are financially weak this increases BRI’s implications of economic and
then political dependence on China Building such relations regionally and globally will
also ensure favourable votes in UN and other multilateral bodies (Terry Mobley)

Raffaello Pantucci

- With BRI china is displacing regional hegemon power as it becomes a central player in
Central Asia, starting to displace the local historical hegemon  through a rewiring of the
region’s infrastructure and gradual growing influence of China within the region 
- By helping countries develop and grow China will be able to produce a positive foreign
policy vision for the world, increasing China’s power within the international stage  as
a state that supports prosperity and promotes opportunity around the world

Michael Clarke

- Security aspects
- Intensify connectivity between Xinjiang and Central Asia/South Asia. Heilongjiang and
Inner Mongolia will become gateways to Mongolia and Russian Far East  development
of a transportation corridor reducing Beijing’s dependency on current sea routes
- The project also entails pipelines for energy resources across the region, this will reduce
its dependence on seaborne routes that may be vulnerable to US navy
- Can also be seen as China advocating a new security concept to undermine US military
presence in Asia (Japan)- regional security arrangement for the Asia Pacific region
(Angela Stanzel)
- It will establish ports with the potential to serve both commericial and military purposes
(Terry Mobley)

June Teufel Dreyer

 - Forming relations with the Region can be seen as China trying to unite the second and third
worlds to form a united front against the superpowers  with China as a leader of this
coalition against hegemony

Q. What are the critical issues in China’s foreign policy?

Taiwan

Crisis in the Taiwan Strait Reading

- Taiwan’s shift to democracy is seen as a challenge to CCP’s authority and legitimacy, as long
as this remains the CCP will continue to see it as a challenge because democracy is not in line
with Chinese values
- Taiwan’s militarisation and acquirement of weapons from the US through the Taiwan
Relations Act is seen as a Chinese belief that independence advocates will only be
emboldened in Taiwan
- China also sees Taiwan issue as a domestic policy issue and US involvement with Taiwan is
not liked by China, also with the DDP coming to power democratic values with US have only
aligned -> China sees US as a barrier to unification
- US just using Taiwan as a tool to use against China and to maintain status quo in Asia Pacific
- Xi seems adamant about protecting blood brothers and sisters from foreign powers
- China does not want to accept Taiwanese independence as that will lead to the Chinese
communist revolution remaining incomplete -> Stanton Jue
- Revitalising the Chinese nation is still on china’s agenda  thus can be seen as inkling
towards reunification  China’s Dream under Xi will be complement (Lowell Ditmer)
- With Taiwan’s
- Hungdah Chiu states that despite claims of peaceful development and status quo arrangement,
china has kept Taiwan isolated from intl forum while Taiwan is seeking to seek intl
recognition and more involvement especially with economic developments  also states that
being a democratic regime Taiwan cannot accept One China principle, people’s opinions
matter  Taiwan also doesn’t’ want a façade of regional autonomy given to regions like
Tibet for e.g, require greater political freedom but under CCP rule that’s quite unlikely

US-CHINA RELATIONS  can there be strategic engagement with the US?

Can there be strategic engagement with the US?

US-China relations are a very critical part of Chinese foreign relations. Different frameworks
are put forth for these relations, considering China’s rise in the international sphere and its
implications of challenging the current US hegemony.

The liberalist framework

• Believe in pacifying power of economic interdependence and international institutions

• Bilateral economic exchanges keep intact good relations, the greater the level of economic
interdependence the more both side are willing to avoid conflict as both have smth to lose

• Economic exchange b/w the 2 has grown since China’s market reforms since 1970s

• China is 2nd largest trading partner of US, largest foreign currency reserves in US dollars
• Moreover liberalists also believe in international institutions power as an instrument of
peace —> can help in improving communication and reduce uncertainty about intentions

• China became part of WTO in 2001, UN —> bringing US china in thickening web of ties

The realist framework

• As a state’s capabilities grow its leads shift more towards strengthening their interests and
seek greater influence ( which china clearly has been trying to do by expanding militarily
in the South China Sea, and spending more on arms, as well as agreements like ASEAN to
ensure that Asia stands for itself to reduce US influence

• Framework also states that recognising growing threat to its position a dominant power
may attempt to use force to destroy a rising state —> US continues to ships weapons to
Taiwan, US maintains a security circle against China along Asian pacific rim, free trade
has led US to become protective of its own economic interests, trade wars)

• Mutual suspicion can lead to a conflict

• The concept of Thucydide’s trap similarly states that when a rising power threatens to
displace a ruling power, violent clash can occur

• Constructive optimists

• state that with china’s increasing participation in intl institutions, repeated interactions can
actually change the underlying beliefs, interests of those who participate

• Constructivist pessimists on the other hand state that interaction can actually reinforce old
values, US criticism of chinese disrespect towards human rights can be seen as US trying
to undermine current chinese regime

But strategic engagement keeping in mind liberalists and constructive optimists —>
economic interdependence, preventive intervention, MAD, domestic needs guiding foreign
policy

Relations with the region

Constructivism  China has begun to look at power through mediating relations in the
region, believes that politics articulates itself through regions

Tony Saich -> China has begun to develop a regional policy and think more about regional
institutions like APEC and ARF

BRI, ASEAN being used to build good relations within Asia, and to reduce US influence in
the region - security, trade all involved --- rise to great power  restoaration of
diplomatic ties with Singapore and Indonesia (Tony Saich)

Begun to see “Greater China” through cultural economic sphere that would include nations in
the region  ASEAN and BRI
Nationalism -- relations with Vietnam and Korea (nuclear proliferation)  some
difficulties and territorial conflicts remain  see’s economies of Vietnam, Indonesia and
Thailand not as complementary to its own economy but rather as a competiton 

Tensions with Japan over the fact that China has received no proper apology for Japanese
invasion in 1973 -> and US-Japan renewal of security guidelines concern Beijing cause it
believes it might be playing a role in US trying to contain China, presence of US troops ->
but economic relations and compatibility seen as a positive

China is concerned about the relationship between North & south Korea as US claims it
would require missile deployment  warm relations important for peace in the region -> also
North Korea’s nuclear proliferation is a threat to china itself

Q. Broad shifts in China’s foreign policy since the 1980’s and

where have there been constants?
SHIFTS

June Teufel Dreyer

- Sino-Soviet relations

- By late 1979 relations between Soviet Union and PRC were uneasy because of Soviet support
to Vietnam as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan  Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 had
been abrogated as PRC said the treaty put china in an inferior position which was humiliating
 - But by late 1981 PRC was becoming increasingly unhappy with US’s stance on Taiwan  as
US was not showing any good responses about ending transfer of military technology to
Taiwan  Taiwan was China’s domestic realm

So PRC came to the decision that as its relations with USSR were better than US-Soviet
relations, improving relations with USSR could be used as a leverage against US and (to also
get economic benefits from US for modernisation to threaten US into good relations) ->
SHENG LIJUN

- As a consequence of this strategy Sino-Soviet relations began to improve and trade which had
ceased since 1960 began to pick up again

- Relations with the region

- In the beginning of the 1980s China still saw itself as a developing and oppressed
country, so its aims of expanding its influence abroad were limited (which has now
clearly changed)  Mitsuru Kitano

- 1990 But it can be seen that in the wake of Tiananmen square and the implications it
had on China – esp US that wasn’t happy about human rights implementation ->
China began to switch from a one-nation strategy to expanding influence in the region
in order to ensure China’s survival by entering the international community in face on
the international isolation it was facing, and also because socialist regimes were
falling in Europe  attempting to avoid US led containment and securing a base of
support (Mitsuru Kitano)

- Mitsuru Kitano, can also be seen as the initation of China of a new global order

June Teufel Dreyer

- Settlements with Britain to return Hong Kong in 1997

- Settlements with Portugal to return Macao in 1999
- This process of negotiations was helped by the less militant rhetoric coming from Beijing, and
also by PRC’s willingness to grant quasi-autonomous status to the areas in light of their
unique historical and development - self-government but with Beijing overlooking
foreign/defense functions (similar mechanism suggested to Taiwan to get it back but not
accepted)

- Indonesia which had suspended relations with China after alleging PRC involvement in a
1965 coup attempt there re-established ties with mainland  main reasons for re-
establishment can be seen as losing out on a good opportunity making ties with a rising
economy (Michael Yahuda)
- Singapore and Brunei following the lead of Indonesia did the same
 - This meant that PRC was now expanding within the region, and had established formal
diplomatic relations with each of the members of ASEAN
- In the past much of China’s foreign policy had been guided by the relationship between
superpowers essentially US and USSR and by ideological factors  but in the near past
China has begun to develop a regional policy  motivated by the ideas of a ‘Great China’
(Tony Saich)
- Theory of constructivism can be applied here
- BRI, ASEAN being used to build good relations within Asia, and to reduce US influence in
the region, and to reduce its own dependence on US - security, trade all involved --- rise
to great power  restoaration of diplomatic ties with Singapore and Indonesia (Tony Saich)
-
- Involvement in International institutions

- China had joined GATT and WTO by 2001  desire to continue receiving loans from foreign
countries that were suspended after Tiananmen square were re-instated

- China has definitely become more involved in international legal systems, e.g GATT and
WTO (1986 re-admission)--  this may have been because of perception of China’s colonial
past and a resulting weakness in foreign relations, sees its current strengths to be employed to
benefit from opportunities that allow for correction and re-dress (Pitman B. Potter)  has
also signed international covenants in regards to human rights, esp to correct mistakes of
Tiananmen square  attempt to increase international influence

- Relations with US

- US-China relations cannot be seen in a linear line due to the various evolving aspects,
although China has remained in contact with the US since the 1980s the relationship has
constantly shifted  With china’s rise there is ease and tension both involved

• Liberalist framework ; Believe in pacifying power of economic interdependence and

international institutions. Bilateral economic exchanges keep intact good relations both
side are willing to avoid conflict as both have smth to lose. Economic exchange b/w the 2
has grown since China’s market reforms since 1970s, China also joined WTO/UN so
increasing ties, joint fight against terrorism post 9/11

• The realist framework puts into perspective China’s increasing assertiveness, especially
post-Deng as relations within the region are expanding, aim to undermine US world order
with BRI esp, militarization, and US trying to maintain its own dominance by selling
weapons to Taiwan, trade wars, US maintains a security circle around Asian Pacific)

• At this point no claims can be made regarding whether China will rise as a status quo
power or a revisionist power -> conengagment is necessary as both def have common
interests like terrorism, nuclear proliferation etc (T.Y. Wang)

Mitsuru Kitano

• Due to the events of the Tiananmen square and the worldwide dismay with China Deng
grasped foreign policy with the aim to bide time and hide capabilities  while Xi’s take on
foreign policy can be seen as more assertive
• Chinese foreign policy is guided by constant reconciliation, competition and conflict
between multiple policy trends  so more shifts

• In the beginning of the 1980s China still saw itself as a developing and oppressed country,
so its aims of expanding its influence abroad were limited (which has now clearly changed)

Nationalism

Suisheng Zhao
- pragmatism lies between the two, asserting China's national interests by both reacting to and
absorbing from the outside world which it has followed singe post-Mao  it’s nationalism is
not focused outward rather more inwards which can be seen through its take on Taiwan or
Hong Kong both which are essentially domestic realms for China
- During Mao aggressive nationalism was followed both inward and outward due to his
stringent faith on communist ideology and to keep away from the capitalist west
- CONSTANT
- The only constant is that since 1949 China has been unable to reunify with Taiwan
- From Deng, to Hu Jintao and now to Xi China seems to continue to try to reunify with
Taiwan in order to complete the communist revolution  China not comfortable with
Taiwan being pro-independence because it sees Taiwan as a part of the mainland (Lowell
Ditmer)
- Hungdah Chiu portrays how China’s aims to reunify with Taiwan as despite claims of
peaceful development and status quo arrangement China has constantly tried to keep it
isolated from the Intl stage